Download circumpolar cooperation at the arctic council`s iqaluit ministerial 2015

UNIVERSITY OF WASHINGTON ARCTIC LAW & POLICY INSTITUTE
MAY 27, 2015
CIRCUMPOLAR COOPERATION
AT THE ARCTIC COUNCIL’S IQALUIT MINISTERIAL 2015
Adam Patrick Murray1
The Arctic Council issues a new declaration every two years, at a Ministerial
meeting in which the chairmanship of the organization passes from one member country to
another. With the chair comes the opportunity to define the Council’s themes from one
Ministerial to the next. The declarations tend to echo the previous year’s document, although
shifting themes yield just enough difference to discern subtle directional change. The 2013
Kiruna Declaration was an exception. As Canada took the helm, a word that appeared only
twice since 1996 became central: business. This word does not appear in the 2015 Iqaluit
Declaration marking the start of the United States chair.
The U.S. theme of “One Arctic” reflects the Obama Administration’s decision to use
its Arctic Council chair as an opportunity to raise global climate change awareness. The idea
behind the slogan, as expressed by Secretary of State John Kerry at the Ministerial, is that
the “entire world shares a responsibility to protect, to respect, to nurture, and to promote the
region.” The United States has three focus areas: improving economic and living conditions
for Arctic communities; Arctic Ocean safety, security, and stewardship; and addressing the
impacts of climate change. The Iqaluit Declaration 2015, and its companion Senior Arctic
Officials’ Report (SAO Report), outline how the United States’ theme will contribute to the
well-being Arctic people, land, and seas.
Preliminary Points
First, news reports that raise alarms about Russia’s Arctic buildup ushering in an
“ice-cold war” largely miss the point. Still, the Ministerial evidenced some deterioration in
the Arctic Council’s general immunity from Russia’s Ukraine-related tension with other
member States.
Regarding the missed point, the buildup should surprise no one. Russia’s Arctic
coastline is 15 times longer than Alaska’s. Roughly half of all Arctic residents are Russian.
Russia has more territory above the Arctic Circle than any other nation. The Northern Sea
Route (NSR) along Russia’s northern coastline is already viable for some kinds of shipping.
And some amount of Russia’s Arctic endeavors respond directly to Arctic Council
initiatives (e.g. improving preparedness and response along the NSR, including exercises
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Adam Murray is the Arctic Law & Policy Institute Research Fellow at the University of Washington School
of Law. His work concentrates on the environmental, maritime, and international legal issues related to the
rapidly changing Arctic. He can be reached at [email protected].
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and conferences).
Nevertheless, Canada has been a harsh critic of Russia’s Crimea annexation. Perhaps
in response, Russia sent its minister of natural resources and the environment to the Iqaluit
Ministerial, not its foreign minister who would be more equivalent to the other diplomats in
attendance. Leona Aglukkaq, Canada’s outgoing chairwoman, used the Ministerial as an
opportunity to confront Russia. No one who watches the Arctic Council very closely
suggests these hairline fractures threaten to crumble Arctic cooperation. Neither should they
be entirely discounted, particularly because sanctions have certainly complicated Russia’s
pursuit of Arctic development.
Second, the Arctic Council almost defies summary. It produces bona fide results
across 84 initiatives. These range from the creation of an Arctic moss and lichen checklist,
through strengthening the pastoralist livelihood of Russian nomadic herders, to the
successful implementation of legally-binding agreements on Arctic Search and Rescue, and
Marine Oil Pollution Preparedness and Response. Nevertheless, some 2015 Declaration
items stand out.
Reaffirming a Commitment to Work Together to Limit the Increase in Global Average
Temperature to Below Two Degrees Celsius
An uncomfortable tension sits at the heart of Arctic law and policy. According to the
Iqaluit Declaration 2015, the Arctic will continue to warm at twice the global average rate as
a direct result of greenhouse gas emissions. Yet many who live and work in the Arctic look
to oil and gas development as the best way out of their condition of relative deprivation.
Growing the Arctic extractive industry will necessarily advance the climate crisis because its
root cause is carbon consumption. The Iqaluit Declaration 2015 acknowledges “that
reducing greenhouse gas emissions continues to be the most important contribution to
addressing global and Arctic climate change and to the long-term conservation and
sustainability of the unique Arctic environment.” If there is an Arctic “way of life” worth
protecting, burning fossil fuels is its antithesis.
