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Speech
nihil temere agendum neque ex
hibernis iniussu Caesaris
discedendum… quantasvis
[magnas] copias etiam Germanorum
sustineri posse munitis hibernis…
rem esse testimonio, quod primum
hostium impetum multis ultro
vulneribus illatis fortissime
sustinuerint: re frumentaria non
premi; interea et ex proximis
hibernis et a Caesare conventura
subsidia: postremo quid esse levius
aut turpius, quam auctore hoste de
summis rebus capere consilium?
Context/ Explanation?
Lucius Aurunculeius [Cotta] and several military tribunes and
the centurions of the first rank thought that nothing should be
done rashly and that they should not leave the winter quarters
[lit., it should not be departed from the winter quarters] without
Caesar’s order; they showed that however many (troops), even
many troops of the Germans, could be withstood with the winter
quarters having been fortified: (this) fact was the proof, (namely)
that they had withstood the first attack of the enemy very
bravely, with many wounds in addition having been inflicted (on
the enemy); because of the grain supply they were not
pressured [i.e., they were not pressed for grain]; meanwhile help
would come both from the nearest winter quarters and from
Caesar; finally, (they asked) what was more unreliable or
more shameful than to make a decision about very important
matters on the advice of an enemy?
si velit secum colloqui, licere;
sperare a multitudine impetrari
posse, quod ad militum salutem
pertineat; ipsi vero nihil nocitum iri,
inque eam rem se suam fidem
interponere
if he (i.e., Titurius) wishes to speak with him, it is allowed; he
hopes that what pertains to the safety of the [Roman] soldiers
can be obtained from the multitude; he himself (i.e., Quintus
Titurius Sabinus) would certainly not be harmed in any way, and
to this end he pledges his word.
non esse consuetudinem populi
Romani accipere ab hoste armato
condicionem: si ab armis discedere
velint, se adiutore utantur
legatosque ad Caesarem mittant;
sperare pro eius iustitia, quae
petierint, impetraturos
Cicero replied only one thing to these [words]: that it was not
the custom of the Roman people to accept term(s) from an
armed enemy; if they wish to put down their arms, they should
use him as a helper and send ambassadors to Caesar; he
hopes that they will obtain what they asked for because of his
(i.e., Caesar’s) [sense of] fairness
desilite milites, nisi vultis aquilam
hostibus prodere; ego certe meum
rei publicae atque imperatori
officium praestitero.
se cum legionibus profectum
celeriter adfore; hortatur ut pristinam
virtutem retineat.
ut procul tela coniciant neu propius
accedant et, quam in partem
Romani impetum fecerint, cedant
ne quis ab loco discederet: illorum
he said, “Jump down, fellow soldiers, unless you wish to betray
the eagle to the enemy. I, for my part will perform my duty to the
commonwealth and my general.”
In the letter, he writes that he, having set out with the legions,
will quickly be there; he encourages him (i.e., Cicero) to retain
his former courage
Ambiorix ordered it to be announced that they should throw
spears from a distance and not approach more closely and
should give way into which direction the Romans made an
attack
For their commanders ordered word to be passed throughout
the whole line of battle that no one was to leave this position,
esse praedam atque illis reservari
quaecumque Romani reliquissent:
proinde omnia in victoria posita
existimarent.
sero facturos clamitabat, cum
maiores manus hostium adiunctis
Germanis convenissent aut cum
aliquid calamitatis in proximis
hibernis esset acceptum. Brevem
consulendi esse occasionem.
Caesarem arbitrari profectum in
Italiam; neque aliter Carnutes
interficiendi Tasgeti consilium fuisse
capturos, neque Eburones, si ille
adesset, tanta contemptione nostri
ad castra venturos esse. Non
hostem auctorem, sed rem spectare:
subesse Rhenum; magno esse
Germanis dolori Ariovisti mortem et
superiores nostras victorias; ardere
Galliam tot contumeliis acceptis sub
populi Romani imperium redactam
superiore gloria rei militaris
exstincta. Postremo quis hoc sibi
persuaderet, sine certa re
Ambiorigem ad eiusmodi consilium
descendisse? Suam sententiam in
utramque partem esse tutam: si nihil
esset durius, nullo cum periculo ad
proximam legionem perventuros; si
Gallia omnis cum Germanis
consentiret, unam esse in celeritate
positam salutem. Cottae quidem
atque eorum, qui dissentirent,
consilium quem habere exitum? In
quo si non praesens periculum, at
certe longinqua obsidione fames
esset timenda.
si videatur, pugna ut excedant et
cum Ambiorige una colloquantur:
sperare ab eo de sua ac militum
salute impetrari posse.
!
that their (i.e., the commanders’) was the loot and for them was
reserved whatever the Romans had left: consequently they (i.e.,
the soldiers) would think that everything was placed in victory.
Against these things Titurius [Sabinus] shouted repeatedly that
they would be acting (too) late, after larger bands of the enemy,
with the Germans having been added, had assembled or after
some disaster in the nearest winter quarters had been suffered.
(He said that) the opportunity for considering was short. He
thought that Caesar had set out for (northern) Italy; otherwise
the Carnutes would not have formed the plan of killing
Tasgetius, nor would the Eburones, if that man were present,
have come into the camp with such disdain for us. The enemy
was not the instigator (of his proposal), but he was looking at the
fact(s): the Rhine was nearby; the death of Ariovistus and our
previous victories were [a source] of great grief to the Germans;
Gaul was inflamed, having been brought under the power of the
Roman people, with so many insults having been received,
(and) with its former glory of warfare having been exstinguished.
Finally, who could persuade himself of this, that Ambiorix without
a sure result resorted to a plan of this type. (He said that) his
own opinion in either case was safe: if there were nothing too
unfortunate, they would arrive at the nearest legion with no
danger; if all Gaul were uniting with the Germans, the one (hope
of) safety lay in speed. (He asked) what outcome the plan of
Cotta and those who disagreed with him (Sabinus) would have,
in which if not present danger, but certainly starvation through a
prolonged siege was to be feared?
He (Sabinus) consults with the wounded Cotta, if it seems
advisable that they leave the battle and together speak with
Ambiorix; he hopes to be able to get what they want from him
concerning their own safety and [that of] the soldiers.