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Prices and Network Externalities in Two-Sided Markets: the Belgian Newspaper Industry Patrick Van Cayseele∗and Stijn Vanormelingen† March 14, 2007 Abstract This paper discusses the newspaper industry in Belgium from a two-sided market perspective. The reader and advertizing market for printed media are closely interlinked with each other by bilateral network externalities. This requires a specific structural model to estimate demand parameters for both markets since a profit maximizing publisher takes into account those externalities. We estimate network effects and demand elasticities for Belgian newspaper publishers to assess market power and the degree of competition in the newspaper market, which experienced a large consolidation wave over the last decade. Keywords: two-sided markets, newspapers, demand estimation JEL Codes: L11, L82, C23 ∗ LICOS, † LICOS, Katholieke Universiteit Leuven and Universiteit van Amsterdam. Katholieke Universiteit Leuven 1 1 Introduction Recently, there is a surge of interest in so called two-sided markets. These markets are defined as markets where a platform that connects two distinct types of economic agents. The value of the good to one type of economic agents depends on the number of agents of the other group that consume the good (Rochet and Tirole 2003, Armstrong 2005). In these markets not only price level but also price structure matters. The choice of this price structure is key to the success of a platform (Rochet and Tirole 2003). Notable examples of two-sided markets are credit card markets, video game consoles, dating agencies, shopping malls. . . The newspaper market is another application since advertisers and consumers are connected with each other by cross-group network externalities. Publishers typically do not sell only newspapers to consumers, but also publicity space to advertisers. The more readers for a newspaper, the higher the value of advertising space to the advertisers. On the other side, it could be that the higher the amount of advertisements, the higher the value of newspapers to consumers. This is true if newspaper readers also want to be informed about promotions and special offers by firms. Similar to the rest of the world, the Belgian newspaper market witnessed a large consolidation process over the last decades (De Bens 2001). The number of newspaper publishers decreased considerably and large cross-media companies emerged. To address the impact of these mergers on newspaper publishers’ market power, one needs to take into account the two-sided nature of the market. Looking for example to the readers’ side alone will lead to wrong conclusions. Therefore we will estimate demand parameters for both sides of the market to make statements about market power and the degree of competition in the Belgian newspaper market. Furthermore, the magnitude of the bilateral network effects is estimated. [to be completed] The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 gives a concise overview of the Belgian newspaper market. Section 3 describes the data while section 4 discusses the empirical model. Section 5 discusses the results and section 6 concludes. 2 The Belgian Newspaper Market This section gives an overview of the Belgian newspaper market since the middle of the nineties. Table 1 shows daily newspaper titles in Belgium. Newspapers can be divided into different groups, for example Dutch language versus French language and "quality" newspapers versus "popular" newspapers. The market for printed dailies is heavily concentrated. There are only five media companies active in the market, publishing fifteen daily newspapers. The two largest publishers 2 together have a market share of around 60% in the readers market and 50% in the advertising market.1 One part of our dataset consists of sales figures of all Belgian dailies with a time span ranging from 1994 to 2005. Figures 1 to 5 show the evolution of the average daily sales per Belgian newspaper2 from January 1994 to June 2005. One can see considerable variation not only between newspapers, but also over time. Sales figures vary quite a lot between different months of the year. Despite the fact that some newspapers manage to increase their average readership, the overall trend is one of a decrease in total