Download Persian Fleet

The Salamis Sea Battle
for the Western Values
Theodosios P. Tasios
• Which options did the Athenians have,
against the Persian threat?
– To align and conform with Persians
(and successively save the day at the
expense of their newly established
Democracy…)*?
– To resist, and be unavoidably
destroyed?
2
(*) “… though we well know that it would
be beneficial to ally with the Persian than
to fight him …”
[Herodotus, 9.7α]
«… ἐπιστάμενοί τε ὅτι κερδαλεώτερόν ἐστι
ὁμολογέειν τῷ Πέρση μᾶλλον ἤ περ πολεμέειν·»
3
“… yet the yearning for freedom urges us
to face him with all the strength we
possess …”
[Herodotus, 8.143]
«… ἀλλ᾽ ὅμως ἐλευθερίης γλιχόμενοι ἀμυνεύμεθα
οὕτω ὅκως ἂν καὶ δυνώμεθα.»
4
In what anti - populist belief, did the
people of Athens waive the dividend from
the big profits of Lavrion mines
And
The Polis (state) builds two hundred (*)
triremes?
(*) or one hundred ?
[Herodotus. 7, 144]
5
How did the Greeks leave their pettiness
and erect the national unity in the
Congress of the Isthmus, in 481BC ?
6
• 31 City-States participated
• Ostracized citizens returned!
• Athenians accepted the chief command
of Sparta (incredible... )
• All City-States committed themselves to
specific military force contributions.
An amazing historical moment...
(1½ century later, King Philip would convene the
National Conference once again at the
Isthmus,..)
7
• The two contradictory (rather posteriorly
generated) oracle prophecies …
[Herodotus 7, 140-142]
• The evacuation of Athens
8
By what mental and physical strength
would 30,000 Athenians (±)
abandon everything they had, in order to
get in the ships and sail to Troezen,
Aegina, Salamis ?
9
Well, if Sociologists and Biologists are not
arguing in vain by indicating the potentiality
of EXAMPLE or Paradigm,
then this boring lecture may be of some
significance ...
10
•
•
•
•
Brief review of naval operations at
Artemision Cape
Sea " support " of Thermopylae pass
Verification of enemy capabilities
Training of Greek crews
Attempt to influence Greeks from Thrace
and Caria who co-campaigned with
Persian King Xerxes
11
Sea Battle of Artemision Cape
Hellenic (Greek) Fleet Courses
Persian Fleet Courses
Artemision
Thermopylae
Figure 1
12
1st phase of the Sea
Battle of Artemision
Hellenic Fleet
Persian Fleet
“the bows heading out and sterns in”
(τας πρώρας μέν έξω, τας πρύμνας δέ έσω)
Figure 2
[and the night storm…]
13
2nd phase of the Sea
Battle of Artemision
Hellenic Fleet
Persian Fleet
Direct successful attack of the Greek Fleet!
Figure 3
14
3rd phase of the Sea
Battle of Artemision
Hellenic Fleet
Persian Fleet
The inconclusive phase of the Sea Battle
Figure 4
15
• Eventually, the Persian fleet didn’t pass
through the straits of Euboea.
• Persians lost about three hundred
triremes.
• Successful battle “rehearsal” of the
Greeks:
Experience, Discipline, Morale.
• Back to Salamis…
16
– Movement of Xerxes’ forces after
Thermopylae battle towards Athens
– Athens was burnt and destroyed.
– The Persian Fleet anchored in Faliron
(the sea borders of Athens/Piraeus)
17
Tempi Pass
Thermopylae
Pass
Isthmus Pass
Persian Empire
Salamis Island
Corinth State
Sparta State
Figure 5
18
• The two defense tasks for the Greek
forces (after Tempi and Thermopylae)
a) Isthmus :
- Started building a 6km wall to fortificate the
area
- Intended to take advantage of the narrow
pass in land (the Salamis principle…)
19
• The two defense tasks for the Greek
forces (after Tempi and Thermopylae)
b) Salamis :
– The narrow sea strait = neutralization of the
numerical superiority of the enemy
– Protection of the Athenian refugee
population in the Saronic Bay
– Safe base for supervision of operations at
Isthmus
20
•
•
•
•
Why the Greeks finally chose to fight
in Salamis
The obsessions of the Peloponnesians,
(concerning their homeland security).
