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CESifo Conference Centre, Munich Workshop 2015 Workshop on Public Opinion and UIFPolitical Economy ofEducation 9 May Trade͈offs Between Social Investment and Passive Transfers in the New Welfare State: New Political Coalitions in European Welfare States? Marius R. Busemeyer Trade‐offsbetweensocialinvestmentandpassivetransfersinthenew welfarestate:NewpoliticalcoalitionsinEuropeanwelfarestates? Thisversion:March2015. MariusR.Busemeyer ProfessorofPoliticalScience UniversityofKonstanz,FachD79 D‐78457Konstanz Fon+497531882860,Fax+497531884103 Email:Marius.Busemeyer@uni‐konstanz.de Web:http://www.polver.uni‐konstanz.de/busemeyer/prof‐dr‐busemeyer/ Abstract: Inthewakeoftheglobaleconomicandfiscalcrisis,welfarestatesarenowenteringanew phaseofausterity.Atthesametime,newsocialrisksrelatedtosingleparenthoodorcare fortheelderlyleadtonewdemandsandexpectationsvis‐à‐visthewelfarestate.Thispaper engagesinananalysisofhowthesecompetingdemandscomeintoconflictwitheachother by using new and original survey data on individual‐level attitudes and preferences towardssocialinvestmentsandpassivesocialtransfersineightEuropeancountries.Ifind strongevidenceforcitizens’dislikeoftrade‐offs.Whenconfrontedwiththerealityoftrade‐ offs between different parts of the welfare state, citizens are less likely to support additionalsocialinvestmentineducation,inparticularwhenthiswouldhavetobefinanced bycutbacksinsocialtransferssuchaspensions.Ialsofindevidencefortheimplicationof the “new politics” school that in the era of retrenchment, distributive conflicts within existing welfare states exhibit a different political dynamic compared to the large‐scale conflict about the scale and size of the welfare state. In particular, self‐interest more narrowlydefinedasmembershipinparticularwelfarestateconstituencygroupsbecomesa more important determinant of preferences when analyzing distributive conflicts within existingwelfarestatesratherthantheconflictaboutredistributioningeneral. 1 Introduction Backinthe1990s,welfarestatescholarsnotedtheendoftheeraofwelfarestateexpansion andthedawnofaneraofpermanentausterity(Pierson2001;Stephensetal.1999). AccordingtoPierson’s(2001)influential“newpolitics”schoolofthought,thisshiftin circumstanceswasaccompaniedbyatransformationofthepoliticaldynamicofwelfare statepolicy‐making.Respondingtoausteritypressures,policy‐makersareforcedtoengage inretrenchment,tryingtominimizetheassociatedpoliticalcostsbyengaginginstrategies ofblameavoidanceorobfuscation(Weaver1986).Inthewakeoftheglobaleconomicand fiscalcrisis,itseemsthatwelfarestatesarenowenteringanewphaseofausterity(Pierson 2011),whichischaracterizedbyevenstrongerfiscalpressurestoconsolidatepublic financeswithimplicationsforthesustainabilityofwelfarestates,inparticularinEurope.At thesametime,newsocialrisksrelatedtosingleparenthoodorcarefortheelderlyleadto newdemandsandexpectationsvis‐à‐visthewelfarestate(Bonoli2013;Hemerijck2013). Thebulkofexistingscholarshipinthisfieldanalyzesthemacro‐levelofpolicy‐making, implyingasimplisticunderstandingofvotersinthesensethattheywouldbestrongly opposedtoanykindofmovementawayfromthestatusquo(Pierson1994,2001).Thus, accordingtothe“newpolitics”argument,ifretrenchmenthappensatall,policy‐makers essentiallyneedtohidethetruecostsofadjustmentinordertoavoidelectoralfallout. Thispaperprovidesacontrastingperspectivetothisargumentbyexploringthedynamics ofpolicytrade‐offsonthelevelofindividualattitudesandpreferences.Existingscholarship onwelfarestateattitudesand,morerecently,onthe“feedbackeffects”ofpoliciesand institutionsonmassattitudesandpatternsofpoliticalparticipation(cf.forrecent overviewsoftheliterature:Béland2010;Campbell2012;Kumlin/Stadelmann‐Steffen 2014;Mettler/Soss2004;Svallfors2012)canonlyprovidelimitedinsightsinthisrespect, becauseavailableinternationalsurveysonpublicopiniondonotmodelthesetrade‐offsina satisfactorymanner.Inthepresentpaper,Icanrelyonoriginaldatacollectedinsurveyof publicopinionineightWesternEuropeancountriesin2014.Amongotherthings,this surveycontainsanexperimentalcomponent,whichallowstoanalyzehowpublicsupport forwelfarestatespendingchangesoncedifferentkindsoftrade‐offssuchastaxincreases, higherlevelsofpublicdebtandcutbacksinotherpartsofthewelfarestatearetakeninto 2 account.Ifocusonsupportforpublicspendingoneducation.Thisisbecauseprevious researchhasshownthatincreasingeducationspendingishugelypopularamongvoters (Ansell2010:Chapter4;Busemeyer2012),butonlywhenpolicyandfiscaltrade‐offsare notfullyacknowledged.Thismakesitagoodtestcaseforstudyingtheimpactoftrade‐offs onpatternsofpublicopinionandcoalitionformation.Furthermore,expandinginvestments inhumancapitalformationisatthecoreoftherisingpolicyparadigmofthe“social investmentstate”(Bonoli2013;Hemerijck2013;Moreletal.2011; Vandenbroucke/Vleminckx2011),whichisgainingtractionamongpolicy‐makersatthe nationalandtheEuropeanlevel.Hence,thepaperalsoprovidesinsightswithregardtothe politicalviabilityofthisnewpolicyapproachasapotentialwayoutofthepolicydilemmas ofcrisis‐riddenEurope. Tobrieflyforeshadowthemainfindings,Ifindstrongevidenceforcitizens’dislikeoftrade‐ offs.Whenconfrontedwiththerealityoftrade‐offsbetweendifferentpartsofthewelfare state,citizensarelesslikelytosupportadditionalsocialinvestmentineducation,in particularwhenthesewouldhavetobefinancedbycutbacksinsocialtransferssuchas pensions.Ialsofindevidencefortheimplicationofthe“newpolitics”schoolthatintheera ofretrenchment,distributiveconflictswithinexistingwelfarestateshaveadifferent politicaldynamiccomparedtothelarge‐scaledistributiveconflictaboutthescaleandsize ofthewelfarestate,whichhadbeenpredominantintheeraofwelfarestateexpansion.In particular,membershipinparticularwelfarestateconstituencygroupsisamoresignificant determinantofindividualpreferenceswhenredistributiveconflictswithinthewelfarestate arefullyacknowledged.Incontrast,consideringredistributivepreferencesmorebroadly definedlarge‐scalecleavagestructuresindicatedbysocio‐economicpositionandpartisan ideologyaremoreimportant. Inthenextsection,Ibrieflyintroducetherelevantliteratureanddevelopatheoretical argumentaswellasasetoftestablehypotheses.Subsequently,Iintroducethedatasetused inthispaperandengageinananalysisoftwodifferentsetsofquestionscontainedinthe survey,aimingatmeasuringtrade‐offsbetweensocialinvestmentandsocialtransfers. 