sales as shown in figure 6. This fall in average sales is especially pronounced in the French speaking part of Belgium. Figures 7 and 8 show the evolution of the price of one single newspaper copy. The figures also show the consumer price index, normalized to the average price of a single copy in the beginning of the sample period. Before the mid nineties, the cover price was fixed at the national level. Even after price liberalization, prices seem to be more or less exogeneously determined and price increases occur mostly simultaneously accross all newspapers. The exceptions are the two business newspapers De Tijd and L’Echo, which have a higher price than the other newspapers. It is clear that before 2000, price increases in cover prices more or less match inflation (as measured by the CPI). Afterwards, nominal newspaper prices rise faster than the CPI. The former figures plot the price of one single newspaper copy. Part of the newspaper sales come from annual (or bi-annual) subscriptions. The correlation between subscription rates and single copy prices is around 0.95. The other part of our dataset includes the monthly spending on advertising of all advertisers in each newspaper from January 2001 to June 2005. We observe for each advertiser the value of advertising spent in each single newspaper. This allows us to get an idea of the degree of multihoming as defined by Rochet & Tirole (2003). In principle, an advertiser multihomes if he uses more than one newspaper to communicate its advertising campaign to the consumers. Due to data limitations we assume that an advertiser multihomes when he buys in one month pblicity space in more than one newspaper. This is equivalent with assuming that a firm launches at most one advertising campaign per month. Table 2 shows the amount of multihoming following this definition. Around 53.5% of the firms singlehome, i.e. buy advertising space in no more than 1 newspaper in one single month. This means that almost half of the advertisers multihome. Almost 20% advertise in two newspapers. Around 5% of the advertisers place their ads in more than 10 newspapers. This makes that the majority of advertisements in one newspaper has also appeared in an other newspaper. Table 3 shows that for example for "Het Volk" less than 1% of its advertisements are unique ads. In contrast, more than 40% of ads in the business newspaper "De Tijd", are unique. We show a comparison between advertising and newspaper sales revenues in figure 9. It can 1 For the Dutch speaking part of Belgium alone, this fraction is even higher, namely almost 80% in both reader and advertising market. 2 "Sud Presse" covers a number of different titles which differ only in their regional news. Before 1999, sales for these titles were reported separately. Afterwards, sales are summed up. 3 be seen that in recent years, nominal revenue from advertisements increased substantially while nominal sales revenue3 remains fairly constant. As a result advertising revenue is higher than sales revenue at the end of the sample period4 . Figure 10 shows the 2004 share of advertising revenue in total revenue for all newspapers5 separately. The ad revenue share ranges from 48% to 75%. In general, the "quality" newspapers have a higher share. advertising prices are plotted in figure 11 and 12. The ad price showed here is the price of a one page black and white advertisement. Smaller ads are a fraction of this price, whereby the fraction does not differ largely between newspapers. Part of the differences between advertising prices can be explained by differences in readership. However, when we look at advertising revenue per reader6 , this still differs between newspapers. (Figure 13). 