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Anti-Roman Insurgency and the Significance of Popular Support during the Mithridatic Wars, 88-63 BCE Aidan Sheerin Dr. Jesse Hingson HIST 300WI: The Techniques of History 9 December 2009 By 120 BCE, the Roman Republic was quickly becoming the most dominant state of the Western world since Alexander the Great‟s empire. Since the Punic wars, Rome had added Mediterranean islands, most of Spain and territory in Northern Africa. Rome also had conquered provinces and protectorates in Gaul, Greece, and Macedonia. The Republic held some territory and had minor interests in Asia Minor and the Middle East as well, but Roman attention and commitment to these regions would only take true form through the Mithridatic Wars. Mithridates VI Eupator Dionysus (134-63 BCE), whom the wars are named for, was an ambitious king of Pontus in Asia Minor. Mithridates was one of Rome‟s greatest adversaries and ardently opposed the Republic for nearly his entire life. Mithridates was able to put up a formidable opposition to Rome, but ultimately lost because he failed to keep the allegiance and support of both those he ruled directly and the populations allied to him. Brian McGing, who has researched Mithridates extensively and written multiple works on the subject, acknowledges the shortcomings of Mithridates in dealing with his people, but would ultimately attribute his loss to the superiority of Roman military. In studying the foreign policies and actions of Mithridates as ruler, liberator, protector and general, it is clear his fate was determined by the gain and lose his greatest asset: the support of the population. Roman domination of the Near East has had a profound effect on Western culture and history. As the catalyst for the Mithridatic Wars, Mithridates holds substantial historical significance. Mithridates was the last fully autonomous Hellenic king of the East. This was mainly because of his staunch resistance that Rome truly came to dominate and administer Asia Minor and the Middle East. For the most part, Mithridates feigned philhellenism to resist Rome. He claimed that he cared more about his kingdom and sovereignty than promoting Greek culture and protecting the various Greek populations. The actions and might of Mithridates made Rome Sheerin 3 decide it needed to dominate the Near East to prevent another ruler like Mithridates from emerging. Thus, Rome would dominate and annex Judea and surrounding lands just before the birth of Jesus Christ. The sources we have on Mithridates and the Mithridatic Wars are few and somewhat unreliable. The only primary sources available are written by Roman historians such as Appian of Alexandria, Plutarch, and Cassius Dio. These accounts have to be considered biased because they were writing about a war between their nation and that of an enemy. Indeed, all three refer to Mithridates as a “barbarian.” Appian‟s Mithridatica is the only thorough account of the war and is very valuable. It is, however, full of errors and contains minimal chronology. Plutarch‟s bibliographies of Lucullus and Sulla are intended to show them in very favorable terms. Ancient historian Frank Burr Marsh wrote in his history of Rome that we “only know Mithridates through his enemies.”1 Furthermore, all were born in the common era, over one hundred years after the end of Mithridates‟s life. They used memoirs from Roman generals and legislation as their main sources of information. Finally, these sources disagree on many key details. The sources record different numbers of strength for armies and navies, different numbers of casualties, and varying terms of treaties. Some of the sources leave parts of the history out and other sections have not been preserved. The kingdom, Pontus, was located on the southern shore of the Black Sea, in modern day Turkey. Greek colonies, remnants of the Persian Achaemenid Empire and Alexander the Great‟s Macedonian Empire dominated the culture of the kingdom. Pontic kings championed the Greek roots of many of their cities and took pride in the Greek tradition. Mithridates VI Eupator was 1 Frank Burr Marsh, A History of the Roman World: From 146 to 30 BC. 3rd edition, volume 5 (London: Methuan and Company Ltd., 1967), 107. king of Pontus between 119 and 63 BCE. Mithridates‟s situation, however, was different. Unlike kings before him who aligned themselves with Rome to expand, Mithridates‟s expansion forced him into conflict with the Republic. Mithridates Eupator portrayed himself as both Persian and Greek to win support over all people in his kingdoms and beyond. He