Download Sentencing reform in California and Public Safety

Sentencing Reform in
California and Public Safety
Steven Raphael
Goldman School of Public Policy
University of California, Berkeley
[email protected]
600
Prison
0
200
Prison plus Jail
400
800
U.S. Prison and Jail Inmates per 100,000 Residents
1920
1940
1960
1980
Year
2000
2020
What determines a nation’s incarceration
rate?
• Rate of admission
• Offending rate x Apprehension rate x Conviction rate x Prison admission rate
• Time served
• Front-end sentencing
• Release policy
Annual Prison Admissions per 100,000
5
5
Murder/manslaughter
4
Rape/Sexual assault
5
11
12
Robbery
4
Aggravated Assault
2
Other Violent
15
8
18
18
Burglary
16
Larceny/Fraud
Motor Vehicle Theft
1
Other Property
1
26
3
4
9
Drugs
47
13
Other
32
15
Parole Violators
0
10
46
20
1984
30
40
2009
50
Expected Time Served by Offense in Years
9.2
Murder/manslaughter
5.1
Rape/Sexual assault
3.5
Robbery
Aggravated Assault
2.2
Other Violent
2.3
14.3
8.1
5
3.1
3.6
1.6
2
1.3
1.3
1.9
1.5
1.1
1.4
1.9
1.8
1
2.1
.8
.5
Burglary
Larceny/Fraud
Motor Vehicle Theft
Other Property
Drugs
Other
Parole Violators
0
5
10
1984
15
2009
U.S. vs. Australia?
0
100
200
300
400
500
Prison Incarceration Rate in the U.S. and California
1980
1990
2000
Year
California
2010
US
2020
50000
100000
150000
200000
Comparison of California Inmate Populations to the Design
Capacity of State Institutions
1990
1995
2000
year
Total Inmate Population
Design Capacity of State Facilities
2005
2010
Inmates in State Facilities
Summary of Prison Overcrowding Litigation in California
• 1990: Coleman v. Brown
• 2001: Plata V. Brown
• 2006: Federal three-judge court established with authority over
prison growth
• 2009: Three-judge court orders state to immediately offer plan to
reduce prison population to 137.5 percent of capacity. State appeals
to the Supreme Court.
• 2011: Supreme Court upholds the population limit order by the threejudge panel.
Policy changes pushing towards lowering the
prison population
• 2009
• Performance incentives for counties to reduce probation revocation
(Assembly Bill 678)
• Introduction of non-revocable parole
• 2011
• Corrections realignment
• 2012
• California voters pass proposition 36 revising the scope of three-strikes
• 2014
• California voted pass proposition 47 downgrading low level felonies to
misdemeanors.
Provisions of Assembly Bill 109 (California Realignment)
• Non-sexual, non-violent, non-serious (triple nons) felons will serve
terms in county jail rather than state prison.
• Triple nons currently serving time are monitored post-release under
the Post Release Community Supervision program administered by
counties. Technical violation will result in short jail terms but not
returns to state prison.
• Nearly all parole revocations are now served in county jail with a
maximum of 180 days.
• Enables greater use of non-custodial alternatives for both pre-trial
and convicted jail inmates (primarily electronic monitoring).
Figure 4.
Observed recidivism outcomes point towards lower recidivism rates
70%
No Realignment
Exposure
Some Realignment
Exposure
All Realignment Exposure
60%
One Year Recidivism Rate
50%
Arrested
40%
Arrested (Adjusted for RTC w/o
arrest)
30%
Convicted
Return to Prison
20%
10%
-24 -22 -20 -18 -16 -14 -12 -10
-8
-6
-4
0%
-2
0
2
4
6
Realignment Month
SOURCE: Authors’ calculations based on individual level administrative data provided by CDCR.
8
Provisions of proposition 47
• Passed by 60 percent of California voters
• Reclassified various drug offenses from felonies or wobblers (crimes
that can be charged as felonies or misdemeanors) to misdemeanors.
• Requires misdemeanor sentencing for petty theft, receiving stolen
property, and forgery/writing a bad check (offenses with amounts less
than $950).
10000 12000 14000
8000
6000
4000
Arrests
Prop 47 and Felony and Misdemeanor Drug
Arrests
-10
-5
0
5
Month Relative to November 2014
Felony Drug Arrests
10
Misdemeanor Drug Arrests
16000
14000
12000
10000
Drug Crime Arrests
18000
20000
Prop 47 and All Drug Arrests
-10
-5
0
5
Month Relative to November 2014
10
6000
4000
2000
Arrests
8000
10000
Prop 47 and Felony and Misdemeanor
Property Crime Arrests
-10
-5
0
5
Month Relative to November 2014
Felony Property Arrests
10
Misdemeanor Property Arrests
10000
9000
8000
7000
Property Crime Arrests
11000
12000
Prop 47 and Total Property Crime Arrests
-10
-5
0
5
Month Relative to November 2014
10
Effects on prison and jail population
• Realignment: large decline in prison population with partial offsetting
increase in jail populations.
