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Project title:
The Arab Spring in Jordan Project seminar
International Development Studies, K1 Prepared by (Name(s) and study number):
Kind of project:
Ditte Ingemann Hansen Project IU-­‐K1 Elsa Annaklara Eriksson Project IU-­‐K1 Name of Supervisor:
Sune Haugbølle Submission date:
27 MAY 2013 Number of pages (Please look at the next page):
73 pages Permitted number of pages cf. Supplementary Provisions (Please look at the next page):
50-­‐75 pages The Arab Spring in Jordan
social movements and the quest for change
Ditte Ingemann Hansen & Elsa Annaklara Eriksson
Supervisor: Sune Haugbølle
Roskilde Universitet - Institut for Samfund og Globalisering - International Development Studies K1
1 27-05-2013
ABSTRACT This project contains analysis and discussion of several social movements in Jordan. The uprising in Jordan and demands for more democratization are inspired by the Arab Spring observed in the Middle East. The most highlighted Jordanian social movements being the religious Muslim Brotherhood, the radical Salafi Movement and the newly proclaimed Popular Mobilization. Questions concerning the identification of them, their goals and ways of mobilizing and the hindrances for these movements to mobilize are brought up. The theoretical framework contains Charles Tilly & Sidney J. Tarrow´s social movement theory, resource mobilization theory inspired by the approach of Roel Meijer and Quintan Wiktorowicz’s perspectives on Islamic activism is included. The mentioned theories are being utilized to address the outlined questions, leading to the answering the research question; what impact do social movements have on democratic processes in Jordan? The conclusion to this being the Muslim Brotherhood as the strongest social movement in terms of resources, the Salafi Movement being considered as a threat to democratization processes and the Popular Mobilization being the strongest believer in the liberal understanding of civil society and democracy. In relation to this the project is build up through the understanding of the scientific theory eclecticism also influencing the conceptual clarification of civil society and democracy. 2 Table of Contents CHAPTER 1 – INTRODUCTION & QUESTIONS .................................................................................................. 4 1.1 Introduction ......................................................................................................................................................... 4 1.2 Research Question & Working Questions ............................................................................................... 5 CHAPTER 2 – METHODOLOGY ................................................................................................................................. 6 2.1 Scientific Approach -­‐ Eclecticism ................................................................................................................ 6 2.2 Methodological Approach .............................................................................................................................. 8 2.3 Conceptual Clarification ............................................................................................................................... 10 2.4 Delimitations ..................................................................................................................................................... 13 2.5 Choice of Theory & Presentation of Theorists .................................................................................... 14 CHAPTER 3 -­‐ THEORY ................................................................................................................................................ 16 3.1 Social Movement Theory .............................................................................................................................. 16 3.2 Resource Mobilization Theory & Islamic Activism ........................................................................... 21 CHAPTER 4 – INTRODUCTION TO THE CASE ................................................................................................. 26 4.1 Historical Background ................................................................................................................................... 26 4.2 Introducing the Muslim Brotherhood & Islamic Action Front ..................................................... 32 4.3 Introducing the Salafi Movement ............................................................................................................. 37 4.4 Introducing the Popular Mobilization .................................................................................................... 40 4.4.1 The Labor Movement ............................................................................................................................ 42 4.4.2 The Youth Movement ............................................................................................................................ 43 4.4.3 The Leftist Movement ........................................................................................................................... 44 CHAPTER 5 -­‐ ANALYSIS ............................................................................................................................................ 46 5.1 Analytical Structure ........................................................................................................................................ 46 5.2 Analysis of the Muslim Brotherhood ...................................................................................................... 47 5.3 Analysis of the Salafi Movement ............................................................................................................... 52 5.4 Analysis of the Popular Mobilization ...................................................................................................... 56 CHAPTER 6 -­‐ DISCUSSION ....................................................................................................................................... 64 CHAPTER 7 -­‐ CONCLUSION ..................................................................................................................................... 69 CHAPTER 8 – FURTHER PERSPECTIVES ........................................................................................................... 71 REFERENCES ................................................................................................................................................................. 72 3 CHAPTER 1 – INTRODUCTION & QUESTIONS 1.1 Introduction The Arab uprisings starting in Tunisia in 2010 led many to believe that democratic changes were on the way in several countries in the MENA region. People stood up, filled the streets with demonstrations and demanded more equality. Social movements in Jordan have also practiced similar uprisings for political change. In comparison with other Arab countries, the Jordanians’ demands do not include an overthrow of the Hashemite Monarchy. Even though King Abdullah II is exercising an authoritarian rule, the Jordanian protesters accept him as their royal leader. Jordan has a long history of mobilization, for example many Jordanians took to the streets in 1989. The demands back then were directed towards the regimes politics. People were especially angry about the handling of the country’s finances and the stagnated democratic process. Interestingly enough these demand still stands, which the more recent demonstrations are pointing at (Ryan, 2011a: 564f). A fascinating perspective of the Jordanian 2010 uprising is that people unite across barriers of ethnicity, ideology and culture. This is seen via the Popular Mobilization where women, men, youth, Jordanian-­‐
