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Holocaust and Genocide Studies
Working Papers Series
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The logic of violence in Kosovo during the
Second World War
A micro-level analysis
MRIKA LIMANI
The Hugo Valentin Centre
Uppsala 2014
Holocaust and Genocide Studies | Working Papers Series
The Hugo Valentin Centre
Uppsala University
P.O. Box 529
SE-75120 Uppsala
Sweden
Phone: +46-18-4712359
E-mail: [email protected]
URL: www.valentin.uu.se
ISBN: 978-91-86531-nn-n
© 201N the author and the Hugo Valentin Centre
Printed in Uppsala by KPH 201N
Contents
1. Introduction .................................................................................................................. 6
2. Methodology ................................................................................................................. 6
3. Theoretical dispositions ................................................................................................ 7
4. Empirical analysis....................................................................................................... 12
4.1 Italian control zones and violence execution ........................................................................12
4.2 German control zones and selective violence ............................................................ 17
4.3 Albanian militias ....................................................................................................... 20
4.4 Counterinsurgency and state organized violence ..................................................... 22
4.5 The rise of the Partisan movement and the challenges to German control ............. 24
4.6 The German retreat and the Partisan victory ............................................................ 25
5. Conclusions ................................................................................................................ 30
6. References .................................................................................................................. 31
1. Introduction
Several historical analyses have been conducted on the topic of Kosovo during the
Second World War, and the general apothegm contends that the Axis powers occupied
Kosovo, but the Communists liberated the people from the talons of National Socialism.
Upon closer historical inspection, however, it is ever more evident that, in fact, the
incentives behind every political and military action were brutally rational. The Axis
powers, for instance, sought strategic dominion in the region and the fortuity to exploit
natural resources, whereas the Communists sought to gain political power. In the
context of these historical facts, it becomes important to analyze strategic violence as
exercised by the Germans, Italians and Partisans in the region. The arguments presented
in this paper entail that establishing and maintaining control was a primary impetus in
exerting violence and that the magnitude of control dictated the magnitude of violence.
It is suggested that rather than ideology, control – and the grave consequences of
defection - shaped collaboration.
The paper analyzes what prevailing reasons stand behind the emergence of
indiscriminate violence during the Italian occupation, and why this phenomenon was
not as prevalent during German incumbency.
2. Methodology
The research is based on primary German sources which were microfilmed in Washington and are
now available at the Archives of Institute for History in Prishtinë, as well as documents from the
National Albanian Archives. Of equal importance in researching the topic has been the collection
of Zbornik dokumenata i podataka o narodnooslobodilačkom ratu i revoluciji (Collection of
Documents and Information on the People’s Liberation War and Revolution, Zbornik) tomes I, II,
XII and XIII, which contain documents from the German, Italian and Communist actors.
After carefully selecting the necessary material to conduct the research, the data has
been organized by mapping out instances of violence by registering violent events
through codes on the software FileMaker Pro. The procedure of event-coding entails
registering available data regarding an instance of violence and categorizing that
information into select codes. Ideally, one event-code includes information regarding
the number of casualties, actors involved in that particular event, the start and end date
of the event, sources wherefrom the information has been acquired, as well as
information that indicate which actor was in control of that particular area or location
prior and after the event. In mapping out all the information into event-codes, one could
conclude if and how a particular event could have influenced an actor’s control over an
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area. Finding and organizing this data on the basis of every registered instance of
violence has made it possible to draw out conclusions regarding the local dynamics of
violence in Kosovo and note whether or not violence was directly correlated with an
actor’s control over a particular area. Kosovo Valley (Rrafshi i Kosovës - Kosovo
Polje) and Dukagjini Plain (Dukagjin – Metohija) have been adopted as primary
geographical references, where the 8 main municipalities are situated. From these
municipalities Prishtinë (Priština), Mitrovicë (Kosovska Mitrovica), Lipjan (Lipljan),
Ferizaj (Uroševac), Gjilan (Gnjilane) are situated in the Kosovo Valley, whereas Prizren
(Prizren), Gjakovë (Đakovica) and Pejë (Peć) are situated in the Dukagjini Plain.
Toponymical references within the territory of Kosovo are sequentially presented in
Albanian, however the equivalent Serbian toponyms are provided in parentheses
whenever a previously unmentioned toponym is presented.
The demographics of the local population have not been extremely relevant in
mapping out the magnitude of violence nor the mechanisms behind it, particularly
considering that in most instances it is difficult to determine the age and gender of the
targeted victims, and often times sources clearly state the victims’ occupation or ethnic
background – which makes it easier to determine whether they were selectively targeted
or not.1 For general orientation, the earliest exact ciphers of the population of Kosovo
are published in the Statistical Yearbook FPRY of 1956, which indicates that the
Autonomous Region of Kosovo was populated by 4.8% of the Federation’s entire
population.2
3. Theoretical dispositions
In analyzing violence and its relation with control it is essential to establish an empirical method
for conceptualizing control. Kalyvas observes that the level, presence and, political access of a
particular political actor are strong indicators of control over a given zone for one or another
actor.3 Race argues that control zones can be defined through “the probability that a certain
1
For assessing the number of victims of the war in Yugoslavia in the 1964 Survey of War, the Committee in
charge compiled single certificates that pertain to every individual who was known to have been killed or
interned during the war. These documents are very detailed and entail information regarding the individual’s
place of origin, whether the victim was incarcerated, or if the victim died while fighting for the National
Liberation Army, place of death and other information. I have been able to find a collection with these
documents at the Archives of Institute for History in Prishtinë, which correspond to the victims registered in
the municipality of Prizren, however, because it requires a significant amount of time in analyzing them, I have
not included the information provided by these documents in my research.
2
Savezni Zavod za Statistiku (Yugoslavia), “Statisticki godišnjak SFRJ,” 1956. See also Bogoljub Kočović,
Žrtve Drugog svetskog rata u Jugoslaviji (London: Veritas Foundation Press, 1985), 172–80.
3
Stathis N. Kalyvas, The Logic of Violence in Civil War (New York: Cambrisge University Press, 2006), 210.
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event or class of events will not occur within a defined area within a defined period of time”.4 In
some cases, control can be conceptualized as an area in which civilians are under “surveillance
and monitoring”.5 As an expedient measure to define the magnitude of control, Kalyvas’ five
designated control zones have been used in this paper.6 In accordance with the data and sources
available for the case of Kosovo during the Second World War, two central elements have been
used to measure control: 1) Military presence of one or another actor; 2) Liberty of movement
for insurgency groups as measured through sporadic outburst of violence initiated either by the
incumbents or insurgents.
As a result, the following zones are integrated in the analysis:
Zone 1: Incumbent combatants have a highly organized military presence and an
established administrative control, no insurgent activity reported.
Zone 2: Incumbent combatants have a medium to highly organized military presence,
and a relatively well established administrative control, with sporadic insurgent activity
reported.
Zone 3: Incumbents and insurgents enjoy an equal level of control.
Zone 4: Insurgent combatants have a medium to highly organized military presence,
with sporadic incumbent activity reported.7
Zone 5: The insurgency enjoys complete military control over the territory.8
The preceding typology will be used for defining the level of control of incumbents and
insurgents in certain areas.
The theoretical dispositions that are used in this paper pertain primarily to rational choice
theories, which offer a compact approach in analyzing the events that occurred during the
Second World War in Kosovo. The dominant assessment is that violence is used as a method to
control groups.9 As such, the use of violence within the margins of strategic violence is
instrumental because it generates compliance. Under this premise, the extensive use of
indiscriminate violence causes defection rather than compliance, and therefore is
counterproductive.10
The war in Kosovo, as in Yugoslavia generally, was an irregular war in the military-technical
nature.11 The fractioned occupation by the Axis forces was accompanied by a dispute of
territorial control between the Axis powers themselves, which actors were also faced with the
4
Jeffrey Race, War Comes to long an Revolutionary Conflict in a Vietnamese Province (Berkeley; Los Angeles;
London: University of California Press, 1973), 277.
5
Kalyvas, The Logic of Violence in Civil War, 218.
6
Kalyvas, The Logic of Violence in Civil War, 211–213.
7
Also known as “semi-liberated” areas. See Kalyvas, The Logic of Violence in Civil War, 211
8
Kalyvas, The Logic of Violence in Civil War, 421.
9
Kalyvas, The Logic of Violence in Civil War, 26.
10
Kalyvas, The Logic of Violence in Civil War, 28
11
Kalyvas, The Logic of Violence in Civil War, 87.
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inability to predict or anticipate Partisan attack and activity. However, lack of established
frontlines remained a prevailing condition throughout the war.
The nature of Partisan warfare in Kosovo fundamentally incorporated three defining
characteristics: irregularity, increased mobility, and intensity of political commitment.12 Their
irregular warfare has been continuously observed in all military actions they engaged in, as will
be examined further in the text, which occurred predominantly in mountainous terrain – the
Partisan’s preferred areas of operation. Their mobility has been similarly observed whenever
they organized attacks against incumbents, likewise whenever they managed to swiftly scatter
and then regain their strength and return to their bases after having been attacked by the
incumbents. If we are to trust the memoirs and diaries written by the Yugoslav and Kosovar
Partisans who fought in the war, it seems evident that their political commitment towards the
Communist Party, and primarily their belief in the Marxist-Leninist ideology in the revolution
of the working class, seems to have been a strong incentive in their fight against the German
and Italian incumbency.13
Fearon and Laitin’s definition of insurgency aids in best describing the Partisan activity
during the war in Kosovo, which states that “insurgency is a technology of military conflict
characterized by small, lightly armed bands practicing guerrilla warfare from rural base areas”.14
Conversely, the stark differences in militaristic capabilities between the three main political
actors in this case study are also an important element in defining the roles that the political
actors adopted in the dominion of war.15 These differences were undoubtedly immense between
the Partisans and Axis forces.
