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Holocaust and Genocide Studies Working Papers Series 3 The logic of violence in Kosovo during the Second World War A micro-level analysis MRIKA LIMANI The Hugo Valentin Centre Uppsala 2014 Holocaust and Genocide Studies | Working Papers Series The Hugo Valentin Centre Uppsala University P.O. Box 529 SE-75120 Uppsala Sweden Phone: +46-18-4712359 E-mail: [email protected] URL: www.valentin.uu.se ISBN: 978-91-86531-nn-n © 201N the author and the Hugo Valentin Centre Printed in Uppsala by KPH 201N Contents 1. Introduction .................................................................................................................. 6 2. Methodology ................................................................................................................. 6 3. Theoretical dispositions ................................................................................................ 7 4. Empirical analysis....................................................................................................... 12 4.1 Italian control zones and violence execution ........................................................................12 4.2 German control zones and selective violence ............................................................ 17 4.3 Albanian militias ....................................................................................................... 20 4.4 Counterinsurgency and state organized violence ..................................................... 22 4.5 The rise of the Partisan movement and the challenges to German control ............. 24 4.6 The German retreat and the Partisan victory ............................................................ 25 5. Conclusions ................................................................................................................ 30 6. References .................................................................................................................. 31 1. Introduction Several historical analyses have been conducted on the topic of Kosovo during the Second World War, and the general apothegm contends that the Axis powers occupied Kosovo, but the Communists liberated the people from the talons of National Socialism. Upon closer historical inspection, however, it is ever more evident that, in fact, the incentives behind every political and military action were brutally rational. The Axis powers, for instance, sought strategic dominion in the region and the fortuity to exploit natural resources, whereas the Communists sought to gain political power. In the context of these historical facts, it becomes important to analyze strategic violence as exercised by the Germans, Italians and Partisans in the region. The arguments presented in this paper entail that establishing and maintaining control was a primary impetus in exerting violence and that the magnitude of control dictated the magnitude of violence. It is suggested that rather than ideology, control – and the grave consequences of defection - shaped collaboration. The paper analyzes what prevailing reasons stand behind the emergence of indiscriminate violence during the Italian occupation, and why this phenomenon was not as prevalent during German incumbency. 2. Methodology The research is based on primary German sources which were microfilmed in Washington and are now available at the Archives of Institute for History in Prishtinë, as well as documents from the National Albanian Archives. Of equal importance in researching the topic has been the collection of Zbornik dokumenata i podataka o narodnooslobodilačkom ratu i revoluciji (Collection of Documents and Information on the People’s Liberation War and Revolution, Zbornik) tomes I, II, XII and XIII, which contain documents from the German, Italian and Communist actors. After carefully selecting the necessary material to conduct the research, the data has been organized by mapping out instances of violence by registering violent events through codes on the software FileMaker Pro. The procedure of event-coding entails registering available data regarding an instance of violence and categorizing that information into select codes. Ideally, one event-code includes information regarding the number of casualties, actors involved in that particular event, the start and end date of the event, sources wherefrom the information has been acquired, as well as information that indicate which actor was in control of that particular area or location prior and after the event. In mapping out all the information into event-codes, one could conclude if and how a particular event could have influenced an actor’s control over an HVC WPS -6- area. Finding and organizing this data on the basis of every registered instance of violence has made it possible to draw out conclusions regarding the local dynamics of violence in Kosovo and note whether or not violence was directly correlated with an actor’s control over a particular area. Kosovo Valley (Rrafshi i Kosovës - Kosovo Polje) and Dukagjini Plain (Dukagjin – Metohija) have been adopted as primary geographical references, where the 8 main municipalities are situated. From these municipalities Prishtinë (Priština), Mitrovicë (Kosovska Mitrovica), Lipjan (Lipljan), Ferizaj (Uroševac), Gjilan (Gnjilane) are situated in the Kosovo Valley, whereas Prizren (Prizren), Gjakovë (Đakovica) and Pejë (Peć) are situated in the Dukagjini Plain. Toponymical references within the territory of Kosovo are sequentially presented in Albanian, however the equivalent Serbian toponyms are provided in parentheses whenever a previously unmentioned toponym is presented. The demographics of the local population have not been extremely relevant in mapping out the magnitude of violence nor the mechanisms behind it, particularly considering that in most instances it is difficult to determine the age and gender of the targeted victims, and often times sources clearly state the victims’ occupation or ethnic background – which makes it easier to determine whether they were selectively targeted or not.1 For general orientation, the earliest exact ciphers of the population of Kosovo are published in the Statistical Yearbook FPRY of 1956, which indicates that the Autonomous Region of Kosovo was populated by 4.8% of the Federation’s entire population.2 3. Theoretical dispositions In analyzing violence and its relation with control it is essential to establish an empirical method for conceptualizing control. Kalyvas observes that the level, presence and, political access of a particular political actor are strong indicators of control over a given zone for one or another actor.3 Race argues that control zones can be defined through “the probability that a certain 1 For assessing the number of victims of the war in Yugoslavia in the 1964 Survey of War, the Committee in charge compiled single certificates that pertain to every individual who was known to have been killed or interned during the war. These documents are very detailed and entail information regarding the individual’s place of origin, whether the victim was incarcerated, or if the victim died while fighting for the National Liberation Army, place of death and other information. I have been able to find a collection with these documents at the Archives of Institute for History in Prishtinë, which correspond to the victims registered in the municipality of Prizren, however, because it requires a significant amount of time in analyzing them, I have not included the information provided by these documents in my research. 2 Savezni Zavod za Statistiku (Yugoslavia), “Statisticki godišnjak SFRJ,” 1956. See also Bogoljub Kočović, Žrtve Drugog svetskog rata u Jugoslaviji (London: Veritas Foundation Press, 1985), 172–80. 3 Stathis N. Kalyvas, The Logic of Violence in Civil War (New York: Cambrisge University Press, 2006), 210. HVC WPS -7- event or class of events will not occur within a defined area within a defined period of time”.4 In some cases, control can be conceptualized as an area in which civilians are under “surveillance and monitoring”.5 As an expedient measure to define the magnitude of control, Kalyvas’ five designated control zones have been used in this paper.6 In accordance with the data and sources available for the case of Kosovo during the Second World War, two central elements have been used to measure control: 1) Military presence of one or another actor; 2) Liberty of movement for insurgency groups as measured through sporadic outburst of violence initiated either by the incumbents or insurgents. As a result, the following zones are integrated in the analysis: Zone 1: Incumbent combatants have a highly organized military presence and an established administrative control, no insurgent activity reported. Zone 2: Incumbent combatants have a medium to highly organized military presence, and a relatively well established administrative control, with sporadic insurgent activity reported. Zone 3: Incumbents and insurgents enjoy an equal level of control. Zone 4: Insurgent combatants have a medium to highly organized military presence, with sporadic incumbent activity reported.7 Zone 5: The insurgency enjoys complete military control over the territory.8 The preceding typology will be used for defining the level of control of incumbents and insurgents in certain areas. The theoretical dispositions that are used in this paper pertain primarily to rational choice theories, which offer a compact approach in analyzing the events that occurred during the Second World War in Kosovo. The dominant assessment is that violence is used as a method to control groups.9 As such, the use of violence within the margins of strategic violence is instrumental because it generates compliance. Under this premise, the extensive use of indiscriminate violence causes defection rather than compliance, and therefore is counterproductive.10 The war in Kosovo, as in Yugoslavia generally, was an irregular war in the military-technical nature.11 The fractioned occupation by the Axis forces was accompanied by a dispute of territorial control between the Axis powers themselves, which actors were also faced with the 4 Jeffrey Race, War Comes to long an Revolutionary Conflict in a Vietnamese Province (Berkeley; Los Angeles; London: University of California Press, 1973), 277. 5 Kalyvas, The Logic of Violence in Civil War, 218. 6 Kalyvas, The Logic of Violence in Civil War, 211–213. 7 Also known as “semi-liberated” areas. See Kalyvas, The Logic of Violence in Civil War, 211 8 Kalyvas, The Logic of Violence in Civil War, 421. 9 Kalyvas, The Logic of Violence in Civil War, 26. 