Palestinians and East Bankers protest side by side. At the same time the religious social movements; the Muslim Brotherhood and the more radical Salafi Movement have fought in accordance of their beliefs. Despite the different social movements’ similar demands their focus and ways of mobilizing, distinguish them from each other. The actions of these social movements create opportunities for change in Jordan, but have not yet reached a stage of victory. This has led to reflections upon; how long a state can afford to keep its citizens discontent; which frames the social movements can work within; and what the odds are of making opportunities into mechanisms of triumph? In the aim of gaining a better understanding of the social movements’ opportunities for making change, it is necessary to look into the relations and contrasts between them and the ruling power. This has lead to the following inquiries. 4 1.2 Research Question & Working Questions From the above introduction and reflections upon the uprisings in Jordan, the research question of this project has been formulated as follows; What impact do the social movements have on democratic processes in Jordan? In order to acquire the necessary background knowledge and to uncover different aspects according to the answering of our research question, the following working questions have been formulated; -­‐ Which are the social movements in Jordan that have been most highlighted in the surge of the Arab Uprising? -­‐ What are the social movements’ goals and how do they mobilize? -­‐ What are the hindrances for social mobilization in Jordan and how are social movements dealing with these obstacles? 5 CHAPTER 2 – METHODOLOGY 2.1 Scientific Approach -­‐ Eclecticism Eclecticism can be defined as a way of addressing an issue by putting together elements from different perspectives and doctrines. By picking out ideas and thoughts from different doctrines and forums in an ad hoc mode (Nationalencyclopedin. 2013 “eklekticism”), a broader and possibly clearer picture of a certain problem can be crystalized. Social movement theory is itself an eclectic approach as it is taking into account a myriad of aspects of the human nature. The behavior of an individual or a group as well as their success in creating a movement, and its outcomes, are based on everything from political opportunities to economical and cultural aspects. There are however problems such as coherence and a problem of generalizability when it comes to utilization an eclectic mode of research. In order to justify this approach, we will hereby entrench our further perspective in Rudra Sil and Peter J. Katzenstein’s understanding of eclecticism. In the search of explaining a social phenomenon, such as social mobilization in an authoritarian state, it is tempting to draw attention to obvious and rather simplistic solutions. Much research is to some extent bound to a certain paradigm, which is creating divisions within the research community. The different paradigms are based on a differing and specific set of cognitive structures, concepts, basic assumptions and analytical approaches. The divisions can be understood as the artificial segmentation of the real world in different doctrines or divisions within the same discipline. The eclectic research is however transcending the traditional boundaries between paradigms to identify and better understand the complex social problems, of interest to both scholars and political actors (Sil & Katzenstein, 2010a: 20). The attempt is to bridge the gap between theory and policy by putting problems in a new light (Ibid: 212). The purpose of an eclectic approach is to increase the breadth and complexity of issues in order to facilitate an analysis that can incorporate insights from theories that originate in different paradigms and relate them to political decision-­‐making and its consequences (Sil & 6 Katzenstein, 2010a: 20). Eclectic research has a rather flexible approach to causality, which is indispensable to discover the hidden connections that paradigm-­‐bound research ignores (Ibid: 21). The ambition is limited to not articulate new arguments or to comply with a direction of analysis that cannot confirm the existing paradigm. It also, and above all, explores how insights that originate in different paradigms can be combined in order to develop theories and narratives that capture the complexity, uncertainty and confusion that characterize the environment in which actors must identify and resolve problems. Eclectic research does not have the aim of creating universal theories or idiographic narratives, but rather something approaching that is referred to ‘theories of middle range’. These kinds of theories are designed to illuminate certain aspects of empirical phenomena, but do not aim to find a general model or a universal theory that is directly applicable to other phenomena (Ibid). Paradigm is by Sil & Katzenstein understood as a set of beliefs about what sort of mechanisms and processes that constitute the field of research. Additionally the paradigm depends on a set of epistemological and methodological norms about how the field of research should be investigated, how theories are to be tested and how data should be collected (Sil & Katzenstein, 2010a: 7). It can thus apply to a division into different academic disciplines, but also ontological and epistemological divisions between different research traditions within a single discipline, such as objectivism/subjectivism, universal/particular and agent/structure (Ibid.: 6). Eclecticism can put an order to more complex causal narratives and seeks problem-­‐