In the discourse of microfoundations of violence in Kosovo during the Second World War, it
is evident that the main factor in inciting military offensives as well as exerting violence on
civilians was the prospect of magnifying the control over a territory on behalf of a political
actor.
In the context of control as exercised by incumbents, Kalyvas’ definitions of sovereignty
between various political actors become relevant to the case study. He delineates two types of
sovereignty:
12
Carl Schmitt, Theory of the Partisan: Intermediate Commentary on the Concept of the Political (New York:
Telos Press Pub., 2007), 13. Schmid makes the distinction between irregular and conventional warfare, or
“aktiv Kriegsstand”. See Juerg H. Schmid, Die völkerrechtliche Stellung der Partisanen im Kriege (Keller,
1957), 101. See also Rolf Schroers, Der Partisan: ein Beitrag zur politischen Anthropologie (Köln:
Kiepenheuer & Witsch, 1961), 109, Dirk Freudenberg, Theorie des Irregulären: Partisanen, Guerrillas und
Terroristen im modernen Kleinkrieg, 2008, 251.
13
Fadil Hoxha, Kur pranvera vonohet. (Fragment nga ditari - 1943) (Prishtinë: Rilindja, 1965), 65. See also
Milovan Djilas, Memoir of a Revolutionary (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1973), 93
14
James D. Fearon and David D. Laitin, “Ethnicity, Insurgency, and Civil War.,” Ethnic Conflict 2 (2009): 12.
15
To this one could attest that the Partisan warfare is in principle a small-war, which is defined also through the
fact that the Partisans are fewer in number than a regular army. The term “guerrilla” is used as a synonym for
“small-war”. See Freudenberg, Theorie des Irregulären: Partisanen, Guerillas und Terroristen im modernen
Kleinkrieg, 252.
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Sovereignty is segmented when two political actors (or more) exercise full sovereignty over
distinct parts of the territory of state. It is fragmented when two political actors (or more)
exercise limited sovereignty over the same part of the territory of the state.16
Because sovereignty is divided between the Axis powers in Kosovo, the definition becomes
pertinent in the discussion of control exerted by each political actor specifically. Following the
discussion of incumbent control, one of the methods to structuralize their authority over the
population is the formation of militias. By the same token, militias directly aided the
incumbents as auxiliaries, both militarily as well as through utilizing their knowledge of local
terrain.17 Theoretically, denunciation on behalf of militias is also an important stride in
implementing the incumbents’ authority.18 A paramount example of this assertion is the
formation of Këmishëzinjve (the Black-shirts) supported by the Italians, similarly how the
Germans aided the formation of the Kosovo Regiment, the Second League of Prizren and its
militia, the Nationalist Youth Committee for the Defense of Kosovo, and the SS Skanderbeg
Division.19
The analysis of violence as exerted by the perpetrators is developed through categorizing the
typology of violence in the context of selective or indiscriminate violence, whereby
fundamentally assuming that whichever type of violence is exerted upon civilians reflects the
level of control of each political actor. Both types of violence are also acknowledged to be used
as an instrumental form to generate collaboration through imposing deterrence among civilians.
The defining difference between the two lies in the fact that while indiscriminate violence
implies a collective targeting of victims, selective violence encompasses personalized targeting.
Fundamentally, it is argued that violence is a product of the level of information a political actor
has for selective targeting and the risk of defection that indiscriminate violence would
produce.20
It is theoretically assumed that insurgents and incumbents by principle rely on exerting
violence as a means to establish or reassert control. The occurrence of indiscriminate violence,
however, is dependent on the variable of information: the more reliable information the
16
Kalyvas, The Logic of Violence in Civil War, 89.
Kalyvas, The Logic of Violence in Civil War, 107.
18
Kalyvas, The Logic of Violence in Civil War, 176.
19
Miodrag Đ. Popović and Jovan P. Zečević, Dokumenti iz istorije Jugoslavije (1999), 3, 142. The Second
League of Prizren was formed on the principles of the First League of Prizren (Albanian League for the
Defense of the Rights of the Albanian Nation) which was founded in 1878 as a response to the Treaty of
Berlin, in which conference it was agreed among the Great Powers to secede Albanian populated territories to
Greece, Montenegro, Serbia and Bulgaria. The League petitioned for the creation of an autonomous state
within the Ottoman Empire while also calling on an armed resistance if its requests were not to be fulfilled. The
Committee for the National Defense of Kosovo (Komiteti për Mbrojtje Kombëtare të Kosovës) was founded in
November 1918, as a reactionary force against the Serbian occupation, which integrated in itself the kaçak
movement. The Committee remained relevant in the context that it represented an organization which
promulgated Albanian nationalistic ideology for the Kosovar Albanians. See also Robert Elsie, Historical
Dictionary Of Kosova (Lanham, Md.: Scarecrow Press, 2004), 41, 251.
20
Kalyvas, The Logic of Violence in Civil War, 142
17
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incumbents have, the less likely they are to use indiscriminate violence.21 Inferring from this
presupposition, it is hypothesized that political actors will gradually move from indiscriminate
to selective violence, assuming they establish control over an area.22
This hypothesis evolves under the assumption that one political actor will increase its
suzerainty over a control zone, hence gaining more power. The element of denunciation further
oscillates the information variable, which ultimately helps in increasing the magnitude of
control.23 However, in the case study presented here, there are far too few sources that either
prove or disprove any cases of denunciation - those appear to have been rare in account for both
insurgents and incumbents. This minimizes the levels of information accuracy, for which reason
indiscriminate violence appears to have been more prevalent in respect to selective violence in
certain control zones.
By definition, insurgency will be more active in mountainous terrain. This phenomenon
should be observable in rough terrain which is poorly connected by roads, as well as in a
significant distance from central incumbent areas. Stemming from this premise, it should be
observed that the insurgents are most active in the mountainous outskirts of municipalities and
that occasionally they are established in cross-border sanctuaries.24
By applying the methods defined in the previous paragraphs to identify control zones, and by
analyzing the appearance of violence, it should be observed that an actor is more inclined to
resort to violence if that actor lacks control over an area. By the same presumption, an actor is
less likely to conduct violence, both indiscriminate and selective, if the level of its control over
an area is high.25 Under this inference, no insurgent violence should be observable in zone type
5, by which definition insurgency has complete control of an area. Similarly, no incumbent
violence should be observable in zone type 1, where incumbency has a high or complete control
over the area.
However, if an actor has a lower level of control, then it becomes likely that the actor will
resort to, if any, indiscriminate violence. Based on these assumptions, it is predicted that
indiscriminate violence should be observable in control zone type 2 and 4, whereas no selective
violence should be observable in a parity zone type 3.26 Similarly, if an actor has a higher
control over an area, then the violence exerted by the actor in control should be selective.
Deriving from this assumption, it is predicted that selective violence should be observable in
control zone type 1. In areas that are under fragmented control, it is hypothesized that violence
will be exercised primarily by the actor who has an advantage in terms of control.27
21
Kalyvas, The Logic of Violence in Civil War, 148.
Kalyvas, The Logic of Violence in Civil War, 169.
23
Kalyvas, The Logic of Violence in Civil War, 176.
24
James D. Fearon and David D. Laitin, “Ethnicity, Insurgency, and Civil War.,” 13
25
Kalyvas, The Logic of Violence in Civil War, 204.
26
Kalyvas, The Logic of Violence in Civil War, 204.
27
Kalyvas, The Logic of Violence in Civil War, 204
22
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Control is also substantial in shaping collaboration.28 This stipulates that the more control a
political actor has over an area, the more likely it is that the local population will collaborate.
For Kalyvas’ case study there was sufficient evidence to suggest that this observation is related
to spatial variance of control. The same assumption is tested in this case study, where it is
postulated that collaboration varies in accordance to control alternation. The analysis will
further be conducted by applying these theoretical premises and testing whether they correspond
with the violence as mapped out in this case study
4. Empirical analysis
4.1 Italian control zones and violence execution
On the 6th of April 1941, the German and Italian forces charged the territory of Yugoslavia,
during which raid the forces advanced throughout Kosovo. After the Axis powers occupied
Yugoslavia, the country was divided into several regions controlled by various members
of the Axis. The Italian administration having already implemented an Albanian-ruled
government proceeded to annex parts of Kosovo to Albania proper, under the regime of
the Albanian Kingdom (Mbretnija Shqiptare), a protectorate of the Kingdom of Italy
under King Victor Emanuel III.29
After several months of dispute between Hitler and Count Ciano, it was agreed that Germany
was to take control over the Trepça (Trepča) mines and the Luboten (Ljuboten) massif.
Consequently, Germany would rule over most of the north-eastern part of Kosovo, whereas
Italy would rule over the south-western territory.
After Italy’s surrender in September of 1943, the Germans rearranged the administrative
control over Kosovo by annexing the territory to Albania.30
The Italian forces were situated throughout most of modern-day territory of Kosovo, including
the municipalities of Prizren, Pejë, Gjakovë, Prishtinë and Ferizaj. The number of troops under the
Italian command varied throughout the Italian occupation. By August of 1943 around 8000
soldiers were under Italian command, of which around 2400 were part of the Albanian regiment in
28
Kalyvas, The Logic of Violence in Civil War, 118.
Also known as the “Greater Albania”. See Casagrande, Die volksdeutsche SS-Division “Prinz Eugen”: Die
Banater Schwaben und die nationalsozialistischen Kriegsverbrechen (Frankfurt am Main: Campus-Verl.
