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Hegemony Or Survival? How Propaganda Perpetuates
And Sustains America’s Global Dominance
by
Kioko Ireri
COMM 643
Miami University
Fall 2007
Professor: Dr. David Sholle
December 11, 2007
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Hegemony Or Survival? How Propaganda Perpetuates
And Sustains America’s Global Dominance
There is no doubt that when it comes to global dominance, America, the most powerful
state in history has no peer competitor. America’s global hegemony is ubiquitous, from the war
ravaged Somalia in East Africa, Afghanistan in South Asia, to Iraq in the Middle East. The
hegemony is exhibited through three fronts: the military front, the economic front, and the
propaganda front. How the US has managed to spread its dominance tentacles, is mainly seen
through military power, which is second to none. This explains why Americans have nearly been
involved in all major wars since the World War I. Noam Chomsky, perhaps the most widely read
voice on foreign policy on the planet explains that the American hegemony is rooted in Wilsonian
idealism that states: “The imperative of America’s mission as the vanguard of history, transforming
the global order and, in doing so, perpetuating its own dominance,” guided by “the imperative of
military supremacy, maintained in perpetuity and projected globally.”1
To perpetuate, protect, and sustain this hegemony requires the all-important role of
propaganda. This paper mirrors the successes and failures of President Bush’s propaganda model
in the Iraq war, and addresses the question of whether America’s invasion of the oil rich nation was
a show of hegemony or a survival tactic.
Three key terminologies are important in this paper: hegemony, dominance, and
propaganda. Hegemony is a concept developed in the 1930s by Antonio Gramsci, an Italian
political theorist. The concept was later incorporated in cultural studies. O’Sullivan et al. define
hegemony as the ability of the dominant classes to exercise social and cultural leadership - rather
than by direct coercion of subordinate classes - to maintain their power over the economic, political
Chomsky, Noam. Hegemony or Survival - America's Quest for Global Dominance. New York: Henry Holt and
Company, 2004, 43.
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and cultural direction of the nation.2 The authors point out that hegemony does not force people
against their conscious will, but seeks their consent to fit with the interests of the hegemonic
leadership or power bloc.
Agreeing with O’Sullivan et al., Morton argues that hegemony is a form of dominance that
refers more to a consensual order, so that “dominance by a powerful state may be a necessary but
not sufficient condition of hegemony.”3 But Jones notes that hegemony is more sensitive, thus,
useful than “domination” which he says fails to acknowledge the active role of subordinate people
in the operation of power. Moreover, he explains that, “hegemony is moral and intellectual
leadership which treats the aspirations and views of subaltern people as an active element within
the political and cultural program of the hegemonizing bloc.”4
The term propaganda entered the Encyclopedia Britannica in 1922 and in the
Encyclopedia of Social Sciences a decade later. Klaebu explains that the propaganda model of
media operations devised by Edward Herman and Noam Chomsky in Manufacturing Consent: The
Political Economy of the Mass Media postulates that elite media interlock with other institutional
sectors in ownership, management and social circles, effectively circumscribing their ability to
remain detached from other dominant institutional sectors.5 The author observes that the HermanChomsky model avows to the view that the mass media are instruments of power that “mobilize”
support for the special interests that dominate the state and private activity.6
Propaganda is mainly executed through the mass media which serves as a system for
communicating messages to the general public. It is the function of the mass media to entertain,
O'Sullivan, Tim, John Hartley, Danny Saunders, and Martin Montgomery. Key Concepts in Communication and
Cultural Studies. London: Routledge, 1994, 133.
3 Morton, Adam. Unraveling Gramsci. Ann Arbor: Pluto Press, 2007, 113.
4 Jones, Steve. Antonio Gramsci. New York: Routledge, 2006, 55.
5 Klaebu, Jeffrey. "A Critical Review and Assessment of Herman and Chomsky's 'Propaganda Model'." European
Journal of Communication, no. 17 (2002): 147.