10 Kalyvas, The Logic of Violence in Civil War, 28 11 Kalyvas, The Logic of Violence in Civil War, 87. HVC WPS -8- inability to predict or anticipate Partisan attack and activity. However, lack of established frontlines remained a prevailing condition throughout the war. The nature of Partisan warfare in Kosovo fundamentally incorporated three defining characteristics: irregularity, increased mobility, and intensity of political commitment.12 Their irregular warfare has been continuously observed in all military actions they engaged in, as will be examined further in the text, which occurred predominantly in mountainous terrain – the Partisan’s preferred areas of operation. Their mobility has been similarly observed whenever they organized attacks against incumbents, likewise whenever they managed to swiftly scatter and then regain their strength and return to their bases after having been attacked by the incumbents. If we are to trust the memoirs and diaries written by the Yugoslav and Kosovar Partisans who fought in the war, it seems evident that their political commitment towards the Communist Party, and primarily their belief in the Marxist-Leninist ideology in the revolution of the working class, seems to have been a strong incentive in their fight against the German and Italian incumbency.13 Fearon and Laitin’s definition of insurgency aids in best describing the Partisan activity during the war in Kosovo, which states that “insurgency is a technology of military conflict characterized by small, lightly armed bands practicing guerrilla warfare from rural base areas”.14 Conversely, the stark differences in militaristic capabilities between the three main political actors in this case study are also an important element in defining the roles that the political actors adopted in the dominion of war.15 These differences were undoubtedly immense between the Partisans and Axis forces. In the discourse of microfoundations of violence in Kosovo during the Second World War, it is evident that the main factor in inciting military offensives as well as exerting violence on civilians was the prospect of magnifying the control over a territory on behalf of a political actor. In the context of control as exercised by incumbents, Kalyvas’ definitions of sovereignty between various political actors become relevant to the case study. He delineates two types of sovereignty: 12 Carl Schmitt, Theory of the Partisan: Intermediate Commentary on the Concept of the Political (New York: Telos Press Pub., 2007), 13. Schmid makes the distinction between irregular and conventional warfare, or “aktiv Kriegsstand”. See Juerg H. Schmid, Die völkerrechtliche Stellung der Partisanen im Kriege (Keller, 1957), 101. See also Rolf Schroers, Der Partisan: ein Beitrag zur politischen Anthropologie (Köln: Kiepenheuer & Witsch, 1961), 109, Dirk Freudenberg, Theorie des Irregulären: Partisanen, Guerrillas und Terroristen im modernen Kleinkrieg, 2008, 251. 13 Fadil Hoxha, Kur pranvera vonohet. (Fragment nga ditari - 1943) (Prishtinë: Rilindja, 1965), 65. See also Milovan Djilas, Memoir of a Revolutionary (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1973), 93 14 James D. Fearon and David D. Laitin, “Ethnicity, Insurgency, and Civil War.,” Ethnic Conflict 2 (2009): 12. 15 To this one could attest that the Partisan warfare is in principle a small-war, which is defined also through the fact that the Partisans are fewer in number than a regular army. The term “guerrilla” is used as a synonym for “small-war”. See Freudenberg, Theorie des Irregulären: Partisanen, Guerillas und Terroristen im modernen Kleinkrieg, 252. HVC WPS -9- Sovereignty is segmented when two political actors (or more) exercise full sovereignty over distinct parts of the territory of state. It is fragmented when two political actors (or more) exercise limited sovereignty over the same part of the territory of the state.16 Because sovereignty is divided between the Axis powers in Kosovo, the definition becomes pertinent in the discussion of control exerted by each political actor specifically. Following the discussion of incumbent control, one of the methods to structuralize their authority over the population is the formation of militias. By the same token, militias directly aided the incumbents as auxiliaries, both militarily as well as through utilizing their knowledge of local terrain.17 Theoretically, denunciation on behalf of militias is also an important stride in implementing the incumbents’ authority.18 A paramount example of this assertion is the formation of Këmishëzinjve (the Black-shirts) supported by the Italians, similarly how the Germans aided the formation of the Kosovo Regiment, the Second League of Prizren and its militia, the Nationalist Youth Committee for the Defense of Kosovo, and the SS Skanderbeg Division.19 The analysis of violence as exerted by the perpetrators is developed through categorizing the typology of violence in the context of selective or indiscriminate violence, whereby fundamentally assuming that whichever type of violence is exerted upon civilians reflects the level of control of each political actor. Both types of violence are also acknowledged to be used as an instrumental form to generate collaboration through imposing deterrence among civilians. The defining difference between the two lies in the fact that while indiscriminate violence implies a collective targeting of victims, selective violence encompasses personalized targeting. Fundamentally, it is argued that violence is a product of the level of information a political actor has for selective targeting and the risk of defection that indiscriminate violence would produce.20 It is theoretically assumed that insurgents and incumbents by principle rely on exerting violence as a means to establish or reassert control. The occurrence of indiscriminate violence, however, is dependent on the variable of information: the more reliable information the 16 Kalyvas, The Logic of Violence in Civil War, 89. Kalyvas, The Logic of Violence in Civil War, 107. 18 Kalyvas, The Logic of Violence in Civil War, 176. 19 Miodrag Đ. Popović and Jovan P. Zečević, Dokumenti iz istorije Jugoslavije (1999), 3, 142. The Second League of Prizren was formed on the principles of the First League of Prizren (Albanian League for the Defense of the Rights of the Albanian Nation) which was founded in 1878 as a response to the Treaty of Berlin, in which conference it was agreed among the Great Powers to secede Albanian populated territories to Greece, Montenegro, Serbia and Bulgaria. The League petitioned for the creation of an autonomous state within the Ottoman Empire while also calling on an armed resistance if its requests were not to be fulfilled. The Committee for the National Defense of Kosovo (Komiteti për Mbrojtje Kombëtare të Kosovës) was founded in November 1918, as a reactionary force against the Serbian occupation, which integrated in itself the kaçak movement. The Committee remained relevant in the context that it represented an organization which promulgated Albanian nationalistic ideology for the Kosovar Albanians. See also Robert Elsie, Historical Dictionary Of Kosova (Lanham, Md.: Scarecrow Press, 2004), 41, 251. 20 Kalyvas, The Logic of Violence in Civil War, 142 17 HVC WPS -10- incumbents have, the less likely they are to use indiscriminate violence.21 Inferring from this presupposition, it is hypothesized that political actors will gradually move from indiscriminate to selective violence, assuming they establish control over an area.22 This hypothesis evolves under the assumption that one political actor will increase its suzerainty over a control zone, hence gaining more power. The element of denunciation further oscillates the information variable, which ultimately helps in increasing the magnitude of control.23 However, in the case study presented here, there are far too few sources that either prove or disprove any cases of denunciation - those appear to have been rare in account for both insurgents and incumbents. This minimizes the levels of information accuracy, for which reason indiscriminate violence appears to have been more prevalent in respect to selective violence in certain control zones. By definition, insurgency will be more active in mountainous terrain. This phenomenon should be observable in rough terrain which is poorly connected by roads, as well as in a significant distance from central incumbent areas. Stemming from this premise, it should be observed that the insurgents are most active in the mountainous outskirts of municipalities and that occasionally they are established in cross-border sanctuaries.24 By applying the methods defined in the previous paragraphs to identify control zones, and by analyzing the appearance of violence, it should be observed that an actor is more inclined to resort to violence if that actor lacks control over an area. By the same presumption, an actor is less likely to conduct violence, both indiscriminate and selective, if the level of its control over an area is high.25 Under this inference, no insurgent violence should be observable in zone type 5, by which definition insurgency has complete control of an area. Similarly, no incumbent violence should be observable in zone type 1, where incumbency has a high or complete control over the area. However, if an actor has a lower level of control, then it becomes likely that the actor will resort to, if any, indiscriminate violence. Based on these assumptions, it is predicted that indiscriminate violence should be observable in control zone type 2 and 4, whereas no selective violence should be observable in a parity zone type 3.26 Similarly, if an actor has a higher control over an area, then the violence exerted by the actor in control should be selective. Deriving from this assumption, it is predicted that selective violence should be observable in control zone type 1. In areas that are under fragmented control, it is hypothesized that violence will be exercised primarily by the actor who has an advantage in terms of control.27 21 Kalyvas, The Logic of Violence in Civil War, 148. Kalyvas, The Logic of Violence in Civil War, 169. 23 Kalyvas, The Logic of Violence in Civil War, 176. 24 James D. Fearon and David D. Laitin, “Ethnicity, Insurgency, and Civil War.,” 13 25 Kalyvas, The Logic of Violence in Civil War, 204. 26 Kalyvas, The Logic of Violence in Civil War, 204. 