Decision of councils-of-war
The arguments, tricks and threats of
General Themistocles
and
The controversial episode of Sikinnos*
*(The teacher of Themistocles’ children)
21
Why did Xerxes accept to fight
in Salamis?
a) Desired a victory prior winter
b) Strategic Opportunity: Greeks were
“trapped” on their own in the Salamis
straits.
c) The land advance to Isthmus was facing
difficulties :
–
–
Skironides passage was blocked
(Kakia Skala),
Megara City State was fortified down to
the sea (Nisaia the sea port of Megara)
22
d) How could Xerxes split his fleet?
- Partly to monitor Greeks in Salamis
- Partly to support the advance of his Army on
land (besides he ignored which ports could
be used by Persian ships in the Saronic Bay)
e) Priority was to get rid of the Greek Fleet
so as to move freely.
f) The ambition and the grandiosity of :
- Xerxes allies (except the female “Admiral”
Artemisia who advised against the action)
- King Xerxes himself, [Herodotus 8, 69]
23
“THE MOST DECISIVE AND GLORIOUS
SEA BATTLE
THAT DETERMINED THE FATE
OF THE WHOLE WORLD FOR EVER”
L. JOFFRIN, 2005
24
How many were the Forces?
(based on Herodotus, Aeschylus and contemporary calculations)
Persian Fleet
• Initial Expeditionary Force
~ 1.200
• Military contributions from North Aegean allies +130
Subtotal :~ 1.330
• Remaining fleet after Artemision Sea Battle
950
• Minus the Egyptian Squadron that was observing
the escape from Megara straits
(not all of them in Salamis straits)
TOTAL ~ 800 (?)
Hellenic Fleet
• Remaining fleet after Artemision Sea Battle,
plus last minute reinforcements
TOTAL ~ 310
25
The example of the four ships from
Serifos, Sifnos and Milos islands that didn’t
obey to the orders of their political
authorities (which were forced to become
Persians allies) is remarkable.
“They disobeyed their commanders’
orders”
(«αλογήσαντες των εντολέων…»)
[Herodotus.8, 46-48]
26
The Phoenician Triremes
in Comparison with the Greek ones were:
– Larger
– Faster
– Higher (and subsequently more unstable)
– Having an armed deck with 40 marines
and archers (versus only 14 hoplites on
board Athenian Triremes).
Advantages…??
27
Xerxes’ misleading strategic move:
• An Army Corps (of 30.000?) advanced to
Eleusis and Megara, indicating misleading
intention to reach Isthmus.
• Psychological pressure to the
Peloponnesian crews of triremes
• (But : the Greeks interpreted the cloud of
dust and the loud voices as a divine sign
against the invaders …)
[alert Intelligence Service!]
28
Figure 7
29
•
•
•
•
The Persian Strategic Plan
Egyptian task group blocks the west passing
through Megara straits.
Psyttaleia was captured by 3.000 Persian
troops (island that controls the south exit of
the straits)
Night silent advance of the Persian fleet
from Faliron, in order to be deployed in North
East area of Psyttaleia by the first morning
light.
Objective: to trap the Greek fleet in
anchorages around Paloukia and Ambelakia
30
areas (modern names of the two bays).
The Persian Plan was revealed:
• By Aristides: He arrived the very last night
from Aegina island, having monitored the
tactics of the Persians.
• By a defector from the fleet of Xerxes: A
Greek Trierarch with his crew from the
island of Tinos, named Panaitios,
appeared during that night.
…As a result the Greek fleet was already at
sea, in battle formation, before dawn !
31
Who surprised whom!
At first light, Persians realized that Greek
fleet :
– Had not partly escaped
– Not at anchor
– and in battle formation !!