The Arctic Council answers this conundrum by pledging to work toward an
international agreement designed to keep global warming under two degrees Celsius above
pre-industrial levels. This commitment first appeared in the 2011 Nuuk Declaration. In the
2015 Iqaluit Declaration it has matured into a specific pledge to work toward an “effective,
ambitious, durable international agreement in Paris in December 2015 that is applicable to
all….” This corresponds to President Obama’s November 2014 Joint Announcement on
Climate Change with China and his general focus on the issue. Some Arctic analysts point
out the dichotomy between this pledge and the Administration’s final approval of Shell’s
2015 Arctic drilling plans. Those criticisms downplay Shell’s purchased right to explore in
the Arctic, and the tremendous hurdles the Obama Administration has placed in their path.
But the point is well-taken. Using existing technology, global warming cannot stay below
two degrees Celsius unless we leave some fossil fuels in the ground. According to a 2014
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study, the relatively high-risk and pristine Arctic Ocean is probably the first place that
should be left alone if the commitment is real.
No Arctic Council initiatives directly furthered this pledge during the Canadian
chair, and some seem to contradict it. For example, the SAO Report indicates that under
Canada’s chair the Council established a task force on Arctic marine oil pollution prevention
(TFOPP). Norway and Russia, the Arctic’s most active extraction states, co-chaired the task
force, and invited input from the Association of Oil and Gas Producers and the International
Association of Drilling Contractors. The task force delivered a Framework Plan for
Cooperation on Prevention of Oil Pollution from Petroleum and Maritime Activities in the
Marine Areas of the Arctic. The Plan is an important step in protecting Arctic communities
and environments from oil pollution. It also makes further oil exploration, and thus
increased greenhouse gas emissions, more likely.
Under the U.S. Chair, the TFOPP’s work appears to end. “Implementation of the
Framework Plan is left in the hands of the appropriate and competent national authorities in
each State.” In a more direct relation to the climate pledge, the Arctic Monitoring and
Assessment Program (AMAP) “has been requested to support relevant activities under
international bodies” (such as the U.N. Framework Convention on Climate Change, among
others) by contributing Arctic information regarding various climate and pollution
indicators.
Exploring Ways to Improve Telecommunications in the Arctic
Improving Arctic telecommunication infrastructure resurfaced in the 2015
Declaration, after previously appearing only in the 2002 Inari Declaration. The current
statement expresses this as important to Arctic communities, science, navigation, and
emergency response. Under the U.S. Chair, the Arctic Council will create a Task Force on
Telecommunications Infrastructure in the Arctic (TFTIA). The task force will deliver an
assessment in 2017 including recommendations for public-private partnerships to enhance
access and service. The SAO Report admits the assessment may take longer, and that the
“eventual build-out of an Arctic-wide telecom infrastructure is a long-term, multi-year
endeavor.”
Improve Health, Mental Wellness, and Resilience in Arctic Communities
Canada’s theme of “Development for the People of the North” emphasized
Northerner’s health issues. The Arctic Monitoring and Assessment Programme (AMAP)
human health assessment group evaluated and reported on the Arctic health effects of
various environmental contaminants. The report urges Arctic Council leadership on
international pollution control agreements which most member States have not ratified, or
adopted only piecemeal (specifically, the Stockholm and Minimata Conventions). The
Sustainable Development Working Group (SDWG) focused on the human dimension of the
Arctic, with projects on mental wellness and resilience, climate change adaptation,
integrating traditional and local knowledge, promotion of Arctic indigenous languages,
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reindeer herding, gender equality, and cancer.
Much of this work continues and expands under the U.S. chair. For example, the
SDWG will institutionalize a new practice, One Health that aims to “assess health issues at
the interface between humans, animals and ecosystems.” The RISING SUN project will
establish common metrics for evaluating suicide prevention efforts. Other projects address
freshwater supply, sanitation, food production, and Arctic indigenous youth.
The Council will also develop a new, pan-Arctic network of climate change
indicators, building on the efforts of the United States Global Climate Change Research
Program. The new Climate Change Indicator System for the Arctic (CCISA) will track
changes in key physical, biological, social, and economic effects related to climate change.
A Final Scientific Report on Arctic Resilience (due May 2016), will show how choices
made in one domain may influence other domains. This may shed some light on the core
tension between competing desires for economic development but also preservation of
Arctic ecosystems and traditional ways of life, by indicating—for example—how increased
oil and gas activity might influence the status of animals important to subsistence users.
