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The Salamis Sea Battle for the Western Values Theodosios P. Tasios • Which options did the Athenians have, against the Persian threat? – To align and conform with Persians (and successively save the day at the expense of their newly established Democracy…)*? – To resist, and be unavoidably destroyed? 2 (*) “… though we well know that it would be beneficial to ally with the Persian than to fight him …” [Herodotus, 9.7α] «… ἐπιστάμενοί τε ὅτι κερδαλεώτερόν ἐστι ὁμολογέειν τῷ Πέρση μᾶλλον ἤ περ πολεμέειν·» 3 “… yet the yearning for freedom urges us to face him with all the strength we possess …” [Herodotus, 8.143] «… ἀλλ᾽ ὅμως ἐλευθερίης γλιχόμενοι ἀμυνεύμεθα οὕτω ὅκως ἂν καὶ δυνώμεθα.» 4 In what anti - populist belief, did the people of Athens waive the dividend from the big profits of Lavrion mines And The Polis (state) builds two hundred (*) triremes? (*) or one hundred ? [Herodotus. 7, 144] 5 How did the Greeks leave their pettiness and erect the national unity in the Congress of the Isthmus, in 481BC ? 6 • 31 City-States participated • Ostracized citizens returned! • Athenians accepted the chief command of Sparta (incredible... ) • All City-States committed themselves to specific military force contributions. An amazing historical moment... (1½ century later, King Philip would convene the National Conference once again at the Isthmus,..) 7 • The two contradictory (rather posteriorly generated) oracle prophecies … [Herodotus 7, 140-142] • The evacuation of Athens 8 By what mental and physical strength would 30,000 Athenians (±) abandon everything they had, in order to get in the ships and sail to Troezen, Aegina, Salamis ? 9 Well, if Sociologists and Biologists are not arguing in vain by indicating the potentiality of EXAMPLE or Paradigm, then this boring lecture may be of some significance ... 10 • • • • Brief review of naval operations at Artemision Cape Sea " support " of Thermopylae pass Verification of enemy capabilities Training of Greek crews Attempt to influence Greeks from Thrace and Caria who co-campaigned with Persian King Xerxes 11 Sea Battle of Artemision Cape Hellenic (Greek) Fleet Courses Persian Fleet Courses Artemision Thermopylae Figure 1 12 1st phase of the Sea Battle of Artemision Hellenic Fleet Persian Fleet “the bows heading out and sterns in” (τας πρώρας μέν έξω, τας πρύμνας δέ έσω) Figure 2 [and the night storm…] 13 2nd phase of the Sea Battle of Artemision Hellenic Fleet Persian Fleet Direct successful attack of the Greek Fleet! Figure 3 14 3rd phase of the Sea Battle of Artemision Hellenic Fleet Persian Fleet The inconclusive phase of the Sea Battle Figure 4 15 • Eventually, the Persian fleet didn’t pass through the straits of Euboea. • Persians lost about three hundred triremes. • Successful battle “rehearsal” of the Greeks: Experience, Discipline, Morale. • Back to Salamis… 16 – Movement of Xerxes’ forces after Thermopylae battle towards Athens – Athens was burnt and destroyed. – The Persian Fleet anchored in Faliron (the sea borders of Athens/Piraeus) 17 Tempi Pass Thermopylae Pass Isthmus Pass Persian Empire Salamis Island Corinth State Sparta State Figure 5 18 • The two defense tasks for the Greek forces (after Tempi and Thermopylae) a) Isthmus : - Started building a 6km wall to fortificate the area - Intended to take advantage of the narrow pass in land (the Salamis principle…) 19 • The two defense tasks for the Greek forces (after Tempi and Thermopylae) b) Salamis : – The narrow sea strait = neutralization of the numerical superiority of the enemy – Protection of the Athenian refugee population in the Saronic Bay – Safe base for supervision of operations at Isthmus 20 • • • • Why the Greeks finally chose to fight in Salamis The obsessions of the Peloponnesians, (concerning their homeland security). Decision of councils-of-war The arguments, tricks and threats of General Themistocles and The controversial episode of Sikinnos* *(The teacher of Themistocles’ children) 21 Why did Xerxes accept to fight in Salamis? a) Desired a victory prior winter b) Strategic Opportunity: Greeks were “trapped” on their own in the Salamis straits. c) The land advance to Isthmus was facing difficulties : – – Skironides passage was blocked (Kakia Skala), Megara City State was fortified down to the sea (Nisaia the sea port of Megara) 22 d) How could Xerxes split his fleet? - Partly to monitor Greeks in Salamis - Partly to support the advance of his Army on land (besides he ignored