3 Literaturereview Welfarestatescholarshaveknownforalongtimethatreformingsocialpoliciescarrieshigh politicalrisks,inparticularinaneraofretrenchmentandausterity,whenpolicy‐makersare nolongerinapositiontohandoutgenerousbenefits,butinfactoftenhavetocutback popularsocialpolicyprograms(Pierson1994,2001).Pierson’sworkwashighlyinfluential inframingthedebateaboutthelinkbetweenwelfarestatereforms,organizedinterestsand masspublics,buttoacertainextent,itimpliedaverysimplisticunderstandingofthelink betweenpolicy‐makersandwelfarestateconstituencies. Pierson’soriginalaccountfocusedmoreonorganizedinterestgroupsandwelfarestate constituenciesmobilizingagainstcutbacksof“their”benefits,buthisargumenthasalso beenappliedtothestudyofwelfarestateattitudes.Here,aninfluentialstrandinthe literaturefindsthatsupportfordifferentsocialpolicieslargelydependsonself‐interest(e.g. Busemeyeretal.2009;Hasenfeld/Rafferty1989;Iversen/Soskice2001;Kangas2003; Lynch/Myrskylä2009;Rehm2009;Svallfors1997,2004),e.g.pensionersaremorelikelyto supportgenerouspublicpensionsandtheunemployedwouldbeexpectedtodemandmore spendingonunemploymentinsurance.Furthermore,agrowingnumberofscholars– drawinginspirationfromahugeliteratureonpolicyresponsivenessandfeedback(Béland 2010;Campbell2012;Eriksonetal.2002;Kumlin/Stadelmann‐Steffen2014;Mettler/Soss 2004;Wlezien1995;Soroka/Wlezien2010;Stimsonetal.1995)–positthatthereisa directlinkbetweenpublicopiniononthewelfarestateandpolicyoutput(Brooks/Manza 2006,2007;Rehm2012):Popularattitudesaretranslatedintoactualpolicyoutput,since policy‐makerscareforpublicopinioneveninbetweenelectionsbecauseoffearofelectoral punishmentinthefuture(Stimsonetal.1995).Becausewelfarestateretrenchmentis thereforegenerallyunpopular(Boerietal.2001),thegeneralexpectationinthisliterature isthatwelfarestates“persist”(Brooks/Manza2006),i.e.large‐scalecutbacksareunlikely becausetheyarepoliticallyrisky.Reformsmayonlybepossiblewhenpolicy‐makers engagein“blame‐avoidance”andobfuscationstrategies(Pierson1994;Weaver1986)and essentiallyhidetheirtrueintensionsandactionsfromvoters. 4 Takentogether,theworkbyPierson,BrooksandManzaimplyarathersimplistic understandingofthelinkbetweenwelfarestatepoliciesandpublicopinion.Once established,welfarestatepoliciesandinstitutionscreatestrong“positivefeedbackeffects” (Pierson1993,2000)inthesensethatpopularattitudesandpreferenceswillincreasingly reflecttheprevailingstatusquoasactorsadapttheirpreferencesandstrategiessothat particularinstitutionaldevelopmentpathsget“lockedin”.Furthermore,asAndrea Campbell(2002)andSuzanneMettler(2005)haveshownintheirwork,welfarestate policiesdonotonlyinfluencethecontentofpolicypreferences,butalsosupportthe creationofpoliticalcapacities,enablingwelfarestatebeneficiariestomoreeffectively mobilizeindefenseoftheircherishedprograms.Forsure,therearepersistentcross‐ nationaldifferenceswithregardtowelfarestateinstitutionsaswellaspreferences,andthe Pierson‐Brooks‐Manzaframeworkishelpfulinexplainingthem.However,scholarshave notedparticularanomaliesinrecentyears,whicharehardtoexplainwithinthis framework. Mostimportantly,welfarestatechangeismorecommonthanwouldbeexpected.Directly contestingPierson’sfindings,scholarshavenotedasignificantdegreeofretrenchmentand numerouscutbacksinwelfarestategenerosityinOECDcountries(Allan/Scruggs2004; Korpi/Palme2003).However,itisnotthecasethatretrenchmentisthe“onlygamein town”(vanKersbergenetal.2014).Infact,somewelfarestateshavesignificantlyexpanded theircommitmentto“socialinvestment”policiessuchasearlychildhoodeducation,active labormarketpoliciesandcarefortheelderly(Bonoli2013;Hemerijck2013;Moreletal. 2011;Vandenbroucke/Vleminckx2011),oftenatthesametimeastheywerecuttingback themoretraditionaltransfer‐intensivepartsofthewelfarestate(seeFleckensteinetal. 2011forthecasesofBritainandGermany).Someclaimthatthisshiftsignalsaqualitative “recalibration”ofwelfarestatescateringtonewsocialrisks(Hemerijck2013:104),butof course,itmightbethecasethattheexpansionofthesocialinvestmentcomponentsof welfarestatesamountsmerelyto“sugarcoating”lesspopularretrenchmentreforms,since theformerarerelativelycheapcomparedtotraditionalsocialinsurancepolicies(Bonoli 2013;Häusermann2010). 5 Theoryandhypotheses Thesebriefexamplesshowthattheprocessofwelfarestatechangeismorecomplexthan oftenassumed.Welfarestatesdonotjust“persist”,insteadthereisretrenchmentandthere issystemicchange,oftenhappeningatthesametime.Onthebackgroundofexisting literatureonwelfarestatereformsandgiventhelimitationsofexistinginternational surveysofpublicopinionwithregardtothemodelingoftrade‐offs,however,wedonot knowwhetherthesechangesareresponsestogenuinechangesinpopulardemandor whetherthereisadisconnectbetweenpeople’sattitudesandpolicychangesinthesense thatlatterresultfromincreasinglybindingconstraintsonthepartofpolicy‐makers,not citizens’demands.Existingresearchhasnotbeenabletoanswerthisquestionina satisfactorymanner,becauseavailablesurveysofpublicopinioncontainfewquestionson socialinvestmentpoliciesand,moreimportantly,theydonottakeintoaccountimportant constraintsandtrade‐offsbetweendifferentpartsofthewelfarestate. Afirstimportantquestionisthereforehowpublicsupportforexistingornewsocial policieswouldchangeoncebudgetarytrade‐offsarefullyacknowledged.Ontheonehand, itcouldbethecasethattheacknowledgementofbudgetarytrade‐offshasnoeffect whatsoeveronpublicsupport,simplybecausecitizensdonotcareaboutbudgetary limitationswhenvoicingdemandsvis‐à‐vispolicy‐makers.Thisisactuallytheimplication ofPierson’s(2001)“newpolitics”argument,whenappliedinfullyconsistentmanner. Votersareonly(orprimarily)interestedinmaintaining“their”welfarestateprograms, hencetheirsupportshouldnotwaveroncetrade‐offsaretakenintoaccount.Ontheother hand,however,citizenscouldactuallymediatetheirdemandswhentheybecomeawareof trade‐offs.Whenremindedthatadditionalspendingwouldhavetobefinancedwithhigher taxes,higherlevelsofpublicdebtorcutbacksinotherpartsofthebudget,citizenscould becomelesssupportiveofthesespendingincreases.Thisisbecauseinfacttheyareableto prioritizebetweendifferentpolicyfieldsratherthansimplydemandingmorespendingat