Download Rome Threatens Sardinia in the First Punic War `The First Punic War

Fir st Pun ic War. Rome finally won
the long war with a naval victory at
the Aegates Islands in 241. In the
Pea ce of Lutatius that ended the war
Cartha ge lost Sicily and had to pay an
enormous indemnity, but retained
control of Sardinia and Corsica.
Rome Threatens Sardini a
in the Fir st Punic War
'The First Pun ic War began in 264 as a
contest between Rome, Syracuse and
Cartha ge for control of eastern Sicily.
Rome defeated Syracuse early on,
and the war expanded as a clash
bet ween the Cartha ginian and Roman
empires. However, as long as Rome
lac ked a fleet, she could threaten only
Sicily. Sardinia, and Africa, were safe
behind the patrols of the
Cartha ginian navy. Punic raids were
launch ed from Sardinia against the
Italian coast, while the Pun ic navy
brough t support to beleaguered cities
on the Sicili an coast. Within the
Roman Senate, the realization came
that this war could never be won
unless Cartha ge was challenged at
sea. So, in 260 Rome built her fir st
battle fleet, and with ingenio us
boarding ramps (th e corvus) defeat ed
the Pun ic navy at Mvlae.
In 259 the consul Lucius Cornel ius
Scipio led the first Roman expedition
against Corsica and Sardinia . He had
some success against the garrisons,
before being driven off by a reinforc ing fleet Under H annibal, son of
Gisgo. In the following year, the
consul Gaius Sulpiciou s Palerculus
campaigned with a Roman fleet in
Sardin ian waters, defeating Hannibal
and capturing or destroy ing all his
ships. Hannibal was crucified by his
own officers for his rep eated failures.
Another Punic Fleet und er Hanno
arrived to restore the situ ation, and
the Romans departed.
As the long war dragged on, Roman
interest in Sardin ia waned. The
immediate objective of ending nav al
raids on Italy had been acco mplished.
Rome turned to a more dir ect
strategy of invadin g Africa. When
this effort was foiled by dis aster on
land (the Battle of the Bagradas
featur ed in SPQR) and sea (256- 55),
Rome revert ed to a strategy of
attrition on Sicily. Sardinia was
never again threatened during the
The Rape of Sardinia
The end of the First Pun ic War
brough t no relief to Carthage. Hard
on the heels of this war came the
revolt of the mercenaries, the
Tru celess War, 240-238 (featured in
C3i Nr. 7). While this brutal war
rag ed in Africa, the contag ion of
reb ellion spread to Cartha ge's
mercenary garrison on Sardin ia in
239. Thes e sold iers of fortune rose
up, and slew their Carthaginian
commander Bostar and his office rs.
In response, Cartha ge sent an
exp edit ion und er (anoth er) Hanno to
punish the reb els, but his troops
des erted and joined the mutineers.
The rebels crucified Hanno, then ran
rampant over the island, slaying all
the Carthaginian settl ers. Once the
euphor ia of the initial uprising had
worn off, the se mercenari es began to
dre ad retribution from Cartha ge. So
the y sent an offer to Rome to surrender Sardin ia to them.
The Roman Sen ate refused the offer.
The senator s decided to honor the
ter ms of the Peace of Lutatius, whi ch
expressly forbid taking as an ally any
ally of the oth er power. Meanwhile,
on Sardinia the muti nou s mercenaries
turned on the local popula ce. Their
depred ations at len gth dro ve the
native tribes to rise up and attack
the m. The mercenaries were expelled
fro m the isl and in 238 , and Sar din ia
was bri efly ind ependent. Carthage,
as soon as the rebel mercenaries in
Africa had been suppressed, began
preparing an expedition to
re -conquer the isl and.
In Rome, however, there was a
change of heart. The senate revers ed
itself and pro clai med the annexation
of Sardin ia and Corsica, in flagrant
dis regard of the Treaty of Lut atius.
When Carthage compla ined, Rome
thr eatened war and inc reased the
ind emnity Carthage had to pay to
keep the pea ce. This aggression
became known as the Rape of Sardin ia.