shares his surname Dionysus with a Greek god. He told his troops that his father was a descendant of Cyrus and Darius, the founders of the great Persian Empire and that his mother was descended from Alexander the Great and Seleucus of Greece. Mithridates also claimed relation to Perseus, who was also of Persian descent and was “the hero of integration between the East and West.”2 This was precisely how Mithridates wanted to represent himself. Mithridates issued royal coins with both Greek and Persian representations depicting Perseus and other Greek heroes and gods. He combined these images on other coins with portraits of himself and Greek and Persian symbols of power and values.3 In 120 BCE, Mithridates‟s father was assassinated, bequeathing the throne to his wife, the Seleucid princess Laodice and two sons. Mithridates lived in the wild for several years, accustoming himself to hardship and learning to use all available resources to survive. When he returned, his mother, according to historian Brian McGing, was “no longer in the picture”. At age eighteen had his younger brother killed, attaining sole control of the Kingdom of Pontus in 116 BCE Laodice‟s Seleucid Kingdom was involved with civil war, and it did not contest the Pontic throne. Thus, the able and ambitious Mithridates VI Eupator was sole ruler of Pontus.4 2 Brian McGing, “Subjection and Resistance to the Death of Mithridates,” A Companion to the Hellenistic World. Edited by Andrew Erskine. (Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishing Ltd., 2003), 95. 3 Ibid., 95-97. 4 Ibid., 84-85; Jona Lendering, “Mithridates VI Eupator (132-63): King of Pontus (120-63), Enemy of Rome in first century BCE,” Livius: Articles on Ancient History, http://www.livius.org/mi-mn/mithridates/mithridates.htm. Sheerin 5 Early in his reign, Mithridates was invited by the Bosporan Kingdom to lead it against the Scythians, who had sacked the key city of Chersoneses.5 The ever-ambitious king took the chance and proclaimed himself protector of Greek culture against non-Greeks, or „barbarians‟.6 The Scythians had been able to pressure the Greek cities of the northern Black Sea into paying tribute and giving them stores of food. The small Greek cities had to rely on each other for what little protection they could provide against the ever present threat. The presence and fear of the barbarians created a unique opportunity for Mithridates to expand his kingdom and prestige. Mithridates‟ General Diophantos, son of Mithares, successfully defeated over fifty thousand Scythians with only his six thousand well trained troops. Afterward, he defeated the barbarian Tauri and a number of other tribes that were threatening Greek cities. The sources we have do not document the chronology of these events very well. We do know, however, that through these campaigns, Mithridates annexed nearly the entire northern shore of the Black Sea and soon came into control of nearly the entire coastline of the Black Sea, as far west as the Danube River.7 Mithridates, however, first showed signs that his ambitions would get in the way of his Greek ideals. He allied himself with the barbarian tribes Bastarnae and Thracians. With this circuit around the Black Sea, Mithridates had rich stores of manpower, food, ship building materials and a monopoly of the luxury trade.8 Next, he turned his ambitions to Asia Minor. Mithridates split the kingdom of Paphlagonia with King Nicomedes II Epiphanes of Bithynia. Next, between 104 and 103 BCE, he conquered Colchis (modern Georgia), parts of Armenia and looked south to Cappadocia and Galatia. This caught the attention of Rome. Rome had not paid much attention to, nor cared 5 This kingdom was located in present day Crimea on the opposite side of the Black Sea. McGing, “Subjection and Resistance”, 85. 7 Arthur E.R. Boak, A History of Rome to 565 AD. 3rd Edition. (New York: Macmillan, 1946), 197. 8 Brian McGing, The Foreign Policy of Mithridates VI Eupator King of Pontus. (Leiden: EJ Brill, 1986), 57-58). 