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Econ DA Uq Market fundamentals show economic gains now, but the economy is still fragile – precarious balance of key sectors – Schwartz and Rasmus – Brexit is the brink Patrick Gillespie, 6-28-2016, Patrick Gillespie is a reporter at CNNMoney. He covers the U.S. economy, stocks and emerging markets. Before CNNMoney, Patrick reported for McClatchy Newspapers and Mashable. He graduated from the University of Delaware and received a Masters from the CUNY Graduate School of Journalism. "Brexit hangover dims U.S. economy's future ," CNNMoney, http://money.cnn.com/2016/06/28/news/economy/brexit-us-economy-downgrade/ Not everyone is dimming their outlook. UBS economist Samuel Coffin is sticking with his forecast of the U.S. economy, though he adds "the U.K. decision does add some downside risk to our growth forecasts." So don't hit the panic button on America's economy -- Brexit doesn't appear to be triggering a recession in the States this year. But the historic vote means major uncertainties loom large on both sides of the Atlantic. A2: Gillespie Concludes neg – the bottom of the article was in the overview Econ Growth strong – Brexit isn’t a big deal Lucia Mutikani, 6-28-2016, Economic reporter for Reuters, "U.S. first-quarter GDP revised up, Brexit risk to outlook," Reuters, http://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-economy-gdp-idUSKCN0ZE1F7 U.S. economic growth slowed in the first quarter but not as sharply as previously estimated, and while there are signs of a pickup in the second quarter, analysts worry Britain's vote to leave the European Union could hurt activity later this year. Gross domestic product increased at a 1.1 percent annual rate, rather than the 0.8 percent pace reported last month, the Commerce Department said on Tuesday in its third GDP estimate. The economy grew at a rate of 1.4 percent in the fourth quarter. There are indications the economy has regained momentum in the second quarter, with retail sales and home sales rising in April and May, although business spending remains weak and job growth has slowed. But uncertainty following last Thursday's so-called "Brexit" referendum poses a risk to the growth outlook. "The test comes in the next few months as the turbulence in financial markets may affect consumers' behavior and also weigh on business investment," said Ryan Sweet, senior economist at Moody's Analytics in West Chester, Pennsylvania. "If financial markets settle down, the effect of the British referendum on the U.S. economy will be very small." Brexit wiped off $3.01 trillion from global stock markets over two days. On Tuesday, global equities recouped some losses, with financial shares leading the rebound. U.S. stock indexes rallied, while prices for government debt fell. The dollar fell against a basket of currencies. Economists estimate that Brexit could subtract an average of two-tenths of a percentage point from U.S. growth over the next six quarters, with most of the drag coming through weak business spending as uncertainty causes companies to either delay or scale back capital projects. "Following the Brexit vote, we expect a stronger U.S. dollar and heightened financial market strains will weigh on domestic activity, but lower interest rates should provide some offset so that the net impact is a marginal negative," said Gregory Daco, head of U.S. macroeconomics at Oxford Economics in New York. Despite signs growth is gaining steam, economists say the Federal Reserve is unlikely to raise interest rates in the near-term, given the uncertainty over the implications of Brexit. Fed Chair Janet Yellen told lawmakers last week that data pointed to "a noticeable step-up" in GDP growth in the second quarter. The Atlanta Federal Reserve is currently estimating second-quarter GDP rising at a 2.6 percent rate. When measured from the income side, the economy grew at a 2.9 percent rate in the first quarter, the quickest pace since the third quarter of 2014. That was up from the 2.2 percent pace reported last month and reflected upward revisions to corporate profits. After-tax profits increased at a 2.2 percent rate in the first quarter, rather than the previously reported 0.6 percent pace. A2: warming savings Econ gains from warming offset dont solve – even elimination of all emissions cant compensate David W. Kreutzer, David W. Kreutzer, Ph.D. Research Fellow in Energy Economics and Climate Change The Heritage Foundation , Ph.D., 11-17-2014, "Impacts of Carbon Taxes on the US Economy," Heritage Foundation, http://www.heritage.org/research/testimony/2014/11/the-impacts-of-carbon-taxes-onthe-us-economy Impact on Climate Some would argue that the CO2 reductions create benefits from reduced global warming and the value of these benefits more than offsets the cost of a million lost jobs and trillions of dollars of lost income. There are several ways of looking at these suggested benefits. Estimates of a carbon tax’s impact on world temperature do not lend much support for a carbon tax. Climatologists Pat Michaels and Chip Knappenberger provides an online calculator to estimate the impact of various cuts in CO2 emissions.