2003), 158; Dragan S. Nenezić, Jugoslovenske oblasti pod Italijom: 1941-1943 (Beograd: Vojnoistorijski
institut vojske Jugoslavije, 1999), 20.
30
Archives at the Institute of History – Prishtinë (henceforth AIHP), NAW, box 1, T 313, roll 200, 7458183.
See also Milan D. Ristović, Nemački “novi poredak” i jugoistočna Evropa, 1940/41-1944/45: Planovi o
budućnosti i praksa (Beograd: Vojnoizdavački i novinski centar, 1991), 67, 309.
29
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Pejë, another 2000 troops in Prishtinë, and another 3500 members of the Gendarmerie.31 These
regiments, however, were later subordinate to the German command after Italy’s surrender.32
Control zones in Italian occupied territory varied between type 1 and type 2, where the
incumbents had complete and medium control. Prizren was the epicenter of the Italian military
and administrative establishment which was typical to zone 1, whereas Gjakovë, Pejë and Ferizaj
were typical of control zone type 2.Italian troops were more numerous in Albania proper, whereas
troops in Kosovo were significantly fewer. Furthermore the Italian military was not nearly as
organized in Kosovo as the German military. For instance, while the Italians used the municipal
agents and militia33 for gaining information regarding insurgency, subsequently issuing arrests, the
Germans employed entire units by the Secret Service, in seizing relevant information regarding
the insurgency. As a consequence, the Italians appeared to have been less meticulous with regards
to insurgent persecution.
The Italian occupation in Kosovo instigated copious persecution against the civilian population,
particularly towards the Serbian inhabitants. In the preliminary phases of the occupation and
installation of Italian administration, the latter instigated the Albanian voluntary groups to expel
Serbians who lived in the Dukagjini Plain.34 The general estimate is that there were around 20,000
Serbs displaced from Kosovo and Macedonia altogether.35 These tactics were employed in order
for the Italians to appease the Albanian nationalists in forming an ethnically homogenous Greater
Albania, part of which included Dukagjini Plain and parts of Drenicë (Drenica) in Kosovo Valley,
which consequently would ensure the Italians a reticence of insurgencies.
The methods that the Italians, aided by Albanian volunteers, employed to deport and persecute
civilians who were assumed to be members of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia, or were in any
form affiliated with the Communists, were persistent throughout their occupation. The economical
importance that ignited interest in controlling Mitrovicë and its district was a significant incentive
for the Italians to continue the persecution of local Serbs who inhabited the area, in order to
appease the Albanian majority, a pretext which they would later use to urge Albanian nationalists
to request national unification.36 Identifying Communists, however, was not an easy task –
31
Zbornik dokumenata i podataka o narodnooslobodilačkom ratu i revoluciji (henceforth Zbornik DNOR),
Ser.XIII, vol.3, doc. 164, doc.99.
32
AIHP, NAW, box 1, T313, roll 200, 7462094-5.
Also known as “policë Bashkijak” who were primarily employed to ensure peace and order. Albanian
National Archives (henceforth AQSH), F. 166, D. 39, fl. 2-3.
34
Ali Hadri, Lëvizja nacionalçlirimtare në Kosovë 1941-1945, 148; Jozo Tomasevich, War and Revolution in
Yugoslavia, 1941-1945: Occupation and Collaboration (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 2001),
749.
35
Zbornik DNOR, Ser.XIII, vol.1, doc.93. See also or Montenegrins displaced from Kosovo see Tomasevich,
War and Revolution in Yugoslavia, 1941-1945: Occupation and Collaboration, 2:139.
33
36
Tomasevich, War and Revolution in Yugoslavia, 1941-1945: Occupation and Collaboration, 2:152.
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particularly in instances where the Italians would have to rely on hearsay.37 Denunciation was not
common, and in most cases it was not an easily verifiable source. This correlates greatly to
previous observations regarding irregular wars, where it has been evident that the “identification
problem” provides obstacles for the incumbents in exercising selective violence.38 Similarly,
indiscriminate violence is considered a consequence of lack of information according to Kalyvas,
which correlation is observed in areas where the Italian incumbents were in control.39 In this
instance, however, it is worthy to note that in comparison to Albanians, Serbs adhered to the
Communist Party of Yugoslavia more so than the latter, and this could have resulted in the
number of victims being higher among ethnic Serbs.
Similarly it should be taken into consideration that the Albanian militias might have persecuted
Serb Communists on the basis of their ethnicity. While it was previously assumed that Italians
exercised complete control over the demarcated territory, it has been established that they in fact
enjoyed such control only in Prizren. While the Italian influence had almost completely absorbed
the Albanian government in Albania proper, the former’s presence and influence in Kosovo was
not as prevalent. The employment of the Këmishëzinjve (Black-Shirts) and other voluntary groups
as militias to spread about the fascist ideology was not as effective or as attention drawing in
Kosovo, as the Italians had hoped it would be.40
The Italian occupation in Kosovo had only one strong component with which the Albanians
identified: the unification of Kosovo with Albania proper. However, Italy’s reign over Kosovo
was fairly unevenly rooted, with a scattered and semi-functional administration. To best elucidate
the Italian indiscriminate violence perpetrated against civilians one should refer to the incident on
the 21st of March 1943, when an anti-Italian group murdered an Italian Federal Inspector named
Severino Ricottini.41 As retaliation, the Italians burned down a large part of Pejë, causing
insurmountable damage to private properties and civilians.42 A similar example of indiscriminate
violence can be inferred from the occurrence of early April 1943, when the Italians burned down
parts of Gjakovë as retaliation for the assassination of Ali Bokshi, the leader of the group “Carta
Bianca”.43
These events raised the level of grievance among the local population, which subsequently
made it more likely for the local population to support the insurgency. Similarly, exercising
indiscriminate violence also increased the likelihood of defection amongst the local population,
37
This phenomenon could have largely been false denunciation, which might provide a supplementary
explanation for the prevalence of indiscriminate violence in Italian controlled areas.
38
Kalyvas, The Logic of Violence in Civil War, 89.
39
Kalyvas, The Logic of Violence in Civil War, 148.
40
Popović and Zečević, Dokumenti iz istorije Jugoslavije, 142.
41
Hadri observes that the action was incurred by members of the National Liberation Movement, however,
German sources report that the action was conducted by Zogists. AIHP, NAW, box 1, T315, roll 64, 000563.
AIHP, NAW, box 1, T311, roll 196, 0482-483. For Italian documents regarding the incident see Zbornik
DNOR, Ser.XIII, vol.3, doc.46. See also “Inspektori Federal i P.N.F. të Pejës viktimë i plumbit t'armikut,”
Tomori, March 26, 1943.
42
AIHP, NAW, box 1, T311, roll 196, 0482-483.
43
Zbornik DNOR, Ser.XIII, vol.3, doc.58.
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which corresponds to Kalyvas’ proposition that indiscriminate violence is counterproductive in
civil wars.44 As retaliation for Ali Bokshi’s death, 13 casualties and a great damage to private
properties were reported.45 A parallel could be drawn by employing Kalyvas’ second hypothesis,
which states that “the higher the level of an actor’s control, the less likely it is that this actor will
resort to violence, selective or indiscriminate”.46 The presented data attests that Italian forces
resorted to indiscriminate violence in the case for Gjakovë and Pejë, because they had insufficient
information regarding the culprits for the assassination of Severino Ricottini and Ali Bokshi. This
relates directly to Kalyvas’ theory which postulates that indiscriminate violence should be
observable in cases when the actors lack relevant information to be selective.47 Similar parallels
can be drawn by applying Kalyvas’ third hypothesis, which states that “the lower the level of an
actor’s control, the less likely the actor will resort to selective violence and the more likely that its
violence, if any, will be indiscriminate”.48
In this context, Pejë and Gjakovë are more typical to zone 2. Seeing that the Italians had a
lower level of control over the area and that Dukagjini Plain has the ideal geographical
predispositions for the Partisans to operate in, it is only logical that the Highlands of Gjakovë
made a great bastion for the Partisans.49 Mountainous terrain generally provides extremely
preferable strategic conditions for insurgency because it corresponds with insurgency’s agility
in warfare but also their superior knowledge of local terrain.50
The cross-border position of Highlands of Gjakovë between Albania and Kosovo provided an
additional advantage for the Partisans, an occurrence that corresponds with Fearon and Laitin's
observation.51 The emergence of indiscriminate violence in control zones type 2 is also in
agreement with Kalyvas’ prediction, which stipulates that in areas where the level of control is
lower it is more likely for indiscriminate violence to be observable.52 The increased Partisan
vigor became evident on the 2nd January of 1943, when the Partisan detachment “Zenel
Hajdini” attacked an Italian procession of trucks passing from Ferizaj to Prizren, in the hills of
Caralevë (Crnoljevo). As a result, 22 Italians and 1 Partisan were killed in action.53 The Italian
control over their demarcated territory was not uniform. While Partisans had a greater liberty of
44
Kalyvas, The Logic of Violence in Civil War, 144.
Zbornik DNOR, Ser.XIII, vol.3, doc.58. See also Hadri, Lëvizja nacionalçlirimtare në Kosovë 1941-1945,
150; Hadri, Lëvizja nacionalçlirimtare në Kosovë 1941-1945, 278.
46
Kalyvas, The Logic of Violence in Civil War, 204.
45
47
Kalyvas, The Logic of Violence in Civil War, 148.
Kalyvas, The Logic of Violence in Civil War, 204.
49
Ali Hadri, Gjakova në lëvizjen nacionalçlirimtare (Prishtinë: Bashkësia Krahinore e Punës Shkencore dhe
Kuvendi i Komunës së Gjakovës, 1974), 82.