specific interactions between paradigms at all levels of social reality (Sil & Katzenstein 2010b: 415ff). There are several risks associated with eclecticism, which is sometimes spoken of in a condescending way and can be perceived as an arbitrary or aimless way of conducting research. Anyone who examines something with an eclectic approach can be accused of not being sufficiently methodical or rooted in his or her scientific perspective whereto it can be difficult to justify the research and the results. The eclectic approach is however evident when it comes to obtain any explanation at all concerning social movements. What one should pay attention to is not to make conclusions that attempt to be universal, since the nature of and the behavior of social movements are context-­‐specific and depend on numerous aspects that 7 indeed are constantly changing. The main problem with the use of an eclectic approach in a project is the problem of incommensurability. Hence, that concepts and terms developed in one theoretical approach might not fit well together with those developed in another, because they are formulated based on different ontological and epistemological starting points (Sil & Katzenstein 2010a: 13). One must therefore be very careful that the relevant terms, concepts and indicators are understood properly before they are placed in a common framework. The problems of eclecticism is however not utterly problematic and there are many benefits with it, since social science is always based on theoretical references and operationalization. By re-­‐
conceptualizing, comparing and trying to put elements from one causal relation against another, the problems of eclecticism are possible to overcome (Sil & Katzenstein 2010b: 415). Although there are many risks associated with eclectic research and research within social science in general, we believe that it is a natural way of approaching the social movements and their influence in Jordan. We will as far as possible be careful not to make harsh generalizations, in order to allow inter-­‐subjectivity. The social movement scholars have a strong focus on Western (U.S. and Europe) mobilization, and by applying parts of their theories on movements in the Middle East we are hoping to broaden the understanding and conduct of social movements in Jordan. In addition to that, there is logically a stark connection between the politics in Jordan and in the farther region that inflict behaviors of the citizens, which at times make them go together and protest. We will by using an eclectic approach try to incorporate different theories and forums that will help us paint a picture of social mobilization in Jordan that allow several angles and ideas -­‐ both historical and current, in order to keep this project as relevant as possible. 2.2 Methodological Approach In the aim of structuring the project in the best way possible considering our research question, we will throughout the introduction of the case, the analysis and discussion focus on our three working questions. To obtain the best understanding of the Jordanian social movements, the analysis will be structured in an eclectic way via elements from Resource mobilization theory, henceforth referred to as RMT, Islamic Activism that will be referred to 8 as IA. We will also utilize the thoughts and theoretical tools explained by Social Movement Theory, which will be referred to as SMT. Working question one addresses which social movements in Jordan that are the most highlighted in Jordan and will be answered via the introduction to the case, where we are bringing up the Muslim Brotherhood, the Salafi Movement and the Popular Mobilization respectively. Working question two considers the different social movements’ goals and mobilization, will be answered throughout the analysis, starting with the Muslim Brotherhood, then the Salafi movement and lastly the Popular Mobilization. Because of the Jordanian Islamic cultural context, we consider this division most necessary. The religious movements, the Muslim Brotherhood and the Salafi Movement will be analyzed separately to underline the differences between them. The Popular Mobilization differs from the others in the sense that it is secular and considered as a new sprout in Jordan. The Popular Mobilization will be the term for three social movements cooperating; the Labor Movement, the Youth Movements and the Leftists. The latter can also explain the reason for the lack of information about the Popular Mobilization compared to the religious movements. For that reason we have combined them under the term Popular Mobilization and the analysis of them will be of a more comparative character than the analysis of the Muslim Brotherhood and the Salafi movement. The third working question will be brought up in the discussion and concerns the hindrances for social mobilization in Jordan, and how they have tried to overcome these obstacles. The discussion section will also contain a context-­‐based discussion of the terms democracy and civil society, where we will be elaborating the movements in the light of these concepts. We have chosen to do that by creating stereotypes with the aim of complexifying these actors in the Jordanian context and their roles as political forces. In the conclusion we will tie the project together and answer our research question. In summary, the working questions in combination with the theoretical tools from RMT, IA and SMT constitute the methodological framework for this project. This structure is created in accordance with our choice of eclecticism as our scientific theory. 9 2.3 Conceptual Clarification With a focus on Arab social movements and their possible influence on democratic processes in Jordan, it is crucial to define our understanding and framework of the terms civil society and democracy. In the aim of presenting them as pluralistic as possible, we are inspired by several theoretical approaches towards these terms. The word democracy stems from the Greek word dēmokratia, where the origins are dēmos (people) and kratos (rule) i.e. ’rule by the people’ (Held, 2012). The essence of a democratic state is by Robert A. Dahl (1971, 1998), a prominent political scientist, defined as a state that deem all its citizens as equal and has a government that response to the will of its people (Dahl, 1971:1). According to Dahl, the democratic discourse cannot prove that it is superior to any other kind of rule, but in any case he claims that democracy “fosters human development more fully than any feasible alternative”(Dahl, 1998: 55). In accordance to these general claims, the concept of democracy can be further conceptualized by these criteria: 1) the right to vote, 2) the right to be elected, 3) the right of political leaders to compete for support and votes, 4) free and fair elections, 5) freedom of association, 6) freedom of expression, 7) alternative sources of information and 8) institutions for making public policies depend on votes and other expressions of preferences (Dahl, 1971:3). Furthermore there are numerous subtypes of democracy. In order to remain our focus, we will not bring up an exhaustive debate about the concept of democracy. Instead we will hereby use the concept of liberal democracy and momentarily discuss its implications in connection to the problem area we are focusing on. Liberal democracy is a concept that embraces many different subtypes, and it