[5] The calculations are based on the MAGICC model developed at the National Center for Atmospheric Research. The AEO2014 side case for the $25 per ton carbon tax would cut energyrelated CO2 emissions by about 50 percent by 2050 (overall emissions would probably drop by a slightly smaller percentage). These cuts translate to a temperature moderation of about 0.05 degrees centigrade (about 0.09 degrees Fahrenheit) by the end of this century. Few would argue that this virtually unmeasurable impact is worth the million lost jobs and trillions of dollars of lost income. Even eliminating carbon dioxide emissions entirely and assuming the highest sensitivity of world temperature to carbon dioxide levels (which happens to be the sensitivity that is furthest from that in recent research) would project a temperature moderation of less than 0.2 degree centigrade.[6] Of course, eliminating CO2 emissions entirely, if possible, would have much higher costs than even those of the $25 carbon tax modeled by the EIA or the Boxer-Sanders tax modeled by Heritage. Link The plan crushes key economic sectors - energy prices, production costs, income and job loss – costs a trillion in GDP – No efficiency gains from offsets/ industry compensation – Kreutzer A2: no short term 1. This measures welfare, not spending – doesn’t answer our i/l 2. Admits that there is still a drop over long trends – rasmus says fragility = short term impacts are especially large Economic calculators are useless- Carbon tax would do more harm than good to the economy even with a revenue neutral tax Robert P. Murphy, Patrick J. Michaels, and Paul C. "Chip" Knappenberger, 9-4-2015, "The Case against a Carbon Tax," Cato Institute, http://www.cato.org/publications/working-paper/case-againstcarbon-tax<Robert P. Murphy is an economist with the Institute for Energy Research specializing in climate change, Patrick J Michaels is a senior fellow in environmental studies at the Cato Institute, Chip Knappenberger is the assistant director of the Center for the Study of Science at the Cato Institute> In the policy debate over carbon taxes, a key concept is the “social cost of carbon,” which is defined as the (present value of) future damages caused by emitting an additional ton of carbon dioxide. Estimates of the SCC are already being used to evaluate federal regulations, and will serve as the basis for any U.S. carbon tax. Yet the computer simulations used to generate SCC estimates are largely arbitrary, with plausible adjustments in parameters — such as the discount rate — causing the estimate to shift by at least an order of magnitude. Indeed, MIT economist Robert Pindyck considers the whole process so fraught with unwarranted precision that he has called such computer simulations “close to useless” for guiding policy. Future economic damages from carbon dioxide emissions can only be estimated in conjunction with forecasts of climate change. But recent history shows those forecasts are in flux, with an increasing number of forecasts of less warming appearing in the scientific literature in the last four years. Additionally, we show some rather stark evidence that the family of models used by the U.N.’s Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) are experiencing a profound failure that greatly reduces their forecast utility. Ironically, the latest U.N. Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) report indicated that a popular climate target cannot be justified in cost/benefit terms. Specifically, in the middle-of-the-road scenarios, the economic compliance costs of limiting global warming to 2 degrees Celsius would likely be higher than the climate change damages that such a cap would avoid. In other words, the U.N.’s own report shows that aggressive emission cutbacks — even if achieved through an “efficient” carbon tax — would probably cause more harm than good. If the case for emission cutbacks is weaker than the public has been led to believe, the claim of a “double dividend” is on even shakier ground. There really is a “consensus” in this literature, and it is that carbon taxes cause more economic damage than generic taxes on labor or capital, so that in general even a revenueneutral carbon tax swap will probably reduce conventional GDP growth. (The driver of this result is that carbon taxes fall on narrower segments of the economy, and thus to raise a given amount of revenue require a higher tax rate.) Furthermore, in the real world at least some of the new carbon tax receipts would probably be devoted to higher spending (on “green investments”) and lump-sum transfers to poorer citizens to help offset the impact of higher energy prices. Thus in practice the economic drag of a new carbon tax could be far worse than the idealized revenueneutral simulations depict. A2 rev neut investment 1. This isn’t the aff – the whole econ advantage is premised on the revenue generated by a tax – that’s their morris card! 2. Even if you think their “tax swap” means its revenue neutral, the plan doesn’t specify what the revenue does, while the obeiter ev says it would go to R/D – be skeptical of solvency for the turn and the advs 3.