6 about, Mithridates‟s conquests on the northern Black Sea, for it was much too concerned with its campaigns in North Africa and defending against Germanic tribes to its north. However, the Senate would not tolerate Mithridates and Nicomedes in Paphlagonia, and it ordered both kings to evacuate Cappadocia.9 After doing so, the powerful Roman consul, Gaius Marius, told him in 96 BCE either to “be stronger than the Romans or obey their commands in silence.”10 The following year, Lucius Cornelius Sulla, the praetor of Rome, put Ariobarzanes on the Cappodocian throne. Thus, Ariarathes IX, Mithridates‟s son, was removed as rule and Mithridates‟s indirect control negated.11 Rome was beginning to see that Mithridates could possibly become a very powerful adversary to the east. Thus, they sought to adopt a policy that would either prevent Pontus‟s further expansion or crush Pontus in a seemingly inevitable conflict. Mithridates also recognized that war with Rome was only a matter of time. He began preparing his army and navy for an impending conflict and attempted to align himself with any nations he could to help Pontus against Rome. The ambition of Mithridates more than caught the attention of Rome. The king and Rome were engaged in political intrigue within Asia Minor, a key outpost of the eastern part of the empire. Rome ruled through a series of puppet kings throughout the region. However, the ever-ambitious Mithridates attempted to maneuver his allies into leadership positions in several strategically important kingdoms. In 94 BCE, King Nicomedes II, the ruler of Bithynia, a Roman province located in what is present day northern Turkey, died, and this left a power vacuum in the region. Mithridates presented Socrates Chrestus, an upstart who coveted the Bithynian throne, as a legitimate heir. In addition, Mithridates tried to restore his son, Ariarathes 9 Lendering. McGing, “Subjection and Resistance”, 85. 11 McGing, The Foreign Policy of Mithridates, 77. 10 Sheerin 7 IX, in Cappadocia within the heart of Asia Minor. In both cases, however, Rome had other ideas: Nicomedes III Euergetes, son of Nicomedes II, was established in Bithynia and Ariobarzanes was restored in Cappadocia by Manius Aquilius around 90 BCE.12 Although ultimately outmaneuvered by Rome, Mithridates successfully caused political instability in the region. Moreover, his intrigues hurt Rome‟s political ambitions. In 89 BCE, Aquilius, Rome‟s consular legate in Asia Minor, persuaded Nicomedes III Euergetes to raid Pontus. This presented Mithridates with a legitimate cause to make war with Bithynia. He appealed to Rome asking them to either do something about the aggression or to let him react. Aquilius, acting on his own, refused to mediate or hear the king‟s complaints. For many in Asia Minor, Mithridates had adhered to Roman terms and was the aggrieved party. This allowed the peoples of Asia Minor to view the Roman Empire as the aggressor and tiny Pontus as the victim. He could now proclaim himself as liberator from Roman oppression and greed in Asia. Still, Mithridates moved cautiously in Asia Minor overall because he wanted to take Rome (Aquilius, in particular) by surprise. Rome had been engulfed in a war with its allies on Italy, known as the Social War. The last thing the Senate wanted was a full scale confrontation in Asia. Acting mostly on his own, however, Aquilius instigated Mithridates. Nicomedes invaded Pontus while Aquilius and his forces held defensive positions. Pontic generals Neoptolemus and Archelaus forced the Bithynians and Romans into flight. Mithridates occupied Bithynia in 89 BCE. He treated the conquered people with great compassion and endeared them with his kindness.13 Many cities submitted willingly and the inadequate Roman forces fled again. Other cities like Rhodes and Magnesia resisted and were besieged. The inhabitants of Mytilene, a city of the isle Lesbos, handed over Aquilius willingly and invited Mithridates in. 12 13 Lendering. McGing, The Foreign Policy of Mithridates, 108-109. Mithridates had Aquilius killed by pouring molten gold down his throat, symbolizing the greed of the Roman oppressors. Mithridates quickly annexed Cappadocia and Bithynia and easily defeated Roman opposition in Asia Minor in 89 BCE, as his fleet of three hundred ships took control of the Aegean.14 Mithridates assumed control of all but a couple of cities in Asia Minor, as most of the inhabitants saw him as a liberator from oppressive Roman rule and welcomed him. In 88 BCE, he had at least 80,000 Romans and Italians living in Asia Minor massacred by the populations of his newly acquired cities. The Asiatic Vespers, as it is known, proved both the peoples‟ hatred for Rome and allegiance to their new king. Mithridates believed that these cities were now “married to him”, forever viewed as enemies of Rome.15 Furthermore, it eliminated a large Italian presence in Asia and provided vast amounts of property for Mithridates to usurp. So great was the government‟s gains that Mithridates allowed participating cities a five year tax exemption.16 This was a much welcomed change from Roman tax laws. Mithridates had support in the Greek world due to the work of his