Download Effect Studies in Unobtrusive Advertising: From Recall to SOA

Effect Studies in Unobtrusive Advertising: From Recall to SOA
A New Experimental Paradigm Applied to Product Placement in Television
This thesis examines product placements on television as an upcoming and increasingly important
form of persuasive communication. Drawing its inspiration from previous research in the area as well
as from work undertaken in related fields, notably social psychology, the thesis outlines a new
research method for investigating product placements along an effectiveness dimension. Different
from earlier research in persuasive communication, which has mainly studied effectiveness in terms
of explicit recall and recognition, the present work focuses on attitudes and attitude accessibility as
mediating variables between media exposure and resulting behavior. The study departs from the
traditionally dominant qualitative paradigm within Scandinavian media studies and operationalizes
its hypotheses in a controlled laboratory experiment. This methodological change is brought about
by a critique of previous research. Specifically, it is suggested that the reason why previous studies
have been reluctant (and unable) to demonstrate any effect of product placements on valenced
persuasion measures may be that researchers have been blind to the less conspicuous nature of the
technique. Instead, inspired by recent findings in social psychology, it is hypothesized that product
placements may favorably persuade viewers less consciously by changing the strength of productattitude associations. Instead of changing viewers’ verbalizable affinity toward a placed product, so
the argument goes, placements may increase the accessibility of product-related attitudes at a
latter stage, when a decision becomes necessary. On a more specific level, it is hypothesized that
viewers’ identification with product-related characters is a crucial antecedent of this effect, in that
product placements encountered under conditions of high identification will strengthen viewers’
positive associations, make these associations more accessible, and thus facilitate attitudecongruent behavior.
To test these hypotheses, a three-conditions between-participants experiment is run, in
which viewers’ level of identification with fictional characters is manipulated. Using the unobtrusive
Implicit Association Test (IAT) – a method originally developed for stereotyping research – evidence
is found supporting the hypotheses. Based on a pretest of viewer identification with different
television shows containing product placements, two shows are chosen as experimental stimuli. Of
the two, the show generating the highest level of identification also leads to significantly more
positive product-related associations in experimental subjects.
In terms of methodology, the experiment indicates that testing placements with unobtrusive
measures may be a better way to investigate persuasive effects of product placements and that selfreported attitude measures, while having their benefits, may not be as sensitive to the subtler form
of influence placements exert. That is, by applying the IAT and focusing on placement-induced
strength of association (SOA), we hope to have outlined a measure that better conveys the
likelihood that attitudes will activate to guide behavior.
Contents
1. Introduction
6
Traditional Advertising Research: The Memory Paradigm
8
Challenges to the Memory Paradigm
9
Toward a New Research Paradigm
15
Context: Consumer Research
16
Perspective: Dual-Process Models
18
Elaboration-Likelihood Model
19
Heuristic-Systematic Model
21
MODE
22
2. Product Placement
25
Previous Definitions
25
Practical Aspects
27
Product Placement as Communication
30
Product Placement as Marketing Communication
32
Analyzing Product Placement
34
Theories of How Product Placement Works
Persuasion
37
39
Mood
40
Persuasion Knowledge Model
40
Classical Conditioning
43
The Modeling Paradigm
45
Academic Studies of Product Placement
3. How Attitudes Guide Behavior: An Automatic Process
49
51
Defining Attitudes
52
Attitude Strength
53
Attitudes to behavior
54
Automatic Attitude Activation
56
Attitudes to Consumer Behavior
57
Attitudes to Behavior in a Product Placement Context
58
Interlude: Attitudes to Behavior, Strength of Association…
60
4. The Viewing Experience: Identification and Transportation
62
Fiction versus Reality – Entertainment versus Persuasion
62
Identification
66
Para-social Interaction
70
Transportation
72
Summary: Implications for Product Placement Research
5. Strength of Association: Definition and Measurement
74
75
Strength of Association (SOA)
75
Unobtrusive Measures of SOA
77
Evaluative Semantic Priming
78
Implicit Association Test (IAT)
79
Interlude: Discussion of Experimental Research
81
6. Experiment: Changing SOA with Product Placements
83
Method
84
Participants
85
Pretest
86
Stimulus Materials
88
Procedure
89
Dependent Measure
90
Data Analysis
93
Results
95
Discussion
7. General Discussion
105
109
Methodological Implications
110
Practical Implications
112
Conclusion
114
References
115
Appendix
134
Appendix 1: Pretest Questionnaire
135
Appendix 2: Pretest Scores (Mean values)
138
Appendix 3: Treatment Protocol (Identification condition)
139
Appendix 4: IAT Script
141
Appendix 5: IAT Booklet
143
Appendix 6: Self-reported attitude questionnaire
154
Appendix 7: Data-matrix
156
Appendix 8: Stimulus Materials
158
I. Introduction
All it takes to save the country from nuclear attack is one man, his Ford Expedition ®, a
Macintosh® laptop, and a Nokia® cell phone. Saving a much smaller country from organized
crime requires more people, a fleet of Nissan® vehicles, and state of the art Sony Ericsson®
PDAs. If you can settle for less drama, and just want a happy marriage and the best friends
in world, it is recommendable to buy furniture at Pottery Barn®, use Snuggle® for your
laundry, and drink imported Carlsberg® beer.
These well-integrated brand-references, drawn from the series 24 (Fox), Unit One
(DR), and Friends (NBC), are prime examples of the recent proliferation of product
placements in television programming. Whereas earlier product placements were almost
exclusively a movie phenomenon, the last decade has seen a surge in brand-appearances in
other media such as television drama, situation comedy, and reality shows. The present
thesis springs from an interest in this upcoming and increasingly important form of
persuasive communication – an interest in what has been called “the blurring of the lines
between entertainment and persuasion” (Shrum, 2004a: xv) - and from a discontent with
previous studies of its effectiveness.
Although various studies have shown product placements to have an impact on
viewers’ awareness, recognition, and recall, researchers have been reluctant (and unable)
to demonstrate any effect on valenced persuasion measures such as attitudes and purchase
intent. Specifically, this thesis draws attention to the less conspicuous nature of placements
as a possible explanation of the lack of demonstrated effects. As product placements are
meant to be less obvious and rarely state any persuasive messages explicitly, we suggest
that viewers may simply be unaware of, and thus unable to verbalize, changes in their
affinity toward a product or brand. Hence, the goal of this study is to develop and apply a
reliable methodology for investigating product placements along a persuasiveness
dimension.
In order to achieve its goal, the study explores possible interactions between media
studies and social psychology. On an epistemological level, we work from the conviction
that the best way to learn about the world around us is by engaging it. More specifically,
the study aims to trace the mental processes that are initiated through exposure to media
products (television programming containing product placements). First, we establish a
conceptual and methodological framework of the technique, then we outline possible
avenues by which it can be investigated, and finally we apply the ideas in an experimental
study.
The first section introduces some of the basic concepts and theories on which the
subsequent experimental study of the effects of product placements in television rests.
First, the study is placed within the context of ongoing developments in media effects
research and social psychology. Second, the academic discipline of experimental consumer
research is introduced and related to more widely known areas of reception studies. Finally,
the dual-process conception of information processing is established and discussed.
The second section presents theories of product placement and reviews previously
published research. The technique of product placement is situated within frameworks of
communication theory and marketing, and the concept of effectiveness is discussed.
Consistent with the first section, effectiveness is mainly investigated in terms of persuasion.
The third section establishes attitudes as a mediating variable between exposure to
product placements and subsequent behavior. Specifically the attitude-behavior
relationship is explored and operationalized to make it applicable in experimental research.
Moreover, the very possibility of assessing effectiveness through an experimental approach
is discussed.
In the fourth section, we explore potential determinants of product placements’
effectiveness. In doing so, we focus on characteristics of the television programs, in which
the product placements are embedded, especially their potential to generate viewer
identification and ‘transportation’ into the fictional narrative.
At that point, the thesis turns to the actual empirical investigation of the theories
developed in the first four sections. Drawing upon research in related fields of study –
notably traditional advertising and social psychology – we propose an experimental method
by which the hypothesized relationship between exposure to product placements embedded
in programs with varying characteristics, attitudes, and subsequent behavior can be
investigated. This method is applied in an experimental study (N=48) comparing the effects
of product placements in two different television shows on viewers’ attitudes (and the
accessibility of these attitudes) to those of a control group.
Finally, comparing the empirical findings with the established framework,
implications, limitations, and directions for future research are discussed.
Traditional Advertising Research: The Memory Paradigm
Traditionally, research in media effects1 has dealt with three key variables, namely
recall/recognition, attitudes, and behavior. Of the three, advertising research within
several theoretical and empirical frameworks has especially focused on the former. For
example, recall and recognition have been subject to a substantial amount of studies
inspired by the influential dual-process theories of social cognition such as the Elaboration
Likelihood Model (ELM: Petty & Cacioppo, 1986) and Heuristic-Systematic Model (HSM:
Chaiken, 1980) as well as by behavioral decision theory (e.g. see MacInnis & Jaworski, 1989;
Greenwald & Leavitt, 1984). Across the various models and theories, it has been a
widespread assumption that, in order to be effective, persuasive messages must generate
awareness among receivers (e.g. see Bargh, 2002; Hawkins & Hoch, 1992; Law & BraunLaTour, 2004). In various languages, this conception is reflected right down to the
etymological level. For instance, the English word “advertising” derives from Latin
“advertere” (to direct attention to) and the Danish equivalent “reklame” from “reclamare”
(to shout). Especially the information-processing paradigm of behavioral decision theory
rests on the assumption that information encountered when only scarcely attentive has
little effect. As stated by Greenwald and Leavitt (1984: 588): “without elaboration, a
message’s propositional content is unintegrated with existing knowledge and thus is difficult
to access”. In other words, much previous research works from the theory that social
judgments and thus purchase behavior is guided by conscious, intentional processes, and
that persuasion effects are linked to deliberative processing and active scrutiny of
information (e.g. see Heesacker & al. 1983: 663). This approach assigns great power to the
presented information and accordingly is sometimes labeled “the strong claim” (Cuperfain
& Clarke, 1985: 36).
Consistent with the assumption that people’s behavior is largely guided by careful
reflection, a number of influential models have been developed to assess the more precise
nature of deliberative processing. Most widely known is probably the Theory of Reasoned
Action (Fishbein & Ajzen, 1975; Ajzen & Fishbein, 1980). In the authors’ own words ”the
theory is based on the assumption that human beings are usually quite rational and make
systematic use of the information available to them” (Ajzen & Fishbein, 1980: 5).
1
As indicated by the remarks on epistemology, above, this thesis mainly addresses developments within the
field of experimental (quantitative) effect studies. For a discussion of the differences between this
experimental approach and more theoretically oriented (qualitative) reception studies, e.g., see Madsen
(2005).
Furthermore, still according to Ajzen and Fishbein (1980), “people consider the implications
of their actions before they decide to engage or not engage in a given behavior” (Ajzen &
Fishbein, 1980: 11).
Challenges to the Memory Paradigm
In spite of the strong theoretical consensus and a large body of empirical work, researchers
have had great difficulty demonstrating the nature and causality of the relationship
between rational processing and explicit memory on one hand and judgment and behavior
on the other (e.g. see Hastie & Park, 1986, for a review). To a certain extent, this can be
explained by the reluctance to investigate the mental conditions underlying changes in
expressed opinion. Another possible explanation, implicitly suggested by Taylor (1981; Fiske
& Taylor, 1984), is that contrary to the assumption held by some dual-process scholars,
people are generally “cognitive misers”, low in need for cognition (NFC; Cacioppo, Petty, &
Kao, 1984), who often lack the ambition and resources to think something through and
therefore rely on more “automatic processes” (Bargh, 1999: 363). On a general level,
research in social psychology indicates that contrary to what was earlier the general
consensus2, intentional control of cognitive processes does not always exist. According to
advocates of this new position, unintended processes are especially prevalent in tasks such
as impression formation and schema-based decision-making (Uleman & Bargh, 1989: xvi). In
a consumer research framework, what is suggested is that rather than intelligent, rational,
and problem-solving processes, consumers tend to engage in a less-extensive search for
information and a less comprehensive evaluation of choice alternatives (e.g. see
Zaichkowsky, 1985: 341). Hence, instead of striving for cognitive elaboration, recipients of
media stimuli are in fact guided by a “sufficiency principle” leading them to the least
possible expenditure of cognitive effort (Chen & Chaiken, 1999: 74). Beyond the theoretical
context this counter-assumption seems to be validated by actual developments in media
and advertising, by the steadily increasing “overload” of mass-mediated information (e.g.
see MacInnis, Moorman, & Jaworski, 1991: 32), and by the development in executional style
toward a new less straightforward media language (Mick, 1992: 411). In an advertising
context, examples of the latter development are seen in the increasing use of practices that
aim at less conscious effects, e.g. subliminal stimuli, mood appeals, celebrity endorsement,
2
Until the mid-1970s, unintended thought was studied within the framework of abnormal psychology (Uleman
& Bargh, 1989)
product placement etc. (Shrum, 2004a), a development that doesn’t seem compatible with
the hypothesized prevalence of controlled information processing. Moreover, the nature of
these unobtrusive practices, in which brand messages are rarely stated explicitly, is such
that viewers may be unaware of or refuse to admit changes in their affinity toward a
product or brand (Dovidio & Fazio, 1991: 207).
The actual development is supported by research showing that even incidental
(versus deliberative) exposure to mass media stimuli can have an effect on subsequent
judgments (see e.g. Janiszewski 1988, 1990, 1993). More specifically, the studies reported
by Janiszewski show that preferences can be formed without an accompanying awareness of
the preference formation process (Janiszewski, 1993: 376). Evidence that people have
positive affective responses toward stimuli they do not explicitly remember having seen
suggests that ads or placements receiving limited attention may nonetheless be effective
agents of attitude change (Anand, Holbrook & Stephens, 1988: 387).
To generalize across research findings, it seems that the traditionally dominant focus
on recall and recognition might lead to an inadequate assessment of real-world reception
processes. For example, measurement of explicit memory of an ad or other marketing
communication may misrepresent (typically, understate) the influence of that
communication (Holden & Vanheule, 1999: 479). This had led Shapiro and Krishnan to
suggest that an alternative retrieval process, implicit memory, may function differently
from the explicit process that has usually been the focus of scholarly interest (Shapiro and
Krishnan, 2001:1). This form of memory retrieval is automatic in nature and does not rely
on consumers deliberately searching their memory for previously viewed stimuli. In a similar
vein, research has shown that brand familiarity can develop without deliberate attention to
the ad, and without explicit recollection of the ad context (Shapiro, MacInnis, & Heckler,
1997: 102). According to Krishnan and Trappey (1999: 451) the most serious shortcoming of
traditional theory and research is the fact that although non-conscious (implicit) memoryprocesses may be acknowledged to play an important role in influencing consumption, this
area is still understudied in communication and consumer research. Krishnan and Trappey’s
claims receive support from research in related areas of social psychology 3 showing that
much of social judgment and behavior occurs without conscious awareness or intent (see
Bargh, 2002, for a review). Transferring these findings from social psychology to consumer
3
The relationship between social psychology and consumer research is addressed in detail below.
research and studying various advertising practices, Hawkins and Hoch found that for many
purchases, a deliberate decision process never occurs, because consumers are not
sufficiently motivated (Hawkins & Hoch, 1992: 212). Popularly speaking, many mundane
products are picked out with the left hand, while the right hand steers the shopping cart.
Despite this, most people seem to cling to the notion that their decisions are willful and for
the most part conscious. As pointed out by Meyrowitz:
“We tend to focus on what is consistent in our behaviors from situation to situation and are rarely
aware of the ways in which we change behavior as we change situations: e.g. when we choose
something to wear or say something, or take any kind of action within a situation, we focus more on
what we decide to do than on the limits the situation imposes on us.” (Meyrowitz, 1985: 26 – emphasis
in original)
Together, the research findings presented above touch upon a crucial distinction in social
psychology and consumer research, namely the one between memory-based and online
decision processes (Hastie & Park, 1986) 4. In the present thesis, the focus shall be on the
latter processes. Herein lies one of the major differences between the traditional approach
and the approach advocated here. As pointed out by d’Astous and Chartier (2000: 32),
previous research on advertising and product placement has major limitations: It has
focused principally on brand awareness and has neglected to look at consumer reactions
toward placements. From an academic as well as an administrative perspective, what seems
to be called for is research examining how well different media products meet the goals of
advertisers, e.g. whether different types of advertising actually lead to change in attitudes
and subsequent behavior. Hence, this study works from the firm belief that it is less
interesting for advertisers that, say, 80% of the audience remembers an ad or placement, if
nobody buys the advertised product or service. One antecedent of this change in focus is
the assumption that the persistence and effectiveness of persuasive communication are
sometimes based on elaboration of the provided (product) information but more often on
execution or perceptual cue influences (Krishnan & Smith, 1998: 274). This in turn leads us
to discard an array of otherwise elaborate theories such as the aforementioned theories of
“reasoned action” and “planned behavior” (Fishbein & Ajzen, 1975; Ajzen & Fishbein,
1980), in which the attributes associated with an attitude object are evaluated along
consciously perceived dimensions. The focus in the present thesis is on spontaneous (vs.
reasoned) behaviors, whereas “affect (or anything but salient beliefs and their evaluative
4
For an elaboration, see the section on dual-process models below
aspects) does not belong in the Fishbein model because Fishbein says it does not” (Herr,
1995: 372). Popularly speaking, Fishbein and Ajzen have outlined a theory that seems
adequate for the analysis of reasoned action but does not adequately address the possibility
and importance of unreasoned action. Although some work has already been done in the
area of non-conscious (automatic) processes, the scope needs to be widened considerably.
Whereas the main emphasis in previous studies of automatic processes has been upon
hedonic impulses and physiological need states (e.g. addiction) (Bargh, 2002: 280), we
propose to move beyond these areas of inquiry to adopt a research paradigm that
encompasses the non-conscious operation of any kind of goal or motivation a person can
have consciously, e.g. self-protective motivation, performance- or achievement-related
motivation, and interpersonal goals.
This leads us to consider some of the discrepancies between experimental settings
and real-world (media) consumption that has threatened the external validity (External
validity: Aronson, Brewer, & Carlsmith, 1985: 478) of previous research. While qualitative
researchers, and quantitative researchers inspired by models such as the ELM, work from
the assumption that people are generally motivated to engage in effortful processing,
evaluation of events and objects in real life are often made in an immediate, automatic (vs.
controlled) manner upon the mere presence of the attitude object (Fazio & al., 1986; Nord
& Paul, 1980)5. Another potential threat to the validity of previous research is presented by
the dominance of self-reported measures (e.g. see Cacioppo & al., 1992), a methodology
that assesses research-participants’ recall/recognition, attitudes, and behavioral intentions
simply by asking them to list their thoughts, complete pencil-and-paper questionnaires, or
by other self-administered tools. Whereas self-report seems a fairly adequate assessment of
the explicit recall/recognition variable6, the method tends to misrepresent participants’
deeper level attitudes. That is, when participants are aware of the goal of research, they
have the possibility to bias their responses in order to present (socially) desirable answers
(e.g. see Wagner & Sundar, 2003: 3; Lowery & al., 2001: 10). In the context of advertising
research, the self-report bias is manifest in what appears to be a widespread skepticism
toward the practice in general and thus in participants’ reluctance to admit being
influenced by persuasive communication (Kardes, 2002: 42). In this respect, persuasive
5
See Section 5 for a comparative discussion of validity
Albeit not an unproblematic one; various methods such as aided recall do present potential problems to the
external validity of research findings
6
communication has some important traits in common with seemingly more controversial
areas of social cognition, e.g. racial prejudice and stereotyping (Fazio & al., 1995) 7. Hence,
it seems problematic to equate research participants’ own assessment of communication
effects with actual effects (Friestad & Wright, 1994: 16). Moreover, instructions to list
thoughts on a given topic (as used in the cognitive response paradigm, see Uleman, 1999,
for a review) may well prompt thinking that would not have otherwise occurred. More
specifically related to the present research context, Fazio and his colleagues (1982) found
that merely having to state one’s attitudinal position in response to an attitude scale may
have the consequence of forcing an individual to consolidate his or her thoughts and form
an attitude (Fazio & al., 1982: 348). The threats to external validity mentioned here are
especially problematic to the study of less conscious media effects. Hence, in laboratory
settings, the stimuli attain an “artificial” level of distinctiveness that is hypothesized to
facilitate deliberative processing. As pointed out by Krugman as early as 1965, the
questionnaires and research procedures themselves may be responsible for creating what
high involvement is present, and which would not otherwise exist (Krugman, 1965: 356).
Toward a New Research Paradigm: Assessing Non-conscious Media Effects
Following the alleged shortcomings of traditional research in media (advertising) effects,
the need arises to outline an alternative theoretical and experimental approach. The actual
design of experimental research is addressed in the empirical part of this thesis 8. However,
to follow up on the observations made above, the requirements to such an approach are
briefly presented here.
On a general level, it is necessary to establish a framework that encompasses
recipients’ subjective use and interpretation of messages without in turn neglecting the
persuasive intention – a framework that does not necessarily see behavior as triggered
solely by features of the environment but rather as something that develops in the
interaction of those features with the properties of the individual (e.g. see Gollwitzer &
Moskowitz, 1996: 362). Furthermore, theory and research needs not only to distinguish
between the knowledge of having seen something before and memory of the context (e.g.
consumers who are not likely to be motivated to search for the specific exposure context,
7
For this reason (and others), the present study will draw extensively on inspiration from previous theory and
research in racial prejudice and stereotyping
8
Sections 5 and 6
may make a brand judgment based on the sense of familiarity alone (Holden & Vanheule,
1999: 480)), but to depart more radically from the assessment of memory per se. Only by
doing this, can researchers acknowledge the claim made by Cacioppo and Petty that
“comprehension, associations, elaborations, and inferences are more important than
verbatim memory for the arguments” (Cacioppo & Petty, 1989: 10), and the observation
made even earlier by Petty & al. that “a growing body of research indicates that simple
recall or recognition of information presented about an attitude object is not predictive of
attitude formation and change” (Petty, Cacioppo, & Schumann, 1983: 143).
