Download 53 CHAPTER 5. THE UNBUILT ENVIRONMENT

CHAPTER5.THEUNBUILTENVIRONMENT:AGRICULTUREANDFORESTRY39
For ECA’s productive environment—farms, commercially exploited forests, and fisheries—
climatechangeisalreadyhappening.Moldova’sdroughtͲstrickenagriculturalsectorandCentral
Europe’s forest fires during the 2003 heat wave provide a harbinger of the challenges the
farmingandforestrysectorswillfaceoverthecomingyears(Finketal.2004).
However, the impact of climate change will vary across ECA countries, with some areas and
sectors projected to experience significant new stresses, while others might see a positive
impact. There are also variations in when and how directly different areas and sectors must
copewithclimatechangeimpacts.Theincreasedfrequencyofheatstress,drought,andflooding
caused by climate change threaten to reduce crop yields and livestock productivity in many
areas.Shorterandlessharshwintersmayresultinpotentialproductivitygainsinothers.Inthe
forestry sector, increased risks of fires and pest outbreaks will negatively affect the health of
forests(Easterlingetal.2007).
Theagricultureandforestrysectorsalsocanhelpmitigatefurtherclimatechangeandmayoffer
opportunities for tapping into carbon finance. Forests, which play a critical role in absorbing
carbon dioxide emissions, are cut in order to clear land for farming. Globally, agricultural
productionanddeforestationaccountforupto30percentofgreenhousegasemissions,second
only to the power sector (IPCC 2007c). These sectors therefore offer opportunities for carbon
sequestration, such as through afforestation or minimum tillage agriculture. But mitigation
strategies do not protect societies against the climate change impacts already in evidence, or
thoseinthepipelineasaresultofpastgreenhousegasemissions.
Adaptation is essential to protect and enhance rural livelihoods in ECA. But adaptation is also
criticaltosupplyglobalfoodmarketsasglobalpopulationsoars,andasyieldsinmanycountries
declinefromthedamagingphysicalimpactsofclimatechange.Farms,forestsandfisheriesplay
a crucial role in rural poverty reduction, employment, economic growth, and food security.
Indeed, the ECA countries that stand to benefit from moderate temperature increases (+1 to
+3ºCintheglobalannualaverage)willplayavitalroleinmeetingtheworld’sgrowingdemand
forfood.
But the benefits and risks of climate change are far outweighed by the costs of the region’s
comparativeinefficiencyandlowproductivity(OlesenandBindi2002).Therecentcrisisinglobal
food prices revealed the inability of a number of ECA countries to respond to the changed
environment,raisingconcernsaboutskewedincentivesandtheregion’sabilitytoadapttothe
challenging shifts projected under climate change scenarios. To change this, ECA’s leadership
andfarmingcommunitymustbereadytoaddresstheproductivitygapwithWesternEuropein
bothagricultureandforestry.
Allgovernmentsintheregionwillneedstrategiesthatallowtheircountriestotakeadvantageof
potential gains from climate change, as well as minimize risks and threatened losses. But
positive outcomes won’t arrive automatically. A country or subͲregion may be positioned to
expandfarmoutputsundercertainclimatechangescenarios,butifthephysicalinfrastructureis
failing, or if institutional or market barriers are a constraint, the benefits of increased farm
outputswon’tmaterialize.
39
Thischapterisbasedon“AdaptationtoClimateChangeinEuropeandCentralAsia’sAgriculture”byWilliamSutton,
RachelBlock,andJitendraSrivastava,abackgroundpapercommissionedforthisreport.
53
Despite variations across countries, each one will need to remove barriers to efficiency and
sustainability. In Central Asia, the unforgiving topography and hydrology will complicate
adaptation strategies, even if institutions are functioning at optimum effectiveness. Southeast
Europe, home to some of the most productive land in the region, is projected to suffer from
drought,heatwaves,andmorefrequentforestfires.Inthenorth,therearepotentialbenefits
fromclimatechange,butthesewillonlyberealizedifcountriesadjustinstitutionalframeworks
to support new patterns of production. Even then, other barriers will persist, including in
northern Russia’s poorsoil’s, the lack of public services and infrastructure, and possible social
dislocationsandlocalenvironmentaldamage(DroninandKirilenko2008).
In sum, countries should be ready to take advantage of potential benefits or to minimize
threatened losses through assessment and wellͲstructured adaptation programs. For those
linkedtothefarmandforestrysectors,theneedisurgentsinceclimatechangewillaffectthem
immediately and most directly. Countries will have to strengthen the capacity of institutions
involved in the rural economy and to improve public services, particularly those that impart
skillsandunderstandingtofarmersandforesters.Finally,infrastructuresthataffectproduction
andinstitutionsthatsupportmarketswillrequiremodernization.
ThechapterreviewstheimpactsofclimatechangeonfarmingandforestryinECA,highlighting
the region’s inherent sensitivity and limited adaptive capacity, and what this implies for both
winning and losing regions and sectors. It concludes with recommendations about possible
adaptation measures. First, however, we discuss the continued importance of agriculture in
manycountriesintheregion—particularlyforpovertyconcerns.
ClimateimpactswillexacerbateECA’spersistentproblemofruralpoverty
Despite the perception of ECA as an urbanized region, many livelihoods are still linked to the
productivity of agriculture, even if those involved do not work directly on farms (Alam et al.
2005). Agriculture is a particularly important part of GDP in Central Asia, the South Caucasus,
andSoutheasternEurope(table5.1).
AcrossECA,roughlyoneͲthirdtooneͲhalfofthepopulationlivesinruralareaswiththefigure
approaching twoͲthirds in Central Asia. Even in Kazakhstan and Central and Eastern Europe, a
significantshareofthepopulationremainsrural,despitethefactthatagricultureaccountsfora
smaller portion of the economy. And, in much of ECA, half or more of the poor live in rural
areas, with threeͲfourths of extremely poor people in Central Asia living in the countryside.
Thus, any forwardͲlooking poverty strategy must take into account new stresses felt in rural
areasasaconsequenceofglobalclimatechange.
Forestryandforests,thoughnotassignificanteconomicallyasagriculture,remainimportantfor
rurallivelihoodsboththroughdirectemploymentandthroughecosystemservices(suchasthe
provisionofwoodandfood,orprotectionagainsterosionandflood)Forestryaccountsforonly
about0.1percentofGDPinmuchofCentralAsiaandtheCaucasus;butoutsidemarketsystems,
forest resources may be significant to rural communities, particularly with respect to the
fuelwood. The market importance of forestry is somewhat higher in Central, Eastern, and
SoutheasternEurope.40
40
ForestryasashareofGDPis2.3%inBelarus,0.8%inRussia,1.2%inUkraine,2.2%inBosniaͲHerzegovina,3.1%in
SerbiaandMontenegro,andabout0.8%inBulgaria,Macedonia,andTurkey(allfigures2000;Suttonetal.2008).
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TABLE5.1AGRICULTUREMATTERS:POVERTYANDTHERURALECONOMYINECA
Region
Agricult. Rural Ruralextreme
asshare pop% povertyrate%
ofGDP%
Ruralpoverty
rate%
Ofextremely
poor,sharein
ruralareas%
Ofpoor,
sharein
ruralareas%
Southeastern
12.3
35.4
20withTurkey, 61withTurkey,
46
45
Europe
9without
44without
Central&Eastern
8.7
36.1
10
44
54
48
Europe
Baltics
5.3
35.2
3
33
39
42
Russia
5.6
27.1
14
53
42
34
SouthCaucasus
12.0
45.9
30
80
49
48
Kazakhstan
6.7
42.2
31
79
64
52
CentralAsia
27.0
64.1
62
94
73
69
NotesonPoverty:Extremepovertyline$2.15orlessperpersonperday.Povertyline$4.30perperson
per day. Both poverty lines using purchasingͲpower parity dollars. 2002, 2003 or 2004 if available. For
rural poverty, Central Europe is Ukraine, Romania, Moldova; Central Asia is Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan,
Uzbekistan; Southeastern Europe is Bulgaria, Serbia, Montenegro, Albania, FYR Macedonia, BosniaͲ
Herzegovina,+/ͲTurkey.NotesonAgricultureandPopulation:2006or2005.
Sources:WorldDevelopmentIndicators(WDI)andAlametal.(2005).
RuralpovertyratesinECAaresignificantlyhigherthannationalaverages,andtheshareofrural
peopleinpovertyrangesfromalowofoneͲthirdinRussiatoastaggering94percentinCentral
Asia.Intherestoftheregionabouthalfofthepoorarefoundinruralareas.Thus,mostECA
countries other than Russia have a poverty profile heavily influenced by conditions in rural
areas,particularlywithrespecttoagriculture.
Agricultureisuniquelyeffectiveinreducingpovertyinallcountrytypes.41Theinverse,ofcourse,
is that setbacks in agriculture—whether losses or missed opportunities—will be
disproportionately damaging to the rural poor. Thus, even if climate change has only a small
impactontheoveralleconomy,itcouldhaveaprofoundeffectontheportionofthepopulation
livingbelowthepovertyline,orthepopulationofaparticulardistrictorlocality.Moreover,at
the local or household level, the impact could go beyond income to affect human health and
nutrition(Randolphetal.2007).