which ports could be used by Persian ships in the Saronic Bay) e) Priority was to get rid of the Greek Fleet so as to move freely. f) The ambition and the grandiosity of : - Xerxes allies (except the female “Admiral” Artemisia who advised against the action) - King Xerxes himself, [Herodotus 8, 69] 23 “THE MOST DECISIVE AND GLORIOUS SEA BATTLE THAT DETERMINED THE FATE OF THE WHOLE WORLD FOR EVER” L. JOFFRIN, 2005 24 How many were the Forces? (based on Herodotus, Aeschylus and contemporary calculations) Persian Fleet • Initial Expeditionary Force ~ 1.200 • Military contributions from North Aegean allies +130 Subtotal :~ 1.330 • Remaining fleet after Artemision Sea Battle 950 • Minus the Egyptian Squadron that was observing the escape from Megara straits (not all of them in Salamis straits) TOTAL ~ 800 (?) Hellenic Fleet • Remaining fleet after Artemision Sea Battle, plus last minute reinforcements TOTAL ~ 310 25 The example of the four ships from Serifos, Sifnos and Milos islands that didn’t obey to the orders of their political authorities (which were forced to become Persians allies) is remarkable. “They disobeyed their commanders’ orders” («αλογήσαντες των εντολέων…») [Herodotus.8, 46-48] 26 The Phoenician Triremes in Comparison with the Greek ones were: – Larger – Faster – Higher (and subsequently more unstable) – Having an armed deck with 40 marines and archers (versus only 14 hoplites on board Athenian Triremes). Advantages…?? 27 Xerxes’ misleading strategic move: • An Army Corps (of 30.000?) advanced to Eleusis and Megara, indicating misleading intention to reach Isthmus. • Psychological pressure to the Peloponnesian crews of triremes • (But : the Greeks interpreted the cloud of dust and the loud voices as a divine sign against the invaders …) [alert Intelligence Service!] 28 Figure 7 29 • • • • The Persian Strategic Plan Egyptian task group blocks the west passing through Megara straits. Psyttaleia was captured by 3.000 Persian troops (island that controls the south exit of the straits) Night silent advance of the Persian fleet from Faliron, in order to be deployed in North East area of Psyttaleia by the first morning light. Objective: to trap the Greek fleet in anchorages around Paloukia and Ambelakia 30 areas (modern names of the two bays). The Persian Plan was revealed: • By Aristides: He arrived the very last night from Aegina island, having monitored the tactics of the Persians. • By a defector from the fleet of Xerxes: A Greek Trierarch with his crew from the island of Tinos, named Panaitios, appeared during that night. …As a result the Greek fleet was already at sea, in battle formation, before dawn ! 31 Who surprised whom! At first light, Persians realized that Greek fleet : – Had not partly escaped – Not at anchor – and in battle formation !! 32 Schematic Layouts of Forces St George Island Kinosoura peninsula 33 Speculated Principles of the Greek Tactics 1) By deploying the fleet in the limited waters between Agios Georgios island and Kinosoura they : – were triple protected from left, right and astern – limited down the number of the Persian triremes that could be involved to 220. 2) The morning swell in the straits would limit the accuracy of the enemy archers and would increase their side aspect 34 Let’s verify how many triremes could line up between Agios Georgios island and Kinosoura Figure 6 3300m / 15m ~ 220 triremes lined up (2.5 m distance between each trireme) 35 Principles of the Greek Tactics (continued) 3) They pretended initially to back up the ships, so as: – to create a false impression to the Persians that they were afraid – to increase the distance between the fleets so as to have space and time to row at full speed and ram the Persians 36 Principles of the Greek Tactics (continued) 4) Sail Through (“Diekplous”) Concentrated attack in a narrow front line - to row triremes at full speed. - to pass close and smash opponents’ oars, and create disorder in the opposing line up. - to turn right, fall back slightly, ram again and smash the enemy trireme by the side! 37 Principles of the Greek Tactics (continued) 5) “No Boarding operations” - The number of enemy marines and archers on board posed a danger in such an action. - Delay of the wider task of creating rapid confusion in the Persian formation. Conclusion: Basic battle concept was to destroy the enemy fleet by ramming - and boarding hoplites only in special occasions. 