32
Schematic Layouts of Forces
St George Island
Kinosoura
peninsula
33
Speculated Principles
of the Greek Tactics
1) By deploying the fleet in the limited
waters between Agios Georgios island
and Kinosoura they :
– were triple protected from left, right
and astern
– limited down the number of the
Persian triremes that could be
involved to 220.
2) The morning swell in the straits would limit
the accuracy of the enemy archers and
would increase their side aspect
34
Let’s verify how many triremes could line up
between Agios Georgios island and
Kinosoura
Figure 6
3300m / 15m ~ 220 triremes lined up
(2.5 m distance between each trireme)
35
Principles of the Greek Tactics
(continued)
3) They pretended initially to back up the
ships, so as:
– to create a false impression to the
Persians that they were afraid
– to increase the distance between the
fleets so as to have space and time to row
at full speed and ram the Persians
36
Principles of the Greek Tactics
(continued)
4) Sail Through (“Diekplous”)
Concentrated attack in a narrow front line
- to row triremes at full speed.
- to pass close and smash opponents’ oars,
and create disorder in the opposing line up.
- to turn right, fall back slightly, ram
again and smash the enemy trireme by
the side!
37
Principles of the Greek Tactics
(continued)
5) “No Boarding operations”
- The number of enemy marines and archers
on board posed a danger in such an action.
- Delay of the wider task of creating rapid
confusion in the Persian formation.
Conclusion:
Basic battle concept was to destroy the
enemy fleet by ramming - and boarding
hoplites only in special occasions.
38
Schematic Layouts of Forces
St George Island
Kinosoura
peninsula
39
Figure 7
40
An emotional parenthesis
a) Prayers and Divine Interventions:
- An Earthquake took place (the day before)
- Divine icons arrived at the camp (Aiakides)
- The divine dust-cloud and Eleusis voices
(it was anticipated as divine intervention,
instead of realizing the Persian advance
towards Eleusis and Isthmus …)
[Herodotus 8.65]
41
An emotional parenthesis
b) Imagine the emotion :
- Thousands of Athenian refugees temporary
located in outdoor facilities at Paloukia and
Ampelakia bays
and
- 310 Greek triremes being lined up in the
Salamis straits, in front of the refugees!
42
At a later time, Persian sources (falsely)
presented to Herodotus the “tactic” of initially
backing up of “Diekplous” as a retreat; so he
commented:
“… the other Greeks reversed their ships
and headed to shore …”
«… οἱ μὲν δὴ ἄλλοι Ἕλληνες [ἐπὶ] πρύμνην
ἀνεκρούοντο καὶ ὤκελλον τὰς νέας» [Her. 8.84.1]
If it were so, then everything would have
been lost for Greeks ! Not to mention that
they hadn't neither room nor time for such
maneuvering. (Nonsense... )
43
Aeschylus claims that as the Persians
approached, they heard the Greeks singing
their battle hymn (paean) before they saw
the Allied fleet:
“Oh sons of the Greeks, go-go, liberate
your country, liberate your children, your
women, the seats of your fathers' gods, and
the tombs of your forebears: now is the time
to fight for everything and everybody”.
[Aeschylus, “Persae”, 402-405]
44
391 «φόβος δὲ πᾶσι βαρβάροις παρῆν γνώμης
ἀποσφαλεῖσιν· οὐ γὰρ ὡς φυγῇ παιὰν’ ἐφύμνουν
σεμνὸν Ἕλληνες τότε, …»
“Terror fell on all the barbarians, balked
of their purpose; for then the Hellenes
chanted their solemn paean, not as in
flight”
394 «…ἀλλ᾿ εἰς μάχην ὁρμῶντες εὐψύχῳ θράσει…»
“…but as men rushing to the onset with
the courage of gallant hearts. …”
[Aeschylus, “Persae”]
45
•And the contradiction, [Herodotus 8.86.1]:
«ἅτε γὰρ τῶν μὲν Ἑλλήνων σὺν κόσμῳ
ναυμαχεόντων ‹καὶ› κατὰ τάξιν, τῶν δὲ βαρβάρων
οὔτε τεταγμένων ἔτι οὔτε σὺν νόῳ ποιεύντων
οὐδέν, …»
“...the Greeks were battling on in order and
discipline, whereas the barbarians were
generally acting without any thought or
concrete plan, …”
• But we should also consider the:
- Narrow maneuvering space
- Sea swell
- Sudden local panic
46
- Direct leadership of the Greeks
There were also initiatives by a number of
Trierachs who hastened to attack first ...