27 Kalyvas, The Logic of Violence in Civil War, 204 22 HVC WPS -11- Control is also substantial in shaping collaboration.28 This stipulates that the more control a political actor has over an area, the more likely it is that the local population will collaborate. For Kalyvas’ case study there was sufficient evidence to suggest that this observation is related to spatial variance of control. The same assumption is tested in this case study, where it is postulated that collaboration varies in accordance to control alternation. The analysis will further be conducted by applying these theoretical premises and testing whether they correspond with the violence as mapped out in this case study 4. Empirical analysis 4.1 Italian control zones and violence execution On the 6th of April 1941, the German and Italian forces charged the territory of Yugoslavia, during which raid the forces advanced throughout Kosovo. After the Axis powers occupied Yugoslavia, the country was divided into several regions controlled by various members of the Axis. The Italian administration having already implemented an Albanian-ruled government proceeded to annex parts of Kosovo to Albania proper, under the regime of the Albanian Kingdom (Mbretnija Shqiptare), a protectorate of the Kingdom of Italy under King Victor Emanuel III.29 After several months of dispute between Hitler and Count Ciano, it was agreed that Germany was to take control over the Trepça (Trepča) mines and the Luboten (Ljuboten) massif. Consequently, Germany would rule over most of the north-eastern part of Kosovo, whereas Italy would rule over the south-western territory. After Italy’s surrender in September of 1943, the Germans rearranged the administrative control over Kosovo by annexing the territory to Albania.30 The Italian forces were situated throughout most of modern-day territory of Kosovo, including the municipalities of Prizren, Pejë, Gjakovë, Prishtinë and Ferizaj. The number of troops under the Italian command varied throughout the Italian occupation. By August of 1943 around 8000 soldiers were under Italian command, of which around 2400 were part of the Albanian regiment in 28 Kalyvas, The Logic of Violence in Civil War, 118. Also known as the “Greater Albania”. See Casagrande, Die volksdeutsche SS-Division “Prinz Eugen”: Die Banater Schwaben und die nationalsozialistischen Kriegsverbrechen (Frankfurt am Main: Campus-Verl. 2003), 158; Dragan S. Nenezić, Jugoslovenske oblasti pod Italijom: 1941-1943 (Beograd: Vojnoistorijski institut vojske Jugoslavije, 1999), 20. 30 Archives at the Institute of History – Prishtinë (henceforth AIHP), NAW, box 1, T 313, roll 200, 7458183. See also Milan D. Ristović, Nemački “novi poredak” i jugoistočna Evropa, 1940/41-1944/45: Planovi o budućnosti i praksa (Beograd: Vojnoizdavački i novinski centar, 1991), 67, 309. 29 HVC WPS -12- Pejë, another 2000 troops in Prishtinë, and another 3500 members of the Gendarmerie.31 These regiments, however, were later subordinate to the German command after Italy’s surrender.32 Control zones in Italian occupied territory varied between type 1 and type 2, where the incumbents had complete and medium control. Prizren was the epicenter of the Italian military and administrative establishment which was typical to zone 1, whereas Gjakovë, Pejë and Ferizaj were typical of control zone type 2.Italian troops were more numerous in Albania proper, whereas troops in Kosovo were significantly fewer. Furthermore the Italian military was not nearly as organized in Kosovo as the German military. For instance, while the Italians used the municipal agents and militia33 for gaining information regarding insurgency, subsequently issuing arrests, the Germans employed entire units by the Secret Service, in seizing relevant information regarding the insurgency. As a consequence, the Italians appeared to have been less meticulous with regards to insurgent persecution. The Italian occupation in Kosovo instigated copious persecution against the civilian population, particularly towards the Serbian inhabitants. In the preliminary phases of the occupation and installation of Italian administration, the latter instigated the Albanian voluntary groups to expel Serbians who lived in the Dukagjini Plain.34 The general estimate is that there were around 20,000 Serbs displaced from Kosovo and Macedonia altogether.35 These tactics were employed in order for the Italians to appease the Albanian nationalists in forming an ethnically homogenous Greater Albania, part of which included Dukagjini Plain and parts of Drenicë (Drenica) in Kosovo Valley, which consequently would ensure the Italians a reticence of insurgencies. The methods that the Italians, aided by Albanian volunteers, employed to deport and persecute civilians who were assumed to be members of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia, or were in any form affiliated with the Communists, were persistent throughout their occupation. The economical importance that ignited interest in controlling Mitrovicë and its district was a significant incentive for the Italians to continue the persecution of local Serbs who inhabited the area, in order to appease the Albanian majority, a pretext which they would later use to urge Albanian nationalists to request national unification.36 Identifying Communists, however, was not an easy task – 31 Zbornik dokumenata i podataka o narodnooslobodilačkom ratu i revoluciji (henceforth Zbornik DNOR), Ser.XIII, vol.3, doc. 164, doc.99. 32 AIHP, NAW, box 1, T313, roll 200, 7462094-5. Also known as “policë Bashkijak” who were primarily employed to ensure peace and order. Albanian National Archives (henceforth AQSH), F. 166, D. 39, fl. 2-3. 34 Ali Hadri, Lëvizja nacionalçlirimtare në Kosovë 1941-1945, 148; Jozo Tomasevich, War and Revolution in Yugoslavia, 1941-1945: Occupation and Collaboration (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 2001), 749. 35 Zbornik DNOR, Ser.XIII, vol.1, doc.93. See also or Montenegrins displaced from Kosovo see Tomasevich, War and Revolution in Yugoslavia, 1941-1945: Occupation and Collaboration, 2:139. 33 36 Tomasevich, War and Revolution in Yugoslavia, 1941-1945: Occupation and Collaboration, 2:152. HVC WPS -13- particularly in instances where the Italians would have to rely on hearsay.37 Denunciation was not common, and in most cases it was not an easily verifiable source. This correlates greatly to previous observations regarding irregular wars, where it has been evident that the “identification problem” provides obstacles for the incumbents in exercising selective violence.38 Similarly, indiscriminate violence is considered a consequence of lack of information according to Kalyvas, which correlation is observed in areas where the Italian incumbents were in control.39 In this instance, however, it is worthy to note that in comparison to Albanians, Serbs adhered to the Communist Party of Yugoslavia more so than the latter, and this could have resulted in the number of victims being higher among ethnic Serbs. Similarly it should be taken into consideration that the Albanian militias might have persecuted Serb Communists on the basis of their ethnicity. While it was previously assumed that Italians exercised complete control over the demarcated territory, it has been established that they in fact enjoyed such control only in Prizren. While the Italian influence had almost completely absorbed the Albanian government in Albania proper, the former’s presence and influence in Kosovo was not as prevalent. The employment of the Këmishëzinjve (Black-Shirts) and other voluntary groups as militias to spread about the fascist ideology was not as effective or as attention drawing in Kosovo, as the Italians had hoped it would be.40 The Italian occupation in Kosovo had only one strong component with which the Albanians identified: the unification of Kosovo with Albania proper. However, Italy’s reign over Kosovo was fairly unevenly rooted, with a scattered and semi-functional administration. To best elucidate the Italian indiscriminate violence perpetrated against civilians one should refer to the incident on the 21st of March 1943, when an anti-Italian group murdered an Italian Federal Inspector named Severino Ricottini.41 As retaliation, the Italians burned down a large part of Pejë, causing insurmountable damage to private properties and civilians.42 A similar example of indiscriminate violence can be inferred from the occurrence of early April 1943, when the Italians burned down parts of Gjakovë as retaliation for the assassination of Ali Bokshi, the leader of the group “Carta Bianca”.43 These events raised the level of grievance among the local population, which subsequently made it more likely for the local population to support the insurgency. Similarly, exercising indiscriminate violence also increased the likelihood of defection amongst the local population, 37 This phenomenon could have largely been false denunciation, which might provide a supplementary explanation for the prevalence of indiscriminate violence in Italian controlled areas. 38 Kalyvas, The Logic of Violence in Civil War, 89. 39 Kalyvas, The Logic of Violence in Civil War, 148. 40 Popović and Zečević, Dokumenti iz istorije Jugoslavije, 142. 41 Hadri observes that the action was incurred by members of the National Liberation Movement, however, German sources report that the action was conducted by Zogists. AIHP, NAW, box 1, T315, roll 64, 000563. AIHP, NAW, box 1, T311, roll 196, 0482-483. For Italian documents regarding the incident see Zbornik DNOR, Ser.XIII, vol.3, doc.46. See also “Inspektori Federal i P.N.F. të Pejës viktimë i plumbit t'armikut,” Tomori, March 26, 1943. 42 AIHP, NAW, box 1, T311, roll 196, 0482-483. 43 Zbornik DNOR, Ser.XIII, vol.3, doc.58. HVC WPS -14- which corresponds to Kalyvas’ proposition that indiscriminate violence is counterproductive in civil wars.44 As retaliation for Ali Bokshi’s death, 13 casualties and a great damage to private properties were reported.45 A parallel could be drawn by employing Kalyvas’ second hypothesis, which states that “the higher the level of an actor’s control, the less likely it is that this actor will resort to violence, selective or indiscriminate”.46 The presented data attests that Italian forces resorted to indiscriminate violence in the case for Gjakovë and Pejë, because they had insufficient information regarding the culprits for the assassination of Severino Ricottini and Ali Bokshi. This relates directly to Kalyvas’ theory which postulates that indiscriminate violence should be observable in cases when the actors lack relevant information to be selective.47 Similar parallels can be drawn by applying Kalyvas’ third hypothesis, which states that “the lower the level of an actor’s control, the less likely the actor will resort to selective violence and the more likely that its violence, if any, will be indiscriminate”.48 In this context, Pejë and Gjakovë are more typical to zone 2. Seeing that the Italians had a lower level of control over the area and that Dukagjini Plain has the ideal geographical predispositions for the Partisans to operate in, it is only logical that the Highlands of Gjakovë made a great bastion for the Partisans.49 Mountainous terrain generally provides extremely preferable strategic conditions for insurgency because it corresponds with insurgency’s agility in warfare but also their superior knowledge of local terrain.50 The cross-border position of Highlands of Gjakovë between Albania and Kosovo provided an additional advantage for the Partisans, an occurrence that corresponds with Fearon and Laitin's observation.51 The emergence of indiscriminate violence in control zones type 2 is also in agreement with Kalyvas’ prediction, which stipulates that in areas where the level of control is lower it is more likely for indiscriminate violence to be observable.52 The increased Partisan vigor became evident on the 2nd January of 1943, when the Partisan detachment “Zenel Hajdini” attacked an Italian procession of trucks passing from Ferizaj to Prizren, in the hills of Caralevë (Crnoljevo). As a result, 22 Italians and 1 Partisan were killed in action.53 The Italian control over their demarcated territory was not uniform. While Partisans had a greater liberty of 44 Kalyvas, The Logic of Violence in Civil War, 144. Zbornik DNOR, Ser.XIII, vol.3, doc.58. See also Hadri, Lëvizja nacionalçlirimtare në Kosovë 1941-1945, 150; Hadri, Lëvizja nacionalçlirimtare në Kosovë 1941-1945, 278. 