6 Ibid., 148.
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inform, and educate the target audience. But, at the same time, Herman and Chomsky assert that
the mass media inculcate individuals with the values, beliefs, and codes of behavior that integrate
them into the institutional structures of the larger society.7 In fact, Rutherford refers to media as
tools or weapons of mass persuasion utilized to sell the commodity of war to Americans.8
Contrastingly, Rampton and Stauber rather see media as weapons of mass deception - used to
dupe or deceive people to blindly support unwarranted decisions or actions by the elite.
While mass media play an important role in democratic societies, Klaebu clarifies that they
are presupposed to act as intermediary vehicles that reflect public opinion, respond to public
concerns and make the electorate cognizant of state policies, important events and viewpoints. 9
Thus, the Herman-Chomsky propaganda model traces avenues through which money and power
manage to filter out news fit to print or broadcast, marginalize dissent, and allow the government or
dominant interests to get their messages to the public. The point Herman and Chomsky are putting
across is that the elite dominate the media, a thing that results in marginalization of dissenting
voices that are seen as a threat to the status quo or the ruling class. Backing this view, Klaebu
observes that, “news discourse is framed so as to reproduce interpretations which endorse,
legitimize and promote elite interests.”10
Now, it is necessary to examine and understand the ingredients of the propaganda model
that filters or censors news to meet the interests of the elite. Of course, news censorship results in
denying members of the public the right to know the truth regarding issues that affect their lives.
These ingredients fall under the following five headings:
Herman, Edward, and Noam Chomsky. Manufacturing Consent: The Political Economy of the Mass Media. New
York: Pantheon Books, 1988, 1.
8 Rutherford, Paul. Weapons of Mass Persuasion: Marketing the War Against Iraq. Toronto: University of Toronto
Press, 2004, 193.
9 Klaebu, Jeffrey. "A Critical Review and Assessment of Herman and Chomsky's 'Propaganda Model'." European
Journal of Communication, no. 17 (2002): 147.
10 Ibid., 152.
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a) The size, concentrated ownership, owner wealth, and profit orientation of dominant
mass-media firms;
b) Advertising as the primary income source of the mass media;
c) The reliance of the media on information provided by government, business, and
“experts” funded and approved by these primary sources and agents of power;
d) “Flak” as a means of disciplining the media; and
e) “Anticommunism” as a national religion and control mechanism.
The first filter recognizes that the media are tiered, with the top tier - as measured by
prestige, resources, and outreach. This tier comprise of between ten and twenty-four corporations,
which according to Herman and Chomsky define the news agenda and supplies much of the
national and international news to the lower tiers of the media, and subsequently to the general
public.11 The fact is that these twenty-four giant corporations are profit-seeking, owned and
controlled by wealthy people. These companies have assets in excess of $1 billion, and
approximately three-quarters of these media organizations had after-tax profits in excess of $100
million in 1986. To capture the media situation in the United States, Herman and Chomsky write:
In 1986 there were some 1,500 daily newspapers, 11,000 magazines, 9,000 radio and 1,500 TV
stations, 2,400 book publishers and seven movie studios in the United States – over 25,000 media
entities in all. But large proportion of those among this set who were news dispensers were very
small and local, dependent on the large national companies and wire services for all but local
news. Many more were subject to common ownership, sometimes extending through virtually the
entire set of media variants.12
On the other hand, an advertising-based system drives out of existence into marginality
the media companies that depend on revenue from sales alone. While the advertisers’ choices
influence media prosperity and survival, they at the same time serve as a powerful mechanism that
weakens the working-class press. Weakening of the working-class press means that interests of
ordinary people are not fully articulated within the realm of the public sphere through the
Herman, Edward, and Noam Chomsky. Manufacturing Consent: The Political Economy of the Mass Media. New
York: Pantheon Books, 1988, 5.