• Proposition 47: declines in both prison and jail populations.
170000
160000
150000
140000
130000
120000
-100
0
100
200
Week Relative to October 5, 2011
300
170000
160000
150000
140000
130000
120000
-100
0
100
200
Week Relative to October 5, 2011
300
170000
160000
150000
140000
130000
120000
-100
0
100
200
Week Relative to October 5, 2011
300
85000
80000
75000
70000
65000
60000
-150
-100
-50
0
Month Relative to October 2011
50
85000
80000
75000
70000
65000
60000
-150
-100
-50
0
Month Relative to October 2011
50
85000
80000
75000
70000
65000
60000
-150
-100
-50
0
Month Relative to October 2011
50
200000 210000 220000 230000 240000 250000
Total Inmates, 2009 through 2015
-40
-20
0
20
Month Relative to October 2011
40
60
0
100
200
300
400
500
Prison Incarceration Rate in the U.S. and California
1980
1990
2000
Year
California
2010
US
2020
100
200
300
400
500
Prison Incarceration Rate in the U.S. and California
1980
1990
2000
Year
California
2010
US
2020
California Males
2007
Non-California Males
0.101
Black 2010
0.096
2015
0.074
2007
0.026
Hispanic 2010
0.024
2015
0.022
2007
0.079
Black 2010
0.079
2015
0.072
2007
0.028
Hispanic 2010
0.031
2015
0.027
2007
0.012
2007
0.020
Other 2010
0.012
Other 2010
0.020
2015
0.010
2015
0.017
2007
0.016
2007
0.013
White 2010
0.015
White 2010
0.014
2015
0.014
2015
0.013
0
.02 .04 .06 .08
.1
Proportion Incarcerated
0
.02
.04
.06
.08
Proportion Incarcerated
California Females
2007
Non-California Females
0.011
Black 2010
0.009
2015
0.010
2007
0.004
Hispanic 2010
0.003
2015
0.002
2007
0.002
Other 2010
0.001
2015
0.001
2007
0.004
White 2010
0.003
2015
0.002
0
.005
.01
Proportion Incarcerated
2007
0.008
Black 2010
0.007
2015
0.005
2007
0.003
Hispanic 2010
0.003
2015
0.003
2007
0.003
Other 2010
0.003
2015
0.003
2007
0.003
White 2010
0.003
2015
0.003
0
.002
.004
.006
.008
Proportion Incarcerated
Comparison of Arrest Rates Pre-Post Prop 47
By Race/Ethnicity
Black Arrests per 100,000
Twelve months prior
884
Twelve months following Change
840
-44
Black Booked Arrests per 100,000
672
610
-62
White Arrests per 100,000
278
266
-12
White Booked Arrests per 100,000
202
179
-23
Hispanic Arrests per 100,000
355
337
-18
Hispanic Booked Arrests per 100,000
253
233
-20
Avenues through which decarceration in California
may impact crime rates (and factors that may
mitigate these effects)
• Incapacitation
• General deterrence
• Rehabilitation/specific deterrence, hardening/criminogenic influence
• Diminishing crime-fighting returns to scale
Incarceration rate equals 2015 level
Last Pre-Realignment Year
400
600
800
1000
1200
Violent Crime Trends
1980
1990
2000
Year
2010
2020
Incarceration rate equals 2015 level
Last Pre-Realignment Year
2000
3000
4000
5000
6000
7000
Property Crime Trends
1980
1990
2000
Year
2010
2020
Figure 9: Violent Crime Rate Trends in California and Synthetic California, with Synthetic
Comparison Group and Weighted Identified by Matching on Violent Crime Rates for Each Year
Between 2000 and 2010
700
Violent Crime Rate
600
500
400
California
300
Comparison States
200
100
0
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
Year
Figure 10: Property Crime Rate Trends in California and Synthetic California, with Synthetic
Comparison Group and Weighted Identified by Matching on Violent Crime Rates for Each Year
Between 2000 and 2010
4,000
3,500
Violent Crime Rate
3,000
2,500
2,000
California
1,500
Comparison States
1,000
500
0
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
Year
Preferred estimates of the effect of a realignment-induced one-unit change in prison
incarceration rates on part I crime rates
And proposition 47?