-A revenue-neutral carbon tax would be net worse for the economy anyway Robert P. Murphy, Patrick J. Michaels, and Paul C. "Chip" Knappenberger, 9-4-2015, "The Case against a Carbon Tax," Cato Institute, http://www.cato.org/publications/working-paper/case-againstcarbon-tax<Robert P. Murphy is an economist with the Institute for Energy Research specializing in climate change, Patrick J Michaels is a senior fellow in environmental studies at the Cato Institute, Chip Knappenberger is the assistant director of the Center for the Study of Science at the Cato Institute> With progressives enumerating the various “green” investments that could be funded by a carbon tax, and with even one of the leaders in the conservative pro‐ carbon tax camp laying the intellectual foundation for a net tax hike, it should be clear that a revenue‐neutral deal at the federal level is very unlikely. However, in order to drive home just how baseless are the claims that a carbon tax could somehow deliver a “win‐win,” we should review the results from the academic economists publishing in the field. For example, a 2013 Resources for the Future (RFF) study considered the different impacts on GDP from various methods of implementing a revenue‐neutral carbon tax of varying levels. Figure 3 below reproduces their findings for the case of a $30/ton tax on CO2 (in 2012 dollars) which is completely revenue neutral, with the funds being returned to citizens through one of four ways: (1) reductions in the corporate income tax rate and personal income tax rate on dividends, interest, and capital gains (blue line), (2) reductions in the payroll tax rate and personal income tax rate on labor income (red line), (3) reductions in state sales tax rates (green line), or (4) a lump‐sum payment made to each adult citizen (purple line). The carbon tax is imposed in 2015 and revenue neutrality is maintained throughout the scenario. The results from the RFF modeling may surprise readers who are familiar with the “pro‐growth” claims about a carbon tax swap deal. As Figure 3 reveals, all of the tax swaps reduced GDP relative to the baseline in the beginning. The only way to eventually see a “double dividend”— where the economy was stimulated in addition to any environmental benefits from the new carbon tax—was to refund all of the revenues exclusively through offsetting tax cuts on capital. Supposing instead that a completely revenue neutral deal used the carbon tax receipts to fund payroll tax reductions, Figure 3 shows (red line) that the economy would actually suffer a permanent reduction of about half a percentage point of GDP. To reiterate, this result may be very surprising to those familiar with the mantra, “tax bads, not goods.” To the extent that a U.S. carbon tax were not fully revenue neutral, the reality would be much worse than is depicted in the theoretical ideal of Figure 3. It should be stressed that RFF is a respected organization in this arena and it’s fair to say that most of its scholars would endorse a (suitably designed) U.S. carbon tax; their team’s modeling results are quite consistent with the academic literature. 21 Indeed, in a 2013 review article in Energy Economics, Stanford economist Lawrence Goulder—one of the pioneers in the analysis of environmental tax analysis— surveyed the literature and concluded: If, prior to introducing the environmental tax, capital is highly overtaxed (in efficiency terms) relative to labor, and if the revenue‐neutral green tax reform shifts the burden of the overall tax system from capital to labor (a phenomenon that can be enhanced by using the green tax revenues exclusively to reduce capital income taxes), then the reform can improve (in efficiency terms) the relative taxation of these factors. If this beneficial impact is strong enough, it can overcome the inherent efficiency handicap that (narrow) environmental taxes have relative to income taxes as a source of revenue. … The presence or absence of the double dividend thus depends on the nature of the prior tax system and on how environmental tax revenues are recycled. Empirical conditions are important. This does not mean that the double dividend is as likely to occur as not, however. The narrow base of green taxes constitutes an inherent efficiency