Addressing the potential problems of self-report bias, experimental research must
strive to circumvent participants’ tendency to give socially desirable answers. In our view,
what is called for are unobtrusive measures, i.e., methods that assess relevant variables
without subjects being explicitly aware of this assessment, or, more radically, without
subjects being explicitly aware of these variables per se9. Ideally, as noted by Bargh, the
dependent measure should be taken when the participants believe they are entirely outside
the experimental situation (Bargh, 2002: 281).
In a wider perspective, the realm of consumer research seems to be an ideal playing
field on which to establish whether automatic evaluation and goal pursuit do in fact apply in
real life. Consumers’ processing of media stimuli is a type of situation that involves the
potential of being involved and motivated, and where outcomes of decisions can affect
important issues such as health, happiness, economics etc. (Bargh, 2002: 282). Thus, if
consumers were found only to be scarcely involved and still somehow affected by media
stimuli in their decisions, the finding would have implications within as well as beyond the
study of purchase behavior10.
Context: Consumer Research
As mentioned above, this thesis addresses developments in the field of consumer research.
Since this area of research is not widely known in a Danish academic context, it seems
relevant to devote space to some introductory remarks. As indicated by the previous work
that has been referenced thus far, consumer research is predominantly an American
9
See section 5 (Strength of Association: Definition and Measurement) for a more elaborate discussion of the
construction of these measures
10
Examples of implications that go beyond mere consumer research could be found in the areas of social
decision making, formation of attitudes through interpersonal interaction, stereotyping etc.
tradition. The tradition embraces a variety of topics, but the origins are normally located
within the field of social psychology; in fact, some scholars view consumer research as a
relatively autonomous sub-category of social psychology. The link between host and subcategory is that both areas of research are concerned with processes guiding behavior,
judgments, and decisions (Kardes, 1998). However, consumer research differs from social
psychology pure by studying non-social stimuli such as goods, services, events, and ads. In
spite of this difference in scope, an interesting transfer of theory from social psychology to
consumer research is undoubtedly at work (e.g. see Petty, Cacioppo, & Schumann, 1983).
Hence, much past research in the two fields seems to indicate that similar processes are
active when people evaluate and judge other people, situations, and products.
Besides psychology, consumer research also encompasses a variety of other theories
and methodologies such as anthropology, philosophy, and the humanities (Holbrook, 1987:
129-30). This does not mean, however, that the discipline is all-inclusive. For example, one
must distinguish consumer research from its more administratively oriented counterpart,
marketing research, a tradition concerned primarily with the study of consumers in a
manner intended to be managerially relevant (Holbrook, 1987: 128).
One of the most important vantage points – some would say the raison d’être – of
consumer research is the assumption that people are limited in processing capacity and thus
only consider a strongly limited decision set. There is some debate concerning the size of
this decision set, but one of the most popular theories states that the average consumer is
able to consider seven items when making a decision (Miller, 1956). This obviously highlights
the importance of understanding selective processes; that is, the mechanisms that
determine which items become subject to further consideration and which items receive
only scarce processing. From this general level the research questions branch out. In the
present study, we especially focus on investigating how the different levels of processing
affect attitudes toward the products and subsequent product-related behavior. As indicated
above, research on this topic typically draws upon so-called dual-process theories11; that is,
theories that distinguish between processes that are memory-based versus online (Hastie &
Park, 1986), systematic versus heuristic (Chaiken, 1980; Chen & Chaiken, 1999), central
versus peripheral (Petty & Cacioppo, 1983), attribute-based versus attitude-based (Kardes,
2002) etc.
11
See immediately below for a review of dual-process theories
Drawing its inspiration from social psychology, consumer research marks a departure
from the semiotic trend in media reception studies that has been prevalent for decades
(e.g. see Grodal, 1994). Fundamentally, the claim that all perception is “linguistic” is
discarded; more specifically, the social psychology approach deals with the ways in which
stimuli (e.g. texts) are processed mentally and thus “co-created” by the recipient. As a
result, in order to achieve any understanding of different types of media genres and formats
one must develop an understanding of the mental processes activated by these genres and
formats. In the next section, we propose an investigation of these processes in the
framework of dual-process theory.
Perspective: Dual-Process Theories
One of the crucial notions in consumer research, and one of the constructs this thesis rests
upon, is that of dual-processes; i.e., the assumption that information can be processed
either deliberatively or more incidentally. The notion of dual-processes can be traced on
several levels of analysis. First, on the neuroscience level, research has shown how the
function of the inferior cortex differs from that of the limbic system, and how the
electrochemical activities of these two anatomical regions produce feelings, attitudes etc.
(Gilbert, 1999: 3). Second, on a more tangible level of psychology, it has been stated how
cognition differs from emotion, reason from intuition, automaticity from control,
consciousness from unconsciousness, and ego from id (Gilbert, 1999: 4). Drawing on these
insights, one important contribution of consumer research lies in the assumption that the
same stimulus can have qualitatively different consequences on cognitive and affective
reactions depending on whether it is perceived consciously or non-consciously (Merikle &
Daneman, 1998: 9).
Elaboration-Likelihood Model
Arguably the most influential dual-process theory is the Elaboration-Likelihood Model (ELM),
developed by Cacioppo & Petty (1979; Petty & Cacioppo, 1981; Petty, Cacioppo, &
Schumann, 1983; Petty & Cacioppo, 1986) 12. The basic idea of Petty and Cacioppo's theory is
that the efficacy of persuasion, in terms of endurance, depends on the likelihood that an
issue or argument will be elaborated upon (thought about) by the receiver (Petty &
12
The following introduction to the ELM is based on a review of all the referenced writings by Petty, Cacioppo,
and associates
Cacioppo, 1981). The authors distinguish between two routes to persuasion, the central and
peripheral route, respectively. The ELM accounts for the differences in persuasive impact
produced by arguments that contain ample information and cogent reasons (central route)
as compared to messages that rely on simplistic associations of negative and positive
attributes to an object, action or situation (peripheral route). According to Petty and
Cacioppo, some of the crucial antecedents of processing, and thus key variables in the study
of persuasive influence, are motivation, ability, and involvement. Involvement in a given
situation or issue determines the extent to which an individual is motivated for demanding
cognitive tasks. Hence, people who are highly involved tend to process incoming
information centrally, whereas people who are less involved will rely on the alternative
(peripheral) route of processing. This seminal distinction has major implications for the
study of consumer information processing. In conditions of high involvement, consumers
exposed to mass mediated message arguments have been found to generate support
arguments and counterarguments that, in turn, strongly influence their subsequent brand
attitudes (e.g. see MacInnis & Jaworski, 1989: 10). What is more, attitudes formed under
such conditions of high involvement, and thus induced via the central route, are postulated
to be relatively enduring and predictive of behavior (Petty, Cacioppo & Schumann, 1983:
135). As an issue or product increases in personal relevance or consequences, it becomes
more important and adaptive to forming a reasoned and veridical opinion (Petty, Cacioppo
& Schumann, 1983: 137). For example, consumers seriously considering to buy a new
computer, car, or house (all goods assumed to generate high involvement in average 13
consumers), are expected to process relevant product-related information in a more careful
fashion, than are consumers shopping for, say, bread or toothpaste. In the ELM, the latter
(mundane) purchase situations are generally associated with attitudes formed under
conditions of low involvement, and thus induced based on peripheral processing of
information. Unlike centrally formed attitudes, these are postulated to be relatively
temporary and unpredictive of behavior. Examples of message processing under lowinvolvement conditions include reliance on heuristics such as “experts are usually right”,
“long explanations are true”, and “beautiful spokespersons are credible” (see MacInnis &
Jaworski (1989) or Chaiken, Liberman, & Eagly (1989) for a review of different heuristics).
13
The term ”average” is used to avoid the fallacy of viewing information processing as a quality inherent in
attitude objects. For highly affluent consumers, the purchase of very expensive goods will not necessarily be
more consequential than the purchase of mundane products for average people.
From this line of reasoning, it follows that as motivation, ability for argument scrutiny or
both increase, peripheral mechanisms become less important determinants of attitude
judgment (Chen & Chaiken, 1999: 80)14.
However, as pointed out by Friestad and Wright, the ELM is somewhat vague
regarding the nature of peripheral cues (Friestad & Wright, 1994: 19). The theory does not
explain why particular peripheral cues will operate, or why these cues are supposedly
ignored when messages are processed centrally (see also Eagly & Chaiken, 1993).
Furthermore, although Petty, Cacioppo, and their various associates have “loosened up”
recently (e.g. see Cacioppo & al., 1992; Petty & Priester, 1994), they still seem to consider
the key elements of their theory (e.g. motivation and involvement) as dichotomous
constructs. That is, either people are motivated, or they are not. Either people are
involved, or they are not. As Giner-Sorolla (1999: 452) has pointed out, this way of thinking
seems overly rigid and an unnecessary constraint on the applicability of the model. A more
fruitful approach, it seems, would be to regard central and peripheral as poles on a
cognitive processing continuum15.
Heuristic-Systematic Model
Another influential dual-process model, developed in the same era and similar to the ELM in
many respects, is generally referred to as the Heuristic-Systematic Model (HSM). Although
the HSM (Chaiken, 1980) shares a number of fundamental assumptions with the ELM, it
nevertheless seems more apt at assessing real-world media reception and persuasive
processes. Notably, the HSM assigns greater significance and devotes greater attention to
situations in which people are not sufficiently motivated to engage in effortful processing
(e.g. see Chen & Chaiken, 1999, for a recent review). As the name implies, the HSM
substitutes the central-peripheral distinction of the ELM with the one between heuristic and
systematic. Unlike the ELM, however, the HSM regards heuristic and systematic processing
as the upper and lower extreme on a continuum of data seeking, analysis, and integration
(Chaiken, Liberman, & Eagly, 1989: 212). Similar to the “central route to persuasion” of the
ELM, the upper end, “systematic processing”, is characterized by comprehensive analysis,
14
See the section on Fazio’s MODE model (I.5.3) for a discussion of motivation and ability as antecedents of
attitude formation
15
More recent reviews of the ELM have devoted some attention to this revision. However, although Petty and
various associates mention the possibility of viewing central and peripheral as extremes on a continuum, the
notions are still applied in a dichotomous fashion (e.g. see Petty & Priester, 1994)
evaluation of message arguments and assessment of their validity (Chaiken, 1980: 752).
Heuristic processing, on the other hand, is based on activation and application of more
subjective judgmental rules (heuristics) on easily accessible information (often non-content
cues), and makes minimal cognitive demands. Chaiken and her associates (1989) define
heuristics as learned knowledge structures, used either self-consciously or non-selfconsciously by social perceivers (Chaiken, Liberman, & Eagly, 1989: 213). Differing
somewhat from the assumption of the ELM that people are generally motivated to scrutinize
incoming information, the HSM holds that situational features such as the presence of
heuristic-cue information, as well as its congruence with other available, judgment-relevant
information, may largely determine the nature of perceivers’ processing (Chen & Chaiken,
1999: 74). Whether information is processed systematically or heuristically is determined by
the presence (absence), conscious or unconscious, of a number of motivations; that is,
heuristic processing is not solely the result of insufficient relevant information. Among the
determining factors are the motivation to make accurate judgments, the motivation to
defend one’s views, and the so-called self-impression motivation (Chen & Chaiken, 1999:
78). In order to guide information processing a heuristic must be available and accessible
from memory.
Given the nature of the phenomenon under study here, e.g. the fact that product
placements rarely involve arguments as such, the heuristic-systematic model seems more
appropriate than the ELM. What is more, research within the heuristic-systematic paradigm
shows that distraction often enhances persuasion by interfering with recipients’ ability to
counter-argue (Osterhouse & Brock, 1970: 344). The latter finding, though not originally
directed at the practice, seems an apt description of the communicative situation in which
product placements are normally embedded.
MODE: Motivation and Opportunity as Determinants of Processing
Finally, before turning to the development of specific theories relevant to the study of
product placements in television, one last dual-process theory is presented. Similar to the
Elaboration-Likelihood Model and the Heuristic-Systematic Model, the MODE distinguishes
between spontaneous (theory-driven) and deliberative (data-driven) processing (Fazio,
1990a; Fazio & Towles-Schwen, 1999). The main asset of the MODE model compared to
previous dual-process models is that it integrates several of the key concepts of the present
thesis. An addition especially welcome to a study of unobtrusive persuasive communication
is the assumption that media recipients are generally low in involvement and motivation
(Fazio, 1990a: 78), and the attention devoted to examining how this influences the
attitude-behavior relationship. Furthermore, the MODE model is an important antecedent of
the theory of Strength of Association (SOA) – a theory that attains crucial significance in the
experimental part of this study.
The MODE model addresses a number of issues related to information processing,
notably how attitudes influence judgment and behavior (e.g. see Fazio & Olson, 2003;
Kardes, 1998, for a review). The MODE acronym refers to the general assumption that
motivation and opportunity are the crucial determinants of which processing mode is likely
to operate in any given situation. Given the effortful reflection required for deliberative
processing, some motivating force is necessary to induce individuals to engage in the
processing. The time and the resources to deliberate – what the model refers to as
opportunity – also must exist. In situations that are not characterized by any of the
motivating factors, or that are so characterized but do not permit the opportunity for
deliberation, any effect of attitude on behavior is hypothesized to operate only through the
spontaneous processing mode (Fazio, 1990a; Fazio & Olson, 2003).
The reason why MODE is considered highly relevant in the present context lies in the
view of motivation (e.g. involvement) as one of the determinants of information processing
and subsequent production of support and counterarguments. Above, it has been argued
that our theory of indirect effects is most interesting in a low-involvement context, and
that persuasive communication normally occurs in such contexts. Supporting this view and
drawing upon the insights of the MODE model, television in general and television fiction in
particular have also typically been regarded as a low-opportunity medium (Krugman, 1967:
585) due to the high pace of information and the relatively limited control over exposure
assigned to recipients16. Specifically, product placements rarely contain any arguments, and
thus are not very likely to generate supporting or opposing arguments in viewers (Batra &
Ray, 1986b: 234). Hence, contrary to the main assumption of the ELM, we assign much of
the effectiveness of product placements to the fact that they are most likely processed
peripherally. Embedded in fiction as they are, product placements are not likely to receive
the same degree of critical scrutiny as overtly persuasive communication and other types of
non-fictional communication (see Prentice & Gerrig (1999) for a discussion of fiction versus
16
Although television viewers have the power to turn the TV on and off and to change the channel at will, once
the exposure has been accepted, it cannot be controlled to the extent possible in print media
reality in information processing). In the explicit framework of Fazio’s model, belief in
fiction is determined not by a critical analysis of the strength of its arguments but instead
by the absence of motivation or opportunity to perform such analysis (Prentice & Gerrig,
1999: 530). When people are busy responding to an ongoing narrative, they do not have
available to them the cognitive resources to generate disbelief (Prentice & Gerrig, 1999:
530).
II. Product Placement
In order to identify and investigate the psychological processes that underlie the effects of
product placement, we must first establish a coherent conceptual model of the technique.
In this section this is done by reviewing past efforts at defining product placement and past
research on various aspects of its functioning. As already indicated, we mainly focus on the
potential of placements to influence viewers’ attitudes and behavior. In the following, we
elaborate on the idea that the subtlety of placements may well be the main reason why
researchers have had such difficulty showing any consistent resulting changes in viewers’
self-reported attitudes and behavioral intentions.
By addressing general psychological mechanisms, this study is not tied to actual
developments in a specific country or media market. For a number of reasons, however,
references to regulations and consumption focus on the U.S. First, this thesis reports on
research that was carried out in the U.S.17 Second, the vast majority of previous studies and
thus the basis of the subsequent review were conducted in the U.S. Finally, the past
decades have shown that media developments originally occurring in the U.S. tend to
proliferate to other markets over time. Hence, it seems reasonable to assume that many of
the trends mentioned here will eventually manifest themselves in Europe as well.
Previous Definitions
Perhaps part of the reason for the problems listed immediately above is that although
product placement is nothing new, adequate definitions of this technique of “deliberate
insertion of branded products into entertainment programs” (Law & Braun-LaTour, 2004:
63) are still in development. That is, since the emergence of academic studies addressing
the phenomenon, product placement (sometimes referred to as “brand placement” 18) has
been defined in a number of different ways. In one of the first attempts to study the
practice comprehensively Balasubramanian viewed product placement as “[a] paid product
message aimed at influencing movie (or television) audiences via the planned and
unobtrusive entry of a branded product into a movie (or television program)”
17
The experimental research reported below was conducted at the University of Texas at Austin in October,
2004.
18
Advocates of the term “brand placement” (e.g. Karrh, 1998) usually argue that the goal of the practice is
promoting a brand rather than a product type (e.g. Ray Ban rather than sunglasses). However, we argue that
the visible part of the practice involves placing actual products.
(Balasubramanian, 1994: 31). By including the “unobtrusive” and “paid” dimensions19,
Balasubramanian addressed two crucial points, which seemingly eluded Gupta and Gould in
their simplistic definition of product placement as “the practice of placing brand name
products in movies as props” (Gupta & Gould, 1997: 40). Something similar applies to
Steortz (1987), although her definition is more specific in terms of the “product message”.
Hence, Steortz defined the practice as “the inclusion of a brand name product package,
signage, or other trademark merchandise within a motion picture, television show, or music
video”. Of the definitions available from previously published research, this study advocates
the one presented by Karrh: “The paid inclusion of branded products or brand identifiers,
through audio and/or visual means within mass media programming” (Karrh & al, 2003:
138). Karrh’s definition is preferred due to its inclusiveness; that is, by using “brand
identifiers” and “mass media programming” Karrh avoids some of the unnecessary restraints
that applied to earlier definitions. Hence, Karrh’s definition is a more apt description of
contemporary media. However, considering that many placements still do not involve
financial compensation20, one might suggest substituting “paid” with “purposeful”. Finally,
it must be noted that this discussion of previous definitions may be somewhat biased by the
present study’s focus on television. A definition that removed “paid” and “mass” and
substituted “programming” with “content” would be better suited for new developments in
novels, songs, video games, internet etc. (e.g. see Fisher & Wagner, 2004: 1).
Practical Aspects
Contrary to what most people may think, placing products and brands in mass media
programming has been a known practice, at least since the 1930s (Karrh, 1998: 35). Early
on, placements were usually negotiated on a barter basis, free props in return for exposure,
but for some decades now, the practice of paid placements has been well known. Most
observers agree that the placement of Hershey’s Reese’s Pieces in E.T. – The Extra
Terrestrial (1982) played a crucial role in drawing attention to a vast potential. Hence,
sales of the candy are reported to have increased 65 per cent as a result of the placement
19
The ”paid” dimension distinguishes actual product placement from random appearances of brands and brand
identifiers, e.g. in news (Avery & Ferraro, 2000)
20
See ”Practical Aspects” for a discussion
(Buss, 1998)21. The current extent to which product placements are done in return for
financial compensation is a matter of some dispute among the scholars that have studied
the phenomenon. Whereas Karrh (1998: 35) claims that 85 per cent of all placements are
still done on a barter basis, others find this picture overly romantic. Indeed, if one
considers the existence of professional placement agencies (Redvall, 2000: 93) and the fact
that filmmakers are not required to identify paid placements as such (Yang, RoskosEwoldsen, & Roskos-Ewoldsen, 2004: 81), it seems reasonable to assume that prominently
featured brands have offered some compensation or other consideration in exchange for the
appearance22. Especially when the placements include mundane and inexpensive products,
it is hard to imagine other incentives than the commercial. That is, when television and film
producers need, say, a car to feature in a scene, engaging in a barter deal with an auto
manufacturer is a way of reducing production costs. Clearly, in the case of laundry
detergent or milk, this cost-incentive is less prevalent.
When studying product placement in visual media it is crucial to distinguish between
movies and television, and, within the latter category, between fiction and other genres.
Compared to movies, television programming is much more strictly regulated23, and paid
placements are not permitted unless the featured brand is listed as a sponsor (Ferraro &
Avery, 2000: 1). However, placements made through an agency bypass these regulations;
marketers are allowed to pay placement firms a retainer to set up favorable deals, and the
production companies accept goods as barter to help defray costs. Hence, in the past
decade or so, product placement has become a very sophisticated (and somewhat
clandestine) business, with placement agencies reviewing scripts in an effort to find product
placement opportunities for their marketer clients (McCarty, 2004: 46). As a result,
placements are occurring more and more frequently in television programs, and product
placement is on the way to becoming a very important revenue source for broadcast
television networks - especially in the United States. Networks depend on ad revenue to
21
Other successful examples that are often mentioned are the placement of Red Stripe beer in The Firm
(1993), Junior Mints in a episode of Seinfeld (1990), and, perhaps most famous of all, the numerous placements
in James Bond movies (Buss, 1998).
22
Prices for placements in movies are reported to vary from $50,000 - $350,000 and to be steadily growing
(Karrh, 1998). Known examples from the television context include $3,400 for a 3-second walk by in front of a
supermarket aisle featuring All detergent in Sex and the City, $22,980 for a a 7-second close up of Sunlight on
Everybody Loves Raymond, and $226,536 for a lengthy Friends placement for Snuggle, including actual handling
of the package (Advertising Age, 74(48))
23
In the U.S. the practice is regulated by the Federal Communications Commission (FCC), in Denmark, by the
Ombudsmand of consumer affairs under the general guidelines of marketing laws [Markedsføringsloven].
survive, and the prevalence of placements within television shows can be expected to
escalate as viewers grow increasingly suspicious to traditional advertising and the use of adskip devices and TIVO becomes more common (Karrh & al., 2003: 146) 24. Hence, in
commercial television the traditional view of programs as “products”, viewers as
“consumers”, and advertising as a “price” viewers pay to watch the programs (Meyrowitz,
1985: 73), no longer seems to hold. Rather, in the commercial world of today, the products
are the viewers, who are sold to advertisers. Addressing these issues, the US watch dog
group Commercial Alert recently filed complaints with the FCC arguing that embedded ads
were getting out of control (http://www.commercialalert.org). The group demanded,
among other things, that a flashing subtitle “advertisement” should appear for all paid for
product inserts. Not considering the absurdities this could lead to (imagine a sign
“advertising” flashing in the midst of a James Bond seduction scene), the case still raises
interesting issues. In their complaint, Commercial Alert cited a 2004 survey of 750 media
planners showing that 18 per cent had negotiated a product placement over the previous six
months, and 26 per cent anticipated working on one during the next six months
(http://www.commercialalert.org).
Together, the developments cited here indicate that product placement is an
increasingly important phenomenon in persuasive mass media communication, and that
researchers should devote more interest to the practice in the future. How the new
development should more specifically be addressed by research is discussed in detail below.