- Ameinias the Pallineus (from Pallinē)
- Eumenes the Anagyrasios (from Anagyra)
- Polykritos the Aeginitis (from the island of
Aegina)
47
• The destructive blow was given by the left
side squadron commanded by Themistocles
• His forces performed a brilliant maneuver
executed with legendary Athenian precision
and – by acquiring a leading position – they
pushed through the Persian lines, close to
the island of St George.
48
SALAMIS
NAVAL BATTLE
DIAGRAMS
a) L. Joffrin
b) History of Hellenic Nation
c) Morrison
49
St George Island
1st phase of the Sea
Battle of Salamis
Hellenic Fleet
Persian Fleet
Persians
Athenians
Allies
Spartans
3000 Persians
seized the island
Figure 8
Kinosoura
peninsula
Psitaleia Island
50
1st phase of the Sea
Battle of Salamis
Hellenic Fleet
Persian Fleet
Athenians
Allies
Spartans
Figure 8
51
2nd phase of the Sea
Battle of Salamis
Athenians
Allies
Spartans
Figure 9
52
Athenians
Allies
3rd phase of the Sea
Battle of Salamis
Spartans
Figure 10
53
Allocation of Forces
prior the Battle of
Salamis
Hellenic Fleet
Persian Fleet
Figure 11
54
King Xerxes
Observatory
1st Phase of the Sea
Battle of Salamis
Hellenic Fleet
Persian Fleet
Figure 12
55
King Xerxes
Observatory
2nd Phase of the Sea
Battle of Salamis
Hellenic Fleet
Persian Fleet
Figure 13
56
King Xerxes
Observatory
3rd Phase of the Sea
Battle of Salamis
Hellenic Fleet
Persian Fleet
Figure 14
57
Figure 15
58
With this succesful “Diekplous”
(“Sailing Through” pattern of attack)
• As the first line of Persian ships was pushed
back, they became fouled in the advancing
second and third lines of their own ships. The
remaining Phoenician squadrons, disorganized
and leaderless, appeared to have been pushed
back against the coast, with many vessels
running aground.
• In the center, a squadron of Greek ships pushed
through the Persians lines, splitting the fleet in
two (Diodoros), resulting in their disorganization.
• Athenians then attacked and rammed the
59
retreating Persian ships.
Aeginetans were waiting for
and attacked the Persian fugitives
before they reached Psyttalia
60
Aristides with an Athenian Army (of 300
Hoplites) performed a sudden, unexpected
assault and conquered the island of
Psitaleia, where Persian nobleman leaders
and Xerxes’ relatives were placed.
61
A different interpretation of the sea battle is
provided by P. Green. (“The Greco-Persian Wars”, 1996)
• Τhe Greek left side squadron under
Themistocles’
command
had
been
prepositioned at the strait between Agios
Georgios and Amphiali.
• Its back had been covered by the Korithian
squadron which had sailed to North, monitoring
and being ready to engage with the Egyptian
squadron from Nisaia. That move misled Xerxes
into thinking that the Greeks were seeking for an
escape route from the battle!
[Herodotus, 8.65 + Burn, 1962]
62
It should be emphasized that, based on
scientific calculations, the width of the
aforementioned straits then, was half of
what it is today, due to an increase of the
sea level of about 1,5 to 2 meters!
Thus, along (say) 500m, less than 35
triremes would be able to line up …
63
Citations mentioning that there was a
Persian plan to close the strait by filling it in
with earth, should not be taken into account :
- Time discrepancies.