handicap…Although results vary, the bulk of existing research tends to indicate that even when revenues are recycled in ways conducive to a double dividend, the beneficial efficiency impact is not large enough to overcome the inherent handicap, and the double dividend does not arise. [Goulder 2013, bold added.]33 In short, Goulder is saying that the bulk of research finds that even a theoretically ideal revenue‐neutral carbon tax would probably not promote conventional economic growth (in addition to curbing emissions). The only way such a result is even theoretically possible is if the original tax code is particularly distorted in a certain dimension (such as taxing capital much more than labor), and if the carbon tax revenues are then devoted to reducing that distortion. It is important for libertarian and conservative readers— concerned about the economic impacts of a new carbon tax—to understand what Goulder means when he explains that the “narrow base of green taxes constitutes an inherent efficiency handicap.” If we put aside for the moment concern about climate change, then generally speaking it would be foolish (on standard tax efficiency grounds) to raise revenue by taxing carbon dioxide emissions rather than taxing labor or capital more broadly. The tax on CO2 would have a much narrower base, meaning that it would take a higher rate of taxation to yield a given dollar amount of revenue. Since standard analyses suggest that the economic harms of taxes (the “deadweight losses”) are proportional to the square of the tax rate, these considerations mean that even a dollar‐for‐dollar tax swap, in which a new carbon tax raised $x which was then used to fund rate reductions in labor or capital taxes, would nonetheless increase the economic drag of the overall tax code.34 A2: pos o/w Their “solves economy” args assume a 3 century timeframe! The short term collapse is sufficient trigger the impact well before then! David W. Kreutzer, David W. Kreutzer, Ph.D. Research Fellow in Energy Economics and Climate Change The Heritage Foundation , Ph.D., 11-17-2014, "Impacts of Carbon Taxes on the US Economy," Heritage Foundation, http://www.heritage.org/research/testimony/2014/11/the-impacts-of-carbon-taxes-onthe-us-economy Extreme Assumptions Needed for Declining Discount Rates The Science paper refers to several other papers that also derive these declining discount rates. A necessity for all of them is that the lower discount rate must be in force for an extended period. For a 300-year time horizon, the simplest split of equally likely one-percent and seven-percent discount rates would be 150 years at 1 percent and 150 years at 7 percent. Discounting $1,000 for 150 years at one percent gives a present value of $224.79. Discounting this value for the remaining 150 years (for a total of 300 years) at 7 percent gives an ultimate present value of $0.0088. Note that using the average discount rate of 4 percent for the whole 300 years gives a present value of $0.0078. In fact, for the present value to even reach as high as $1.00, the one percent discount rate has to apply to at least 232 of the 300 years. If one and seven are equally likely for each of those years, the probability of this occurring is 2.05 x 10-22. Correlated Discount Rates and Economic Growth Rates To extricate themselves from the dismal probabilities of the previous paragraph, proponents of declining discount rates appeal to the possibility of correlated discount rates. In essence, the coin flips stop early in the game and we are stuck with the rate chosen on that last flip, which at the time of analysis is unknown. Weitzman illustrates the uncertainty this way: “When I try to imagine how the future world might look a century from now, I start by trying to conceptualize how people a century ago might have attempted to envision our world today. We have available now some important technologies, like computers or airplanes, that were essentially unimaginable 100 years ago. Maybe a now unimaginable ‘photon-based technology’ will replace today’s electronic technology and deliver such prodigious rates of technological progress with a clean environment that historians then will look back on the previous 100 years and smile at the modest projections of even the growth optimists at the close of the twentieth century. Or, who knows, maybe a century from now people will feel crowded and polluted and very disappointed in a pace of technological change that failed to maintain the productivity growth of the ‘golden age’ of the industrial revolution during the earlier two centuries from 1800 to 2000.” The people in the future envisioned by the IWG (and embedded in their IAMs) need not worry. They will not be disappointed because the IWG assumes future growth in per capita GDP that actually exceeds that of the U.S. for the past two centuries. The per capita GDP growth rates for the reference scenarios listed by the IWG ranged from 1.58 percent to 2.03 percent per year with an average of 1.8 percent per year. On the other hand the Maddison Project estimates per capita GDP levels for the U.S. that grew only 1.56 percent per year from 1800 to 2000.