Download Muslims Reclaiming the Quasi

Muslims Reclaiming the Quasi-Secular Democratic State
Lily Zubaidah Rahim
Department of Government and International Relations
University of Sydney
Paper presented at the symposium ‘Spirited Voices from the Muslim World’,
University of Sydney, 27-29 April, 2011.
Abstract
More than half of the world’s Muslim population live in countries where the state is
secular, quasi-secular or where Islam is not the official state religion. Major opinion polls
also suggest that most Muslims do not want religious leaders to play a direct role in
drafting the constitution and legislation, determining foreign policy and deciding on how
women should dress in public. Most Muslims do not want a rigidly secular or Islamic
state and would like to see a religious form of democracy with the sharia only as one
source of legislation. Are these Muslim aspirations inherently contradictory or reflective
of the re-emergence of a quasi-secular ideal based on reconciling Islam with secular
democracy? What political and constitutional form will this quasi-secular democracy
take? What will be the status of Islam and the shariah in such a polity? Is this ideal a
refinement of the post-colonial quasi-secular polity in Muslim majority states? To what
extent does the emerging quasi-secular ideal resemble the established religion model of
Western Europe? In addressing these questions, the paper examines the significance of
historical factors, political forces, ideational shifts and Islamic reformist discourses in reimagining and re-negotiating secularism and democracy in the contemporary Muslim
World.
In the Spirit of Wasatiyyah
The global community of 1.5 billion Muslims is at a crossroads, as they face a world of
multiple modernities, political systems and interpretations of Islam. Like other faith
communities, Muslims struggle with the myriad challenges of how to adapt and apply
1
their faith in a complex and increasingly globalised environment. Confronted by the
limitations of authoritarian Islamic and secular-oriented states, there is a yearning for a
political paradigm that is sensitive to the religious aspirations of Muslims (and nonMuslims) and promotes democratic governance based on the principles of popular
sovereignty and social justice. This yearning is inherent in the popular protest movements
currently sweeping the Middle-East. Spearheaded by an eclectic mix of secular activists,
intellectuals, Islamists, non-government organisations, opposition parties, disenfranchised
youth and citizens from various social classes, this protest movement is challenging
outmoded modes of authoritarian governance and ways of thinking about Islam. More
specifically, it is charting a relatively new political course - a Muslim democracy that
recognises religion as a frame of reference but arguably incorporates the sacred within
the framework of secularism. This Muslim quasi-secular democracy resonates with the
universal Islamic principles of shura (consultation and consensus), wasatiyyah
(moderation/middle path), adil (justice) and maslaha (common good). Recognising the
shortcomings of authoritarian Islamic states such as Iran and Saudi Arabia, these popular
movements are not demanding the establishment of Islamic states governed by traditional
sharia (Islamic law) as interpreted by unelected ulama (religious scholars).
Swinging Pendulum of Quasi-Secular Democracy: Rise of the Wasatiyyah Ideal
Ironically, the steady erosion of the constitutional foundations of the quasi-secular states
in the contemporary Muslim World contradicts the political vision of post-colonial
nationalist leaders such as Tunku Abdul Rahman, Sukarno and Naser. In the midtwentieth century, secular-oriented ideas dominated the Muslim World. Nasserism
inspired the masses throughout the Middle East and ideologies such as socialism and
communism acquired grass-roots support in Iran, Iraq, Sudan and Indonesia. In the
predominantly, Muslim country of Indonesia, President Sukarno articulated the Nasakom
ideal – the eclectic integration of nationalism, socialism and communism.
Consistent with the tradition of modernising post-colonial elites, the middle-ground
(wasatiyyah) nation-building stance of reconciling Islam within a secular-oriented
constitutional and political framework was adopted in many Muslim-majority states.
2
Within this framework, the role of Islam in the state and political system was
purposefully restricted. As such, only a limited number of references to Islam were
incorporated in the constitution and the status of sharia restricted to the realms of
personal status law. Modernised interpretations of sharia were thus not placed under the
jurisdiction of the traditional ulama, but under state religious bureaucracies headed by
state appointed ulama.
While Islam may have been pronounced the national religion of the Malayan Federation,
the country’s post-colonial elites envisioned a largely ceremonial role for religion in the
political system based on a federal parliamentary democracy. Article 3 (1) of the Malayan
constitution provides that “Islam is the religion of the Federation, but other religions may
be practised in peace and harmony in any part of the Federation”1. Article 11 (1) provides
that “Every person has the right to profess and practice his religion and, subject to Clause
(4), to propagate it”.2 This clause restricts the propagation rights of non-Muslims. It is
worth noting that Article 11, which guaranteed religious freedom, is almost identical to
Article 25 of the Indian constitution.
In view of the secular-oriented foundations of Malaya’s constitution, it did not surprise
many Malaysians when Prime Minister Tunku Abdul Rahman’s pronounced shortly after
independence in 1957 that “this country is not an Islamic state as it is generally
understood, we merely provide that Islam shall be the official religion of the state”3.
Thus, while the post-colonial Malaysian state recognised the status of sharia and Islamic
institutions such as sharia courts, sharia law was modernised in alignment with the
modernising society. For example, in the closing decades of the twentieth century,
Malaysia boasted some of the most progressive sharia laws protecting women’s rights,
including restrictions on the right to polygamy.
In Indonesia, Islamists failed in persuading nationalist leaders to adopt the Jakarta
Charter into the 1945 Constitution by including the seven words “with the obligation for
adherents of Islam to practice Islamic law”. The Jakarta Charter, which would have
placed Muslims firmly within the jurisdiction of sharia law, was rebuffed in favour of
3
Pancasila. Non-Muslims protested against the seven words believing that the clause
would have amounted to discrimination against other religions4. The religious-friendly
but secular-oriented national ideology, Pancasila, affirms the belief in God and the
importance of religion in public life but does not accord special status to Islam5. President
Sukarno and other secular nationalists recognised the danger of alienating non-Muslims
and the likely destabilisation of the fledgling Indonesian state if Islam was accorded
special status. Indonesia’s Pancasila quasi-secular state remains a major source of
dissatisfaction to conservative Islamists intent on expanding the jurisdiction of the sharia.