Here suffice it to note that practitioners have apparently already realized that new
marketing tactics require new measures. For example, New York based Intermedia
Advertising Group (IAG) recently unveiled a new service which will assess both the recall
and viewer attitudes toward product placements and sponsorships. The system looks at the
type of product and whether it's mentioned, shown or both; whether the product is shown
in the background or foreground; its duration of time on screen; whether it's embedded;
how many program segments the product appears in. It also takes into account whether the
central character or a bit player uses the product and, perhaps most interestingly, whether
viewers see the product placement as positive or negative to the brand in the context of
the show (Koh, 2004). However, this scheme doesn’t seem adequate for serious academic
effect studies. A product appearance on screen doesn’t necessarily equate to a persuasive
24
Judging from the ongoing debate on advertising forums such as adcritic.com and adadge.com, advertisers
and practitioners are fully aware of this potential threat and have addressed the issue for some time.
message. If a viewer sees, say, a bottle of Carlsberg beer in a movie it may well assist with
recall, but the content of the overall brand value created in the viewer’s mind is dependent
on the context in which the placed product appears. The more specific factors influencing
the relationship between placement context and persuasive impact are discussed at much
more detail below.
Product Placement As Communication
Although product placement on a larger scale tends to be regarded as a relatively novel
phenomenon, the practice has a number of common traits with more traditional forms of
persuasive communication. Herein lies much of the rationale behind the theoretical
framework of this study: On a general level, product placement can be seen as an example
of unobtrusive advertising. More specifically, the practice seems to combine aspects of
subliminal advertising and the use of celebrity spokespersons (see e.g. Stafford & al., 2002;
Ohanian, 1990). Perhaps most important to the framework established in the present study
is the link between product placement and subliminal advertising. Product placement is not
strictly subliminal communication, because products usually have exposure times measured
in seconds rather than milliseconds, often with some verbal labeling. However, as Erdelyi
and Zizak point out, subliminality was initially understood to be “inaccessibility to
consciousness” (Erdelyi & Zizak, 2004: 14), in which case product placements may often be
considered to be subliminal. What we argue here is that the effects should be taken to be
tacit or implicit because recollection of the brands may be unreliable or unavailable.
Theoretically, both product placements and “real” subliminal communication involve cases
where subjects are not aware of stimuli due to lack of attention (unattended messages);
stimuli which no act of attention will bring to awareness (subliminal messages); and finally,
cases where the subject is attending to the stimuli, of which he is consciously aware, but
which cannot be recognized (subrecognition messages) (Groeger, 1984: 305). If one adopts
this view, it is evident, as advocated above, that traditional measures focusing on explicit
recall and recognition are not adequate for assessing the effectiveness of product
placements.
In a slightly different perspective, product placements can be seen as “hybrid
messages” (Balasubramanian, 1994: 30); that is, a form of communication that combines
key advantages and avoids key disadvantages of advertising and publicity messages,
respectively25. Hence, product placement is a unique form of communication that brings
together emotional and cognitive responses evoking aspects of both fiction and persuasive
communication. Specifically, by virtue of being paid for (purposeful), product placements
allow senders to retain some control over message content and, by virtue of being discrete,
make the message seem more credible. To fully understand the implications of this, one
needs to consider the link to television programming - especially the way reality is
mediated and presented on television. In a study addressing the ontology of television
programming, Shrum, Burroughs, and Rindfleisch have developed the notion of “distortion
of reality” (Shrum, Burroughs, & Rindfleisch, 2004: 179) implying that the world as it is
portrayed on television (whether it is fiction or nonfiction) differs in important and
sometimes dramatic ways from how the real world is constituted. In an illustration of this,
O’Guinn and Shrum found the world of television to be more affluent and generally
demographically different from the real world (O’Guinn & Shrum, 1999: 285). What is
interesting about the findings is that exposure to these ‘distorted’ images may result in
their internalization by viewers.
Furthermore, by often being inscribed in an serialized narrative (e.g. in TV series)
product placements may be able to circumvent the non-monotonical relationship between
repetition and effectiveness that compromises the durability of traditional advertising
effects (The inverted U-shape: Anand & Sternthal, 1990: 345). What is meant by “nonmonotonical” is that although initial exposure to persuasive communication may affect
viewers significantly, the effect tends to wear out relatively quickly. In traditional
advertising this wear-out is assumed to occur as viewers grow familiar with a particular ad
and thus stop paying attention to it. The superior durability of product placements we
suggest here can be linked to an extended shelf life and a more global reach 26 compared to
traditional advertising. Whereas ads can be expected to reach a point of wear-out after a
certain number of exposures, films and television shows have a greater potential of being
rerun and generally attract a higher level of attention and involvement (d’Astous &
Chartier, 2000: 31). Adding to this potential, product placements could be viewed as an
example of the ongoing trend toward customization to smaller audiences, i.e. to the
25
Other examples of “hybrids” are infomercials, video news releases, and program tie-ins
In the words of one agency executive: “Product placement on The Sopranos is the best of all worlds. You
have no commercial messages to compete with. People watch the episodes over and over again. Then they buy
them on videotape and DVD — and watch them again." (http://www.usatoday.com/money/advertising,
12/2/2002)
26
“communities of interest” created by audiences of specific programs (Kalyanaraman &
Sundar, 2003: 3). That is, product placement allows advertisers to target very specific
audiences because the demographics of who watches which kinds of TV shows is well known
by producers (Yang, Roskos-Ewoldsen, & Roskos-Ewoldsen, 2004: 81). In the next section,
we explore the marketing implications of the technique in more detail.
Product Placement as Marketing Communication
Product placement can be compared to other forms of marketing communication in a
number of ways, in that all product placements as a form of marketing communication
share some common aspects with one another, but differ from other forms of marketing
communication (McCarty, 2004: 47). In the research interest of the present study, we
propose looking at marketing communication along two dimensions: (1) the extent to which
the sponsor of the message is disguised, that the message is a paid advertisement is
disguised, or both, and (2) the extent to which the persuasive message is secondary to the
main message of the communication. As mentioned above, product placement is generally
seen as an unobtrusive form of advertising, sometimes even referred to as “stealth
advertising”, implying that the technique represents one of the highest degrees of disguise
and a totally secondary status to the main message. However, considering the amount of
attention the practice does in fact receive in public debate, this account seems somewhat
exaggerated. Hence, marketers who still believe in the complete naïveté of viewers
concerning product placements may well be revealing the same about themselves
(Bhatnagar, Aksoy, & Malkoc, 2004: 101)27. In this section, we review some of the incentives
for advertisers to adopt the practice and compare these to aspects of traditional
advertising.
Most importantly, product placements are more likely than traditional advertising to
gain goodwill from viewers (d’Astous & Séguin, 1999: 905). Whereas traditional advertising
has become a phenomenon that most viewers strive to avoid, product placements are
(naturally) embedded in a context viewers actively choose to join. Inclusion in programs
reduces the likelihood of zapping (d’Astous & Séguin, 1999: 896) and thus adds an element
of “forced exposure” (de Pelsmacker & al., 2002: 52). With channel hopping and new
27
It must be noted, however, that the one Danish study that has addressed the practice of product placement
(Redvall, 2000) treats it as something unknown and unexpected – something toward which viewers don’t have a
proper defense.
technologies such as personal video recorders (PVRs) and TIVO, people can actively avoid
commercials. Hence, the only way for advertisers to reach them might be when they are
engaged in viewing a program that they meant to watch (Elpers & al., 2002: 437; Koh, 2004:
2). While it is easy to run to the kitchen for a soda during a commercial break, viewers are
less likely to run to the kitchen in the middle of a program. Moreover, as mentioned above,
inclusion in specific programs facilitates advertisers’ access to relevant target groups.
For producers of the mass media programming that “hosts” the placed products, the
incentive is mainly financial. In addition to the possible revenue from the actual placement,
advertisers often buy traditional advertising space in or surrounding the programs (d’Astous
& Séguin, 1999: 899). Sometimes, product placements are part of a larger marketing tie-in,
in which a company agrees to create an ad campaign, a sweepstakes, or some other
promotional campaign that complements the studio’s own marketing efforts for the film or
TV series. The flipside of this relationship between placements and other marketing efforts
is a difficulty of measuring the specific effectiveness of the technique using traditional
methods of business scholarship. That is, by focusing on, say, improvement in overall sales,
one doesn’t assess whether product placements or other parts of the marketing mix are
accountable for the effects.
Another interesting two-way interaction between media product and consumer
product is found on the content-level and was originally cited as one of the main arguments
for both advertisers and producers; the inclusion of products, so the argument goes, adds
reality to the fictitious media program and credibility to the brand message (Brennan,
Dubas, & Babin, 1999: 323). When executed successfully, product placement can add a
sense of realism to a movie or television show that something like a can simply marked
"soda" or a box labeled “cigarettes” cannot. If, however, the inclusion of products seems
unrealistic, exaggerated, or phony, viewers are expected to respond with distrust and doubt
(Batra & Ray, 1986b: 238). In these latter cases, watching television programs containing
product placements will feel like watching an extremely long commercial. Hence, there's a
line that can be crossed when presenting brand-name items as props within the context of a
television show. A line marketing practitioners try never to cross. They want their products
to be visible within a scene, but not the focus. The product needs to fit, almost seamlessly
(almost being the key word here) into the shot and context of the scene.
Analyzing Product Placement
Since the advent of academic research in product placement, scholars have analyzed the
phenomenon from very different, though not mutually exclusive, vantage points (see Fisher
& Wagner (2004) for an exhaustive review). Roughly speaking, previously published research
can be divided into (1) studies of variations in placements, (2) studies of viewers’ reception,
and (3) studies of outcomes. Within these analytical frameworks, a wide array of variables
has been examined. To provide an overview of important past research as well as outline
directions for future work, the variables are here divided into characteristics of program
content, characteristics of characters, characteristics of products, and characteristics of
execution. As the references indicate, some of the mentioned characteristics have already
been studied in a product placement context28, some have been studied in traditional
advertising, and some are yet to receive analytical attention. This section serves as an
overall guide to potential research areas; the specific findings produced by past research
are presented in a subsequent section.
Research in content characteristics has mainly focused on genre, e.g. how the
overall style of a program has the potential to significantly alter viewers’ reactions to a
placement (Dambron, 1991), and program-induced mood, e.g. how the affective quality of
different program contexts evokes differing levels and types of empathy (Lord & al., 2001).
On a more specific level, research has investigated the congruence between programinduced mood and product-induced mood, and found this congruence to increase recall
(Lord & al., 2001).
Among the character characteristics that have attracted researchers’ attention are
character-product continuity (i.e. the perceived strength of the relationship between a
placed product and the associated character; see Deighton, Romer, & McQueen, 1989;
DeLorme & Reid, 1999), content centrality (Fisher & Wagner, 2004), as well as the
credibility (Ohanian, 1990) and likeability (McGuire, 2001) of the associated character.
Research in brand characteristics has focused mainly on familiarity; that is, on the
relation between previous activation from short or long term memory of brand-related
stimuli and the amount of cognitive elaboration required for processing a placement
(Russell, 2002). Other brand characteristics that could be studied in the future are
28
The fact that a variable has been studied does not necessarily indicate that we consider this variable to have
been adequately assessed. Hence, much of the research referenced in this section has been done from the
vantage point of the memory paradigm.
topicality, e.g. level of social importance, and product life cycle, i.e. whether product
placements are especially effective for promoting new or well-known brands.
Most work has been done within the area of execution characteristics. Russell
(2002) proposed and applied a taxonomy of modalities distinguishing between placements
that are visual, auditory, and audiovisual. Other research has examined the prominence of
placements, i.e. the extent to which the product placement possesses characteristics
designed to make it a central focus of audience attention (Gupta & Lord, 1998; Russell,
2002). Research on prominence has usually divided placements into “subtle” and
“prominent” (Gupta & Lord, 1998: 49) or “creative” and “on-set” (Brennan, Dubas, & Babin,
1999: 323). Closely related to research on prominence, a number of studies have addressed
the content-connection of placed products; that is, the integration of products into the
‘hosting’ media product (Russell, 2002). Finally, one published study has assessed the
amount of content devoted to a placed product and how this affects effectiveness (Karrh,
2003).
However, studying characteristics of the placement itself is not sufficient to achieve
a comprehensive understanding of how product placements work. In order to understand
effects on viewers one needs to take into account individual and situational differences
of the reception context as well. Especially, as is the case for all kinds of effect studies,
product placement research must consider the cultural and social background of the
receivers. Research in traditional advertising has shown substantial differences in reception
relative to high-context and low-context cultures (Gupta & Lord, 1998: 58). Something
similar may well be the case for product placements. Moreover, it seems crucial to consider
viewers’ receptiveness and desire to “go along” with the fictitious context established with
product placements, e.g. viewers “desire to emulate” (Karrh, 1998: 43) and willingness to
bridge the identity gap between themselves and the fictitious characters. Finally, related to
the dual-process framework of this study29, one must assess viewers’ attention intensity,
e.g. opportunity to process, level of prior knowledge etc.
Together, the characteristics of the placement and specific reception contexts
constitute the independent variables of effect studies in product placement. However,
before engaging in experimental research one needs to outline the potential dependent
variables as well. Similar to what was done above, these dependent variables are here
29
See sections on dual-process models and MODE above
divided into three categories, namely (1) cognitive, (2) affective, and (3) conative. Among
the potential cognitive (thinking) variables, one finds awareness (Leckenby & Wedding,
1982), recognition (Russell, 2002), and beliefs (Fishbein & Ajzen, 1975). As indicated in
previous sections, this cognitive category has received by far the most attention from
previous research in persuasive communication. Less work has been done on variables
belonging to the affective (feeling) category. In fact, it is only very recently that convincing
applications of these variables have begun to emerge in product placement studies and
related research. Here, we draw attention to Fazio’s seminal work on attitudes (e.g. see
Fazio, 1990), and especially Wagner and Sundar’s analysis of strength of association (SOA:
Wagner & Sundar, 2003). The SOA concept, assessing the likelihood that an attitude is
activated upon priming with a relevant stimulus, is crucial to this study and shall be
discussed in detail below. Even less work has been done in the area of conative (behaving)
variables. In fact, behavioral analysis such as eye-tracking and assessment of purchase
intention has mostly been mentioned by researchers as potentially fruitful avenues of future
study.
Theories of How Product Placement Works
As noted above, the primary goal of this study is to analyze the effectiveness of product
placement as a form of persuasive communication. More specifically, what is addressed is
the formation and change of attitudes as a result of exposure to mass media (television)
stimuli and the subsequent transformation of these attitudes into behavior. The nature of
the attitude-behavior relationship is discussed below; here we seek to establish a general
framework of relevant effectiveness dimensions. In order to do so, we draw upon some of
the insights presented above, notably the conceptual link between product placement and
the use of subliminal stimuli, and findings from social psychology research on non-conscious
information processing. The rationale behind this transfer of theory lies in the conception of
product placements as dependent on unattended stimuli; that is, the way placements are
hypothesized to function is closely related to the way in which subliminal social primes have
been shown to influence subsequent judgments (e.g. see Pratkanis & Greenwald, 1988).
Furthermore, research in non-conscious processing provides a rationale for focusing on
attitudes as opposed to recall and recognition. Hence, studies (e.g. Wilson, 1979) have
shown that non-conscious processing of information led to increased liking, but not
recognition for stimuli presented to the unattended channel. However, acknowledging that
the type of product placements studied here is a phenomenon inescapably linked to the
television medium, the theories must seek inspiration from media studies as well.
To establish a macro-level framework, one may draw upon previous theory and
research within the area of media sociology. For example, the assumption that television
has long since supplanted reading, interpersonal narrative, and other traditional media as
our primary means of storytelling and myth delivery (McLuhan, 1964; Silverstone, 1991) has
obvious implications for the status of televised communication as an agent of socialization.
Moreover, in the present context, where televised fiction is analyzed as a potentially
powerful conveyer of information about real world phenomena, it seems relevant to draw
on Ong’s theories of the other-than-real world that is created by the medium. According to
Ong (see Silverstone, 1991, for a review) the television world is not quite life, but still more
than fiction. Hence, it can be seen as television’s peculiar capacity to establish a sense of
presence and blur the live and the recorded, the real and the imagined, the spontaneous
and the rehearsed. Across different works in media sociology, there seems to be a general
consensus that media images in general and television in particular have the power to
cultivate individuals’ perceptions and attitudes. Below we discuss some of the processes by
which this influence may occur.
Persuasion
As a consequence of questioning the notion of conscious influence, the present study must
depart from the influential definition of persuasion as something that occurs when the
audience has “tested and accepted the truth of a claim of value” (Deighton, Romer, &
McQueen, 1989: 336). Whereas such evaluation of argument quality is related to central
route processes (Kahle & Homer, 1985: 954), we assume product placements to be
processed more peripherally and thus to rely on other mechanisms for effectiveness.
Although the ‘host’ program itself may be processed centrally, in terms of content or
execution, due to their unobtrusive nature the placed products are assumed to serve as
peripheral cues. One way to illustrate this hypothesized difference is by comparison with
studies in traditional advertising. As noted above, a large body of research has addressed
the non-monotonical relation between exposure and persuasion that occurs due to wear-out
mechanisms in the reception of traditional ads (Batra & Ray, 1986a: 442). Briefly stated,
Batra and Ray show how increasing the number of exposures does not necessarily increase
persuasive power. On the contrary, “too many” exposures to the same media product may
lead to wear-out; that is to an increase in the production of counterarguments. In the
context of product placement this wear out, and, as a result, generation of
counterarguments seems less likely to occur. Among the possible reasons one could mention
that viewers are less accustomed to the reception of product placements and thus less
suspicious to the persuasion attempt, or that product placements are embedded in a
context that typically generates more possible feelings in viewers. This in turn leads us to
consider (1) the influence of mood on persuasive impact and (2) theories of viewers’
knowledge about persuasive strategies.
Mood
Most research on the relationship between mood and reactions to persuasive communication
has been done within the field of traditional advertising and has focused on recall and
recognition (Shrum, 1999; Goldberg & Gorn, 1987; Lord, Burnkrant, & Unnava, 2001). For
example, previous studies have shown that when elaboration-likelihood is high, mood is
predicative of the thoughts generated in response to a message (Wegener, Petty & Klein,
1994: 39). Although this finding is interesting, it isn’t directly transferable to the low
elaboration-likelihood associated with product placements. In fact, Wegener, Petty, and
Klein (1994: 39) report no significant effect under low-elaboration conditions. However,
another study (Erber, 1991) has shown that mood, especially at the time of encoding, makes
affectively congruent material more accessible in memory leading to “biases” in retrieval of
information (Erber, 1991: 483). Hence, it may be hypothesized that less conscious attitudes
formed under conditions of positive mood (e.g. while watching one’s favorite television
show) are activated more easily in a subsequent decision situation evoking a similar mood.
In terms of consumer decision-making, Erber’s findings indicate that the one brand among
many, for which brand-attitudes have been formed under pleasant conditions, will
automatically attract more positive thoughts when encountered at the point of purchase.
This line of reasoning received some support from a study (Goldberg & Gorn, 1987) in
traditional advertising showing that relative to sad programs, happy programs induced
greater perceived commercial effectiveness and more affectively positive cognitive
responses (Goldberg & Gorn, 1987: 398). However, some researchers’ claim that mood
congruent information tends to be processed more elaborately makes it premature to
simply accept the mood congruency theory in the area of product placements.
Persuasion Knowledge Model
Addressing the second issue mentioned above, viewers’ knowledge about persuasion
strategies, Friestad and Wright have developed an elaborate model (Persuasion Knowledge
Model; Friestad & Wright, 1994) stating how consumers gradually gain more insight into
various persuasion attempts and thus become increasingly immune to them. Hence, a claim
that product placements are effective as a means of persuasion could be backed by arguing
that the practice is still relatively novel and that viewers therefore may not yet be fully
aware of its persuasive agenda. Acknowledging the appeal of this theory we now turn to a
more detailed discussion of the potential applicability of the Persuasion Knowledge Model
(PKM). More specifically, the PKM assumes that an observable feature, or pattern of
features, of a persuasion attempt takes on meaning to people as a persuasion strategy only
if they perceive a causal connection between it and a psychological activity they believe
mediates persuasion (Friestad & Wright, 1994: 4). Furthermore, the model describes how
people identify for themselves an overriding goal of “effectiveness in persuasion coping”.
Although Friestad and Wright theorize on a very psychological and not very tangible level,
the real world implications are obvious. For example, the model could be used to explain
the widespread reluctance among people to admit being influenced by persuasive
communication. Hence, if Friestad and Wright’s theory is plausible, the chances of finding
any conscious and self-reported effects of advertising seem very limited. Interestingly,
Friestad and Wright assign much of the development of persuasion knowledge to (1)
scholarly insight made commonly accessible (e.g. through popular press) and (2) what is
taught in schools. Especially the latter antecedent of persuasion knowledge seems relevant
in the present context. Whereas analyzing traditional advertising is a common discipline in
the educational system, product placement is treated to a much lesser extent. Following
this line of reasoning, one may expect people to have a well-established defense
mechanism that is automatically activated when identifiable advertising stimuli are
encountered. Conversely, product placements due to their unobtrusiveness may not lead to
such activation. To elaborate one may draw upon the parallel to subliminal communication
introduced above. By being ‘hidden’ product placements can be expected to circumvent
people’s defense mechanisms: If focal consciousness were fully deployed on advertising
claims, receivers might well reject them on the basis of logic or reality. If, however,
consciousness is degraded, it may fail to inhibit more primitive (and credulous) subsystems.
Although the attributes of the PKM are here presented as if they were all but
universal, any application of the model needs to consider potential personal differences.
Addressing these differences, Heesacker & al. (1983) found that some people are more
disposed to attend to social/contextual features (field dependent) whereas others are more
disposed to extract meaning from content features (field independent) (Heesacker & al.,
1983: 665). Applied to product placements, this finding indicates a higher likelihood of
affecting field dependent receivers; that is, receivers that are less likely to question the
intentions of the characters acting or speaking in favor of the placed product. To elaborate
on Heesacker’s distinction, one may expect field independent receivers to question why
someone speaking on behalf of a marketer has chosen to advocate the product he is
endorsing (Friestad & Wright, 1994: 21), and to be skeptical toward spokespersons that are
obviously paid.