12 Ibid., 4.
11
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mainstream media giants. The hegemonic function, however, strives to see to it that the plight of
the working class is put into consideration within its political and cultural programs. For instance, as
a way of managing this social group, a hegemonic leadership would encourage them to form trade
unions through which their aspirations are articulated. Herman and Chomsky explain:
The ad-based media receive an advertising subsidy that gives them a price-marketing-quality
edge, which allows them to encroach on and further weaken their ad- free rivals. Even if ad-based
media cater to an affluent (“upscale”) audience, they easily pick up a large part of the “downscale”
audience, and their rivals lose market share and are eventually driven our or marginalized.13
The reliance of the media on gathering information provided by state agents and
institutions owned by wealthy people only acts as a means of curtailing journalists’ independence
as they in the process fall prey to propaganda mill controlled by the powers that be in society. The
Pentagon has a public-information service that aims at disseminating positive information about
America forces to the public. For example, in 1980 the US Air Force revealed that its publicinformation outreach included the following: 140 newspapers, 690,000 copies per week; Airman
magazine, monthly circulation 125,000; 34 radio and 17 TV stations, primarily overseas; 45,000
headquarters and unit news releases; 50 meetings with editorial boards, and 6,600 interviews with
news media, etc.14
“Flak” refers to negative responses to a media or program. Examples take the form of
letters, phone calls, petitions, lawsuits, complaints, threat, and punitive action. Flak from the
powerful can be costly as seen from what befell The People Daily, a national English daily in
Kenya. On March 22, 2002, then Minister for Trade and Industry Nicholas Biwott won a libel suit
against the newspaper in the amount of $250,000 for implicating him in the allegedly corrupt
dealings during the construction of the Turkwel Gorge hydro electric power plant in Turkana district.
Biwott, then Minister for Energy was such a powerful figure during President Daniel Moi’s regime
13
14
Ibid., 15.
Ibid., 19.
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which was voted out in December 2002 after twenty four years of wanton mismanagement of
public resources. At the height of his power, Biwott, the diminutive Keiyo South Member of
Parliament, boisterously referred to himself as “Mr. Total Man.” The $250,000 Biwott compensation
was a record punitive action meted on a news organization in the country’s media history. It stands
out clearly as an example of ramifications associated with flak.
It is certain that all governments engage in propaganda to counter criticism from opposition
quarters, or when state agents want to whip up the support of the masses for a certain cause of
action. Crises such as the Iran-Contra scandal, the Cuba Missile Crisis, or the Iraq war create a
platform for the return of the propaganda state, which Rutherford defines as, “a regime in which the
governors employ constant stream of messages to propel the population toward some desired
condition of right thinking and acting.”15 The term “propaganda state” was first witnessed during the
early years of revolution when the Communist Party tried to remake Russia. Rutherford writes that
the Bolshevik regime prohibited dissent and employed posters, advertising, school books, plays,
paintings, newspapers, cinema - all apparatus of persuasion so as to fashion the new socialist man
and woman.16 During the 1930s Nazi Germany was at the forefront as a propaganda state with
Joseph Goebbels, a genius of persuasion, commanding the press, radio, art, and cinema to
program minds and stigmatize enemies. During the Second World War, Goebbels employed
“whisper” (or person-to-person) propaganda to ensure a uniform set of messages that expressed
the Nazi vision of war.17
In 2002, President Bush and his think tank team were burning the midnight oil scheming
how to invade Iraq, and depose Saddam Hussein from power. By September, the Bush
Rutherford, Paul. Weapons of Mass Persuasion: Marketing the War Against Iraq. Toronto: University of Toronto
Press, 2004, 184.