ancestors. In 115 BCE, Dionysus, (not to be confused with Mithridates‟s surname) son of Neon, erected a statue of Mithridates and his brother on Delos. In Athens, Rhodes and Delos there were herons, coins and statues dedicated to Eupator.17 Mithridates filled his court with Greek philosophers, doctors, poets and historians. He was regarded in the Greek world as a great and civilized king. Mithridates not only strongly promoted Hellenism in his court; he used Greek propaganda to enhance his image. A famous bust of Mithridates as Hercules was created to honor him. Similar statues such as another of him as Hercules saving Prometheus from the eagle 14 McGing, “Subjection and Resistance”, 86. Boak, 197. 16 McGing, The Foreign Policy of Mithridates, 113. 17 Ibid., 89-90. A „heroon‟ is a small shrine filled with busts of Eupator and those close or important to him. 15 Sheerin 9 were created. This one in particular is a clear example of anti-Roman propaganda. Mithridates (Hercules) is depicted saving Prometheus (the Greek World) from the eagle (Rome/torture). Greek oracles foretold that a great king from the East would unite Europe and Asia and conquer and oppress Rome. His propaganda also focused heavily on Roman greed. The heavy taxes that Rome imposed angered her populations. When Mithridates promised to overthrow this subjugation, the people listened.18 Mithridates offered to free some slaves and cancel debts to Rome. This made most of the population love him. He was welcomed especially by the lower classes, but did not do as much to help the upper classes. The upper and ruling classes often cooperated with Rome in administering their domain and were rewarded substantially. They went along with their populations at first but represented a growing opposition from within to Mithridates. They knew that if Rome gained control again, supporters would be again rewarded, but dissenters would face the wrath of the Roman military.19 Mithridates‟s propaganda was based on protecting Hellenism and Greek peoples from tyranny and barbarians. As he had done at Chersoneses, Mithridates fought and ruled under the title of liberator of Greece and Greek people. Mithridates referred to the Romans as “barbarians” and likened the situation of Roman dominance of Greece to the Scythian takeover of Chersoneses in the Bosporus. Greece, eager to be rid of Roman taxes and foreign rule bought into Mithridates‟s claim. The Athenian populace took over the pro-Roman provincial government and gave control over to Mithridates.20 Other mainland Greeks took note of this. The populace of Athens aligned themselves with Mithridates and invited him to lead them. In 88 18 Ibid., 100, 116-117. Ibid. 20 Boak, 197. 19 BCE, Mithridates assumed control of the island Euboea and sent his general, Archelaus, into Greece. He destroyed the Roman eastern center Delos on his way to take control of Athens and much of southern Greece, while Mithridates sent another army from the north, into Hellas. Similar to his overrunning of Asia Minor, many willingly invited the king, the others were taken by force and few resisted the Pontic military.21 Meanwhile, in Rome, newly selected consul Sulla was selected to combat Mithridates in the east. Marius opposed Sulla and vied for control. When Sulla left to join his forces, Marius‟s supporters seized control of Rome and passed a law instituting Marius as commander in the east.22 Subsequently, Sulla marched on Rome and took control. The Marian, or “populares,” leaders were outlawed and Sulla replaced their legislation with some of his own, giving much power to the Senate. Finally, in 87 BCE, Sulla began his march on Greece.23 During this tumultuous period, Mithridates was basically running free on mainland Greece, gaining immense support. His greatest asset was that he had many recent victories and seemed invincible. Sulla and his five legions landed at Epirus, Greece, intent to change Mithridates‟s fortune. As he marched through Greece, the cities quickly sided with him to avoid harsh treatment. Both Pontic strongholds, Piraeus and Athens, fell to Sulla, but Archelaus managed to escape and joined the northern army at Thessaly. Sulla spared the buildings of Athens, but a large number of citizens were massacred. Sulla met Mithridates‟s army and won victories at Chaeronea and Orchomenus. He was anxious to start negotiations so he could return to Rome and restore order.24 Meanwhile, to Sulla‟s dismay, advocates of Marius‟s successor, Cinna, were taking control in Rome. They 21 McGing, The Foreign Policy of Mithridates, 119-123. Boak, 198. 