A slightly different line of research has linked persuasion knowledge more closely to
mode of information processing and rendered additional support to the persuasive
effectiveness of less conscious processing. For example, Campbell and Keller (2003) state
that low-level (peripheral) processing leads individuals to focus on content, whereas highlevel (central) processing is more likely to lead to scrutiny of the tactics, formations of
counterarguments and thus to a decrease in persuasiveness (Campbell & Keller, 2003: 294).
In summary, the theories mentioned here seem to be very skeptical as to the potential of
traditional advertising. After all, people know they are being persuaded by a biased source
and can appropriately source-discount. The flip side of that reason indicates why the notion
of subliminal advertising is so feared and reviled by consumers – the notion that they could
be persuaded without their knowledge and thus be deprived of their ability to defend
themselves (Shrum, 2004: xv).
Classical Conditioning
An alternative explanation of product placements’ persuasive potential draws on one of the
most famous theories in social psychology. The seminal work on classical conditioning
(sometimes referred to as respondent conditioning) was done by Pavlov in the early 20 th
century30. When used in a contemporary context, the notion of classical conditioning refers
to an affective, non-cognitive process (Stuart, Shimp, & Engle, 1987: 334) by which
30
Especially the study, in which Pavlov made dogs salivate upon hearing a bell that had previously been
associated with food, is often cited.
responses to one stimulus are automatically associated with a conceptually unrelated
stimulus. In advertising research, classical conditioning can be defined as the presentation
of a product (conditioned stimulus) along with some other element (unconditioned stimulus)
that elicits pleasant attitudinal response (conditioned response) to later elicit similar
positive responses to the product presented alone (Stuart, Shimp & Engle, 1987: 335;
Erdelyi & Zizak, 2004: 23). Potentially, classical conditioning could be used to explain many
processes by which communication is used to achieve attitude change in receivers. As an
example relevant to the study of product placement, the use of a character who arouses
positive affect in receivers may lead to a transfer of affect to the product (Gorn, 1982: 97).
Hence, advertisers aim to create a positive “paired association” between unconditioned
stimulus (e.g. a favorable endorser image) and a conditioned stimulus (e.g. a brand)
(Balasubramanian, 1994: 38). The reason why classical conditioning is introduced here is
that much contemporary advertising, including product placement, appears to be structured
so that such conditioning is likely to occur. Moreover, past research indicates that classical
conditioning does in fact have the power to influence brand attitudes and behavior (Gorn,
1982: 100). Taking this perspective to the extreme, one may claim that the very reason for
the unobtrusive nature of product placements is the potential for classical conditioning;
that is, the hope that viewers will attach their feelings toward the characters and shows to
the products (Karrh, 1998: 34; DeLorme & Reid, 1999: 79).
A review of previous research assessing the more specific potential of classical
conditioning reveals a number of interesting trends. For example, McSweeney and Bierley
(1984) found classical conditioning to be most effective for products that are not frequently
encountered or thought about outside the advertising context (327). This, in turn, indicates
that the mechanism may be best suited for promoting mundane products such as laundry
detergent, inexpensive personal hygiene and food products31. Moreover, classical
conditioning has been found to be more effective for products about which consumers have
limited prior knowledge (Cacioppo & al., 1992: 220); that is, the process is presumably
more powerful in attitude formation than in attitude change. Finally, in a study that
renders intuitive support to the practice of product placement, McSweeney and Bierley
(1984: 327) found that, in order to be effective, advertisements must be as similar as
possible to the situation in which people will actually encounter the product. Although
31
Although some of the products mentioned here are used on a daily basis, we assume the use to be of a little
involving nature, and thus the purchase to be less conscious.
pointing to an interesting potential, these findings also indicate that classical conditioning
has limitations. For advertisers who want to promote more frequently used and more
consequential products, and products that are already well established, classical
conditioning may not be the best approach. Furthermore, basing product placements on
classical conditioning through characters on screen creates the risk of “overshadowing”;
that is, if characters are overly salient, product attitudes may be left unchanged
(McSweeney & Bierley, 1984: 629).
On the executional level, however, the existence and fruitfulness of classical
conditioning in product placement seems to be well documented. First, in the previously
cited study, McSweeney and Bierley found that classically conditioned responses normally
do not appear full blown until after the conditioned and unconditioned stimuli have been
paired a number of times (McSweeney & Bierly, 1984: 625). This indicates that traditional
ads created to generate classical conditioning may fail due to the wear-out mechanisms
described above and that a more successful strategy may be the pairing of products with
well-liked characters in serialized fictional narratives. Following this argument, the
repeated pairing of Omega watches with James Bond should be a better way to achieve a
positive association than numerous commercials and print ads pairing the same product with
Cindy Crawford, Anna Kournikova, and other real world celebrities. In fact, this
hypothesized difference in persuasiveness is attributable to a synthesis between classical
conditioning and persuasion knowledge. Somewhat ironically one might claim that a sports
star or fashion model endorsing a product unrelated to her profession seems less
trustworthy than a fictitious aristocrat playboy. A second study (Bierley & al., 1985) lends
support to the potential of fictitious stimuli to create classical conditioning. Whereas one
might expect receivers to actively “filter out” persuasive attempts such as the James BondOmega connection, Bierly and her associates found that people didn’t necessarily need to
be aware of the process for classical conditioning to occur (Bierley & al., 1985: 320). Hence,
instead of seeing through the spokesperson in order to form attitudes toward the “real”
agents (i.e. the companies behind the ads), viewers of film and other audiovisual fiction
may accept the presence of branded products as something more natural and not even
notice that a persuasive attempt is being made. In the next section, we further elaborate
on the pairing of characters with placed products and its potential as a means to attitude
and behavioral change.
The Modeling Paradigm
Regardless of what dimension of effectiveness researchers choose to apply to product
placement, nobody seems to disagree about the key characteristics of the technique.
Essentially, product placements aim at achieving a goal, whether it is recall, attitude
change, or behavior, by having viewers observe the actions of others (models) and the
consequences of those actions (Nord & Peter, 1980: 40). The present section examines in
more detail the nature of this observation drawing on both theories of social learning and
previous research in persuasive communication.
In the seminal works of social learning theory, Bandura (1973; Bandura, 1994)
describes the expansion of knowledge and skills that can occur when people process
information conveyed by modeling influences; that is, by watching other people’s behavior
and its consequences for them (Bandura, 1994: 66). According to Bandura, a great deal of
information about human values, thinking patterns, and behavior is gained from models
portrayed symbolically through verbal or pictorial means (Bandura, 1994: 68). Although
Bandura is not explicitly concerned with persuasive mass media communication, the
experiments dealt with aggressive behavior in children, his theory is never the less
applicable in the present context. Adapting the focus somewhat, one might hypothesize
that product demonstrations through models (e.g. actors) have the capacity to facilitate
learning and spark viewers’ desire to emulate (Balasubramanian, 1994: 38). However, the
fact that Bandura’s theory deals with real people performing real behavior raises interesting
questions to the study of product placement. Compared to real people and to the personae
of traditional advertising, characters in product placement have a status somewhere in
between. Understanding this status seems crucial to assessing the persuasive potential of
product placements. Hence, if characters are perceived to be more real than fictitious, one
may apply theories of interpersonal influence. If, on the other hand, characters are
perceived as purely fictitious, it will be more relevant to draw upon previous research on
spokesperson characteristics in advertising. Judging from the way placements are typically
done, one gets the impression that practitioners advocate the former interpretation (e.g.
see Bearden & al., 1989: 473). The very practice, especially the portrayal of products being
consumed in social situations, seems to rely on the influence of others as an important
determinant of an individual’s behavior. When a claim rests on subjective grounds, as is
often the case in advertising, the advantage of product placement over more traditional
forms is that it does not have to reduce the subjective experience to words and then
depend on the credibility of a narrator to communicate it. Instead it can depict the
experience directly, with the aim of evoking the feeling itself in its audience (Deighton,
Romer, & McQueen, 1989: 336).
However, the most fruitful approach may still be to fuse theories from the domains
of social interaction and advertising studies. Although product placements undoubtedly aim
at creating the illusion of interpersonal interaction, the practice still draws on some of the
source characteristics of traditional advertising. In one relevant study, Ohanian (1990)
demonstrated a significant influence of communicators’ positive characteristics on
receivers’ acceptance of a message. More specifically, Ohanian found trustworthiness,
expertise, and attractiveness to be the main factors of source credibility (Ohanian, 1990:
47). Hence, in a conscious paradigm these dimensions of a celebrity endorser’s source
credibility along with consumer demographics and psychographics, can be used as potential
predictors of attitude toward and intention to purchase a specific product. Also within the
context of effect studies based on self-report, early research found attractiveness and
credibility to influence attitude but not recall (Joseph, 1982: 19), and to be effective only
under conditions of low ego-involvement (Johnson & Izzett, 1970: 81; Heesacker & al.,
1983: 664). Although the present study departs from the conscious approach, it still seems
likely that similar processes are at work on a less explicit level.
Another dimension relevant to the special status of product placements between real
world and fiction is the distinction between direct and indirect experience. Of course,
direct experience per se is formed through actual physical interaction with an object.
However, it seems plausible that the experience formed through exposure to products
placed in television shows is more direct than the experience one can have by simply
reading or viewing traditional advertising. Research in television shows indicates two ways
in which these can be considered a substitute for direct experience. First, viewers may be
aware that the source of information is television but still consider the exemplars relevant.
Second, viewers may not consider television portrayals to be veridical (low perceived
reality) but they also may not ascertain the source of the exemplars recalled when they
construct their judgments (Shrum, 1999: 128). Interestingly, attitudes and attitude
accessibility are hypothesized to change most dramatically through direct experience.
Hence, it is essential for research inspired by the modeling paradigm to examine the extent
to which character associations and attitudes travel from the drama context to the
consumer context.
Before we conclude the discussion of the effectiveness dimension, it must be noted
that although this study focuses on attitudes and attitude-related persuasiveness, we do not
imply that product placement should be discarded as a powerful means to generate recall
and recognition. On the contrary, placements are very effective in this respect, possibly
due to the salience of product information in a context where it is less challenged by
surrounding messages. The reasons why the recall dimension has not received more
attention are (1) that the topic has already been sufficiently treated in previous research
(see below for a review of previous research) and (2) that we do not consider recall to be an
adequate measure of persuasiveness.
In summary, this section has suggested four ways by which product placement may be
effective as an agent of attitude formation and change. Previous research on the influence
of mood, knowledge of persuasion strategies, classical conditioning, and learning through
modeling was reviewed and adapted to the context of this study. It has not been the goal of
this review to perform a comparative evaluation; rather the various theories have been
introduced as equally valid and equally applicable depending on the exact nature of study.
Academic Studies of Product Placement
Unlike previous sections we here focus on past research explicitly dealing with product
placements; that is, instead of seeking inspiration from surrounding areas and adapting
relevant related theories, we attempt an up-to-date presentation of the work that has
actually been done on product placements. Albeit limited in number32, previous research
can be classified as: content analysis of placements in various media; surveys of
practitioners; qualitative studies of placement’s meaning to audiences; studies of audience
knowledge of and inferences about placements; and experimental studies testing memory,
attitude change, and/or purchase intention (Karrh, 1998). Among these, the majority of
studies has focused on the technique’s impact on viewer memory and investigated the
effects of product placement on brand recall and recognition (e.g. Babin & Carder, 1996b;
Karrh, 1994). Research has demonstrated that prominently displayed brands enjoy higher
recall and recognition compared to brands placed less conspicuously (Brennan, Dubas, &
32
Especially research on product placements in television has been all but non-existent; the work that has
been done has mainly addressed the phenomenon in the movie context
Babin, 1999: 323; Gupta & Lord, 1998: 47) and that audio-only placements better impact
viewers’ memory than do visual-only placements (d’Astous & Chartier, 2000: 39).
Placements combining the two modes have been found to elicit the highest recall and
recognition (Karrh & al., 2003: 146).
Interestingly, the impact of product placements on actual consumer behavior has
mostly been addressed through speculation. Up until 2003 all empirical studies focused on
the technique’s impact on viewer memory and measured effectiveness in terms of
awareness and recognition. Perhaps for this reason, no studies had shown product
placements to have any impact on viewers’ attitudes toward the brands. However, all of
these studies (Babin & Carder, 1996a; Babin & Carder, 1996b; Karrh, 1994; Ong & Meri,
1994; Vollmers & Mizerski, 1994) assessed brand-related attitudes through self-report
measures. Researchers and, so it seems, practitioners have apparently equated
effectiveness with recall and recognition33. Hence, as pointed out by Law and Braun, the
lack of demonstrated impact on attitudes and subsequent behavior may well be a
methodological issue (Law & Braun, 2000: 1059).
The first study to depart from the reliance on self-report was done by Andriasova and
Wagner (2004). Hypothesizing that self-report measures tend to misrepresent actual effects
on attitudes (see above for a discussion), Andriasova and Wagner applied the unobtrusive
Implicit Association Test and focused on placements’ impact on the strength of viewers’
product-related associations. Whereas previous studies had failed to detect any change in
viewers’ self-reported attitudes, Andriasova and Wagner showed that placements could
influence consumers’ product-related strength of association and thus be a powerful agent
of persuasion. Both unobtrusive measures and strength of association are discussed
extensively below. Here suffice it to note that the Andriasova and Wagner (2004) study was
the first to demonstrate product placements’ affects beyond the cognitive level.
33
As reported by Brennan, Dubas, & Babin (1999: 326), many practitioners deem placements effective when a
minimum of 20 per cent of the audience is aware of the identity of a placed brand
3. How Attitudes Guide Behavior: An Automatic Process
Above, previous research in advertising and product placement has repeatedly been
lamented for its focus on recall and recognition. The main argument has been that
measuring memory does not equate to measuring actual effectiveness, that is, whether the
communication leads to persuasion and subsequent behavior. Hence, the challenge is to
develop an alternative scheme that more aptly measures whether exposure to a given
persuasive stimulus leads recipients to change their behavior. However, in the present
context, a reliable experimental assessment of actual behavior seems all but impossible.
Although many potential threats to external validity can successfully be eliminated, it is
very difficult to simulate real world consumption behavior in laboratory settings. The few
previous studies that have investigated effectiveness in terms of behavior (as opposed to
self-reported behavioral intention) have mostly sought to establish simulated consumption
environments, e.g. by having research subjects ‘buy’ one among an array of available
products as compensation for their participation (Law & Braun, 2000: 1065). However, we
find the external validity of such simulations to be highly questionable. Herein lies one of
the crucial challenges to this study, compared to the social psychology research from which
it draws inspiration - e.g. work on stereotyping (Bargh, 1999) and racial prejudice (Fazio &
al., 1995; Lowery & al., 2001), where behavior can be assessed more directly 34. To resolve
this methodological problem we propose an assessment of effectiveness that links emotional
and conative dependent variables. More specifically, this is done by introducing attitude as
a mediator between exposure and behavior. Using the attitude-construct this way is a
strategy well supported by past research in related disciplines. For example, previous
studies (e.g. Hastie & Park, 1986) have indicated that people are generally reluctant to
consult long-term memory for evidence on which to base a judgment, thus implying that
other variables must be at work (Hastie & Park, 1986: 262). In the following sections, we
argue that attitude is indeed such variable, and thus a useful construct on which the
experimental study of effectiveness can be based.
Defining Attitudes
34
One parsimonious scheme for assessing the effect of racial prejudice on behavior is to have participants
interact with experimenters of the given race
Since Allport’s influential work (Allport, 1935), several theorists have sought to define the
concept of attitudes. Among the available definitions this study mainly draws on the one
presented by Fazio of attitude as “the association in memory of a given object and a given
summary evaluation of the object” (Fazio & al., 2000: 8). Hence, in our view attitudes are
organized around responses to real or imagined objects and evaluative in nature. As reviews
of the use of attitudes within social psychology reveal, the concept of attitude is closely
related to, and sometimes used interchangeably with, that of affect (e.g. see Giner-Sorolla,
1999; Hoffman, 1986). However, in the present context it seems more fruitful to view
attitudes as consisting of affective, cognitive, and behavioral components (Edell & Burke,
1987: 431). The affective component reflects an individual’s general feelings or emotions
toward an object. The cognitive component represents one’s awareness of and knowledge
about an object. The behavioral component includes intentions and behavioral expectations
and reflects a predisposition to action (Zikmund, 1997: 340). This conception has previously
been applied in advertising research, e.g. by Shimp (1981: 10) who assigned the first two
components – affective and cognitive - to his attitude-toward-the-ad (Aad) construct. In an
elaboration of Shimp’s theory, McKenzie and Lutz (1989) added the behavioral dimension
and defined Aad as the predisposition to respond in a favorable or unfavorable manner to a
particular advertising stimulus during a particular exposure condition (McKenzie & Lutz,
1989: 49). There has been some debate as to whether attitudes should be conceptualized as
(1) persistent mentally represented summary evaluations (the so-called “file drawer”
metaphor), or (2) temporary constructions created when an attitudinal judgment is needed.
Claiming that attitudes are the sum of all object-related (brand-related) beliefs and their
evaluation, as has been done by advocates of the ELM, leads to the assumption that
centrally induced attitudes are more persistent (Petty, Cacioppo & Schumann, 1983: 135).
If, on the contrary, attitudes are viewed as more temporary tools, it is no longer given that
central processing leads to stronger, more persistent attitudes. Hence, considering the
importance assigned to non-conscious processes in this study, we tend to prefer the latter
view. Consistent with the dual-process framework, Giner-Sorolla (1999) has proposed a
further distinction between two components of attitudes: (1) immediate affect, i.e. feelings
and emotions activated rapidly and effortlessly upon identification of the attitude object
and (2) deliberative affect, i.e. feelings and emotions that are activated later on, in
response to other objects associated with the attitude object (Giner-Sorolla, 1999: 444445).
Attitude Strength
On a theoretical level, defining attitude as the relation between objects and their
evaluations implies that attitudes (relations) can vary in strength. Although attitude
strength seems an important construct for theory and research, there is no apparent
consensus about its conceptualization and assessment. Some have viewed attitude strength
in terms of personal knowledge of the attitude-related issue, some in terms of personal
importance, or simply in terms of attitude extremity and polarization (Pomerantz, Chaiken,
& Tordesillas, 1993: 408). However, neither of these indicants has been linked to the
process by which attitudes guide behavior. In this study we therefore change the scope
somewhat and focus on the accessibility of attitudes, that is, the speed and ease with which
the attitude can be accessed from memory. We do this assuming that that attitude strength
per se is less interesting than whether the attitude will actually activate to guide behavior.
Reversing the concept in this way and focusing on activation instead of extremity, we view
the strength of the object-evaluation association as a critical determinant of accessibility,
which, in turn, acts as a central factor in the process by which attitudes guide behavior.
This assumption received initial support from an experiment conducted by Fazio, Powell,
and Williams (1989) showing that individuals with accessible attitudes had immediate
perceptions of a given object that were heavily influenced by their attitudes and, as a
result, tended to behave consistently with those attitudes. In contrast, the immediate
perceptions of people with less accessible attitudes appeared to have been less attitudinally
congruent and tended to be governed by the momentarily salient dimensions. Further
evidence regarding the functional value of accessible attitudes was provided by Blascovich
& al. (1993). Employing a psycho-physiological measure to assess effort expenditure during
decision-making, they found that participants displayed less cardiovascular activity when
deciding between alternatives toward which they already held accessible attitudes.
Automatic activation of their attitudes apparently obviated any need to construct
evaluations of the alternatives ‘on the spot’ (Blascovich & al., 1993: 167).
Attitudes to behavior
Since the very beginning of attitude research, definitions have reflected the notion that
behavior follows from attitudes35. For instance, Allport (1935) posited that attitudes
determine for each individual what he will see and hear. That is, according to Allport,
attitude-evoking objects are at an advantage in terms of their being consciously noticed.
Although this early theory is intuitively appealing, we need some modification to make it
applicable to less conscious behavior. As noted above, this modification is presented by
Fazio’s MODE model, according to which attitudes guide decisions, and hence behavior in a
less direct fashion, by affecting people’s appraisals of decision alternatives (Sanbonmatsu &
Fazio, 1990: 620). An attitude that is highly accessible from memory, and hence likely to be
activated automatically upon the individual’s encountering an attitude object, is apt to
result in immediate perceptions that are congruent with the attitude (Fazio & TowlesSchwen, 1999: 109). Taking this line of thought to a more general level, attitude
development seems to constitute an important means by which individuals can structure the
multitude of objects, people, and issues they encounter daily. By forming attitudes,
individuals structure their social world into classes of objects that merit either approach or
avoidance behavior. The more accessible the attitudes are, the greater their impact on
behavior will be (Fazio, 2001: 130).
Consistent with the dual-process thinking that guides this study, we assume that
attitudes can lead to behavior by two different routes. The basic difference between the
two is the extent to which deciding on a particular course of action involves conscious
deliberation about or a spontaneous reaction to one’s perception of the immediate situation
(Fazio, 1990a: 78). The deliberative process involves individuals’ deciding how to behave in
a given situation and subsequent behavior in accordance with that decision. Like other
controlled processes, this involves considerable cognitive work (Fazio, 1990a: 78). For
reasons already stated, the process by which spontaneous reactions lead to behavior is more
interesting to this study. Of special interest is the fact that many consumption-related
behaviors appear to be of this kind and that influence may occur even though the individual
does not actively retrieve the attitude from memory and reflect upon it in any way (Fazio,
1990a: 79). Investigating this spontaneous attitude-behavior relationship, Fazio found that
the recent activation, or priming, of a construct from memory is sufficient for that
35
It must be noted, however, that some theorists have taken the complete opposite approach and claimed that
attitudes follow from rather than guide behavior (Holland & al., 2002). One influential example of this
approach is Festinger’s (1957) theory of cognitive dissonance.
construct to influence interpretations in a latter situation (Fazio, 1990a: 79). Hence, the
spontaneous attitude-behavior relationship is enormously functional for daily life, e.g.
consumer behavior. Attitudes can serve as “ready aids” that eliminate the need to appraise
an object anew upon each encounter, and thus facilitate decision-making (Fazio,
Blascovich, & Driscoll, 1993: 2). Given that an individual’s social behavior is largely a
function of his/her perception of the immediate situation (typically somewhat ambiguous),
the extent to which attitudes influence perception becomes an indirect determinant of the
degree to which attitudes guide behavior (Fazio, 1986: 208; Fazio & Zanna, 1981: 165).