anycost. Furthermore,if“positivefeedbackeffects”indeedoccur,citizensshouldbemostreluctant tofinanceadditionalspendingwithcutbacksinotherpartsofthewelfarestate,because 6 existingsocialpoliciescreatestrongsupportamongtheirbeneficiariesandbeyond.If forcedtochoose,citizensmightbemoreopentofinanceadditionalspendingwithhigher taxesorpublicdebt,incasepublicdemandforthisspendingissufficientlyhigh.Thecaseof educationspendingstudiedinthispaperisagoodtestcaseinordertoteaseoutthese differences,becausepreviousresearchhasshownthatlargemajoritiessupportmorepublic spendingoneducationinprinciple(Ansell2010:Chapter4;Busemeyer2012).Therefore, thereissufficientleewayforreductionsinpublicsupportoncedifferentkindsof constraintsarementionedintheframingofthesurveyquestion. Therefore,thefirsthypothesistobetestedis: Hypothesis1:Ingeneral,individual‐levelsupportforincreasing(education)spendingdrops oncetrade‐offsbetweenspendingandtaxationaswellastrade‐offsacrossdifferentpartsof thewelfarestatearetakenintoaccount.Iexpectthedropinsupporttobestrongerinthe lattercasesincetheserefertocutbacksinhighlyvisiblesocialpolicies. ThesecondhypothesisIwanttotestinthispaperismorecomplexandrelatesto differencesinthedeterminantsofspendingsupport,dependingonwhichkindsof constraintsareenforced.Theultimategoalhereistofindoutwhetherthesocio‐political coalitionsthatsupportspendingincreaseschangeoncetrade‐offsareacknowledged.A plausibleexpectationisthatgeneralconflictsaboutthesizeand/orgenerosityofthe welfarestatearedeterminedbyotherfactorsthanconflictsaboutthedistributionof resourceswithinexistingwelfarestates. Thebulkofthepertinentliteratureonwelfarestateattitudesandredistributive preferenceshasbeenconcernedwithstudyingthefirstaspect,i.e.thedeterminantsand variationofindividualpreferencesalongthedimensionof“moreorless”redistribution and/orsocialspending(e.g.Alesina/Angeletos2005;Corneo/Grüner2002;Cusacketal. 2006;Fong2001;Kenworthy/McCall2008;Rehm2009).1Theliteraturehasidentifieda 1Ofcourse,somestudiesalsoexplorethevariationofattitudesacrosspolicyfields(e.g. Busemeyeretal.2009),buteveninthatcase,thegoalislesstoidentifytrade‐offsbetween 7 numberof“usualsuspects”thathavebeenfoundtoaccountforvariationinsupportfor redistribution,suchasincome,educationalbackground,age,genderorindividualpartisan ideology.Morerecently,scholarshaveaddedfactorssuchasskillspecificity (Iversen/Soskice2001),occupationalunemploymentrisk(Rehm2009),the“offshorability” ofone’sjob(Walter2010),orperceptionsoffairnessanddeservingness(Alesina/Angeletos 2005;VanOorschot2006)–tonameafewexamples. ThecoreargumentIwanttodevelopinthefollowingistosaythatconflictsaboutthe overallsizeandgenerosityofthewelfarestateplayoutonadifferentpoliticaldimension thanconflictsaboutthe(re‐)distributionofresourcesacrossdifferentpartsofthewelfare state.Whereasconflictsabouttheoverallsizeofthewelfarestateandthegenerallevelof redistributioninagivensocietyarerelatedtomacro‐levelcleavagesdefinedbyincome, age,class,ideologyorsimilarfactors,materialself‐interestinthesenseofbelongingtoa particularwelfarestateconstituencygroupmattersmorewhenitcomestodistributive conflictswithinwelfarestates.Thus,givenacertaindegreeofwelfarestategenerosity,trade‐ offswithinthewelfarestatereflecttheclashofinterestsofdifferentconstituencies. Inthepresentpaper,Ifocusondistributiveconflictsbetweenthebeneficiariesof“old”and “new”socialpolicies(Vandenbroucke/Vleminckx2011),i.e.socialtransferprogramssuch aspensionsontheonehandandnewkindsofsocialinvestmentpoliciessuchaseducation andfamilypoliciesontheother.Ingeneral,thetrade‐offbetweensocialinvestmentsand passivesocialtransfersisoftendepictedasonebetweenpoliciesthatcreatediffusebenefits atsomepointinthefuturevs.socialpoliciesthathaveconcretebenefitsinthepresent(cf. e.g.Streeck/Mertens2011).Forexample,today’sinvestmentsineducationandearly childcarewillpayoffwhenyounggenerationswhoenjoythesebenefitstodayenterthe labormarketatsomedistantpointinthefuture.Incontrast,pensionandunemployment schemesentailimmediatebenefitsforthosewhoreceivethem.Cuttingbacksocialtransfers –sotheargumentmightgo–isthereforedifficult,becausethediffusebenefitsofsocial investmentsinthefutureareusuallynotsufficientlystrongtooutweighthematerialist policies,buttoexplorehowthesupportforredistributionvariesacrossandwithinpolicy fields.Inotherwords,theunderlyingdimensionremainsthesame. 8 interestsofpensionersandtheunemployed.Theelectoralconstituenciesandorganized interestsassociatedwithsocialinvestmentarealsobelievedtobepoliticallylessinfluential comparedtothedefendersofthetraditionalwelfarestate.Itisevenmoredifficultintimes ofausterity,whenbudgetpressuresnecessitatereductionsinspending.Discretionarytypes ofspendingsuchaspublicandsocialinvestmentsareeasiertocutbackthanentitlement‐ basedspending(Breunig/Busemeyer2012;Streeck/Mertens2011). Thisperspective,however,neglectsthefactthatsocialinvestmentsoftenproduce immediatebenefitsaswell–andoftenbeyondthegroupofthosewhoareimmediately affected.Thecaseofearlychildhoodeducationisonesimpleexampleofthisprocess:The expansionofchildcareprovisiondoesnotonlybenefitthechildrenthemselves,butitalso increasestheopportunitiesforyoungparentstocombinefamilylifewithemployment.The welfarestateconstituencygroupthatsupportstheexpansionofchildcareopportunities– (young)parents–mighteasilybeaslargeassomedefendersoftraditionalsocialtransfers (e.g.theunemployedorthedisabled).Therefore,thetrade‐offcouldbelessaboutfuture‐ orientedinvestmentsvs.consumption‐orientedsocialtransfers,butsimplyreflectthe emergenceofnewredistributiveconflictsbetweenoldandnewwelfarestate constituencies. Thecentralhypothesisisthatincontrasttothegeneralpoliticalconflictabout redistributionandthesizeofthewelfarestate,materialself‐interestmorenarrowlydefined willplayalargerroleinredistributiveconflictswithinthewelfarestate.Thereasonisthat whenitcomesto(re‐)distributionwithinthewelfarestate,servicesandtransfersarevery visibleandconcreteforthosewhoimmediatelybenefitfromthem,whereastheissueof redistributionandwelfarestategenerosityislocatedonamoreabstractlevelsothat generalvalueandideologicalorientationsaswellastheindividual’sgeneralsocio‐ economicpositionwithregardtoincome,educationandagemattermore. Hence,thesecondhypothesistobetestedis: 