50
James D. Fearon and David D. Laitin, “Ethnicity, Insurgency, and Civil War.,” 20. See also Schmitt, Theory
of the Partisan, 13.
48
51
James D. Fearon and David D. Laitin, “Ethnicity, Insurgency, and Civil War.,” 12.
Kalyvas, The Logic of Violence in Civil War, 204.
53
Zbornik DNOR, Ser.I, vol. 19, doc. 27, 158; Zbornik DNOR Ser.I, vol.19, doc. 93, 422; For the documents
issued by the Italian Supreme Command regarding the incident see Zbornik DNOR, Ser.XIII, vol.2, doc.12. See
also Hadri, Levizja nacionalclirimtare ne Kosovë 1941-1945, 276.
52
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movement in the Highlands of Gjakovë, Pejë, Ferizaj and generally in Drenicë, the Italian
presence was more ascendant in Prizren.54 Because of a vaster Italian administrative and
military presence in Prizren, the Partisan and anti-Italian activity was observably less eminent
there. To these observations, one could apply Kalyvas’ first hypothesis as mentioned previously,
which denotes that the higher level of control an actor has over an area, the less likely it is for
violence to occur in that area.55
This contends to the argument that the Italian occupation can be characterized with two types
of control zones, where Prizren is typical to control zone 1, and other municipalities and rural
areas identifiable as control zone 2. Italian incumbency was characterized by a profoundly
violent reign, particularly in regards to political opponents.
During February of 1943, Italians killed 19 people in Ferizaj and its outskirts. Of these, 10
were villagers and 9 were Partisans.56 The indiscriminate behavior in this instance prompts two
possible explanations. The first one being that incumbents aimed at sanctioning those who they
suspected were Partisans and those collaborating or related to them, but lacked sufficient
information to be selective.57 This complies with Kalyvas’ assertion regarding the emergence of
indiscriminate violence in zones type 2, where incumbents have a lower level of control.58
Although this denotes an instance of inter-ethnic hostilities, the similarities are drawn upon
the theoretical fact that both incumbents in this instance do not fully control specific areas,
which gives them incentive to adopt alternative strategies for inducing submission. The second
explanation is that the Italians simply did not have complete sovereignty over Ferizaj59and were
therefore unable to obtain information to execute selective violence. The available data suggest
that the Germans and Italians had fragmented sovereignty over Ferizaj, Lipjan, Prishtinë,
through which cities the railroads were constructed. In light of these suggestions, it could be
postulated that Ferizaj, Lipjan and Prishtinë represented an intermediate area of control.60
Similarly, one should take into account the counterproductive effects of indiscriminate violence,
which can be best exemplified through the soi-disant battle of Grackë (Gracko), a village in the
vicinity of Lipjan.61
54
Hadri, Gjakova në lëvizjen nacionalçlirimtare, 91. It is interesting to note that in July of 1943 the Italians had
captured 19 prisoners who they believed were leaders of rebel formations, in Opojë, a village situated in the
mountainous terrain of Sharr in the vicinity of Prizren. This similarly proves that the Italians lacked
information for selective targetting. See Zbornik DNOR, Ser. XIII, vol.3, doc.84. Likewise, the Italian troops of
the division “Puglia” arrest around 27 civilians in July in Pejë, who were “partly suspected of subversive
activities”. See Zbornik DNOR, Ser. XIII, vol.3, doc. 93.
55
Kalyvas, The Logic of Violence in Civil War, 204.
Zbornik DNOR, Ser. I, vol. 19, doc.35.
57
Kalyvas, The Logic of Violence in Civil War, 150.
58
Kalyvas, The Logic of Violence in Civil War, 204.
59
As opposed to the Germans, who controlled the railroads by constructing 51 posts throughout the railroad,
and operated in their vicinity by tasking 402 soldiers on guard. Miletić, “Kosovo u okviru jedinstvenog
nemačkog okupacionog sistema na jugoslovenskom prostoru 1941 - 1944,” 82–83.
60
Kalyvas, The Logic of Violence in Civil War, 88.
61
Kalyvas, The Logic of Violence in Civil War, 151.
56
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Although the Partisans lost 8 soldiers fighting against the Germans, this example illustrates
that the Partisan nexus of supporters was growing in these territories. This phenomenon relates
to Kalyvas’ postulate that exercising indiscriminate violence induces an increase of support for
the insurgents.62 Similar Partisan activity was reported in the villages of Dobrevë (Dobrevo),
Magurë (Magura), Llapllasellë (Laplje Selo), Fushë Kosovë (Kosovo Polje), Kastriot etc., all of
which are situated throughout the axis Ferizaj–Lipjan–Prishtinë.63 Likewise, these observations
suit McColl’s and Kalyvas’ postulate of intermediate areas of control, according to which
intermediate zones represent important areas of struggle.64
According to Yugoslav sources, on the 14th of April 1943, a group of 12 Partisans were
detected by the so-called fascist militia while crossing the mountains near Lipovicë (Lipovica),
in the vicinity of Mitrovicë to join the Partisan unit “Emin Duraku” which operated in Ferizaj.65
Subsequently they were attacked, 9 of which were killed in action and 3 were imprisoned and
executed in Prishtinë.66
The Italian occupation, while initially somewhat welcomed by Kosovar Albanians, was
characterized by a deficiency of control and inability to prevent insurgent activity. The
increased level of grievance among the local population as a result of indiscriminate violence
exerted by the Italians caused for a general reign of anti-Italian sentiment by the time Italy
capitulated the war.67
4.2 German control zones and selective violence
After the capitulation of Yugoslavia, the German and Italian forces secured their
position throughout the territory of Kosovo. The Germans, for the most part, were
interested in ensuring their control over the areas where they could benefit
economically, particularly nearby mine ores. As a result, the latter positioned their units
in Trepça - Mitrovicë, Kastriot - Prishtinë, Golesh - Prishtinë, Jezerinë - Mirtrovicë and
further south in Luboten - Ferizaj.
The entire administrative, territorial and military jurisdiction of Kosovo, alongside Serbia
proper, was administered by Oberbefehlshaber Südost (OB Southeast). Because of a large German
military presence, Mitrovicë and Drenicë are considered as control zone type 1 where the
incumbents are in complete control.68
62
Kalyvas, The Logic of Violence in Civil War, 151.
Izber Hoti, Lëvizja nacionalçlirimtare në Prishtinë dhe rrethinë (1941-1945), 95.
64
Kalyvas, The Logic of Violence in Civil War, 88; Robert W. McColl, The Insurgent State: Territorial Bases of
Revolution, 1969, 624.
65
Zbornik DNOR, Ser.I, vol. 19, doc.34.
66
Hoti, Lëvizja nacionalçlirimtare në Prishtinë dhe rrethinë (1941-1945), 97.
67
Hadri, Lëvizja nacionalçlirimtare në Kosovë 1941-1945, 205. Regarding the Italian retreat from Albania, in
his memoirs Badoglio recollects that the retreat was particularly difficult for Italian troops. See Pietro
Badoglio, Italy in the Second World War: Memories and Documents. (London; New York: Oxford Univ. Press,
1948), 102.
68
Zbornik DNOR, Ser.XII, vol.1, doc.7.
63
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The German military presence in Kosovo was well established. The Germans managed to
initially gain gradual but complete tactical control of Kosovo Valley while they shared their
incumbency with the Italians, and later control the entire region of Kosovo after Italy’s surrender.
The German troops clearly outnumbered the Italian troops in Kosovo, which resulted in the former
enjoying complete tactical control over the regions they were stationed in.
Apart from a well founded administrative control over Mitrovicë and the surrounding towns, the
Germans had a very consistent Secret Service. Similarly, interrogating captured prisoners was a
preferred method for the Germans to acquire information.69 Subsequently, these methods
combined with the employment of local militias as informants, could have influenced the
prevalence of selective violence exercised by the Germans. The observations pertaining to the
German control zones apply to Kalyas’ assertion that no violence should be observed in areas of
complete control, and if it is observed, then it is more likely to be selective violence.70
Selective violence conducted by Germans is best illustrated by the event that occurred on the
16th of January 1942 in Lipjan. According to relevant sources, the Germans had captured three
members of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia, namely Aleksandar Marović, Robert Gajdik and
Milutin Aksić who were subsequently executed in Lipjan.71 This type of selectiveness in
perpetrating violence against civilians was not observed in the Italian controlled zones even in
1943. However, it is also relevant to note that Partisan activity in the beginning of 1942 was not
significantly widespread either.72
Similarly, there were no violent events observed against civilians in the Italian control zone.
Inferring from these data, it can be concluded that the Italians and the Germans had segmented
sovereignty over Lipjan, Ferizaj and Prishtinë in 1942, whereas the Germans had complete
sovereignty over Mitrovicë, both instances being characteristic of control zone type 1. Likewise,
one can conclude that the Germans’ control over Prishtinë in 1942, albeit under shared
sovereignty, was typical to zone 1. The emergence of selective violence observed on the 27th of
July 1942, when the German forces executed Aleksandar Mrdaković, a member of the Communist
Party of Yugoslavia, similarly applies to Kalyvas’ prediction that such violence is more likely to
be observed in areas of complete control.73 As previously asserted, the quantitative data pertaining
to German military suggest that from 1941 to 1942 Germans enjoyed control typical to zone 1 in
Mitrovicë, Prishtinë, Ferizaj, and Lipjan. Similarly, the deficiency of insurgent activity also attests
to the deduction that these areas represent control zones type 1.