[14] Over those same two centuries the real compounded annual rate of return in U.S. stock markets has been a “remarkably stable” 6.8 percent per year.[15] It would be reasonable to assign an even higher projected rate of return on capital in an environment where growth is projected to be in excess of 1.56 percent. In short, the growth rates built into the IAMs exceed that of the past two centuries in the U.S. (and the world) and therefore rule out the possibility that Weitzman offers as justification for the very low discount rates. The IWG cannot simultaneously entertain arguments for low discount rates and project high GDP growth rates. At least until economic growth in the IAMs is re-worked to match the lower rates implied by DDRs there can be no argument for DDRs in the IAMs. A2: slow phase in 1. Patterson assumes a slow phase in – fiat isn’t that – its immediate or you violate resolved and should and lose on T – I’d read a def but the file isn’t out! – makes CP competition impossible and skews links to core neg DA’s like elections and econ!– voter for f/e 2. Assumes a measured response by investors and consumers – every market crash ever disproves this b/c there are panics and rushes – rasmus 3. Requires tax swaps to work – all the rev neutral work answers this Case Econ A2: econ weak (general) Doesn’t assume specific fundamentals stability – it is strong now but fragile – this ev is descriptive of the brink – Schwartz and rasmus U.S. Economy strong now – several factors Focus economics, 6-28-2016, "United States Economy," FocusEconomics | Economic Forecasts from the World's Leading Economists, http://www.focus-economics.com/countries/united-states The U.S. economy has been in good shape overall in the second quarter following the slowdown in Q1. Consumer spending—the main engine of the economy—likely remained strong in Q2 as retail sales expanded for a second consecutive month in May. In addition, an increase in the ISM manufacturing index was positive news in May, although the indicator still suggests soft growth in the sector. Meanwhile, the May jobs report took center stage as non-farm payrolls grew at the weakest pace since September 2010. On 8 June, Hillary Clinton, former first lady, secretary of state and senator for New York, became the Democratic Party's presumptive nominee for the 2016 presidential election. Clinton will run against the Republicans' choice of real estate mogul and television personality, Donald Trump, in an unusual battle to lead the country. American voters are divided and many are faced with a tough decision as they must choose between one candidate who, for many, is associated with supporting the dysfunctional Washington status quo, while many others believe a vote for Trump is equivalent to taking a dive into the unknown. United States Economy Data 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 Population (million) 312 314 317 319 321 GDP per capita (USD) 49,725 51,384 52,608 54,375 55,868 GDP (USD bn) 15,518 16,155 16,663 17,348 1 7,947 Economic Growth (GDP, annual variation in %) 1.6 2.2 1.5 2.4 2.4 Domestic Demand (annual variation in %) 1.6 2.1 1.3 2.5 3.0 Consumption (annual variation in %) 2.3 1.5 1.7 2.7 3.1 Investment (annual variation in %) 6.4 9.8 4.2 5.3 4.0 Exports (G&S, annual variation in %) 6.9 3.4 2.8 3.4 1.1 Imports (G&S, annual variation in %) 5.5 2.2 1.1 3.8 4.9 Industrial Production (annual variation in %) 2.9 2.8 1.9 2.9 0.3 Retail Sales (annual variation in %) 7.3 5.0 3.7 3.9 2.2 Unemployment Rate 8.9 8.1 7.4 6.2 5.3 Fiscal Balance (% of GDP) -8.4 -6.7 -4.1 -2.8 -2.4 Public Debt (% of GDP) 98.3 102 104 105 106 Money (annual variation in %) 7.4 8.6 6.8 6.2 5.9 Inflation Rate (CPI, annual variation in %, eop) 3.1 1.8 1.5 0.7 0.7 Inflation Rate (CPI, annual variation in %) 3.1 2.1 1.5 1.6 0.1 Inflation (PPI, annual variation in %) 3.9 1.8 1.4 1.6 -0.9 Policy Interest Rate (%) 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.50 Stock Market (annual variation in %) 5.5 7.3 26.5 7.5 -2.2 Current Account (% of GDP) -3.0 -2.8 -2.3 -2.2 -2.7 Current Account Balance (USD bn) -460.4 -449.7 -376.8 -389.5 -484.1 Trade Balance (USD billion) -740.7 -741.2 -702.6 -741.5 -759.3 SAMPLE REPORT 5 years of United States economic forecasts for more than 30 economic indicators. DOWNLOAD United States Economy Overview Economic Overview of the United States Despite facing challenges at the domestic level along with a rapidly transforming global landscape, the U.S. economy is still the largest and most important in the world. The U.S. economy represents about 20% of