16 Ibid., 185.
17 Ibid., 186.
15
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administration announced its National Security Strategy that declared the right to resort to force to
eliminate any perceived challenge to the US global hegemony. It is a fact that controlling the
general population has always been a dominant concern of power, and the Bush administration
was eager to do so. Chomsky, in his book Hegemony or Survival: America’s Quest for Global
Dominance, writes that the same September, a propaganda campaign was launched to depict
Saddam as an imminent threat to the United States and to insinuate that he was responsible for
the 9-11 atrocities and was planning others.18 Perhaps a hegemonic perspective can offer a better
way to understand the Bush administration’s propaganda strategy and its impact on public opinion
in relation to the Iraq invasion.
Therefore, the challenge facing President Bush and his henchmen was to craft
communications strategies that would sell what Americans wanted to hear - that Saddam
masterminded the 9-11 bombing of the World Trade Center (WTC), and that the tyrant was in
possession of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD). In the aftermath of 9-11, Americans felt
horror, anger and outright astonishment, and therefore any propaganda pinpointing the devil
behind the heinous attack would be good music to the ears of the US citizens. Earlier in this paper I
stated that the US media is owned and controlled by affluent people, and it must serve their
interests. Hence in the wake of the Iraq invasion, the media had no option but to support both the
imperial grand strategy and the propaganda campaign that depicted Saddam as a real threat to
Americans. Regarding media’s collusion with elites, Snow and Taylor observe:
Although they will rarely admit to it, news organizations are often willing colluders with
governments and militaries in efforts to censor because major media owners are members of the
political elite themselves and therefore share similar goals and outcomes. Making profit would
appear to rank higher than telling the truth in the minds of some media owners and many of their
employees.19
Chomsky, Noam. Hegemony or Survival - America's Quest for Global Dominance. New York: Henry Holt and
Company, 2004, 43.
19 Snow, Nancy, and Philip Taylor. "The Revival of the Propaganda State." The International Gazette, no. 68 (2006):
396.
18
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The quest to perpetuate, protect and sustain the American hegemony was unstoppable,
not even the toothless Security Council division of the United Nations could convince President
Bush that attacking Iraq was not a wise move. Saddam had already failed to fully comply with
numerous Security Council resolutions. Indeed, well-known international affairs specialist John
Ikenbery describes the National Security Strategy as, “grand strategy that begins with fundamental
commitment to maintaining a unipolar world in which the United States has no competitor.”20
Chomsky notes that when the UN fails to serve as “an instrument of American unilateralism” on
issues of elite concern, it is dismissed. It is well documented that since the 1960s, the US has been
at the frontline - notoriously vetoing UN Security Council resolutions on a wide range of issues,
even those calling on states to observe international law.
The national security propaganda was not enough to convince Americans that attacking
Iraq was necessary. The Bush advisors did not leave anything to chance as they crafted a plethora
of other communication strategies such as advertising and public relation campaigns to sell the war
product to Americans. Some of the Bush administration’s advice came from Jack Leslie, chairman
of Weber Shandwick, one of the world’s largest public relations firms. Rampton and Stauber in their
book Weapons of Mass Deception say that Leslie proposed that the United States adopt a PR
version of the “Powell doctrine” of using “overwhelming force” as its communications strategy.21
Rampton and Stauber, further write:
The Washington Post reported that the White House had created an Office of Global
Communications (OGC) to coordinate the administration’s foreign policy message and supervise
America’s image abroad. In September, the Times of London reported that the OGC would spend
$200 million for a “PR blitz against Saddam Hussein” aimed “at American and foreign
audiences, particularly in Arab nations skeptical of US policy in the region.” The campaign
Chomsky, Noam. Hegemony or Survival - America's Quest for Global Dominance. New York: Henry Holt and
Company, 2004, 11.