9 Hypothesis2:Conflictsabouttheoverallsize/generosityofthewelfarestateplayoutona differentpoliticaldimensionthanconflictsaboutthe(re‐)distributionofresourcesacross socialpolicysub‐fields.Intheformercase,ideology,normativeorientationsandthe individuals’socio‐economicpositionintheclasshierarchyareexpectedtomattermore, whereasinthelattercase,Iexpectmaterialself‐interestmorenarrowlydefinedtohavea strongerimpact. Operationalizingtrade‐offsattheindividuallevel:Introducinganewdataset Methodologicallyspeaking,themeasurementoftrade‐offsinindividualpreferencesfor welfarestatepoliciesischallenging.ExistingsurveyssuchastheEuropeanSocialSurvey (ESS)ortheInternationalSocialSurveyProgramme(ISSP)oftencontainquestionsabout individualpreferencesforpublicspendingorgovernmentinvolvementmoregenerally defined.Unfortunately,thesequestionsusuallyneithertakeintoaccountthefactthat individualsupportforpublicspendingshouldmatchindividualwillingnesstopaytaxes2 nordotheyexplicitlytakeintoaccounttrade‐offsacrosspolicyfields.Theseissuesare crucial,however,inordertoproperlymeasuretherealindividual‐levelsupportforsocial spendingacrossarangeofpolicies,sinceneglectingthesetrade‐offswillprobablyresultin onoverestimationofsupportforspending.Thisisbecauserespondentsinpublicopinion surveyshavebeenfoundtosupportbothlowertaxesaswellasagenerouswelfarestate withnoconstraintsortrade‐offsenforced(Citrin1979;forarecentupdate:Giger/Nelson 2013).Also,ifnotforcedtochoose,theyarelikelytosupporthigherspendinginallpolicy fields(seeGoerres/Prinzen2012foramoregeneraldiscussionoftheproblemsof measurementinwelfarestatepreferences). Forthepurposeofthispaper,Icanrelyonanoriginaldatasetthatmeasurestrade‐offsin preferencesattheindividuallevelinanovelway,takingintoaccounttrade‐offsbetween supportforspendingandfinancingontheonehandaswellastrade‐offsacrosspolicyfields 2TheISSPRoleofGovernmentmoduleisoneofthesurveysmostoftenusedtomeasure individualspendingpreferences,anditpaysabitmoreattentiontothisissuethanother surveys.Thewordingofquestionsaboutpublicspendingcontainsa“warning”to respondentsthatlargespendingincreasesmightrequireataxincreasetopayforthis.This is,however,aratherweakformofmodelingtrade‐offs. 10 ontheother.Thisoriginalsurveydatawascollectedintheproject“InvestinginEducation inEurope”(INVEDUC).3Inthisproject,weconductedasurveyofpublicopinionon educationandthewelfarestateineightEuropeancountries.Thecountriesareselectedas representativesofdifferentwelfarestateregimesinNorthernandWesternEurope: GermanyandFrancefortheconservativewelfarestateregime,theUKandIrelandforthe liberalregime,DenmarkandSwedenforthesocialdemocraticvarietyaswellasItalyand SpainasSouthernEuropeanwelfarestates.Thequestionnairewasdesignedbytheproject teamattheUniversityofKonstanzincollaborationwithexpertsfromTNSInfratest Sozialforschung–thesurveycompanyinchargeoftheactualfieldworkofthesurvey.The originalquestionnairewaswritteninEnglishandthentranslatedintothedifferent languagesinafour‐stepprocess,whichconsistedofatranslatabilitycheck,theactual translation,alinguisticqualitycontrolandafinalqualitycontrolbytheprojectteam(for detailsseeGensickeetal.2014). Thetargetpopulationofthesurveyisthepopulationinagivencountryaged18andabove. Thesurveyusedcomputer‐assistedtelephoneinterviewing(CATI).Randomdigitdialing (RDD)wasusedinallcountriesexceptSweden(whereacomprehensiveaddressregister coveringmorethan90percentofthepopulationexists)inordertodealwiththeproblem thatasizableandincreasingshareofthepopulationdoesnothavealandlineanymore,but usesmobilephonesonly.Thedatasetcontainstwosetsofweightsthatareappliedinthe descriptivestatisticsbelow:first,adesignweightappliedinthecaseoflandlinesonlyto takeintoaccountdifferentselectionprobabilitiesofindividualsdependingonthenumber oflandlinesperhouseholdandthenumberofpotentialintervieweesinagivenhousehold; second,aselectivityweightthatcorrectsfordifferencesbetweenthesampleandthetarget populationbyreferringtowell‐knownstratificationcharacteristicsofthelatter(using stratificationvariablessuchasage,gender,educationlevels,occupationalstatus,regions andemploymentstatus).Inthemultivariateregressionanalyses,Irefrainfromapplying weightsbecausetheinclusionofindependentvariablescontrolsfordifferencesinthe 3Thisprojectisfinancedwitha“StartingGrant”fromtheEuropeanResearchCouncil,Grant No.311769. 11 dependentvariablerelatedtothesecharacteristicsandavoidsrelyingonthe“blackbox”of weighting. ApretestofthequestionnairewasconductedinalleightcountriesinFebruary/March 2014.Theactualfieldworkforthesurveytookplacebetweenmid‐AprilandendofMay 2014.Theaveragelengthofaninterviewwas25minutes.Thenetnumberofinterviews differedslightlybetweencountriesinordertotakeintoaccountdifferencesinthesizeof thetargetpopulationinthatparticularcountry.TableA1intheappendixdisplaysthe numberofinterviewspercountryaswelltheresponserate.Theaverageresponseratewas roughly30percentwithahighof36percentinDenmarkandalowof20percentinIreland. Interviewersweretrainedextensivelybeforethepretestaswellasthemainphaseofthe fieldwork.MembersoftheprojectteamatKonstanzwereinvolvedinthebriefingof interviewersinordertomakesurethatinterviewersalsounderstoodthecoregoalsofthe project.Inordertoreducethedistancebetweentheinterviewerandtherespondent,the fieldworkintheindividualcountrieswasconductedbynationalfieldofficesofTNS InfratestSozialforschung,butcentrallycoordinatedandmonitored(Gensickeetal.2014: 13‐14).Theinterviewerswerenativespeakers. Thedeterminantsoftrade‐offsinthewelfarestate(I) Inthefollowing,Iemploytwodifferentsetsofquestionsthatwereincludedinthesurveyto measuretrade‐offsinwelfarestateattitudes.Thefirstisasetofquestionsthattriedto measuretheindividuals’willingnesstoinvestinapopularpolicysuchaseducationby manipulatingthealternativeoptionsthatindividualscouldchoosefrom.Tothatextent,the totalsamplewassplitintofourgroups(one“control”groupandthreedifferenttreatment frames),4andassignmenttooneofthesegroupswasrandom,ofcourse.Theexactwording ofthefourquestionswere: Split1(“Control”):“Thegovernmentshouldincreasespendingoneducation.” 4Ofcourse,thesearenottreatmentsinthestrictexperimentalsense,becausethe “treatment”ismeasuredtogetherwiththedependentvariable(supportforeducation spending). 