Download Following two days of intensive battle in the hills and ridges south of

Why GEN Lee Ordered
F
ollowing two days of intensive battle in the hills and ridges
south of Gettysburg, Pa., GEN Robert E. Lee hurled his
Army of Northern Virginia against the Union center an-
chored on Cemetery Ridge on the sweltering afternoon of
July 3, 1863. Operationally brilliant but tactically flawed, the Gettysburg campaign constituted GEN Lee’s all-out effort to destroy
the Union Army of the Potomac on Northern soil. Lee’s strategic
goal was to so demoralize the Northern supporters of the war
that public opinion would pressure President Abraham Lincoln’s
administration to recognize the Confederate States of America
and terminate the Civil War.
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Pickett’s Charge
By COL Cole C. Kingseed
U.S. Army retired
Dennis Steele
Library of Congress
Library of Congress
The Gettysburg Battlefield today, from the tree line to the
fence line, where Confederate soldiers, led by GEN Robert
E. Lee, left, and MG George E. Pickett, below, continued
their attack on Cemetery Ridge under withering Union fire.
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Dennis Steele
Dennis Steele
Above, the First Pennsylvania Cavalry Memorial is situated on the
flank of the Union line’s position on Cemetery Ridge. Bottom right,
a statue of GEN Robert E. Lee tops the Virginia Memorial along
Gettysburg National Military Park’s Confederate Avenue, which
follows the position of Confederate lines that faced Cemetery
Ridge on July 3, 1863.
More popularly known as Pickett’s Charge, the Confederate assault of July 3 is often portrayed by modern historians as a monumental effort of military futility, but to GEN
Lee, the Confederate attack was neither ill-conceived nor
doomed to failure. Why did Lee order Pickett’s Charge,
and what did he do to enhance the chances of its success?
COL Cole C. Kingseed, USA Ret., Ph.D., a former professor of history at the U.S. Military Academy, is a writer and consultant.
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Dennis Steele
Lee’s Strategic Reassessment
The Battle of Gettysburg began on July 1 as a meeting
engagement when Confederate infantry from LTG Ambrose P. Hill’s corps encountered Union cavalry under
command of BG John Buford on the ridges northwest of
Gettysburg. Hoping to capitalize on his ability to bring
more reinforcements to the field before MG George G.
Meade could react in sufficient strength, GEN Lee accepted
battle even though, in his words, he was “marching blind”
Dennis Steele
Above left, an artillery piece is displayed on the Gettysburg Battlefield. Right, Union, state and regimental memorials dot Cemetery Ridge.
due to the absence of MG J.E.B. Stuart’s cavalry. GEN Lee’s
gamble on July 1 paid off as converging Confederate
columns smashed two Union corps by late afternoon and
the Union Army retreated to Cemetery Hill south of Gettysburg. The following day, July 2, GEN Lee planned to strike
both flanks of the Army of the Potomac simultaneously, but
he failed to coordinate the attacks. After some of the most
ferocious fighting of the war, MG Meade maintained the
high ground from Culp’s Hill through Cemetery Ridge to
Little Round Top by day’s end, and the Army of the Potomac survived to fight another day.
The dilemma confronting GEN Lee on the evening of July
2 was knowing whether he had devised a good strategy that
had been poorly executed or whether the strategy itself was
flawed. As he surveyed the field, GEN Lee believed that,
had LTG James Longstreet’s assault against MG Meade’s
southern flank been coordinated with fellow corps commander LTG Richard S. Ewell’s attack against the northern
extremity of the Union line on Culp’s Hill, the Confederates
would have crushed the Army of the Potomac in a vise.
In spite of the lack of coordination—for which he must
bear full responsibility—GEN Lee had almost achieved success because the Army of Northern Virginia’s subordinate
commanders at the brigade and division level were so skilled
and the infantry was so proficient. GEN Lee’s army had
nearly penetrated the Union line on Cemetery Ridge in two
places before Union artillery and reinforcements took advantage of interior lines and repelled the Confederate forces.
GEN Lee reasoned that if he could coordinate the attack
the following day, he could still drive the Army of the Potomac from the field. Moreover, for the first time during the
battle, GEN Lee had his entire army on the field before the
end of July 2. MG Stuart returned with his depleted horsemen by early evening, and, most importantly, by late afternoon, MG George E. Pickett’s fresh division of 4,500 Vir-
ginians arrived on the battlefield and was available for action on July 3.
Lee’s Alternative
For 150 years, historians have dissected GEN Lee’s rationale for remaining at Gettysburg a third day, when by his
own admission he was far less optimistic for the army’s
chances for success than the preceding day. Yet GEN Lee
stayed to fight when he didn’t have to, even though LTG
Longstreet had presented a legitimate alternative to a frontal
assault against the Federal center. The only conceivable reason for Lee overriding Longstreet’s recommendation to leave
Gettysburg and fight a defensive battle closer to Washington,
D.C., is that Lee believed he could win at Gettysburg. He believed it from the time the Army of Northern Virginia entered Pennsylvania until midafternoon on July 3, when the
remnants of LTG Longstreet’s grand assault stumbled back
to their line on Seminary Ridge.
In GEN Lee’s mind, the decision was never whether he
would stay or not stay, whether he would attack or retreat.
He had made those decisions when he accepted battle on
July 1. Only by offensive action could GEN Lee achieve his
intent of destroying the Union Army, and he would not retreat while any chance of success remained. Knowing that
the South would never have sufficient resources to mount a
subsequent invasion of the North and that time was working against the Confederacy, GEN Lee opted to attack
again. He played to win, not to avoid defeat. To achieve total victory, he was willing to risk complete defeat.
Coordinated Attack or Act of Desperation?