23 Richard E. Sullivan, Dennis Sherman, and John B. Harrison, A Short History of Western Civilization (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1994), 114. 24 Appian, “History of Rome: The Mithradatic Wars,” Livius: Articles on Ancient History. http://www.livius.org/apark/appian/appian_mithridatic_01.html. 22 Sheerin 11 sent an army of their own, under Lucius Valerius Flaccus to combat Mithridates.25 Flaccus, however, was afraid to face Sulla and marched on the Hellespont. Gaius Flavius Fimbra led a mutiny and killed Flaccus. He assumed command of the army and captured Pergamum, Mithridates‟s capital. Discontent among the upper classes continued to grow in Mithridates‟s new territories. Mithridates‟s losses in Greece only added to this feeling. He had set up tyrants, or “satraps”, to rule over his new possessions, and this had aggravated the people from all classes as well. As Sulla methodically took back Greece, Mithridates was losing support in his Asian conquests to a combination of the military losses and his oppressive policies. He had all but three of sixty Galatian nobles executed when he found they were conspiring to assassinate him and side with Sulla. He appointed a satrap in Galatia, but he was run out by the remaining three nobles.26 Mithridates confiscated the property of all Chians (of the Asian city Chios) who fled to join Sulla. He imposed an immediate fine of two thousand talents on the city. Chios was unable to pay and the entire population was deported to the Euxine. He redistributed the property to loyal subjects. The king also discovered conspirators in Lesbos, Smyrna and Pergamum. He had over sixteen hundred suspects executed. He also usurped all wealth from his new provinces that he could, realizing that loss in the struggle was imminent.27 Mithridates still held the Aegean Sea and forced Sulla into winter quarters in Greece. In 85 BCE, naval commander Lucius Licinius Lucullus, defeated the Pontic navy and secured Sulla‟s passage to Asia. Many Greek and Asian cities recognized the dire position of Mithridates and abandoned supporting him. The cities were ultimately looking to be liberated from Roman 25 Marsh, 111. McGing, The Foreign Policy of Mithridates, 127. 27 Ibid., 129. The term “Euxine” refers to the Black Sea. 26 imperialism but, sought the most favorable treatment when retaken by Rome. Concerned with matters in Rome, Sulla did not destroy Mithridates. Instead, he gave the king rather favorable terms: Mithridates relinquished command in Greater Cappadocia and Bithynia to their former kings, gave up Paphlagonia and his other recent conquests, gave Sulla eighty warships, surrendered all prisoners of war and deserters, and paid modest reparations.28 Thus, the First Mithridatic War ended in 85 BCE, and Sulla spent that winter stabilizing the area and imposing a harsh settlement by confiscating lands and resources.29 Sulla illegally marched on Rome, again seized power, proscribed much of the populares‟ property, and became dictator while Mithridates was left to himself to rebuild and prepare. The aftermath of the First Mithradatic War included neither the total defeat of Mithridates, nor the acquisition of any new territory by Rome. The retaken eastern provinces were, however, for the first time made tributary; vastly increasing Roman interest and presence in the area. Perhaps the greatest effect of the first war was the damage that Eupator‟s reputation took. It was easy to see the superiority of the Roman military. Greek cities could not rely on this “protector/liberator of Hellenism” if he could not defeat the Romans. Worse still, Mithridates treated the cities that came under his control worse than the Romans had prior to him. He levied massive amounts of taxes to finance the war and demanded sacrifice from the people in order to win, which he did not. Finally, he fought mostly on mainland Greece, bringing the destruction of war to the very area he was supposed to be protecting and liberating. Mithridates lost the support of most of the Greek and Asian cities he once controlled. They recognized the might of Rome and would be reluctant to invite the harsh policies they experienced under Mithridates again. 28 A talent was a measure of mass in the ancient world that varied from region to region. Talents were used to measure amounts of precious metals such as gold and silver for currency. 