Overall, the events that occurred from 1941 to 1942, relate directly to Kalyvas’ prediction that it
is less likely for violence to be observable in areas where an actor is in complete control.
69
Charles D. Melson, “German Counterinsurgency Revisited.” Journal of Military and Strategic Studies 14, no.
1 (2011): 14.
70
Kalyvas, The Logic of Violence in Civil War, 204.
71
Zbornik DNOR, Ser. I, vol.19, doc.28, 200
72
The Partisan activity in Kosovo arguably increased in intensity much belatedly in comparison to other regions
in Yugoslavia. Tomasevich, War and Revolution in Yugoslavia, 1941-1945: Occupation and Collaboration,
2:70.
73
Hoti, Lëvizja nacionalçlirimtare në Prishtinë dhe rrethinë (1941-1945), 93.
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Likewise, the appearance of selective violence also corresponds with Kalyvas’ hypothesis, which
suggests that if violence is observable in areas of complete control, then it is more likely that it
will be selective.74
However, in 1943 Partisan activity increased and this was reflected by the way Germans
responded to the increasing support that the Partisans were gaining. Although at first sight it
appears as if the incumbents were being selective in imprisoning and executing Communists, the
exaggerated numbers of imprisoned civilians indicates moderate inability to collect sufficient data
to apply maximum selectiveness.
The prevailing paradigm would be the events that occurred throughout February of 1943 in the
region of Graçanicë, in the vicinity of Lipjan, where they managed to imprison as many as 280
civilians, whom they believed to be Partisans or affiliated with the Communist Party. During this
period they also executed 20 Communists in Llapllasellë, a village in the municipality of
Prishtinë.75 The high number of the civilians imprisoned indicates that the Germans lacked
sufficient information to be more selective in targeting insurgents, which was quite inimical for
German incumbency up to this point. The data suggest that as a consequence of the inability to
completely confirm the victims’ relation with the Communists, the Germans turned to “secondaryprofiling”, which they achieved by incarcerating military-aged men.76 Moreover, the selective
violence they employed in executing Communists in Llapllasesllë correlates to Kalyvas’
prediction in regards to full control zones.77 To this phenomenon Kalyvas observes that even
selective violence targets many innocent people, although he argues that by employing selective
violence political actors ensure deterrence in spite of all the innocent killings.78
To further institutionalize authority in the local level, the utilization of Albanian militias was
quintessential for the German incumbency. The activity of Albanian militias was particularly
prevalent after Italy’s capitulation, by which time a number of German founded militias began
operating in both regions of Dukagjini Plain and Kosovo Valley. Although the Germans supported
the formations of the militias early on in their occupation, the militias reached the peak of their
activity after Italy’s capitulation in September of 1943. However, there were instances where they
did perpetrate violence against civilians prior to September. For instance, the Kosovo Regiment
was quite active in Ferizaj in April of 1943, by which time they killed as many as 34 Serbs who
were assumed to be related to the National Liberation Movement.79
Bearing in mind that the available sources do not indicate a strong emergence of Partisan
insurgency in this area until September of 1943, it is presumed that the Germans maintained a
relatively stable control over Prishtinë, Ferizaj and Lipjan typical to zone 2, where incumbents
74
Kalyvas, The Logic of Violence in Civil War, 204.
Hoti, Lëvizja nacionalçlirimtare në Prishtinë dhe rrethinë (1941-1945), 96.
76
Hoti, Lëvizja nacionalçlirimtare në Prishtinë dhe rrethinë (1941-1945), 96; Kalyvas, The Logic of Violence in
Civil War, 187.
77
Kalyvas, The Logic of Violence in Civil War, 204.
78
Kalyvas, The Logic of Violence in Civil War, 190.
79
Zbornik DNOR, Ser.I, vol.19, doc. 117.
75
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enjoy from medium to high control. The nascent of Partisan insurgent activity and their increased
capacity in manpower became evident in the middle of 1943, when their forces had advanced
from Northern Albania to establishing a relatively stable control over the Highlands of Gjakovë.
While the Italians were retreating from the Dukagjini Plain, the Partisans had established a
plexus of collaborators and ideological sympathizers, whose numbers were steadily increasing.80
The German military presence, which had already moved troops in Dukagjini Plain, was also
steadily on the rise particularly after decreeing Kosovo’s annexation to Albania.81 By midSeptember of 1943 the Germans had control of the three major municipalities in the Dukagjini
Plain, namely Pejë, Gjakovë and Prizren.
Calculating these developments, the Partisans initiated an attack against the approaching
German troops, who had already established control over the mainland in the region of Dukagjini
Plain. On the 10th of September the Partisan unit “Bajram Curri” attacked the German and Italian
troops as well as the Albanian Gendarmerie in order to gain control over Gjakovë. The offensive
lasted for two days, until the 12th of September, by which point the Partisans retreated having had
killed three Germans in action.82
At this point the Germans had established a fairly stable dominance over the Dukagjini Plain;
however the Highlands of Gjakovë proved to be a stronger bastion for the Partisans than the
Germans had anticipated. By December of 1944, the latter initiated a powerful attack against the
Partisans in the outskirts of Gjakovë in an attempt to establish complete control over the area. As a
result, 81 Partisans and 18 Germans were killed in action.83 The Partisan activity in the region of
Gjakovë continued throughout December, often times ending with the Partisans retreating in the
Highlands.84
The Partisan activity was overall successful in the highlands, but they never amassed to the
necessary strength for gaining control over the mainland. To achieve this task they had to
completely defeat the German troops in the mainland, which they managed to do only after the
Germans were retreating from the Balkans. Therefore, it has become clear that the German
incumbency was not extremely threatened by Partisan insurgency. The Partisan insurgency, on the
other hand, gradually increased but it never completely overthrew the German incumbency in the
main municipalities.
80
AIHP, NAW, box 1, T313, roll 486, 001265.
AIHP, NAW, box 1, T 313, roll 483, 000788.
82
Hadri, Lëvizja nacionalçlirimtare në Kosovë 1941-1945, 399.
83
AIHP, NAW, box 1, T78, roll 331, 00115. The document reports that another 400 Partisans, albeit
unaccounted for, were killed by Bandits, who are assumed to be either Chetniks or Albanian militias. However,
the number of the killed Partisans appears to be considerably higher than the assumed number of active
Partisans in the region during the time. A defeat of these proportions would have been devastating for the
Partisans, which would have made it highly unlikely for them to regain strength in the upcoming months.
84
AIHP, NAW, box 1, T 313, roll 486, 001265.
81
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4.3 Albanian militias
The formation of Albanian militias as auxiliary units for the Germans and Italians was quite
prevalent during the Axis occupation. They were primarily employed through providing weapons
for them, and distributing an extent of authority on the local level. However, Kalyvas argues that
militias represent a more political role rather than a military one. Their establishment is directly
related to the incumbents’ aspirations in enforcing their local rule. The employment of militias by
the incumbents is usually perceived as an installment of military auxiliary units, whose foremost
task is to help the incumbents with fighting opponents, however it is evident that the possibility of
militias providing information through surveying in regards to local insurgents strongly aids the
incumbents. In this context, the appearance of denunciation is directly correlated to the existence
of local militias, thus minimizing the possibility for defection amongst the locals. Hence, the
relevance of militias is directly related to the information variable, which would subsequently
solve the identification problem for incumbents.85 As a result, the latter would not have to resolve
to indiscriminate violence, which would further defection.86 The usage of militias in surveying and
monitoring the civilians could also be described as a means for defining complete control.87
The employment of Albanian militias by the Axis powers aided the latter greatly both in
fighting off Partisans, but also rounding up suspected insurgents. Some of these formations, like
the SS Skanderbeg Division, were part of the German strategy in counterinsurgency, and as such
were formed for the main task of fighting Partisans.88 The appearance of Albanian militias as
Italian and German auxiliaries, comply with Kalyvas’ observation that they represent a political
institution rather than a military one, which serves as means to strengthen the incumbent control
over an area. During the Axis occupation, the incumbents established several local militia
formations, some of which functioned for a longer period of time and some of which barely
managed to be organized and functional. The SS Skanderbeg Division, which was formed in
1944, operated in the area of Gjakovë, particularly the Highlands of Gjakovë, and the
Montenegrin border. Their most intense activity was throughout June and July of 1944, during
which they killed as many as 80 Partisans in the outskirts of Prishtinë.89 The SS Division was also
responsible for capturing around 131 Communists, who were imprisoned in the concentration
camp in Prishtina, which was built in June 1944. The prisoners were later executed.90 In a similar
spree of violence, the Kosovo Regiment had killed as many as 80-90 civilians in Pejë and its
vicinity in December of 1943.91 Similarly, in January of 1944 the Party’s District Committee for
the Dukagjini region reports that as many as 100 members of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia
were killed in Pejë, of whom only 3 were Albanian.92
85
Kalyvas, The Logic of Violence in Civil War, 107.
Kalyvas, The Logic of Violence in Civil War, 105.
87
Kalyvas, The Logic of Violence in Civil War, 218.
88
Melson, “German Counterinsurgency Revisited.”, 13.
89
Zbornik DNOR, Ser.XII, vol.4, doc. 84.
90
Hadri, Lëvizja nacionalçlirimtare në Kosovë 1941-1945, 331.
91
Zbornik DNOR, Ser.I, vol.19, doc.70; AIHP, NAW, box 1, T 313, roll 486, 000541.
92
Zbornik DNOR, Ser.I, vol.19, doc.93.