Rome may hav e gain ed a valuable
pro vin ce, but she also earned the
und ying hatred of Hami lcar Barca
and his sons (Hannibal , Hasd rubal
and Mago), a matt er of no small
consequen ce.
The Roman Provin ce
Victor y in the Fir st Punic War
brough t Rome her first two overse as
pro vin ces, Sicily and Sardin ia. The
highly civi liz ed isl and of Sic ily
became a pro fitable and peaceful
posses sion. Wild, unt amed Sardin ia
was another story. Cartha ge had
nev er conquered the enti re isl and,
content with coastal enclav es and
dip lomati c, commercial and cultural
domination of the isl and. Roman
ways were different. A series of
exp edit ions were sent to the island to
pacify it comple tel y. Both consuls
fou ght on the isl and in 238, and after
a bri ef interlude consular armies were
dispat ched every year for five years,
fro m 235 -231. The first of the se
exp edit ions was led by the consul
Titus Manlius Torq uatus, of whom
more wil l be heard anon .
Findin g the admini stration of
overse as pro vinces a burden on the
limited office rs of the Roman govern ment, the number of praetors was
exp anded from two to four in 227.
The first pra etor of Sardin ia in that
year was Gains Fla mini us, destined
to meet his end at Hannib al's hands
by Lake Trasimene. In 225 the consul
Gaius Atilius Regulu s was dispat ched
with his arm' to quell another
uprising on Sardin ia. His coll eague,
Lucius Anielius Papus remain ed in
Italy to guard against an expected
Celtic inv asion. Atilius Regu lus
suppre ssed the Sardin ian revolt and
return ed to Italy in tine to tak e par t
in the Battle of Telamon (featur ed in
C3i Nr. 6). On the eve of the Second
Pun ic War Sardin ia was a pro vince
bar ely pacified. A generation of
Roman comman der s and legionnai res
had the ir chief battle experience from
campai gns on this island.
The Second Pun ic War
Sardin ia did not figure pro minently
in the openin g campai gns of the
Second Pun ic War. The isl and was
held for Rome onl y by a garrison of
allied troops, probab ly no more than
5,000 men. Hannib al's surprise
cro ssing of the Alps, and his first
major victor y at Trebbi a, convin ced
the Romans that this war would be
neithe r easy nor short. The Roma n
senators knew that Carthage would
attempt to regain Sardin ia at the first
opportuni ty. Therefore, early in 217
the praetor Aulus Cornelius
Mammu la was sent to reinforce the
isl and's garrison with Legion V, a
full-str ength double legion with some
1
),000 foot and 800 horse. Cornelius
Mammul a main tained a tenuous
control of Sardin ia over the next two
years, as Hann ibal's continuin g string
of victori es over Rome excited the
anti-Roman pas sion s of the native
tribes. The pra etor had to exact ever
inc reasing taxes and tribute from his
pro vin ce to suppor t the war, which
contribut ed greatl y to the rising
dis content.
The counci l in Carthage also too k
more dir ect action to break Sardinia
away fro m Rome's grasp. A general ,
Hanno, infiltrated ont o the isl and as
an agent pro vocateur, to fome nt
reb ellion. Hanno soon made conl
111011 cause with Hallipsicora, tile
leadin g Sardin ian chieftain, to
prepar e a massive isl and -wide
insurr ection . Cornelius Mammlula,
however, was a wary and circum spe ct govern or. Even aft er the Bat tle
of Cannae, when much of sou thern
Italy rebelled, Hanno and
Hamp sicora bid ed the ir time. They
awaited a more favorable moment to
raise the cry of 'freedom from Rome!' .
The opportuni ty the y sought came
soon enough. At the end of 216, the
propraetor Cornelius Mammul a was
rec alled to Rome, pendin g the arrival
of his successor. The pra etor Quintu s
Mucius Sca evola arrived early in 215,
and imme diatel y came down with a
seriou s, incapacitating illness.
Cornelius Mammul a, alarmed by the
turn of even ts, hur ried back to Rome
to make his report. Leader less, the
Roman garrison was unable to rea ct
as Hanno and Hampsi cora now
unl eashed the lon g simmering
reb ellion. The insurr ection qui ckl y
spr ead across the isl and. Legion V
hunk ered down in its bases and
waited.