Retreat of the Wasatiyyah Ideal: Constitutional Nuances and the Expansion of
Sharia
The governance failures of secular regimes in the Muslim World have, in no small
measure, contributed the incidences of violence and acute political tension associated
with religious extremism and intolerance. These inter-religious tensions have occurred in
and beyond the Middle East - in countries such as Sudan, Nigeria, Iran, Iraq,
Afghanistan, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Malaysia and Indonesia. Even the most democratic
country in the Muslim World, Indonesia, has witnessed regular incidents of religious
extremism and intolerance. Inter and intra-religious tensions have often been fuelled by
the jurisdictional expansion of sharia as a result of the intellectual confusion arising from
the nuanced constitutional status of religion, in particular Islam. Civil and sharia laws
have become politicised and often reduced to a ‘political football’, particularly when
there is intense electoral competition between secular-oriented and Islamic political
parties.
Inter-religious tensions can also be attributed to a minority of hardline conservative,
fundamentalist and militant Islamists (and their counterparts in other faith communities)
who reject religious pluralism, equal rights for women and harbour exclusive attitudes
towards other faith communities. Extremists have targeted women, non-Muslims and
Muslim sects even though the citizenship rights of these communities are constitutionally
enshrined. In many authoritarian secular-oriented states, conservative and fundamentalist
Islamists have benefited from the restricted political space available by mobilising grass-
4
roots support following the brutal suppression of the leftist organisations and movements.
Indeed, Islamic institutions survived authoritarian suppression far better than their secular
counterparts in part because mosques could not be removed from the socio-political
landscape6.
Less commonly acknowledged are the religious tensions fuelled by state agencies and
regimes who politicise Islam and pander to the religious bureaucracy intent on expanding
the jurisdiction of sharia. To curb the power of conservative Islamists and buttress their
own legitimacy, these political elites have initiated sharia rulings, laws and policies that
severely impact on non-Muslims, secular Muslims and women. In attempting to outIslamise conservative Islamists, progressive sharia reforms from the post-colonial era
have either stalled or regressed particularly in areas such as inheritance, divorce and
polygamy. In many states, sharia has adopted a more illiberal form, closely resembling
the theologically rigid Wahhabi worldview of the Islamic monarchy of Saudi Arabia.
Ironically, in Indonesia’s post-authoritarian state, religious conflict and tensions have
intensified. Following the passage of legislation granting greater autonomy to the outer
regions in 1999, conservative Islamists have made significant political inroads. As the
central government retains control over religious affairs, Islamists in collusion with local
politicians hoping to boost their public profile have implemented sharia by-laws. The
regional by-laws include enforcing compliance with shariah codes such as the wearing of
the hijab, restricting the movement of women in the evening and the closure of
nightclubs. The so-called Pornography Bill, initially sponsored by Islamist parties, was
passed in 2008 despite strong opposition from non-Muslims and progressive Muslim
organisations.
In Indonesia’s Aceh province, the central government has facilitated the comprehensive
implementation of shariah primarily to appease the popular separatist movement and
keep the Indonesian nation-state intact. As such, the shariah court system now has
primacy over the civil courts. Specific Islamic criminal offences not found in national
laws have been implemented. They include shariah laws on ‘correct belief’, liquor,
5
gambling and illicit relations. In 2002, the Islamic dress code became mandatory and in
the following year, another law was passed allowing for the severe punishment of
unmarried couples caught in an intimate act or in close proximity. The punishment for
this breach is whipping – a minimum of three and a maximum of nine lashes7. However,
these regressive developments have energised progressive Muslim civil society to
challenge the constitutionality underpinning the expansive reach of shariah and the
initiatives of the Islamic bureaucracy and local politicans in Aceh and other regions.
In Malaysia, churches have been firebombed, Christians prohibited from using the word
Allah and Muslims whipped for alcohol consumption and extra-marital sex. Concerns
have also been raised by the violent demolition of Hindu temples, raids by the Islamic
religious police on places of entertainment and forced separation of Hindu-Muslim
couples by the religious police and sharia authorities.
Constitutional Quandary: Is Malaysia an Islamic State?
Non-Muslim anxiety in Malaysia has been bolstered by the expanded jurisdiction of the
shariah court into the realms of civil matters. As the extended jurisdiction of the shariah
courts includes non-Muslims, there are growing concerns that Malaysian civil law has
become desecularised. For example, the 1988 constitutional amendment to Article 121
provides that the High Courts “shall have no jurisdiction in respect of any matter within
the jurisdiction of the shariah courts”. Importantly, the amended Article 121 (1A) has
resulted in the High Courts and civil courts abdicating their constitutional role of
upholding fundamental constitutional rights. They have declined to adjudicate on issues
of fundamental constitutional rights and are inclined to defer to the jurisdiction of the
shariah court, thereby creating “an interpretive quandary” amongst scholars, lawyers and
the judiciary (Karean 2006:51). This quandary is fuelled by the reality that even though
Article 11 guarantees the right of every person to profess and practice their religion, state
legislation empowers state religious authorities and sharia courts to decide on personal
laws of Muslims.
6
In the high-profile case Lina Joy (Azlina Jailani) vs Majlis Agama Islam Wilayah
Perseketuan, the High Court held that Article 121 (1A) of the constitution has accorded
exclusive jurisdiction to the sharia court on matters of conversion (Karean, 2006:54). The
case concerned the right of a Muslim woman to renounce Islam, embrace Christianity and
marry a Christian. The Malaysian Federal Court finally ruled in 2007 that Lina Joy could
not delete the word ‘Islam’ from her identity card. In a another case, a Malaysian Chinese
woman who converted to Islam but wished to leave the faith was ordered by the sharia
court to undergo religious rehabilitation and counselling for three months organised by
the Penang Religious Affairs Department before she could formally leave the faith.