46 Kalyvas, The Logic of Violence in Civil War, 204. 45 47 Kalyvas, The Logic of Violence in Civil War, 148. Kalyvas, The Logic of Violence in Civil War, 204. 49 Ali Hadri, Gjakova në lëvizjen nacionalçlirimtare (Prishtinë: Bashkësia Krahinore e Punës Shkencore dhe Kuvendi i Komunës së Gjakovës, 1974), 82. 50 James D. Fearon and David D. Laitin, “Ethnicity, Insurgency, and Civil War.,” 20. See also Schmitt, Theory of the Partisan, 13. 48 51 James D. Fearon and David D. Laitin, “Ethnicity, Insurgency, and Civil War.,” 12. Kalyvas, The Logic of Violence in Civil War, 204. 53 Zbornik DNOR, Ser.I, vol. 19, doc. 27, 158; Zbornik DNOR Ser.I, vol.19, doc. 93, 422; For the documents issued by the Italian Supreme Command regarding the incident see Zbornik DNOR, Ser.XIII, vol.2, doc.12. See also Hadri, Levizja nacionalclirimtare ne Kosovë 1941-1945, 276. 52 HVC WPS -15- movement in the Highlands of Gjakovë, Pejë, Ferizaj and generally in Drenicë, the Italian presence was more ascendant in Prizren.54 Because of a vaster Italian administrative and military presence in Prizren, the Partisan and anti-Italian activity was observably less eminent there. To these observations, one could apply Kalyvas’ first hypothesis as mentioned previously, which denotes that the higher level of control an actor has over an area, the less likely it is for violence to occur in that area.55 This contends to the argument that the Italian occupation can be characterized with two types of control zones, where Prizren is typical to control zone 1, and other municipalities and rural areas identifiable as control zone 2. Italian incumbency was characterized by a profoundly violent reign, particularly in regards to political opponents. During February of 1943, Italians killed 19 people in Ferizaj and its outskirts. Of these, 10 were villagers and 9 were Partisans.56 The indiscriminate behavior in this instance prompts two possible explanations. The first one being that incumbents aimed at sanctioning those who they suspected were Partisans and those collaborating or related to them, but lacked sufficient information to be selective.57 This complies with Kalyvas’ assertion regarding the emergence of indiscriminate violence in zones type 2, where incumbents have a lower level of control.58 Although this denotes an instance of inter-ethnic hostilities, the similarities are drawn upon the theoretical fact that both incumbents in this instance do not fully control specific areas, which gives them incentive to adopt alternative strategies for inducing submission. The second explanation is that the Italians simply did not have complete sovereignty over Ferizaj59and were therefore unable to obtain information to execute selective violence. The available data suggest that the Germans and Italians had fragmented sovereignty over Ferizaj, Lipjan, Prishtinë, through which cities the railroads were constructed. In light of these suggestions, it could be postulated that Ferizaj, Lipjan and Prishtinë represented an intermediate area of control.60 Similarly, one should take into account the counterproductive effects of indiscriminate violence, which can be best exemplified through the soi-disant battle of Grackë (Gracko), a village in the vicinity of Lipjan.61 54 Hadri, Gjakova në lëvizjen nacionalçlirimtare, 91. It is interesting to note that in July of 1943 the Italians had captured 19 prisoners who they believed were leaders of rebel formations, in Opojë, a village situated in the mountainous terrain of Sharr in the vicinity of Prizren. This similarly proves that the Italians lacked information for selective targetting. See Zbornik DNOR, Ser. XIII, vol.3, doc.84. Likewise, the Italian troops of the division “Puglia” arrest around 27 civilians in July in Pejë, who were “partly suspected of subversive activities”. See Zbornik DNOR, Ser. XIII, vol.3, doc. 93. 55 Kalyvas, The Logic of Violence in Civil War, 204. Zbornik DNOR, Ser. I, vol. 19, doc.35. 57 Kalyvas, The Logic of Violence in Civil War, 150. 58 Kalyvas, The Logic of Violence in Civil War, 204. 59 As opposed to the Germans, who controlled the railroads by constructing 51 posts throughout the railroad, and operated in their vicinity by tasking 402 soldiers on guard. Miletić, “Kosovo u okviru jedinstvenog nemačkog okupacionog sistema na jugoslovenskom prostoru 1941 - 1944,” 82–83. 60 Kalyvas, The Logic of Violence in Civil War, 88. 61 Kalyvas, The Logic of Violence in Civil War, 151. 56 HVC WPS -16- Although the Partisans lost 8 soldiers fighting against the Germans, this example illustrates that the Partisan nexus of supporters was growing in these territories. This phenomenon relates to Kalyvas’ postulate that exercising indiscriminate violence induces an increase of support for the insurgents.62 Similar Partisan activity was reported in the villages of Dobrevë (Dobrevo), Magurë (Magura), Llapllasellë (Laplje Selo), Fushë Kosovë (Kosovo Polje), Kastriot etc., all of which are situated throughout the axis Ferizaj–Lipjan–Prishtinë.63 Likewise, these observations suit McColl’s and Kalyvas’ postulate of intermediate areas of control, according to which intermediate zones represent important areas of struggle.64 According to Yugoslav sources, on the 14th of April 1943, a group of 12 Partisans were detected by the so-called fascist militia while crossing the mountains near Lipovicë (Lipovica), in the vicinity of Mitrovicë to join the Partisan unit “Emin Duraku” which operated in Ferizaj.65 Subsequently they were attacked, 9 of which were killed in action and 3 were imprisoned and executed in Prishtinë.66 The Italian occupation, while initially somewhat welcomed by Kosovar Albanians, was characterized by a deficiency of control and inability to prevent insurgent activity. The increased level of grievance among the local population as a result of indiscriminate violence exerted by the Italians caused for a general reign of anti-Italian sentiment by the time Italy capitulated the war.67 4.2 German control zones and selective violence After the capitulation of Yugoslavia, the German and Italian forces secured their position throughout the territory of Kosovo. The Germans, for the most part, were interested in ensuring their control over the areas where they could benefit economically, particularly nearby mine ores. As a result, the latter positioned their units in Trepça - Mitrovicë, Kastriot - Prishtinë, Golesh - Prishtinë, Jezerinë - Mirtrovicë and further south in Luboten - Ferizaj. The entire administrative, territorial and military jurisdiction of Kosovo, alongside Serbia proper, was administered by Oberbefehlshaber Südost (OB Southeast). Because of a large German military presence, Mitrovicë and Drenicë are considered as control zone type 1 where the incumbents are in complete control.68 62 Kalyvas, The Logic of Violence in Civil War, 151. Izber Hoti, Lëvizja nacionalçlirimtare në Prishtinë dhe rrethinë (1941-1945), 95. 64 Kalyvas, The Logic of Violence in Civil War, 88; Robert W. McColl, The Insurgent State: Territorial Bases of Revolution, 1969, 624. 65 Zbornik DNOR, Ser.I, vol. 19, doc.34. 66 Hoti, Lëvizja nacionalçlirimtare në Prishtinë dhe rrethinë (1941-1945), 97. 67 Hadri, Lëvizja nacionalçlirimtare në Kosovë 1941-1945, 205. Regarding the Italian retreat from Albania, in his memoirs Badoglio recollects that the retreat was particularly difficult for Italian troops. See Pietro Badoglio, Italy in the Second World War: Memories and Documents. (London; New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 1948), 102. 68 Zbornik DNOR, Ser.XII, vol.1, doc.7. 63 HVC WPS -17- The German military presence in Kosovo was well established. The Germans managed to initially gain gradual but complete tactical control of Kosovo Valley while they shared their incumbency with the Italians, and later control the entire region of Kosovo after Italy’s surrender. The German troops clearly outnumbered the Italian troops in Kosovo, which resulted in the former enjoying complete tactical control over the regions they were stationed in. Apart from a well founded administrative control over Mitrovicë and the surrounding towns, the Germans had a very consistent Secret Service. Similarly, interrogating captured prisoners was a preferred method for the Germans to acquire information.69 Subsequently, these methods combined with the employment of local militias as informants, could have influenced the prevalence of selective violence exercised by the Germans. The observations pertaining to the German control zones apply to Kalyas’ assertion that no violence should be observed in areas of complete control, and if it is observed, then it is more likely to be selective violence.70 Selective violence conducted by Germans is best illustrated by the event that occurred on the 16th of January 1942 in Lipjan. According to relevant sources, the Germans had captured three members of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia, namely Aleksandar Marović, Robert Gajdik and Milutin Aksić who were subsequently executed in Lipjan.71 This type of selectiveness in perpetrating violence against civilians was not observed in the Italian controlled zones even in 1943. However, it is also relevant to note that Partisan activity in the beginning of 1942 was not significantly widespread either.72 Similarly, there were no violent events observed against civilians in the Italian control zone. Inferring from these data, it can be concluded that the Italians and the Germans had segmented sovereignty over Lipjan, Ferizaj and Prishtinë in 1942, whereas the Germans had complete sovereignty over Mitrovicë, both instances being characteristic of control zone type 1. Likewise, one can conclude that the Germans’ control over Prishtinë in 1942, albeit under shared sovereignty, was typical to zone 1. The emergence of selective violence observed on the 27th of July 1942, when the German forces executed Aleksandar Mrdaković, a member of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia, similarly applies to Kalyvas’ prediction that such violence is more likely to be observed in areas of complete control.73 As previously asserted, the quantitative data pertaining to German military suggest that from 1941 to 1942 Germans enjoyed control typical to zone 1 in Mitrovicë, Prishtinë, Ferizaj, and Lipjan. Similarly, the deficiency of insurgent activity also attests to the deduction that these areas represent control zones type 1. Overall, the events that occurred from 1941 to 1942, relate directly to Kalyvas’ prediction that it is less likely for violence to be observable in areas where an actor is in complete control. 