Livestock activities are important to many vulnerable groups in the ECA region and may be
undergoingstructuralshiftsasthedemandformeat,eggs,anddairyproductsincreasesinAsia’s
fastͲgrowing economies. The delicate balance of grain allocation as a staple food or as animal
feedmaybecomemoredifficulttomaintaininthecontextofchangingglobaldemand.Shocks
fromclimatechangecouldaddtoanalreadyuncertainmixoffactors,potentiallyexacerbating
thecurrentglobalfoodandfeedcrisis(SirohiandMichaelowa2007).Untanglingtheinterplayof
shiftingglobaldemand,climatechange,andpatternsinlivestockͲrelatedlanduse͸andteasing
outthepolicyimplications͸isacontinuingendeavorworldwide.
ModelspredictthattherewillbewinnersandlosersinECA
Beyond the undisputed conclusion that climate change will add to the vulnerability of most if
notallruralpopulationsalreadylivinginpoverty,theeffectsofchangingweatherpatternson
ECA’s agriculture and forestry are hugely varied. In addition, projections build on uncertain
41
Thispoint,whichwashighlightedintheWorldDevelopmentReport2008onagriculture,iswellillustratedbythe
factthatGDPgrowthoriginatingintheagriculturalsectorreducespovertytwiceasmuchasgrowthdrivenbyother
sectors(WorldBank2007).
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factors, including the ways that private interests or institutions might respond to the new
opportunitiesandrisksthatcomewithwarmer,wetter,ordrierweather.
Adaptationwillbeessentialnotonlytoprotectthepoorestbutalsotorealizepotentialbenefits.
However, adaptation strategies carry costs and face barriers that must be factored into any
calculationaboutnetgainsinECA.Andthescopeofopportunitiesispartlyafunctionofworld
foodmarkets,whicharesubjecttofluctuationanduncertainty.
Still,climateandagroeconomicinformation,whilefarfromcomprehensive,providessufficient
datatoillustratethescopeofclimateshiftsalreadyunderway,alongwithsomefuturechanges
andtheirpotentialimpacts.
Insightsfromobservedclimatechangesandimpacts
Changes in climate and their impacts on agricultural systems and rural economies are already
evident throughout ECA. The growing season has lengthened in locations stretching from
GermanytoEuropeanRussia(Maracchietal.2005).Chapter2notedthatextremeeventshave
occurred with greater frequency and intensity in Europe, most recently in the 2003 summer
heatwaveovermuchofthecontinent,andmoreintensefloodinginCentralandSoutheastern
Europe.AdeclineinprecipitationalongthenortheasterncoastoftheMediterraneanhascaused
significant droughtͲrelated damages in the agricultural economies of Southeastern Europe
(Alcamoetal.2007,p545).DroughtͲinducedeconomiclossesinallsectorshavebeencalculated
for the region, and are in some cases large.42 Successive weather extremes add to stresses:
Moldova’sresiliencewasalreadyweakenedbypaststormsanddroughtswhenamajordrought
arrivedin2007,bringinggreatereconomicdisruption.
In Central Asia, Kazakhstan, Asian Russia, and the Arctic, twentieth century increases in
temperaturehavesurpassedtheworldwidewarmingaverage,risingbyasmuchas+3ºC(Cruzet
al.2007p475;Kattsov2007p8).Thefrequencyandintensityofextremeeventshasincreased,
including heat waves, extreme cold days and winter storms, heavy rains and floods, and
droughts(Alcamoetal.2007;Cruzetal.2007).
In the mountainous South Caucasus, observed changes have exhibited geographic variation in
bothdirectionandmagnitude;sowhileaveragetemperaturehasincreasedslightlyandaverage
precipitation declined slightly, localized impacts have been larger (Hovsepyan and Melkonyan
2007).SeveredroughtshavebecomeincreasinglycommonintheNorthandSouthCaucasusand
Central Asia, worsened by poor land management, soil degradation, and reduced rain or river
runoff(WorldBank2005).
Impacts:theagronomicview
ECAasawhole,aswellasindividualECAcountries,isuniqueinencompassingbothwarm,dry
areaswhereagricultureandforestsareprojectedtoexperiencesignificantdamagefromclimate
change, and colder areas where agriculture and forestry could benefit from warmer
temperaturesandincreasedprecipitation(seetable5.2forasummaryofchangesinagricultural
potential;detailedregionalinformationonimpactsisinbox5.1).
42
Albania(1989–1991:$25m),Macedonia(1993:$10m),Moldova(2000:$170m,2007:$1billion),Romania(2000:
$500m),Croatia(2003:$330m),BosniaͲHerzegovina(2003:$410m)(UNISDR/WorldBank2007;WMO2007).
56
SmallͲholderfarmsinAlbaniathatdependonirrigationmaybehardhitbydroughtsandheat
waves,whileinpartsofPoland,alongergrowingseasonandwarmerwintersmayallowgreater
cropdiversityandincreasedproductivity.
LargecountriessuchasKazakhstanincorporatevariousclimatezones,andwillbehometoboth
winnersandlosersasclimatechangeimpactsplayout.Areasprojectedtoseeincreasingrainfall
couldseeexpandingopportunitiesforrainͲfed,highͲyieldingwinterwheat,whileotherpartsof
thecountryfacereducedwateravailability,sporadicdrought,andlowercottonyields.
Ideally, countries could embark on a smooth adaptation (as illustrated by the arrows in table
5.2), with cereal cultivation shifting northward in Russia and Kazakhstan, and longer growing
seasons allowing for increased diversification into highͲyield or highͲvalue crops in the cool,
temperate areas of Central Europe and European Russia. Of course, it takes planning,
investment, and effective knowledge services to take advantage of climateͲinduced
opportunities.
TABLE5.2CROPPOTENTIALINTHEECAREGIONTODAYANDPOSSIBLESHIFTSBY2100
General
climate
class
Average
temperature
ofwarmest
months(°C)
CropͲ
growing
period
(days)
Croppotential
Verycold
8.5–11
<90
Quickmaturinggreenroot
vegetables(lettuce&
radishes)
PartsofArctic
Region,Siberia&
FarEast(Russia)
Cold
10.5–16
<100
Earlyvarietiesofvegetables
(cabbage,spinach,turnips),
earlyvarietiesofbarley,oats,
buckwheat,flax,hardiestlocal
varietiesofapples&pears
Northernpartsof
Urals,Western
Siberia&FarEast
Moderately
cold
15–20
100–150
Winterwheat,springwheat,
rye,barley,oats,legumes,
flax,potatoes,cabbage,beets,
locallyadaptedwinterͲhardy
varietiesofapples,pears,
plums.
Baltics,northern
partsofCentral
Russia&Volga
Region&Southern
Siberia,Northern
Kazakhstan
Moderate
18–25
150–180
Grain,corn,sunflower,
soybeans,rice,wheat,
melons,earlycotton,
vegetables,walnuts,peaches,
apricots,apples,grapes,
cherries,plums.
Ukraine,southern
partsofCentral
Russia&Volga
Region,Northern
Caucasus,Central
Europe
Warm
>25
>180
Cotton,citrus,figs,grapes,
olive,wheat,corn,rice,
vegetablesduringwinter,
subtropicalperennials(tea),
nutsandavarietyoffruit
crops
CentralAsia,
Caucasus,
Southeastern
Europe,Turkey,
Southern
Kazakhstan
ECAregions
ECA
regions
in2100
in2009
Compare to
South Mediterranean
& Middle East
in 2009
Source:Suttonetal2008.
57
BOX5.1ESTIMATEDAGRONOMICIMPACTSOFCLIMATECHANGEINECATO2050—ASUMMARY
SOUTHEASTERNEUROPEincludingTurkey
Decreasedprecipitationinallseasons,yetmorestorms,floods•Soilerosionfromwind,storms,andfloods*•increasedevapotranspiration,soil
salinization•increasedirrigationdemand,stressonwatersupply•especiallyseverewaterstressinsouthernTurkey.
Higher average temperature, very hot summers, heat waves, and droughts • Faster maturation, shorter development period, with water
shortageandheatstress,grainsterility,loweryieldsofmanycereals,oilseeds,andpulses(i.e.,determinantcrops)*•decreasedyieldorquality
of onions,** coolͲweather vegetables* • longer season for warmͲweather vegetables • possible shifts to higher altitude of some crops (esp.
mountainousTurkey)•increasedvariabilityofgrapequality,quantity,andvulnerabilitytopests,butpotentialbenefitfromCO2fertilization•
,
expansion of droughtͲtolerant olive, citrus, fig* *** • but tree crops highly vulnerable to storms, pests** • winter survival and subsequent
†
proliferationofpests.