total global output, and is still larger than that of China. Moreover, according to the IMF, the U.S. has the sixth highest per capita GDP (PPP), surpassed only by small countries such as Norway and Singapore. The U.S. economy features a highly-developed and technologically-advanced services sector, which accounts for about 80% of its output. The U.S. economy is dominated by services-oriented companies in areas such as technology, financial services, healthcare and retail. Large U.S. corporations also play a major role on the global stage, with more than a fifth of companies on the Fortune Global 500 coming from the United States. Even though the services sector is the main engine of the economy, the U.S. also has an important manufacturing base, which represents roughly 15% of output. The U.S. is the second largest manufacturer in the world and a leader in higher-value industries such as automobiles, aerospace, machinery, telecommunications and chemicals. Meanwhile, agriculture represents less than 2% of output. However, large amounts of arable land, advanced farming technology and generous government subsidies make the U.S. a net exporter of food and the largest agricultural exporting country in the world. The U.S. economy maintains its powerhouse status through a combination of characteristics. The country has access to abundant natural resources and a sophisticated physical infrastructure. It also has a large, well-educated and productive workforce. Moreover, the physical and human capital is fully leveraged in a free-market and business-oriented environment. The government and the people of the United States both contribute to this unique economic environment. The government provides political stability, a functional legal system, and a regulatory structure that allow the economy to flourish. The general population, including a diversity of immigrants, brings a solid work ethic, as well as a sense of entrepreneurship and risk taking to the mix. Economic growth in the United States is constantly being driven forward by ongoing innovation, research and development as well as capital investment. Obvi the da turns – im going for the utsourcing arg and if I win then it makes solvency impossible for all advs Welfare – insuff – that’s the DA link Rev recycle is link arg On case Leakage Link mag XT The aff leads to outsourcing carbon emissions to coutries without regs – NCPA on the case page – that magnifies the link argument 1. It destroys exchange rates and results in higher inflation levels – it erodes all resiliency to feedback loops and makes economic risks net worse in the world of the aff – Roberts 2. In generates international models that incentivizes low cost high emission production in developing nations – yoshida That increases costs by 250% - the global econ doesn’t stand a chance post plan! Robert P. Murphy, Patrick J. Michaels, and Paul C. "Chip" Knappenberger, 9-4-2015, "The Case against a Carbon Tax," Cato Institute, http://www.cato.org/publications/working-paper/case-againstcarbon-tax<Robert P. Murphy is an economist with the Institute for Energy Research specializing in climate change, Patrick J Michaels is a senior fellow in environmental studies at the Cato Institute, Chip Knappenberger is the assistant director of the Center for the Study of Science at the Cato Institute> Besides the arbitrariness and/or dubious choices for the major input parameters, another problem with use of the SCC as a guide to setting carbon taxes is the problem of leakage. Strictly speaking, it would make sense (even in textbook theory) to calibrate only a worldwide and uniformly enforced carbon tax to the SCC. If a carbon tax is applied only to certain jurisdictions, then emission cutbacks in the affected region are partially offset by increased emissions (relative to the baseline) in the non‐regulated regions. Depending on the specifics, leakage can greatly increase the economic costs of achieving a desired climate goal, and thus the “optimal” carbon tax is lower if applied unilaterally in limited jurisdictions. To get a sense of the magnitude of the problems of leakage, consider the results from William Nordhaus, a pioneer in the economics of climate change, and creator of the DICE model (one of the three used by the Obama Administration).13 After studying his 2007 model runs, Nordhaus reported that relative to the case of the entire globe enforcing the carbon tax, to achieve a given environmental objective (such as a temperature ceiling or atmospheric concentration) with only 50 percent of planetary emissions covered would involve an economic abatement cost penalty of 250 percent. Even if the top 15 countries (by emissions) participated in the carbon tax program, covering three‐quarters of the globe’s emissions, Nordhaus still estimated that compliance costs for a given objective would be 70 percent