29 Lendering. Sheerin 13 Mithridates began rebuilding his army and recruiting soldiers soon after the peace. Sulla left his legate and general, Lucius Lucinius Murena, in charge of the Roman province Asia. Murena raided Mithridates‟s territory, then moved his army into Pontus under the claims that Mithridates was preparing for war and posed a direct threat to Asia. The king, however, fully complied with Sulla‟s terms and was only using his military to put down uprisings in Colchis and the Bosporan Kingdom.30 After appealing to the Senate with no success, he was forced to act. Mithridates won a decisive victory and forced Murena out of Pontus. Sulla ordered that peace be made. The only change from the terms of the first Mithradatic War was that Mithridates annexed a small part of Cappadocia. Mithridates gained some of his prestige back with this win, but the massive defeat was still fresh in the minds of many. After this short second war (82 BCE), Mithridates again prepared his military.31 In preparation for yet another inevitable conflict, Mithridates enlisted the help of another Roman enemy, Quintus Sertorius. Sertorius was proconsul and a Roman general. He sided with Marius and opposed Sulla. Sertorius and his army opposed Rome in the province of Hispania, present day Spain. Mithridates offered to give Sertorius forty warships and three thousand talents if he would recognize Mithridates‟s rights to Bithynia, Paphlagonia, Cappadocia, Galatia and Asia. Sertorius disagreed on the rights to Asia and did not include that in the treaty. In 74 BCE, Mithridates and Sertorius finalized a treaty. Sertorius sent some troops to aid Mithridates under M. Marius. Next, Mithridates appealed to Ptolemy Auletes of Egypt for support. He would not get any from Egypt but did find sufficient help from the pirates of the Mediterranean and Black Seas. The pirates were largely autonomous and sought after their own material gains rather than hampering the Romans for Mithridates‟s cause. Nonetheless, they did provide some 30 31 McGing, The Foreign Policy of Mithridates, 133. McGing, “Subjection and Resistance”, 187. opposition to Roman naval forces and greatly helped the king. They were also a means by which Mithridates could keep in touch with Sertorius.32 Mithridates sought help from anyone he thought might be able to lend it. Based on this fact, we can infer that he would do anything to help his cause against Rome. He did not care so much about protecting or liberating the Greek people as he did his kingdom and expansion. He did, however, skillfully use his stance as great protector of Hellenism to enlist Greek help. The opportunity in Asia Minor was again ripe for Mithridates to gain influence. Sulla cruelly punished the cities that turned on Rome and instituted huge taxes and war reparations. The cities were forced to borrow money. When they could not pay the interest, many people were sold or enslaved Rome did nothing when the people of Asia appealed for help.33 Conflict was again initiated in 75 BCE, when King Nicomedes IV of Bithynia died and left his kingdom to Rome.34 Mithridates, immediately wished to contest this territory, and invaded, instigating the Third, and final, Mithradatic War. Mithridates‟s fleet quickly won a victory at Chalcedon. His army, however, was defeated on land at Kyzikos (or Cyzicus), near the Hellespont by Lucullus. From the outset of war, the cities of Asia Minor and the Black Sea did not submit easily, as they had in the first war. Mithridates was, therefore, forced to withdraw with heavy losses. Lucullus pursued Mithridates with no major conflicts for almost the next five years through Bithynia, Pontus and into Armenia.35 In Armenia, Mithridates was taken in and protected by his son-in-law King Tigranes. In 69 BCE, Lucullus demanded Tigranes turn Mithridates over, to which the latter refused. Machares, Mithridates‟s son who now was in 32 McGing, The Foreign Policy of Mithridates, 138-139. Plutarch, Agesilaus and Pompey; Pelopidas and Marcellus. Translated by Bernadotte Perrin. Plutarch‟s Lives. Volume 5. (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1917), 1-2. 34 Boak, 207. 35 McGing, “Subjection and Resistance”, 88. 