,
Increasedvariabilityinyieldsofcereals,othercrops.* ***
**,***
Livestock • Heat stress and both indigenous and nonͲindigenous disease in livestock threaten milk and meat production.
Heat, water
scarcitydecreaseforageproductionleadingtoshortageinlatesummer.***
CENTRAL&EASTERNEUROPE
Rightonlinebetweennorth(wetter,milderwinter)andsouth(drier,hotter),sonotyetclearifclimateandthusimpactswillbesimilartothe
††
neighbors to the north or to the south. Potential yield increases projected by models mostly shown in Alps, Carpathians, where significant
agriculture not actually feasible. Disagreement among sources, including range from benefits to large losses around Black Sea (E. Romania,
Moldova,S.Ukraine—hotanddry),littleagreementforallofUkraine.**,††
Increased storms, but ambiguous magnitude and direction of precipitation change • Tree crops vulnerable to storms • even if no change in
regionoverall,possibleyielddeclineiftoowetinthenorth(seeBaltics)orevenslightlydrierinthesouth(seeSoutheasternEurope).
Equalamountofwarminginwinterandsummer•Fastermaturation,shorterdevelopmentperiod,mayloweryieldofmanycereals,oilseeds,
andpulses(i.e.,determinantcrops)*•potentialfornorthwardexpansionofwarmweathercropslikeoilseeds,pulses,vegetables**•potatoes
morevariable,possiblylimitedbylowsoilmoisture*•wintersurvivalandsubsequentproliferationofpests•toowarm,dryforrainͲfedcereals
inparts,butsuitableformoretreecrops,includingfruit,nutsandmorenaturalpasturebiomassforanimals;possibleincreaseinareaofwinter
wheatandrye.
BALTICS
Increasedprecipitation,floods•Riskofsoilerosion•excesssoilmoisturelimitsdayssuitableformachineryuse*•springplantingdisruptedby
April/Mayrains•harvestdisrupted,damagefromwaterͲlogging,ormoldingofharvestedgrainifexcessraininautumn.*
Milderwintersandhigheraveragetemperature•Fastermaturation,shortergrainͲfillingperiod,loweryieldofwinterwheat,*butnowpossible
tousehigheryieldingspringͲwheat•potentialfornorthwardexpansionofwarmͲweathercropslikeoilseeds,pulses,vegetables*•eithernoor
favorable changes in potato, sugarͲbeet yields, but increased variability* • winter survival and subsequent proliferation of pests* • more
varietiesofapples,plums,pears.
†††,‡
Increasedvariabilityinyieldsofcereals,othercrops.
Potentialyieldgainsrequiremorefertilizerandpesticides.**Noconsensusonstronglypositivenorstronglynegativeyieldprojectionsoverall;
generallysmall,positiveforinitialmoderatewarming,becomingunpredictableandpossiblynegativeasmeantemperatureincreasesfurther.†,††
Livestock • Increased survival, reduced winter feed requirements for livestock.** Forage, grassland may benefit but only with proper
drainage.†,††
RUSSIA:Baltic&WesternArctic
Markedincreaseofprecipitation,especiallyinwinter,andofsurfacewater•Riskofsoilerosionandnutrientleachingfromexcessrain•excess
soilmoisturelimitsdayssuitableformachineryuse*•springplantingdisruptedbyApril/Mayrains•harvestdisrupted,damagefromwaterͲ
logging,ormoldingofharvestedgrainifexcessraininautumn.*
Muchmilderwintersandhigheraveragetemperature•Potentialfornorthwardexpansionoftemperatecereals,vegetables,pulsesinBaltic,and
‡
ofhardiestcropsintouncultivatedland**•longergrowingseason •potatoyieldsmorevariable,thoughwithaverageincrease.**
Largechange,especiallyinArctic,andthuslargeuncertainty.
ExpansionofleafͲbearingandstepperangeintocurrenttundra,taiga.**Changeincompositionofforests,andpossibleincreaseinvaluefor
timberproduction.
Livestock • Increased survival, reduced winter feed requirements for livestock.** Forage, grassland may benefit but only with proper
drainage.**,†
RUSSIA:Central&Volga
Smallincreaseofprecipitation,mostlyinwinter,andofsurfacewater•Givensmallchange,uncleariftherewillbesufficientmoisture,given
temperatureincreasesandfasterevaporation,insomemonths•extremelowrunoffeventsthreatenoutput†duetodrought.
Much milder winters and hotter summers, higher average temperature • Potential for northward expansion of winter cereals and crops like
oilseeds,pulses,vegetables,aswellasfruitcropscurrentlygrowninNCaucasus**•longergrowingseason•wintersurvivalandsubsequent
†
proliferationofpests.
Increasedvariabilityinyieldsofcereals,othercrops.†††,‡
Livestock•Increasedsurvivalandreducedfeedrequirementsforlivestockinwinter.**Possibleheatstress,dryingupofgrasslandinsummer.
**,†,‡
Possibleexpansion, intensification of indigenous and nonͲindigenous disease.† In southernpart, productivity of grassland to decline, will
needtoshiftnorthward.Lowergrassproduction,heatstress,drysummersleadtoreducedmilk,vulnerabilitytodisease.† (continued)
58
RUSSIA:NorthCaucasus
Decreasedprecipitationinallseasons,yetmorestorms,floods,andsoilerosion.
Higheraveragetemperature,veryhotsummers,heatwaves,anddroughts.
Very similar changes, on average, to South Caucasus, though even higher heat wave risk. See agronomic impacts information for South
Caucasus.TheareawiththegreatestpotentialdamageswithinRussia,givencurrentagriculturalimportanceandnatureofprojectedchanges.
Plantandanimaldiseasestobecomemorerecurrent.
RUSSIA:Urals&W.Siberia,S.Siberia,E.Siberia&FarEast
Markedincreaseofprecipitation,especiallyinwinter,andofsurfacewater,highfloodrisk•Excessprecipitationmaylimitexpansionofcereals
otherwisepossiblefromtemperatureincreasealone•riskofsoilerosion•excesssoilmoisturelimitsdayssuitableformachineryuse*•spring
plantingdisruptedbyApril/Mayrains•harvestdisrupted,damagefromwaterͲlogging,ormoldingofharvestedgrainifexcessraininautumn.*
Muchmilderwintersandhigheraveragetemperature•ShiftofagroͲecologicalzonesonadiagonalgradienttowardsthenortheast,socurrently
forestedoruncultivatedlandwarmenoughforwintercereals,shortseasonvegetables,•expansionofcerealswouldentailmajorchangesin
landuseovertime.
Livestock • Increased survival, reduced winter feed requirements for livestock.** Forage, grassland may benefit but only with proper
**,†
drainage.
ExpansionofleafͲbearingandstepperangeintocurrenttundra,taiga.**Changeincompositionofforests,andpossibleincreaseinvaluefor
timberproduction.
SouthSiberiahasadifferentclimaticandagriculturalbaseline,thoughprojectedclimatechangesaresimilartotherestofAsianRussia.See
impactsinKazakhstanformorerelevantagronomicimpacts.
SOUTHCAUCASUS
Decreaseinsurfacewater;droughtsandfloods;declineinspringandsummerprecipitation,smallincreaseonseacoastsinwinter•Highriskof
summerdroughts•salinization,desertification,andsoildegradation‡‡•yielddeclinesforcereals,vegetables,potatoesfromwatershortageand
excessheatinmanyareas•widespreadcropfailuresduringdroughts•strainonwatersupplyforirrigatedagriculture. ‡‡Especiallyhotter in
summer, also milder winters • Despite milder winters, more cropͲdestroying frosts (tree crops, fruits) because of absence of heatͲretaining
‡‡
‡‡
humidity • longer growing season may allow multiple harvests • expanded area for cultivation of warmͲweather tree crops (figs, nuts) in
plains,andexpandedareaforvegetables(tomato,peppers)andcoolͲweathertreecrops(apples)athighaltitudes,butlimitedbysteepnessand
riskofincreasederosion‡‡•potentialyieldincreaseandgeographicexpansionforhotͲweatherperennialslikegrapevine,olive,citrus,butwith
riskofhighvariability‡‡,**•treecropsvulnerabletostorms,pests**•wintersurvivalandsubsequentproliferationofpests.†
Livestock•Increasedheatstressanddisease,butlessstressfromcoldinwinter.**Outcomesforforage,grasslandnotclear.‡‡
KAZAKHSTAN
Morerainfall,surfacewateryearͲroundinnorth,withverydrysummersinsouth•DespiteCO2fertilization,increasedheatandwatershortage
†
causedeclineincotton,rice,fodder,vegetableandfruitcropproductioninirrigatedsouth •potentialexpansionofgrazinglandnorthwards
and in formerly virgin marginal lands, that were later ploughed for wheat cultivation. Note, greater water demand for rice production with
†
highertemperatures. Muchwarmerthroughoutyear,slightlymoreinsummer•Potentialincreaseincereal,legumeandoilcropproductionincooler,wetternorth•
increasedfodderproduction•increasedwaterdemandofplantsanddryingofsoilsinwarmermonthsbecauseofhighertemperatures,causing
droughtriskandwaterscarcitytopersistorworsen.