69 Charles D. Melson, “German Counterinsurgency Revisited.” Journal of Military and Strategic Studies 14, no. 1 (2011): 14. 70 Kalyvas, The Logic of Violence in Civil War, 204. 71 Zbornik DNOR, Ser. I, vol.19, doc.28, 200 72 The Partisan activity in Kosovo arguably increased in intensity much belatedly in comparison to other regions in Yugoslavia. Tomasevich, War and Revolution in Yugoslavia, 1941-1945: Occupation and Collaboration, 2:70. 73 Hoti, Lëvizja nacionalçlirimtare në Prishtinë dhe rrethinë (1941-1945), 93. HVC WPS -18- Likewise, the appearance of selective violence also corresponds with Kalyvas’ hypothesis, which suggests that if violence is observable in areas of complete control, then it is more likely that it will be selective.74 However, in 1943 Partisan activity increased and this was reflected by the way Germans responded to the increasing support that the Partisans were gaining. Although at first sight it appears as if the incumbents were being selective in imprisoning and executing Communists, the exaggerated numbers of imprisoned civilians indicates moderate inability to collect sufficient data to apply maximum selectiveness. The prevailing paradigm would be the events that occurred throughout February of 1943 in the region of Graçanicë, in the vicinity of Lipjan, where they managed to imprison as many as 280 civilians, whom they believed to be Partisans or affiliated with the Communist Party. During this period they also executed 20 Communists in Llapllasellë, a village in the municipality of Prishtinë.75 The high number of the civilians imprisoned indicates that the Germans lacked sufficient information to be more selective in targeting insurgents, which was quite inimical for German incumbency up to this point. The data suggest that as a consequence of the inability to completely confirm the victims’ relation with the Communists, the Germans turned to “secondaryprofiling”, which they achieved by incarcerating military-aged men.76 Moreover, the selective violence they employed in executing Communists in Llapllasesllë correlates to Kalyvas’ prediction in regards to full control zones.77 To this phenomenon Kalyvas observes that even selective violence targets many innocent people, although he argues that by employing selective violence political actors ensure deterrence in spite of all the innocent killings.78 To further institutionalize authority in the local level, the utilization of Albanian militias was quintessential for the German incumbency. The activity of Albanian militias was particularly prevalent after Italy’s capitulation, by which time a number of German founded militias began operating in both regions of Dukagjini Plain and Kosovo Valley. Although the Germans supported the formations of the militias early on in their occupation, the militias reached the peak of their activity after Italy’s capitulation in September of 1943. However, there were instances where they did perpetrate violence against civilians prior to September. For instance, the Kosovo Regiment was quite active in Ferizaj in April of 1943, by which time they killed as many as 34 Serbs who were assumed to be related to the National Liberation Movement.79 Bearing in mind that the available sources do not indicate a strong emergence of Partisan insurgency in this area until September of 1943, it is presumed that the Germans maintained a relatively stable control over Prishtinë, Ferizaj and Lipjan typical to zone 2, where incumbents 74 Kalyvas, The Logic of Violence in Civil War, 204. Hoti, Lëvizja nacionalçlirimtare në Prishtinë dhe rrethinë (1941-1945), 96. 76 Hoti, Lëvizja nacionalçlirimtare në Prishtinë dhe rrethinë (1941-1945), 96; Kalyvas, The Logic of Violence in Civil War, 187. 77 Kalyvas, The Logic of Violence in Civil War, 204. 78 Kalyvas, The Logic of Violence in Civil War, 190. 79 Zbornik DNOR, Ser.I, vol.19, doc. 117. 75 HVC WPS -19- enjoy from medium to high control. The nascent of Partisan insurgent activity and their increased capacity in manpower became evident in the middle of 1943, when their forces had advanced from Northern Albania to establishing a relatively stable control over the Highlands of Gjakovë. While the Italians were retreating from the Dukagjini Plain, the Partisans had established a plexus of collaborators and ideological sympathizers, whose numbers were steadily increasing.80 The German military presence, which had already moved troops in Dukagjini Plain, was also steadily on the rise particularly after decreeing Kosovo’s annexation to Albania.81 By midSeptember of 1943 the Germans had control of the three major municipalities in the Dukagjini Plain, namely Pejë, Gjakovë and Prizren. Calculating these developments, the Partisans initiated an attack against the approaching German troops, who had already established control over the mainland in the region of Dukagjini Plain. On the 10th of September the Partisan unit “Bajram Curri” attacked the German and Italian troops as well as the Albanian Gendarmerie in order to gain control over Gjakovë. The offensive lasted for two days, until the 12th of September, by which point the Partisans retreated having had killed three Germans in action.82 At this point the Germans had established a fairly stable dominance over the Dukagjini Plain; however the Highlands of Gjakovë proved to be a stronger bastion for the Partisans than the Germans had anticipated. By December of 1944, the latter initiated a powerful attack against the Partisans in the outskirts of Gjakovë in an attempt to establish complete control over the area. As a result, 81 Partisans and 18 Germans were killed in action.83 The Partisan activity in the region of Gjakovë continued throughout December, often times ending with the Partisans retreating in the Highlands.84 The Partisan activity was overall successful in the highlands, but they never amassed to the necessary strength for gaining control over the mainland. To achieve this task they had to completely defeat the German troops in the mainland, which they managed to do only after the Germans were retreating from the Balkans. Therefore, it has become clear that the German incumbency was not extremely threatened by Partisan insurgency. The Partisan insurgency, on the other hand, gradually increased but it never completely overthrew the German incumbency in the main municipalities. 80 AIHP, NAW, box 1, T313, roll 486, 001265. AIHP, NAW, box 1, T 313, roll 483, 000788. 82 Hadri, Lëvizja nacionalçlirimtare në Kosovë 1941-1945, 399. 83 AIHP, NAW, box 1, T78, roll 331, 00115. The document reports that another 400 Partisans, albeit unaccounted for, were killed by Bandits, who are assumed to be either Chetniks or Albanian militias. However, the number of the killed Partisans appears to be considerably higher than the assumed number of active Partisans in the region during the time. A defeat of these proportions would have been devastating for the Partisans, which would have made it highly unlikely for them to regain strength in the upcoming months. 84 AIHP, NAW, box 1, T 313, roll 486, 001265. 81 HVC WPS -20- 4.3 Albanian militias The formation of Albanian militias as auxiliary units for the Germans and Italians was quite prevalent during the Axis occupation. They were primarily employed through providing weapons for them, and distributing an extent of authority on the local level. However, Kalyvas argues that militias represent a more political role rather than a military one. Their establishment is directly related to the incumbents’ aspirations in enforcing their local rule. The employment of militias by the incumbents is usually perceived as an installment of military auxiliary units, whose foremost task is to help the incumbents with fighting opponents, however it is evident that the possibility of militias providing information through surveying in regards to local insurgents strongly aids the incumbents. In this context, the appearance of denunciation is directly correlated to the existence of local militias, thus minimizing the possibility for defection amongst the locals. Hence, the relevance of militias is directly related to the information variable, which would subsequently solve the identification problem for incumbents.85 As a result, the latter would not have to resolve to indiscriminate violence, which would further defection.86 The usage of militias in surveying and monitoring the civilians could also be described as a means for defining complete control.87 The employment of Albanian militias by the Axis powers aided the latter greatly both in fighting off Partisans, but also rounding up suspected insurgents. Some of these formations, like the SS Skanderbeg Division, were part of the German strategy in counterinsurgency, and as such were formed for the main task of fighting Partisans.88 The appearance of Albanian militias as Italian and German auxiliaries, comply with Kalyvas’ observation that they represent a political institution rather than a military one, which serves as means to strengthen the incumbent control over an area. During the Axis occupation, the incumbents established several local militia formations, some of which functioned for a longer period of time and some of which barely managed to be organized and functional. The SS Skanderbeg Division, which was formed in 1944, operated in the area of Gjakovë, particularly the Highlands of Gjakovë, and the Montenegrin border. Their most intense activity was throughout June and July of 1944, during which they killed as many as 80 Partisans in the outskirts of Prishtinë.89 The SS Division was also responsible for capturing around 131 Communists, who were imprisoned in the concentration camp in Prishtina, which was built in June 1944. The prisoners were later executed.90 In a similar spree of violence, the Kosovo Regiment had killed as many as 80-90 civilians in Pejë and its vicinity in December of 1943.91 Similarly, in January of 1944 the Party’s District Committee for the Dukagjini region reports that as many as 100 members of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia were killed in Pejë, of whom only 3 were Albanian.92 85 Kalyvas, The Logic of Violence in Civil War, 107. Kalyvas, The Logic of Violence in Civil War, 105. 87 Kalyvas, The Logic of Violence in Civil War, 218. 88 Melson, “German Counterinsurgency Revisited.”, 13. 89 Zbornik DNOR, Ser.XII, vol.4, doc. 84. 90 Hadri, Lëvizja nacionalçlirimtare në Kosovë 1941-1945, 331. 91 Zbornik DNOR, Ser.I, vol.19, doc.70; AIHP, NAW, box 1, T 313, roll 486, 000541. 