Hanno and Corneli us
Plea for
Rei nforcement
The opposing generals, Hanno and
Cornelius Mammu la, both hurried to
get urgent ple as for reinforcing
exp edit ions to the ir home govern ments. Cornel ius Mamm ula report ed
in per son to the senate on the
imp ending revolt and the incapacita tion of Mucius Sca evola. Rome,
unfortunatel y, had jus t about scraped
the bot tom of her manpower bar rel.
After Cann ae in the fall of 216, Rome
had bar ely managed to conscript one
new consular army of two legions.
Additional armi es were formed from
the sur vivo rs of Cann ae and a force a
sla ve and convict volunteers, the
volones. Then another dis aster befell
Rome in the winter of 216- 215 . The
praetorian artily of two legion, in
Cisalpine Gaul lea s ambushed and
annihilated in the Litani forest by
Celtic tribes, instigated by Hannibal.
This brought to ten the number of
legion s comple tely destroyed so far in
the war. The senate had reluctantly
con clud ed in early 216 that no
additional forces could be raised, and
that the Litani ambush must go un avenged for now. It was in this
situation tha t Cornelius Mammula
made his ple a for reinforce ment s.
Despit e their many difficulties, the
senate ordered a lev y to be raised.
Somehow, the urb an pra etor, Quintu s
Ful vius Fla ccus, managed to scrape
up a reinforced Roman leg ion, the
XIV. Its strength was 5,0 00 foot and
400 hor se. It was most likely com
pos ed of teen-agers, old men and
tho se earlier rej ected as unfit for
ser vice. But Legi on XIV would have
to do.
Hanno' s message met an entirely
different respon se in Cartha ge, The
way had been paved by Mago Bar ca's
mission to the council following
Cannae in the autu mn of 216. Mago
had pou red a bushel basket of gold
rin gs cut from the fingers of dead
Roman nob les and knights ont o the
council chamber floor. Mago's
request for 20,000 infant ry and 4,0 00
cavalry was readil y approved. When
Hanno s emergency dispat ch arrived,
Mago Barca was on the point of
sailin g for Italy with the first contingent of this lev y, 12, 000 foot, 1,500
hor se and 20 elephants . Arriving at
nearly the same time as Hanno's ple a
to re-conquer Sardin ia came news of
HasdrubaI Barca's disastrous defeat
at Dertosa in Spain (featured in C3i
Nr. 4). The council was forced to
allocate resour ces amongst three
competing theaters - Italy, Spain and
Sardin ia. The councilors' decision
revealed their strategic priorities.
Mago and his army were div erted to
protect Spain. A mere 4,000 cavalr y
and 40 e lephants were sent with
Bomilcar and the home fleet to
reinforce Hannibal in Italy. (It was
the onl y reinforcement lie ever
rec eived.) A new army of 12,000
infantry, 1,500 cavalry and 20
elephants was prepared for an
exp edit ion to Sardin ia.
The expeditionar y army was pro b abl y formed of a core of sonic six
thousand soli d Libyan spearme n,
supported by over 1,0 00 superb
Numidi an light cavalry and heavy
Cartha ginian horse. There was also
available a force of 13,850 Iberian
infantry and 1,200 cavalr y from the
The rsitae, Mastiani, Oretes and
Olc ades trib es. ']'his uni t had been
posted to Africa in 218 by Hannibal,
in keep ing with his policy of defending Spain with African troops and
Africa with Iberians. Probably about
six thousand of these Ibe rian foot,
with suppor ting cavalry were
ass igned to the Sardinia bound army.
This Iberian contingent was by now
well dri lled, after three years of
gar rison dut y in Africa.