higher than for the full‐coverage baseline case.14 To see the tremendous problem of limited participation from a different perspective, one can use the same model that EPA uses to calculate the effect of various policy proposals. The Model for the Assessment of Greenhouse‐Gas Induced Climate Change (MAGICC) is available and easy‐to‐use on the Cato Institute website. MAGICC shows that even if the U.S. linearly reduced its emissions to zero by the year 2050, the average global temperature in the year 2100 would be 0.1°C—that’s one‐ tenth of a degree—lower than would otherwise be the case.15 Note that this calculation does not even take into account “leakage,” the fact that complete cessation of U.S. emissions would induce other nations to increase their economic activities and hence emissions. Our point in using these results from the MAGICC modeling is not to christen them as confident projections, but rather to show that even on their own terms, using an EPA‐endorsed model, American policymakers have much less control over global climate change than they often imply. Warming Turns warming Economic crisis turns warming and investment – increases fossil fuel use and outweighs short-term gains Reuters, 3/20/’9 (http://www.reuters.com/article/GCA-GreenBusiness/idUSTRE52J1BV20090320) ROME (Reuters) - The economic crisis may lower carbon emissions in the short term but will raise them over the long term by crimping investment in cleaner energy sources, the International Energy Agency's chief economist said on Thursday.¶ The impact of the financial crisis and the ensuing economic slump on energy investments had been "stronger than anyone expected" and significant enough to have an impact on climate change and the whole energy supply chain, warned Fatih Birol.¶ "To think that lower economic growth is good for the environment is completely wrong," Birol told Reuters.¶ "Because there are many investments that are good for the environment, like efficiency, renewables and nuclear, that are being postponed or canceled. One or two years of lower carbon emissions won't count for much at the end of the day."¶ A $100 a barrel price drop from a record high last year has hurt oil producers, but is a bigger threat to generators of more environmentally-friendly fuels, which are considered commercially viable only as alternatives to expensive oil. Yes outsource – assume that no nations are willing – our v says china and india will cheat! – doesn’t assume BRICS nations Tech The wealthy countries will just outsource their carbon pollution to developing nations Suzanne Goldenberg, 1-19-2014, "CO2 emissions are being 'outsourced' by rich countries to rising economies," Guardian, https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2014/jan/19/co2-emissionsoutsourced-rich-nations-rising-economies The world's richest countries are increasingly outsourcing their carbon pollution to China and other rising economies, according to a draft UN report. Outsourcing of emissions comes in the form of electronic devices such as smartphones, cheap clothes and other goods manufactured in China and other rising economies but consumed in the US and Europe. A draft of the latest report from the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, obtained by the Guardian, says emissions of carbon dioxide and the other greenhouse gases warming the planet grew twice as fast in the first decade of the 21st century as they did during the previous three decades. Much of that rise was due to the burning of coal, the report says. And much of that coal was used to power factories in China and other rising economies that produce goods for US and European consumers, the draft adds. Factories in China and other rising economies now produce more carbon pollution than industries in America and Europe. "A growing share of global emissions is released in the manufacture of products that are traded across international borders," the draft says. The newly wealthy elites of China, India and Brazil are flying more, buying more cars and otherwise fuelling the consumption that is driving climate change. There is now growing debate about how to assign responsibility for emissions generated producing goods that were made in one country but ultimately destined for another. "The consumers that are importing those goods have some responsibility for those goods that are happening outside of our boundaries," Cummis said. The 29-page draft, a summary for policy makers, was dated 17 December. An edited version is due to be published in Germany in April. The report is the third in a series by the IPCC, summing up the state of the climate crisis since 2007 and prospects for solutions. The first part was released in September. It is stark about the chances of avoiding dangerous climate change – especially if deep cuts in greenhouse gas emissions are pushed back beyond 2030.