3 Data Description This section provides a description of the data used in the paper. Our dataset includes all daily national newspapers in Belgium. Sales figures of Belgian newspapers are provided by the association of Belgian newspaper publishers (BVDU). The dataset includes monthly figures of average daily newspaper sales, from both subscriptions and sales at local newspaper shops. The time span of sales figures ranges from January 1994 to June 2005. Also the free distribution of newspapers is included in the data, which acounts for about 2% of total distribution. We received cover prices and subscription rates from BVDU. Subscription rates are provided for annual, bi-annual and quarterly subscriptions. The subscription rate per edition is computed by dividing the annual subscription rate by the total number of editions published in a given year. Characteristics of newspaper readers are provided by CIM, an agency that gathers and publishes data about all different media outlets. The characteristics include educational attainment, age, sex, socio-economic status, professional status and number of children. These data are gathered on a yearly basis, however for the moment we only have data for the year 20047 at our disposal. Data on media advertising come from Aegis Media. This database shows on a monthly basis the companies that have bought advertising space in each newspaper separately. The agency that gathers this data, computes ad spending per company, by using the appropriate list price for the advetizement size. We aggregated advertising spending up to total monthly publicity spending per newspaper. Data is observed from January 2001 to June 2005. We obtained advertising prices from Scripta and Full Page, which are the main companies that commercialize and sell publicity 3 Revenue from subscriptions and daily distribution through newspaper shops need to be careful in interpreting advertising revenues. These are computed using listed prices and do not take into account possible rebates. This issue will be further discussed in the data description section and in the econometric analysis. 5 Metro is a free newspaper that is distributed in railway stations, schools, etc. . . Its share of advertising revenue in total revenue equals obviously 1 and is thus not included in the graph. 6 Advertising revenue per reader is computed as total ad revenue in one month divided by the number of editions appearing in that particular month times the number of newspapers sold. As a result advertising revenue per reader can be compared with the cover price of one single copy. 7 In fact, this includes data from surveys conducted between May 2003 and may 2004. 4 One 4 space in Belgian newspapers. Because some years were missing, we complemented them with data from Mediabook, a yearly publication about the Belgian media market. Unfortunately, prices we observe are list prices while it is likely that rebates are granted for larger advertisers and during the summer period. However, as long as these do not differ too much between newspapers or over time, this is not a serious problem for our empirical analysis8 . Also data about newspaper formats come from Mediabook. There are three different newspaper formats in our sample, namely (1) broadsheet, (2) Belgian, and (3) tabloid. A number of newspapers shifted to a smaller publishing size over the sample period. 4 Empirical Model This section presents the econometric model. It takes into account both sides of the markets, namely readers and advertisers and the interaction between them. The model is mainly based on that of Rysman (2004). A newspaper publisher receives revenue from both the readers and advertisers. In its pricing strategy, he takes into account the fact that advertisers value the readership of the newspaper. 4.1 advertising demand Given the numbers on multihoming shown in the previous section ,a discrete choice model would not be appropriate. Therefore we rely on a representative advertiser model. Suppose there are N advertisers. The representative advertiser choses aj , the amount of advertising in newspaper j, j = 1 . . . J. We assume advertisers act as price takers. Profit from advertising is a function of the amount of advertising, profit per informed consumer and the number of newspaper readers9 : Π = f (a1 , R1 , P1A , π e1 , ..., aN , RJ , PJA , π eJ ) whith Rj the number of readers, PjA the advertising price and π ej the profit per consumer that remembers the advertisement. Under the assumptions that readers singlehome and that there is constant profit per reader who notices the advertisement, the profit function of the advertiser is separable in aj . If these assumptions are satisfied, there is no reason why the choice to advertise in one newspaper should be influenced by the choice to advertise in another newspaper. From the demand side, if consumers singlehome they can only be reached by advertising in the specific newspaper they read. As a result, the advertiser’s decision about the amount of advertising in newspaper j is affected only by the amount of readers , their characteristics and the price of an ad in that particular newspaper. The assumption of constant profits per consumer, says that serving many consumers because of an advertisement in newspaper j does not affect the benefit 8 Note that the list prices are correct to infer advertising quantity from advertising revenue, since the same prices are used to compute adertizing revenue. 