What explains small effects on crime?
• Change in offending propensity
• Diminishing returns to incarceration
• Criminogenic heterogeneity among those who criminally offend
• Expansion of the use of prison along the extensive margin
• Net less serious offenders for less serious offenses
• Expansion of the use of prison along the intensive margin
• More likely to incarcerate offenders beyond the age of desistance
Evidence from other setting of diminishing
marginal returns
• Italy’s collective clemency
• Dutch sentencing enhancement
• Heterogeneity in prison-crime effect estimates at different points in
time for the U.S.
The 2006 Italian Collective Clemency Bill
• Passed on July 1, 2006
• Reduced sentences of inmates convicted of certain felony offenses prior to May 2,
2006 by three years.
• Led to the immediate release of one-third of the prison population on August 1,
2006.
• Ineligible inmates include those convicted of offenses involving organized crime,
sexual assault, terrorism, kidnapping, and exploiting a prostitute.
• No post-released supervision.
• Pardoned inmates who re-offend have their residual sentence tagged on to any new
sentence for offenses occurring within five years.
Scatter plot of monthly incarceration rates against month
measured relative to August 2006
Estimated Annual Crime Effects per Prison
Year Served
Per Inmate Impact on Annual Crimes
Reported to the Police
50
46.8
45
40
36.8
35
29.8
30
24.7
25
20
17.9
15
10
5
0
Crime effect using
time series break
Crime effect, 6
months
Crime effect, 12
months
Crime effect , 18
months
Crime effect, 24
months
Estimates of the Annual Effects of a Pardoned Inmate on
Province Level Crime Totals
40
Per Inmate Impact on Annual Crimes
Reprted to the Police
36
35
30
25
20
15
15
10
4
5
0
Crime effect, all provinces pooled
Crime effect, below-median
incarceration provinces
Crime effect, above-median
incarceration provinces
Incarceration Rate or Annual Incapacitation
Estimate
Estimated Impact of a Pardoned Inmate on Local Crime by Key
Percentiles of the Per-Pardon Incarceration Rate
250
191.9
200
160.1
150
Incarceration Rate
100.1
100
Annual Incapacitation Effect
58.9
50
32.5
32.6
27.6
19.9
8.6
2.6
0
10th
25th
50th
75th
90th
Percentile of the Cross-Province Distribution of Pre-Pardon Incarceration Rates
Analysis of Habitual Offender Sentence Enhancement in Holland 2001
(Study by Ben Vollard in the Economic Journal, 2012)
• The Dutch pass a sentence enhancement in 2001 targeted at
offenders with 10 or more prior felony offenses.
• Increases sentence for theft from two months to two years.
• Limited initially to 10 largest cities, but later (2004) expanded nationwide.
• Ability to apply the sentence limited through a centralized rationing process
of available prison space.
• Resulted in cross-area differences in the extent to which localities were able
to apply the sentence enhancement to their population of usual suspects.
• Based on police records, Vollard estimates that there were roughly three to
four thousands offenders whose criminal history made them eligible for the
sentence enhancement.
• Dutch incarceration rate at the time low by U.S. standards (124 per 100,000)
Relationship between recorded offenses in years preceding the policy change among
those receiving the sentence enhancement and the proportion of eligible offenders
sentenced under the new law
Annual Number of Offenses
on Offence History
8
6
4
2
0
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
Incapacitation Ratio
0.4
0.5
Vollard results
• Large average annual incapacitation effects on the order of 50 to 60
offenses prevented per year served.
• Moving from the 25th to the 75th percentile of the incapacitation ratio
results in a 25 percent reduction in the incapacitation effect.
Time period
1977 through 1988
1989 through 1999
2000 through 2010
Average prison
incarceration rate
Joint
incapacitation/deterren
ce effect per prison year
served
171
349
449
9.93
1.246
2.21
Estimates from Raphael, Steven and Michael Stoll (2013), Why are So Many Americans in Prison?,
Russell Sage Foundation Press, New York, NY.
Concluding thoughts
• Much more room for selective incapacitation, especially in the United
States where the incarceration rate is so high. Many states have
incarceration rates that exceed that of California (whether measured
before or after this slate of reforms).
• While a sizable share of U.S. prison growth is attributable to changes
in drug sentencing policy (roughly one-fifth) the lion’s share in state
prisons is attributable to longer sentences for violent offenders
(roughly one half of growth).
• Many violent offenders are often thought to be low-risk of recidivism.
Creates tension between utilitarian and just-desert objectives of corrections.