92 Zbornik DNOR, Ser.I, vol.19, doc.93. 86 HVC WPS -21- During the same period in January of 1944, the Kosovo Regiment was also active in Kosovo Valley, where reportedly they killed as many as 33 Albanians in Mitrovicë, Vushtrri (Vučitrn) and Podujevë (Podujevo), who were believed to be involved with the National Liberation Movement.93According to the numbers provided by reports from the Committee of the Communist Party, it becomes evident that the Kosovo Regiment was very active in persecuting Communists throughout the area where the Germans had control. The selective violence perpetrated by Kosovo Regiment, serving as Germany’s auxiliary, adds veracity to the argument that during the period of December 1943 and January 1944, the Germans had almost complete control over Pejë, Mitrovicë, including Vushtrri and Podujevë, thus by fact deeming these two municipalities as typical to zone 1. However, the particular selectiveness in targeting Serb Communists develops as an independent pattern of violence which is not predicted by Kalyvas’ hypotheses. 4.4 Counterinsurgency and state organized violence The emergence of Partisan activity instigated the Germans to employ counterinsurgency tactics in fighting the Partisans. These tactics were developed early on in their occupation, from September 1941, which were taken into action after two orders were issued by Hitler, one of which was his Directive No.31a to Field Marshal Wilhelm List to suppress the resistance movement in the southeast. The second one was Hitler’s directive to suppress the “Communist Armed Resistance Movements in Occupied Areas”, which were issued by the Armed Forces High Command under the signature of Field Marshal Wilhelm Keitel.94 The order directed that for each German soldier killed one hundred hostages were to be executed, and for each German soldier wounded fifty hostages would be executed.95 These orders were brutally employed in Serbia proper. As such, every attack against the Germans was considered to origin from the Communist insurgency.96 German counterinsurgency operations included attacking fixed insurgency locations, large-scale offensive operations, and small-scale actions. The SS were also tasked with persecuting Jews.97 However, the influx of German counterinsurgency actions in Kosovo did not increase until late 1943. By the beginning of 1944 the major areas of combat were situated mostly in the Dukagjini Plain. The Partisan activity grew steadily in these areas, mostly because they were gaining support from civilians, with whom they did not have great cooperation up to this point, in contrast to the Germans. An increase of bellicosity is observed in the Highlands of Gjakovë and the outskirts of Prizren, where the Partisans had developed strong bastions. 93 Zbornik DNOR, Ser.I, vol.19, doc.93. Jozo Tomasevich, War and Revolution in Yugoslavia, 1941-1945: The Chetniks (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 1975), 146. 95 Zbornik DNOR, Ser.1, vol.1., doc.159. 96 Zbornik DNOR, Ser.1, vol.1., doc.159. 97 Charles D. Melson, “German Counterinsurgency in the Balkans: The Prinz Eugen Division Example 19421944.” The Journal of Slavic Military Studies 20, no.4 (2007): 715. 94 HVC WPS -22- A paragon of this situation would be the event on the 13th of February 1944, when the Germans in collaboration with Chetniks and a group of Albanian volunteers under the orders of Shah Curri, attacked the Partisan bastions in the hills of Has, an area in the proximity of Prizren, where they killed 6 Partisans in action. The documents pertaining to the Committee of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia do not specify how many incumbents were killed in action, but they specify that this action caused for the Partisans to retreat from Has in Prizren.98 Inferring from these data, it appears evident that the Partisans had control over mountainous terrain in early 1944, however the Germans had control over plain territories, particularly the urban areas, more typical to control zone 2. Kalyvas’ postulate regarding the emergence of indiscriminate violence in areas where control levels are lower for incumbents is best observed with the attacks perpetrated by Albanian militias, whose activity was most prevalent among the civilians in urban areas.99 The control shifts between incumbents and insurgents in certain mountainous areas appears to have been alternated throughout 1944, particularly in Kosovo Valley. However, the main Partisan bastions such as the Highlands of Gjakovë, although perpetually attacked, remained a stronghold for the Partisans until the end of the war. A major attack initiated against the Partisans occurred on the 14th of February 1944, when the German troops besieged the Partisan battalions “Skutari” and “Kosmeta” which were situated in the Highlands of Gjakovë. As a result 18 Germans and 11 Partisans were killed in action, which lasted for a day after which period the German troops retreated.100 An instance of control alternation can also be observed in this event, where the Germans initiated an attack as a response to the Partisans’ increasing strength. The Highlands of Gjakovë perpetually represented a zone controlled by the insurgents, and in 1944 it was a typical control zone type 4, where incumbent attacks were common. From February until September, the Wehrmacht troops did not actively attack the Partisans, who throughout this period were starting to gain strength in the Kosovo Valley. Instead, most of the attacks and violence at this period was perpetrated by Albanian militias against civilians. The Germans initiated another large scale attack against the Partisans in September 1944, because the latter were gaining support rapidly in the city of Gjakovë as well as the villages surrounding Gjakovë. These events correspond with Kalyvas’ prediction regarding counterinsurgency, which explains that the Germans would attack the Partisans in an attempt to re-enforce their control over the surrounding villages of Gjakovë.101 Furthermore, According to a report issued by the SS Skanderbeg division Commando, there were as many as 1500 Partisans in the area during mid-February 1944.102 The high number of Partisans in the area complies with 98 Zbornik DNOR, ser.I, vol.19, doc. 12. Kalyvas, The Logic of Violence in Civil War, 294. 100 Zbornik DNOR, Ser.I, vol.19, doc.117. 101 Kalyvas, The Logic of Violence in Civil War, 213. 102 AIHP, NAW, box 1, T354, roll 160, 3805944. 99 HVC WPS -23- Kalyvas’ observation that the insurgents will scatter and reestablish contact with clandestine cells or collaborators in the villages.103 As a result of counterinsurgency tactics, the Germans fought off the Partisans throughout the vicinity of Gjakovë and its highlands, where the former managed to kill as many as 104 Partisans in action. According to the same report, 10 German soldiers were killed in this offensive.104 This action caused significant damages to the Partisans in the area. However, the latter rapidly regained strength and managed to reestablish their control over the Highlands of Gjakovë, and within months they gained control over the major municipalities in Kosovo. In the discourse whether Kosovo - as part of Greater Albania under the Nazi aegis, could have simultaneously been Germany’s auxiliary in implementing its policies, seems to be an ample exaggeration of the Albanian leaders’ authority and political impact on the region. Kosovo, a relatively small region, was for the most part a peripheral, yet secure bastion for the Germans. 4.5 The rise of the Partisan movement and the challenges to German control The Partisan insurgency operated primarily by creating civil unrest, civil disobedience and creating riots. Their operations were characterized as a conduct of terrorist activities, which sabotaged government and industry and by assassinating key political opponents.105 As such the Yugoslav and Kosovar Partisans instigated similar insurgent activities throughout the duration of their movement in Kosovo. Kosovar Partisan sabotaging techniques have been observed early on in their activity, when members of the unit “Zenel Hajdini” sabotaged a small telepheric cable line in German controlled area in 1942.106 Likewise, The Partisans were also involved in assassinating the appointed leader of the Chetnik organization in Kosovo, Dr. Nikola Radijević, on the eve of the 31 October of 1941.107 The formation of Partisan units began in 1941, however they were not particularly active well until 1943. For the most part, the activity of members of the National Liberation Movement from ‘41 to ‘42 was perpetrated by armed men grouped in small crowds, and as such their activity was sporadic. The first Albanian Partisan unit in Kosovo was formed on the 27th of September 1942, and at that point it consisted of a dozen armed men.108 The unit was named “Zenel Hajdini”, and operated throughout the region of Kosovo Valley.109 After approximately five months, by January of 1943, the number of recruits fighting in this unit was increased. The unit was divided in two 103 Kalyvas, The Logic of Violence in Civil War, 213. AIHP, NAW, box 1, T354, roll 160, 3805944. 105 Raymond M. Momboisse, Blueprint of Revolution: The Rebel, The Party, The Techniques of Revolt (Springfield, Ill.: Thomas, 1970), 62. 106 Hadri, Lëvizja nacionalçlirimtare në Kosovë 1941-1945, 274. 107 Hoti, Lëvizja nacionalçlirimtare në Prishtinë dhe rrethinë (1941-1945), 87. 108 Velimir Terzić, Oslobodilački rat naroda Jugoslavije 1941-1945, vol. 2 (Beograd: Vojnoistorijski institut, 1963), 319. 109 Vahide Hoxha, ”Aradha Partizane ’Zenel Hajdini’” Kosova, no.9-10 (1980). 104 HVC WPS -24- groups, forming the new unit named “Emin Duraku”, which would, for the most part, operate throughout the Dukagjini Plain. 