Promote Circumpolar Collaboration on Renewable Energy and Energy Efficiency
Secretary Kerry’s Ministerial remarks emphasized that clean energy is the solution to
climate change. He said, “If we got the whole world to embrace clean energy choices
rapidly, we can meet our two-degree target.” Perhaps addressing the Canadian emphasis on
business, Kerry also said clean energy “happens to be the world’s biggest market. It will
make many people rich.”
The Arctic Council will support an Arctic Energy Summit in Fairbanks, Alaska
during September 2015. The summit draws together industry executives, government
agency officials, policy makers, researchers, energy professionals, and community leaders to
produce a report for the SDWG on Arctic energy issues. The United States will also lead a
project to develop a modular system that pairs renewable energy technology with the
common, much-maligned diesel generators to power micro-grid energy systems in small
Arctic communities. Kerry’s remarks and the SAO Report squarely target diesel-based
electrical systems as a scourge to be eliminated. The SAO Report suggests that the Council
will add more renewable energy projects before the next Ministerial.
Promote Food Security
Food security is a critical issue because so many Arctic inhabitants subsist on
nutritional sources threatened by climate change. As the ice recedes, traditional foods
derived from ice-dependent animals becomes scarcer. Pollutants like Mercury render other
sources unhealthy to consume. In fact, the AMAP human health assessment addressed an
emerging increased risk of animal-borne infectious diseases. Some projects during the next
biennium seek to mitigate the effects of pollution on existing food supplies. For example,
one project aims to apply new mercury emission control technology to coal-fired power
plants. Another will demonstrate the environmentally sound destruction of obsolete
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pesticides. Other projects attempt to protect or expand the Arctic food supply. The Salmon
Rivers Peoples’ Project intends to assess the status of salmon in three circumpolar Arctic
rivers. There are initiatives to support reindeer herding and subsistence hunting. One project
aims to assess and develop the Arctic as a food-producing region.
Implement the Framework for Action on Enhanced Black Carbon and Methane
Emissions Reductions
According to the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, “Black carbon is the most
strongly light-absorbing component of particulate matter, and is formed by the incomplete
combustion of fossil fuels, biofuels, and biomass.” AMAP produced a 2011 Report that
details the complex, climate-related feedback loops created by black carbon (BC) deposits in
the Arctic. Part of the problem in raising awareness about climate change processes is how
technical and complicated true explanations become, and this report is no exception.
Nevertheless, the Arctic Council seems poised to make serious progress on black carbon and
methane emissions.
A task force developed the Framework for Action on Enhanced Black Carbon and
Methane Emissions Reductions during the Canadian chair. The SAO Report describes the
Framework as “a common vision with enhanced, ambitious, national and collective action to
accelerate the decline in our overall black carbon emissions and to significantly reduce our
overall methane emissions.” It asks member States to report on and reduce their BC and
methane emissions, encourages action by Arctic Council Observer States, and pledges the
member States to work toward actions in other international and regional forums.
The framework also repeats a cautionary statement from the AMAP report:
“reducing anthropogenic carbon dioxide emissions remains the most important challenge to
address global and Arctic climate change.” In other words, action on black carbon matters,
but it should not distract from the larger problem of CO2 emissions. Also, the SAO Report
includes a Russian “interpretation” of the Framework that emphasizes its voluntary nature
and flexible implementation.
Specific mitigation projects during the Canadian chair studied the impact of wood
burning stoves and diesel engines, and demonstrated that upgrades to Murmansk buses
resulted in a 90 percent decrease in their black carbon emissions.
The U.S. leadership appears to take BC action even further. Multiple initiatives will
expand on the Murmansk bus project, replacing BC-intensive diesel systems with cleaner
technology at mines, reindeer farms, and power plants. A number of assessment,
communication, and outreach activities will be compiled and catalogued to provide a “onestop-shop” for people seeking information on the mitigation of BC and other contaminants.
A significant portion of this action must take place in Russia, where the Council has
identified off-road diesel consumption as a primary contributor to Arctic BC pollution.
Russia’s interpretation of the Framework could weaken its implementation; and the Arctic
States’ thus-far impressive ability to compartmentalize Ukraine-related tensions remains
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crucial.
Further Cooperation on Oil Spill Preparedness and Response
Another major Framework Plan, delivered at the Ministerial and briefly discussed
above, addresses cooperative efforts to prevent oil pollution from extractive and shipping
activities. The objective is to strengthen cooperation and information exchange to protect the
Arctic marine environment from oil pollution. Beyond information sharing, “The
Participants intend to carry out impact assessments—in accordance with their national
legislation (laws and regulations) and, as appropriate, policies—including environmental
impact and risk assessments,” to protect and conserve the Arctic marine environment,
wildlife, and ecosystems. Also, to “explore coordination of hydrography and mapping
surveys to improve the safety of Arctic shipping,” and to “develop a catalogue of existing
resources (tug boats, tow packages, ship arrestors, mooring buoys, etc.)” that might
contribute to marine safety.