The Commanders
So bot h Cartha ge and Rome prepar ed
exp edit ions for Sardinia in the spr ing
of 215. But these armies needed
commander s, and this pos ed a
problem for both empires. The
Roman Senate habituall y turned to
exp erienc ed consulares (former
consul s) to lead her armies in
emerge nci es of this nature , however,
few were available . Fives consulares
had alread y been slain in the first
thr ee years of this war: Gaius
Fla minius (Tr asimene); Lucius
Aemi liu s Pau llus, Mar cus Minucius
and Gnaeus Ser vilius Gemi nus
(Cannae); and Lucius Postumius
Albinus (Litani). Tiberias
Semproniu s Longus (Tr ebbia) and
Gains Terentius Varro (Canna e) were
in dis grace. Quintu s Fabius Maximu s
and Tiberias Semproniu s Gracchus as
consul s, and Mar cus Claudius
Mar cellus as pro consul faced
Hannib al, while Gnaeus and Public s
Cornelius Scipio were in distant
Spain. There were few tri ed
leader s left. The pra etor Fulvius
Fla ccu s, charged with des ignating a
temporary commander for Sardin ia,
chose Titus Manlius Torquatus.
Manlius was one of the elder states
man of Rome, a stern, har sh man
kno wn for his conservative, traditional views. His intran sigence
pla yed a key role in the rejection of
Hannibal's offer to ran som the 8,000
Roman pri soners tak en at Cannae,
condemnin g the se men to a life of
sla very. He was probably already
over 60 years of age, and like
Marcellus, he had probably served as
a jun ior office r against Hamilcar
Bar ca in Sicily. His first consulship
had been served in Sardin ia in 235.
His seco nd consulship had been in
224, leadin g a puniti ve expedit ion
against the Celts after the inv asion of
Tel amon. 'tradition dictat ed that no
man serve more than two consul
ships. Even though Fab ius, Mar cellus
and oth ers ignored this pro vision and
ser ved multiple consulships dur ing
the Second Pun ic War, Manlius
would have non e of it. Later, in 210 ,
aft er the leadin g century had elected
him, he forced the m to annul the vote
and begin anew. Again in 207 lie
wou ld refuse to stand for the consul
ship when it was offered. But in this
cas e he agreed to serve temporarily
as the deputy of the strick en pra etor
Mucius, probably as a propra etor .
Manlius would return to Sardin ia a
full two decades sin ce hi, firs t
comman d on the island.
Cartha ge had as yet los t no senior
comman ders in this war. Nevertheles s, Cartha ge was also short of
exp erienc ed generals. The veteran
comman ders of the Iberian conquest
had all acco mpanied Hannib al.
Hasdrubal, his chief of staff, Hanno,
son of Bomilcar, Mah arbal, Mago
Saunites, Hamilcar and Carthalo
were all with the army in Italy.
Hasdrubal Barca, his deputy Himilco
and his brother Mago were engaged
in Spain. With the best commander s
already commit ted, the council in
Cartha ge selected Hasdrubal the Bald
to lead the Sardinian expedition. He
does not see m to hav e been a veteran
of the Iberian campai gns, but
Hasdrubal may hav e camp aign ed
against the tribes on Cartha ge's
Africa n frontier. The council as
signed Hasdru bal a deputy commander, Mago. This general was said
to be a clo se relati ve of Hannibal,
probab ly a cousin. Hasdrub al could
also rely on the suppor t of the gen eral
Hanno, already in Sardinia.
The Race is On
Cartha ginian and Roman expeditions
were both prepar ed for Sardin ia in
the spring of 215. The question was,
whi ch would arrive first? Hasdrubal
set out first from Cartha ge, his army
of 13,500 escorted by 60 quinqu eremes.
If he could arrive first, he could join
the rebel Sar dinian army to his own
and besiege the leader less Roma n
troops in their bases. But fate too k a
hand. When in the open sea between
Cartha ge and Sardinia, Hasdrubal 's
fleet was caught by a savage stor m
and hur led some 300 miles west onto
the Baleari c Islands. Loss of life was
not severe, but Hasd rubal found he
had to rep air many of his ships before
continuin g the journe y. Hasdrubal
too k advantage of this une xpected
diversion to reinforce his army with a
strong bod y of the reno wned Balearic
slinge rs.
While the Carthaginian s cooled their
heels in the Balearics, Manlius set out
with his 5,400 men escorted by some
40 quinquer emes. The Roman
voyage to Sardin ia was une ventful,
and Manlius put in at the pro vincial
capitol, Caralis (modern Cagliari) .