entails essential civil freedoms as indispensable in order to create real and worthwhile competition and participation. The political democracy as implemented in western societies is often what is referred to when speaking of liberal democracy. In addition to the essential ‘rule by the people’, liberal democracy is upheld by constitutional arrangements. Rights to freedom of expression and freedom of association are in the societies based on liberal democracy perceived as a prerequisite for the impact of the notion ‘rule of the people’ 10 (Nationalencyklopedin 2013 “Demokrati”). The liberal democracy can be seen as a concept that bridges liberalization and democracy. Rex Brynen (1995), professor and researcher on authoritarianism and democracy in the Middle East, claims that without a context of political freedom, citizens are unable to effectively participate, organize, or freely choose among political alternatives. The above does not imply that western liberal democracy is the only rightful path to go. Brynen acknowledges that the historical and cultural contexts are of great significance in creating democracy, and it is within this context feasible democracy has to emerge. Furthermore, there are elements of liberal democracy that should be debated and open for alternative interpretation. For example; the majoritarian decision-­‐making, the connection between liberal democracy and market economy and if economic equality is a prerequisite of political equality (Brynen et. al, 1995: 3f). Moreover, the very relation between Arab-­‐Islamic values and democracy has been debated, as the conception of democracy is seen to rely on western values that might be hard to implement in other parts of the world exclusive of these foundational principles. On the other hand these thoughts have been criticized of being ethnocentric, in alienating Islamic culture (Brynen et. al. 1995: 8). In order to defend why we are using the concept of liberal democracy in this project, a more tangible explanation of what is missing in terms of democracy in the region is in place. Daniel Brumberg, (2003) a much published peace and conflict researcher focused on the Middle East, claims that there are some instrumental obstacles for democracy in most Middle Eastern countries, these consist of a lack of consensus considering national identity in combination with deficiency of “[..] political parties that speak for organized constituencies, parliaments that have the constitutional authority to speak on behalf of the electorate, and constitutions that impose limits on executive authority” (Brumberg, 2003: 8). According to a social structural approach, presented by Raymond Hinnebuch (2006), a strong civil society is also required in the process of democratization. In order for civil society to flourish and in the creation of a necessary ‘democratic coalition’ there needs to be a “balance between the state/ruler and independent classes, in which the state is neither wholly autonomous of dominant classes nor captured by them (Hinnebuch, 2006: 378f). Further, a democratic coalition needs to be made up by a mix of agents from different socio-­‐economic groups. The upper classes have traditionally been part of liberalizing the state function while the involvement from the middle and working classes has been seen as a factor that broadens 11 the ‘liberalization into democratization’ (ibid). The Senior Lecturer Francesco Cavartorta and Lecturer Vincent Durac in Middle Eastern Politics & Civil Society (2011) focus on that the concept civil society that is often linked with democracy. This is also seen in the traditional normative definition of the concept; “thus CSOs [i.e. civil society organizations] must be secular in ideology, civil in their behavior, legally recognized, and supportive of democratic reform” (Cavatorta & Durac: 2011: 21). The result of working with civil society in an Arab context on the basis of this approach shows that it is not possible for a very weak civil society to influence the regime to make democratic reforms. Moreover this approach is underlining the reduced focus upon individuals in Arab cultures because they are influenced by the structures of tribes and clans. This does not affiliate with the western understanding of civil society (Cavatorta & Durac: 2011: 21). The concept civil society is regarded as a product of western political thought that is shaped in a different context than an Arab one. It is therefore essential to work out from a different approach in analyzing Arab civil society (Ibid.). The social movement researcher Roel Meijer (2005) is also critical towards the traditional theoretical way of analyzing the possibility for democratization from a civil society perspective. Meijer argues that a consequence of this has been to neglect the informal sector as not being contributive to the fight against the authoritarian state, because of the claim that a formal structure of civil society is what there is needed to gain ‘democracy’. For these reasons Meijer encourages the social movement theory approach since he considers this as being more neutral and objective in analyzing movements (Meijer, 2005: 287f). A consequence often seen by analyzing Arab civil society organizations (CVO) through a narrow definition of the concept, are conclusions arguing that they are very weak and not in the position of resisting the repression from the state (Cavatorta & Durac: 2011: 23). To avoid this, it is relevant to work out from another approach outlining that “(…) conceptualizes civil society in neutral terms and refuses to assume that the concept is necessarily rooted in liberal democratic theory” (Ibid.). With that in mind, civil society as a concept should not include normative notions that promote liberal-­‐democratic values. Hence, a strong civil society is not necessarily connected to activism that promotes democracy. Thereby civil society should be 12 understood as neutral and concerns “(…) the space between the state and the individual where voluntary groups are formed with the intention of pursuing a specific social goal (…)” (Ibid.). According to the Research Fellow and Professor Quintan Wiktorowicz (2007), civil society is in a Muslim context seen organized through professional structures and student organizations. In Muslim countries these associations usually function as a replacement for political space whereby different social tendencies fight for the control of resources and institutional positions. In this sense Muslims have often achieved the control of these different associations and they take advantage of them to promote Islamist messages. The continuation of civil society mobilization is also seen through Islamist political parties (Wiktorowicz, 2007: 197). 