86
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During the same period in January of 1944, the Kosovo Regiment was also active in Kosovo
Valley, where reportedly they killed as many as 33 Albanians in Mitrovicë, Vushtrri (Vučitrn) and
Podujevë (Podujevo), who were believed to be involved with the National Liberation
Movement.93According to the numbers provided by reports from the Committee of the
Communist Party, it becomes evident that the Kosovo Regiment was very active in persecuting
Communists throughout the area where the Germans had control. The selective violence
perpetrated by Kosovo Regiment, serving as Germany’s auxiliary, adds veracity to the argument
that during the period of December 1943 and January 1944, the Germans had almost complete
control over Pejë, Mitrovicë, including Vushtrri and Podujevë, thus by fact deeming these two
municipalities as typical to zone 1. However, the particular selectiveness in targeting Serb
Communists develops as an independent pattern of violence which is not predicted by Kalyvas’
hypotheses.
4.4 Counterinsurgency and state organized violence
The emergence of Partisan activity instigated the Germans to employ counterinsurgency tactics in
fighting the Partisans. These tactics were developed early on in their occupation, from September
1941, which were taken into action after two orders were issued by Hitler, one of which was his
Directive No.31a to Field Marshal Wilhelm List to suppress the resistance movement in the
southeast. The second one was Hitler’s directive to suppress the “Communist Armed Resistance
Movements in Occupied Areas”, which were issued by the Armed Forces High Command under
the signature of Field Marshal Wilhelm Keitel.94
The order directed that for each German soldier killed one hundred hostages were to be
executed, and for each German soldier wounded fifty hostages would be executed.95 These orders
were brutally employed in Serbia proper.
As such, every attack against the Germans was
considered to origin from the Communist insurgency.96 German counterinsurgency operations
included attacking fixed insurgency locations, large-scale offensive operations, and small-scale
actions. The SS were also tasked with persecuting Jews.97 However, the influx of German
counterinsurgency actions in Kosovo did not increase until late 1943.
By the beginning of 1944 the major areas of combat were situated mostly in the Dukagjini Plain.
The Partisan activity grew steadily in these areas, mostly because they were gaining support from
civilians, with whom they did not have great cooperation up to this point, in contrast to the
Germans. An increase of bellicosity is observed in the Highlands of Gjakovë and the outskirts of
Prizren, where the Partisans had developed strong bastions.
93
Zbornik DNOR, Ser.I, vol.19, doc.93.
Jozo Tomasevich, War and Revolution in Yugoslavia, 1941-1945: The Chetniks (Stanford, California:
Stanford University Press, 1975), 146.
95
Zbornik DNOR, Ser.1, vol.1., doc.159.
96
Zbornik DNOR, Ser.1, vol.1., doc.159.
97
Charles D. Melson, “German Counterinsurgency in the Balkans: The Prinz Eugen Division Example 19421944.” The Journal of Slavic Military Studies 20, no.4 (2007): 715.
94
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A paragon of this situation would be the event on the 13th of February 1944, when the Germans
in collaboration with Chetniks and a group of Albanian volunteers under the orders of Shah Curri,
attacked the Partisan bastions in the hills of Has, an area in the proximity of Prizren, where they
killed 6 Partisans in action. The documents pertaining to the Committee of the Communist Party
of Yugoslavia do not specify how many incumbents were killed in action, but they specify that
this action caused for the Partisans to retreat from Has in Prizren.98 Inferring from these data, it
appears evident that the Partisans had control over mountainous terrain in early 1944, however the
Germans had control over plain territories, particularly the urban areas, more typical to control
zone 2. Kalyvas’ postulate regarding the emergence of indiscriminate violence in areas where
control levels are lower for incumbents is best observed with the attacks perpetrated by Albanian
militias, whose activity was most prevalent among the civilians in urban areas.99 The control shifts
between incumbents and insurgents in certain mountainous areas appears to have been alternated
throughout 1944, particularly in Kosovo Valley.
However, the main Partisan bastions such as the Highlands of Gjakovë, although perpetually
attacked, remained a stronghold for the Partisans until the end of the war. A major attack initiated
against the Partisans occurred on the 14th of February 1944, when the German troops besieged the
Partisan battalions “Skutari” and “Kosmeta” which were situated in the Highlands of Gjakovë. As
a result 18 Germans and 11 Partisans were killed in action, which lasted for a day after which
period the German troops retreated.100
An instance of control alternation can also be observed in this event, where the Germans
initiated an attack as a response to the Partisans’ increasing strength. The Highlands of Gjakovë
perpetually represented a zone controlled by the insurgents, and in 1944 it was a typical control
zone type 4, where incumbent attacks were common.
From February until September, the
Wehrmacht troops did not actively attack the Partisans, who throughout this period were starting
to gain strength in the Kosovo Valley. Instead, most of the attacks and violence at this period was
perpetrated by Albanian militias against civilians.
The Germans initiated another large scale attack against the Partisans in September 1944,
because the latter were gaining support rapidly in the city of Gjakovë as well as the villages
surrounding
Gjakovë.
These
events
correspond
with
Kalyvas’
prediction
regarding
counterinsurgency, which explains that the Germans would attack the Partisans in an attempt to
re-enforce their control over the surrounding villages of Gjakovë.101 Furthermore, According to a
report issued by the SS Skanderbeg division Commando, there were as many as 1500 Partisans in
the area during mid-February 1944.102 The high number of Partisans in the area complies with
98
Zbornik DNOR, ser.I, vol.19, doc. 12.
Kalyvas, The Logic of Violence in Civil War, 294.
100
Zbornik DNOR, Ser.I, vol.19, doc.117.
101
Kalyvas, The Logic of Violence in Civil War, 213.
102
AIHP, NAW, box 1, T354, roll 160, 3805944.
99
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Kalyvas’ observation that the insurgents will scatter and reestablish contact with clandestine cells
or collaborators in the villages.103
As a result of counterinsurgency tactics, the Germans fought off the Partisans throughout the
vicinity of Gjakovë and its highlands, where the former managed to kill as many as 104 Partisans
in action. According to the same report, 10 German soldiers were killed in this offensive.104 This
action caused significant damages to the Partisans in the area. However, the latter rapidly regained
strength and managed to reestablish their control over the Highlands of Gjakovë, and within
months they gained control over the major municipalities in Kosovo. In the discourse whether
Kosovo - as part of Greater Albania under the Nazi aegis, could have simultaneously been
Germany’s auxiliary in implementing its policies, seems to be an ample exaggeration of the
Albanian leaders’ authority and political impact on the region. Kosovo, a relatively small region,
was for the most part a peripheral, yet secure bastion for the Germans.
4.5 The rise of the Partisan movement and the challenges to German control
The Partisan insurgency operated primarily by creating civil unrest, civil disobedience and
creating riots. Their operations were characterized as a conduct of terrorist activities, which
sabotaged government and industry and by assassinating key political opponents.105 As such the
Yugoslav and Kosovar Partisans instigated similar insurgent activities throughout the duration of
their movement in Kosovo. Kosovar Partisan sabotaging techniques have been observed early on
in their activity, when members of the unit “Zenel Hajdini” sabotaged a small telepheric cable line
in German controlled area in 1942.106 Likewise, The Partisans were also involved in assassinating
the appointed leader of the Chetnik organization in Kosovo, Dr. Nikola Radijević, on the eve of
the 31 October of 1941.107
The formation of Partisan units began in 1941, however they were not particularly active well
until 1943. For the most part, the activity of members of the National Liberation Movement from
‘41 to ‘42 was perpetrated by armed men grouped in small crowds, and as such their activity was
sporadic. The first Albanian Partisan unit in Kosovo was formed on the 27th of September 1942,
and at that point it consisted of a dozen armed men.108 The unit was named “Zenel Hajdini”, and
operated throughout the region of Kosovo Valley.109 After approximately five months, by January
of 1943, the number of recruits fighting in this unit was increased. The unit was divided in two
103
Kalyvas, The Logic of Violence in Civil War, 213.
AIHP, NAW, box 1, T354, roll 160, 3805944.
105
Raymond M. Momboisse, Blueprint of Revolution: The Rebel, The Party, The Techniques of Revolt
(Springfield, Ill.: Thomas, 1970), 62.
106
Hadri, Lëvizja nacionalçlirimtare në Kosovë 1941-1945, 274.
107
Hoti, Lëvizja nacionalçlirimtare në Prishtinë dhe rrethinë (1941-1945), 87.
108
Velimir Terzić, Oslobodilački rat naroda Jugoslavije 1941-1945, vol. 2 (Beograd: Vojnoistorijski institut,
1963), 319.
109
Vahide Hoxha, ”Aradha Partizane ’Zenel Hajdini’” Kosova, no.9-10 (1980).
104
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groups, forming the new unit named “Emin Duraku”, which would, for the most part, operate
throughout the Dukagjini Plain. 110
During 1943, the National Liberation Army was rapidly gaining supporters, especially among
local Albanians. As a result, as many as three other units were created throughout different regions
in Kosovo. Other Partisan units were formed throughout 1943 and 1944 in areas outside of
Kosovo’s borders. The two main operative zones of the Partisans in Kosovo were composed of the
1st operative zone which encompassed the region Prizren–Kukës, Albania, and the 2nd operative
zone which corresponded with the Highlands of Gjakovë.111
However, these two zones represented the regions on which the Kosovar Albanian Partisan units
operated primarily, whereas further in the text analysis corresponds to the two main geographical
regions in Kosovo, which regions correspond with the development of Partisan activity in the
territory of Kosovo.112 The Highlands of Gjakovë were a Partisan bastion throughout the war,
however they remained a control type zone 4, where incumbent activity was observed for the most
part of 1943. Even during the German retreat instances of combat were recorded in the Highlands,
but it ultimately transformed to a control type zone 5 where the insurgents were in complete
control.