33 Sheerin 15 charge of the Bosporan Kingdom, appealed to Lucullus and became “friend and ally of the Roman people.”36 Lucullus invaded Armenia and took its capital Tigranocerta, but had to stop because of his mutinous soldiers and a large number of deserters. When Rome withdrew support for Lucullus‟s campaign in 68 BCE, Mithridates slipped back into Pontus and defeated the Romans under Cotta in his country.3739 Mithridates and Tigranes were left to themselves in their respective countries. Rome had failed once again to capture or kill Mithridates. Shortly after, in 66 BCE, Gnaeus Pompeius Magnus, known as Pompey, took command in the east. He sent an envoy with peaceful offerings to Mithridates. The king would not make peace because he believed he could get support from Phraaces, the powerful king of Parthia. Phraaces, however, sided with Pompey. Pompey defeated Mithridates easily in their first combat. Mithridates fled, using a scorched Earth tactic against Pompey. Pompey was far from home, in unfamiliar land and unable to acquire sufficient provisions for his army. Mithridates felt he was winning and Pompey‟s men would soon lose motivation and turn back. He had witnessed two mutinies and many desertions by Roman soldiers before and believed it was only a matter of time until it happened again. On his way to Armenia, Mithridates made camp atop a high hill in a great defensive position. Pompey dared not attack the impregnable position but baited Mithridates instead. He set up camp in a wooded area off the base of the hill and lined up his troops in a horseshoe shape. He sent some of his light cavalry out to the base of the hill, baiting Mithridates‟s far superior cavalry to attack them. They did just that. Pompey‟s cavalry retreated into the woods, where his men fell upon Mithridates‟s men from all sides, executing a 36 Dio. Dio’s Roman History. Translated by Earnest Cary. Volume 3. (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1954), 3. 37 Appian, 66. double envelopment. Some escaped, but the many killed took away Pontus‟s upper hand in cavalry: one of Mithridates‟s only advantages.38 Pompey surrounded the hill and wanted force Mithridates‟s army into direct conflict. Mithridates, however, fooled Pompey and slipped out at night into Armenia. Mithridates marched for some time and lost sight of Pompey‟s army. He believed he had lost them or they gave up and turned around, so he continued on his way nonchalantly. Pompey had, in fact, wheeled around and gotten ahead of Mithridates. Mithridates took his army through a pass with high ground on both sides. At night, Pompey surrounded his enemy, taking the high ground. The Romans descended on the confused and frightened soldiers in the valley. The majority of Mithridates‟s army was killed or captured, but he was able to escape with some of his forces. Mithridates made his way toward Tigranes but found no help from him. Tigranes had been at war with Parthia and his son, who sought the Armenian throne, had no help or protection to offer.39 Mithridates turned north and marched to Colchis, which is located on the eastern coast of the Black Sea, in modern day Georgia. Pompey sent a pursuing party to find out where Mithridates was going but mostly focused on Armenia and the surrounding areas. Mithridates slipped away up to the Bosporan Kingdom on the northern shore of the Black Sea. Mithridates marched in with his dwindling` army had Machares killed and took over. Thus, again, he was left alone and began recruiting, publicizing anti-Roman propaganda and making preparations for conflict with Rome. Pompey attempted to follow Mithridates‟s route between the Caspian and Black Seas up to the Bosporus. The terrain and people were hostile and Pompey deemed it not 38 39 Dio, 75-79. Ibid., 199-203. Sheerin 17 worth the risk to march through the dangerous and unfamiliar land. He sent his prefect Servilius, admiral of the Euxine Fleet, to blockade Mithridates‟s kingdom. Pompey turned around and marched south to bring Syria and the other nations of the area under control. Along the way, Mithridates‟s rich fortresses surrendered to Pompey.40 Pompey stated that Mithridates was easier to deal with in battle than in flight. He knew Mithridates was forming another army but did not care.41 The beleaguered king had to lay down huge taxes on the Bosporan people. He planned for lofty and farfetched goals, such as a land invasion of Italy, similar to Hannibal‟s. The people had once loved the inventive, energetic king who embodied the ideals of the people, but they no longer identified with the tyrant who seemed bent on destruction. Dio states that, Mithridates “preferred to perish along with his kingdom, with pride undiminished, rather than live deprived of it in humility and disgrace.”42 He no longer cared for his philhellenism, which he showcased earlier in his reign and cared not for the well being of his subjects. He was bent on victory over Rome or glory in defeat. He would allow his Greek and Persian kingdom to perish along with him rather than submit to Roman oppressors. The public was incensed with rage at Mithridates‟s taxation and seizure of property to finance his new army. Phanagoreia and other neighboring cities revolted. Along with the public, many of his armed forces did not share the zeal and passion to fight Rome. Nearly none believed that the king would lead an invasion of the Italian peninsula. In 63 BCE, Pharnaces, son of Eupator and apparent heir, recognized the dire situation the remains of the kingdom was in. He knew total defeat at Roman hands was ultimately inevitable. He conspired with some of the king‟s officers against his father in the city of Phanagoreia, just across the Bosporus from the 40 Peter Greenhalgh, Pompey: The Roman Alexander. (Columbia: University of Missouri Press), 114-115, 126, and 131. 