21 Rampton, Sheldon, and John Stauber. Weapons of Mass Deception. New York: Jeremy P. Tarcher, 2003, 10.
20
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would use “advertising techniques to persuade crucial target that the Iraqi leader must be
ousted.22
The choice of Leslie encapsulates how Bush and his cronies were determined to use
credible figures in the fields of communication and politics. They went for the best, so as to win the
support of the public. They wanted credible personalities who can transform attitudes of Americans
jittery about the Iraq invasion. Leslie was the man fitting this bill. Weber Shandwick’s website
describes Leslie as a veteran communication strategist. He has been an architect of some of the
most visible communication campaigns of the last two decades, as well as serving as a high-level
strategist for nationwide political campaigns on three continents. Weber Shandwick’s website
further states that:
Leslie specializes in helping prominent corporations and public institutions to transform public
attitudes rapidly on divisive, high-profile issues. Leslie's dual background as a seasoned
communications professional and political operative offers a unique perspective that enables him to
integrate advertising, media relations, direct marketing and political strategy.23
Leslie has served as a communications crisis advisor to the NY-NJ Port Authority in the
immediate aftermath of the 1993 World Trade Center bombing and to American Airlines following
the attacks of 9-11; to the Government of Colombia on illegal narcotics; to the State of Florida on
the shootings of foreign tourists; and many other foreign and domestic crises. He was a senior aide
to Senator Edward M. Kennedy as well as a strategist on dozens of nationwide and local
campaigns in the United States, Asia, Africa and Latin America. Leslie has advised several heads
of state on communications as well as managing trade and economic development campaigns for
the governments of Colombia, Chile, Portugal, the Philippines and Indonesia. Such a respectable
Ibid., 38.
"Jack Leslie." Weber Shadwick. Available from http://www.webershandwick.com/Default.aspx/People/JackLeslie.
Internet; accessed 7 December 2007.
22
23
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resume saw Leslie’s wealth of experience in managing crisis being desperately sought by the Bush
administration to sell the Iraq war to skeptical people.
Since coming to power the Bush administration had fumbled on many issues of national
importance. This is why many Americans did not buy the idea of attacking Iraq. Therefore, to make
the clamor to invade Iraq more credible, the Bush administration used then secretary of state Colin
Powell to announce that indeed Iraq had assembled biological weapons of mass destruction.
Secretary Powell had a distinguishing career as a soldier. He was a professional soldier for 35
years, during which time he held myriad command and staff positions and rose to the rank of 4-star
General. His last assignment, from October 1, 1989 to September 30, 1993, was as the 12 th
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the highest military position in the Department of Defense.
During this time, he oversaw 28 crises, including Operation Desert Storm in the US’ victorious 1991
Persian Gulf War. His success during the Gulf war earned him respect, and even political pundits
argued that Powell would pass as a credible and strong presidential candidate. Secretary Powell’s
civilian awards include two Presidential Medals of Freedom, the President’s Citizens Medal, the
Congressional Gold Medal, the Secretary of State Distinguished Service Medal, and the Secretary
of Energy Distinguished Service Medal.24 On February 5, 2003, Powell appeared before the UN to
“prove” the urgency to engage a war with Iraq. He told the UN that Iraq harbors a terrorist network
headed by al-Qaeda operative Abu Musab Zarqawi. He also showed photos of what he said was a
poison and explosives training camp in north-east Iraq, operated by the group.
In November 2002, immediately after the mid-term elections, a new group - Committee for
the Liberation of Iraq (CLI) was formed, and Rampton and Stauber say that its mission statement
was, “to promote regional peace, political freedom and international security by replacing the
"Secretary of State Colin L. Powell." The White House. Available from
http://www.whitehouse.gov/government/powell-bio.html. Internet; accessed 7 December 2007.
24
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Saddam Hussein regime with a democratic government that respects the rights of the Iraqi people
and ceases to threaten the community of nations.25 There were other groups pushing the pro-war
propaganda agenda for America’s survival. These were; the Project for the New American Century
and the American Enterprise Institute, the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS),
the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, Middle East Forum, the Hudson Institute and the
Hoover Institute, each which shared a number of overlapping memberships and interests with the
others.