2.4 Delimitations As a contribution to gain a better understanding of the project’s structure, we consider it of importance to make an account for our reflections concerning the academic focus and theoretical choices. The choices that we have made have been determined by the conceivable material and out of considerations about what potentially could be used in order of fully answer the research question. In this section we will motivate the relevance of our focus on social mobilization in Jordan, and in the following section we will bring in our perspective and choices concerning the theorists that will be utilized in this project. At the starting point our focus upon Jordan in relation to the social movements came from an interest in the Arab uprisings in 2010. As mentioned in the introduction, Jordan is an interesting case because of the fact that the demands from the Jordanian protesters are different from the ones in other Middle Eastern countries. For that reason we have chosen to solely focus upon Jordan and thereby not structuring the project as a comparative analysis between Jordan and other Arab societies. Moreover, referring to the Arab uprisings throughout the project indicates the uprisings in Jordan that have been ongoing since the starting point. In continuation of this, we believe that it is of fundamental importance to have an in-­‐depth analysis of the social movements; the Muslim Brotherhood and the Salafi 13 Movement before even bringing up the uprising seen in Jordan since 2010. The explanation for this is that these social movements have always played a crucial part in opposition to the regime. In this context, other newly formed social movements have been formed whereto we have chosen not to focus upon all possible ones, but only on the most notable ones. We have chosen to only bring in elements from the history of Jordan that are contributing to a better understanding of the case. Since the Arab uprisings can be described as part of a global reaction, it could have been interesting to look more into Jordan in a global context and the international relations between the Hashemite regime and external actors, but we believe that this would have taken the focus away from the social movements, which is our main interest and reason for doing this project. Moreover we are not explicitly focusing upon the social media platforms that the Popular Mobilization is mainly using as mobilization, because we consider a more in-­‐depth analysis of this interesting aspect, as a challenge to keep an equal focus on the three social movements. 2.5 Choice of Theory & Presentation of Theorists Social Movement Theory (SMT) was founded by the Americans Charles Tilly (2007) and Sidney G. Tarrow (2007,2011) in cooperation with Doug McAdam (Meijer, 2005: 279). Tilly is a professor of Social Science at Columbia University and Tarrow is a professor of Sociology at Cornell University (Tilly & Tarrow, 2007). We consider Tilly & Tarrow and their books ‘Contentious Politics’ and ‘Power in Movement – Social Movements and Contentious Politics’ as relevant literature and proficient for the understanding SMT in relation to this project. The knowledge and theoretical approach understood through this literature has contributed to a better understanding of social movements and their way of mobilizing. In spite of this, we are aware of the critique of SMT, founded in USA and brought to Europe, as being too focused upon social movements from a western perspective. We will therefore have that in mind and stay critical towards it throughout the project. Because of that we are also including the theories resource mobilization theory and Islamic Activism. 14 Resource Mobilization Theory (RMT) is a wide perspective that we have gained knowledge in through the explanations offered by Roel Meijer (2005) who is a senior lecturer in the history of the Middle East at Radboud University, Netherlands. The combination of RMT and Meijer’s expertise in the Middle East gives a good insight of how RMT is particularly relevant in a Jordan context. In relation to Islamic Activism and Jordan we consider Quintan Wiktorowicz (2001) as a relevant source of information. The book ‘The Mangement of Islamic Activism – Salafis, the Muslim Brotherhood, and State Power in Jordan’ is exceptionally relevant. As a Research Fellow and Visiting Assistant Professor of Government at Dartmouth College Wiktorowicz visited Jordan 1996-­‐1997 where he, among other things, interviewed a vast number of members related to the Salafi Movement, the Muslim Brotherhood and sixteen other NGO’s (Wiktorowicz, 2001: ix). Despite the essential part we are giving Wiktorowicz, we are also aware of his primary focus upon these main Jordanian social movements. Because of this and for the reason that this project is written in a post-­‐2010 context, we will bring in additional academic literature about other social movements in Jordan. 15 CHAPTER 3 -­‐ THEORY 3.1 Social Movement Theory As a theoretical framework this project will be structured by Tilly & Tarrow’s understanding of SMT. The different Jordanian social movements will be analyzed through the use of several of SMT tools, which will be described in the following. Firstly the term contention and contentious politics will be emphasized. Contention means that one party makes claims on another, that bear on someone else’s interests. The parties can be a group or an institution, but mostly it is individuals. One party is seen as a subject (the maker of claim) and the other is the object (the receiver of claim). Contentious politics is thereby defined as interactions in which the actors make claims bearing on someone else’s interests. The efforts are coordinated from shared interests and the government is the target, initiator of claim or third party. Contentious politics gather three features of social life: contention, collective action and politics (Tilly & Tarrow, 2007: 4). Tilly and Tarrow define contentious politics as; Episodic, public, collective interaction among makers of claim, and their objects when a) at least one government is claimant, an object of claims or a party to the claims and b) the claims would, if realized, affect the interests of at least one of the claimants (Tilly et al., 2001: 5). In relation to the social movements in Jordan it will be relevant to look into the different claims stated by each of them and how this might effect the Jordanian state, the Hashemite regime and the democratization processes in Jordan. Thereby each separate movement is considered as the subject and their respectively targets will be regarded as the objects. Tilly & Tarrow distinguish between contained contention and transgressive contention, which can be understood as the familiar distinction between ‘institutional’ and ‘unconventional’ politics. Contained contention implies cases of contention where the involved parties are 16 previously established actors that are experienced with claim making. It involves that a government is a claimant, an object of claims or a party to the claims and that the claims would affect the claimant, if they were realized. In a Jordanian context the contained contention is primarily seen