The Partisans started to strengthen their positions and increase the number of recruits and
supporters exponentially throughout 1944. Nevertheless, the Germans had firm control over most
of the cities well until late 1944. While the Partisan insurgency accounted for some attacks
throughout Kosovo during 1944, the major transformation of control started being apparent in
November of 1944. For example, in March of 1943, the Germans still maintained control over the
region of Kosovo Valley, albeit that the Partisan insurgency was becoming ever more apparent.
Sources indicate that on the 18th of March, a group of 50 Partisans were attempting to cross to
Jabllanicë in an attempt to join Partisan units situated in the area.113 However, en route to
Jabllanicë, the Partisans were spotted from what the sources indicate were Albanian militias, and
subsequently attacked. As a result, 27 Partisans were killed in action, 21 were taken prisoners and
only 2 managed to cross through to Jabllanicë.114 This event denotes a typical counterinsurgency
tactic adopted by the incumbents, where the idea was to attack Partisans before they construct base
camps.115
4.6 The German retreat and the Partisan victory
Inferring from the data which inform us about Partisan activity, it is presumable that at the
beginning of March 1944, the Partisans maintained a degree of control over the main mountainous
110
For the formation of Partisan units and their operation zones in Kosovo see Zbornik DNOR, Ser.I, vol.19,
doc.27, doc. 32, doc.49, doc.137.
111
AIHP, NAW, box 1, T 313, roll 208, 7470684.
112
For recorded insurgent activity see AIHP, NAW, box 1, T 313, roll 308, 7470683-84. See also Hadri, Lëvizja
nacionalçlirimtare në Kosovë 1941-1945, 398–400.
113
Ðurovic, Ustanak naroda Jugoslavije 1941: Zbornik, vol. I (Beograd: Vojno delo, 1964) 513.
114
Zbornik DNOR, Ser. I, vol, 20, doc. 131, 524.
115
Melson, “German Counterinsurgency Revisited.” 20.
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region in Dukagjini Plain, however the incumbents had control over the main routes and plains.
This indicates that in the early period of 1944 the region was divided in two main categories: zone
2, where the incumbents had a medium to highly organized military presence where sporadic
insurgent activity was reported, which included the plains; and the mountainous areas being
categorized as zone 4, where the insurgents had a medium to highly organized military presence,
with sporadic incumbent activity. This case partially fits Kalyvas’ third hypothesis, in which it is
postulated that violence perpetrated by incumbents is more likely to be indiscriminate in zones 2
and 4. Deducing from the data available pertaining to this event, it is indicative that the
incumbents were significantly selective in targeting Partisans, regardless how predisposed by
circumstantial conditions to induce direct violence against Partisans the incumbents might have
been.
Throughout the summer of 1944, the Allies initiated several aerial attacks against the main
municipalities under German control. On the 28th and 29th of June, the Allies bombed Prizren,
where as a result 50 civilians were counted as collateral victims. The attack heavily destroyed the
main roads from Prizren to Shkodër in Albania, Gjakovë and Suharekë (Suva Reka), which
subsequently hampered the agility in transportation for the German troops.116 In August the Allies
bombed Pejë, which attack killed as many as 1000 civilians and around 500 were left wounded.117
Although another aerial attack was initiated by the Allies in Mitrovicë in early September,118 the
bombing of Pejë by far had caused the most damage and killed the most civilians from any other
attack perpetrated by all belligerents involved in the war.
The direct involvement of the Allies in war against the Germans was a certain indicator that the
Partisans were rapidly gaining power and were very likely to end up as victors. Likewise, a
correlation could be drawn between the prevalence of grievances among the locals after the
bombings and the increased number of supporters for the Partisans.119 This occurrence
corresponds to Fearon’s and Laitin’s observation in which they state that “grievances are
necessary for the local population’s support of active rebels”.120
The subsequent attack of Partisans towards German troops in late August through which several
incumbents were killed also caused a retaliatory action from the Germans, who on the 30th of
August 1944 executed 10 Communists in Gjakovë, including Fahri Hoxha, the brother of the
116
Lidhja e Prizrenit, 2.7.1944.
AQSH, F.153, D. 141, fl.
118
Lidhja e Prizrenit, 10.9.1944.
119
Izber Hoti, Çështja e Kosovës gjatë Luftës së Dytë Botërore (Prishtinë, Kosovë: Instituti i Historisë –
Prishtinë, 1997), 60. Vickers contends that because most Albanians knew that Germany was on the brink of
defeat, they considered the National Liberation Movement their chief enemy, however German sources, and the
overall observable development of support towards the National Liberation Movement, contend otherwise. It
should also be taken into account that by leading a small-scale war, the Communists aspired to incite an
international intervention which could subsequently be used as an “anti-imperialist” propaganda and thus
generate supporters. See Chalmers Johnson, Revolution and the Social System (Stanford, Calif.: Hoover
Institution on War, Revolution, and Peace, Stanford University, 1964), 62.
120
James D. Fearon and David D. Laitin, “Ethnicity, Insurgency, and Civil War.,” 13.
117
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initiator of the said attack, Fadil Hoxha.121As predicted, the selective violence exercised by the
Germans proves that they continued to enjoy control over Gjakovë. However, the retaliatory
measures taken by the Germans furthered the grievance among the local population. Conversely, it
was not such a simple or a rapid task for the Partisans to gain control on the local level, despite the
growing level of support they were receiving from the local population. This is also exemplified
through their attacks on civilians, who arguably were collaborating with the incumbents. In
September of 1944 the Partisans initiated indiscriminate violence against civilians in a Chromium
ore mine in the vicinity of Gjakovë, where they kidnapped 40 miners.122 The area of Gjakovë and
its vicinity were under the control of incumbents, where sporadic, however not sequential,
insurgent activity was reported, which was typical for a control zone type 2. The appearance of
indiscriminate violence perpetrated by insurgents indicates that the case Gjakovë in September of
1944 complies with Kalyvas’ prediction that indiscriminate violence is more likely to be executed
by the political actor who lacks control.123
The incumbents at that point were still in control of the city; nonetheless, insurgency was slowly
strengthening in the rural areas of the city – which was not a customarily observed phenomenon –
unlike what was observed in the Highlands of Gjakovë. Furthermore, these observations also
suggest that because they lacked sufficient control over the territory, and in an attempt to establish
control, the Partisans conducted indiscriminate violence in this area. This observation corresponds
to Kalyvas’ second and third hypothesis, in which, among others, it is postulated that
indiscriminate violence perpetrated by insurgency will most likely occur in a zone where
incumbents are in relative control.124
The Partisan attacks on German troops retreating from the city of Gjakovë became ever more
prominent in December of 1944, by which time the latter had already retreated from most of the
cities in Kosovo Valley. On the 24th of December the 12th Partisan Division fought off retreating
fragments of the German Army in the vicinity of Gjakovë, where as a result 60 Partisans were
reported as killed in action, and numerous imprisoned.125 German sources report that another 120
Partisans were killed in combat throughout December in the outskirts of Gjakovë, however the
available documents do not provide information as to how many Germans were killed throughout
these combats.126 It is also evident that both Yugoslav and German sources seem to downplay
their losses, which is why in certain events it is difficult to determine which belligerent was on the
winning side. However, considering the chain of events throughout late 1944, it is evident that the
Germans already were on the brink of defeat.
The Partisans, however, were conspicuously not as strong in the Dukagjini Plain at this period,
mostly because the majority of non-Kosovar Partisan units were accruing in the region of Kosovo
121
AQSH, F. 153, D. 141, fl. 12
AIHP, NAW, box 1, T 311, roll 193, 000173. See also
123
Kalyvas, The Logic of Violence in Civil War, 204.
124
Kalyvas, The Logic of Violence in Civil War, 204.
125
AIHP, NAW, T311, roll 196, 0453.
126
AIHP, NAW, T311, roll 196, 000470-471.
122
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Valley to prevent the retreat of Army Group E. The Partisan insurgency was steadily gaining
strength in Kosovo Valley during the period of September-October of 1944, whereas as displayed
in the previous section, at the same period the insurgents were being actively attacked by the
incumbents in the Dukagjini Plain, respectively in the Highlands of Gjakovë.127 The events that
occurred during this period are interesting because they portray a parallel alternation of control
between insurgents and incumbents in both regions. The Partisans previously have had a stronger
presence in the Dukagjini Plain, particularly a strong bastion in the Highlands of Gjakovë,
whereas the Germans had a persistent control over the Kosovo Valley, especially in the
municipality of Mitrovicë and Prishtinë. By October of 1944, the Partisans had organized and
gained sufficient strength to outright attack German troops, as is best observed in the event of 7th
October of 1944 in the village of Rudnik in the municipality of Mitrovicë.
According to documents issued by the Commando of the Ibri detachment, 108 armed men
fighting on the side of the Germans were killed in action.128 Furthermore, the Partisans initiated
another attack against the Germans in Mitrovicë on the 9th of October, where the former assaulted
one German wagon carrying artillery, which attack resulted in 19 Germans dying.129 By May of
1944 the Allies were defeating the Germans evermore on the Western Front. Similarly, the Red
Army had overthrown the Germans in the Baltic States, and by August of the same year the Red
Army infiltrated Romania. By October of 1944 Germany was withdrawing the troops of the Army
Group E from Greece, Macedonia and Albania.