- Lack of continuous naval support available to
contribute in such an operation.
64
• Persians and their allies were not familiar
with the sea and they couldn’t swim.
Consequently, death was their price, when
their ships were sunk.
• The sea was afloat with wreckage and
corpses, reaching the Agios Kosmas
seashore.
• Greeks were chasing Persians until dusk.
65
And yet, Queen Artemisia escaped! A
woman; is it possible ….
«… πρὸς δὲ καὶ ἄεθλον ἔκειτο μύριαι δραχμαί, ὃς
ἄν μιν ζωὴν ἕλῃ· δεινὸν γάρ τι ἐποιεῦντο γυναῖκα
ἐπὶ τὰς Ἀθήνας στρατεύεσθαι.»
“… and a prize of a ten thousand drachmae
had been proclaimed for anyone who
captured her alive; since it was a matter of
honour – a woman taking up arms and
marching against Athens.”
[Herodotus 8.93.2]
66
“The whole notion of political and spiritual
freedom […] was tied upon Greeks
determination to stand up and fight against
a barbaric eastern spirit of palatial
absolutism […].
Against this monolithic opposite end, the
Greek achievement distinguishes even
more: an inexplicable miracle”.
Peter Green, 1969
67
«… ἡ Περσῶν ἐπίθεσις τοῖς Ἕλλησιν, ἴσως δὲ
σχεδὸν ἅπασιν τοῖς τὴν Εὐρώπην οἰκοῦσιν, …»
“… the attack of the Persians against the
Greeks, and perhaps against almost ALL
THE INHABITANTS OF EUROPE, …”
[Plato, Laws, 698b]
68
Which were the circumstances
leading to Victory?
1. The Persians were forced to fight in the
Salamis
straits,
resulting
in
a
neutralization
of
their
numerical
superiority.
2. The right choice of the area in which the
Greek fleet lined up (between Agios
Georgios and the Kinosoura peninsula).
69
Which were the circumstances
leading to Victory?
3. The maneuvering skills, the discipline and
precise coordination of Greek crews, especially
during the implementation of the decisive
tactical move of Diekplous (“Sailing Through”).
4. Persians, due to their effort to catch Greek fleet
by surprise, prepositioned their ships at night,
and left their crews sleepless and tired.
5. Moreover, the Athenians had revered spectators:
their own family members, located at nearby
areas (Paloukia and Ambelakia bays). There was
no room for hesitation.
70
However, we must recollect that the Greeks
also had their moments of shame:
Few decades later, the Greeks entered in a
long civil war confrontation, and not even
thinking twice about allying with the Persian
empire whenever they needed gold for the
needs of their army.
(Contrary to King Philip whose greatness
depicts on his efforts to unify all Greeks
against Persians)
71
Persians “defeated” Athenians with the
support of Spartans (412 BC)
Sparta finally prevailed over the Athenians in
the Peloponnesian War:
Sparta, though a land power, built an
enormous naval fleet using Persian gold
and progressively downgraded the alliance
of the Athenians and their naval supremacy.
72
Persians “defeated” the Spartans with the
support of Athenians (392 BC)
Konon, an Athenian General, having being
financed by the Persians, arrived with his
fleet in Athens and reconstructed the Long
Walls joining them to Athens.
Athens were again very strong against
Sparta.
73
CONCLUSION
?
74
«… ἡ Περσῶν ἐπίθεσις τοῖς Ἕλλησιν, ἴσως δὲ
σχεδὸν ἅπασιν τοῖς τὴν Εὐρώπην οἰκοῦσιν, …»
“… the attack of the Persians against the
Greeks, and perhaps against almost ALL
THE INHABITANTS OF EUROPE, …”
[Plato, Laws, 698b]
75
“THE MOST DECISIVE AND GLORIOUS
SEA BATTLE
THAT DETERMINED THE FATE
OF THE WHOLE WORLD FOR EVER”
L. JOFFRIN, 2005
76
IN MEMORIAM
VADM James B. Stockdale
77