Was Pickett’s Charge a coordinated attack or Lee’s last
desperate gamble to win a victory over the Army of the Potomac? Twenty-twenty hindsight provides an interesting
answer, but Lee suffered no illusions as to the risks accomJuly 2013 ■ ARMY
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panying his decision to conduct a frontal assault across
nearly a mile of open terrain. Eighty-one years later,
Dwight D. Eisenhower made a similar decision to launch a
direct assault against entrenched enemy positions above
Omaha Beach on D-Day. In both cases, the challenges confronting the attacking forces were formidable. The comparisons between Pickett’s Charge and D-Day remain eerily
similar 150 years after the Battle of Gettysburg.
Creating the Conditions for Success
Having made the decision to remain on the field and
launch a massive assault, GEN Lee directed his efforts to
creating the conditions conducive to success. He first
placed LTG Longstreet in command of the general assault.
Some historians opine that LTG Longstreet was a poor
choice since he was so vehemently opposed to the attack,
but GEN Lee believed he was the most proven corps commander and his “right arm” now that LTG Thomas J.
(Stonewall) Jackson was dead. If not LTG Longstreet, which
commander could better have managed the preparations in
so little time? Should GEN Lee have assigned corps commanders Ewell, Hill, or Stuart to lead the attack? None of
these commanders had ever proven able to match LTG
Longstreet’s ability to deliver the hammer-like assault required on July 3.
Next, GEN Lee directed an intense two-hour artillery
preparation to soften the Union center before the infantry
commenced its attack. Had the Confederate bombardment
destroyed the Union artillery, the infantry could have traversed the no-man’s-land that separated the Union and
Confederate lines with minimal casualties. If anything, the
artillery bombardment on the early afternoon of July 3 was
far more intense than the Allied aerial and naval bombardment that lasted a mere 40 minutes before the initial assaulting waves came ashore at Omaha Beach. Unfortu-
nately for the attacking forces in 1863 and 1944, neither artillery preparation was effective, and it was left to the infantry to overcome the enemy’s defenses.
Simultaneously, GEN Lee directed MG Stuart to circle the
Northern right flank and strike MG Meade’s rear. Union
cavalry under Brigadier Generals David M. Gregg and
George A. Custer intercepted MG Stuart’s attack three
miles short of Cemetery Ridge, where they fought an inclusive, yet strategically vital, engagement. The ensuing casualties, coupled with the fatigue of his horses, forced MG
Stuart to depart the field short of his objective and return to
the Confederate lines.
Lastly, GEN Lee utilized all available resources in the attack—three divisions totaling about 12,000 men—and focused the assault against a short stretch of line along Cemetery Ridge. Two additional brigades of infantry were
prepared to support any penetration of the Union line.
Such an assault would have provided GEN Lee numerical
superiority at the point of attack.
Could the Confederate attack have succeeded? Lee certainly believed so. If everything had worked perfectly, Pickett’s Charge might well have broken the Union line. If the
artillery preparation had destroyed or significantly degraded the Union center before the Confederate infantry
advanced, or had MG Stuart struck the Union rear as the
Southern infantry reached Cemetery Ridge, GEN Lee might
have won the battle. According to Eisenhower, though, before the battle is joined, plans are everything, but once the
battle is joined, plans go out the window.
Reflection
In retrospect, GEN Lee’s judgment seems flawed, but his
method of command had always been to bring his army to
the field, create the conditions for success and then leave the
execution to his subordinate commanders. That recipe had
Dennis Steele
A statue of LTG James
Longstreet stands in Pitzer
Woods, where he anchored
the left of his corps’ line.
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Dennis Steele
Left, plaques note Confederate unit battlefield actions
along Confederate Avenue in
Gettysburg National Military
Park. Below, images of
Confederate soldiers who
charged Cemetery Ridge on
July 3, 1863, decorate the
base of the Virginia Memorial.
Dennis Steele
proven successful against five successive
commanders of the Army of the Potomac.
If Lee is to be faulted at Gettysburg, it
should not be for ordering the attack on
July 3 but rather for his lack of situational
awareness. Meade was different from the
Army of the Potomac’s previous commanders, fighting an orchestrated battle with a
team that was far more aligned than in previous engagements. Of course, the soldiers
of the Army of the Potomac simply fought
much better than had been the case in the
engagement just two months earlier at
Chancellorsville. Part of Lee’s lack of situational awareness was his underestimation
of the fighting ability of his adversary.
In addition, even though it should have
been clear that the leadership team put in
place after Stonewall Jackson’s death was
not functioning smoothly, Lee failed to intervene to coordinate his own team until it
was too late to influence the action. On July
1, his instructions to Ewell to “take Cemetery Hill if practicable” lacked a sense of urgency required to
ensure Confederate success. The following day, Lee left the
timing of the main attack to Longstreet’s discretion and
failed to ensure that Ewell was in position to support the assault on Cemetery Ridge and Little Round Top. In the words
of GEN Lee’s principal biographer, Douglas S. Freeman, the
“Army of Northern Virginia slipped back a year” with respect to its ability to coordinate and control the battle.
Following the conclusion of the Gettysburg campaign,
GEN Lee tendered his resignation to Confederate President Jefferson Davis on August 8, 1863. Before doing so, he
permitted himself a rare bit of introspection as he summarized his personal assessment of the failure of the cam-
paign. GEN Lee wrote to the president:
I still think if all things would have worked together, it would
have been accomplished. But with the knowledge I then had,
and in the circumstances I was then placed, I do not know
what better course I could have pursued. … Could I have
foreseen that the attack on the last day would have failed to
drive the enemy from his position, I should certainly have
tried some other course. What the ultimate result would have
been is not so clear to me.
Therein lies the calamity that befell Southern arms during
the Battle of Gettysburg.
✭
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