These and many other cases have contradicted religious freedom guaranteed by Article
11(1). The desecularisation of Malaysia’s legal system has also been highlighted by the
high-profile and controversial Moorthy (2005), Shamala (2003-2004) and Subashini
(2007) cases involving non-Muslim spouses. In these cases, the civil courts were willing
to defer to the jurisdiction of the shariah courts. Moreover, judges in civil courts regularly
employ Islamic principles and texts to determine and then justify their decisions8.
In part, Malaysia’s constitutional ambiguity stems from numerous interpretations of
Article 3 (1) of the Federal Constitution which states that Islam is the religion of the
Federation. Unravelling the intentions of the framers of the constitution and the meaning
of Article 3(1), Joseph Fernando’s (2006) study of the primary constitutional documents
has led him to contend that the Federation was in fact conceived as a secular state. For
example, the 1957 White Paper tabled in parliament by the Alliance government to
explain Article 3 noted that even though Islam is the recognised religion of the Federation
in the constitution, this would not affect the position of the Federation as a secular state
(Fernando, 2006:257). Affirming the 1957 White Paper, former Lord President Tan Sri
Mohammed Salleh Abbas ruled in 1988 that the term Islam in Article 3(1) meant only
“such acts as they relate to rituals and ceremonies” and that “the law in this country is
what it is today, secular law, where morality is not accepted by the law and is not
enjoying the status of the law”9.
7
In many respects, Malaysia’s constitutional quandary has been sustained by the absence
of a constitutional amendment declaring Malaysia an Islamic state. Even though the High
Court has the authority to conduct judicial review of the sharia court and declare that a
particular decision of the sharia court is unconstitutional or ultra vires, it has not done so.
Eroding further the quasi-secular spirit of the Malaysian constitution, in 2001 Malaysian
Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamad, and shortly after Deputy Prime Minister Najib Tun
Razak, pronounced that Malaysia is an Islamic state despite the protestations of nonMuslim politicians from the Barisan Nasional (BN or National Front) coalition
government. So has Malaysia become an Islamic state and thus no longer a quasi-secular
state? But why have Malaysia’s political leaders readily acceded to the conservative
theological turf of conservative Islamists? Ironically, there is now minimal difference
between the views of UMNO’s Islamic activists and those of the Islamist party PAS on
many religious issues. Is this a lapse in political judgement by the UMNO leadership or a
case of political desperation following the Barisan Nasional’s limp performance in the
1999 and 2008 elections?
Scholars such as Joseph Fernando (2006) and Vanitha Karean (2006:50) argue that the
foundational character of the Malaysian constitution is secular and “was not meant to
institutionalise the state as a theocracy”. Recognising that secular and Islamic states are
not monoliths and characterised by subtle gradations, Andrew Harding (2002:158) opines
that Malaysia is “much closer to the purely secular end of the scale than the Islamic end”.
Ironically, these perspectives are supported by the Islamist Party PAS. While Karean
(2006:56) purports that the constitution cannot viably harmonise Islamic and civil law
due to the fundamental differences between Islamic law and civil law, Shad Faruqi
asserts that the Malaysian constitution is neither theocratic nor secular but possesses a
hybrid quasi-secular nature10. Faruqi’s proposition has been endorsed by Prime Minister
Abdullah Badawi who in 2007 asserted that Malaysia was neither theocratic nor secular
but a parliamentary democracy11. Unfortunately, Abdullah Badawi did not clearly define
what he meant by Malaysia’s quasi-secular parliamentary democracy before retiring from
government in 2009.
8
The constitutional contradictions associated with the expansion of sharia have also been
played out in Pakistan. In November 2010, the Lahore High Court in Pakistan barred
President Asif Ali Zardari from pardoning a Christian woman Asia Bibi, facing a death
sentence, for insulting Islam under the country’s blasphemy law. The case gained
international attention when the secular-oriented Punjab Governor Salmaan Tasser was
assassinated for criticising the blasphemy law. Instructively, Tasser’s widow could not
find a single criminal lawyer to prosecute the assassin Mumtaz Qadri even though 500
lawyers have volunteered to defend Qadri . Tasser’s widow was also unable to find a
registered mullah in Lahore willing to conduct her husband’s funeral rites (Guardian, 8
January, 2011). It is worth noting that Qadri admitted to being influenced by the sermons
of militant preachers who denounced Tasser. The rise of religious intolerance in many
quasi-secular Muslim states has often been accompanied by conservative theological
rationalisations for the steady erosion of civil and human rights.
Resurgence of Wasatiyyah - The Silent Revolution in Muslim Apirations
There is a commonly held perception that Islam is incompatible with values associated
with democracy, pluralism and secularism12. Irobically, these perceptions have been
fuelled by the cultural essentialist postulations of conservative Islamists and Western
scholars such as Samuel Huntington and Bernard Lewis. Huntington famously asserted
that: “The underlying problem for the West is not Islamic fundamentalism. It is Islam”13.
Similarly, Lewis opined that Muslims are “willing enough to accept the products of
infidel science in warfare and medicine…However, the underlying philosophy and socioeconomic context of these scientific achievements proved more difficult to accept or even
recognise”14.
These Islamophobic and cultural essentialist perspectives have been contradicted by
qualitative and quantitative analyses which indicate that Muslims strongly value
democracy and secular based political systems that accommodate religiosity. The World
Values survey (1981-2007) of Muslim majority societies found that in all but one Muslim
country (Pakistan), public support for democracy was equal to or even greater than in
Western countries15. Significantly, Muslim respondents strongly favour multi-party
9
elections but expected political leaders to be inspired by religious values. However, the
Muslim mainstream tends to be politically liberal but culturally conservative16.