Livestock • Initial warming good for livestock, provided sufficient water availability, but after first few degrees, increased heat stress and
disease.†
CENTRALASIA
Unchanged or increased winter rainfall, decrease in rainfall and surface water in spring, summer, fall, with droughts • Major stress on water
†
resourcesforirrigation•declineincerealyieldfromwatershortagefromspringtofall,andfromthermalstress •drought,desertification,soil
erosion, salinization • widespread crop failures during droughts • increased suitability for droughtͲresistant tree crops. Note, greater water
demandforriceproductionwithhighertemperatures.†
†
Hottersummer,milderwinter•Greaterwaterdemandforriceproductionwithhighertemperatures •despiteCO2fertilization,increasedheat
andsignificantwatershortagecausedeclineincottonyields.†
Livestock•Marginalgrasslandsatriskforaridization,desertification.Heatstressreducesmilkproduction.
Sources: Olesen and Bindi 2002;* Maracchi et al. 2005;** Branczik 2007;*** IPCC 2007c;† European Commission 2007;†† Alexandrov 1997;†††
Sirotenko,Abashina,andPavlova1997;‡HovsepyanandMelkonyan2007.‡‡
59
Further south, hotter, drier summers pose new risks, with more frequent, intense droughts in
Southeastern Europe and Turkey, the North and South Caucasus, and Central Asia. The net
effectcouldwellbenewlimitsonoutput,andfargreatervolatilityincropyieldsfromyearto
year.Infact,asillustratedinthelastrowoftable5.2,themodelforagricultureinthealready
warm,dryareasofECAeventuallywillbedrawnlessfromlocalexperiencethanfromcurrent
practices in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA). Today’s management challenges and
conflictsoverwaterinMENAofferasoberingpictureofwhatsomeinECAmustadaptto.
Theprojectedincreaseinweatherextremespresentschallengesforagricultureacrossallparts
ofECA.InundatingrainsinRussiaandtheBalticsmayinterruptsowingandharvestingofcereals.
Storms in Central and Southeastern Europe could destroy tree crops. Alternating drought and
intenserainandsnowmeltcouldcauseerosionandlandslidesinthedenselycultivatedslopesof
the Caucasus. Drought combined with the scarcity of irrigation water could accelerate soil
degradation;andasvegetationwithers,localclimatefeedbackeffectsresultinlessprecipitation
andworseningdrought.ClimatechangewillworsenthislongͲtermspiralofintensifyingaridityin
CentralAsiaandtheSouthernCaucasus(Easterling etal.2007; Cruzetal.2007;Alcamoetal.
2007; Olesen and Bindi 2002; Maracchi, Sirotenko, and Bindi 2005; Branczik et al. 2007;
HovsepyanandMelkonyan2007).
Livestock production, also sensitive to weather patterns, could benefit in the north from
increasedforageproduction,lowerfeedrequirements,andlessthreatofextremecold.Butin
the warmer, drier areas changing rainfall patterns and extreme heat will affect livestock both
directly—throughheatstress,lackofdrinkingwater,andchangedreproductivepatterns—and
indirectly—through reduced forage and feed yields. The unwelcome arrival of infectious
diseases,suchasbrucellosisorrabies,becauseofwarmertemperatures,wouldaddtostresses
onherds.
Livestock production can add to the climate change problem—through overgrazing and local
climatefeedbackeffectsand,globally,throughmethaneemissions.Alltold,livestockactivities
now contribute 80 percent of all agricultural greenhouse gas emissions (FAO 2006a). If
producersrespondtodeclinesintheproductivityoflivestockbyenlargingtheirherds,theresult
could be overgrazing, pasture degradation, and erosion of watershed catchments, causing
devastatinglocalclimatefeedbackeffects(Kokorin2008).Thisscenarioofgrasslandsbecoming
dryandbarrenisalreadyaconcerninwaterͲscarceCentralAsia,wheremanypeopledependon
traditionalagroͲpastoralgrazingsystems.
ECA’sforestsfacetreelossanddegradationfromextremeeventsandfromthecombinationof
earlier snowmelt and hot, dry summers. Regional droughts and shifting wind patterns have
alreadyincreasedthefrequencyandintensityofwildfires,notablyinSerbia,BosniaandCroatia
in 2007, and Russia, where some 20 million hectares were lost to fires in 2003 alone. Strong
winds,whichareprojectedtoincreaseasclimatechanges,cannotonlyspreadwildfiresbutalso
spark the initial conflagration. Many suspect that strong winds near electrical wires were the
culpritinthe2008firesintheTurkishprovinceofAntalya,where,inadditiontotakinglifeand
destroyingtrees,thefiresdevastatedvaststretchesofproductivefarmlands.
Achangingclimatecanredistributetreespecies,withwarmingcausingshiftstohigherlatitudes.
The new patterns can also provoke outbreaks of insect infestations, as seen in the northern
marchofdamagingpestsinborealforestsaroundtheworld(Easterlingetal.2007).
60
Similarly,achangedclimatesetsthestageforaninvasionofnonͲnative,harmfulplantspecies
intoalreadydisruptedforestecosystems.Plantandpestspecieswillmovetohigheraltitudesin
responsetoglobalwarming,atrendalreadyobservedintheexpandednorthwardrangeofbirch
(Betulapubescens)intothetundraofSwedenoverthelasthalfofthetwentiethcentury.
Impacts:theeconomicmodels
Themodelestimates
The economic effects of climate change on agriculture include direct yield impacts, which are
the most easily estimated, as well as ripple effects across sectors and markets. We take the
initial shock to potential crop yields as our starting point before subsequently considering
marketforcesandfeedbacks,withparticularfocusontheinternationalfoodmarket.Basedon
ouranalysisandestimatesavailableinglobalsynthesisstudies,primarilyCline(2007),whichare
discussedfurtherinbox5.2,wehavealsoattemptedtoidentifypotentialwinnersandlosersin
agriculturaloutputmarkets.
BOX5.2ECONOMICAGRICULTURALIMPACTMODELSANDTHEIRLIMITATIONS
The Cline estimates have been chosen here because they incorporate both main types of models,
agronomicandRicardian,toarriveatconsensusestimates.(Forfurtherdiscussion,seeSuttonetal.2008.)
However,thereareanumberofreasonstointerprettheresultswithcaution.Fivemajorlimitationsofthe
estimates are (i) the lack of ECAͲspecific data, particularly important in mountainous and waterͲ
constrained areas, in the initial design of the models; (ii) the reliance on averages to determine yields,
wheninfactvariability,extremes,andnonͲlineartippingpointsmaybeequallyormoreimportant;(iii)
oversimplificationofhydrology,andthusfailuretoconsiderrealisticconstraintsonwateravailability;(iv)
a partial equilibrium view of resource allocation and production, i.e., omission of tradeͲoffs in the
allocationoflandandwaterandofmarketfeedbackeffects;(v)thelackofconsiderationofthebarriersto
adaptation,fromthegeographic,technological,andinfrastructuraltotheinstitutional,informational,and
financial; (vi) highly optimistic assumptions about a positive supply response from ECA in the face of
global shifts in food production potential, demand, and prices, which would in fact require currently
absentcomplementaryinstitutionsandinvestments.
The results show that there is the potential for the following changes in the agricultural
economiesoftheregion:
x
NetlossesinSoutheasternEuropeandTurkey,theNorthandSouthCaucasus,andCentral
Asia;
x
GainsintheBalticsandSiberia,Urals,FarEast,andBaltic&WesternArcticregionsof
Russia;
x
MixedoruncertainoutcomesinCentralandEasternEurope,Kazakhstan,andtheCentral
andVolgaregionsofRussia(table5.3).
The subͲregional summaries are not meant to be definitive because uncertainties remain, but
they can help identify potential conditions that farmers and policymakers can shape and
respondtobasedoncurrentclimatechangeknowledge.Whilepreciseimpactscan’tbegauged,
a pattern does emerge in which southern areas, already waterͲstressed, will be vulnerable to
theprojectedhighertemperaturesandlowerprecipitation,whilehigherlatitudescouldbenefit
from improved conditions for agriculture. (The economic impact models for forests are less
developed.)
61
TABLE5.3ECA’SPOTENTIALWINNERSANDLOSERSINAGRICULTUREFROMCLIMATECHANGE
Region
Basedonannex5.1,
Cline,authors’analysis
Yieldimpacts2080s
withoutCO2
fertilization(%)
Yieldimpacts2080s
withCO2
fertilization43(%)
SouthCaucasus
Likelyloser
–17
–5
CentralAsia
Likelyloser
–9
+4.6
SoutheasternEurope&Turkey
Likelyloser
Eur:–8.6Turk:–16.2
Eur:+5.1Turk:–3.6
Central&EasternEurope
Mixed/indeterminate
–5
+8.5
Kazakhstan
Mixed/indeterminate
+11.4
+28.1
Russia:NorthCaucasus
Likelyloser
Russia:CentralandVolga
Mixed/indeterminate
Russia:Baltics
Potentialwinner
Russia:WestArctic
Potentialwinner
Russia:SouthSiberia
Potentialwinner
–7.7
+6.2
Russia:Urals&W.Sib,E.Sib&
FarEast
Potentialwinner
Baltics
Potentialwinner
–5to+5
+9.5to+27.9
Source:Suttonetal.2008.Notes:RelativetotheotherpartsofECA,Kazakhstan’syieldincreasesare
probablyanoverestimate.Moredetailsareinbox5.2.