9 Time subscripts are omitted for expositional reasons. 5 of serving extra consumers through an advertisement in newspaper i (Rysman 2004). The profit function of an advertiser can therefore be written as: Π = [e π 1 G(a1 , R1 ) − P1 a1 ) + ... + (e π J G(aJ , RJ ) − PJ aJ ] G(aj , Rj ) measures the number of readers that notice and remember the advertisement. We β assume that G(., .) takes the Cobb-Douglas functional form, namely G(aj , Rj ) = aα j Rj . We expect α to lie between 0 and 1, so there are decreasing returns to larger advertisements. β is expected to be positive, capturing potential network effects. The advertiser chooses aj to maximize advertising profits: aj = Ã Pj αe π j Rjβ 1 ! α−1 Hence the total amount of advertising demand for newspaper j is given by N · aj : Aj = Ã Pj απj Rjβ 1 ! α−1 where π j = π ej N (1−α) . Assume that ln(π j ) can be written as a linear function of some observable and unobservable characteristics of the readership of newspaper j. The above can be written as: 1 β (1) ln(Pj ) + ln(Rj ) + Xj γ + ηj α−1 1−α Equation 1 allows to estimate demand parameters using aggregate data on advertising prices and quantities. We stress that the advertising price is likely to be endogeneous, so we need proper instruments to get consistent estimates. This issue is further addressed in the next section. ln(Aj ) = 4.2 Readers’ demand To model reader demand for newspapers, we use of a nested logit model. The utility consumer i derives from newspaper j depends on both product and consumer characteristics. As such, utility can be written as10 : uij = δ j + ν ij where δ j represents the mean utility of consuming newspaper j which is common to all consumers and ν ij is the deviation from this mean and is specific to each individual consumer. Consumers choose the newspaper which gives them the highest utility and buy one unit of it (discrete choice). Mean utility can be expressed as a function of the newspapers’ observable characteristics XjN , its cover price PjN and a "taste" parameter ξ j , which is unobservable: 1 0 Again, time subscripts are omitted. 6 δ j = Xj β + α ln(PjN ) + ξ j The nested logit model puts more structure on the consumer specific part of utility. It allows consumer utility to be correlated accross products belonging to the same group. So, in response to for example a price increase of newspaper j a consumer is more likely that consumers will substitute away to newspapers in the same group than to other, more different products. We apply a nested logit model with two levels (Verboven 1996). Assume that the market can be divided in G groups. Each group g, g = 1, . . . G can be further divided into Hg subgroups. The individual specific part of utility can be written as: ν ij = εig + (1 − σ g )εihg + (1 − σ hg )εij Where εig captures consumer i’s preference for group g, similarly εihg captures preference for subgroup hg of group g. They are both the same for each product in in the same group and subgroup respectively. We assume that σ hg and σ g are common accross (sub)groups, so σ hg = σ 1 and σ g = σ 2 The σ parameters must satisfy the following condition to be consistent with random utility maximization: 0 ≤ σ 2 ≤ σ 1 ≤ 1. The higher σ 2 , the more consumer preferences are correlated accross newspapers belonging to the same group. Similarly, the higher σ 1 , the more consumer preferences are correlated accross newspapers in the same subgroup. When σ 2 approaches σ 1 , correlation accross newspapers in the same subgroup is the same as between newspapers in the same group, but belonging to an other subgroup. As a result, we are back in the one level nested logit model. When both σ2 and σ 1 are equal to zero, the model is the simple logit. If εij , εig and εihg have the standard nested logit distribution such that εig , εig + (1 − σ 2 )εihg and ν ij have the extreme value distribution, the market share of newspaper j, sj , can be written as (Berry 1994, Verboven 1996): ln sj − ln s0 = XjN β + α ln(PjN ) + σ 1 ln sj|hg + σ 2 ln shg|g + ξ j (2) Where s0 represents the market share of the outside good, sj|hg is market share of newspaper j in subgroup hg and shg|g is market share of subgroup hg in group g. So market share of newspaper j can be written as a linear function of mean utlility of the newspaper and the logarithm of its group and subgroup market shares. which allows us to estimate β, α, σ hg and σ g using linear estimation techniques.Note that sj|hg and shg|g are endogeneous by definition and need to be instrumented. 4.3 Equilibrium [to be added] 7 5 5.1 Results advertising Demand We estimate equation 1 to get advertising demand parameters. As noted above, advertising price is likely to be endogeneous, since an increase in advertising demand for unobservable reasons is expected to have an impact on the advertzing price too. As instrument we use the size of the newspaper. At the beginning of our sample period, most newspapers were published in Broadsheet format. Some of them switched to Belgian format, others switched to Tabloid format.11 Changes to narrower newspaper formats are decided at least one year in advance since they require large investments in printing facilities. Format changes can be seen as cost shifters. First, pages are smaller and thus printing costs per advertising page are lower, and second, format changes coincide with investments in newer and more efficient printing rolls. More compact formats are assumed to have no other impact on advertising quantity than through advertising prices.12 Another instrument we use to identify the price coefficient is the share of subscriptions in total newspaper sales. Most newspapers announce their advertising rates for the whole year at the beginning of that year. Newspapers with higher subscription rates have more loyal readers and are more certain of the number of newspapers they will sell in the following year. Consequently, we expect a positive correlation between advertising prices and the share of subscriptions. We use Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) to estimate advertising demand in equation 1, applying three different specifications. The first (GMM1) uses a quality dummy and a Dutch language dummy to capture the main reader characteristics. The quality dummy is equal to 1 when the newspaper is considered as a "quality" newspaper, the Dutch dummy is equal to one if the newspaper is written in Dutch(cf. Table 1). The second specification (GMM2) uses data from the CIM survey about Belgian newspaper readers. We include the percentage of readers that belong to the two highest socio-economic groups (High Soc. Group %), the percentage of readers that have at least one child younger than 15 years old (With children %), the percentage of male readers (Male %) and the percentage of readers that consider themself as responsible for the daily purchases (Purchases Resp. %). The last specification is a GMM estimation with newspaper fixed effects (GMM-FE). A time trend and a seasonal dummy are also included in all specifications. Although, there are no real first stage regressions in GMM, we report OLS regressions of the advertising price on the instruments to assess their appropriateness. Results are shown in Table 4. The instruments excluded from equation 1, are Belgian, Broadsheet and Subscription Share in the 1 1 Broadsheet measures 540X385 millimeters (8 columns) , Belgian format is slightly smaller namely 490X336 mm (7 columns). Tabloid is the smallest format with 385X250 mm (5 columns). 1 2 "Gazet van Antwerpen" was published simultaneously on broadsheet and tabloid format in the period before the definite switch to tabloid. This allowed the measurement of the influence of different formats on the impact of an advertisement on consumers. The results were that not the absolute size, but rather the relative size to total newspaper size mattered for consumer responsiveness (MediaMarketing 2004) Consequently we do not expect the newspaper format to have a direct impact on advertizing quantity. This is confirmed in a simple OLS regression of equation 1 where also newspaper format is included. The coefficients on newspaper formats were not significant at the 10% level. 