12 Split2(“Treatment1”):“Thegovernmentshouldincreasespendingoneducation,evenif thatimplieshighertaxes.” Split3(“Treatment2”):“Thegovernmentshouldincreasespendingoneducation,evenif thatimpliescuttingbackspendinginotherareassuchaspensions.” Split4(“Treatment3”):“Thegovernmentshouldincreasespendingoneducation,evenif thatimpliesahigherpublicdebt.” Followingthesestatements,respondentswereaskedwhethertheywouldstronglyagree, agree,neitheragreenordisagree,disagreeorstronglydisagreewiththestatement.Table A2intheappendixdisplaysmeansandstandarderrorsforthemostimportantvariablesin theindividualgroupsaswellastheoverallnumberofvalidobservations,showingthatthe randomassignmentofindividualstogroupsdidworkforthemostpart.TableA3contains informationaboutthenumberofobservationsinthedifferentgroupsacrosscountries. Figure1isasimplegraphicalrepresentationofthemeans(and95%confidenceintervals) ofthecontrolgroupandthethreedifferenttreatmentswithouttakingintoaccount differencesbetweencountries.Table1containstheresultsofaseriesofunpairedt‐testsof differencesinmeansbetweenthecontrolandtreatmentgroupsinordertoconfirmthat differencesbetweengroupsareallstatisticallysignificant.Responsesarecapturedona5‐ pointLikertscalefrom1(stronglydisagree)to5(stronglyagree). Thefigureandthet‐testsclearlyshowthatsupportformoreinvestmentsineducationis conditionalonthemenuofalternativechoicesthatrespondentsareconfrontedwith,which isclearconfirmationofmyfirsthypothesis.Notsurprisingly,supportformoreeducation spendingbythegovernmentishighestinthegroupwithoutanyconstraintsorqualifiers added.Inthisgroup,meansupportformoreeducationspendingisat3.77pointsonthe5‐ pointscalementionedabove.Thisisequivalenttoashareof73.36percentofrespondents expressingsupportformoreorevenmuchmorepublicspendingoneducation.Support dropssignificantlyto3.13,whenrespondentsareremindedthatmoreeducationspending 13 mightimplyhighertaxes(equivalenttoashareof53.84percentsupportingmore(ormuch more)spending).Whenrespondentsareconfrontedwiththefactthathighereducation spendingwouldnotbefinancedwithhighertaxes,butwithhigherlevelsofpublicdebt, supportdropsfurtherto2.95(ashareof42.10percent).Thisisacriticalthreshold,because itrepresentsthewatershedbetweenindividualslargelysupportingincreasingeducation spendingvs.themopposingspendinghikes.Mosttellingly,however,supportformore educationspendingdropsevenfurtherto2.64whenrespondentsareconfrontedwiththe possibilitythatincreasingeducationspendingcouldgoalongwithcutbacksinotherparts ofwelfarestate,inparticularpensions.Thehugemajoritysupportingeducationspendingin thefirstgroupisnowreducedarelativeminorityof27.19percentsupportingmoreor muchmorespendingoneducation. Thefactthatrespondentsbecomelesslikelytosupportspendingincreaseswhentheyare remindedthattheyhavetopayforitintheformofhighertaxesorhigherlevelsofpublic debtisnotsurprising.Whatissurprisingisthatreducingspendinginotherpartsofthe welfarestate,inparticularpensions,isevenmoreunpopularthanrisingtaxesorincreasing publicdebt.Themagnitudeofdifferencesinmeansbetweengroupsisstrikingasisthefact thatallthesedifferencesarehighlystatisticallysignificant.Alsosomewhatunexpectedly, respondentsdonotpreferincreasingpublicdebttorisingtaxes.Ifindividualswouldonly caretomaximizeshort‐termbenefitsandminimizeshort‐termcosts,wewouldexpectthem tobemoreopposedtotaxhikes,becausethesecreateimmediateshort‐termcosts. However,individualsseemtobeawareofthepotentialnegativesideeffectsofhighlevelsof publicindebtednessevenwhendebtisusedtofinancepublicinvestmentssuchas education.Onecaveatthatneedstobeaddedhere,however,isthatindividualsinEuropean countriescouldbemoresensitivetohighlevelsofpublicdebtbecauseoftheongoing economicandfiscalcrisisinmanyEuropeancountries. 14 Figure1:Trade‐offsinthewelfarestate:meansandCIsofcontrolandtreatmentgroups. 15 Table1:Resultsofunpairedt‐testsofdifferencesinmeansbetweencontrolandtreatment groups. t‐Test Difference t‐Value(H0=no p‐Value difference) Cvs.T1 0.5526487 17.2721 0.0000 Cvs.T2 1.184971 37.5701 0.0000 Cvs.T3 0.8132021 25.6048 0.0000 T1vs.T2 0.6323221 18.4245 0.0000 T2vs.T3 ‐0.3717687 ‐10.8912 0.0000 T1vs.T3 0.2605534 7.5556 0.0000 InthefollowingmultivariateregressionanalysesIwanttodeterminewhethersupportfor educationspendingisinfluencedbydifferentfactors,dependingonwhichkindoftrade‐off questionisasked.Thisexerciseaddressesthesecondhypothesisstatedabove,namelythat materialself‐interestmorenarrowlydefinedwillbecomemoreimportantrelativeto broadersocietalcleavagesoncetrade‐offsarefullyacknowledged. Buildingontheinsightsofthelargeliteratureonwelfarestateattitudescitedabove,the modelcontainsvariablesrelatedtoself‐interestaswellasideologicalandnormative orientations.Thelattermayatleastbepartlyendogenous,i.e.individuals’socialpolicy preferenceswillalsocontributetoshapingtheirpartisanworldviewsandnormative dispositions.However,theproblemofendogeneitycouldbelesssevereifoneassumesthat ideologyandnormativeorientationsarefactorsthatarepartofdeepbeliefsystemsand thusnotpronetoshort‐termchangestothesameextentassocialpolicypreferencesmight be. Morespecifically,thefollowingindependentvariablesareincludedinthemodels: Educationalbackgroundmeasurestheindividual’seducationalexperiencesonafive‐point scalefrombasiceducationtouniversity‐leveleducation.Previousresearchhasshownthat highlyeducatedindividualsarealsomorelikelytosupportthefurtherexpansionof 16 educationalopportunities,eventhoughthismightseemcounterintuitivefromanarrow rational‐choiceperspective(Busemeyer2012:230).Individual(net)incomeisgivenin purchasing‐poweradjustedUS‐Dollars,re‐categorizedintofiveincomequintiles.In contrasttoeducation,theassociationbetweenincomeandsupportforeducationspending ismoreambivalent,sinceeducationalinvestmentsarelessredistributivethanothersocial policies(Ansell2008,2010).Hence,Idonotexpectastrongassociationinthiscase. Expectationsrelatedtodemographicvariablesaremorestraightforward:Retiredpersons shouldbelesssupportiveofmoreeducationspending,whereasrespondentsstillin education,womenandindividualswithsmallkidsathomeshouldexhibithigherlevelsof support. Inadditiontovariablesrelatedtodemographicsandthesocio‐economicposition,Iinclude variablescapturingideologicalorientations.Left‐rightorientationcapturesindividuals’ self‐placementona10‐point‐scalefrom1(left)to10(right).Finally,generalpreferences forincreasingthesizeofstatecouldbetakenasanindicatorofaprevalenceofanormative orientationontheroleofthestate.Thisvariablemeasuresindividualresponsestothis question:“Ashareofthenationalgovernment’sannualbudgetisspentonsocialbenefits andsocialservices.Pleasetellme,accordingtoyou:Shouldthegovernmentspendmuch more,more,thesame,spendlessormuchlessonsocialbenefitsandsocialservices?”Again, responsesarerecordedona5‐pointLikertscalewithhighervaluesindicatingstronger supportforstateinvolvement. Withregardtomethods,Iapplyverysimpletechniques.Firstofall,Idichotomizethe dependentvariablesinordertofacilitateinterpretationofthecoefficientestimates.Inall fourcases,supportformoreormuchmorespendingiscodedas“1”,whereassupportfor thesameorlessspendingiscodedas“0”.Second,thestructureofthedatasetishierarchical (individualsnestedwithincountries).However,thenumberoflevel‐2units(countries)is notsufficientinordertobeabletorunfully‐fledgedmulti‐levelmodelsortomodelthe effectofmacro‐levelcharacteristicsonmicro‐levelvariablesdirectly.Instead,Itreatthe multi‐levelstructureofthedatasetsimplyasafactorthatneedstobetakenintoaccountin theselectionofthepropermodelspecification.Ithereforeemployasimplelogitmodelwith 17 countrydummiesandstandarderrorsclusteredbycountry(seetable2).Tomakethe findingsmoreaccessible,averagemarginaleffectsareplottedinfigure2. Takentogether,thepatternthatemergesfromtheregressionanalysesisthefollowing: Firstofall,thereisadistinctionbetweenquestionsabouttheoveralllevelofpublic spendingoneducationanditsfinancingviahighertaxesorpublicdebtontheonehandand thequestionofredistributingresourcesfromotherpartsofthewelfarestate(inparticular pensions)toeducationontheother.Inthefirstsetofquestions,educationalbackground, left‐rightorientationandgeneralspendingpreferencesarestrongdeterminantsofsupport foreducationspending:Highlyeducated,left‐leaningandstate‐lovingindividualsaremore likelytosupporteducationspending,whereasindividualswithlittleeducation,arightist ideologicalorientationandagreaterskepticismwithregardtotheroleofthestatetendto bemoreopposed.Asexpectedandinlinewithpreviousresearch,individualincomedoes notmattermuch,nordoesbeingfemaleorretired. Inthequestionaboutredistributingresourceswithinthewelfarestate,however,these variableslooseanyexplanatorypower.Instead,variablesrelatedtoself‐interestmore narrowlydefinedturnouttobestatisticallysignificantnow:Theretiredare–forobvious reasons–stronglyopposedtotakingawayresourcesfrompensionstoincreasespending oneducation.Usingmodel3oftable2,thepredictedchangeintheprobabilityforaretired persontosupporteducationspendingcomparedtoanon‐retiredpersonisareductionof about6percentagepoints.5Viceversa,individualswithsmallkidsathomearemorelikely tosupporttakingawayresourcesfrompensionerstofundeducationalinvestments. Simulatingasimilarchangeasaboveyieldsanincreaseinsupportforeducationspending forindividualswithchildrenathomeofabout10percentagepoints.Beingineducation (student,vocationaltrainingorinschool)isalsoassociatedwithahighersupportfor educationspending,whichisnotsurprising.Similartotheothervariablescapturingnarrow self‐interest,theaveragemarginaleffectofbeingineducationbecomeslargeroncetrade‐ offsandconstraintsareacknowledged.Comparedtothevariableindicatingthepresenceof 5Genderissettomaleandthesmallkidsdummyvariableissetto“0”.Allothervariables areattheirmean. 18 smallkidsathome,however,theeffectisstrongestinthecaseoftrade‐offsbetween spendingandhigherlevelsofpublicdebt,i.e.youngpersonsineducationaremorelikelyto supporteducationspendingevenifthatentailshigherlevelsofpublicdebt.Atfirstsight, thisseemscounter‐intuitivebecauseitcouldbeexpectedthatyoungindividualshavea stronginterestinkeepingpublicdebtlevelsdown,sincetheyhavetopayfortheselaterin theirlives.However,aplausiblealternativeexplanationisthatyoungindividualshavea shortertimehorizonandarethereforelessconcernedaboutincreasinglevelsofpublic debt.Ingeneral,confidenceintervalsforthisgroupofindividualsarelargerbecausethey representarelativelysmallshareofthesample. Finally,itisnoteworthytoemphasizeagainthatneithergeneralsupporttowardsstate spendingnorindividualpartisanideology–twovariablesthatareusuallyhighlycorrelated withindividualspendingpreferences–donothaveanystatisticallysignificanteffecton supportformoreeducationspendingoncetrade‐offsbetweendifferentpartsofthewelfare stateareseriouslytakenintoaccount.Thiseffectisstrongestinthecaseofgeneral spendingpreferences,whereaveragemarginaleffectsareindistinguishablefromzerofor thoseindividualswhowereconfrontedwiththeconstraintsofpensionscuts,whereasthere arestrongpositiveeffectsintheotherthreetreatmentgroups. Exploringchangesinthemagnitudeofpredictedeffectsacrossthedifferentmodel specificationsingreaterdetail,figure3containssimulatedchangesinthepredicted probabilityofsupportingmoreeducationspendingthatresultfromachangeinthe respectiveindependentvariablefromavalueonehalfofastandarddeviationbelowthe meantoonehalfofastandarddeviationabovethemean.6Aninterestingobservationisthat changesinthepredictedprobabilityresultingfromamanipulationoftheindependent variablesarestrongestinthecaseofthegroupwithnoconstraintsenforced.Thisis particularlythecasewithregardtogeneralsupportforstatespending,butalsowithregard toindividualeducationalbackground.Onlyindividualpartisanideologyseemstohavea strongereffectinthefourthgroup(increasingpublicdebt),perhapsindicatingthatleft‐ 6Othercontrolvariablesaresetatthemeanvalue,thedummyvariables(retired,female, student/ineducationandsmallkidsathome)aresetatzero. 19 leaningindividualsaremorewillingtoaccepthigherlevelsofpublicdebtinorderto financesocialinvestments.Themostimportanttake‐awayfromFigure3isagainthe observationthatbroadsocio‐economiccleavagesaccountforsignificantlylessofthe variationinthedependentvariable,whenindividualsareconfrontedwiththepossibilityof spendingcutsinpensionsinordertofinanceadditionaleducationspending. 20 Figure2:Determinantsofsupportforeducationspendingacrossdifferentmodels. 