Object appraisal, which following the definition advocated above is a common feature of all
attitudes, allows individuals to decide quickly and efficiently how to relate to situationally
relevant attitude objects (Blascovich & al., 1993: 165). However, and herein lies the link to
the accessibility-construct presented above, unless an attitude can be activated from
memory it cannot produce selective perception of the object in the immediate situation
(Fazio, 1986: 212). This, in turn, makes the notion of “strength of associations between
objects and their evaluation” (Fazio, 1989) crucially important.
Automatic Attitude Activation
Classical experiments is social psychology (see Wegner & Bargh, 1998, for a review) all seem
to highlight a basic conflict between the automaticity of behavior and the desire to control
it. Across several studies discussed by Wegner and Bargh, the real behavior is conceived to
be the one that occurs spontaneously, not something developed for the experimenters’
amusement or misdirection. In an attempt to outline what constitutes automatic behavior in
the context of attitude activation Fazio & al. (1986; see also Bargh & al., 1992; Chaiken &
Bargh, 1993) focused on the tendency of the stored evaluation of an attitude object to
become active on the mere observation of that object (or its symbolic equivalent) in the
environment. Automatic attitude activation can be seen as a mediating mechanism that
plays a crucial role in many significant cognitive and social processes. As it has been argued
above, the extent to which an individual’s attitude is capable of automatic activation
determines both the power that the attitude exerts on the individual’s information
processing, judgments, and behavior and the functional value of possessing the attitude
(Fazio, 2001: 129). For example, accessible attitudes alert people to the presence of
objects that have the potential for hedonic consequences and promote hedonically
meaningful categorizations of such objects. In a discussion crucially relevant to the study of
product placements, some researchers (e.g. Fazio, 1993: 753) have held that the key
determinant of automatic activation is idiosyncratic differences in the strength of the
association in memory between an object and its evaluation, whereas others (e.g. Bargh &
al., 1992) have claimed the key determinant to be the mere existence of an evaluation
stored in memory. Clearly the former explanation assigns greater significance to the
technique of product placement, by postulating that attitudes change through exposure.
Claiming that priming simply evokes pre-existing attitudes leaves less influence to the
actual media stimulus.
On the level of information processing, the notion of automaticity generally refers to
either processing without awareness and effort or processing that captures attention even
when an individual is engaged in other behavior (Isen & Diamond, 1989: 124). It is important
to note that these two concepts of automatic processing are not mutually exclusive;
automatic and attentive processes may occur together and produce different outcomes.
This, in turn, implies the possibility of viewing a TV show attentively while processing the
embedded product placements automatically. In order for this to occur, however,
placements must not be overly prominent or in other ways attract too much conscious
attention.
Attitudes to Consumer Behavior
Essentially all persuasive mass media communication can be conceptualized as attempts to
change people’s attitudes and behavior. Above, research findings in social psychology have
been presented in support of a causal relationship between the two notions. For example,
racism studies have found evaluations that were automatically activated (toward blacks) to
be predictive of people’s observed behavior (toward black peers) (Fazio, 2001: 129). Here
we narrow the scope to consumption-related behavior and argue that a similar causality can
be found in this domain. Inspired by Batra and Ray, we assume that changes in purchase
behavior is related most of all to changes in brand attitudes (1986a: 443). Before accepting
this causality, however, some important issues must be taken into account; the
generalizability of attitude functionality must be tempered by a number of considerations.
For example, the importance of a behavioral decision may moderate the effect advocated
here. In terms of the effort-reducing potential assigned to accessible attitudes, mundane
decisions may benefit more than decisions of a more profound nature (Blascovich & al.,
1993: 175). Having a very accessible positive attitude toward a particular brand of car (e.g.
BMW) does not necessarily facilitate this economically consequential purchase decision (e.g.
because the car too expensive to be a realistic option). Furthermore, a given attitude
object (e.g. beer or soft drink) may evoke more than one accessible attitude, and these
attitudes may differ in polarity (e.g. like the taste and dislike the calories) thereby perhaps
even increasing the effort of a decision (e.g. to drink or not to drink) (Blascovich & al.,
1993: 175). In spite of these moderations, however, it seems safe to assume that accessible
attitudes can often function to facilitate coping with everyday situations. Especially when
choosing among brands of regularly purchased products, attitudes (e.g. brand preferences)
facilitate efficient shopping. Without highly accessible attitudes, however, such as when
choosing among brands of less frequently purchased products, shopping requires more
cognitive effort.
Attitudes to Behavior in a Product Placement Context
To examine the importance of attitudes as a mediator between exposure to product
placements and subsequent behavior we here return to the conception of product
placements in television programs as a substitute for direct experience. Of special
importance to this discussion are two studies by Fazio and his colleagues (Fazio & Zanna,
1981; Fazio & al., 1982) indicating that attitudes formed through direct, behavioral
experience with the attitude object are (1) more predicative of subsequent behavior and (2)
more persistent over time than attitudes based on indirect experience. Especially the latter
finding is crucial to the external validity of experimental research. In order to have any
impact on consumer behavior, the effects of exposure to stimuli must hold for considerably
longer than just the duration of the experiment (e.g. see Chaiken & Bargh, 1993: 761).
Attitudes that are formed through exposure to media content have to be accessible even
several hours or days later, e.g. at the point of purchase. Fazio and his colleagues (cited in
the addendum to Chaiken & Bargh, 1993: 765) tested delays between attitude formation
and activation of up to three months and found exactly such durable effects. Baker tested
durability of effects in a classical conditioning framework and found stable effects across
two- and seven-day delays (Baker, 1999: 44).
In a study of particular relevance to product placement, Fazio and Zanna (1982)
found that specific or single-act behaviors are best predicted by specific attitudes, whereas
general attitudes, on the other hand, are more predictive of general behavior patterns
across multiple acts. Although Fazio and Zanna’s finding pertains to social behavior in
general, it seems an apt description of the different challenges that face commercial
product placements and public service announcements, respectively. That is, product
placements aim at influencing specific attitudes (e.g. brand attitudes) in order to influence
specific behavior (e.g. the purchase of a product). Public service messages typically target
general issues (e.g. drugs) in order to change behavioral patterns (e.g. drug use)36. The
view of attitudes, whether specific or general, as important antecedents of cognition (and
thus behavior) is supported by MacKenzie and Lutz’s finding that brand attitude is strongly
influenced by attitude toward the ad and hardly at all influenced by brand-related
cognition, i.e. that peripheral processing is at work in the formation of brand attitude
(MacKenzie & Lutz, 1989: 62).
Interlude: Attitudes to Behavior, Strength of Association, and MODE
As argued in the previous sections, attitudes can be thought of as useful constructs that
individuals rely on as the basis for a decision when situational constraints impair their
motivation and opportunity to consider the details of the available information (RoskosEwoldsen & Fazio, 1992: 198). Importantly, we assume this lack of motivation and
opportunity to be attributable to both the viewing context, in which product placements
are encountered, and to much of everyday consumer behavior. In the viewing experience,
the generally low level of information provision increases the proportion of inferences to
facts retrievable from memory (Berger, 1999: 557), constituting a lack of opportunity to
process deliberatively. Later, at the point of purchase, many decisions are made without
any significant motivation to process information. Under these circumstances, the MODE
model highlights the notion of attitude activation (rather than attitude extremity) as a
central component in the process by which attitudes guide behavior. According to the
model (Fazio & Towles-Schwen, 1999), automatically activated attitudes guide behavior in a
relatively spontaneous manner; that is, without the individual’s active consideration of the
attitude and without the individual’s necessary awareness of its influence. Together, the
importance assigned to accessibility and the definition of attitudes as associations in
36
See Wagner & Sundar (2003) for an extensive study of the role of attitudes in relation to PSAs.
memory between objects and their evaluation lead to the view of associative strength as a
crucial determinant of behavior.
The theory and research presented thus far have a number of methodological
implications for the experimental study of effects. First, the MODE model indicates that
explicit (self-reported) measures should be restricted to the domain of high-motivation
attitudes, whereas implicit (unobtrusive) measures are adequate for assessing attitudes
regardless of subjects’ level of motivation. According to Fazio (1986: 217) the best way to
measure associative strength (attitude-accessibility) is via response time to attitudinal or
other queries. Presentation of an attitude-object has been shown to automatically activate
from memory the evaluation that an individual associates with the object (Fazio, 2001:
115). In addition, a variety of field and laboratory research has revealed that attitudebehavior consistency is greater for accessible attitudes (see Fazio (2001) for a review). In
other words, strength of association (SOA) can be seen as a moderator variable with regard
to the direction of the relation between attitudes and behavior. In a seminal study, Fazio &
al. (1986) found that if a subject had a strong negative (positive) association to an object,
then presentation of that object as a prime facilitated the subject’s indication that an
evaluative adjective was negative (positive). Whereas the insights cited above are all
conceptual in nature, this finding seems more immediately relevant to the design of
experimental research. That is, in order to assess whether a given stimulus has affected an
individual’s associative strength, researchers may use as primes relevant attitude-objects
and subsequently measure response latencies in an evaluation task. This important
methodological implication is discussed in much more detail below.
4. The Viewing Experience: Identification and Transportation
As noted in the introduction to product placement, there seems to be a general consensus
among theorists within different fields that media images have the power to guide and
cultivate individuals’ perceptions and attitudes (e.g., see O’Guinn & Shrum (1997) or
Schrøder & al. (2003) for reviews). The purpose of this section is to investigate to more
detail the aspects of television programming and television consumption that constitute the
medium’s “guiding function” (Green, Garst, and Brock, 2004: 162). Below, we propose a
way of understanding viewers’ reconstruction of televised narratives by addressing the
procedures by which viewers cognitively and emotionally identify with the agents of fiction,
using mental models and schemata from social psychology. In doing this, we work from the
assumption that the bond audiences form with programs and characters, and the
opportunity offered by product placements to represent desirable identity characteristics
through the brand/character pairing (Karrh, 1998: 31), is an interesting vantage point in the
study of product placements. In the following we explore these aspects and potentials of
the technique, drawing further inspiration from the view of product placements as a
blurring of the line between fiction and reality and the line between entertainment and
persuasion.
Fiction versus Reality – Entertainment versus Persuasion
By addressing the concept of identification - the perceived relationship between viewers
and characters on screen - we here try to explore the boundary and potential interactions
between fiction and reality. Specifically, in the context of persuasion studies, the notion of
identification leads to the question of how viewers reconcile the competing normative and
experiential claims of fictional information in their beliefs about and actions in reality. In
asking this question, and linking identification with fictional characters to real-world
behavior, the present study differs from the majority of earlier research in at least two
ways. First, although the power of fictional narratives to influence people has never been
questioned (as an example, one may think of censorship), most persuasion studies have
addressed non-fictional advocacy messages rather than fictional genres. Second, previous
research has mostly focused on one of two issues: either on potential applications of
“everyday psychology” on the fiction experience (e.g. Prentice & Gerrig, 1999) or the realworld consequences of exposure to fiction (Green, Garst, & Brock, 2004). Instead of just
examining how viewers use their skills of interpersonal interaction when dealing with
fictional characters, we try to examine the “full circle” from application of real-life
processes on fiction and back again; that is, how the fiction experience influences real-life
behavior. Before we go as far, however, the distinction between fiction and reality, and the
way it conditions viewers’ responses, needs to be addressed in more detail.
Our cultural default may be to assume that nonfiction, with its pretension of
veridicality, and fiction, with its patina of verisimilitude but no necessary pretension to
accuracy, should be understood as distinct realms, with information gained from fiction
treated as at least potentially less reliable. Most television content is clearly distinguished
as either fiction, such as sit-com and soap opera, or nonfiction, such as news report and
documentary, although the lines are becoming increasingly blurred (Green, Garst, & Brock,
2004: 164). Although our object of study is television, our interest in dual-process theory
makes us turn to Prentice and Gerrig (1999), who have discussed the issue of reality and
fiction in relation to literature. According to Prentice and Gerrig’s review of the usefulness
of dual-process theories beyond the realm of real-world social interaction, two opposing
views can be adopted. One, inspired by Cooleridge, holds that application of fictional
insight requires a “willing suspension of disbelief” (Prentice & Gerrig, 1999: 529). Other
theorists, however, call into question the idea that information is ever greeted with default
disbelief (Prentice & Gerrig, 1999: 530). Arguing that unobtrusive persuasive stimuli in
television are considerably different from literature, we tend to advocate the latter view.
In a work related to that of Prentice and Gerrig, Gilbert (1991) summarizes laboratory
evidence showing that when subjects are presented with communication, the initial (more
primitive) response is to believe in it. Apparently, if we do have a cognitive default value, it
is to believe.
In a similar vein, but contrary to what has traditionally been the general assumption,
recent studies suggest that fiction is not inherently less persuasive than nonfiction. More
specifically, research on viewers’ and readers’ reception has shown that narratives labeled
as news (nonfiction) or as fiction had equivalent influence on perceptions of a social
problem, and that both specific and general beliefs were affected by exposure to a
narrative, regardless of whether the narrative was labeled as fiction or nonfiction (Green,
Garst, & Brock, 2004: 164). In fact, research has shown that in some cases fiction may even
be more persuasive than non-fiction. Testing his own hypothesis - that individuals do not
automatically create a separate mental category for fictional information, as compared
with factual communication (Gerrig, 1993) - Gerrig and his associates (Prentice, Gerrig, &
Bailis, 1997) found that people accepted false assertions, such as “chocolate helps you lose
weight” and “mental illness is contagious” if those assertions were embedded in fictional
narratives. The finding that people are apparently susceptible to assertions embedded in a
fictional narrative may easily be extended, for example, to product endorsements
contained within entertainment programs.
Changing the focus from media products to receivers we claim that there is nothing
unique about the mental processing of fictional narratives and characters. Rather these are
processed in much the same way as situations and people encountered in real life (e.g. see
Grodal, 1997: 85). It must be clearly noted that this is not the same as claiming that
viewers cannot tell fiction from reality. Rather perception of single elements takes place
and lead to effects on a local level, whereas assessment of reality status is carried out on a
global level. That is, although aware of the overall fictional status of a given media
product, viewers still “perform hypothetical ‘as if’ simulations of situations” (Grodal, 1997:
94). Further, Grodal states:
“When we agree to watch visual fiction, we accept a set of rules of experience and establish a viewer
personae, a mental model of the viewer as spectator of fiction, and this viewer model, this personae,
feels suspense, happiness, fear, and sadness as if witnessing similar phenomena in the non-fictive
world” (Grodal, 1997: 103)
Or, as stated in an early work by Horton and Wohl:
“At the end of the day, what is soap operas other than a never-ending examination of the
eventualities one can meet in real life?” (1956: 33)
To address the persuasive potential of commercial messages embedded in other types of
communication, we here return to the theories of learning through observing the behavior
of others that were presented above. For instance, McInnis and Jaworski have introduced
the concept of “empathy-based persuasion” to account for the process that occurs when
consumers’ attitudes are affected by vicariously experiencing the emotions the source
exhibits in reaction to brand use (MacInnis & Jaworski, 1989: 13). Whereas marketing
practitioners have apparently seized on the selling potential inherent in entertainment
media, psychologists and media scholars are only beginning to understand the nature and
mechanisms of fictional influence. However, early evidence suggests that two mechanisms,
low elaborative scrutiny and high experienced “transportation”37, may underlie the
influence of fictional communication (Green, Garst, & Brock, 2004: 161).
37
The concept of transportation is introduced below
By focusing on the fiction-reality dichotomy, we take an approach comparable to the
one often applied in traditional advertising research with the distinction between dramatic
and argumentative forms (e.g. see Deighton, Romer, & McQueen, 1989). That is, we
hypothesize dramatic forms - be it dramas in a classical sense or more pathetic genres have the potential to spark audience involvement and identification, whereas
argumentative genres are processed in a more rational manner. In terms of persuasiveness,
effective fiction is hypothesized to influence beliefs by a path that evokes more expression
of feeling and verisimilitude, less counterargument, and less direct elicitation of beliefs
than occurs with effective factual argument (Deighton, Romer, & McQueen, 1989: 335).
Andriasova and Wagner (2004) have applied this theory in a study of product placements
and shown promising results. However, Andriasova and Wagner worked with the two distinct
variables of “desire to emulate the characters” and “program involvement” and found both
to correlate significantly with persuasiveness. This leads us to suggest the concept of
identification as a unifying construct explaining the persuasive effect.
Identification
The following discussion is based on an inclusive reading of literature addressing
identification and related phenomena. That is, in the literature reviewed for this section,
the process in question is referred to as “identification”, “transportation”, “empathy”, and
“para-social interaction”. Although the different theories differ in their implications, we
consider the common traits to be more prevalent than the differences. For the sake of
conceptual consistency, we shall therefore use the unifying notion of identification in the
experimental part of the study.
On a general level, theories of identification (e.g. see Jo & Berkowitz, 1994;
Livingstone, 1998), transportation (Green, Garst, & Brock, 2004) and para-social interaction
(Horton & Wohl, 1956) all deal with the ways in which an illusion of personal relationship
between viewers and media personae can be created. Of special interest to the social
psychological approach advocated here is the conception of audience involvement in
dramatic programs as consisting of many of the same roles as occur in normal social
interaction, e.g., in primary groups (Horton & Wohl, 1956: 30). The conceptual framework
that humans regard as their ‘real-world knowledge’ largely consists of information mediated
through stories featuring people they have never met, or who do not exist, and broadcasted
events they did not witness or that never happened. Whether such stories are fictional or
not, people learn about the outside world from them and frequently build up affective
relationships with the characters, sometimes undertaking action to seek or avoid
interaction. In extreme cases people write love letters to a soap opera character or hang
garlic from the ceiling to ward off vampires. Hence, fictional characters seem to satisfy
basic functions; they are used as sources of information about the real world and serious
life events (e.g., Busselle, 2001; Prentice & Gerrig, 1999, pp. 529-530).
Adapted to the focus of the present study, identification is here viewed as a motivational
state that affects the extent and focus of consumers’ attention and comprehension
processes, and thus the specific meanings that are produced (Celsi & Olson, 2001: 210).
Compared to some earlier theories of identification, which have presumed a primary
identification with the (movie) image as such as antecedent of the secondary character
identification (e.g. see Frandsen & Bruun, 2004: 6), we consider identification to be a
general psychological process that doesn’t need mediation.
A crucial issue when examining the effect of identification on product placement
effectiveness is the intimate tie that often exists between the product and characters in the
story or the story line. Hence, contrary to what has been found to be the case in traditional
advertising, where higher involvement in the surrounding story reduces the involvement
with the commercials (McCarty, 2004: 58), one might assume that high involvement in the
story would increase the effect of product placements that are intimately tied to the plot.
We argue that when individuals watch a movie or a television program, their primary focus
is on comprehending the story and that an adequate understanding of product placement
requires an understanding of how people comprehend the programming (Yang, RoskosEwoldsen, & Roskos-Ewoldsen, 2004: 80).
As early as 1916, Münsterberg stated how spectators ‘share’ the emotions of the
characters on screen and simulate these so that “all the resulting sensations from muscles,
joints, tendons, from skin and viscera, from blood circulation and breathing, give the color
of living experience to the emotional reflection in our mind” (cited in Grodal, 1997: 82).
Along the same line of reasoning, Balázs (1970) posited that “[characters] need not tell us
what they feel, for we see what they see and see it as they see it (…) Herein lies the
psychological act of ‘identification’” (cited in Grodal, 1997: 83). Several authors have
suggested that viewers’ identification with characters influence the extent to which they
are affected by the witnessed occurrences. For instance, in her study of soaps Livingstone
(1998) found that it was not sociological or demographic factors that influenced viewers’
interpretation, but psychological factors. The most important factor was identification.
Whether the viewers identified with (or saw themselves similar to) any of the characters
was shown to be important in how viewers interpreted the narrative (Livingstone, 1998: 56).
The viewers who identify with the actors they watch might vividly imagine themselves as
these characters and think of themselves as carrying out the depicted actions. As a
consequence, the ideas and action tendencies associated with the depicted behavior should
be activated relatively strongly (Jo & Berkowitz, 1994: 46). It is important, however, to
note that identification does not exclude a certain distance. Such distance seems to keep
the observer from becoming totally involved with a fictional character, which could be too
scary or too desirable to be pleasurable. Instead, we advocate a view of the fiction
experience as the performance of hypothetical ‘as if’ simulations of situations. Hence,
participation in fiction may function as a form of role-playing. To the extent that viewers
identify closely with one or more of the characters and experience the events of the story
as they unfold, they are likely to come away feeling that those people and events could
have been real (Prentice & Gerrig, 1999: 531). Recently, Reesink has conceptualized this
fiction-reality continuum of reception in terms of viewer discourse. In a study of the reality
show Big Brother, Reesink distinguishes between the “psychological discourse” applied by
academic observers to explain the phenomenon and the “soap discourse”, in which ‘normal’
viewers accept the characters’ interactions as if they were between real people (Reesink,
2001: 11). Interestingly, the two types of discourse are far from mutually exclusive;
theoretical insight in underlying mechanisms does not prevent viewers from ‘getting lost’ in
characters’ interactions.
By stating this, we do not mean to imply that all viewers are equally likely to identify
with the characters of any given program. From our own television consumption, we know
that some mechanisms of selection are at work to determine which programs we get
immersed in and which programs leave us unaffected. Most importantly perhaps, the
salience and activation-power of fictions may be enhanced if the ‘texture’ of protagonists
has a close match to that of the particular viewer. We draw this idea from early studies
showing that a communicatee’s perception of his/her similarity to a communicator is an
important determinant of the communicator’s effectiveness (Berscheid, 1966: 670).
Although Berscheid examines real-world interactions, we assume the finding to be relevant
in a mediated context as well. That is, similar to real life, where physical attractiveness is
decisive in the initial stages of choosing friends, because the availability of other
information is limited, the characters we ‘meet’ in fiction are usually quite unfamiliar to us
and the time in which we become acquainted with them is no longer than the length of
exposure to the (art)work. Therefore, during the first few moments, physical attractiveness
is used to assess the inner qualities of the fictional character.