as the relation between the regime and the Muslim Brotherhood. Transgressive contention also involves the government as a claimant and that it would have an effect on that party if the claims were realized, but compared to contained contention, transgressive contention also includes that at least some parties are newly self-­‐identified political actors and/or at least some parties use innovative collective action. For example if the actions involved are unprecedented or forbidden within the regime (Tilly et al., 2001: 7f). This theoretical term will be useful in the analysis concerning the Popular Mobilization that includes the new Youth Movements Karak & Tafileh. Contained contention and transgressive contention interact and transgressive contention should be understood as growing out from episodes of contained contention. Tilly claims that social change often emerges from transgressive contention (Ibid.). This is especially present in relation to the uprising in 2010 demanding reforms and more democratization. These included different riots and street events, which is described as a part of a cycle of contention whereto this theoretical approach is essential to present. Cycle of contention produces temporary options for the actors to overcome their weak positions and it effects the states to work out strategically repressive or conducive responses to the actors. In that way cycles of contention are seen as different events that challenge an isolated focus upon the sum of the results (Tarrow, 2011: 199). For this reason the cycles in the beginning can seem alike, but the endings of the cycles dissimilar from each other. A group’s interactions are the dynamic of the cycle (Ibid.). By acknowledging the importance of using cycle of contention as an important academic approach to the case, we thereby avoid the tendency to analyze the main events as separate and see them as part of the processes the groups work out from. The understanding of cyclical dynamics is seen by different scholars including political, economical and cultural approaches. Through these different angles, the cycles emphasize their regularity, global aspects and origin from structural change (Ibid.: 200). We acknowledge this understanding of cyclical dynamics, and believe that it is also present in the case. 17 A cycle of contention is started by the so-­‐called early risers when their statements resound with other’s claims and they unite to challenge the elite. In general, the state replies by refusing to give in, which both influences the groups to search for other claimants and to rethink their demands. This will be relevant in relation to analyze the social movements and their ways of mobilizing. A cycle of contention also contains the mechanism of signalling mostly to the media, whereby information and debate is increased. This is mostly done by the new Jordanian movements with young participants. Even though the early risers often start the cycle of contention out from narrow and group-­‐specific demands, they are referred to as big demands that threatens the system (Tarrow, 2011: 202), which in a Jordanian context is exampled by the Youth Movements that in the beginning were frustrated about their poor conditions and later on focused upon more democratization. Such cycles of contention demonstrate three things; that claims are turned into actions, the operators challenge the interest of other actors, and it advocates junction between challengers and polity members that result in alliances between them (Ibid.). Because of the fact that the different Jordanian movements act in different ways, it will be relevant to bring in the three types of collective action that Tarrow highlights: violence, contained behavior and disruption. The violent ones are mostly seen in smaller groups with limited resources that would be willing to risk suppression. The contained ones are in opposition to the violent ones and want to build on the routines that can be understood by the people and accepted by the regime or elites. These two kinds of collective actions will be relevant in the analysis of the Salafi Movement in contrast to Muslim Brotherhood. The disruptive ones, on the other hand, leave the elites disoriented and challenge the normal routines. In the power of movement, disruption is the cause of much of the innovation in the repertoire, but it is described as unstable and can easily lead to violence (Tarrow, 2011: 99). Since actions in Jordan especially can be related to disruption, we find it necessary to emphasize this term more in-­‐depth. Disruption can be seen as a tool to provoke the receiver of claim and as a way to realize one’s claims. Examples of disruption are sit-­‐ins or disruption of media networks, which are carried out by the Jordanian movements as well (Tarrow, 2011: 101). This kind of collective action was particularly present in the Jordanian uprising from 2010 carried out by several groups. According to Tarrow disruption is the strongest weapon of social movements, because it spreads uncertainty and gives power to the weak actors in 18 their confrontation with the opponents (Ibid.: 103). In relation to this, Wiktorowicz points out that public protest demonstrations are the most disruptive form of collective action in Jordan. Since the effect of such events is a threat for the regime to remain stability and control it tries to prevent demonstrations. One of the measures to this prevention is the demand that the organizers of the demonstration must get permission from the district governor, which they rarely get (Wiktorowicz, 2001: 37). The theoretical term contentious performances should be understood as when political actors make well-­‐known and standardized collective claims on some other set of political actors, for example seen by participating in demonstrations (Tilly & Tarrow, 2007: 202). All forms of contention rest on performances. A performance always links at least two actors: a claimant and an object of claims. A performance can be understood as the actors’ actions and a form of expression, for example a presentation of a petition, barricading the streets or raising a demonstration. Looking back, people mostly engaged in particular performances for their specific claims, but many contentious performances have spread worldwide and have become modular. This is understood as performances that can be adopted and adapted across a wide range of conflicts by a broad range of actors. An effect from the mass media is that modular performances have become the major conventional form of contention and the Internet has become an important tool to mobilize people. Tilly & Tarrow claim that the Internet’s major function in contentious politics has been to assemble people in demonstrations or to coordinate demonstrations across a broad range of territory (Ibid.: 12f). The uprising in Jordan from 2010 was inspired by riots accruing in other countries in the MENA region. In relation to the religious