In the months preceding the Iraq invasion, the government media propaganda mouthpiece
had its effects, as within weeks, Chomsky reports that some 60 percent of Americans came to
regard Saddam Hussein as an “immediate threat to the US” who must be removed from power as
quickly as possible.26 And by March, almost half of Americans believed that Saddam Hussein was
personally involved in the 9-11 attacks and that the hijackers included Iraqis. It is also notable that
the propaganda united Americans, at least setting aside their political differences. During the 2002
midterm elections, the Bush administration won a mere majority as American voters put aside their
immediate worries and demonstrated their commitment to fight the common enemy. President
Bush’s approval rating stood at a high of 70 percent.
Therefore, it can be seen that hegemonic function of the Bush administration built its
agenda for the war based on the 9-11 bombing of WTC twin towers. That propaganda linking
Saddam Hussein with 9-11 won the consent of many Americans to endorse the war is a pure
hegemonic function, which thrives on consensual order, and not coercing people to support a
public agenda. The hegemonic function had less resistance in achieving its goal. This is so
Rampton, Sheldon, and John Stauber. Weapons of Mass Deception. New York: Jeremy P. Tarcher, 2003, 53.
Chomsky, Noam. Hegemony or Survival - America's Quest for Global Dominance. New York: Henry Holt and
Company, 2004, 18.
25
26
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because even the democrats, who were supposed to question the motive behind invading Iraq,
appeared to already have succumbed to the propaganda.
How the democrats’ bigwigs succumbed to the pro-war propaganda and to a lager extent
the hegemonic function is demonstrated by what they said about Saddam. On October 9, 2002,
Senator John Kerry, who ran for the presidency in 2004 said: "I will be voting to give the President
of the United States the authority to use force - if necessary - to disarm Saddam Hussein because I
believe that a deadly arsenal of weapons of mass destruction in his hands is a real and grave
threat to our security." The following day Senator Hillary Clinton of New York, now garnering for
the democratic presidential nomination ahead of next year’s presidential polls said:
In the four years since the inspectors left, intelligence reports show that Saddam Hussein has
worked to rebuild his chemical and biological weapons stock, his missile delivery capability, and his
nuclear program. He has also given aid, comfort, and sanctuary to terrorists, including al Qaeda
members. It is clear, however, that if left unchecked, Saddam Hussein will continue to increase his
capacity to wage biological and chemical warfare, and will keep trying to develop nuclear
weapons.27
On September 23, 2002, former vice president Al Gore said, “We know that he has stored
secret supplies of biological and chemical weapons throughout his country." Senator Jay
Rockefeller of West Virginia said: “There is unmistakable evidence that Saddam Hussein is
working aggressively to develop nuclear weapons and will likely have nuclear weapons within the
next five years. We should also remember we have always underestimated the progress Saddam
has made in development of weapons of mass destruction.”28
It can also be said that the Bush war propaganda addressed some of the values that keep
the fabric of American society intact. American values revolve around patriotism, democracy,
freedom and the American Dream. The urge for the Iraq war called for the spirit of patriotism, and
"Don't Quote Me." BreakTheChain.org. Available from http://www.breakthechain.org/exclusives/demquotes.html.
Internet; accessed 7 December 2007.
28 Ibid.
27
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for the American people to defend their country by going for the enemy’s jugular. The American
society professes democracy, and they saw the dictatorial leadership of Saddam as an impediment
to the liberation of Iraqis, especially women and the Kurds. They also thought that imminent threat
from Saddam was tantamount to putting the “American Dream” in jeopardy.