Similarly, the most comprehensive and systematic survey of contemporary Muslim
perceptions undertaken by the Gallop World Poll (2001-2007) found that Muslims
overwhelmingly support democracy, believing that it is central to a more just and
progressive society. Instructively, Muslims are inclined to support secular democracies
which do not insist on a strict separation of state and religion. They are thus disinclined to
support the strict separation of state and religion practised by assertive secular states such
as France and Kemalist Turkey. However, they are also not supportive of Islamic states
governed by traditional sharia, as dictated by the state.
The key findings of the Gallop World Poll17, in relation to Muslim perceptions of
democracy and secularism, are worth reiterating:
-
An overwhelming number of Muslims support democracy believing that it is the
key to a more just society and to progress.
-
Muslims indicate that the lack of political freedom is what they least admire about
the Islamic and Arab world. However, they did not favour the wholesale adoption
of Western models of democracy and secularism.
-
The majority of Muslims would like to see a religious form of democracy with the
sharia as one source of legislation, albeit a restricted source.
-
Most Muslims desire a system of government in which religious principles and
democratic values co-exist.
-
A significant majority in many Muslim countries say religious leaders should
play no direct role in drafting a country’s constitution, writing national legislation,
determining foreign policy, deciding how women dress in public or what is
published in newspapers.
-
Most Muslims do not want a rigidly secular or Islamic state.
The World Values Survey and Gallop World Poll findings noted above have been
reaffirmed by Kurzman and Naqvi’s study of 89 electoral contests in the Muslim World
1
0
over the last 40 years. Their study found that the electoral performance of Islamic parties
has been less than impressive. The median Islamic party performance hovers at around
15.5% of votes and 15% of seats. This suggests that the likelihood of Islamists winning in
free and fair elections in a non-violent and turbulent political environment is negligible18.
Islamist parties have only made significant electoral headway in a few ‘breakthrough
elections’ – the first truly competitive electoral contests in a generation or more
(Kurzman and Naqvi, 2010:50). They include the Islamic Salvation Front in Algeria
(1991), the Justice and Development Party in Turkey (2002, 2007) and the Islamic
Resistance Movement (Hamas) in Palestine (2006). Hamas’s electoral success in 2006,
garnering 44% of the vote, was largely to do with voter concerns about corruption and
lack of security rather than with religiosity (Kurzman and Naqvi, 2010:50).
Importantly, the authoritarian excesses of the Iranian and Saudi Islamic states and
governance failures of other Islamic states have dampened the Islamic state model as a
source of inspiration for Islamists and the wider Muslim community. Recognising that
the Muslim mainstream is ‘politically liberal but culturally conservative’ many secularoriented and Islamist parties in the Muslim World have shifted their ideological and
policy platform to appeal to this electorally potent mainstream constituency.
For
example, the failure of Indonesia’s Islamic parties to make significant electoral inroads in
the 1999, 2004 and 2009 elections and to revive the Jakarta Charter has led to a
pragmatic downgrading of their Islamic agenda - focusing instead on non-religious issues
such as anti-corruption. In Indonesia’s fledgling democracy, where debate on sensitive
issues is conducted in mainstream public arenas, conservative Islamists supporting the
Islamic state agenda have been pressured to clearly explain their position on the rights
and status of religious minorities, women, veiling and shariah. Unable to articulate
positions that are widely endorsed, many Islamic political parties have pragmatically
abandoned the goal of establishing an Islamic state. Similarly, in Malaysia, the Islamist
party PAS has downplayed its Islamic state agenda, particularly since their poor electoral
showing in the 2004 elections and pragmatic electoral alliance with other secular-based
opposition parties in the 1999 and 2008 elections.
1
1
In the Islamic republic of Iran, support for a religiously-based secularism appears to be
strengthening with reformists making significant electoral strides, particularly since the
1997 election which catapulted the reform-oriented President Khatami to office. Many
within Iran’s middle-class have grown disenchanted with clerical constructions of divine
sovereignty and the authoritarian nature of the theocratic republic. Overt religiosity
appears to have taken a battering with surveys indicating that only 3% of Iranians attend
Friday prayers compared to almost 50% before the revolution in 1979 (Kuru, 2009:107).
Similarly, in the Islamic state of Saudi Arabia, Saudis attend mosques less frequently
than Egyptians and Jordanians living in quasi-secular polities (World Values Survey,
2000-2004). There appears to be a negative correlation between the religious trappings of
the state and the religiosity of the public.
Chequered Record of Secular States
At first glance, opinion polls which consistently indicate that Muslim enthusiasm for
quasi-secular democracy, rejection of rule by the ulama but support of the sharia as a
source of law, appear somewhat contradictory. However, this seeming contradiction is
better appreciated when placed within the historical experiences shaping the diverse
state-religion relations and the varieties of secularism in the Muslim and non-Muslim
Worlds.
It is worth reiterating that more than half of the world’s Muslim population live in
countries where the state is secular, quasi-secular or where Islam is not the official state
religion (Kuru, 2009:18). As Table 1 indicates, only a minority of Muslims live in
Islamic states – all of whom are authoritarian. This is consistent with the vast majority of
states in the international community, where the strict separation of state and religion is
rarely be found19.
Table 1
State-Religion Regimes in 45 Muslim Countries
Islamic states
11
States with Islam as the established religion (quasi-secular)
15
1
2
Secular states
19
Source: Ahmet Kuru, Secularism and State Policies Toward Religion: The United States,
France and Turkey, (NY: Cambridge Uni. Press, 2009, p.18).
Yet, secularism remains one of the most misunderstood concepts in the Muslim World.
Part of this misunderstanding stems from confusion over the terms secularism,
secularisation, secular, ‘separation of religion and the state’ and secular democracy. Not
surprisingly, fierce disagreements remain about the status of religion in the constitution
and political system in the Muslim world – from the quasi-secular democracy of
Indonesia and Malaysia, secular democratic state of Turkey, Islamic monarchy of Saudi
Arabia, Islamic Republic of Iran, ambiguous Islamic state of Pakistan and the fledgling
Islamic states of Afghanistan and Iraq.