The Romans had won the rac e, with a
helpin g hand from Neptune. But
Manlius still faced a seriou s situation ,
with the island in full revolt and the
gar rison disheartened and demora lized. Manlius too k command of
Mucius ' Legion V and added the
ori ginal garr ison allied troops to his
gre en Roman Legi on XIV to form a
second double legion . This gave him
a full consular army of about 18,000
infantry, but with onl y 1,200 cavalry.
Manlius was not satisfied. To swell
his ran ks, he grou nded his fleet and
pre ssed the marines and rowers into
ser vice as infantry. The crews of 40
quinquereme s would pro vide over
1,500 mari nes and 8,000 rowers.
Manlius formed the marine s into
cohorts, and selected some 2,500 of
the most capable rowers to serve as
lightl y armed veli tes. This added
4,000 men to his army, bringing his
for ce up to 22,000 foot and 1,2 00
horse.
Manlius undoubtedly would have
appreciated some time to drill his
for ce and develo p more cohesion
amongst his V and XIV Legions,
gar rison troops and naval infant ry,
but there was no time to spare.
Manlius had to suppre ss the
Sardin ian rebellion , before the
rumored Cartha gini an expedition
arrived. So Manlius led his dis jointed
army out of Caralis, seekin g the main
rebel concentratio n. As fate would
lav e it, when Manlius came upon the
rai n reb el hos t, Hamp sicora was
away, recruitin g amongs t the Goatskin
tribes of the mountains. He had left
his son Hostus in command of the
army, which may have numbered
15,000 men. Hostus was young and
rec kless and imme diatel y attacked
the larger Roman army when it
approa ched. Manliu s predic tably
rou ted the rebel army. Its losses were
onl y 3,000 killed and 800 taken
pri soner, indicating that most of the
rebels fled before the figh ting got too
hot .
Hasdrubal and Company Arrive
Hampsi cora established a new base at
Cornus with his Goatskin light
infantry and began collecting the
sca ttered remn ants of his army.
Manlius, as soon as lie learned of
Hampsi cora's location, advanced on
Cornus to finish off the insurr ection .
The war in Sar dinia would have been
over, but just then word came that a
Cartha ginian fleet had landed on the
Western coast. Hasdrubal the Bald
qui ckly dis embarked his force of over
14,000 men, then dis missed his fleet.
Manlius chose a cautious course,
abandoned the field and withdrew
bac k to his base at Caralis.
Hasdru bal joined with Hampsicora,
who by now had rallied an army of
over 12,000 Sar dinian trib esmen to
reinforce the Cartha gini an expedi tion. The combin ed armies now
number ed nearly 27,000 men.
Manlius' hasty retreat seems a hit
pre mature in retrospect. A more
aggressiv e commander could have
held the field and possibly prevented
the jun ctur e of Hasd rub al and
Hampsi cora. Manlius, however, was
not chosen for his aggressiveness. It
was his steady, cautious nature that
the Roman sen ate counted on.
Manlius knew well that ten Roma n
legions had already been lost in this
war. He wasn 't about to los e two
mor e. A younger noble, in his first
pra etorship or consulship, migh t
have felt compelled to ris k battle to
est abli sh his reputation. Manliu s
already had his share of glor y, and
could freely put the interest of Rome
ahead of his own. Beside s, the Pun ic
superiority in cavalry mean t that he
could have had little int elligen ce on
the size or intention s of Hasdrubal 's
army. The pruden t course was to fall
bac k on his secure base, develo p the
situation, and engage in battle onl y
und er clearer, safer circumstances.
Hasdrubal, with an army sli ghtl y
lar ger than the Roman force, followed
Manlius, loo ting and pillaging the
villag es of any pro -Roman tribes
along the way. Manlius fell back all
the way to Carali s, grad ually pie cin g
tog ether a clearer pictur e of the
inv adin g army he faced. Thou gh the
for ce was large, a great portion of its
str ength was from the often beaten
irregular Sardinian s. Hasdrub al's
hard cor e of pro fessional mercen aries
was much smalle r than the Roma n
army. In any case, Manlius could not
allow the pillage of Rome's loyal
subjects to continue ind efinitely.