8 previous year. Belgian is a dummy equal to one if the newspaper has the Belgian format, similarly Broadsheet is a dummy equal to one when the newspaper has a Broadsheet format. Results are in line with expectations. The bigger the size of the newspaper, the higher the advertising price. The lagged subscription share has the expected sign in GMM1 and GMM2, but is negatively correlated with advertising price in the fixed effects estimation. However, the coefficient is never significant. Also, the included instruments show the expected partial correlations with the advertising price. The more readers a newspaper has, the higher the price. "Quality" newspapers charge higher prices. Dutch language newspapers charge lower prices, given the other variables. Newspapers with more readers from higher socio-economic groups, female readers and readers who are the purchasing responsibles charge higher advertising prices. The F -statistic of joint significance of the excluded instruments is higher than 10 in all specifications. The partial R2 statistics are also satisfactory, namely around 0.6. Table 5 shows the results of estimating equation 113 . Results from an OLS regression are reported in column 1. The coefficient on advertising price is negative and highly significant despite the upward endogeneity bias. Column 3 (GMM1) corrects for this endogeneity problem and the coefficient on advertising price goes in the right direction, i.e. increases in absolute value. However, the difference is not that large. The number of readers have a strong and positive impact on the advertising quantity, pointing to a network effect. The more readers a newspaper has, the more advertising it can attract14 . Results from the GMM1 specification point to a demand elasticity of -1.61, impying returns to scale to advertising quantity of 0.38. β is estimated to be close to one. There is significantly more advertising in quality newspapers and somewhat less in Dutch language newspapers. In column 4, reader characteristics are included in the regression. It can be seen that especially the percentage of readers fom the highest socio-economic groups has a significant and positive impact on advertising quantity. Also the percentage of purchases responsables has a positive impact, although only significant at the 10% level. advertising quantity drops as the relative number of male readers increases, but again, this result is only significant at the 10% level. The results from the fixed effects estimates (column 2 and 5) are more or less similar, although the demand elasticity is estimated to be somewhat smaller. For all specifications, the Hansen test does not reject validity of the instruments. 5.2 Readers’ demand We use equation 2 to retreive information about readers’ demand parameters. First, whether the newspaper is published in Dutch or not, divides newspapers into groups. Second, each group is 1 3 All estimations are done by taking into account the panel structure of the data. Standard errors are robust against heteroskedasticity and intra-group correlation in all specifications. In the GMM estimations, the weighting matrix is constructed such that the coefficient estimates are efficient in the presence of heteroskedasticity and intra-group group correlation. 1 4 We also tried a specification where the number of readers was assumed to be endogeneous, but this did not change the results. 9 further divided into subgroups on the base of whether it is a "quality" or "popular" newspaper. Again, there are some identification issues since sj|hg and shg|g are endogeneous. Total market size is defined as the population older than 15 years, consequently the outside good is given by the population above 15 years who do not buy a newspaper. We assume the cover price to be exogeneous, given the price pattern in figures 7 and 8. The cover price variable was deflated using the consumer price index, and is included in logs. As instruments we use the average subscription share of other newspapers belonging to the same group and subgroup. The artificial first stage regressions are shown in table 6. The Shea partial R2 and F-statistics are considerably lower than in first stage regressions for advertising demand, pointing to weaker instruments. However, there is still some significant