110 During 1943, the National Liberation Army was rapidly gaining supporters, especially among local Albanians. As a result, as many as three other units were created throughout different regions in Kosovo. Other Partisan units were formed throughout 1943 and 1944 in areas outside of Kosovo’s borders. The two main operative zones of the Partisans in Kosovo were composed of the 1st operative zone which encompassed the region Prizren–Kukës, Albania, and the 2nd operative zone which corresponded with the Highlands of Gjakovë.111 However, these two zones represented the regions on which the Kosovar Albanian Partisan units operated primarily, whereas further in the text analysis corresponds to the two main geographical regions in Kosovo, which regions correspond with the development of Partisan activity in the territory of Kosovo.112 The Highlands of Gjakovë were a Partisan bastion throughout the war, however they remained a control type zone 4, where incumbent activity was observed for the most part of 1943. Even during the German retreat instances of combat were recorded in the Highlands, but it ultimately transformed to a control type zone 5 where the insurgents were in complete control. The Partisans started to strengthen their positions and increase the number of recruits and supporters exponentially throughout 1944. Nevertheless, the Germans had firm control over most of the cities well until late 1944. While the Partisan insurgency accounted for some attacks throughout Kosovo during 1944, the major transformation of control started being apparent in November of 1944. For example, in March of 1943, the Germans still maintained control over the region of Kosovo Valley, albeit that the Partisan insurgency was becoming ever more apparent. Sources indicate that on the 18th of March, a group of 50 Partisans were attempting to cross to Jabllanicë in an attempt to join Partisan units situated in the area.113 However, en route to Jabllanicë, the Partisans were spotted from what the sources indicate were Albanian militias, and subsequently attacked. As a result, 27 Partisans were killed in action, 21 were taken prisoners and only 2 managed to cross through to Jabllanicë.114 This event denotes a typical counterinsurgency tactic adopted by the incumbents, where the idea was to attack Partisans before they construct base camps.115 4.6 The German retreat and the Partisan victory Inferring from the data which inform us about Partisan activity, it is presumable that at the beginning of March 1944, the Partisans maintained a degree of control over the main mountainous 110 For the formation of Partisan units and their operation zones in Kosovo see Zbornik DNOR, Ser.I, vol.19, doc.27, doc. 32, doc.49, doc.137. 111 AIHP, NAW, box 1, T 313, roll 208, 7470684. 112 For recorded insurgent activity see AIHP, NAW, box 1, T 313, roll 308, 7470683-84. See also Hadri, Lëvizja nacionalçlirimtare në Kosovë 1941-1945, 398–400. 113 Ðurovic, Ustanak naroda Jugoslavije 1941: Zbornik, vol. I (Beograd: Vojno delo, 1964) 513. 114 Zbornik DNOR, Ser. I, vol, 20, doc. 131, 524. 115 Melson, “German Counterinsurgency Revisited.” 20. HVC WPS -25- region in Dukagjini Plain, however the incumbents had control over the main routes and plains. This indicates that in the early period of 1944 the region was divided in two main categories: zone 2, where the incumbents had a medium to highly organized military presence where sporadic insurgent activity was reported, which included the plains; and the mountainous areas being categorized as zone 4, where the insurgents had a medium to highly organized military presence, with sporadic incumbent activity. This case partially fits Kalyvas’ third hypothesis, in which it is postulated that violence perpetrated by incumbents is more likely to be indiscriminate in zones 2 and 4. Deducing from the data available pertaining to this event, it is indicative that the incumbents were significantly selective in targeting Partisans, regardless how predisposed by circumstantial conditions to induce direct violence against Partisans the incumbents might have been. Throughout the summer of 1944, the Allies initiated several aerial attacks against the main municipalities under German control. On the 28th and 29th of June, the Allies bombed Prizren, where as a result 50 civilians were counted as collateral victims. The attack heavily destroyed the main roads from Prizren to Shkodër in Albania, Gjakovë and Suharekë (Suva Reka), which subsequently hampered the agility in transportation for the German troops.116 In August the Allies bombed Pejë, which attack killed as many as 1000 civilians and around 500 were left wounded.117 Although another aerial attack was initiated by the Allies in Mitrovicë in early September,118 the bombing of Pejë by far had caused the most damage and killed the most civilians from any other attack perpetrated by all belligerents involved in the war. The direct involvement of the Allies in war against the Germans was a certain indicator that the Partisans were rapidly gaining power and were very likely to end up as victors. Likewise, a correlation could be drawn between the prevalence of grievances among the locals after the bombings and the increased number of supporters for the Partisans.119 This occurrence corresponds to Fearon’s and Laitin’s observation in which they state that “grievances are necessary for the local population’s support of active rebels”.120 The subsequent attack of Partisans towards German troops in late August through which several incumbents were killed also caused a retaliatory action from the Germans, who on the 30th of August 1944 executed 10 Communists in Gjakovë, including Fahri Hoxha, the brother of the 116 Lidhja e Prizrenit, 2.7.1944. AQSH, F.153, D. 141, fl. 118 Lidhja e Prizrenit, 10.9.1944. 119 Izber Hoti, Çështja e Kosovës gjatë Luftës së Dytë Botërore (Prishtinë, Kosovë: Instituti i Historisë – Prishtinë, 1997), 60. Vickers contends that because most Albanians knew that Germany was on the brink of defeat, they considered the National Liberation Movement their chief enemy, however German sources, and the overall observable development of support towards the National Liberation Movement, contend otherwise. It should also be taken into account that by leading a small-scale war, the Communists aspired to incite an international intervention which could subsequently be used as an “anti-imperialist” propaganda and thus generate supporters. See Chalmers Johnson, Revolution and the Social System (Stanford, Calif.: Hoover Institution on War, Revolution, and Peace, Stanford University, 1964), 62. 120 James D. Fearon and David D. Laitin, “Ethnicity, Insurgency, and Civil War.,” 13. 117 HVC WPS -26- initiator of the said attack, Fadil Hoxha.121As predicted, the selective violence exercised by the Germans proves that they continued to enjoy control over Gjakovë. However, the retaliatory measures taken by the Germans furthered the grievance among the local population. Conversely, it was not such a simple or a rapid task for the Partisans to gain control on the local level, despite the growing level of support they were receiving from the local population. This is also exemplified through their attacks on civilians, who arguably were collaborating with the incumbents. In September of 1944 the Partisans initiated indiscriminate violence against civilians in a Chromium ore mine in the vicinity of Gjakovë, where they kidnapped 40 miners.122 The area of Gjakovë and its vicinity were under the control of incumbents, where sporadic, however not sequential, insurgent activity was reported, which was typical for a control zone type 2. The appearance of indiscriminate violence perpetrated by insurgents indicates that the case Gjakovë in September of 1944 complies with Kalyvas’ prediction that indiscriminate violence is more likely to be executed by the political actor who lacks control.123 The incumbents at that point were still in control of the city; nonetheless, insurgency was slowly strengthening in the rural areas of the city – which was not a customarily observed phenomenon – unlike what was observed in the Highlands of Gjakovë. Furthermore, these observations also suggest that because they lacked sufficient control over the territory, and in an attempt to establish control, the Partisans conducted indiscriminate violence in this area. This observation corresponds to Kalyvas’ second and third hypothesis, in which, among others, it is postulated that indiscriminate violence perpetrated by insurgency will most likely occur in a zone where incumbents are in relative control.124 The Partisan attacks on German troops retreating from the city of Gjakovë became ever more prominent in December of 1944, by which time the latter had already retreated from most of the cities in Kosovo Valley. On the 24th of December the 12th Partisan Division fought off retreating fragments of the German Army in the vicinity of Gjakovë, where as a result 60 Partisans were reported as killed in action, and numerous imprisoned.125 German sources report that another 120 Partisans were killed in combat throughout December in the outskirts of Gjakovë, however the available documents do not provide information as to how many Germans were killed throughout these combats.126 It is also evident that both Yugoslav and German sources seem to downplay their losses, which is why in certain events it is difficult to determine which belligerent was on the winning side. However, considering the chain of events throughout late 1944, it is evident that the Germans already were on the brink of defeat. The Partisans, however, were conspicuously not as strong in the Dukagjini Plain at this period, mostly because the majority of non-Kosovar Partisan units were accruing in the region of Kosovo 121 AQSH, F. 153, D. 141, fl. 12 AIHP, NAW, box 1, T 311, roll 193, 000173. See also 123 Kalyvas, The Logic of Violence in Civil War, 204. 124 Kalyvas, The Logic of Violence in Civil War, 204. 125 AIHP, NAW, T311, roll 196, 0453. 126 AIHP, NAW, T311, roll 196, 000470-471. 122 HVC WPS -27- Valley to prevent the retreat of Army Group E. The Partisan insurgency was steadily gaining strength in Kosovo Valley during the period of September-October of 1944, whereas as displayed in the previous section, at the same period the insurgents were being actively attacked by the incumbents in the Dukagjini Plain, respectively in the Highlands of Gjakovë.127 The events that occurred during this period are interesting because they portray a parallel alternation of control between insurgents and incumbents in both regions. The Partisans previously have had a stronger presence in the Dukagjini Plain, particularly a strong bastion in the Highlands of Gjakovë, whereas the Germans had a persistent control over the Kosovo Valley, especially in the municipality of Mitrovicë and Prishtinë. By October of 1944, the Partisans had organized and gained sufficient strength to outright attack German troops, as is best observed in the event of 7th October of 1944 in the village of Rudnik in the municipality of Mitrovicë. According to documents issued by the Commando of the Ibri detachment, 108 armed men fighting on the side of the Germans were killed in action.128 Furthermore, the Partisans initiated another attack against the Germans in Mitrovicë on the 9th of October, where the former assaulted one German wagon carrying artillery, which attack resulted in 19 Germans dying.129 By May of 1944 the Allies were defeating the Germans evermore on the Western Front. Similarly, the Red Army had overthrown the Germans in the Baltic States, and by August of the same year the Red Army infiltrated Romania. By October of 1944 Germany was withdrawing the troops of the Army Group E from Greece, Macedonia and Albania. Throughout May and June the German military presence was increasing steadily in Kosovo Valley. However, considering that the Germans were retreating and not planning to station in the region, the Partisans had favorable conditions to attack the German troops. At this point the Bulgarians under the orders of a pro-Communist government had also joined the Allies in combating the Germans.130 Three Bulgarian Armies advanced from Sofia, through Niš and Skopje to block the retreating of German troops. On the 19th of October the 2nd Bulgarian Army fought alongside the 2nd Proletarian Division in Merdarë (Merdare), in the region of Podujevë, against the 22nd German Infantry Division and local Albanian volunteers. The German losses outnumbered the Partisan ones, where 59 Germans and 8 Partisans were killed in action, whereas 20 were wounded and 15 others were missing.131 Despite the losses that the Partisans endured during this event, the Partisans managed to take control of most of the region by organizing tenacious attacks on the remaining German troops, Albanian militia and volunteers. Nevertheless, the latter managed to somehow deflect Partisans from attacking the retreating troops, in a combat that lasted from the 28th until the 29th of October, when the 24th Serbian Partisan Division attacked the Albanian militias who were 127 Izber Hoti, Forcat e armatosura në Kosovë 1941-1945 (Prishtinë: Instituti i Historisë – Prishtinë, 1998), 45. Zbornik DNOR, ser.I, vol.19, doc.203. 