The Emergency Prevention, Preparedness and Response Working Group (EPPR)
produced a 185-page Guide to Oil Spill Response in Snow and Ice Conditions in
conjunction with the International Maritime Organization (IMO). EPPR intends the guide to
serve as a resource to help spill responders rapidly select and apply the most effective
response strategy. It encompasses both planning and preparation for Arctic drilling
operations, and response and implementation during an active spill. The Guide indicates a
need to plan for the credible worst-case scenario, however unlikely, and time a response
within the seasonal ice and snow cycle. It also reports that ice can extend the available
response time and protect shorelines by trapping oil in a close to fresh state. Nevertheless,
the Guide acknowledges that the Arctic’s harsh climate and remote location can severely
limit the effectiveness of containment and recovery processes used in temperate areas. In
situ burning may be the default response strategy, to maximize use of limited operational
windows and minimize the requisite personnel.
Canada hosted an exercise of the Agreement on Cooperation on Marine Oil Pollution
Preparedness and Response in the Arctic (MOSPA) in 2014. The United States plans to
carry out a second exercise in 2016. Member States will submit spill scenarios, from with
EPPR will select one for a live exercise designed to test the Agreement and Operational
Guidelines Notification and Request for Assistance procedures.
Sustain Arctic Biodiversity
The Declaration notes with concern “that Arctic biodiversity is being degraded and
that climate change is the most serious threat.” The Conservation of Arctic Flora and Fauna
working group (CAFF) develops projects to “resolve challenges arising from trying to
conserve the natural environment and permit regional growth.” Its cornerstone is the 678page 2013 Arctic Biodiversity Assessment (ABA), which included 17 recommended
actions. CAFF’s work on these actions follows an implementation plan for 2013 to 2021.
Much of the work completed during the Canadian chair expanded CAFF’s data monitoring
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and reporting capacities. For example, the Arctic Biodiversity Data Service “is an on-line,
data management system which allows integration of Arctic biodiversity information from
the Arctic Biodiversity Assessment, Circumpolar Biodiversity Monitoring Program, other
Arctic Council programs and other international data-management initiatives.” The Arctic
Migratory Bird Initiative (AMBI) included concrete actions to recover declining populations
of priority species, and delivered a four-year work plan to improve conservation across four
flyways.
CAFF projects expand during the U.S. chair, to address: mainstreaming biodiversity,
reducing stressors on migratory birds, ecosystem services evaluation, communications and
outreach, climate adaptation, invasive species, critical area protection, traditional and local
knowledge, and indicator development. The projected work continues to emphasize
gathering and disseminating data. A key activity led by the United States is the development
of a global vegetation map of the circumboreal forest biome, recognizing the boreal region
as a single geo-ecosystem with a common set of cultural, political, and economic issues.
Develop a Pan-Arctic Network of Marine Protected Areas
The Arctic Council itself represents a recognition that the diverse countries above the
Arctic Circle are inextricably linked by a network of connections that derive significantly
from a common ocean. These connections can manifest in multiple realms: political
(competing claims to the North Pole seabed), cultural (Inuit heritage across Greenland,
Canada, and Alaska), and economic (migratory fish stocks). They necessarily manifest in
transboundary environmental impacts. The collapse of a Beaufort Sea ecosystem may be
quickly felt across the Arctic Ocean in the Barents Sea, and vice versa.
The Protection of the Arctic Marine Environment work group (PAME) developed a
Framework for a Pan-Arctic Network of Marine Protected Areas during the Canadian chair.
Its purpose is “to protect and restore marine biodiversity, ecosystem function and special
natural features, and preserve cultural heritage and subsistence resources for present and
future generations.” The Framework recognizes that a network of Marine Protected Areas
(MPAs) provides the spatial links and connectivity necessary to spread the risk of collapse
in the event of localized disasters. Building from the data accumulated under CAFF, the
Framework establishes guidelines and recommendations to assist individual member States
in identifying and creating MPAs that most effectively promote ecosystem stability and
recovery throughout the Arctic. With regard to the high seas, where the Arctic States don’t
have the authority to establish MPAs, PAME recommended Arctic States pursue a
Particularly Sensitive Sea Area (PSSA) designation at the International Maritime
Organization. “No Arctic State embraced this recommendation.” This reflects the Arctic
States’ persistent assertion that the Arctic can be effectively governed, protected, and
developed without new international legal regimes (with the significant exception of the
mandatory Polar Code).