41 Ibid., 133. 42 Dio, 119. king‟s new capital at Panticapaeum. The king learned of this and sent some of his bodyguards to seize Pharnaces. Pharnaces easily persuaded these men to his cause, and together, they marched on Panticapaeum and his father. Mithridates was locked up in his citadel with his wives and other children. First, he administered poison to them and then drank all that remained. Mithridates survived due to immunity he built up and remained alive in a weakened state. He attempted again to commit suicide by stabbing himself with his sword, but could not finish himself off. Dio states that Pharnaces‟s troops came in and killed the dying king.43 Appian and Plutarch hold that his compassionate guard, Bituitus, ended the king‟s life upon his request.44 Either way, it does not matter. For the purpose of the argument, the subjects of Mithridates were dissatisfied and wanted him dead. After the death of Eupator, Pompey established firm Roman control in Asia Minor as far east as Armenia and south along the coast into Palestine.45 He combined Bithynia and Pontus to make one new Roman province, established Syria and set up tribute collections.46 Also, he made many kingdoms, such as Judea and Armenia dependant allies, to act as buffers on the Roman frontier. Pompey believed that strong Roman presence in places like the east would prevent another enemy like Mithridates from emerging. Pharnaces was allowed to rule the Bosporan Kingdom as Rome‟s ally. Thus, Mithridates was the final autonomous Greek king in the East. Mithridates attempted to take Asia Minor and Greece from Rome, becoming a mechanism by which Rome would truly administer and dominate those regions for hundreds of years to come (including Byzantine rule). He used the title of protector/liberator of Greece and Hellenism effectively to gain support, recruit allies and tie people emotionally to his noble cause. 43 Dio, 123; McGing, “Subjection and Resistance”, 88; Boak, 214. Appian, 455; Plutarch, 207. 45 McGing, “Subjection and Resistance”, 88. 46 Sullivan, 119. 44 Sheerin 19 Mithridates Eupator was an adept politician, a good general and a great inspirer. He used all resources and means available to him to combat his arch enemy Rome and enlisted the support of people from widespread territories. Mithridates used his ripe opportunity in time to get this great support. He aligned himself with anyone who may have helped him, even Sertorius who was himself Roman. The king‟s inability to recognize that the best chance he had against Rome was to reverse Roman oppression and keep the support of the people ultimately was the deciding factor in his defeat. Bibliography Appian. “History of Rome: The Mithradatic Wars.” Livius: Articles on Ancient History. 05 October 2009. <http://www.livius.org/ap-ark/appian/appian_mithridatic_01.html>. Boak, Arthur E. R., Ph. D. A History of Rome to 565 A.D. 3rd ed. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1946. Dio. Dio’s Roman History. Translated by Earnest Cary. vol. 3. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1954. Greenhalgh, Peter. Pompey: The Roman Alexander. Columbia: University of Missouri Press, 1981. Lendering, Jona. “Mithridates.” Livius: Articles on Ancient History. 05 October 2009. <http://www.livius.org/mi-mn/mithridates/mithridates.htm>. Marsh, Frank Burr. A History of the Roman World: From 146 to 30 B.C. 3rd ed. vol. 5. London: Methuen & Co. Ltd., 1967. McGing, B.C. The Foreign Policy of Mithridates VI Eupator King of Pontus. Leiden, The Netherlands: E.J. Brill 1986. McGing, Brian. “Subjection and Resistance: to the Death of Mithridates.” A Companion to the Hellenistic World. Ed. Andrew Erskine. Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishing Ltd., 2003. Plutarch. Agesilaus and Pompey. Pelopidas and Marcellus. Translated by Bernadotte Perrin. vol. 5 of Plutarch’s Lives. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1917. Sullivan, Richard E., Dennis Sherman, and John B. Harrison. A Short History of Western Civilization. New York: McGraw-Hill Inc., 1994.