129 Zbornik DNOR, ser.I, vol.19, doc.203. 130 AIHP, NAW, box 1, T 311, roll 191, 51-52. 131 Zbornik DNOR, Ser.I, vol.14, doc. 109; 128 HVC WPS -28- securing the axis Bujanoc (Bujanovac) – Kërshi Uglarit (Ugljarski Krš). As a result, 250 Albanians and 118 Partisans were killed in action, whereas 350 Albanians and 209 Partisans were wounded.132 By November of 1944, the Germans had retreated from Mitrovicë, Prishtinë and Lipjan which resulted in these territories being under complete control of the Partisans, thusly corresponding to control zones of type 4.The shift in control between the incumbents and insurgents becomes increasingly evident in October of 1944, especially in the region of Kosovo Valley. The tactical military withdrawal of German troops paved the way for the Partisans to take control of the previously German controlled regions. However, even after the Germans completely withdrew their troops from Kosovo, the Partisans were fighting the remaining Albanian militias and other Albanian nationalist groups. This phenomenon corresponds greatly with Wickham-Crowley and Kalyvas’ observations regarding the process of gaining control by the insurgents, where they state that it is common that the insurgents “show up in areas and times of weak government control”.133Nevertheless, after the German troops retreated from Kosovo, the Communist Party of Yugoslavia initiated the attempts of establishing administrative control over the territory. The Albanian militias who until late 1944 were fighting alongside the German troops had either deserted or had been captured and imprisoned by Partisans. Some nationalist groups, however, continued fighting the Partisans well until April of 1945. Combat between the Partisans and the Albanian nationalists was evident in Janjevë (Janjevo), in the vicinity of Lipjan, in December of 1944, during which month the 16th Division of the Army of Yugoslavia, brigades 26 and 27, fought against Albanians who collaborated with the Germans. As a result, throughout December, around 40 Albanians and 7 soldiers of the National Liberation Army were killed in action. During February of 1945, the Partisans managed to defeat the Albanian nationalists who operated in the region of Drenicë, where as a result the Partisans killed as many as 272 Albanians.134 During the same month the Partisans managed to defeat Shaban Polluzha’s unit, which signified the collapse of the Albanian nationalists in Drenicë.135 In April of 1945 the Partisans defeated the last unit of Albanian nationalists situated in Kabash (Kabaš) during which action 3 Partisans and 4 Albanians were killed.136 After this action, the Partisans had complete territorial control over Kosovo. The retreat of German troops signified the liberation of these territories from the Germans. The Partisans were thusly considered the victors and the areas as liberated. 132 Zbornik DNOR, Ser.I, vol.15, doc. 180. Kalyvas, The Logic of Violence in Civil War, 216; Timothy P. Wickham-Crowley, Exploring Revolution: Essays on Latin American Insurgency and Revolutionary Theory (Armonk, N.Y.: M.E. Sharpe, 1991), 35. 134 Hoti, Forcat e armatosura në Kosovë 1941-1945, 169. 135 See also Zbornik DNOR, Ser. II, vol. 15, doc. 69. 136 Hoti, Forcat e armatosura në Kosovë 1941-1945, 176. 133 HVC WPS -29- This phenomenon complies greatly with Kalyvas’ observation that this terminology is typical for insurgent controlled areas.137 However, the transition from German occupation to Partisan dominion was quite violent. The Partisan units terrorized civilians under the pretext that they had fought alongside German troops. For instance, during November of 1944 in the vicinity of Vushtrri, they killed as many as 22 civilians, looted their homes and raped the women. During December the 17th Macedonian brigade executed 50 people in Ferizaj, whereas in Gjilan and the villages in the vicinity they killed as many as 35 people.138 Violence against civilians was prevalent also in Prizren, where the 2nd Kosovar brigade shot 70 men.139 These examples are in junction with Kalyvas’ prediction that indiscriminate violence will be highest in territories where insurgents are in complete control if they lack necessary information for selective targeting.140 5. Conclusion The primary focus of research in this paper has been the study of strategic violence as exercised by the three main political actors in Kosovo during the Second World War. The prevailing paradigm has been that violence was used as an instrument to generate collaboration, in which case the excessive use of indiscriminate violence has caused defection and has henceforth been counterproductive. Under this premise, it has been hypothesized that the more control an actor establishes over a region, the less likely it is for that actor to use indiscriminate violence. Under this assumption, violence should gradually shift from indiscriminate to selective in correlation to the level of control an actor acquires. In analyzing the patterns of control as exercised from different political actors, it has become apparent that during the period of 1941-1943, when it was previously believed that the Italians had more control over Kosovo – presumably because they had established administrative control over a larger territory of Kosovo in comparison to Germany – they had in fact notably less control. This conclusion has been surmised through noticing the patterns of insurgent activity in Italian controlled areas, while also establishing that the Italians did not have an abundant military presence, especially in comparison to the Germans. The data suggest that the Italian occupation was characterized with a prevalence of grievance among the local population, which was caused by the former’s employment of indiscriminate violence. These occurrences subsequently raised the likelihood that the population would endorse insurgency in contrast to incumbency. The data mapped so far seem to suggest that the local population in the Dukagjini Plain was more welcoming of the insurgency than the incumbency, which might help explain why the Partisans’ main bastions were situated in the Dukagjini Plain during the period 1941-1943. Similarly it is 137 Kalyvas, The Logic of Violence in Civil War, 219. Muhamet Shatri, Kosova në Luftën e Dytë Botërore, 1941-1945 (Prishtinë, 1997), 230. 139 Shatri, Kosova në Luftën e Dytë Botërore, 1941-1945, 234. 140 Kalyvas, The Logic of Violence in Civil War, 113. 138 HVC WPS -30- noted how during this period the Germans exerted selective violence on civilians by persecuting a select number of Communists, whereas the Italians persecuted in large numbers, while also arguably targeting Communists. The results comply with Kalyvas’ theory regarding the interaction between control and violence.141 This is best observed in the context of German incumbency and areas where they exercised complete control. The German incumbency was highly selective in targeting Communists, with one possible exception that occurred in February 1943, when they incarcerated 280 civilians. To similar phenomena Kalyvas’ argues that selectiveness is still employed, albeit under a “secondary profiling”, by which the incumbents target military aged men.142 Similarly, Kalyvas’ theory complies with the observations pertaining to Italian incumbency, where it has become apparent that in areas where they lacked control they exercised indiscriminate violence. This phenomenon is best observed in Pejë and Gjakovë, whereas in areas where they were in complete control such as Prizren, the Italian incumbency did not exercise neither selective nor indiscriminate violence. Evidence suggests that drastic alternations of control between incumbents and insurgents occurred during the period from September 1943 until April 1945. While the German incumbency maintained a relatively stable control during the period 19431944, the increased activity of insurgency destabilized the level of control that the Germans attempted to maintain. Conversely, the Partisans gradually took territorial control over Kosovo; however, they did not gain complete control until the Germans retreated. Even after the Germans retreated, the Partisans were still fighting with the local nationalists who were opposing them. Similarly, collaboration between the local population and incumbency varied in relation to the level of control that the incumbency enjoyed. During the period from 1941 to 1943 collaboration between the local population and incumbency remained relatively the same – with the collaborators remaining loyal from the beginning of the occupation. Conversely, collaboration seems to have been equally prevalent in both Italian and German incumbency, whereas it has become apparent that Italian incumbency did not have complete control over its designated area. Contrarily, evidence seems to suggest that collaboration between the local population and the Partisans increased linearly in relation to the latter’s consolidation from 1943 to 1945. These observations are in conform to Kalyvas’ hypothesis regarding the juncture of collaboration and control, in which he postulates that “the higher the level of control exercised by a political actor, the higher the level of civilian collaboration with this political actor will be”.143 Lastly, violent events as predicted were more apparent in mountainous terrain and less so in urban areas. In conclusion, it has become evident that the intent of establishing and maintaining control and the eventual inability to do so, dictated the fluctuation of violent outbursts throughout the territory of Kosovo. 141 142 Kalyvas, The Logic of Violence in Civil War, 204. Kalyvas, The Logic of Violence in Civil War, 187. 143 Kalyvas, The Logic of Violence in Civil War, 111. HVC WPS -31- 6. 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