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Weak State and Political Economy of Thailand: Ten Years after the Crisis Apichat Satitniramai 25/2/2008 Introduction Crisis destroyed old mode of K accumulation; Bankers’ Capitalism— capital (credits) allocation and Investment coordination Re-form = building a new form of accumulation Main Qs: what is the new form? is it success?, why? Main Arguments Weak state unsuccessful reform (case of financial sector) Slower econ growth Weak state = low capacity (ability) of state to negotiate and collaborate with strong societal actors, esp dominant econ class. Or low institutionalized capabilities for guiding sectoral changes, e.g. coordinating Investment, upgrading industries/sectors. Main Arguments Capacity determined by level of autonomy and effectiveness of state agencies: bureaucracy & government (technocrats & politicians) Autonomy = state’s policy/direction is not captured by dominant class/group Effectiveness = ‘getting thing done’ Unsuccessful Reform Slow pace of crisis solution, both in FIs capitalization and NPLs workout Unable to build rules (laws) for facilitating neoliberal new mode of K. accumulation Legislative failures of 3 basic laws: Bank of Thailand Act, Financial Institution Act, Deposit Insurance Act. Slow pace of crisis solution (Chuan Government) Political weaknesses (lack of autonomy) of the gov’t, due to pre1997 constitution, ‘forced’ it to use Mkt-led approach > state-led app., e.g. NPL transfer pricing between. Private FIs & state own AMC, Mkt-led app. both for recapitalization & NPLs workout Chuan’s gov’t mkt-led app. outcome Voluntary K support of the state for FIs: a backstopping plan Failure: big banks refused to join: want to protect their control & ownership inadequate K for absorbing losses from NPL workout slow pace of workout Chuan’s gov’t mkt-led app. outcome Slow NPLs workout Weak bankruptcy law—watered downed by debtors-cum-senators: automatically allows a bankrupt person to regain their normal status after 3 years of the court’s ruling, hence would be freed of any debt obligations; shortened the bankrupt period by at least 9 years. inadequate threat against debtors to workout debts with FIs Chuan’s gov’t mkt-led app. outcome Slow NPLs workout FIs lacked of K to absorb losses from NPLs workout: to protect ownership cosmetic method: rescheduling (min. ‘haircut’) > restructuring reentry NPLs Slow pace of crisis solution; contraction of FIs’ loan till 2002 slow econ recovery NPLs of Financial Institutions 1999 2000 2001 Unit: Million Baht, % 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 1998 484,905 2,674,533 2,094,425 45.02 38.93 863,663 17.73 Source: BOT 477,405 771,126 641,883 592,171 10.41 15.65 12.70 10.73 477,071 8.19 8.16 Unable to build new mode of K accumulation (Thaksin Gov’t) Legislative failures of 3 basic laws: Bank of Thailand Act, Financial Institution Act, Deposit Insurance Act Main issue of conflicts, teachnocrats VS politicians = political autonomy of BOT i.e. level of central bank independence Appointing & dismissal of BOT’s Governor FI supervision authority: Gov’t proposed new regulatory organization; Financial Services Authority (FSA) All problematic original laws still intact after 10 years Unable to build new mode of K accumulation (Thaksin Gov’t) Why did Thaksin’s gov’t want less independent BOT? It was a real sector gov’t who captured the state & used state power for benefiting its constituencies, cronies & inner circle Further amend bankruptcy law in favor of debtors State direct credits & ‘picking winner’ industrial policy, Unable to build new mode of K accumulation (Thaksin Gov’t) Thai state under Thaksin was further weakened. It was directly captured by a new dominant capitalists from real sector. But, the executive branch of the state as an organization was strengthened by the 1997 Constitution, more effective gov’t Outcome of reform 10 years after Excess liquidities continues Growth rates of Deposits & Credits (%) ิ ื่ และเงินฝากของธนาคารพาณิชย์ การขยายต ัวสนเช อ 40 30 10 ปี -20 ิ เชอ ื่ สน เงิน ฝาก 49 25 48 25 47 25 46 25 45 25 44 25 43 25 42 25 41 25 40 25 39 25 38 25 37 25 36 25 35 25 -10 34 0 25 ร้อยละ 20 Imbalances in capitals and credits allocations 1988 – 2000 2001 - 31 May 2007 Sector GDP security credit GDP bonds security credit Manu, Export, Import 31.6 16.9 36.7 34.6 3.9 21.4 27.6 Services, Consumer Products, Utilities 20.0 10.4 22.4 22.8 16.7 38.0 29.7 Wholesale, Retail 16.5 2.0 16.7 15.1 7.1 0.4 16.2 FIs, Constructions, Real Estate 12.1 67.3 21.1 9.3 72.4 40.0 24.1 Agricultures 10.2 - 2.5 10.1 - - 2.1 Mine 4.1 3.5 0.6 2.8 - 0.1 0.4 Defense 3.0 - - 4.5 - - - Housing 2.5 - - 0.8 - - - 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 รวมทั้งหมด Investment & output still lower than the pre boom period 1959-1986 1987-1996 1997-1998 1999-2006 Output (growth %) 8.3 9.5 -5.9 5 Investment (growth %) 11.1 15.1 -32.4 7.6 Private (growth %) 9.8 15.9 -41.4 11.9 Government (growth %) 17.4 14.1 -9.3 9.6 Investment (% of GDP) 26.3 29.1 27.7 21.2 Private (% of GDP) 19.4 21.5 17.4 14.6 Government (% of GDP) 6.8 7.7 10.4 6.5 Most investments are replacement, not new investment Share of Replacement to Total Private Investment (%) 1986-1996 36.4 1997-1999 2000-2005 97.3 82.4 Productivity growth is lower than others GDP per person employed (1980=100) 450 400 350 300 China Indonesia 250 Korea, Republic of M alaysia Taiwan, China 200 Thailand Viet Nam 150 100 50 0 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 Future of Thai political economy 19th September Coup: A royalist led coup against effective government 2007 constitution’s agenda is to produce weak government slower economic growth than pre-boom period