During the U.S. chair, both PAME and CAFF will work to implement the
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Framework. This involves analyzing existing Arctic MPAs to identify gaps, buffer zones,
and priorities; and mapping areas with special potential as MPAs (high species density,
unique diversity, particularly important for sensitive life stages). The Arctic Council will
also emphasize stakeholder engagement in MPA development, through the project
Meaningful Engagement of Indigenous Peoples and Local Communities in Marine
Activities (MEMA).
Raise Awareness of Ocean Acidification
Secretary Kerry’s Ministerial remarks pointed out that “incomprehensibly, ocean
acidification is often an overlooked impact of climate change.” He said scientists predict
that, by the end of the century, Arctic waters will become too corrosive to support shellbuilding species, a critical component of the unusually simple Arctic marine food web. The
Arctic Ocean is also particularly vulnerable to acidification as a result of its unique
geographic, biological, and chemical traits. This issue has been on the Arctic Council’s radar
since at least the 2004 Reykjavik Declaration. The 2013 Kiruna Declaration recognized that
carbon dioxide emission reductions are the only effective way to mitigate ocean
acidification.
The Arctic Monitoring and Assessment Program (AMAP) released a 2013 Report on
Arctic Ocean acidification, a companion video, and a Summary for Policymakers. The
assessment identified global carbon dioxide emissions as the primary driver of acidification,
and the recommended actions are similarly global in scope: (1) urge Member States,
Observer countries, and the global society to reduce the emission of carbon dioxide as a
matter of urgency; (2) call for enhanced research and monitoring; (3) urge Member States to
implement adaptation strategies that address all aspects of Arctic change, including
acidification, tailored to local and societal needs.
The Iqaluit SAO Report indicates very little acidification progress during the
Canadian chair. During the U.S. chair, AMAP will place more focus on developing case
studies in specific areas. It will also update the 2013 assessment with new information on
the extent and effects of acidification, deliverable at the 2017 Ministerial. The Task Force on
Arctic Marine Cooperation will consider whether a new cooperative mechanism should
promote and coordinate scientific research on acidification, among other problems.
Secretary Kerry pledged that “during our chairmanship, we’re going to call on every Arctic
and observer state to join the Global Ocean Acidification Observer Network to facilitate
greater monitoring of Arctic waters.” The December 2015 Conference of Parties to the UN
Conference on Climate Change will indicate whether any of this translates into action.
Arctic Marine Strategic Plan (2015-2025)
The Protection of the Arctic Marine Environment working group (PAME) delivered
the first Arctic Marine Strategic Plan (AMSP) at the Reykjavik Ministerial in 2004. It
guided related Arctic Council initiatives from 2005–2015, under the vision of “A healthy
and productive Arctic Ocean and coasts that support environmental, economic and
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sociocultural values for current and future generations.”
The new Arctic Marine Strategic Plan for 2015–2025, approved at the 2015
Ministerial, has four goals: (1) improve knowledge of the Arctic marine environment, and
continue to monitor and assess current and future impacts on Arctic marine ecosystems; (2)
conserve and protect ecosystem function and marine biodiversity to enhance resilience and
the provision of ecosystem services; (3) promote safe and sustainable use of the marine
environment, taking into account cumulative environmental impacts; and (4) enhance the
economic, social and cultural well-being of Arctic inhabitants, including indigenous peoples
and strengthen their capacity to adapt to changes in the Arctic marine environment.
The AMSP addresses the core development/conservation tension head on.
Oil and gas production, mining, shipping, fishing, aquaculture and tourism is
already taking place in the Arctic and can further facilitate social and
economic development of the Arctic communities through increased
infrastructure investment, increased tax revenues for local and state budgets
and other ripple effects such as increased employment. Although increased
shipping, petroleum activity and extraction of minerals represent important
opportunities for the Arctic communities, this also entails environmental and
social challenges that must be handled in the best possible way. The Arctic is
already a major recipient of chemical pollutants, such as mercury and
persistent organic pollutants (POPs) carried to the Arctic by long range
atmospheric winds and ocean currents. Arctic ecosystems and the Arctic
peoples are exposed to these pollutants through the food chain at levels that
are of concern to environment and health authorities.