Interpretationandcaveats
At first glance, the impact on ECA’s farm economy appears manageable, particularly when
comparedtoSouthAsiaortheSahel,whereyieldsareprojectedtodecreasebymorethan25
percent. Because the models all have weaknesses, and because country level economic
projectionsarerudimentary,decisionͲmakersshouldseetheprojectionsasindicative.Todate,
verylittleanalyticalworkhasbeendoneatthecountrylevelinECAtoestimatetheeconomic
costs and benefits of climate change impacts and agricultural adaptation, and even less to
addresstheintraͲcountrydistributionalimplicationsofclimatechange.
The estimates are limited in the sense that they can only include trends; but not all climate
changesfollowasimpletrajectory.AkeyexampleofclimatechangecomplexityistheSyrDarya
andAmuDaryaRivers,whichdrawonmountainsnowmeltinthespringandearlysummerand
glacialmeltinlatesummer,andwhichprovidemuchofthewaterforCentralAsianfarmsbefore
eventuallydrainingintotheAralSeainwesternKazakhstanandUzbekistan.Thecrucialglaciers
oftheTienShanMountainsofNorthernChinaandKyrgyzstan,acriticalsourceofwater,have
declined sharply in the past 50 years, with an accelerated retreat in the past two decades
(Niedereretal.2008).
43
Carbon fertilization refers to an expected increase in yield of many crops in an environment of higher CO2
concentrations,becausei)CO2isaninputintophotosynthesis,andmoreCO2meansmorephotosynthesisandthus
growth; and ii) higher concentrations can reduce respiration, i.e., water loss from the “pores” in leaves, thereby
increasing water use efficiency. There is still debate about the magnitude of the CO2 fertilization effect, so both
estimateswithandwithoutitareconsideredhere(Cline2007).
62
Aswarmingcontinuesandwintersnowfallisreplacedbyrainfall,riverflowwillincreaseinthe
winterbutdeclineinthespringandsummerwhenitismostneeded.Thisisbecausetherewill
belittleaccumulatedsnow.Uptotheyear2050,waterfromthemeltingglacierswillincrease
substantially:estimatesrangefromanincreaseofoneͲthird(Agaltseva2008)toatripling(Cruz
etal.2007).Butafterthesefewdecades,theflowfromthediminishedglacierswillslowtothe
pointwhereCentralAsianfarmswon’thaveenoughwaterforirrigation.Asaresult,theAralSea
will likely shrink further, possibly reversing recent successes in restoring its ecosystems
(Savoskuletal.2003).
ThestateandsensitivitiesofECA’sagriculturetoday
Foranyregionthecapacitytomanageclimatechangewilldependonitsdemonstratedabilityto
addressabroadercategoryofproblemsrelatedtotheenvironmentandnationalresourcebase.
The institutional and economic conditions of countries will shape the ways that countries
respondtothechallengesposedbyshiftingweatherpatterns.
Stakeholders engaged in adaptation assessments and planning will need to understand how
land is used, which population groups are vulnerable, as well as the diversity of agricultural
practices.Amapoftheregion’slandusecategoriesappearsinmap5.1,whileECA’sagricultural
characteristicsappearintable5.4.
Climatechangeiscomplicatedbyenvironmentalmanagementweaknesses
Independentofclimatechange,environmentalproblemshavepresentedsubstantialchallenges
to ECA countries, many of which lack management practices needed to protect the natural
resource base on which critical economic activities depend (Sutton et al. 2007). Shortcomings
are evident in soil fertility management, water use, pest control, nutrient conservation, forest
health,andillegallogging.Projectingcurrentmanagementpracticesintoaneraofaccelerating
climate change raises concerns not only about social and economic setbacks in farming and
forestry, but also about ecosystem stresses including biodiversity loss, and damage to
watershedsandrurallandscapes.
Failure to address soil erosion is particularly worrisome, since climate change could make
present problems worse through a pattern of alternating droughts and extreme rains. Turkey
standsoutforitsprogressinmanagingsoilerosion,motivatedinpartbyconcreteestimatesof
lostoutput,whichhelpedtomotivatestakeholders.Thishighlightstheimportanceofmonetary
estimatestoempowerchampionsadvocatingforchange(Suttonetal.2007).
Institutional and management weaknesses in ECA stem mainly from the wrenching transition
fromcentrallyplanned,CommunistͲeragovernancemodels.Thoughthebleakestdecadeispast,
alegacyofdistortedspecializationandrigid,resourceͲpoorinstitutionsremains.Theemphasis
on inputs that characterized the region’s thinking on agriculture for decades—more fertilizer,
more seeds, more irrigation—have left the sector unprepared to adapt to knowledgeͲbased
farmingbettersuitedtoaworldofconstrainedresources.
63
Farms mostly in Central & Volga, N. Caucasus, some in Baltic, and in
southernUrals andSouthSiberia.AboutoneͲthirdofagriculturallandin
privatehands,therestpublic.Fewsubsistencefarms.Family,jointstock
companyfarms,andpublicownedfarms;lowyields,poorlyrun.
Russia
Little privatization, with land ownership and distribution policies
distortionary except in Kyrgyzstan, which is implementing privatization.
Subsistence/familyfarms,inefficientlowͲproductivitycollectivefarms.
CentralAsia
64
Notes:CentralEuropeisUkraine,Moldova,andRomania.Sources:WorldDevelopmentIndicators.Alametal.2005.FAO2006b.Csakietal.2006.WorldBank2005.
Privatization progressing but incomplete. Small family farms in irrigated
south but large farms in the north are betterͲrun, private joint stock
companiesgrowingwheat.
Mostly rainfed. Some irrigation in N
Caucasus,southernmostpartofUralsand
Siberia,smallamountinCentral&Volga.
Moderatelydroughtproneinsouth.
Armenia,Azerbaijan:20–30%ofcropland
irrigated. Georgia: 40%. Highly droughtͲ
prone, but rainfall more abundant in
BlackSeacoastalareaofGeorgia.
Moderate diversification. Cotton, rice, wheat, fruits Rainfed pasture. Just 10% irrigated.
& vegetables. Forage, livestock, poultry in south. In HighlydroughtͲprone,especiallyinsouth.
the north monoculture of wheat, some oil crops,
pasture.
Highly diversified. Cotton, rice, wheat, corn, large Kyrgyz, Turkmen, Uzbek mostly rainfed
number of fruits, vegetables, livestock, poultry, pasture. 75–90% of region’s cropland
sheep,pasture.Especiallyreliantonlivestock.
irrigated. Extremely droughtͲprone,
waterͲstressed.
Little diversification except in N. Caucasus. Barley,
rye, potatoes, fodder in north & west. Spring wheat
innorth&east,somewinterwheatinsouth.Diverse
fruits, vegetables, vineyards inVolga & N. Caucasus.
SomericeinN.Caucasus.Livestock.
Most productive arable land now under private ownership, but pasture Highly diversified. Fruits & vegetables, orchards
still communal in places. Small, fragmented holdings. Subsistence and including apple, pears, cherries and some citrus,
vineyards,dairy,sheep.Cereals,forage,corn,tea.
familyfarmswithlowproductivity.
Kazakhstan
South
Caucasus
Farmsareprivatelyowned.
Baltics
Little diversification. Barley, rye, wheat, potatoes Entirelyrainfed,abundantprecipitation.
(especially Belarus). Livestock, pork and poultry.
OilseedinPoland.Limitedfruitsandvegetables.
Current yields low relative to potential. Moldova especially poor and Moderatelydiversified.Wheat,barley,fodder,fruit& Mostly rainfed, around 10% irrigated,
agricultureͲbased; moderate privatization but highly fragmented private vegetables,orchards,potatoes,oilseeds,sugarbeets. except in Romania 30%. Moderately
holdings and some remaining inefficient collectives. Privatization also Livestock,thoughsmallersharethanrestofECA.
droughtͲprone, Moldova more droughtͲ
incomplete in Ukraine. In Romania, mix of small family and commercial
prone.
farms,allprivatelyowned.
Central&
Eastern
Europe
Northwestern part of Balkans entirely
rainfed.
Albania:
50%
irrigated.
Macedonia, Bulgaria: 15%. Turkey: 20%.
DroughtͲprone, hot desiccating winds,
intenserain,soilerosion.