Muslim mis/understanding of secularism can be attributed to the simplistic conflation of
secularism with atheism, particularly since the word secularism is commonly translated
into Arabic as ilmaniyah (science or knowledge), alamaniyah (of this world or universe)
or ladini (irreligious or non-religious)20. In particular, ladini promotes the view of a
binary opposition between Islam and secularism and fuels the assumption that secularism
is an alien ideology that is threatening to Muslim religious identity. Secularists are thus
commonly perceived to have abandoned Islam, rejected Islamic morality21 and consumed
with self-loathing, particularly since secularism was introduced and institutionalised by
Western colonialism22. Secularism’s tarnished image has thus resulted in many secular
Muslims defensively withdrawing altogether from public debates so as to avoid
accusations of being Muslims contaminated by Western secularism.
Conservative Islamists have long argued that Muslims must reject secularism as it
constitutes a form of heresy or bida (innovation) and those that defend secularism are
either kafir (unbelievers), unauthentic Muslims or enemies of Islam. Moreover,
conservative Islamists are inclined to frame Muslim identity in opposition to Western
secularism. Sayyid Abdul Mawdudi, founder of the Islamist organisation, Jamaat Islami
1
3
and the World Muslim League, denounced secularism for being la din (no religion) in
comparison to Islam as din (religion). According to this logic, secularism and Islam are
opposed to one another and cannot be reconciled. Similarly, one of the most high-profile
Muslim scholars in the Arab World, Shaik Yusuf al Qaradawi, has pronounced that
supporting secularism is akin to abandoning Islam and the denial of God23.
Secularism’s tarnished image can also be attributed to the record of authoritarian secular
states aggressively imposing the separation of state and religion on the Muslim populace.
In particular, the policies and practices of assertive secular states such as France, Iran
under the Shah and Kemalist Turkey have engendered the perception of secularism as an
anti-religious ideology. In Pahlavi Iran and Kemalist Turkey, secularism was not allowed
to evolve but imposed in a top-down manner far removed from the realities of the masses.
Similarly, in quasi-secular authoritarian Muslim majority states, religious institutions and
associations were stripped of their independence and placed under the control of state
authorities. The state thus determined the appointment of imams (prayer leaders), content
of the Friday sermon and managed mosques. Islamist organisations and civil society were
suppressed.
Much has been written about the way by which secular Muslim elites saw the adoption of
secular modernity as essential for the survival of the nation-state. Secular modernity was
expected to free society from religion, which was projected as divisive, anti-national and
anti-modern compared to secularism which was projected as progressive and
emancipatory (Hakan Yuvuz, 2009:149). Rationalising dramatic social engineering
policies such as the adoption of the Latin script, European dress and laws and reforms to
religious institutions, Kemal Attaturk paternalistically counselled the Turkish masses that
“Surviving in the world of modern civilisation depends on changing ourselves. This is the
sole law of any progress in social, economic and scientific spheres of life”24. As the
development of cultural identity and modernity were projected as unidirectional,
mimicry was deemed essential for the survival of all modern societies. Not surprisingly,
many Muslims perceived secularism as a form of domination, fanaticism and bigotry25.
Driven by this outrage, Islam became the rallying point in resisting authoritarian secular
1
4
states. These movements were often led by Islamic organisations and parties committed
to the ‘re-Islamisation’ of society. Rachid Al-Ghannouchi has insightfully characterised
this authoritarian top-down secularism as a form of “pseudo-secularism”, adopting the
worst aspects but discarding the positive aspects of Western secularism26.
Varieties of Secularism in the West
Al-Ghannouchi’s assessment of secularism in the Muslim World and the West is
poignant. Indeed, many secular liberal democracies in the West do not impose a strict
separation of state and religion but operate along the lines of Alfred Stepan’s ‘twin
tolerations’ model of state-religion. It is worth noting that Jonathan Fox’s global study of
religious legislation found that all liberal democracies, except the United States, that have
separation of religion and state (SRAS) clauses in their constitution also have religious
legislation27. Indeed, the courts often allow governments to by-pass or disregard SRAS
clauses (Fox, 2011:62). Secularism in many democracies is thus strongly based on
concessions, reconciliations and settlements rather than a strict separation between the
religion and the state.
Many western states with established churches and recognised official religions practice a
form of passive secularism noted above. For example, Norway, Denmark, Finland,
Greece, Sweden and Britain have established churches. In Germany, Protestantism and
Catholicism are recognised as official religions. Christian Democrat political parties have
frequently governed in Germany, Austria, Italy, Belgium and the Netherlands. The Queen
of England is the head of the Church of England as well as the head of state. These forms
of passive secularism exist within the constraints of religion, tradition, church, public
opinion, legislation and the constitution. Passive secularism does not ban religion from
the public sphere but requires the state to be neutral and attempts to treat all religions
fairly. These constraints have gone some way towards restricting extremist and intolerant
tendencies by the state and society28.
It would appear that laicite or the assertive French model of secularism which seeks to
control all religious expression and erase it from the public sphere is relatively unique in
1
5
the West. This assertive form of anti-clerical secularism was strongly shaped by the
French revolution in 1789 which overthrew the historical alliance between the Catholic
Church and the monarchy. The conflict was very much zero-sum – a ‘war of the two
Frances’29. The separation of the state and church was codified in 1905 and updated in
2004. To be sure, the French policy of banning the hijab (headscarf) in public schools
and banning the niqab (attire which conceals the body and face) in the public sphere, in
the name of secularism, has severely undermined the inclusive secular ideal. In many
respects, these assertive secular policies are reflective of the ascendency of assimilation
and the rejection of multiculturalism despite the changed social realities of French
society.