March 18, 2003 was a day of reckoning for Saddam Hussein as the US troops, backed by
British forces invaded Iraq. Patrick and Thrall argue that the hegemonic perspective envisions a
president able to command media attention in support of his agenda and to determine the news
framing applied to Iraq.29 Therefore, Bush’s propaganda team set the news agenda, and framed
war coverage for the news media and the public. So the media was there to cover the unfolding
events. Interpreting the hegemonic nature of the Iraq war news coverage, Rutherford says, “Once
the bombing started, the big media rallied to the cause of war, as did much of the public, leaving
even less room for dissent.”30 The hegemonic function perpetrated by the political elite was already
working. True, the media was playing into the hands of the hegemonic mission. One incident which
was given wide coverage during the fall of Saddam was in a square in central Baghdad, where US
marines helped a crowd of Iraqis topple a giant statue of Saddam in a bold symbolic gesture. CBS
news analyst Col (Ret) Mitch Mitchell referred to the event as a “psychological victors,” and went
ahead to add that, “bringing it down is symbolic of the fall of the regime - that the regime no longer
is in control of the country.”31 “Saddam Hussein is now taking his rightful place alongside Hitler,
Stalin, Lenin, and Ceausescu in the pantheon of failed brutal dictators, and the Iraqi people are
well on their way to freedom,”32 declared then Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld.
Patrick, Brian, and Trevor Thrall. "Beyond Hegemony: Classical Propaganda Theory and Presidential
Communication Strategy After the Invasion of Iraq." Mass Communications & Society, no. 10 (2007): 104.
30 Ibid., 96.
31 CBS, "Saddam Toppled In Baghdad." CBS News 1-1. cbsnews.com. 04/04/2003.
32 Rampton, Sheldon, and John Stauber. Weapons of Mass Deception. New York: Jeremy P. Tarcher, 2003, 2.
29
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That President Bush’s propaganda machinery had managed to rally media to support the
Iraq invasion meant that the grand strategy propaganda supplemented by other efforts had
succeeded. Saddam was no longer in power, a big victory for the Bush administration. Rampton
and Stauber note that the Bush administration had succeeded in making “Should we attack Iraq?”33
- the most-considered political question in the United States that time. However, the events that
unfolded in Iraq in the aftermath of ousting Saddam from power in Baghdad questions the success
of the propaganda campaign. Though President Bush’s approval rating stood at a high of over 70
percent at the time of the Iraq invasion, only four months later Patrick and Thrall said that the
president’s support for the war dropped faster than support for Vietnam between 1965 and 1971.34
Such a drastic fall in the president’s approval rating begs for one central question that
confronts the hegemonic tradition: Did President Bush’s propaganda machinery fail to dominate the
news for some reasons? If so, Patrick and Thrall argue that the hegemonic-inspired theories were
dealt a devastating blow.35 French playwright Jean Anouilh once observed, “propaganda is a soft
weapon; hold it in your hands too long, and it will move about like a snake, and strike the other
way.”36 Did President Bush hold his propaganda campaign too long in his hands such that it
boomeranged once Saddam was out of power? Chomsky argues that from the first moments of the
propaganda offensive, it was apparent that the pronouncements lacked credibility.37 Here is what a
US government source in Washington as quoted by Chomsky says about the propaganda
campaign, “This administration is capable of any lie....in order to advance its war goal in Iraq.”38
Another comment came from Anatol Lieven, a political analyst who says that most Americans had
Ibid., 41.
Patrick, Brian, and Trevor Thrall. "Beyond Hegemony: Classical Propaganda Theory and Presidential
Communication Strategy After the Invasion of Iraq." Mass Communications & Society, no. 10 (2007): 96.
35 Ibid., 96.
36 Rampton, Sheldon, and John Stauber. Weapons of Mass Deception. New York: Jeremy P. Tarcher, 2003, 81.
37 Chomsky, Noam. Hegemony or Survival - America's Quest for Global Dominance. New York: Henry Holt and
Company, 2004, 18.