21 Table2:Determinantsofsupportforeducationspending,logitmodelswithclustered standarderrorsandcountrydummies. Dependentvariable (1) (2) (3) (4) Supportforeducationspending No Increase Cut Increase constraints taxes pensions publicdebt Educational 0.183*** 0.0631* 0.0547 0.0932** background (0.0418) (0.0322) (0.0656) (0.0465) Income ‐0.0157 0.0853* 0.0529 ‐0.00933 (0.0517) (0.0467) (0.0355) (0.0245) Retired ‐0.0536 0.0704 ‐0.356*** ‐0.0107 (0.115) (0.131) (0.0756) (0.108) Student,inschoolor 0.433 0.514** 0.618*** 0.666*** vocationaltraining (0.293) (0.250) (0.162) (0.226) Female 0.0583 ‐0.0371 ‐0.0970 ‐0.00473 (0.134) (0.138) (0.0938) (0.0960) Smallkidsathome 0.0966 0.252** 0.462*** 0.0210 (dummy) (0.128) (0.122) (0.112) (0.169) Left‐rightideological ‐0.0864*** ‐0.0808** ‐0.0167 ‐0.0912*** orientation (0.0321) (0.0320) (0.0227) (0.0290) Generalspending 0.388*** 0.266*** ‐0.0602 0.269*** preferences (0.0876) (0.0607) (0.0526) (0.0711) Constant 0.0206 ‐0.705* ‐0.791** ‐1.116** (0.447) (0.395) (0.375) (0.492) Countrydummies Yes Yes Yes Yes PseudoR2 0.0782 0.0577 0.0236 0.0380 Observations 1,771 1,741 1,681 1,700 Robuststandarderrorsinparentheses ***p<0.01,**p<0.05,*p<0.1 22 Figure3:Comparingthemagnitudeofeffectsacrossmodels. 0,08 0,06 0,04 Education 0,02 Left‐Right 0 ‐0,02 No constraints Taxincrease Pensioncuts Debtincrease Statism ‐0,04 ‐0,06 Note:Thefigurecontainschangesinpredictedprobabilityinthesupportforeducation spendingforthedifferentgroups,simulatingachangeintherespectiveindependent variablefrom½ofastandarddeviationbelowtothemeanto½ofastandarddeviation abovethemean,holdingothercontinuousvariablesattheirmeansandsettingthedummy variables(oldage,femaleandsmallkidsathome)tozero. 23 Thedeterminantsoftrade‐offsinthewelfarestate(II) Thesecondsetofquestionsalludedtoabovearetwoquestionsthatforcerespondentsto choosebetweensocialinvestmentsontheonehandandpassivesocialtransfersonthe other.Inthiscase,thetotalsamplewassplitintotwogroups(notfourasabove),and individualsselectedatrandomweregiveneithertheoneortheotherquestion.Thefirst questionisaimedatmeasuringsupportforsocialinvestmentandreadsthus: “Whatdoyouthinkaboutthefollowingstatement?Tobeabletofinancemorespendingon educationandfamilies,thegovernmentshouldcutbackonoldagepensionsand unemploymentbenefits.” Incontrast,thesecondquestionissupposedtocapturesupportforthepassivewelfare state: “Whatdoyouthinkaboutthefollowingstatement?Tobeabletofinancemorespendingon oldagepensionsandunemploymentbenefits,thegovernmentshouldcutbackspendingon educationandfamilies.” Again,respondents’answerswerecodedon5‐pointLikertscale(stronglyagree,agree, neitheragreenordisagree,disagree,stronglydisagree).Forthemultivariateregression analyses,thisvariableisthentransformedintoabinaryvariable,whichtakesthevalueof “1”forindividualswhostronglyagreeoragreeand“0”fortheremainingcases.Thisisa ratherconservativemeasureofsupportforsocialinvestmentandpassivetransfers, becausetherearefewercasesinthesecategoriescomparedtothegeneralspending questionusedabove.7 Whenlookingatthedescriptivestatistics,oneconspicuous,butunsurprisingfindingisthat ingeneral,supportforspendingdeclinesprecipitouslyoncerespondentsareconfronted withtrade‐offsacrosspolicyfields.Intheunconstrainedquestiononsupportforeducation 7Inpracticalterms,theresultsdonotdiffermuchnomatterwheretheexactcut‐offpointis drawn. 24 spendingdiscussedabove,about73percentexpressedsupportformoreormuchmore educationspending.Incontrast,only11.26percentdemandmoreormuchmorespending on“educationandfamilies”ifthisadditionalspendingwouldbefinancedwithcutbacksin passivesocialtransfers.Evenfewer(7.82percent)wouldliketoseemoreormuchmore spendingonoldagepensionsandunemploymentbenefitsifthisistobefinancedby cutbacksineducationspending(seetable3fordetails).Thelargestshareofrespondents disagreeswithbothstatements,averysizableminorityevenstrongly.Theoverallmeanin thesampleis2.11forthefirstquestionand2.06forthesecond.Thiscouldindicatethat cuttingbackspendingonpensionsandunemploymentbenefitsforthebenefitofchildren andfamiliesisslightlylessunpopular8relativetotheopposite,buttheoverallmessageis clearandconfirmsthesimilarfindingoftheprevioussection:Individual‐levelsupportfor spendingincreasesdropsprecipitouslyoncerespondentsareconfrontedwithacleartrade‐ offproblembetweendifferentsocialpolicies.Inotherwords,individualsdon’tlikebeing forcedtochoose,independentofwhethertheyareaskedfortheirsupportforspendingon socialinvestmentsorpassivesocialtransfers. Infigure4andtheassociatedtable4,Ipresentfindingsfrommultivariateregression analysesonthedeterminantsofsupportforsocialinvestmentandpassivesocialtransfers, respectively.Ialsoincludeathirddependentvariablethatcapturesgeneralpreferencesfor redistribution.Thisisdoneinordertoachieveasimilarcomparisonasabovebetweena relativelyunconstrainedsettingontheonehandandamoreconstrainedsituationonthe other,whererespondentsareconfrontedwithtrade‐offs.Thiswayitispossibletosee whetherthecoalitionsthatsupportsocialinvestmentsandsocialtransfersaresimilarto classicalredistributivecoalitions.Supportforredistributionismeasuredbyrespondents’ degreeofagreementwiththestatement:“Thegovernmentshouldreduceincome differencesbetweentherichandthepoor.”Asabove,Iemployasimplelogitmodelwith standarderrorsclusteredbycountryandcountrydummiesandIusethesamesetof independentvariables.Again,resultsarepresentedintheformofplottedaveragemarginal effects(Figure5)aswellasastandardregressiontable(Table4). 8Anunpairedttestconfirmsthatthedifferenceinmeansbetweenthesetwogroupsis statisticallysignificantatthe.05level. 