Manlius too k the field just out side,
Car alis. Hasdrubal acc epted the
challenge of battle with no reluct anc e.
The Battle of Caralis
Unfortun ately, Livy 's account of the
battle (Book XXIII, Chapter 40) is
typically vague and muddled, but it
is the onl y one we have. Hasd rubal
had about 25, 000 foot, 2,0 00 horse
and 20 elephants. Some 2,000 of his
infantry would have been left behind
to guard his camp. Manlius had
22,000 infantry and 1,2 00 cavalry, and
would have det ail ed a camp guard of
similar size. All we know for sure
about the deployment is that
Hasdrubal the Bald deplo yed his
army in two wings - the Carthagin ian
exp edit ionary force on one side and
the Sardin ian levies on the oth er. This
would have been similar to
Hasdrubal Barca's later deployment
at the Battle of the Metaurus. Like his
namesake, the bald Hasdrubal may
hav e tri ed to reinforce his weaker
(Sa rdinian) wing with a secu re flank,
defensible terrain and his elephants.
Manlius most likely deployed his
army in standard formation - two
Roman legion s in the center, with
Italian allies and the marine s and
rowers on the flanks.
Aftermath
The war for Sardin ia was ove r. The
remnants of Hasdrubal's army were
hunted down. The captured mercenar ies may well have been taken into
Roman service, as happen ed later in
Sicily. Manlius, when the campai gn
was comple te, gather ed up his sailors
and re- mann ed his fleet. The
wizened Manlius then laid down his
command in Sardinia, and sailed
hack to Rome. The senate kept a full
consul ar army of two legion s in
Sardin ia for most of the remainder of
the war, to guard against the threat
fro m Cartha ge. In the event,
Cartha ge nev er mounted another
attack on this island province.
The bat tle was hotly contested, the
fighting report edly lastin g four
hours. The Cartha ginian wing was
having the bes t of it on its side, while
the Romans gradually gained the
upp er hand over Hamp sicora's
levies. Finally, the Sardin ians were
routed. The Roman legion which
overpo wered the Sardin ians next
swung around to fall on the flan k and
rea r of the Cartha ginian wing. The
Africa n and Ibe rian mercenaries were
trapped and pra ctically annihilated.
The Romans counted 12,000 slain on
the battlefield, and too k 3,700
pri soners.
Hos tus had died fighting. His father ,
Hampsi cora, fled with a few hor se
men. When he learned of the
magnitude of the defeat, and the
death of his son, Hampsi cora fell on
his sword that night. Hasdru bal,
Mago and Hanno were all captured
ali ve, an unu sual occurr enc e perhap s
brough t about by the envelop ment of
the Carthaginian wing. Captivity
was surely a cruel fate, but certainly
better than the crucifixion that
awaited so many ear lier unsuccess ful
Cartha ginian commanders in
Sardin ia.
The failur e of Hasdrubal the Bald's
exp edit ion was one of a number of
dis appoin tments that ruined the only
chance Carthage had to win the war,
during the campai gn of 215. First
Hasdrubal Barca had been defeat ed
at Dertosa, then Hasd rubal the Bald
lost this bat tle in Sardin ia and finall y
the ambassadors negotiating the
treaty bet ween Hannibal and Ki ng
Phi lip V were captur ed by Roma n
nav al pat rols, del aying the
Mac edonian entry into the war for a
whole year. The momentum of
victor y, painstakingly generated at
Trebia, Trasimene and Cannae, was
squandered on the fields of Dertos a
and Caralis.
Notes on the Sce nario
Legion s probably did n't have
per man ent number s at this time, so
the designat ions V and XIV are not
historical, but rather chosen to match
the uni ts in the SPQ R counter- mix .
The dep loyment for both armies is
only an educated guess, and players
may Wish to use free deploymen t. If
using this opt ion, allow the Roma n
pla yer to select the map and deploy
first. The Cartha ginian pla yer may
observ e the Roman dispositions and
then dep loy his forces, the advant age
of a superior mounte d force.