38 Ibid., 18.
33
34
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been duped…..by a propaganda program which for systematic mendacity has few parallels in
peacetime democracies.39 Snow and Taylor comment:
The selling of the invasion of Iraq as a ‘liberation’ of the Iraq people from Saddam’s regime –
all these themes proved to be highly controversial in the justification for war not only among
those four democracies who formed a ‘coalition of the willing’ to actually fight the Saddam
regime.40
Another blow to the propaganda campaign that was pegged on allegations that Saddam
retains some stockpiles of chemical and biological weapons occurred when the military forces
occupying Iraq failed to discover the said weapons. It is worth noting that for the hegemony to
remain unchallenged the American leader is free to change rule at will. So when the WMD were
not discovered, the Bush administration justified the invasion by discovery of equipment that
potentially could be used to produce lethal chemical weapons. This means that America is free to
act unilaterally especially to ensure uninhibited access to key markets, energy supplies, and
strategic resources.
On March 14, 2006, CNN’s lead story read: Iraq drives Bush's rating to new low. The
news article reports that 60 percent of those polled said they disapproved of President Bush’s
performance. “Growing dissatisfaction with the war in Iraq has driven President Bush's approval
rating to a new low of 36 percent, according to a CNN/USA Today/Gallup poll released Monday,”41
says the article. In the same article, 57 percent of those interviewed said they believe the March
2003 invasion of Iraq was a mistake. Thus, Bush’s approval rating of 36 percent was the lowest
mark of his presidency in a Gallup poll, falling a percentage point below the 37 percent approval he
scored the previous November.
Ibid., 19.
Snow, Nancy, and Philip Taylor. "The Revival of the Propaganda State." The International Gazette, no. 68 (2006):
391.
41 CNN, "Iraq drives Bush's rating to new low." CNN International 1-1. cnn.com. 03/14/2006.
39
40
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It can be concluded that the propaganda put in place by the Bush administration as an
excuse to invade Iraq succeeded, but backfired immediately after Saddam was out of power. The
success is explained by the high approval rating of 70 percent of Bush’s performance just before
the invasion. The propaganda was effective such that it convinced a majority of Americans,
including leading democratic figures whose priority at that time was security, that Saddam was
behind WTC bombing and was in possession of deadly weapons that were a threat to American’s
survival. Also, the propaganda had managed to portray the dictator as the ultimate evil and an
imminent threat to Americans’ survival. The tyrant was assembling the world’s most dangerous
weapons so as to dominate, intimidate or attack US installations around the world as was the case
of US embassy bombing in Nairobi, Kenya in 1998. The propaganda was effective beyond
reasonable doubts when it claimed that Saddam had already used his deadly weapons on whole
villages – leaving thousands of his own citizens dead, blind or transfigured. If this was not right, the
propaganda said, then, evil has no meaning.
However, events that took place after the fall of Baghdad indicate that the propaganda was
not a success. First of all there were no weapons of mass destruction as put by Bush and his spin
doctors. That it took the US troops less than a month to push Saddam out of power, is an indication
that Iraq was defenseless, which negates a critical view that the tyrant was assembling WMD.
What followed after the failure of getting WMD was a drastic fall in approval rating of Bush, and
Iraq was plunged into sectarian war which has claimed the lives of thousands of American soldiers
and over a million Iraqi civilians. The propaganda’s failure can be seen in the words of Rutherford
who says that propaganda state is the dark shadow of democracy. He points out that the
propaganda state thrives when other voices are silenced.42 Therefore, the Iraq invasion captures
Rutherford, Paul. Weapons of Mass Persuasion: Marketing the War Against Iraq. Toronto: University of Toronto
Press, 2004, 184.
42
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18
all of characteristics of a superpower ready to show its hegemony by perpetuating and sustaining it
through propaganda campaigns. It can also be seen as a survival tactic because America, in its
quest for global dominance has created many enemies such that its citizens live under fear –
hence this vital quote by Snow and Taylor: “we must defeat them over there before they attack us
here.”43 There is no slightest indication that the America’s global dominance is about to be
challenged by any nation, thus, the American hegemony is here to stay – whether we like it or not.
Snow, Nancy, and Philip Taylor. "The Revival of the Propaganda State." The International Gazette, no. 68 (2006):
397.
43
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19
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