25 Ingeneral,thefindingspointinthesamedirectionastheonesabove:First,supporting coalitionsforsocialinvestmentsdifferfromthoseofpassivesocialtransfersinimportant ways.Increasingspendingonsocialinvestments,evenifitentailscuttingbackpensionsand unemploymentbenefits,isstronglysupportedbyindividualswithsmallchildrenathomeas wellasstudents.Thepredictedchangeintheprobabilityofsupportingsocialinvestmentis anincreaseofabout5percentagepointsinbothcases.Incontrast,retiredpeoplearemore likelytoopposesocialinvestmentsiftheyneedtobefinancedwithcutbacksinpension spending.Here,thepredictedchangeinprobabilityisadecreaseofsimilarmagnitude(4 percentagepoints).Whenitcomestopassivesocialtransfers,however,individualswith smallkidsathomearemorelikelytoopposespending(thepredictedchangeinprobability is3percentagepoints).Ialsofindthathighlyeducatedindividualsaremoreopposedto spendingonpassivesocialtransfers.Themagnitudeoftheeffectiscomparabletothatof the“smallkids”dummy. Second,therearealsosomeindicationsthatsupportforsocialinvestmentvs.passive transfersisdeterminedbybelongingtoparticularconstituencygroupsratherthan cleavagesbroadlydefined,whichisrevealedwhencomparingthefindingsfromthefirst twomodelswiththelatteronefocusingongeneralredistributivepreferences.Inthecaseof generalredistributivepreferences,variablessuchaseducation,income,left‐right ideologicalorientationandgeneralspendingpreferenceshavemoreexplanatorypower thaninthecaseofpreferencesforsocialinvestmentsandpassivetransfers,exceptforthe factthatstudentsarealsolesslikelytosupportredistribution,whereasretiredpersonsare morelikelytodoso.Whatisalsointerestingisthatgeneralsupportforsocialspendingis positivelyassociatedwithsupportforredistribution(asonewouldexpected),but negativelyassociatedwithsupportforsocialinvestments. Takentogether,theseresultscanberegardedasastrongconfirmationofHypothesis2. Withsomeexceptions,thegeneralpatternisthatvariablesrelatedtobroadsocietal cleavagesaremorepowerfulinaccountingforvariationingeneralsupportfor redistribution.Incontrast,whenrespondentsareforcedtomakechoicesbetweensocial 26 investmentsandpassivetransfers,variablesrelatedtoself‐interestmorenarrowlydefined suchashavingsmallchildrenathome,beingineducationorretiredbecomemore important. Table3:Trade‐offsinspendingpreferences:socialinvestmentvs.passivesocialtransfers. Morespendingoneducationand Morespendingonoldage familiesandcutbackonoldage pensionsandunemployment pensionsandunemployment benefitsandcutbackspending benefits oneducationandfamilies Percent Cumulative Percent Cumulative Stronglyagree 1.60 1.60 1.14 1.14 Agree 9.66 11.26 6.68 7.82 Neitheragree 15.29 26.55 15.12 22.94 Disagree 43.37 69.92 49.62 72.56 Strongly 28.44 98.36 25.20 97.76 100.00 2.24 100.00 nordisagree disagree Don’tknow/no 1.64 answer Overallmean 2.11(0.986) 2.06(0.887) (andstandard deviation) 27 Figure5:Supportforsocialinvestments,passivetransfersandredistribution. 28 Table4:Determinantsofsupportforspendingonsocialinvestmentsandpassivesocial transfersaswellasredistributionmoregenerallydefined. (1) (2) (3) Dependentvariable Supportfor Supportfor General spendingon spendingon supportfor social social redistri‐ investments transfers bution Educational 0.0240 ‐0.236*** ‐0.0559** background (0.0344) (0.0350) (0.0255) Income ‐0.0311 ‐0.0981* ‐0.136*** (0.0241) (0.0511) (0.0193) Retired ‐0.384*** 0.168 0.287*** (0.138) (0.140) (0.0863) Student,inschoolor 0.527*** ‐0.103 ‐0.531*** vocationaltraining (0.196) (0.418) (0.157) Female ‐0.217 ‐0.0237 ‐0.00111 (0.155) (0.0882) (0.0489) Smallkidsathome 0.452*** ‐0.568*** ‐0.0437 (dummy) (0.147) (0.180) (0.110) Left‐rightideological 0.0209 0.0945** ‐0.197*** orientation (0.0209) (0.0376) (0.0287) Generalspending ‐0.381*** 0.0751 0.458*** preferences (0.0706) (0.0741) (0.0231) Constant ‐0.999*** ‐2.621*** 1.000*** (0.256) (0.310) (0.218) PseudoR2 0.0508 0.0594 0.1197 Observations 3,430 3,423 6,873 Robuststandarderrorsinparentheses ***p<0.01,**p<0.05,*p<0.1 29 Conclusions Thispaperhasaddedanewperspectivetotheongoingdebateaboutwelfarestate retrenchmentbyfocusingontrade‐offsbetweendifferentpartsofthewelfarestate,in particularsocialinvestmentsandpassivesocialtransfers.Ifoundthatcitizensindeed dislikebeingforcedtochoosebetweendifferentkindsofsocialpolicies.Although investmentsineducationareverypopularinprinciple,supportforspendingdrops precipitouslywhencitizensareremindedthatincreasingspendingimpliesraisingtaxes, increasinglevelsofpublicdebtorcuttingbackpensions.Ifforcedtochoose,citizensare evenmorelikelytoaccepthighertaxesorhigherlevelsofdebtratherthancuttingback otherpartsofthewelfarestate. Thesecondmajorfindingofthepaperisthatthepoliticalcleavagestructuresindistributive conflictsthatplayoutwithinexistingwelfarestatesmightbeverydifferentfromthekindof coalitionsthathavebeenidentifiedinthegeneralstruggleabouttheirexpansion.Existing researchalmostexclusivelyfocusesonthelatterforthesimplereasonthatgenerally availablesurveysofpublicopiniondonotincludequestionsthatwouldadequatelymeasure trade‐offs.Therobustandconsistentfindingthatemergesfromtheanalysisofouroriginal surveydataisthatdistributivestruggleswithinexistingwelfarestatesaremuchmore determinedbyself‐interestmorenarrowlydefinedratherthanbroadsocietalcleavages relatedtoideologicalorientations,norms,valuesorsocio‐economicposition. Thisalsohasimplicationsfortheworldofpolicy‐making.Theviabilityofthe“social investmentstate”asthenewdominatingparadigminsocialpolicy‐makingcouldbe hamperedbythepoliticaloppositionofpowerfulconstituencygroups,ifexpandingsocial investmentswouldgoalongwithcutbacksinotherpartsofthewelfarestate.Giventhe limitedfiscalroomofmaneuverofmostEuropeangovernments,thisseemsunavoidablefor themostpart,however,sinceincreasingtaxesorlevelsofpublicdebtisnolongerfeasible. 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Country Numberofinterviews Responserate Denmark 1,000 36% France 1,003 28% Germany 1,500 26% Ireland 1,000 20% Italy 1,002 28% Spain 1,000 24% Sweden 1,100 33% UnitedKingdom 1,300 21% Total 8,905 27% 35 TableA2:Meansandstandarddeviation(inparentheses)formostimportantconfounding variablesacrossgroups. “Noconstraints” “Taxincrease” “Pensioncuts” “Debt increase” Max.number 2,237 2,238 2,148 2,178 3.42(1.52) 3.37(1.52) 3.37(1.53) 3.36(1.54) 3.03(1.39) 3.07(1.41) 3.09(1.44) 3.03(1.42) Retired 0.32(0.47) 0.34(0.47) 0.35(0.48) 0.34(0.47) Student/in 0.04(0.20) 0.04(0.20) 0.03(0.18) 0.03(0.18) Female 0.55(0.50) 0.54(0.50) 0.53(0.50) 0.54(0.50) Smallkidsat 0.14(0.35) 0.13(0.34) 0.14(0.35) 0.15(0.36) Left‐rightid. 4.81(2.30) 4.76(2.34) 4.86(2.36) 4.86(2.31) General 3.36(0.97) 3.41(0.95) 3.36(0.97) 3.36(0.94) ofvalidobs. Educational level Individual income (quintiles) education home spendingpref. 36 TableA3:Distributionofnumberofobservationsacrosscountries. Control Treatment1 Treatment2 Treatment3 Denmark 266 225 231 253 France 263 231 255 251 Germany 358 377 378 377 Ireland 258 262 230 242 Italy 243 274 240 228 Spain 272 245 237 240 Sweden 264 318 261 245 UK 313 306 316 342 37