PAME updated the AMSP during the Canadian chair, after input from other Arctic
Council working groups, with an emphasis on economic, social, and cultural well-being.
The report identifies Ecosystem Based Management (EBM) as the cornerstone of Arctic
Council efforts, incorporating sustainable development concepts, the precautionary
approach, and the polluter pays principle. The Plan sets out a range of 40 possible actions,
some of which are already underway within PAME or other working groups. It is not clear
from the Ministerial documents which actions will see substantive progress during the
United States chair. The SAO Report says, “PAME will undertake implementation of the
Arctic Marine Strategic Plan (2015–2025): Implementation plan to be developed during the
period 2015–2017, and the aim is that specific activities will become integral [sic] part of
future PAME work plans as approved at the biennial Arctic Council ministerial meetings.”
Observers
The Iqaluit Declaration and supporting documents reveal a peculiar push and pull
between the Arctic Council and Observer or would-be-Observer States. Some United States
climate change agenda items require robust Observer engagement (work towards a
meaningful climate agreement at the Paris Conference of Parties). Others aspire to activate
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Observers on issues of special significance in the Arctic (black carbon). Secretary Kerry
acknowledged that, “…Arctic Council members in [sic] observer states contribute 60
percent of black carbon pollution.” That percentage would grow if the Arctic Council
approved pending observer applications, notably the European Union. But the Iqaluit
Declaration deferred “decisions on pending Observer issues with the goal of deciding them
at the Ministerial Meeting in 2017.”
Administration and Budget
Arctic Council declarations usually address finances. The Iqaluit Declaration 2015
does so under the heading “Building a Stronger Arctic Council.” It specifically “approves
the Arctic Council Secretariat budget for 2016 through 2017, and instruct(s) Senior Arctic
Officials to review and adjust the mandates and work plans of the Arctic Council working
groups and other subsidiary bodies as necessary.”
The Arctic Council decided to establish a Secretariat hosted in Tromso, Norway at
the 2011 Nuuk Ministerial. By June 2013, the Secretariat took responsibility for many of the
organizational and administrative services previously handled by the chair country. Under
the Terms of Reference, the host country (Norway) pays 42.5% of the administrative budget,
to a maximum of $739,130 USD, and the balance is shared equally by all Arctic states, not
to exceed $1 million USD, unless otherwise agreed.
The member states have otherwise agreed. They have doubled Secretariat funding
since 2013. The 2013 Annual Report budgeted $472,626 for staff, $58,192 for rent, and
$36,990 for professional services; total expenses were $797,178 USD. At Iqaluit, the
Ministers approved a 2016 budget of $1,005,007 for staff, $123,279 for rent, and $185,677
for professional services; the total expense budget is $1,655,602 USD. The total expense
number increases in 2017 to $1,751,288 USD.
Assess Future Needs for a Regional Seas Program
The idea of an Arctic Regional Seas Program appears for the first time in the 2015
Iqaluit Declaration. Regional Seas Programs, sometimes administered under the United
Nations Environment Programme (UNEP), aim to address ocean and coastal degradation by
“engaging neighboring countries in comprehensive and specific actions to protect their
shared marine environment.” The programs are tailored to the region they address, and can
include a legal framework in the form of a convention.
The Ministerial documents establish a Task Force to “consider future needs for
strengthened cooperation on Arctic marine areas, as well as mechanism [sic] (e.g. regional
seas program, or other mechanism as appropriate), to meet these needs….” The Work Plan
carefully stressed that the decision to establish the Task Force does not constitute a decision
to establish a cooperation mechanism. Rather, the Task Force will spend the next two years
analyzing the range of issues that might be included. The SAO Report indicates that
questions about the appropriate legal form of a new agreement “should only be taken up
after a consensus on the substance begins to emerge.”
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Conclusion
Generally, the Arctic Council does not act without consensus. This is one of its
founding principles. As the organization transitions from a Canadian leadership that
emphasized business to a United States leadership focused on climate change, it is easy to
see how important this precept is. The Council’s 84 initiatives would generate no
consistency if a new chair completely redirected their efforts every two years. The Members,
Work Groups, and Task Forces recognize climate change as both a crisis and an opportunity
across these diverse projects. Whether the seemingly antithetical development and
conservation efforts can be joined in something truly sustainable has yet to be seen. That
would require more sacrifice than the Arctic Council consensus has been willing to require.
In this regard, the consensus approach is not well-suited such ambitious results.
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