Highly diversified. Cereals, fruits, vegetables,
orchards, vineyards, oilseeds, nuts, sugar beets;
dairy,pork,sheep,poultry.InTurkey,cotton,olives,
figsinadditiontoabove.
Farms of Bulgaria now privatized; Croatian and Macedonian farms
privately owned. Albania, Serbia and Montenegro mostly private but
unclear ownership rights, and some inefficient collectives remain.
Excessivefragmentationofholdingsthroughoutregionlimitsefficiency.In
Turkey,farmsaresmallandprivatelyowned.
SouthͲ
eastern
Europeand
Turkey
CroplandIrrigationandWaterSupply
MajorCrops&Products
Distribution,Ownership,andProductivityofAgriculturalLand
Region
TABLE5.4CHARACTERISTICSOFCURRENTAGRICULTURALPRODUCTIONINECA
BuildingthecapacitytoadaptwillbecrucialforECA’sAgriculturalKnowledgeandInformation
Systems, which were designed to assist large, publicͲsector, collective farms in meeting preͲ
determined production targets for crops and livestock commodities. These systems remain illͲ
suited for meeting the needs of smaller, private farmers who constitute a large share of the
sectortoday.
Years of overͲspecialized production have also taken a toll. Under the command economy,
collective farms, subͲnational regions, and even entire countries specialized in an often small
numberofgoodsthatmayormaynothavebeenappropriatetothelocalnaturalandhuman
resource endowment. One of the most damaging examples was the concentration of cotton
productioninCentralAsia,whichledtooverexploitationofwaterforirrigation,heldinplaceby
aninstitutionalframeworkresistanttodiversification.
In the first decade of the region’s transition to markets, agriculture, like most sectors,
experienced major upheavals, with sometime severe declines in output, and a drying up of
governmentfinancialsupport(WorldBank2007).Thenewprivatefarmerslackedexperiencein
modernmanagementorinoperatinginamarketeconomy.Theyhadlittletrainingsupportfrom
institutions that had either collapsed or remained geared towards the old system. Knowledge
gaps combined with a shortage of inputs, equipment, storage facilities, and market structures
continuetoweakenthefarmsectorthroughouttheregion(SwinnenandRozelle2006).
Theagriculturalsectorisgraduallyadjustingtopolicyreforms.Farmeconomieshavebegunto
recover,withharvestsandheadsoflivestockincreasingtoward1990levels.Privateagriculture
based on market principles is now predominant. But serious problems persist in the sector’s
institutional foundations. Environmental laws protecting agriculture, forestry, and biodiversity
are weakly or unevenly enforced (Sutton et al. 2007). Research, education, training, and
technologytransfersystemssufferfromneglect.
Turkey stands out, since it isn’t emerging from CommunistͲera central planning. Private farms
have always dominated agriculture in Turkey, though the small farm size limits the country’s
productivity gains. There is diversity in farm production within the country, and agriculture in
western Turkey has generally been more progressive and exportͲoriented than in eastern
Turkey. The research, extension, training, information, and technology transfer institutions
function relatively well, and crossͲministry cooperation on environmental issues is promising
(Suttonetal.2007).
ThecapacitytomonitortheimpactofclimatechangehaslargelybrokendowninRussiaaswell
as in other Eastern European and Central Asian countries, along with services for monitoring
baselineweatherconditions(seechapter7).Theabilitytotrackpests,watchforforestfires,and
providewarningofflashfloodsandotherextremeeventswillincreasetherisksforfarmsand
forestersasclimatechangeplaysoutovertime.Becausefirespassuncheckedacrossborders,
they can spark transboundary political disagreements in addition to causing physical and
economic damages. The fires of the summer of 2007 in Southeastern Europe offer a sobering
exampleofthehuman,economic,andpoliticalcostofinsufficientcooperationandcoordinated
planningatthenationalandinternationallevel.
65
Farmtypeandadaptivecapacity
Different types of farms have varying advantages and disadvantages in adapting to the
challengesposedbyclimatechange.
Broadly, the ability to adapt to a changing climate depends on the elements of a functioning
agriculturalsystem:(i)timelyclimateinformationandweatherforecasts,andtheskillsneeded
for their interpretation; (ii) locally relevant agricultural research in techniques and crop
varieties;(iii)traininginnewtechnologiesandknowledgeͲbasedfarmingpractices;(iv)private
enterprises, as well as public or cooperative organizations for inputs, including seeds and
machinery, and affordable finance for such inputs; (v) infrastructure for water storage and
irrigation; (vi) physical infrastructure and logistical support for storing, transporting, and
distributing farm outputs; and (vii) strong linkages with local, national, and international
marketsforagriculturalgoods.
Different types of farms have different levels of access to these critical elements. Although
smallerprivatefarmswouldseemtobethemostnimbleinrespondingtochangingconditions,
largerfarmsgenerallywouldhavesuperiorclimateinformationandexpandedaccesstocredit;
and governmentͲowned farms would have better access to state sources of information and
finance.
All told, diversified operations are better positioned to respond to stresses that might hit one
setofcropsoronetypeofactivity.Anyfarmsalreadydealingwithstressedwatersupplieswill
facenewhardshipsinthemoreuncertainandextremetimesthatmaylieahead.
Corporate farms in Bulgaria, Romania, Russia, and northern Kazakhstan represent the largest
type of farm and have the greatest physical and human capital resources. Next are the
cooperative or group farms, generally managed by a few individuals using the pooled land of
manysmallholders,whomayalsobehiredtoprovidefarmlabor.Whilethesefarmscanexploit
economiesofscale,theirmanagerstypicallylackthetechnologicalknowͲhowandfinancingof
thecorporatefarms,makingthemmorevulnerable.
The largest and fastest growing group is the small, family farm, which produces for the
commercial market but at a small scale. These farms make up the bulk of agricultural income
and output in the Balkans, Turkey, the Caucasus, and Central Asia, and remain important in
CentralandEasternEuropeandRussia.Thesefarmswilllikelycontinuetoserveastheengineof
theruraleconomyinthecomingdecades,buttheymaybehighlyvulnerabletoclimatechange
giventheirsize,thefarmers’limitedtechnicalknowledge,andpooraccesstopublicandprivate
informationandfinancialservices.
Smallfarmersinparticularwillfaceclimatechangeasyetonemorestresscompoundingmany
others, including fragmented holdings, marginal land, poor environmental management, illͲ
defined property rights, increasing demand for standardized and safetyͲcontrolled products,
declining health and vitality of the rural poor (in ECA, due to aging and outmigration of the
young),protectionistfoodpoliciesabroad,andunpredictableworldfoodprices(Easterlingetal.
2007).
ThefinaltypeoffarmisthelowͲproductivitysubsistencefarm,withagingproprietorssupported
in part by urban remittances, which have little resilience to shocks. The transition out of
66
agriculturewillnotbeeasyforthesepeoplesincetheyoftenhavenootheroptions.Safetynets
willbeneededtoassistthem.
Potentialclimatechangewinnersfacetheirownchallenges
Potentialwinnerswillnotbenefitautomaticallywithoutmakingsubstantialinvestmentsinthe
future. They must take significant actions if they are to reap the potential benefits of climate
change. Producers and policymakers in northern latitudes have begun to anticipate longer
growingseasonsandimprovedfarmoutputs.
However,anycomplacencywouldbemisplaced,sinceadaptationinvestmentswillberequired
totakeadvantageofanypotentialgains(Parry,Rosenzweig,andLivermore2005).Thepotential
winnersneedtobeawareofthespecificchangesprojectedandhowbesttotakeadvantageof
them. Moreover, most countries will have a mix of losing and winning producers, and will
requireadaptationstrategiesacrosssectorsandsubͲregions.
Some new challenges will emerge as producers take advantage of new farming opportunities.
Northern areas will see intense competition between forestry and agriculture for land. The
relativefeasibilityoffieldcrops,treecrops,andlivestockmayfurtheralterlandͲusepatterns.As
seen in the case of the Aral Sea, overexploitation of water resources for irrigation, as well as
overuse and resulting runoff of polluting fertilizers, can have devastating consequences on
fisheriesandotherwaterͲdependentactivities.
Thequestionofwhether ECA’spotentialwinnerscanrealizethe benefitsoffavorableclimatic
conditionshasimportantimplicationsnotjustforthecountriesthemselves,butforworldfood
marketsingeneral.Inparticular,Kazakhstan,Russia,andUkraine(KRU),itisoftensaid,havethe
mostunrealizedgrainproductionpotential,andtheycouldbenefitfromclimatechange(atleast
intheirnorthernregions).
But a recent report notes that, since the breakup of the Soviet Union, these three countries
combined have removed 23 million hectares of arable land from production, the largest such
withdrawalinrecentworldhistory(FAO&EBRD2008).Almost90percentofthislandhadbeen
usedtoproducegrain.
Bringing large parts of this land back into production could increase world grain supplies and
helpsolvethecurrentglobalfoodpricescrisis.Meanwhile,anumberofglobalstudies(e.g.Cline
2007) project a substantial increase in agricultural output for the KRU countries as a result of
climatechange(seethecaveatsinthediscussionoftable5.3above).Theseprojectedincreases
contributetotherelativelysanguineattitudeofmanytowardsclimatechange’simpactonworld
foodsupplies.