Inclusive Secularism – Stepan’s ‘Twin Tolerations’ Framework
In endorsing the Anglo-American variant of passive or inclusive secularism, Alfred
Stepan posits that secular democracy can be effectively nurtured when religious
authorities and state institutions mutually recognise and respect the “minimal boundaries
of freedom of action”. Stepan proposes that religious communities be accorded the
autonomy to worship privately, advance their interests in the public sphere and sponsor
organisations - as long as they do not violate the liberty of others30. At the same time,
religious institutions should not have a constitutionally guaranteed right to dictate, limit
or veto decisions made by a democratically elected government31. As the boundaries
between religion and state are periodically debated and negotiated, they are expected to
shift with time.32. Importantly, the ongoing debate and negotiation between the state and
religion over the boundary between the two occurs on the basis of their mutual respect
towards each other’s autonomous spheres. Thus the lesson from this form of passive or
inclusive secularism “lies not in church-state separation but in the constant political
construction and reconstruction of twin tolerations” (Stepan, 2001:213-253). The
inclusive nature of passive secularism accepts the presence of religious symbols in the
public sphere and the diversity of religious perspectives.
Stepan reminds us that this ongoing reconstruction of state–religion relations is in line
with the reality of states and societies that are increasingly globalised, multi-ethnic and
1
6
multi-religious and thus need to respond effectively to new contingencies and
challenges33. This point is particularly salient when attempting to understand the
limitations of the French, and to a lesser extent, American separation of state and religion
model - models that have not evolved fundamentally since they were first formulated
even though these societies have changed quite radically. As a result, France finds it
difficult to manage the ethnic and religious aspirations of its Muslim citizens. On the
other hand, the United States finds it difficult to control the demands of politically
assertive fundamentalist groups arising from the ‘wall of separation’ principle between
state and religion (Stepan, 2010: 8-9).
There is increasing recognition by Muslims that there are multiple forms of secularism
and that secularism does not necessarily require the rejection of religion in the public
sphere. The experience of passive secular democracies in the West demonstrates that
secularisation does not necessarily lead to the erosion of religious belief. Indeed, religious
belief and forms of spirituality can and have persisted within the negotiated processes of
state secularism. Moreover, the experience of passive secularism demonstrates that the
rigid ‘wall of separation’ between church and state is excessive, unnecessary and
counterproductive in nation-building terms. Stepan’s twin-tolerations model is
particularly effective when operating within the context of democratic institutions and a
reformist Islamic discourse that advocates the harmonisation of Islam and secular
democracy.
Progressive Muslim Reformists: Harmonising Islam and Inclusive Secular
Democracy
Islam possesses a rich history of islah (reform) and tajdid (renewal) since the earliest
days of its establishment. Consistent with Islamic tradition, Muslim reformists recognise
the need to reinterpret traditional Islamic theology to effectively meet the complexities of
modern life. They have been particularly concerned by the narrow and exclusivist
interpretations of the holy texts. This concern was expressed by Muhammad Iqbal who
courageously called for an Islamic reformation: “We need a new theology, a period
1
7
similar to the Protestant reformation; the lesson of Luther’s movement should not be
lost”34.
In keeping with this tradition of reform, progressive Muslim reformists35 and intellectuals
have been at the forefront in articulating an Islamic discourse based on the compatibility
of Islam with the principles of secular democracy, gender equality, economic justice,
constitutionalism and universal humanism. Equipped with an understanding of the
Western experience of modernisation, secularism and Islamic theology, progressive
Muslims are at the forefront of the intra-civilisational struggle for the soul of Islam and
the Muslim World. Utilising the concept of Islamic ijtihad (critical thinking guided by
disciplined but independent reasoning and providing constructive solutions to
contemporary challenges), progressive Muslim reformists are in the process of
revolutionising Islamic theology and religiosity36. Rejecting the conservative Islamist
position that the ‘gate of ijtihad’ is closed, progressive Muslim reformists see ijtihad as
key to a dynamic understanding of religious texts, driving Islamic reformation and
promoting political pluralism.
A progressive Muslim reformist that has written seminal works on the interdependent
relationship between Islam, secular democracy and human rights is the Sudanese
American scholar Abdullahi Ahmed An Naim. He defines the inclusive secular
democratic state as one that is neutral with regard to religious matters and safeguards the
civil liberties of citizens.
An Naim asserts that it is in the interest of Muslims to promote the inclusive secular
democratic state that is based on the principles and institutions of constitutionalism,
human rights and citizenship. Such a polity does not enforce sharia and allows a person
“to be a Muslim by conviction and free choice”. Importantly, it “facilitates the possibility
of religious piety out of honest conviction” and “promotes genuine religious observance”.
(An Naim, 2008:1-2). Far from negating religion, inclusive secular democracy promotes
religious freedom as a basic right (An Naim, 2008:1).
1
8
The neutrality of the inclusive secular democratic state allows Muslims to discuss
sensitive religious issues such as gender equality, debate fresh interpretations of the
Quran, and arrive at a consensus. As An Naim notes: “In the conception of secularism I
am proposing, the influence of religion in the public domain is open to negotiation and
contingent upon the free exercise of the human agency of all citizens, believers and
unbelievers alike”37. The secularising of the state does not necessarily result in the
secularising of society but “facilitates the possibility of religious piety out of honest
conviction” and “promote genuine religious observance” (An Naim, 2008:1). This
nuanced and sophisticated discourse cannot be fully appreciated by conservative Islamists
who simplistically equate the secular state with a society devoid of religiosity.
Importantly, An Naim highlights the importance of establishing a clear framework of
constitutional governance for limiting the powers of government, safeguarding individual
and collective rights, and respecting the principles of human rights, accountability and the
separation of powers. He reminds us that constitutional rights are only useful where there
are institutional means for exercising them and holding governments accountable.