social movements, it will be relevant to use repertoires as an analytical tool to understand the different forms of action, inherit from their cultural and historical background. Strikes, contract negotiations and third-­‐part mediation are examples of the claim-­‐making repertoires that connect the claimant and the object. Repertories vary from the situations, but include that, when the actors are making collective claims, they innovate within limits set by the repertoire already established for their place, time and pair. Repertoires represent the cultural set in which actors interact in contentious politics (Tilly et al., 2001: 16) and can be understood as inherit forms of collective actions. In each country the people’s repertoire draws on a long history of previous struggles (Tilly & Tarrow, 2007: 16f). Contentious repertoires are defined as arrays of contentious performances that are presently 19 known and available within some set of political actors (Ibid.: 202). We consider it interesting to look into the different groups’ cultural inherent as a possible analytical explanation for the differences between the actions. In the aim of using cycle of contention, it is necessary to use three relevant casual mechanisms that change different challenges into a generalized contention, which we will describe in the following. The first one diffusion goes from the initiators of collective actions to the unconnected groups and its opponents. This can effectively produce countermovements that may include violent episodes and riots between different ethnical groups because threat towards their own interests that are in contrast to the early risers’ demands. Another dimension seen within diffusion is scale shift that is the contention’s shift to levels of the polity, described as including new potential allies and new institutional frames shaping the contention’s progress. A scale shift can make contention more transgressive or more contained (Tarrow, 2011: 205-­‐
206), which will be a crucial theoretical tool in analyzing the Muslim Brotherhood and their way of organizing. Diffusion is also seen when the contention in big cities trace back to rural areas or vice versa (Ibid.: 205-­‐206), which is relevant to the uprising of the Youth Movements that started in the rural areas and grew bigger in the capital Amman. The second mechanism, exhaustion refers to how the cycle of contention in general is started by different actions such as demonstrations and protests, but will after a while, include a fall in participation. The explanations for this, is seen through personal costs, risks and disagreements of methods and goals. It challenges a movement concerning the leadership within and may separate the participants between the ones that are willing to negotiate with the authorities and the ones who wish to stay as an opponent. This in spite of the fact that the participants know that their strength lies in the amount of protesters they are (Ibid.: 206). This theoretical approach will especially be relevant to employ in the analysis of the internal dilemma between the hawks and the doves in the Muslim Brotherhood, but also in the discussion concerning the challenges for the Popular Mobilization and its ability to continue its influence on the state. The last mentioned mechanism radicalization/institutionalization is relevant in relation to the ideological turn of the different movements and their ability to influence more democratization. This mechanism is seen when a social movement chooses the path of either 20 radicalization or institutionalization. Radicalization is defined as ‘a shift in ideological commitments towards the extremes and/or the adoption of more disruptive and violent forms of contention’ and institutionalization is described as when ‘a movement away from extreme ideologies and/or the adoption of more conventional and less disruptive forms of contention’. The tendency of a social movement to choose one of these directions if often explained by internal competition or conflicts between potential leaders (Ibid.: 207), which especially will be relevant in relation to more radical and violent approaches for example carried out by the Salafi Movement. Radicalization is also often seen as a result of state repression (Ibid.) that also occurs in the relation between the Hashemite regime and almost a total of the different movements. Therefore it is relevant to bring in different kinds of responses from the targets of claim. Most of the time, social movements seek to gain polity outcome, which can be complicated, depending on the target of the contention as for example elites, authorities or other groups. There are four identified kinds of responses from the targets: concession, repression, toleration, and a combination of concession and repression. For some movements the success is not only about gaining policy change but more about putting specific topics on the political agenda, establishing a collective identity and being a role model for new actors in the next cycle of contention (Tarrow, 2011: 216f). In a Jordanian context this has for example occurred when several organizations unite concerning a specific goal, as with HCCNOP, but do not wish to collaborate on a long-­‐term scale. 3.2 Resource Mobilization Theory & Islamic Activism Related to SMT are Resource Mobilization Theory (RMT) and Islamic Activism (IA), which both are useful theoretical approaches to understand the movements. This particularly concerns the Muslim movements, The Muslim Brotherhood and the Salafi Movement. In the following there will be a brief sketch of RMT and afterwards a more in-­‐depth description of IA. We see a logical combination of RMT and IA, which particularly will be relevant in analyzing how the religious groups are mobilizing and what kind of resources they possess. 21 RMT explains how a social movement ‘organizes the mobilization of resources through communication channels, the division of labor, and the financing of the movement’. Through these activities, the goal is to exploit its impact and make it as effective as possible. (Meijer, 2005: 281) Resources are understood as several things such as money, supporters and attention from the media, which for example is brought up by both the secular and religious movements. Pursuant to RMT, movements are ‘rational, organized manifestations of collective action ‘(…)Resources and mobilizing structures(…)are needed to collectivize what would otherwise remain individual grievances’. In relation to IA, the organizational resources are crucial. The strongest example to this is the mosque, which is often used to gather people for sermons, lessons and study groups and through these networks Islamist groups can have a starting point (Wiktorowicz, 2007: 196). Another kind of organization is seen through Islamic social movement organizations (SMO’s) where they present specific offers from an Islamic perspective, such as medical clinics, schools and other