The key question is whether the potential ECA winners will be able to provide the supply
responsethatmanyexpectofthem.Therearetwopossibilitiesforincreasingproductioninthe
KRU countries: (i) raise yields on currently cultivated agricultural land; and/or (ii) expand the
areas under cultivation. Because the latter would require large investments in landͲclearing,
production,marketing,andtransportinfrastructure,movestoimproveproductivityofexisting
farmsaremoreattractive.
67
Productivity depends not only on the climate conditions, but also on technology, investment,
support services, and crop management. Analysis has shown that the current gap between
potentialandactualyieldsinCentralandEasternEuropeandtheEuropeanpartsoftheformer
SovietUnionaresignificantlyhigherthananypotentialgainsfromclimatechange.Inparticular,
thecurrentyieldgapfortheformerSovietcountriesinEurope(includingUkraineandEuropean
Russia) is 4.5 times higher than the potential increase in production from climate change by
2050(OlesenandBindi2002).
Whileworldgrainyieldshavebeenrisingonaveragebyabout1.5percentperyearsince1991,
yieldsinUkraineandKazakhstanhavefallen,andRussia’shaveincreasedonlyslightly.Yieldsin
allthreecountriesarefarlowerthanthoseinWesternEuropeortheUS.ThefactthattheKRU
countries and other ECA countries have not been able to take advantage of this potential for
productivity gains suggests fundamental weaknesses in the agricultural sectors of these
countries, which does not bode well for their capacity to adapt to and benefit from climate
change. Indeed, the key challenge would be to close the existing productivity gap rather than
expectingtoridetheclimatechangetrendstoaneweraofprosperity.
Forests show a similar pattern to agriculture. Estimates indicate that the largest share of
potential forest stock increases in Europe would be due to improved management (60–80%)
rather than climate change (10–30%) (Easterling et al. 2007). Improved management requires
strongforestinstitutions,whichareoftenlackinginthetransitioncountries.
Adaptationintheproductiveenvironment
Adaptingtheproductiveenvironmenttochallengesofclimatechangewilldemandtechnologies
to monitor and measure conditions in the productive environment, institutions to facilitate
change, and policies that encourage reform. Managers will need to show resilience and
flexibility if they are going to be less vulnerable to changing weather patterns. A number of
sustainable, appropriately chosen adaptation initiatives would yield measurable benefits
regardless of climate factors. Policies and technologies for more efficient distribution and onͲ
farmuseofwatermakeeconomicsense͸byloweringcoststogovernmentintheformofwater
subsidies͸and make adaptation sense͸by equipping farmers to cope with reduced water
availabilityaswellasdroughtevents.
But adaptation is a national effort not limited to individual farmers or foresters. For example,
increased waterͲuse efficiency will not be implemented without adoption of irrigation
technologies andmanagementstrategies.But institutional componentsare equallyimportant:
waterͲuserassociationsmightaidinknowledgesharing,andadvisoryservicescanequipfarmers
withwasteͲreducingtechniques.Atthepolicylevel,governmentscaninvestinadvisoryservices
andawarenesscampaigns,whilesettingwater pricestogive usersincentives toreducewaste
andtherebylowergovernmentspendingonsubsidies.
Given the uncertainty about the exact spatial and temporal distribution of climate changes, a
cautious approach is to pursue adaptations that would be worthwhile even without climate
change. Following are examples from areas where adaptation measures hold the greatest
promise,independentofclimatechangescenarios:
68
Technology and management (see annex table 5.1): Conservation tillage for maintaining
moisturelevels;reducingfossilfuelusefromfieldoperations,andreducingCO2emissionsfrom
the soil; use of organic matter to protect field surfaces and help preserve moisture;
diversification of crops to reduce vulnerability; adoption of droughtͲ, floodͲ, heatͲ, and pestͲ
resistant cultivars; modern planting and cropͲrotation practices; use of physical barriers to
protectplantsandsoilsfromerosionandstormdamage;integratedpestmanagement(IPM),in
conjunction with similarly knowledgeͲbased weed control strategies; capacity for knowledgeͲ
based farming; improved grass and legume varieties for livestock; modern fire management
techniquesforforests.
Institutional change (see annex table 5.2): Support for institutions offers countries winͲwin
opportunities for reducing vulnerability to climate risk and promoting development. Key
institutions include: hydromet centers, advisory services, irrigation directorates, agricultural
research services, veterinary institutions, producer associations, waterͲuser associations, agroͲ
processingfacilities,andfinancialinstitutions.
Policy (see annex table 5.3): NonͲdistorting pricing for water and commodities; financial
incentives to adopt technological innovations; access to modern inputs; reformed farm
subsidies; risk insurance; tax incentives for private investments; modern land markets; and
socialsafetynets.
69
Landusemanagement
Mixedfarmingsystems(crops,livestock,andtrees)
Conservationtillage
Nutrientmanagementanduseoforganicmatter
Watershedmanagement
Waterharvestingtechniques,storage,reductionofrunoff
Drainagesystems
Rehabilitationandmodernizationofirrigationinfrastructure,canals
Developnewirrigationfacilities
Useofmarginalwater
Damsforwaterstorage,floodcontrol
Supplementalirrigation
Irrigationatcriticalstagesofcropgrowth
Sprinklerirrigation
Dripirrigation
FurrowandflatͲbedirrigation
Drought
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
Needforwateruse
efficiency(irrigated)
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
Landdegradation,soil
infertility,erosion
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
Heatstress
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
Pestanddiseasecontrol
Climate/weather/agriculturalphenomena
x
x
x
x
x
x
Excessrain,flooding,storms
Technologicaladaptationmeasuresandinvestments
Needforsoilmoisture
conservation(rainͲfed)
ANNEXTABLE5.1TECHNOLOGICALADAPTATIONPRACTICESANDINVESTMENTSFORVARIOUSCLIMATE,WEATHERANDAGRICULTURALPHENOMENA
Milderwinters,longer
growingseason
x
x
x
x
x
70
x
x
x
x
x
Emissionsmitigation,
carbonsequestration
Cropdiversification
UsewaterͲefficientcrops,varieties
HeatͲanddroughtͲresistantcrops/varieties/hybrids
Switchtocrops,varietiesappropriatetotemp,precipitation
Croprotation(sequencing)
Switchfromfieldtotreecrops(agroͲforestry)
Timingofoperations(planting,inputs,irrigation,harvest)
Stripcropping,contourbundingandfarming
Vegetativebarriers,snowfences,windbreaks
Rangelandrehabilitationandmanagement
Pasturemanagement(rotationalgrazing,etc)andimprovement
Supplementalfeed
Fodderbanks
Wateringpoints
Livestockmanagement(includinganimalbreedchoice)
Firemanagementforforestandbrushfires
Responsefarming(usingseasonalforecasts)
IntegratedPestManagement
Source:authors;Padgham(forthcoming).
Drought
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
Needforsoilmoisture
conservation(rainͲfed)
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
Needforwateruse
efficiency(irrigated)
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
Landdegradation,soil
infertility,erosion
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
Heatstress
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
Pestanddiseasecontrol
Climate/weather/agriculturalphenomena
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
Excessrain,flooding,storms
Technologicaladaptationmeasuresandinvestments
Milderwinters,longer
growingseason
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
71
x
x
x
x
x
x
Emissionsmitigation,
carbonsequestration
ANNEXTABLE5.2INSTITUTIONSCRITICALFORADAPTATION
Institution
Hydromet&
Forecasting
Centers
ImportanceforAdaptation
StatusinECA
NATIONALANDLOCALGOVERNMENTS
Essentialinformationforplanning,
USSRwasservedwell,hassincecrumbled.
understandingchangingclimate,providing
ImprovinginEuropeanRussiabutstill
farmerswithlongͲterm,seasonal,anddaily
unsatisfactoryinCentralAsiaandtherest
weatherforecastingforknowledgeͲbased
ofECA.Poorcapacityforlocalmonitoring,
localdatainterpretation,andforecasting.
responsefarming.
AdvisoryServices
(incl.Agricultural
Extension)
i.AgronomicInfo
ii.Financial
Advice
iii.MarketInfo
i.Interprethydrometoutputforpractical
advicetofarmers;conveyinformationon
trendsofclimatechangeandrisk;
recommendandtraininnewandoffͲtheͲ
shelftechnologiesandinnew/different
locallyͲadaptedcropsandvarieties;
demonstratenewfarmingpractices.
ii.Provideinformationonsourcesoffinance
foradaptiveinvestments.
iii.Provideinformationonmarketpricesand
channelsofdistributionforcropsand
livestock.
Keytoensurethatservicesreachsmalland
mediumfamilyfarms.