Constitutional rights are also important in protecting the freedom of each person “to
affirm, challenge or transform” their cultural and religious identity38.
Without a clear framework of constitutional governance, an ambiguous relationship
between religion and the state has resulted in protracted inter-religious tensions and
political instability. Conservative Islamists and opportunistic politicians have exploited
this ambiguity by expanding conservative interpretations of sharia and impinging on the
rights of women and religious minorities. This ambiguity has been seized upon by
politicians who have reinterpreted quasi-secular Muslim states as Islamic states, despite
the questionable constitutional foundations of such claims. As discussed above, this
ambiguity has contributed to religious tensions in Muslim majority quasi-secular states
such as Malaysia and Indonesia.
In rejecting the theological basis and political viability of the Islamic state, An Naim
maintains that constitutions which are based on particular religious beliefs are out-of-
1
9
sync with the complex and rapidly changing world (An Naim, 2005:79). The Islamic
state’s viability is undermined by the reality that the state has always been a political
institution and that religious and political authority emanate from different sources and
require different skills. The conflation of religious and political authority was only
possible during the time of the Prophet because of his unique combination of religious
and political authority.
An Naim asserts that no state has the authority to enforce sharia because sharia can only
be freely observed by Muslims. In other words, sharia loses its religious authority when
enforced by the state as “the outcome will necessarily be the political will of the state and
not the religious law of Islam” (An Naim, 2008:1). In highlighting the inherent
contradictions of the Islamic state, An Naim39 (2005: 78) points to the Iranian Islamic
state’s dilemma of being locked in unworkable and contradictory policies stemming from
mixing notions of divine and popular sovereignty and citizenship rights with traditional
conceptions of sharia. For example, the constitution of the Islamic state ensures equal
rights for women but only “in conformity with Islamic criteria”. Similarly contradictory
is the assertion that an “absolute religious leader and the leadership of the ummah have
ultimate authority in the executive branch of government” (cited in An Naim, 2005:7879). It is not altogether surprisingly that these contradictions have given rise to a bottomup push for secularism and a religio-secular model akin to the quasi-secular state,
discernible in Iran40. The repressiveness of the Iranian state has prompted An Naim to
call for “dispelling the dangerous illusion of an Islamic state that can enforce sharia” in
favour of implementing the principles and institutions of constitutionalism, human rights
and citizenship (An Naim, 2008:2). It has become increasingly apparent that the Islamic
state model is a spent political force.
Importantly, An Naim is just as critical of authoritarian and assertive secular states as he
is of Islamic states as these states have attempted to control religion through draconian
means. In highlighting the similarity between the Islamic state’s coercion of women to
wear the headscarf and the banning of the headscarf in assertive secular states, An Naim
observes that: “It is wrong to coerce women to cover themselves….it is equally wrong for
2
0
the state to present women with the degrading choice between upholding their religious
beliefs and losing their rights to education, employment and personal autonomy in
general”41.
The attempt of assertive and authoritarian secular states to restrict the
autonomy of religion is “defeated by the failure of the state to respect the legitimate role
of Islam in public life” (An Naim, 2008: 184).
Conclusion
This paper has placed the chequered record and meandering trajectory of the quasisecular state in Muslim-majority countries within an historical and comparative context
to highlight its contemporary relevance. The varieties of secularism in the Muslim and
non-Muslim Worlds suggests that it is a non-linear and fluid process subject to ebbs and
flows. Each country has its own experience of religiosity and secularism based on its
historical evolution and socio-political condition. Religiosity and secularism are dynamic
and deeply contextual processes. Islamisation and secularism are not mutually exclusive
and can work together within the framework of the quasi-secular democratic state 42. This
has occurred in the West and in the Muslim World.
It would appear that the rehabilitation and resurgence of the quasi-secular state in the
Muslim World has been fuelled by the promotion of progressive interpretations of Islam
which support the safeguarding of religious and political pluralism, citizenship rights and
gender justice. This rehabilitation and resurgence of the quasi-secular state is supported
by the push for greater clarification and public renegotiation of the constitutional and
political foundations of the quasi-secular democratic state. As highlighted by progressive
Muslim reformists such as Abdullahi An Naim, the inclusive secular democratic state is
consistent with the inclusive spirit of the Quran as embodied in the verse which enjoins
that “There is no compulsion in religion”.
Progressive Muslim intellectuals and movements have played a pivotal role in
reconciling Islam with the principles of quasi-secular democracy, universal humanism
and gender justice. They have resisted the attempts of conservative Islamists to impose
traditional sharia and question the propriety of politicians out-Islamising conservative
2
1
Islamists at the expense of compromising the foundations of the quasi-secular state.
Progressive Muslims are at the forefront of challenging theological discourses articulated
by the conservative ulama and engage in rainbow alliances with secular and progressive
religious forces in civil society. They recognise that the religious neutrality of the quasisecular democratic state can effectively mediate relations between the various religious
communities,
promote
an
inclusive
approach
towards
nation-building
and
constitutionalism. This wasatiyyah discourse and trajectory dovetails with the aspirations
of the majority of Muslims and the experiences of many inclusive secular democracies in
the non-Muslim world.
1
Cited in Joseph M. Fernando, ‘The Position of Islam in the Constitution of Malaysia’, Journal of
Southeast Asian Studies, 37(2), June, 2006.
2
Clause 4 provides that the federal law “may control or restrict the propagation of any religious doctrine or
belief among persons professing the religion of Islam”. Cited in Vanitha Karean, ‘The Malaysian
Constitution and its Identity Crisis – Secular or Theocratic?’, LAWASIA Journal, 2006, p.49.
3
Ahmad Ibrahim, ‘The Position of Islam in the Constitution of Malaysia’, in Readings on Islam in
Southeast Asia, Sharon Siddique and Yasmin Hussin (eds), (Singapore: ISEAS, 1985), p.217.