In another relevant early study, Festinger (1954) found that people, who are similar
to oneself, especially with regard to an opinion but also on other criteria, are more likely
seen as the proper referents for that particular opinion. If a discrepancy in opinion exists
between people who perceive each other to be the proper referents for an opinion,
Festinger predicted and found a tendency to change one’s opinion to move it closer to the
opinion of the referent. Wagner and Sundar (2003) have applied this theory in a study of
celebrity spokespersons in anti-drug PSAs with promising results. In the context of product
placement, one may imagine Festinger’s theory to work along the unconscious lines of
“Rachel (Friends) likes Carlsberg Beer. I like Rachel. Therefore I ‘have to’ like Carlsberg
Beer”.
Para-social Interaction
To elaborate the idea of the almost-personal relationship between viewers and on-screen
character, we now turn to the concept of para-social interaction, as it was introduced by
Horton & Wohl as early as 1956. In outlining their theory, the authors drew inspiration from
the advent and increasing influence of new mass media, notably television. As stated by
Horton and Wohl:
“One of the striking characteristics of the new mass media – radio, television, and the movies – is that
they give the illusion of face-to-face relationship with the performer. The conditions of response to
the performer are analogous to those in a primary group. The most remote and illustrious men are met
as if they were in the circle of one’s peers. (…) We propose to call this seeming face-to-face
relationship between spectator and performer a para-social relationship. ” (Horton & Wohl, 1956: 27)
As the citation indicates, Horton and Wohl combine social psychology and media theory and
as such their theory is a welcome input in the present discussion. Specifically, Horton and
Wohl describe people’s relation to media characters along the same dimensions as one
would use to describe aspects of interpersonal interaction; the only difference being the
absence of reciprocity (Frandsen & Bruun, 2004: 12). Interestingly, para-social interaction
occurs when the relationship between viewers and characters is of a lasting nature, and
when the characters’ actions are relatively predictable (which intuitively seems to be the
case in serialized television narratives). To viewers, characters in television fiction (e.g.
soaps) and the actors that play these characters are often one and the same (Frandsen &
Bruun, 2004: 9).
Essential to the theory is that viewers have to believe what they are seeing as
credible and natural in order to become a part of the para-social interaction. When this
belief is present, the audience is assumed to become involved in the action and social
relations of the program. Thus, the audience changes status back and forth between
observer and participant (Horton & Wohl, 1956: 27). Rather than immersing herself in the
production, the viewer answers the characters back, feels sorry for them when in difficulty,
hates them when they are belligerent and to all intents and purposes responds and replies
to them as though they were people she knows intimately. Herein lies the para-social
interaction.
Although the theory explicitly addresses the processing of non-fictional stimuli and
was introduced at a time where product placement was still in its infancy, Horton and Wohl
did address the technique’s commercial potential:
The audience is supposed to play the role of the lover when facing the personae’s lover […] The
audience is expected to benefit from the [personae’s] wisdom, contemplate his advice, sympathize
with him through hardship, forgive his wrongdoings, buy the products he recommends, and keep his
sponsors informed of the respect he enjoys” (Horton & Wohl, 1956: 30 – emphasis added)
Clearly, Horton and Wohl are here touching upon a crucial dimension of product placement
in televised fiction. Unlike traditional advertising, product placements are embedded in a
context that is often highly involving. As indicated by Horton and Wohl (1956) the extent to
which this character-involvement is transformed into product-related attitudes is an
important antecedent of persuasive potential. Serialized television narratives, due to the
sustained relationship that is established between viewers and characters, may be
especially prone to spark such transfer (Avery & Ferraro, 2000: 219). Still drawing on Horton
and Wohl (1956) we assume the role played by fictional characters can serve as an idealized
version of everyday performance – a para-social approximation to events that perhaps never
occur in real life. Addressing this issue, Horton and Wohl describe the contribution of the
personae as that of “holding up a magic mirror to his followers, by virtue of playing his
mutual role better and more ideally than partners in real life ever do” (1956: 32).
Our main argument for viewing identification and para-social interaction as closely
related is the fact that both concepts deal with the ways in which an illusion of personal
relationship between viewers and media personae can be created. Of special interest to the
social psychological approach advocated here is the conception of audience involvement in
dramatic programs as consisting of many of the same roles as occur in normal social
interaction.
Transportation
Before discussing how theories of the viewer-character relationship can be applied in actual
effects research, we introduce one last concept, “transportation”. The notion of
transportation was proposed by Gerrig (1993) and further developed by Green and Brock
(2000) as a mechanism whereby fiction can effect beliefs. Transportation is defined as
absorption into a story (Green & Brock, 2000: 701) and entails imagery, affect, and
attentional focus. Although transportation was introduced in studies of literary fiction
(Green & Brock, 2000; Green, Garst, & Brock, 2004) it seems equally relevant to television.
Instead of being aware of their physical surroundings, transported viewers see the action of
the narrative unfold before them. They react emotionally to events that are simply the
staged interaction of actors (Green, Garst, & Brock, 2004: 168). To the extent that
individuals are absorbed into a story or transported into a narrative world, they may show
effects of the story on their real-world beliefs (Green & Brock, 2000: 701). Through this
process parts of the world of origin may become inaccessible. In other words, the viewer is
assumed to lose access to some of the real-world facts, including the ones that contradict
the assertions made in the narrative, in favor of accepting the narrative world that the
author (screen writer) has created.
Beyond the loss of access to real-world facts, transported viewers may experience
strong emotions and motivations, even when they know the events in the story are not real
(e.g. see Gerrig, 1999: 179-191). For example, in a series of studies carried out by Green
and Brock (2000), transported individuals – as measured on a paper-and-pencil
Transportation Scale (p. 704) - showed more story-consistent beliefs on both story-specific
and general attitudinal measures than did individuals who were less transported. Green and
Brock’s demonstration of the power of fictional narratives highlights an interesting
difference between rhetorical communication and narratives. Whereas rhetoric is much
influenced by framing – e.g., the impact of arguments is affected by source credibility or
perception of speaker’s intent - Green and Brock’s findings suggest that once a viewer is
“rolling along” with a compelling narrative, the source has diminishing influence. In this
fashion, the belief positions implied by a narrative might be adopted regardless of whether
they correspond with reality. Thus, fictional narratives might be used to advantage by lowcredible sources or by speakers who lack cogent arguments.
Because transportation is hypothesized to be related to belief or attitude change, it
is helpful to distinguish between transportation and cognitive elaboration. Whereas dualprocess theory addresses amount of thought per se, transportation theory posits processing
that is qualitatively different from the traditional systematic or heuristic modes.
Elaboration implies critical attention to major points of an argument, whereas
transportation is an immersion into a text. Elaboration leads to attitude change via logical
consideration and evaluation of arguments, whereas transportation may lead to persuasion
through other mechanisms. First, transportation may make narrative experience seem more
like real experience. Second, transportation may reduce negative cognitive responding.
Finally, transportation is likely to create strong feelings toward the characters; the
experiences or beliefs of those characters may then have an enhanced effect on viewers’
beliefs (Green & Brock, 2000: 702). This attachment to characters may play a critical role in
narrative based attitude change. Source credibility is usually an external “given” in
persuasive communications; however, for narrative communications, attachment to a
protagonist may be an important determinant of the persuasiveness of a story. If a viewer
likes or identifies with a particular character, statements made by that character, or
implications of events experienced by that character, may carry special weight. This
attachment may extend to objects or consumer products used by (or praised by) characters;
on a more or less conscious level, viewers may form more positive attitudes through this
association (Green, Garst, & Brock, 2004: 170)
The differences from dual-process theory, or rather the questioning of its ability to
capture the phenomenological experience of viewing fiction, does not make the notion of
transportation incompatible with the general dual-process framework. For instance, one
may still draw upon the MODE model and suggest that transportation into a story causes
people to be less motivated (or less able) to disbelieve any particular conclusion;
transported individuals are so absorbed in the story that they would likely be reluctant to
stop and critically analyze propositions presented therein.
Summary: Implications for Product Placement Research
Taken together, the theories about the television viewing experience that have been
presented in this section have important implications for the experimental study of product
placement effectiveness. Most importantly, the literature review leads us to assume that
products placed in programs and related to characters that generate high levels of
identification among viewers will elicit significantly more positive responses than products
placed in programs that generate less viewer identification. In our attitude-to-behavior
framework, what we expect is that product placements encountered under conditions of
high identification will strengthen viewers’ positive associations, make these associations
more accessible, and thus facilitate attitude-congruent behavior. In terms of study design,
this leaves us with two challenges. First, we need to successfully manipulate stimulus
materials (television programs) in order to generate differing levels of viewer identification.
Second, we need to develop and apply a reliable measure of non-verbalizable effects. The
following sections deal with to these two issues in reverse order.
5. Strength of Association: Definition and Measurement
In previous sections it has been argued that effect studies in product placement need to
adopt a different paradigm to better acknowledge the unobtrusive nature of the technique.
Instead of relying on self-reported measures of recall, attitude, and purchase intention,
we’ve suggested that researchers focus on the less conscious way in which product
placements are processed and on the less verbalizable effects that thus occur. Above, the
notion of attitudes and especially the ease with which these attitudes are activated from
memory has been introduced as a potential mediating variable between exposure to mass
media stimuli and resulting behavior. In the present section we aim to further
operationalize this construct in order to make it directly applicable in experimental
research. In doing this, we question a number of the established dogma of qualitative media
studies in a way that may seem controversial. It must be stressed that we do not do this in
order to arouse controversy for controversy’s own sake, but rather to acknowledge what we
consider to be the specific analytical challenges related to advertising in general and
unobtrusive advertising in particular.
Strength of Association (SOA)
The concept of Strength of Association (SOA; Fazio, 1990b) is an extension of the ideas
presented above on (1) motivation and opportunity as determinants of processing, (2) the
attitude-behavior relationship, and (3) the automatic activation of attitudes. Following from
the definition of attitudes as paired associations in memory of objects and objectevaluations, SOA can be seen as a determinant of the accessibility of attitudes from
memory and, hence, the likelihood that the associated evaluation will be activated
automatically upon the individual’s exposure to an attitude object (Fazio, 2001: 125).
Whereas traditional attitude measures rely on people’s ability to express their own
reactions, e.g. by using semantic differential scales, having participants rate objects on an
attitude-barometer or otherwise, SOA measures may allow us to assess persuasive effects of
which viewers themselves are not aware (Dovidio & Fazio, 1991: 206). That is, SOA
determines the likelihood that attitudes will guide behavior and can therefore be seen as a
measure of the power and function of an attitude. The greater the accessibility, the more
likely an attitude can be activated automatically, without the conscious attention of the
individual (Blascovich & al., 1993: 165). Hence, compared to traditional comprehensionrecall theories, SOA is found at a deeper level of subjective processing.
Also very relevant to the present study, SOA is hypothesized to change through
“associative learning” (Fazio, 2001: 127). That is, associative strength is affected by the
simple and direct pairing in memory of an object and a descriptor – a process similar to
“peripheral processing” in the Elaboration-Likelihood Model or “spontaneous processing” in
the MODE. This connection to dual-process theory is illustrated by Wagner and Sundar’s
research on anti-drug ad viewing styles (Wagner & Sundar, 2003). Manipulating participants’
motivation to process - by having the experimenter exaggerate and downplay, respectively,
the importance of the study - Wagner and Sundar found the most effective changes in SOA
to be achieved through peripheral processing. Furthermore, recent research conducted by
Andriasova and Wagner has shown that while product placement consumption may not lead
to a change in viewers’ self-reported attitudes toward placed products, watching them can
influence consumers’ product-related strength of association (Andriasova & Wagner,
2004)38. As the citations indicate, research on SOA as a result of media consumption is still a
relatively novel phenomenon. However, the first results seem very promising and should
attract scholarly attention in the future.
Unobtrusive Measures of SOA
As noted throughout this study, effect research in unobtrusive advertising should strive to
develop an indirect measure that circumvents response biases and other problems
associated with direct reports; that is, an assessment of attitudes in which subjects either
are not aware that their attitudes are being measured, and therefore cannot adapt their
responses to what they find socially or situationally desirable (Dovidio & Fazio, 1991: 210),
or in which answers are given at a pace too high to allow conscious control. Though some
work has been done toward this end, the development of implicit measures relevant to
social psychology in general and media effects studies in particular is still in its infancy. The
literature, in spite of a recent surge of interest in the use of implicit measurement
techniques39, has not matured to the point at which many firm conclusions can be drawn
38
The methodological aspects of Wagner and his colleagues’ work are discussed shortly
Recently four special issues of influential journals have been devoted to the issue: Journal of Experimental
Social Psychology on “Unconscious Processes in Stereotyping and Prejudice (1997), Cognition & Emotion on
“Automatic Affective Processing” (2001), Zeitschrift für Experimentelle Psychologie on “Attitude Measurement
39
(Fazio & Olson, 2003: 320). However, a number of studies have compared the predictive
abilities of SOA measures to self-report and found the former to be superior (Dovidio &
Fazio, 1991; Fazio & Towles-Schwen, 1999; Wagner & Sundar, 2003). In the past research
that has come to our attention, two different (albeit conceptually related) methodological
constructions have been proposed for assessing the evaluative associations that underlie
deep-level attitudes. The two - evaluative semantic priming and the Implicit Association
Test (IAT) - share a common focus on attitudes that are manifest as actions or judgments
under the control of automatically activated evaluations, without the performer’s
awareness of that causation (Greenwald, McGhee, & Schwartz, 1998: 1464).
Before we turn to the more detailed discussion of specific unobtrusive measures, it
must be noted that our preference for these is highly context specific. That is, we prefer
unobtrusive measures because we examine a construct assumed not be measurable via selfreport. This does not imply that we generally advocate Schein-Wesen thinking and consider
non-verbalizable attitudes more ‘real’ than explicit ones. Moreover, it should be noted that
implicit measures do not necessarily assess implicit (unconscious) attitudes. Participants
may be unaware that their attitudes are being assessed, but that does not mean they are
unaware that they posses these attitudes (Fazio & Olson, 2003: 315). This consideration
obtains crucial significance in the empirical part of this study (reported below), where the
strength of research participants’ associations toward different computer brands is
measured using unobtrusive methods.
Evaluative Semantic Priming
In the method referred to as evaluative semantic priming, differences in SOA are
operationalized in terms of how quickly subjects can evaluate an attitude object (Fazio &
al., 1986; Chaiken & Bargh, 1993: 759). Experimental subjects are primed with an attitude
object and subsequently given a semantic evaluation task. Typically, in this evaluation task
subjects are asked to categorize adjectives (positive/negative) as quickly and accurately as
possible. The pattern of facilitation that is exhibited on positive versus negative adjectives –
usually the time needed to correctly categorize the presented words - is seen as an
indication of the individual’s (latent) attitude toward the primed object (Fazio & al., 1995:
1013). That is, if exposure to a given prime (e.g. puppies) results in faster categorization of
using the Implicit Association Test (IAT) (2001), and Journal of Personality and Social Psychology on “Implicit
Prejudice and Stereotyping” (2001).
positively than negatively valenced adjectives (e.g. “cute” vs. “evil”), the subject is
considered to posses a positive attitude toward the prime. As the example indicates,
priming measures focus on what is automatically activated by the primed stimulus; the
process is potentiated by the automatic activation of an evaluation associated with the
prime, and any consequent effect on the latency of response to positive versus negative
targets provides information about the evaluation of the prime (Fazio & Olson, 2003: 310).
Priming is explained in the theoretical framework of category activation according to which
concepts (such as words and persons) are represented in memory by nodes in a network of
associations. Priming can activate a concept node, thereby increasing the probability of its
use in subsequent tasks (Pratkanis & Greenwald, 1988: 343).
Some studies have indicated that priming measures may be sensitive enough to serve
as measures of individual differences in the strength of automatic attitudinal evaluation
(e.g. Bargh & al., 1992; Fazio, 1993; Fazio & al. 1986; Hermans, de Houwer, & Eelen, 1994;
Sanbonmatsu & Fazio, 1986; Sanbonmatsu, Osborne, & Fazio, 1986), whereas other studies
have indicated that the measure is relatively unaffected by variations in attitude strength
(notably Bargh & al., 1992). Regardless of this inconsistency, however, priming studies have
shown good predictive ability in terms of subsequent behavior (see Fazio & Olson, 2003:
317), especially, and consistent with the MODE model, among individuals whose motivation
to control responses was relatively low.
Implicit Association Test (IAT)
Compared to evaluative semantic priming and its appealing simplicity, the Implicit
Association Test (IAT) is less parsimonious. However, by complicating the procedure
somewhat, the IAT seems better able to resist participants’ ‘masking’ by self-presentation
strategies (such as the reluctance to admit being influenced by persuasive communication).
The IAT assesses the association between a target-concept discrimination and an attitude
dimension (Greenwald, McGhee, & Schwartz, 1998: 1465). The method focuses on the ease
with which participants can associate a response intended to signal a positive (or negative)
reaction to the stimulus with a second response regarding some attribute dimension other
than evaluation. The critical portion of the IAT involves a combined categorization task for
which a response key has two meanings (Fazio, 2001: 135). For example subjects may be
asked to simultaneously perform the evaluative task of categorizing adjectives (e.g.
“good”, “beautiful”, “gloomy” etc.) as positive/negative and the non-evaluative task of
sorting nouns (e.g. “sparrow”, “parrot”, “revolver”, “riffle” etc.) into two main categories
(“birds” and “weapons”). Noun-adjective evaluative congruence (e.g. flower-beautiful;
weapon-nasty) facilitates responding to the target, producing variations in response
latencies that can be used to measure automatic evaluation of the prime category
(Greenwald, McGhee, & Schwartz, 1998: 1464). Of course, sorting birds and flowers is not
directly relevant to a study of product placements. Nor is the facilitation achieved by
pairing congruent nouns and adjectives revolutionary. However, and herein lies the appeal
to this study, the method seems to lend itself readily to studies of a more commercial
nature. That is, by substituting the nouns mentioned above with the main attributes of a
given product (i.e. the product placed in a previously shown program) or other product
identifiers, researchers are able to measure consumers’ attitudinal responses to
placements. Andriasova & Wagner (2004) did just this using as stimulus the placement of
Snuggle® laundry detergent in an episode of the sit-com Friends. After viewing an excerpt
from the episode, participants were administered a pencil-and-paper IAT in which “soft”
(assumed to be a key product-attribute) and “hard” served as judgment items. As noted
above, Andriasova and Wagner (2004) found a significant facilitation effect when “soft” or
synonyms for this word (“fluffy”, “gentle”, “comfy” etc.) were paired with positive
adjectives, indicating that the placement had positively affected participants’ productrelated SOA. Interestingly, this facilitation effect was not found in a no-exposure control
group. These findings, adding to two earlier studies (Wagner, 2004; Wagner & Sundar, 2003)
showing significant differences between IAT-scores and self-reported attitude-measures,
strongly indicate that unobtrusive assessment of SOA can yield interesting results to the
study of product placements. Moreover, studies in other areas of social psychology have
found the IAT to be more sensitive to evaluative differences than evaluative semantic
priming (Greenwald, McGhee, & Schwartz, 1998: 1478) and various studies have
demonstrated that IAT can be a better indicator of behavior than explicit attitude
statements (e.g. Fazio & Olson, 2003: 303). Taken together, these indications of the IAT’s
applicability in research areas conceptually similar to ours, lead us to prefer this method. In
the next section, we describe to more detail how the measure is adopted to fit the present
purpose.
Interlude: Discussion of Experimental Research
Before we get as far, however, some basic methodological issues need to be clarified and
some potential critiques must be addressed. Most importantly, the epistemological basis for
experimental effects research has been the subject of some debate. Whereas
experimentation has been an indispensable part of the natural sciences as far anyone can
remember; its use in media studies is still a relatively novel phenomenon (Zikmund, 1997:
271). Needless to say, however, the novelty is not the sole reason why the concept has
sparked controversy. Rather, the basic idea of isolating processes meant to occur in the real
world and studying them out of context is far from the epistemology advocated by most
qualitative researchers. In our context, the question can be raised whether artificial
laboratory settings and an indirect measure said to represent associative strength actually
capture the real-life processes we aim to investigate. In all likelihood, scholars adhering to
qualitative fieldwork would say that they do not, because the very setting violates external
validity. Hence, the question is highly relevant when presenting a study inspired by the
American tradition of social psychology to a continental European audience 40. As a result,
our answer may seem controversial, even conceptually incompatible with the dominant
qualitative view. In our opinion, however, this potential controversy is brought about more
than anything by differing views of external validity. That is, whereas qualitative
researchers tend to view external validity in terms of naturalistic research context, we have
no illusion of recreating such context. Instead, we aim at establishing a non-naturalistic
context that recreates mental processes, as they would occur in real life. The key to
achieving this is our unobtrusive experimental design. Instead of assessing people’s
verbalizable responses, we use the Implicit Association Test to blur the actual purpose of
study. By doing this we hope to avoid generating an unrealistically high degree of
involvement with stimuli that are meant to be processed in a spontaneous fashion.
Another potential critique concerns the generalizability of experimental findings.
This issue is addressed in the “Participants” and “Stimulus Materials” sections below. Here
suffice it to note that we consider generalizability to lie in the two-step operation of
selecting appropriate stimuli and assessing their effects on participants. That is, we do not
claim to that our exact findings apply to everybody everywhere. However, we do claim that
40
According to Rasmussen (1998) Danish media scholars are generally among the most faithful to the
Humanities and to qualitative methodology
successful confirmation of our experimental hypotheses would indicate a promising
potential of the identification theory.
6. Experiment: Changing SOA with Product Placements
The experiment reported here continues the ongoing ‘research conversation’ where
Andriasova and Wagner (2004) left off. As presented above, Andriasova and Wagner’s
research showed that product placements have the power to influence viewers’ productrelated SOA in a way unparalleled by influence on self-reported attitude measures. This
experiment seeks to replicate Andriasova and Wagner’s general results and goes a step
further in an attempt to investigate factors that may underlie their findings. In doing so, we
try to operationalize the theories presented in previous sections about viewers’
identification with television shows as a possible antecedent of the effects of product
placements on valenced persuasion measures. In accordance with the methodological
standpoints that have been advocated throughout this thesis, the experiment applies an
unobtrusive measure of the effect of product placements on viewers’ brand attitudes based
on the evaluations that are automatically activated on the presentation of brand identifiers.
Hence, as all experimental research, this experiment aims to test the explanatory power of
hypotheses developed based on both general theory and previous research. To sum up the
ideas developed thus far, we here present four hypotheses upon which the experimental
study rests. The first two express the attempt to replicate Andriasova and Wagner’s (2004)
key findings:
H1: Participants who view a product placement will exhibit significantly more positive
product-related SOA than those who do not view a placement.