Generallypoorstateofbothpublicand
privatesectoradvisoryservices.Challenge
toreachsmallfarmers.Lackofcapacityfor
interpretationofclimateforecasts,
interpretationofprobabilisticclimate
data,andthuscommunicationof
probabilisticandnotdeterministic
forecasts.InTurkey,advisoryservicesare
betterdevelopedbutlackcapacityto
effectivelyadvisefarmersinan
environmentofincreasedchallenges.
Irrigation
Directorates
Maintain,rehabilitate,expand,andreplace
oldandnewirrigationfacilities,whichwillbe
moreimportantinwaterͲstressedareas.
Intermediarybetweenmanagersofwater
resourcesandfarmusers.
Forestry
Departments/
Agencies
Maintainhealthofforestsandrespondto
pestsandrisksoffire.Observechangesin
forestecosystemsinresponsetochanging
climate.Participateinplanningrelatedto
forestͲagriculturelandtradeͲoffs.
InmuchofECA,oftenamongthebestͲ
functioningofthoseinstitutionsthatwill
berelevantforclimateadaptation.
Agricultural
Research
Institutes
BringknowledgeoflocallyͲrelevantneedsto
researchnetworksfromlocaltointernational
level,developvarietiesandtechnologies
suitableforchangingclimateandlocal
endowments.
AfterthedisintegrationoftheSoviet
Union,researchsystemscollapsedandare
noteffectiveinmeetingthecurrent
demands.InTurkey,thesituationis
better.
Agricultural
Educationat
Vocational
Schools,
Technical
Colleges
Importantconduitforinformationabout
implicationsofclimatechangeforfarmers
andmanagers,includingadaptation
measuresandtechnologiesandguidanceon
howandwhentoimplementthem.Keyin
movetowardsmoreknowledgeͲbasedrather
thaninputͲbasedfarming.
QualityControl,
Phytosanitary,&
Veterinary
Services
Providestandardsinformationand
enforcementconsistentwithnationaland
internationalregulation,monitorandcontrol
livestockhealthandprovidetimely
informationondiseaserisks.
Stronginsomecountries,inothersnotup
tochallengeofglobalfoodmarket.
72
Institution
Producer
Associations&
Farmer
Organizations
ImportanceforAdaptation
CIVILSOCIETY
Shareinformationaboutoutcomesand
challengesofadaptation,serveaslocusfor
absorbingnewinformationfromand
communicatingfarmerconcernsto
governmentbodiesandprivateenterprises,
allowsharedinvestmentinnewmachinery
bysmallfarmers.
StatusinECA
Producerassociationsandfarmer
organizationsarestartingtogrowand
theireffectivenessvariesacrosscountries.
Thereispotentialforfurtherexpansionto
moreareasandfordeepeningofactivities.
WaterUser
Associations
Encouragemoresustainablewateruse.
Relativelyrecentinstitution,notfully
developed,justbeginningtofunction.
NGOs
Provideinformation,funding,and
institutionalsupportatsmallscaleforpilot
adaptationeffortsbyfarmers,offer
microcredittoenableadoption,share
knowledgeoflocalexperiences,advocate
farmers’concerns.
Moderatepresence,increasinginECA
clientcountries.Facetheusualchallenges,
e.g.interventionsnotsustainedafter
projectsend,struggletoreachthe
neediest,lackofcoordinationwithother
institutions.
Private&Public
SeedCompanies
&Nurseries
PRIVATEENTEPRISES
Ensureproductionandavailabilityof
InEurope,availablebutcurrently
seeds/seedlingsofappropriatevarieties,e.g., inadequate.Limitedpresence,efficacyin
withimproveddroughtͲandpestͲresistance, Caucasus,CentralAsia.GoodinTurkey.
totakeadvantageofagriculturalresearch
anddevelopmentandfacilitateadoption.
GrainStorage
andDrying
Facilities
Willbeneededincurrentlyunservednewly
cultivatedareas,andareaswithintense
rainfallorheatwhichcauserot,spoilage.
Notpresentorinadequateinareasthat
willneedthemascropping,livestock
zonesshift,andasrainfallincreasesduring
cerealharvestingtimeintheBaltics,
CentralEurope,Russia,northern
Kazakhstan.
Agroprocessing
Facilities
Offerprocessingoflivestockproductsin
expandedpastureareas,processingof
horticulturecropsinnewareas.
Notpresentorinadequateinareasthat
willneedthemascropping,livestock
zonesshiftnorthwards.
Marketing
Enterprises
Exploiteconomiesofscalebybuyingproduce Variableandwithscopeforimprovement.
GenerallystrongerinTurkeyandEurope
offamilyfarmsandsellingatmarket,
mitigatesrisktofarmersofadopting
thantheCaucasus,CentralAsia.
unfamiliarcropsorvarietieswithuncertain
demandlocally.
FinancialServices
i.Banks
ii.Microloans
iii.Agricultural
Insurance
i.Providenecessaryfinancefor
implementationofadaptations.ii.Reachout
tosmallfarmerswithlimitedaccessto
formalbanks.iii.Mitigaterisksofcropfailure
fromunpredictableweather,unproven
adaptations,marketuncertainties.
Pooraccessofsmallfarmerstobanks.
Limitedpresence,effectivenessof
microcreditorganizations.WeatherͲ
indexedinsurancedoesnotexistinmost
ofECAclientcountries.
73
ANNEXTABLE5.3POLICIESCRITICALFORADAPTATION
Policy
NonͲDistortionaryWater
Pricing
ImportanceforClimateChangeAdaptationandimplementationchallenges
Reducesubsidiestoincreaseincentivesforbettermanagementofwaterresources,allocationof
water,andefficiencyofitsuse.Difficultbecauseremovingsubsidiesoftenmeetspolitical
resistance.
NonͲDistortionary
Reducedistortionsinmarketsforcerealsandoilseeds,includingsettingpricecaps,ortaxingor
CommodityMarket
otherwiserestrictingexports.Lettingpricespassthroughwillincreaseincentivesforproducersto
Policies
investandexpandproductionofthesecropsovertime.Exportrestrictionsbecomecontagious,
significantlyreducingagriculturaltradeandtheabilityofworldfoodmarketstorespondtoclimate
change.Also,managestategrainreservestransparentlyandeffectivelytoensuresupplyduring
shortͲtermshocks,nottokeeppriceslow.
FinancialIncentivesfor
Providetaxincentivesfor,e.g.,farmers’purchaseofmachineryrequiredforconservationtillage,
AdoptionofTechnological plantingofdroughtͲresistantseedlings.Providefinancing,coordinationforhiringofmachinesand
laborforreforestationprojects.
Adaptations
AccesstoModernInputs Removerestrictionsonimportsofmodernseedsandseedlingstoallowfarmersaccesstomodern
varieties(e.g.,withincreaseddroughtresistanceorlongermaturation).
Thoseinstitutionshavebeenunderfundedforalongtime,somegovernmentspayattentiontoit
InvestinSupport
Institutions(identifiedin andsomedon’t,somehavetheresourcestoinvestthereandsomedon’t.
previoustable)
ReformFarmSubsidies
Subsidiestargetedatproductionofspecificcropsmaybecounterproductiveascomparative
advantageschange.Avoidtryingto“pickwinners,”e.g.,subsidiesforcerealsratherthanthefruits
andvegetableswhichmaybecomemoreappropriateduetowarming.Recurrentproduction
subsidiesalsoreducescopeforinvestmentsinpublicservicesandfarminvestmentsubsidies.
PromotePrivate
Promoteinvestmentsbytheprivatesectorinnewtechnologiesbyprovidingtaxincentives,
matchinggrants,technicalassistance,etc.Notonlyforprimaryproduction,butalsoforinputs,
Investments
processing,logistics,warehousing,andotherrelatedsectors.
RiskInsurance
Exploreopportunitiesfordevelopingsystemofweatherindexinsurance(asopposedtotraditional
multiͲperilcropinsurance).Forsmallercountriesespecially,spreadriskacrosscountries.
ImproveLandMarkets
Ensurelandtenuresecurity,improvelandregistrationandcadastresystems,andreducemarket
transactioncosts.Thiswillhelptoincreasetheflexibilityoffarmers,reducefragmentation,
increaseaccesstofinance,andencourageinvestment.
CalculateEconomicCosts Calculatetheeconomiccostsandbenefitsofpolicychangesandinvestmentsdecisionsas
rigorouslyaspossibletoensurethemostefficientandeffectiveuseofpublicresources.Thiswill
andBenefits
oftenrequirecapacitybuilding.
EncourageLivelihood
Insomeareas,andforsomeruralresidents,agricultureandforestrymaybecomeunviable.
Diversification
ProvidetrainingandfinancialsupporttoencouragethedevelopmentofnonͲfarmrural
employmentorskillsforurbanemployment.
StrengthenSocialSafety
Providetargetedincomesupportforpoorandvulnerablesegmentsofthepopulationthatmay
Nets
havedifficultyaffordingfood,whomayliveinareaswhereagriculturebecomesunviable,maynot
beabletoeasilychangelivelihoods(elderly,sick).
74