Throughout May and June the German military presence was increasing steadily in Kosovo
Valley. However, considering that the Germans were retreating and not planning to station in the
region, the Partisans had favorable conditions to attack the German troops. At this point the
Bulgarians under the orders of a pro-Communist government had also joined the Allies in
combating the Germans.130 Three Bulgarian Armies advanced from Sofia, through Niš and Skopje
to block the retreating of German troops. On the 19th of October the 2nd Bulgarian Army fought
alongside the 2nd Proletarian Division in Merdarë (Merdare), in the region of Podujevë, against
the 22nd German Infantry Division and local Albanian volunteers. The German losses
outnumbered the Partisan ones, where 59 Germans and 8 Partisans were killed in action, whereas
20 were wounded and 15 others were missing.131
Despite the losses that the Partisans endured during this event, the Partisans managed to take
control of most of the region by organizing tenacious attacks on the remaining German troops,
Albanian militia and volunteers. Nevertheless, the latter managed to somehow deflect Partisans
from attacking the retreating troops, in a combat that lasted from the 28th until the 29th of
October, when the 24th Serbian Partisan Division attacked the Albanian militias who were
127
Izber Hoti, Forcat e armatosura në Kosovë 1941-1945 (Prishtinë: Instituti i Historisë – Prishtinë, 1998), 45.
Zbornik DNOR, ser.I, vol.19, doc.203.
129
Zbornik DNOR, ser.I, vol.19, doc.203.
130
AIHP, NAW, box 1, T 311, roll 191, 51-52.
131
Zbornik DNOR, Ser.I, vol.14, doc. 109;
128
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securing the axis Bujanoc (Bujanovac) – Kërshi Uglarit (Ugljarski Krš). As a result, 250
Albanians and 118 Partisans were killed in action, whereas 350 Albanians and 209 Partisans were
wounded.132 By November of 1944, the Germans had retreated from Mitrovicë, Prishtinë and
Lipjan which resulted in these territories being under complete control of the Partisans, thusly
corresponding to control zones of type 4.The shift in control between the incumbents and
insurgents becomes increasingly evident in October of 1944, especially in the region of Kosovo
Valley.
The tactical military withdrawal of German troops paved the way for the Partisans to take
control of the previously German controlled regions. However, even after the Germans completely
withdrew their troops from Kosovo, the Partisans were fighting the remaining Albanian militias
and other Albanian nationalist groups.
This phenomenon corresponds greatly with Wickham-Crowley and Kalyvas’ observations
regarding the process of gaining control by the insurgents, where they state that it is common that
the insurgents “show up in areas and times of weak government control”.133Nevertheless, after the
German troops retreated from Kosovo, the Communist Party of Yugoslavia initiated the attempts
of establishing administrative control over the territory. The Albanian militias who until late 1944
were fighting alongside the German troops had either deserted or had been captured and
imprisoned by Partisans. Some nationalist groups, however, continued fighting the Partisans well
until April of 1945.
Combat between the Partisans and the Albanian nationalists was evident in Janjevë (Janjevo), in
the vicinity of Lipjan, in December of 1944, during which month the 16th Division of the Army of
Yugoslavia, brigades 26 and 27, fought against Albanians who collaborated with the Germans. As
a result, throughout December, around 40 Albanians and 7 soldiers of the National Liberation
Army were killed in action. During February of 1945, the Partisans managed to defeat the
Albanian nationalists who operated in the region of Drenicë, where as a result the Partisans killed
as many as 272 Albanians.134
During the same month the Partisans managed to defeat Shaban Polluzha’s unit, which signified
the collapse of the Albanian nationalists in Drenicë.135 In April of 1945 the Partisans defeated the
last unit of Albanian nationalists situated in Kabash (Kabaš) during which action 3 Partisans and 4
Albanians were killed.136 After this action, the Partisans had complete territorial control over
Kosovo. The retreat of German troops signified the liberation of these territories from the
Germans. The Partisans were thusly considered the victors and the areas as liberated.
132
Zbornik DNOR, Ser.I, vol.15, doc. 180.
Kalyvas, The Logic of Violence in Civil War, 216; Timothy P. Wickham-Crowley, Exploring Revolution:
Essays on Latin American Insurgency and Revolutionary Theory (Armonk, N.Y.: M.E. Sharpe, 1991), 35.
134
Hoti, Forcat e armatosura në Kosovë 1941-1945, 169.
135
See also Zbornik DNOR, Ser. II, vol. 15, doc. 69.
136
Hoti, Forcat e armatosura në Kosovë 1941-1945, 176.
133
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This phenomenon complies greatly with Kalyvas’ observation that this terminology is typical
for insurgent controlled areas.137 However, the transition from German occupation to Partisan
dominion was quite violent. The Partisan units terrorized civilians under the pretext that they had
fought alongside German troops. For instance, during November of 1944 in the vicinity of
Vushtrri, they killed as many as 22 civilians, looted their homes and raped the women. During
December the 17th Macedonian brigade executed 50 people in Ferizaj, whereas in Gjilan and the
villages in the vicinity they killed as many as 35 people.138
Violence against civilians was prevalent also in Prizren, where the 2nd Kosovar brigade shot 70
men.139 These examples are in junction with Kalyvas’ prediction that indiscriminate violence will
be highest in territories where insurgents are in complete control if they lack necessary
information for selective targeting.140
5. Conclusion
The primary focus of research in this paper has been the study of strategic violence as exercised
by the three main political actors in Kosovo during the Second World War. The prevailing
paradigm has been that violence was used as an instrument to generate collaboration, in which
case the excessive use of indiscriminate violence has caused defection and has henceforth been
counterproductive. Under this premise, it has been hypothesized that the more control an actor
establishes over a region, the less likely it is for that actor to use indiscriminate violence. Under
this assumption, violence should gradually shift from indiscriminate to selective in correlation to
the level of control an actor acquires.
In analyzing the patterns of control as exercised from different political actors, it has become
apparent that during the period of 1941-1943, when it was previously believed that the Italians had
more control over Kosovo – presumably because they had established administrative control over
a larger territory of Kosovo in comparison to Germany – they had in fact notably less control. This
conclusion has been surmised through noticing the patterns of insurgent activity in Italian
controlled areas, while also establishing that the Italians did not have an abundant military
presence, especially in comparison to the Germans. The data suggest that the Italian occupation
was characterized with a prevalence of grievance among the local population, which was caused
by the former’s employment of indiscriminate violence. These occurrences subsequently raised
the likelihood that the population would endorse insurgency in contrast to incumbency. The data
mapped so far seem to suggest that the local population in the Dukagjini Plain was more
welcoming of the insurgency than the incumbency, which might help explain why the Partisans’
main bastions were situated in the Dukagjini Plain during the period 1941-1943. Similarly it is
137
Kalyvas, The Logic of Violence in Civil War, 219.
Muhamet Shatri, Kosova në Luftën e Dytë Botërore, 1941-1945 (Prishtinë, 1997), 230.
139
Shatri, Kosova në Luftën e Dytë Botërore, 1941-1945, 234.
140
Kalyvas, The Logic of Violence in Civil War, 113.
138
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noted how during this period the Germans exerted selective violence on civilians by persecuting a
select number of Communists, whereas the Italians persecuted in large numbers, while also
arguably targeting Communists. The results comply with Kalyvas’ theory regarding the
interaction between control and violence.141
This is best observed in the context of German incumbency and areas where they exercised
complete control. The German incumbency was highly selective in targeting Communists, with
one possible exception that occurred in February 1943, when they incarcerated 280 civilians. To
similar phenomena Kalyvas’ argues that selectiveness is still employed, albeit under a “secondary
profiling”, by which the incumbents target military aged men.142 Similarly, Kalyvas’ theory
complies with the observations pertaining to Italian incumbency, where it has become apparent
that in areas where they lacked control they exercised indiscriminate violence.
This phenomenon is best observed in Pejë and Gjakovë, whereas in areas where they were in
complete control such as Prizren, the Italian incumbency did not exercise neither selective nor
indiscriminate violence.
Evidence suggests that drastic alternations of control between
incumbents and insurgents occurred during the period from September 1943 until April 1945.
While the German incumbency maintained a relatively stable control during the period 19431944, the increased activity of insurgency destabilized the level of control that the Germans
attempted to maintain. Conversely, the Partisans gradually took territorial control over Kosovo;
however, they did not gain complete control until the Germans retreated.
Even after the Germans retreated, the Partisans were still fighting with the local nationalists who
were opposing them. Similarly, collaboration between the local population and incumbency varied
in relation to the level of control that the incumbency enjoyed. During the period from 1941 to
1943 collaboration between the local population and incumbency remained relatively the same –
with the collaborators remaining loyal from the beginning of the occupation. Conversely,
collaboration seems to have been equally prevalent in both Italian and German incumbency,
whereas it has become apparent that Italian incumbency did not have complete control over its
designated area. Contrarily, evidence seems to suggest that collaboration between the local
population and the Partisans increased linearly in relation to the latter’s consolidation from 1943
to 1945. These observations are in conform to Kalyvas’ hypothesis regarding the juncture of
collaboration and control, in which he postulates that “the higher the level of control exercised by
a political actor, the higher the level of civilian collaboration with this political actor will be”.143
Lastly, violent events as predicted were more apparent in mountainous terrain and less so in urban
areas. In conclusion, it has become evident that the intent of establishing and maintaining control
and the eventual inability to do so, dictated the fluctuation of violent outbursts throughout the
territory of Kosovo.
141
142
Kalyvas, The Logic of Violence in Civil War, 204.
Kalyvas, The Logic of Violence in Civil War, 187.
143
Kalyvas, The Logic of Violence in Civil War, 111.
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6. References
Archival sources
Archives at the Institute of History in Prishtinë
AIHP, NAW, Dokumente të Luftës së Dytë Botërore.
AIHP, NAW, Dokumente të Arkivit Ushtarak në Beograd.
Albanian National Archives
Fondi 153
Fondi 155
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