H2: Participants who view a product placement will not exhibit significantly more positive
self-reported product-attitudes than those who do not view a placement.
In hypotheses three and four we address the concept of identification and the
methodological dimension:
H3: Viewers’ level of identification with the television program in which the product
placement occurs will predict their product-related SOA.
H4: Viewers’ level of identification with the television program in which the product
placement occurs will not predict their self-reported attitudes toward the placed product.
Method
In a three-conditions between-participants experiment, all participants’ (N = 48) productrelated SOAs toward a placed product were measured with pencil-and-paper scales. Prior to
measurement, participants were randomly assigned to either one of the two experimental
conditions (identification condition or no-identification condition) or the control condition.
The goal of assigning participants randomly to conditions was to eliminate, or at least
control, potential distorting variations that result from chance; that is, to assure that
groups were identical with respect to all variables except the experimental treatment.
Participants assigned to one of the experimental conditions first viewed one of two sevenminute TV program excerpts that contained product placements, while control participants
(zero-exposure) simply completed the measures. Across the three groups, all participants
completed the same measures in the same order, and all groups were told that they were
participating in a general study examining the effects of media. The posttest control group
design can be diagrammed as follows:
Experimental groups: R
Control Group:
R
X1, 2
O1, 2
O3
With R signifying random assignment, X the experimental treatment, and O the
observations.
Participants
48 undergraduate students from two advertising classes at a major American university
participated in the study as a course requirement introducing them to social science
research methods41. Given that we aimed to test the influence of character identification
on product placement effectiveness and given that a pretest was conducted to assess which
television shows generated high and low degrees of identification in a sample population
demographically similar to the research participant population, a student sample was
considered perfectly appropriate. Hence, it is important to stress that we do not work with
a random representative sample. As noted above, the generalizability we sought to achieve
41
As pointed out below, participants were not made aware of this educational purpose until after completion
of the experiment
was at the level of character-viewer identification; that is, we did not aim to generalize
from student sample to general population. On the contrary, such generalization is
conceptually incompatible with the idea of target audiences and their unusually high level
of identification with characters in their favorite shows. Herein lies one of the specificities
of advertising research compared to other areas of study. Whereas other types of study
must adhere to principles of representativeness to attain explanatory power, the concept of
a target audience – and thus the method of purposive sampling – is a sine qua non of
advertising effects research.
Participants were recruited early in their introductory semester, meaning that they
had not yet read extensively about the topics of investigation. Theoretically, and, as the
findings show, in practice, this reduces the risk of demand characteristics due to
participants’ guessing the purpose of the experiment (Stafford & al., 2002: 24).
Each condition was run in three separate experimental sessions. Sixteen students
were randomly assigned to each of the experimental groups and sixteen were assigned to
the control group. In order to not give away the purpose of study, participants were simply
told that they were participating in a study examining the effects of media. As noted above,
this ‘blurring’ was undertaken to eliminate potential demand characteristics, i.e.
experimental design elements that unintentionally hint to subjects about the
experimenter’s hypotheses. In the present example, where the phenomenon being studied
is hypothesized to function at a not fully conscious level, this is crucially important. Thus,
by not presenting the research topic as “product placement effectiveness” we sought to
avoid the potential threat of constant error that arises if participants recognize the goal of
study and try to act in a manner consistent with the experimental treatment.
Pretest
In order to select appropriate stimulus materials, a pretest (N=105) was run separately one
week prior to the actual experiment (see appendix 1 and 2). In this pretest participants
demographically similar to participants in the subsequent experiment were administered a
questionnaire addressing their level of identification with characters in six television shows.
Before selecting the six pretest-shows, the decision was made to focus on shows featuring
placements of Apple® computers. Computers were chosen due to their relevance to the
sample population. Moreover, there seems to be an extremely strong dichotomy at work
between the Macintosh® and Microsoft® platforms – a dichotomy that leads us to assume the
existence of strongly held associations among potential consumers. In addition to this, the
dichotomy between Apple Computers® and its rival Microsoft® makes it very suitable for the
Implicit Association Test (see below).
In addition to their product placements, pretest shows were chosen based on a
consideration of genre. This was done in acknowledgement of previous research showing
that the genre aspect is crucial in viewers’ identification processes; that is, certain
prototypical genres activate certain responses. In the product placement context, this has
important implications for practitioners and researchers alike. For practitioners the
challenge seems to lie in choosing the appropriate genres of programming on which to lay
their product placement emphasis. For researchers wanting to examine the potential of the
technique, it seems reasonable to focus, at least in the outset, on the genres most likely to
spark viewer identification. On an overall level this issue has recently been addressed by
Frandsen and Bruun (2004). Adopting a more general media studies (rather than consumer
behavior) approach, the two researchers quote Corner’s statement that:
“Genre is a principal factor in the directing of audience choice and of audience expectations and in the
organizing of the subsets of cultural competencies and dispositions appropriate for watching, listening
to, and reading different kinds of things” (Corner, cited in Frandsen & Bruun, 2004: 3)
As pointed out by Frandsen and Bruun, the core assumption advocated by Corner is that the
notion of genre encompasses textual characteristics as well as viewers’ expectations and
schemata. That is, different genres can be assumed to have different functions and offer
viewers different types of experience (Frandsen & Bruun, 2004: 4).
Elaborating on Frandsen and Bruun’s general ideas, one may assume that
identification is most likely to occur when watching a drama whose central characters
possess desirable attributes, e.g. due to their perceived similarity to viewers. Conversely,
Frandsen and Bruun speculate, some television genres, e.g. situation comedy, may impede
identification by their obvious staging, the use of the actors’ real names etc. (Frandsen &
Bruun, 2004: 11). Although it was not an explicit goal of ours to test this idea, the pretest
rendered it some initial support. Hence, the one sit-com chosen for the pretest – Absolutely
Fabulous (BBC) – scored by far the lowest on identification, and was therefore chosen as
experimental stimulus in the no-identification condition.
The actual pretest questionnaire asked participants to rate their degree of
agreement on six semantic differential (likert) scales. Answers were summed to calculate
an identification index and the two shows scoring the highest and lowest were chosen as
experimental stimuli for the identification and no-identification conditions, respectively.
Pretest questionnaires are reproduced in appendix 1 and scores are presented in appendix
2.
Stimulus Materials
Participants in the identification condition viewed a seven-minute excerpt from the 1st
season of the television drama serial The O.C. (Fox, 2004)42. The O.C. is an immensely
popular prime time show portraying the lives of college age youth in the wealthy community
of Orange County, California. Apparently, in a number of respects the action of the show is
comparable to the life among college students in equally affluent Austin, Texas, where the
study was conducted. This was confirmed by the pretest, in which students similar to the
experimental participants showed a high level of identification with the show and its
characters and a high degree of perceived similarity between their own lives and the
action. The excerpt from the show - episode 25 “The Shower”, originally aired in April, 2004
- contained a relatively prominent visual placement of Apple Computers ®. During a dialogue
between two of the main characters, Ryan and Seth, several close-ups show one of them in
the left half of the picture while giving equal exposure to an iMac® computer in the other
half.
Participants in the no-identification condition viewed a seven-minute excerpt from
the less known British show Absolutely Fabulous (BBC). Absolutely Fabulous is the story of
Edina Monsoon, a fortyish PR-person and her much more mature teenage-daughter Saffron.
The show is set in a London upper class home and depicts frequent and heavy consumption
of brand name champagne, vodka, and controlled substances. Hence, compared to The
O.C., Absolutely Fabulous can be assumed to be much less recognizable to American college
youth. This was confirmed by the pretest, in which the sit-com achieved the lowest level of
identification and perceived similarity of all shows. Similar to the excerpt from The O.C.,
the excerpt (episode 6 “Small Opening”, originally aired in April 2001) contained visual
placement of an Apple product; somewhat unusually, the upper class family has an Apple
Cube® computer sitting on the kitchen table next to more ordinary kitchen appliances.
During a heated dialogue between three of the main characters, the computer attains visual
prominence several times.
42
Screen shots from both shows are presented in appendix 8.
As mentioned, both placements are visual. This modality - as opposed to verbal or
audiovisual - was mainly chosen because we assume it to have the most promising potential
of creating subtle influence. That is, because visual information is more available in the
environment where consumers make their choices (such as seeing the cereal box they
recently saw on Seinfeld or the beer that was drunk on Friends), research on perceptual
priming43 suggests that congruence in modality favors a visual placement (Law & BraunLaTour, 2004: 75).
Procedure
Upon arrival at each of the three experimental sessions, participants were asked to draw a
slip of paper that contained their identification (ID) numbers, which in turn signified their
condition assignment, from a Ziploc bag containing ID numbers for all three conditions. In
order to hopefully allow us to distinguish changes in the dependent variable that are due to
experimental treatment from changes due to other (confounding) factors, participants were
randomly assigned to conditions. Three conditions, two experimental and one control, were
run separately by three experimenters during each session. Unlike the main researcher, the
two assistant experimenters were only partially aware of the nature of the study. After
selecting ID numbers, participants were escorted to separate rooms – depending upon the
numbers they drew – in which the conditions were run. The average number of participants
per room was 5. Although the settings did not physically restrict participants from
interacting, verbally or otherwise, they were instructed not to do so. Before starting the
actual experiment, participants were asked to sign informed consent forms, which
described their rights as research participants. This document also explained their
responsibilities and gave contact information for the principal investigators of the project.
Three researchers, all male, each administered three different conditions during the three
sessions, and their presence did not qualify the reported results. In order to maintain the
integrity of the study, all experimenters read from a script containing instructions for each
condition (see appendix 3 and 4).
After completion of the experiment, participants were given a debriefing in which all
the pertinent facts about the nature and purpose of the study were provided. This
43
Law and Braun-LaTour (2004: 71) distinguish perceptual priming (where viewers respond to the modality or
surface attributes of the prime) from conceptual priming (based on semantic memory, in which the meaning of
words activates an existing belief and influences behavior), and emotional priming (using a prime that has an
emotional connotation).
debriefing had the double purpose of counteracting potential negative effects of the
deception (telling participants that the purpose was one thing when it was in fact another)
and providing an educational experience.
Dependent Measure
As mentioned above, the main dependent variable of the experiment – the construct
expected to be dependent on the manipulation of viewer identification – is that of
associative strength (SOA). This section outlines how the SOA construct was measured using
a pencil-and-paper version of the Implicit Association Test (IAT; Greenwald, McGhee, &
Schwartz, 1998) originally designed for stereotyping research (Lowery, Hardin, & Sinclair,
2001) and later adapted to examine drug related SOA (Wagner, 2001) and product
placement effects (Andriasova & Wagner, 2004). While reading this description it may be
helpful to consult appendix 5, in which the full measure is reproduced.
The dependent measure was administered to all participants in the same order.
Experimental participants completed the measures following stimulus presentation, while
control participants simply did so after signing their consent forms. The measure assessed
participants’ SOA toward Apple Computers® based on their associations with various subbrands from the company (iPod®, iBook®, iTunes®, Powerbook® etc.). Similar to previous IAT
variations, the method applied here has five judgment stages. For each stage, a list of
words down the middle of a page comprises the judgment items, and evaluations are
indicated by checkmarks in the appropriate right and left-hand columns.
Before entering the judgment stage, participants are shown four lists of words, two
at a time, and they are asked to become familiar with the words before moving on. The
first two lists include words related to Apple ® and Microsoft®, respectively, and lists three
and four include positive and negative adjectives. Eight words of each type are shown on
each list, and the words are later used as items in association tasks. The list of Applerelated words include OS X, iMac, iTunes, Powerbook, Airport, Safari, iPod, and Macintosh,
and the list of Microsoft words include Windows, X-Box, Outlook, Word, Media Player
Office, PowerPoint, and Explorer. The list of positive adjectives includes good, pleasant,
valuable, favorable, acceptable, nice, wonderful, and excellent. The list of negative
adjectives includes the antonyms bad, unpleasant, worthless, unfavorable, unacceptable,
awful, horrible, and poor.
The first two timed stages are “practice stages”, wherein participants become
familiar with the activity of categorizing words. The first of these stages list Apple® and
Microsoft® words, mixed in random fashion, and participants are given fifteen seconds to
categorize as many as possible by placing a checkmark to the left or right. The appropriate
sides are indicated at the top of the page, and participants are given verbal instructions as
to the appropriate sides prior to beginning the timed judgment stage. For example:
MICROSOFT
APPLE
X-BOX
POWERPOINT
IPOD
The second stage is similar to the first, except that the list is of positive and negative
adjectives. For example:
POSITVE
NEGATIVE
good
unpleasant
acceptable
The third stage is a “critical judgment phase”, one that is used to calculate SOA, and
it includes all four types of words. The list begins with either a positive or negative
adjective or an Apple- or Microsoft-related word. The following word comes from the
opposite category (e.g. adjective). The word after that comes from the initial category
(e.g. Apple- or Microsoft-related word), and so on in that fashion. The appropriate
judgment sides indicated at the top of the page include both Apple and Microsoft and
Positive and Negative. One of the sides is appropriate to check for one kind of computerword and one kind of adjective, and the opposite is the correct side for the other kind of
computer-word and adjective. The specific sides match those used in the preceding
practice stages. For example:
MICROSOFT or Positive
APPLE or negative
worthless
OUTLOOK
wonderful
ITUNES
Participants are allotted fifteen seconds to categorize as many of these items as they can,
moving sequentially down the page, and this stage includes two lists given one after the
other.
The fourth stage is another practice stage introduced to afford participants
familiarity with categorizing Apple- and Microsoft-related words on opposite sides and
therefore only includes this type of words. As the measure calculates SOA by differencing
the number of items correctly categorized when pairing Apple-words with positive
adjectives versus pairing Apple-words with negative adjectives, the appropriate side for
Apple® and Microsoft® in the fifth stage is switched while keeping positive and negative
constant.
The fifth stage is again a critical phase, requiring simultaneous categorization of
computer words and adjectives. This phase is the same as the third, except that the
appropriate side for Microsoft® and Apple® is switched – in accordance with the fourth phase
– and participants are therefore categorizing them with the opposite kind of adjective. The
order of pairing Apple-words with positive and negative adjectives (phases 3 and 5) along
with the side participants check to categorize positive and negative were counterbalanced
across participants, but this did not qualify the reported results.
Following SOA assessment, participants were administered another questionnaire in
which they were asked to report their attitudes toward Apple ® and Microsoft® using
semantic differential scales anchored by the same pairs of adjectives that were used in the
IAT measure (see appendix 6). This self-reported measure was administered after the IAT in
order to prevent distorting the unobtrusive measure by heightening participants’ awareness
that their attitudes were being measured. Participants’ attitudes toward the products were
measured by using five-point scales, and the instruction read: Please circle the numbers
near the word in each pair that best describes how you feel about…
Finally, participants in the two experimental conditions were asked to indicate their
perceived degree of identification with the show they had just seen. This last questionnaire
re-used the questions and five-point likert scales from the pretest and served as a
manipulation check.
Data Analysis
Given that we employed a paper-and-pencil version of the IAT, in which SOA scores are
derived from the number of judgments participants can make in strictly timed congruent
and incongruent association phases, the critical value is the amount of words categorized
correctly within the 15 seconds allowed in each phase. More specifically, the scores for
each of the two critical phases – Apple paired with positive and Apple paired with negative
adjectives – were summed into positive and negatives indices, respectively, and the
negative phase scores were subtracted from the positive phase scores to create an SOA
Difference Score Index (Lowery, Hardin, & Sinclair, 2001; Wagner, 2001; Andriasova &
Wagner, 2004). For self-reported attitudes toward the products, participants’ scores on the
items were averaged, with equal weighting, to create a Self-Reported Attitude Index. In
order to test whether SOAs and self-reported attitudes differed significantly between the
treatment conditions, so-called analyses of variance (ANOVAs) were conducted on both
indexes. ANOVA is a bivariate statistical technique involving the investigation of the effects
of one treatment variable (stimuli) on an interval-scaled dependent variable (SOA and selfreported attitude). ANOVA is the appropriate tool to determine whether differences in
mean scores between the conditions are larger than what could have occurred by chance
(Zikmund, 2003: 581).
Next, in order to assess whether the manipulation of participants’ identification with
the fictional characters had been successful, a t-test was run to compare the two
experimental groups. The t-test is largely similar to the ANOVA, but is preferred to the
ANOVA when assessing the difference between only two conditions (Zikmund, 577). In this ttest, shows were entered as independent variable and identification scores were entered as
dependent variables.
Finally, to investigate whether, and if so how, viewers’ identification with the
product-related characters influences the effect of product placements, correlation
coefficients between identification scores and SOA Difference Index and Self-reported
Attitude Index were calculated. These measures of correlation indicate both the strength
and the direction of the relationship between a pair of variables (Bryman & Cramer, 2001:
169). To strengthen the validity of correlation analyses, the same variables were then
subjected to regression analysis. Doing this allows us to make judgments about the quality
of results of the dependent variables for each value of the independent variable (Bryman &
Cramer, 2001: 185).
All calculations were carried out using SPSS (v. 11.0 for Macintosh ®) statistical
software. Acknowledging that procedures may not be widely known among all readers,
thorough descriptions are provided. At first glance, the explanations of statistical
operations may seem exaggerated. However, they are motivated by the frustrations of this
author when first studying reports of experimental research. As such, the following section
can be seen as an attempt to bridge the gap between psychology and the humanities on the
practical as well as on the theoretical level.
Results
Appendix 7 shows the complete data generated in our three-conditions between-participants
experiment. Simply from looking at the raw data (illustrated in Figure 6.1 below), one gets
an idea that there are in fact important differences between the three groups. Interestingly,
there are noticeable differences in mean SOA Differences Index scores with the
identification condition achieving by far the highest score, and the two experimental
conditions scoring higher than the no-exposure control condition ( X = 9.06, -2.19, and –
6.88). Equally interesting, something similar does not seem to apply to mean scores of selfreported attitudes.

In other words, exposure to product placements embedded in a television show that
sparks viewer identification seemingly affects product-related SOA in a way unparalleled by
placements embedded in a show that does not. In fact participants in the identification
condition are the only ones to achieve a positive SOA Difference Index score; that is, for
participants in the no-identification and control conditions, the dual task of categorizing
computer-nouns and valenced adjectives was easier when Apple-words were paired with
negative adjectives and Microsoft-words with positive.
Mean Values for SOA Difference Socre
Index and Self-reported Attitude
Index
10
1
8
6
4
1
2
3
2
SOA
Self-reported
attitudes
0
-2
1
22
3
-4
-6
3
-8
identification
no-identification
control
Figure 6.1
When effects are measured as differences in participants’ self-reported attitudes, results
(fig. 6.1) show no significant difference between conditions. Hence, exposure to product
placements seems to have no influence on how participants explicitly evaluate the products.
ANOVA
To get a more qualified measure of the observed differences, we start by comparing the
mean scores on the dependent variables (SOA Difference Score Index and Self-reported
Attitude Index) in the three conditions. To do this we use a common statistical tool, analysis
of variance (ANOVA), in which an estimate of the between-groups variance is compared with
an estimate of the within-groups variance by dividing the former by the latter44. The result
of this division, referred to as the F-ratio, increases as the magnitude of the variation
between groups becomes greater than those within groups. The total amount of variance in
the dependent variable (SOA Difference Score Index and Self-reported Attitude Index,
respectively) can be thought of as comprising two elements: that which is due to the
independent variable (identification) and that which is due to other factors. The latter
component essentially consists of errors in the research design or execution, whereas the
44
Variance is a measure of data dispersion showing how much each score deviates from a mean.
former can be expected to result from experimental manipulation. If the between-groups
variance (i.e. the variance resulting from experimental treatment) is considerably larger
than that within-groups (i.e. the variance resulting from error), then the value of the F-ratio
will be higher, implying that the differences between the means are unlikely to be due to
chance.
Terminology for variance estimates is derived from the calculation procedures.
Hence, an explanation of the terms used to calculate the F-Ratio should clarify the meaning
of the analysis of variance technique. The within-groups estimated variance (or mean-square
as it is often referred to) is the within-group sum-of-squares divided by the degrees of
freedom. The term degrees of freedom (d.f.) – a term associated with any statistic – simply
refers to the number of components which are free to vary (Bryman & Cramer, 2001: 121).
The number of degrees of freedom is equal to the number of observations minus the number
of constraints or assumptions needed to calculate a statistical term. The sum of squares is
the sum of squared differences between each score in a group and its mean, summed across
all three groups. The between-groups estimated variance is obtained by subtracting each
group’s mean from the overall mean, squaring them, multiplying them by the number of
cases in each group, and summing the result.
ANOVA
SOA Differenc e Index
Between Groups
W ithin Groups
Total
Sum of
Squares
2146,875
2965,125
5112,000
df
2
45
47
Mean Square
1073,438
65,892
F
16,291
Sig.
,000
Table 6.1 One-way analysis of variance comparing SOA Difference Score Index across conditions
For 2 degrees of freedom in the numerator and 45 degrees of freedom in the denominator,
an F of 3.23 is required to show statistically significant difference (see Zikmund (1997: 585)
for a table of required F-values). Hence, based on the analysis of variance (F(48)= 16.291,
p= .0001) we can conclude that the differences in SOA between conditions were in fact
larger than could be expected by chance. In fact, table 6.1 shows a significance level of
.0001; that is, our results have a mere .001 percent probability of occurring by chance.
To examine the effect of experimental treatment on participants’ self-reported
attitudes toward the placed products, the exact same calculation of F-ratio was repeated
entering Self-reported Attitude Index as dependent variable.
ANOVA
Self-report ed attitude
Between Groups
W ithin Groups
Total
Sum of
Squares
20,792
1921,125
1941,917
df
2
45
47
Mean Square
10,396
42,692
F
,244
Sig.
,785
Table 6.2 One-way analysis of variance comparing Self-reported attitude Index across conditions
Interestingly, the F-ratio for self-reported attitudes failed to reach statistical significance
(F(48)= 0.2435, p= .785). In other words, our results show no apparent connection between
exposure to placements and expressed product-attitudes. In terms of methodology, the lack
of statistical significance implies that there are considerable differences between implicit
and explicit measures of product-related attitudes. Hence, H1 and H2 receive initial
support. To interpret the findings further, however, we need to look more closely into the
influence of identification on measured and reported attitudes.