part of variation in the endogeneous variables explained by the instruments. Table 7 shows results for OLS, fixed effects and GMM estimation of equation 2. The OLS estimates for σ 1 and σ 2 are estimated to be equal to one. GMM gives estimates of 0.94 for σ1 and 0.86 for σ 2 . These estimates are consistent with the two-level nested logit model, although the difference between σ 1 and σ 2 is not significant. The coefficient on cover price has a negative sign but is not significant at all. The models with newspaper fixed effects perform rather bad. Fixed effects estimation returns σ parameters inconsistent with the two-level nested logit model. GMM estimation with newspaper fixed effects gives insignificant σ parameters, pointing to a standard logit model. An explanation could be that our instruments do not vary enough over time to get consistent estimates. We also ran regressions with the amount of advertzing included as explanatory variable to test for a feedback loop between advertisers and newspaper readers. The coefficient on the number of readers was not significant in the OLS regressions15 , so we excluded the variable in order to use the longer time span of newspaper sales and prices. 6 Conclusions [to be added] 1 5 This is in line with empirical results of Argentesi and Filistrucchi (2006). See also Gabszewicz et al. (2002). 10 7 References Argentesi, E. and L. Filistrucchi (2005): "Estimating Market Power in a Two-Sided Market: the Case of Newspapers", forthcoming in Journal of Applied Econometrics. Armstrong (2005): "Competition in Two-Sided Markets" forthcoming in Rand Journal of Economics. Berry S. (1994) "Estimating Discrete-Choice Models of Product Differentiation", Rand Journal of Economics, vol. 25(2), pp. 242-262. De Bens E. (2001) "De Pers in België", Lannoo Uitgeverij, 454 p. Gabszewicz J, D. Laussel and N. Sonnac (2002): "Press advertising and the Political Differentiation of Newspapers", Journal of Public Economic Theory, vol. 4(3), pp. 317-334 Mediabook (2001-2006), Kluwer Publishing, Diegem. Rochet, J-C. and J. Tirole (2003a): "Platform Competition in Two-Sided Markets", Journal of the European Economic Association, vol. 1(4), pp. 990-1029. Rysman, M. (2004b): "Competition Between Networks: A Study of the Market for Yellow Pages", Review of Economic Studies vol. 71, pp. 483-512. Verboven F. (1996): "International Price Discrimination in the European Car Market", Rand Journal of Economics, vol. 27(2), pp. 240-268. 11 8 Tables and figures Table 1: Belgian Newspapers 16 Dutch French German Quality De Morgen (DM) De Standaard (DS) De Tijd (FET) Le Soir (LS) La Libre Belgique (LLB) L’Echo (LECH) Popular Het Laatste Nieuws (HLN) Het Nieuwsblad (NB) Het Volk (HV) Gazet van Antwerpen (GVA) Belang van Limburg (BVL) Sud Presse (SUD) Vers l’Avenir (VA) La Dernière Heure (DH) Grenz-Echo (GRE) Table 2: Number of advertizements per newspaper Nr. of newspapers Frequency Percentage 1 19662 53.5% 2 7015 19.1% 3 to 5 5781 15.7% 6 to 10 2527 6.9% More than 10 1796 4.9% Total 36781 100% 12 Free Metro NL (METN) Metro FR (METF) Table 3: Multi per newspaper Newspaper Percentage Het Volk 99.4% Het Nieuwsblad 97.1% Metro FR 94.7% Grenz-Echo 91.5% Sud Presse 90.9% Metro NL 89.1% Belang van Limburg 87.3% Gazet van Antwerpen 87.1% Vers l’Avenir 84.5% La Dernière Heure 84.4% Het Laatste Nieuws 80.4% De Standaard 79.4% De Morgen 76.8% Le Soir 72.7% La Libre Belgique 72.5% L’Echo 69.8% De Tijd 57.6% Table 4: First Stage Regressions Advertizing Demand Belgian Broadsheet Subscr. Share [t-1] Nr. Readers Qual. Dutch Multi High Soc. Group % With Children % Male % Purchases Resp. % Constant GMM1 Coef. S.E. 0.245 [0.081] 0.480 [0.080] 0.107 [0.214] 0.695 [0.052] 0.358 [0.059] -0.120 [0.053] 0.095 [0.130] 0.831 F-stat excl. instr. Partial R2 excl. instr. Standard errors in brackets. [0.673] GMM2 Coef. S.E. 0.188 [0.077] 0.423 [0.068] 0.228 [0.124] 0.855 [0.053] GMM-FE Coef. S.E. 0.221 [0.070] 0.369 [0.071] -0.208 [0.509] 0.395 [0.084] 0.146 1.291 0.412 1.381 2.630 -3.616 0.099 [0.110] [0.199] [0.844] [0.683] [0.518] [0.974] [0.065] 12.29 14.45 22.23 0.61 0.58 0.68 + , * , **, significant at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively 13 Ad Price Nr; Readers Quality Dutch Table 5: OLS -1.341 [0.188]** 1.234 [0.139]** 0.813 [0.102]** -0.171 [0.093]+ Advertizing Demand FE GMM1 -1.360 -1.606 [0.104]** [0.173]** 1.183 1.418 [0.190]** [0.128]** 0.935 [0.085]** -0.158 [0.084]+ High Soc. Group % With Children % Male % Purchases Resp. % Multi -0.025 [0.324] -1.048 [0.128]** -0.039 [0.269] GMM2 -1.447 [0.272]** 1.325 [0.245]** GMM-FE -1.163 [0.272]** 1.053 [0.572]+ 2.572 [0.530]** 0.303 [1.359] -2.672 [1.416]+ 2.316 [1.183]+ -0.579 [0.242]* -1.064 [0.193]** Nr. Obs 810 810 810 756 810 R2 0.62 0.54 P-value Hansen test 0.98 0.41 0.43 + Standard errors in brackets. , * , **, significant at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively Table 6: First stage regressions readers’ demand GMM GMM-FE sj|hg shg|g sj|hg shg|g Subscr. group -0.711 5.902 1.141 0.802 [3.260] [1.212]** [0.946] [0.406]+ Subscr. subgroup 3.208 -3.392 1.256 -0.860 [1.201]* [0.700]** [0.537]* [0.333]* Cover price -1.431 -1.336 -0.341 0.272 [0.821] [0.570]* [0.181]+ [0.130]+ Trend 0.010 0.007 -0.009 -0.002 [0.033] [0.012] [0.006] [0.004] F-stat excl. instr. Shea Partial R2 Standard errors in brackets. 3.86 15.2 13.32 3.86 0.08 0.22 0.07 0.04 + , * , **, significant at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively 14 Cover Price sj|hg shg|g Trend Constant Table 7: OLS 0.249 [0.825] 1.033 [0.112]** 1.004 [0.184]** -0.020 [0.015] -2.003 [0.510]** Readers’ demand FE GMM -0.121 -0.209 [0.070] [1.455] 0.895 0.941 [0.062]** [0.440]* 1.191 0.860 [0.100]** [0.420]* -0.016 -0.012 [0.003]** [0.028] -2.218 -2.437 [0.146]** [1.521] GMM-FE -0.012 [0.269] 0.185 [0.395] 0.034 [0.725] -0.013 [0.007]* Nr. Obs. 1938 1938 1938 1938 R2 0.86 0.80 Standard errors in brackets. + , * , **, significant at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively Figure 1: Sales Dutch language quality newspapers 20000 40000 Sales 60000 80000 100000 Sales per Newspaper 1994m1 1995m1 1996m1 1997m1 1998m1 1999m1 2000m1 2001m1 2002m1 2003m1 2004m1 Maand De Standaard De Morgen 15 De Tijd 2005m1 Figure 2: Sales Dutch language popular newspapers 80000 100000 Sales 120000 140000 Sales per Newspaper 1994m1 1995m1 1996m1 1997m1 1998m1 1999m1 2000m1 2001m1 2002m1 2003m1 2004m1 2005m1 Maand Gazet van Antwerpen Het Volk Belang van Limburg Figure 3: Sales Dutch language popular newspapers (ctd.) 200000 220000 Sales 240000 260000 280000 300000 Sales per Newspaper 1994m1 1995m1 1996m1 1997m1 1998m1 1999m1 2000m1 2001m1 2002m1 2003m1 Maand Het Laatste Nieuws 16 Het Nieuwsblad 2004m1 2005m1 Figure 4: Sales French language quality newspapers 0 50000 Sales 100000 150000 200000 Sales per Newspaper 1994m1 1995m1 1996m1 1997m1 1998m1 1999m1 2000m1 2001m1 2002m1 2003m1 2004m1 2005m1 Maand La Libre Belgique L'Echo Le Soir Figure 5: Sales French language popular newspapers 60000 80000 Sales 100000 120000 140000 160000 Sales per Newspaper 1994m1 1995m1 1996m1 1997m1 1998m1 1999m1 2000m1 2001m1 2002m1 2003m1 2004m1 2005m1 Maand Dernière Heure Sud Presse 17 Vers l'Avenir 400000 600000 Sales 800000 1000000 Figure 6: Total sales Belgian newspapers 1994m1 1995m1 1996m1 1997m1 1998m1 1999m1 2000m1 2001m1 2002m1 2003m1 2004m1 2005m1 Dutch French 1 .8 .6 Cover Price € 1.2 1.4 Figure 7: Cover price Dutch language newspapers 1994m1 1996m1 1998 m1 2000m1 Date 2002m1 2004m1 DM DS FET GVA HLN NB HV cp i 18 2006m1 BVL 1 .6 .8 Cover Price € 1.2 1.4 Figure 8: Cover price French language newspapers 1994m1 1996m1 1998m1 2000m1 Date 2002m1 DH SUD LECH LLB VA cpi 2004m1 2006m1 LS Advertizing and sales revenue for all newspapers 40000 30000 20000 10000 Revenue X 1000 € 50000 60000 Figure 9: Advertizing and sales revenue for all newspapers 1995m1 1996m1 1997m11998m1 1999m12000m1 2001m1 2002m12003m1 2004m12005m1 Sales Revenue 19 Ad Revenue Figure 10: Share of ad revenue in total revenue 0 .1 .2 Share of Ad Revenue .3 .4 .5 .6 .7 .8 Share of Ad Revenue in Total Revenue LLB LS DS DM LECH GRE SUD NB HV DH VA HLN FET BVL GVA 5000 Ad Price of 1 B/W Page, € 10000 15000 20000 25000 30000 Figure 11: Advertizing prices Dutch language newspapers 2001m1 2002m1 2003m1 Date 2004m1 2005m1 DS DM FET HLN GVA BVL HV METN 20 NB 0 Ad Price of 1 B/W Page, € 5000 10000 15000 20000 Figure 12: Advertizing prices French language newspapers 2001m1 2002m1 2003m1 Date 2004m1 2005m1 LECH LS LLB DH SUD VA GRE METF Figure 13: Advertizing Revenue per Reader (2004) 0 .5 Ad Revenue per Reader 1 1.5 2 2.5 Ad Revenue per Reader LLB LECH LS DS DM GRE SUD 21 NB FET DH HV HLN VA GVA BVL