38 Schematic Layouts of Forces St George Island Kinosoura peninsula 39 Figure 7 40 An emotional parenthesis a) Prayers and Divine Interventions: - An Earthquake took place (the day before) - Divine icons arrived at the camp (Aiakides) - The divine dust-cloud and Eleusis voices (it was anticipated as divine intervention, instead of realizing the Persian advance towards Eleusis and Isthmus …) [Herodotus 8.65] 41 An emotional parenthesis b) Imagine the emotion : - Thousands of Athenian refugees temporary located in outdoor facilities at Paloukia and Ampelakia bays and - 310 Greek triremes being lined up in the Salamis straits, in front of the refugees! 42 At a later time, Persian sources (falsely) presented to Herodotus the “tactic” of initially backing up of “Diekplous” as a retreat; so he commented: “… the other Greeks reversed their ships and headed to shore …” «… οἱ μὲν δὴ ἄλλοι Ἕλληνες [ἐπὶ] πρύμνην ἀνεκρούοντο καὶ ὤκελλον τὰς νέας» [Her. 8.84.1] If it were so, then everything would have been lost for Greeks ! Not to mention that they hadn't neither room nor time for such maneuvering. (Nonsense... ) 43 Aeschylus claims that as the Persians approached, they heard the Greeks singing their battle hymn (paean) before they saw the Allied fleet: “Oh sons of the Greeks, go-go, liberate your country, liberate your children, your women, the seats of your fathers' gods, and the tombs of your forebears: now is the time to fight for everything and everybody”. [Aeschylus, “Persae”, 402-405] 44 391 «φόβος δὲ πᾶσι βαρβάροις παρῆν γνώμης ἀποσφαλεῖσιν· οὐ γὰρ ὡς φυγῇ παιὰν’ ἐφύμνουν σεμνὸν Ἕλληνες τότε, …» “Terror fell on all the barbarians, balked of their purpose; for then the Hellenes chanted their solemn paean, not as in flight” 394 «…ἀλλ᾿ εἰς μάχην ὁρμῶντες εὐψύχῳ θράσει…» “…but as men rushing to the onset with the courage of gallant hearts. …” [Aeschylus, “Persae”] 45 •And the contradiction, [Herodotus 8.86.1]: «ἅτε γὰρ τῶν μὲν Ἑλλήνων σὺν κόσμῳ ναυμαχεόντων ‹καὶ› κατὰ τάξιν, τῶν δὲ βαρβάρων οὔτε τεταγμένων ἔτι οὔτε σὺν νόῳ ποιεύντων οὐδέν, …» “...the Greeks were battling on in order and discipline, whereas the barbarians were generally acting without any thought or concrete plan, …” • But we should also consider the: - Narrow maneuvering space - Sea swell - Sudden local panic 46 - Direct leadership of the Greeks There were also initiatives by a number of Trierachs who hastened to attack first ... - Ameinias the Pallineus (from Pallinē) - Eumenes the Anagyrasios (from Anagyra) - Polykritos the Aeginitis (from the island of Aegina) 47 • The destructive blow was given by the left side squadron commanded by Themistocles • His forces performed a brilliant maneuver executed with legendary Athenian precision and – by acquiring a leading position – they pushed through the Persian lines, close to the island of St George. 48 SALAMIS NAVAL BATTLE DIAGRAMS a) L. Joffrin b) History of Hellenic Nation c) Morrison 49 St George Island 1st phase of the Sea Battle of Salamis Hellenic Fleet Persian Fleet Persians Athenians Allies Spartans 3000 Persians seized the island Figure 8 Kinosoura peninsula Psitaleia Island 50 1st phase of the Sea Battle of Salamis Hellenic Fleet Persian Fleet Athenians Allies Spartans Figure 8 51 2nd phase of the Sea Battle of Salamis Athenians Allies Spartans Figure 9 52 Athenians Allies 3rd phase of the Sea Battle of Salamis Spartans Figure 10 53 Allocation of Forces prior the Battle of Salamis Hellenic Fleet Persian Fleet Figure 11 54 King Xerxes Observatory 1st Phase of the Sea Battle of Salamis Hellenic Fleet Persian Fleet Figure 12 55 King Xerxes Observatory 2nd Phase of the Sea Battle of Salamis Hellenic Fleet Persian Fleet Figure 13 56 King Xerxes Observatory 3rd Phase of the Sea Battle of Salamis Hellenic Fleet Persian Fleet Figure 14 57 Figure 15 58 With this succesful “Diekplous” (“Sailing Through” pattern of attack) • As the first line of Persian ships was pushed back, they became fouled in the advancing second and third lines of their own ships. The remaining Phoenician squadrons, disorganized and leaderless, appeared to have been pushed back against the coast, with many vessels running aground. • In the center, a squadron of Greek ships pushed through the Persians lines, splitting the fleet in two (Diodoros), resulting in their disorganization. • Athenians then attacked and rammed the 59 retreating Persian ships. Aeginetans were waiting for and attacked the Persian fugitives before they reached Psyttalia 60 Aristides with an Athenian Army (of 300 Hoplites) performed a sudden, unexpected assault and conquered the island of Psitaleia, where Persian nobleman leaders and Xerxes’ relatives were placed. 