T-test: Manipulation Check
First, however, a calculation was carried out to assess whether the manipulation of
participants’ identification with the shows (based on the pretest) had been successful. Given
that the only difference between the two experimental groups was the show they watched,
we can assume that any significant difference in mean identification scores is due to the
manipulation of stimuli. Hence, to determine whether the two groups differed, a t-test was
conducted. The t-test, which is conceptually similar to the ANOVA, is used to determine
whether the means of two samples differ significantly. It does so by comparing the
differences between the two means with the standard error of the difference in the means
of the two samples. The underlying assumption is that the difference in means between the
groups, unlike the standard error of the difference in means, should not be normally
distributed45. In other words, the further the difference in the means of the two samples is
from zero, the less likely it is that this difference is due to chance. Before calculating the
value, the confidence level was set to .95. That is, provided the calculations showed a
difference, the criteria allowed us to be 95 percent certain that this was not due to chance.
Group Statistics
Manipulation check
Condition assignment
Identification
No identification
N
Mean
5,25
-4,31
16
16
Std. Deviation
4,266
2,798
Std. Error
Mean
1,067
,700
Independent Samples Test
Levene's Test for
Equality of Variances
F
Manipulation check
Equal variances
as sumed
Equal variances
not ass umed
1,457
Sig.
,237
t-test for Equality of Means
t
df
Sig. (2-tailed)
Mean
Difference
Std. Error
Difference
95% Confidence
Interval of the
Difference
Lower
Upper
7,497
30
,000
9,56
1,275
6,958
12,167
7,497
25,890
,000
9,56
1,275
6,940
12,185
Table 6.3 t-test comparing identification scores in identification and no-identification conditions.
With 30 degrees of freedom at a confidence interval of 0.95, the two-tailed t-value needs to
be higher than 2.042 to be considered statistically significant (see Zikmund (1997: 711) for a
table of required t-values). Hence, by conventional criteria we can consider our
experimental manipulation of identification to have been successful (t(32) = 7.497, p =
.0001).
Correlation and Regression: Influence of Identification on SOA and Self-reported Attitudes
Finally, the more exact nature of the relationship between identification and productrelated attitudes is assessed. This is done by first performing a correlation analysis. As
mentioned in the introduction to data analysis, correlation scores are used as ‘yardsticks’
whereby the intensity or strength of relationships can be gauged. More specifically, we want
to estimate whether participants’ level of identification did indeed influence the changes in
their product-related SOA and self-reported attitudes in the way we hypothesized. To
45
Normal distribution is a symmetrical, bell-shaped distribution that describes the expected probability
distribution of many chance occurrences.
provide such estimates, correlation coefficients are calculated. When the variables of
interest are interval/ratio, as is the case with our indexes and identification scores, the
most common measure of correlation is Pearson’s r (Bryman & Cramer, 2001: 170).
The first step to calculating Pearson’s r is plotting each individual case (pairs of
identification score and SOA/attitude for each participant) into scatter diagrams. These
diagrams illustrate the relationship between variables for each participant and thus provide
us with a useful initial impression of whether the variables generally correlate. More
specifically, correlation between variables is indicated if cases fall at or closely around a
straight line. Below, diagrams are presented for each of the four potential correlations: (1)
Identification score and SOA in the identification condition, (2) Identification score and selfreported attitude in the identification condition, (3) Identification score and SOA in the noidentification condition, and (4) Identification score and self-reported attitude in the noidentification condition.
20
20
10
Self-reported attitude index (ID)
30
10
0
-10
-4
-2
0
-10
-20
0
2
4
6
8
Identification score (ID)
Figure 6.2 Identification score & SOA
(identification condition)
10
12
-4
-2
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
Identification score (ID)
Figure 6.3 Identification score & Self-reported
attitude (identification condition)
20
20
Self-reported attitude index (no-ID)
10
0
-10
-20
-10
10
0
-10
-8
-6
-4
-2
0
Identification score (no-ID)
Figure 6.4 Identification score & SOA (noidentification condition)
2
-10
-8
-6
-4
-2
0
2
Identification score (no-ID)
Figure 6.5 Identification score & Self-reported
attitude (no-identification condition)
Although scatter diagrams are useful aids to understanding the nature of correlation, to use
the concept in a more formal manner, we still need to calculate the numeric value of
Pearson’s r. Hence, a short introduction: Pearson’s r allows the strength and direction of
linear relationships between variables to vary between –1 and +1. If the value of r equals
+1.0, there is a perfect positive linear (straight-line) relationship - as identification
increases, so does attitude/SOA score. If the value of r equals –1.0, a perfect negative linear
relationship, or a perfect inverse relationship, is indicated - as identification increases,
attitude/SOA score decreases. No correlation is indicated if r equals 0. What is a large
correlation? Bryman and Cramer (2001: 174) suggest the following: 0.19 and below is very
low; 0.20 to 0.39 is low; 0.40 to 0.69 is modest; 0.70 to 0.89 is high; and 0.90 to 1 is very
high.
Below we report the results (Pearson’s r and significance level) of correlation analyses
on all four combinations of identification and SOA/self-reported attitudes. Given that the
relationships we seek to investigate are one-directional – how does identification influence
SOA and self-reported attitudes - we use the so-called one-tailed correlation test.
Correlations
Identification s core (ID)
SOA Difference Score
Index (ID)
SOA
Difference
Identification
Score Index
score (ID)
(ID)
1
,739**
,
,001
16
16
,739**
1
,001
,
16
16
Pearson Correlation
Sig. (1-tailed)
N
Pearson Correlation
Sig. (1-tailed)
N
**. Correlation is s ignificant at the 0.01 level (1-tailed).
Table 6.4 Identification score & SOA (identification condition)
Corre lations
Identification s core (ID) Pearson Correlation
Sig. (1-tailed)
N
Self-report ed attitude
Pearson Correlation
index (ID)
Sig. (1-tailed)
N
Identification
sc ore (ID)
1
,
16
,279
,148
16
Self-report ed
att itude index
(ID)
,279
,148
16
1
,
16
Table 6.5 Identification score & Self-reported attitude (identification condition)
Corre lations
Identification s core
(no-ID)
SOA Differenc e
Sc ore Index (no-ID)
Pearson Correlation
Sig. (1-tailed)
N
Pearson Correlation
Sig. (1-tailed)
N
Identification
sc ore (no-ID)
1
,
16
,316
,116
16
SOA
Difference
Sc ore Index
(no-ID)
,316
,116
16
1
,
16
Table 6.6 Identification score & SOA (no-identification condition)
Corre lations
Identification s core
(no-ID)
Self-report ed attitude
index (no-ID)
Pears on Correlation
Sig. (1-tailed)
N
Pears on Correlation
Sig. (1-tailed)
N
Identification
sc ore (no-ID)
1
,
16
,263
,162
16
Self-report ed
att itude index
(no-ID)
,263
,162
16
1
,
16
Table 6.7 Identification score & Self-reported attitude (no-identification condition)
What we are looking for in these tables are the two values in the upper right hand corner,
Pearson’s correlation coefficient (r) and the level of statistical significance (Sig.). As in the
t-test above, we are looking for at least 95 percent certainty that demonstrated effects are
not due to chance. In the tables such certainty is indicated if the value for “Sig. (1-tailed)”
is .05 or below. As the tables show, only the correlation between identification and SOA
Difference Score Index in the identification condition reaches statistical significance (r(32) =
.739, p= .001). This finding is crucial to the overall study as well as to the testing of
experimental hypotheses. A statistically significant correlation between identification and
SOA in the identification condition, and lack thereof in all other relations, indicates that the
strength of viewers’ product-related associations can be changed with product placements.
However, the effect of product placements is dramatically mediated by viewers’ level of
identification with the program.
These interpretations are elaborated in the concluding discussion. Before we get that
far, however, the crucial findings are illustrated by one last step in the analysis of our
experimental data, the calculation of regression. The concept of regression is closely related
to that of correlation in that it shares many of the basic assumptions of Pearson’s r, notably
the idea that relationships among variables are linear. Compared to Pearson’s r, however,
regression analysis goes a step further, works from the assumption of a causal relationship
between two variables, and provides us with the actual line of best fit between the
variables. Similar to correlation coefficient, the regression is affected by the amount of
variance in either of the variables concerned. For example, if one variable has a restricted
range and the other a wider range, the size of the correlation coefficient and the precision
of the linear relationship may both be reduced compared with if both were of equally wide
variance.
Most interestingly, the strength and direction of the relationship between
identification and SOA in the identification condition are clearly illustrated, when we draw
the line of best fit. The pairs of identification scores and SOA Difference Score Indexes fall
around a straight line (see figure 6.6); that is, as viewers’ identification with the program
increases, so does the effect of product placement on their product-related SOA. More
specifically, the regression shows that for each one-unit increase in identification score, SOA
Difference Score increases .739.
30
20
10
0
-10
-4
-2
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
Identification score (ID)
Figure 6.6 Regression: Identification score & SOA (identification condition)
Discussion
Overall, the four hypotheses received various levels of support. H1 was partially supported
in that experimental group participants exhibited significantly more positive product-related
SOA as compared to the control group, but only participants in the identification condition
achieved positive mean scores. Next, H2 went supported, as exposure to product placements
did not significantly influence self-reported attitudes. On the contrary, mean scores showed
the control group – who had watched no placement at all – to express the most positive
product-attitudes. This finding seems to confirm the assumption that people are generally
either biased when expressing attitudes toward products and ads, or simply unable to assess
these attitudes. H3 and H4 were also supported, as viewers’ level of identification with
programs significantly predicted their product-related SOA, but not their self-reported
attitude. What this means is that, beyond leading to awareness and memory for included
products, placements have demonstrable persuasive effects in that they can be shown to
alter SOA – a judgmental basis of decision-making. Overall, the pattern of reported data
suggests that testing placements with SOA measures may be a better way to investigate
persuasive effects of product placements and that self-reported attitude measures, while
having their benefits, may not be as sensitive to the subtler form of influence placements
exert.
Although the pertinent issues have already been discussed to some extent, we now
turn to a more thorough discussion of the general aspects of experimental studies such as
the one reported here. First, the question of validity must be addressed: Does showing
television excerpts out of context to a non-representative sample amount to any predicative
power? Second, there is the question of generalizability: Do our findings apply to anyone but
college undergraduates in a media lab? Not surprisingly, we tend to answer both questions in
the affirmative. In order to understand our (naïve) belief, however, one must keep in mind
that we do not claim to simulate real-world behavior in the laboratory. Instead we try to
isolate one crucial element of the exposure-to-behavior relationship, the influence of
exposure to different media content on attitude accessibility (associative strength).
Furthermore, one needs to remember that the potential generality of our findings lies in the
congruency of stimulus and target audience. That is, what we have hoped to demonstrate is
that if the television shows, in which product placements are embedded, spark
identification in the target audience, then the effect of placements on viewers’ latent
attitudes is increased. Albeit limited in scope, we consider this type of finding to be an apt
illustration of the main asset of experimental research compared to other methods. By
focusing on one variable (attitude/SOA) and trying to control all other variables, we aimed
to assess a causal (rather than correlational or indicial) relationship between features of the
media product and attitudinal impact. To corroborate the findings quantitatively, one might
attempt to replicate the experiment with different ‘target audiences’, i.e. by recruiting
participants socio-demographically different from students and running a new pretest to
establish which stimuli attract high and low levels of identification in the given group.
To assess the present experiment in terms of reliability, one needs to see it in
connection with previous research applying similar methods. Although the body of previous
research is not extensive, one may draw attention to at least three conceptually similar
studies indicating that SOA measures are in fact a useful way to assess the attitudinal impact
of social and mass mediated stimuli. The conceptual link between the studies referenced
here is their common interest in practices that are not suitable for self-reported measures.
The first study to apply the unobtrusive IAT measure (Lowery & al., 2001) used it to
investigate the concept of racial stereotyping. The key finding from the study was that
although people explicitly renounce any kind of stereotyping, unobtrusive measures as well
as observed behavior show that stereotyping does in fact occur. In a similar vein, Wagner
(2004; Wagner & Sundar, 2003) studied young people’s reactions toward anti-drug
advertising and found SOA measures to be more veridical than self-reported attitude
measures. Wagner did this by running both types of measure and comparing results to actual
drug use in a population demographically similar to the research sample. Whereas selfreported measures found almost everybody to be strongly negative toward drug use, SOA
measures as well as actual statistics showed this to be an overly romantic picture. Compared
to its application in studies on social issues, motivated by the need to circumvent a “social
desirability bias”, the initial use of the IAT in product placement research was a result of
more practical concerns. Hence, Andriasova and Wagner (2004) hypothesized placements to
be of a nature that does not lead to detectable change in attitudes but which may never the
less have an impact on viewers. Comparing self-reported measures to the IAT, Andriasova
and Wagner found just this to be the case. In summary, our results can be seen as a
corroboration of earlier research findings, further demonstrating the usefulness of applying
unobtrusive measures.
7. GENERAL DISCUSSION
This thesis has focused on product placement in television as an example of unobtrusive
advertising. The work was inspired in part by the impression that product placement is
becoming an increasingly important form of persuasive communication and in part by a
discontent with previous research in the technique’s effectiveness.
Based on a thorough review of previous research in advertising and product placement
and a discussion of relevant theories, an experiment was designed to test two main
hypotheses. First, it was suggested that while product placement consumption may not lead
to a change in viewers’ self-reported attitudes toward placed products, placements could
influence consumers’ product-related strength of association (SOA) and thus have a
persuasive ability. Second, a review of theories about the fiction viewing experience led us
to suggest that effects may be mediated by viewers’ identification with product-related
characters. Both hypotheses received empirical support.
Although the present study is an exploratory investigation into the effects of
placements on SOA, the results are promising for researchers and practitioners. In reporting
attitudes, the subtlety of placements may hinder consideration of their persuasive influence,
but our findings confirm Andriasova and Wagner’s (2004) theory that such passive processing
can change SOA. Also, as experimental participants’ SOAs were driven by their level of
identification with fictional content, the results suggest that viewing placements may
simulate real-life product experience.
Although more effortful processing is generally thought to result in greater persuasion
(see Petty & Cacioppo, 1986; Petty & Wegener, 1999), it can be argued that this depends on
the way in which studies theorize and measure attitudes. If attitudes are positioned as the
sum of all brand-related beliefs and their evaluations (see Ajzen, 1991; Ajzen & Fishbein,
1980), then effortfully-produced attitudes should be more persistent. However, attitudes
can also be thought of as a tendency to avoid or approach an object, influencing perception
of object and situation – and in turn behavior – in a less-controlled fashion. In this way,
attitudes produce an affective response predicated on valenced SOA (Fazio, 1990), which
may be difficult to alter through argumentation, and one reason for which is that strong
associations can influence the perception of new information during the learning process
(Fazio, 1990; Fazio & Towles-Schwen, 1999). A strong association can lead someone to see
new data about an attitude object or category as incredulous, or it can guide the person to
rationalize the information to fit the association, often further strengthening it. If attitudes
are theorized in this way as opposed to the sum of all beliefs, then central route processing
may not enjoy the longevity advantage.
Our findings may also support an early suggestion by Krugman (1965) that persuasion
from ads can occur with little or no conscious awareness, when the viewing audience
“lets down its guard to the repetitive commercial use of the television medium and… easily changes its
ways of perceiving products and brands and its purchasing behavior without thinking very much about it
at the time of TV exposure or at any time prior to purchase, and without changing verbalized attitudes
(Krugman, 1965: 354, italics added)
Krugman’s argument has remained largely untested, but it may help explain the influence of
product placements. Given the subtlety of placements, their influence may not initially lead
to a change in expressed attitudes, but their effects may be more visible at a later point if
placements alter the automatic activation of attitudes toward a brand, for instance at the
point of purchase.
Methodological Implications
In discussing the methodological implication of the research reported in this thesis, we
inevitably find ourselves discussing the conceptual divide between qualitative and
quantitative methodologies. In an acknowledgement of the basic assumptions of qualitative
audience research, we agree that people (viewers) are free to make sense of media products
and that their verbalized responses will differ radically. At the same time, however, we have
aimed to condition the strong focus of audience researchers on these verbalized effects.
Instead we have sought to promote awareness of indirect (i.e. non-verbalizable) media
effects. Furthermore, in our experimental design we have tried to challenge the claim made
by Schrøder & al. that “all audience research is obtrusive” (2003: 16). Of course the
participants in our study were all well aware that they were participating in research.
However, by not revealing the exact nature and purpose of the study and by applying a
measure that should not allow participants conscious control of their responses, we aimed to
overcome one of the major threats to the validity of audience research. Compared to
previous use of the IAT measure in product placement research (Andriasova & Wagner,
2004), this study marks a step forward. Whereas Andriasova and Wagner relied on the
concept of brand essence (in representing the placed brand through its most important
attributes/benefits), we took a more direct approach in using actual brand names. Of course
this is in part a change brought about by the brands themselves (Apple computers versus
Snuggle detergent), but still it makes for results that require less interpretation
Overall, the pattern of reported data suggests that SOA measures may be a more
precise gauge of product placements’ persuasive effects than self-reported attitudes.
Supporting a number of studies that compare the predictive abilities of SOA measures to
self-report questionnaires (see Dovidio & Fazio, 1991; Fazio & Towles-Schwen, 1999; Wagner
& Sundar, 2003), these findings also demonstrate the superior veridicality of the SOA
measures – predicting more placement characteristics than did self-reported attitudes.
Perhaps most importantly, while the study did not uncover self-report attitudinal effects –
also in line with prior research – persuasive placement effects were shown using SOA
measures.
A further refinement of the SOA measure might utilize more sophisticated computerbased response latency SOA measures such as PsyScope or SuperLab (see
http://www.superlab.com) to prime participants with specific visual brand identifiers.
Computer-based measures can best be understood as a fusion of the two measures described
in this study, evaluative semantic priming and the IAT. Similar to the unobtrusive measures
described above, the computer-measures rely on the presence of facilitation as an indication
that the evaluation associated with the primed attitude object has been activated on
presentation of the object. The computer-based measure consists of two critical stages. In
the first (the priming stage) participants are primed with a visual stimulus thought to
identify the concept (e.g. brand) of interest. The concept-identifier is shown on the
computer-screen at duration just above the threshold of conscious awareness. In the second
stage (the response latency stage) participants categorize adjectives appearing on screen by
pressing either a “positive” or a “negative” button. During this categorization task, response
latencies are continuously measured by the computer. Finally, the facilitation effect is
calculated as the difference in mean latency between “compatible prime-adjective” and
“incompatible prime-adjective”. The use of computer-based priming and measurement
would offer a number of advantages compared to more traditional methods. Perhaps most
importantly the experimental software allows the use of both graphic and verbal primes, as
opposed to the word-only priming of the IAT. One may assume this use of more realistic
stimuli to further increase external validity (e.g. see Fazio & al. (1995); Hermans, de
Houwer, & Eelen (1994) for a discussion of realistic primes). Moreover, the almost-subliminal
duration of priming further reduces the risk of conscious control of responses. Compared to
the pencil-and-paper IAT, in which participants inevitably gain some knowledge of what is
being assessed (Lowery & al., 2001), this seems a more reliable way of securing
unobtrusiveness.
Practical Implications
On the ontological level, part of the purpose of effect studies is to understand how we can
better communicate – how various characteristics of content and execution influence the
impact of communication on receivers. Obviously, such knowledge is interesting and has
implications for various types of senders. Although our study was driven by an academic
pursuit of knowledge, it can also be seen as a fusion of administrative and critical research.
Among the potential managerial implications – for public and private communicators alike –
one could mention that the method may yield insight on how to better reach the receivers
and attain desired effects. Such insight would be useful in planning as well as a pre-, and
post-testing context: In a media situation where costs have continued to accelerate at a rate
greater than the rate of inflation (MacKenzie & Lutz, 1989: 48), it has become increasingly
important for advertisers to assess potential effects of the various strategies at hand.
More specifically, the finding that effects may be achieved without receivers being
aware of any influence, suggests that practitioners might successfully abandon their
conception of effectiveness as recall and recognition. In a not so distant future our approach
may be developed further to dramatically change the field of applied advertising research.
In fact one company, Brighthouse Enterprises, is already successfully conducting
“neuromarketing” research; that is, employing a method conceptually similar to the one
demonstrated here. As the term implies, however, Brighthouse mainly focuses on the
psycho-physiological effects that occur as a result of exposure to persuasive communication.
It is no coincidence that this extreme development has occurred in the United States. In
Denmark the tradition of professional research is much less prevalent. In fact, to an outside
observer, it may seem as though the question of effectiveness is gauged from a lay
perspective, rather than studied scientifically, among Danish practitioners.
Although we have not addressed the practice of product placement in a normative
perspective, the findings still raise a number of issues relevant to the public policy
discussion of unobtrusive persuasive communication. Specifically, the demonstration of less
conscious effects raises entirely different and more pressing public policy issues than earlier
studies showing no effect on self-reported attitudes. The blurring of the lines between
entertainment and persuasion that occurs when commercial stimuli are embedded in a
‘neutral’ context is especially problematic when directed toward children. Thus, an
awareness of the potential power of product placement messages is needed by program
makers and regulators in order to protect children against unsuitable practice.
Conversely, as discussed by Wagner and Sundar (2003), potential effects on a less
conscious level could be used in public service contexts, e.g. to influence attitudes toward
drug use, drunk driving or similar public health issues. Furthermore, it seems reasonable to
assume that any finding pertaining the effectiveness of product placements might also apply
to behavioral effects from exposure to other stimuli. For example, to the much debated
issue of television and movie violence. Since neither placed products nor violent episodes
are processed as the central aspects of televised narratives (e.g. see Comstock, 2004: 194),
one may assume similar processes to be at work in the exposure-to-behavior relationship.
Conclusion
In conclusion, our findings indicate that conceptualizing the effects of unobtrusive
advertising as something that occurs on a conscious level and investigating them along the
lines of recall and recognition is inadequate. Instead, the present study helps demonstrate
the usefulness of unobtrusive SOA measures in product placement research. In doing so, it
reinforces and reiterates recent calls for the increased use of implicit effectiveness
measures (e.g. Law & Braun-Latour, 2004). Although a plethora of independent and
individual difference variables remain untested – and the measures, themselves, can be
continuously improved – as the findings of this exploratory study show, SOA is a promising
measure for gauging placement effectiveness.
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