4
Nadirsyah Hosen, Sharia and Constitutional Reform in Indonesia, (Singapore: ISEAS, 2007), p.1
5
Pancasila‘s five principles include belief in God, national unity, social justice, popular sovereignty and
just humanitarianism.
6
Sami Zubaidah, ‘Islam and Secularization’, Asian Journal of Social Sciences, 33(3), 2005, p.442.
7
Maznah Mohamad, ‘Politisation of Islam in Indonesia and Malaysia’, in Theresa Devasahayam (ed),
Trends in Southeast Asia: Women Now, Women in the Future, (Singapore: ISEAS, 2009), p.101-102.
8
Amanda Whiting, ‘Desecularising Malaysian Law?’, in Penelope Nicholson and Sarah Biddulph (eds),
Examining Practice, Interrogating Theory: Comparative Legal Studies in Asia, (Leiden: Martinus Nyhoff
Pub., 2008), p. 231-255.
9
Tan Sri Mohammed Salleh bin Abbas, Constitutional Law and Judiciary: Selected Articles and Speeches,
(KL: Malaysia Law Publishers, 1984).
10
Shad Saleem Faruqi, ‘Secularism or Theocracy – A Study of the Malaysian Constitution’, Universiti
Teknologi Mara law Review, 146, 2004.
11
‘Malaysia Neither Secular Nor Theocratic State, Says Abdullah’, Sunday Times, 5 August, 5 August,
2007.
12
The 2003 Pew Forum on Religion and Public Life found that there were growing numbers of Americans
who believe that Islam encourages violence among Muslims. Refer to Pew Forum on Religion and Public
Life 2003, Washington DC, September 10, 2003, Press Release.
13
Samuel Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order, (NY: Simon and
Schuster, 1996), p.238.
14
Bernard Lewis, What Went Wrong? Western Impact and Middle Eastern Response (NY: OUP, 2002).
15
Ronald Inglehart and Pippa Norris, ‘The True Clash of Civilizations’, Foreign Policy, March/April,
2003, p.62-70.
16
World Values Survey, 4th and 5th waves, Available at www.worldvaluessurvey.org
17
Refer to John Esposito and Dalia Mogahed, Who Speaks for Islam: What a Billion Muslims Really Think,
(NY: Gallup Press, 2007), p.29-63.
18
Charles Kurzman and Ijlal Naqvi, ‘Do Muslims Vote Islamic?’, Journal of Democracy, Vol. 21, April,
2010.
2
2
19
Jonathan Fox, A World Survey of Religion and the State, (Cambridge: Cambridge Uni. Press, 2007).
Nader Hashimi, Islam, Secularism and Liberal Democracy: Towards a Democratic Theory of Muslim
Societies, (Oxford: OUP, 2009), p.136.
21
Naser Hashimi, 2009, p.136.
22
Abdou Filali-Ansary, ‘Muslims and Democracy’, Journal of Democracy, Vol.3, No.3, 1999.
23
Muhammad Khalid Masud, ‘The Construction and Deconstruction of Secularism as an Ideology in
Contemporary Muslim Thought’, Asian Journal of Social Science, Vol.33, No.3, 2005. p.372.
24
Cited in Ahmet Davutoglu, ‘Philosophical and Institutional Dimensions of Secularisation’, in and Azzam
Tamimi (eds), Islam and Secularism in the Middle East, ( UK: Hurst &Co,2002), p.170.
25
John Keane, ‘The Limits of Secularism’ in John Esposito and Azzam Tamimi (eds), 2002, p.36.
26
Rachid Al-Ghonnouchi, ‘Secularism in the Arab Magreb’, in John Esposito and Azzam Tamimi (eds),
2002), p.98.
27
Jonathan Fox, ‘Out of Sync: the Disconnect Between Constitutional Clauses and State Legislation on
Religion’, Canadian Journal of Political Science , 44(1), March, 2011.
28
See Ahmet T. Kuru, ‘Passive and Assertive Secularism: Historical Conditions, Ideological Struggles and
State Policies Toward Religion’, World Politics, Vol.59, July, 2007, p.568-594.
29
Ahmet Kuru, 2007.
30
Only the courts can place constraints on religious groups after their violation of laws.
31
“Democratic institutions must be free, within the bounds of the constitution and human right to generate
policies. Religious institutions should not have constitutionally privileged prerogatives that allow them to
mandate public policy to democratically elected governments”. A. Stepan, 2000, p. 39.
32
Nader Hashimi, 2009, p.114.
33
Alfred Stepan, ‘The Multiple Secularism of Modern Democratic and Non-Democratic Regimes’, Paper
Presented at the American Political Science Association (APSA) Conference, Washington D.C., September
2-5, 2010, p.48.
34
Muhammad Iqbal, Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam, (Lahore: Institute of Islamic Cultutre,
1986).
35
In this paper, progressive and reformist Muslims refer to those who are committed to socio-economic
justice, gender equality, political pluralism and ijtihad (independent reasoning and critical reflection).
Progressive Muslims are theologically flexible and view ijtihad as pivotal in facilitating Islam’s relevance
to the needs of the time, place and history. They do not espouse the establishment of an Islamic state.
36
Mahmoud Sadri, ‘Sacral Defense of Secularism: The Political Theologies of Soroush, Shabesteri and
Kadivar’, International Journal of Politics, Culture and Society, 15(2), Winter, 2001.
37
An Naim, 2008, p.267-268.
38
An Naim, 2008, p.214.
39
Abdullahi Ahmed An Naim, ‘The Interdependence of Religion, Secularism and Human Rights’, Common
Knowledge, 11(1), 2005, p.78
40
Vali Nasr, ‘Secularim: Lessons from the Muslim World’, Daedalus, 132, Summer, 2003, p.72.
41
Vali Nasr, 2003, p.214.
42
M. Hakan Yavuz, Secularism and Muslim Democracy in Turkey, (Cambridge: Cambridge Uni. Press,
2009), p.145.
20
2
3