61 A different interpretation of the sea battle is provided by P. Green. (“The Greco-Persian Wars”, 1996) • Τhe Greek left side squadron under Themistocles’ command had been prepositioned at the strait between Agios Georgios and Amphiali. • Its back had been covered by the Korithian squadron which had sailed to North, monitoring and being ready to engage with the Egyptian squadron from Nisaia. That move misled Xerxes into thinking that the Greeks were seeking for an escape route from the battle! [Herodotus, 8.65 + Burn, 1962] 62 It should be emphasized that, based on scientific calculations, the width of the aforementioned straits then, was half of what it is today, due to an increase of the sea level of about 1,5 to 2 meters! Thus, along (say) 500m, less than 35 triremes would be able to line up … 63 Citations mentioning that there was a Persian plan to close the strait by filling it in with earth, should not be taken into account : - Time discrepancies. - Lack of continuous naval support available to contribute in such an operation. 64 • Persians and their allies were not familiar with the sea and they couldn’t swim. Consequently, death was their price, when their ships were sunk. • The sea was afloat with wreckage and corpses, reaching the Agios Kosmas seashore. • Greeks were chasing Persians until dusk. 65 And yet, Queen Artemisia escaped! A woman; is it possible …. «… πρὸς δὲ καὶ ἄεθλον ἔκειτο μύριαι δραχμαί, ὃς ἄν μιν ζωὴν ἕλῃ· δεινὸν γάρ τι ἐποιεῦντο γυναῖκα ἐπὶ τὰς Ἀθήνας στρατεύεσθαι.» “… and a prize of a ten thousand drachmae had been proclaimed for anyone who captured her alive; since it was a matter of honour – a woman taking up arms and marching against Athens.” [Herodotus 8.93.2] 66 “The whole notion of political and spiritual freedom […] was tied upon Greeks determination to stand up and fight against a barbaric eastern spirit of palatial absolutism […]. Against this monolithic opposite end, the Greek achievement distinguishes even more: an inexplicable miracle”. Peter Green, 1969 67 «… ἡ Περσῶν ἐπίθεσις τοῖς Ἕλλησιν, ἴσως δὲ σχεδὸν ἅπασιν τοῖς τὴν Εὐρώπην οἰκοῦσιν, …» “… the attack of the Persians against the Greeks, and perhaps against almost ALL THE INHABITANTS OF EUROPE, …” [Plato, Laws, 698b] 68 Which were the circumstances leading to Victory? 1. The Persians were forced to fight in the Salamis straits, resulting in a neutralization of their numerical superiority. 2. The right choice of the area in which the Greek fleet lined up (between Agios Georgios and the Kinosoura peninsula). 69 Which were the circumstances leading to Victory? 3. The maneuvering skills, the discipline and precise coordination of Greek crews, especially during the implementation of the decisive tactical move of Diekplous (“Sailing Through”). 4. Persians, due to their effort to catch Greek fleet by surprise, prepositioned their ships at night, and left their crews sleepless and tired. 5. Moreover, the Athenians had revered spectators: their own family members, located at nearby areas (Paloukia and Ambelakia bays). There was no room for hesitation. 70 However, we must recollect that the Greeks also had their moments of shame: Few decades later, the Greeks entered in a long civil war confrontation, and not even thinking twice about allying with the Persian empire whenever they needed gold for the needs of their army. (Contrary to King Philip whose greatness depicts on his efforts to unify all Greeks against Persians) 71 Persians “defeated” Athenians with the support of Spartans (412 BC) Sparta finally prevailed over the Athenians in the Peloponnesian War: Sparta, though a land power, built an enormous naval fleet using Persian gold and progressively downgraded the alliance of the Athenians and their naval supremacy. 72 Persians “defeated” the Spartans with the support of Athenians (392 BC) Konon, an Athenian General, having being financed by the Persians, arrived with his fleet in Athens and reconstructed the Long Walls joining them to Athens. Athens were again very strong against Sparta. 73 CONCLUSION ? 74 «… ἡ Περσῶν ἐπίθεσις τοῖς Ἕλλησιν, ἴσως δὲ σχεδὸν ἅπασιν τοῖς τὴν Εὐρώπην οἰκοῦσιν, …» “… the attack of the Persians against the Greeks, and perhaps against almost ALL THE INHABITANTS OF EUROPE, …” [Plato, Laws, 698b] 75 “THE MOST DECISIVE AND GLORIOUS SEA BATTLE THAT DETERMINED THE FATE OF THE WHOLE WORLD FOR EVER” L. JOFFRIN, 2005 76 IN MEMORIAM VADM James B. Stockdale 77