social services, in opposition to the state’s modernization strategy. In that way, they get in contact, and interact with the civil society. In a Jordanian context, this strategy is for example being practiced by the Muslim Brotherhood via medical clinics. Islamic activists also mobilize through professionals and students, such as political parties. In that way, the activists do not create these organizational resources, they take over ‘potential resources’ for the purpose of the movement. Different kinds of reform-­‐orientated movements have taken advantages of new political opportunities (Wiktorowicz, 2003: 11). Again, this is also a way the Muslim Brotherhood is trying to influence the society, seen by the mobilizing through their political party Islamic Action Front. In relation to social movements, three fields of resource mobilization structure could be available, depending on the movements’ ability to use the opportunities to structure and manage to conquer restrictions. ‘1) the formal political mobilizing structure of political parties and legal institutions; 2) the legal environment of civil society in the form of NGOs, medical clinics, charity societies, schools, and especially professional organizations; and 3) the informal sector of social networks and personal ties’ (Meijer, 2005: 281). The social movement’s success depends on their ability to access political institutions and decision-­‐making processes, which is defined as their political space. The level of repression from the state is also very influential in this perspective (Ibid.). This will be essential to the analysis of the Jordanian groups and their ways of mobilizing. The choice of tactics and planning is different for each local context, 22 but there are some common tools for social movements and Islamic activism, for example marches, banners and petitions. In that way, IA is not of its own kind, since it includes important elements of contention that are similar to other kinds of social movements, but the difference form others is that it is rooted in Islam as ideology, system of meaning and basis of collective action (Wiktorowicz, 2003: 3). According to Wiktorowicz IA is defined as the mobilization of contention to support Muslim causes. The definition is broad so it can be as inclusive as possible (Ibid.: 2). ‘Islam activism is rooted in the symbolism, language, and cultural history of Muslim society and as a result has successfully resonated with increasingly disillusioned populations suffering from political exclusion, economic deprivation and a sense of growing importance at the expense of outside powers and a faceless process of globalization. Much of the work of Islamic activism is devoted to creating frames that motivate, inspire and demand loyalty’ (Wiktorowicz, 2003: 25). IA shares the belief with SMT, that activism comes from a structural crisis as a result of the failure of secular modernization projects. In the 1960’s and 1970’s many Muslim leaders in the Middle East used western modernization models in hope of gaining economical development. As a result in the Middle East, the westernized elites gained wealth and the majority of the populations experienced negative side effects. For example an increase of both unemployment and prices for basic goods. Many scholars argue that IA grew as a response to a decline in socioeconomic conditions, whereby the religious commitment can be seen as re-­‐
anchoring themselves through religion. Others argue that it is a response to the cultural imperialism and, the westernization and attack on Islam that they believe is an attempt to dominate Muslim countries. A third estimate for IA is seen as a result of living under an authoritarian rule, lack of political access and repression that thereby lead to oppositional activism (Wiktorowicz, 2003: 6ff). Although the above mentioned arguments seem rooted in suppression, Wiktorowicz reminds us that most of the participants in social movements represent educated and stable citizens of the society (Ibid.: 9). The theoretical term social movement communities is defined as ‘informal networks of politicized participants who are active in promoting the goals of a social movement outside the 23 boundaries of formal organization […] flexible leader structures and malleable divisions of labor’. It is crucial for mobilization to use informal resources and social networks, in particular for those in less open societies where it can be risky to go out public with your opinion as for example seen in authoritarian states (Wiktorowicz, 2003: 12). In relation to this, Wiktorowicz gives an example from Jordan, where Islamic activists have used informal social networks to mobilize and as a resource of contention in a context where the regime is repressing the population. The regime does usually not acknowledge radical activists whereby it through administrative procedures favors moderate Islamic SMO’s, which disempower the radical ones. For this reason, the radical activists have mobilized through informal social networks and institutions, whereby they interact outside the boundaries of formal institutions. This is especially present in a context with an authoritarian regime that limits the ability for formal resources that would have been a preferable use by activists and social movements (Ibid.: 13). Wiktorowicz mentions external factors as decisive for opportunities for the Islamic social movement activists. He criticizes the fact that most scholars define these as political opportunity structures, since it also determines cultural, economic and social factors. This perspective is similar to the one presented in the SMT, that underlines the relevance of using these dimensions as a structure in the analysis (Wiktorowicz, 2003: 14). Islamic movements are as new social movements more focused upon identity, culture and post-­‐materialism than class, economic and narrow political interests, which is the focus for many other social movements. Moreover there is a distinction between what Islamic movements want; some do not consider it necessary with an Islamic state while others fight for ‘a society governed and guided by sharia (Islamic law)’. That being said some Islamic movements acknowledge state institutions as an important tool to gain the wished transformation, but most of their struggles are won through informal structures such as via civil society. The Islamic movements believe in outlining the sources of Islam in the hope of achieving good development and success, which also explains their critical approach against western values (Wiktorowicz, 2003: 16). 24 This is related to the important fact that there are many different kinds of Islamic activists. Even though many believe in confronting the West since Islam is the solution, they work out from different strategies. For example fundamentalists rely on da’wa (propagation) meaning that one individual’s actions in the end can have a big impact of the society as a whole -­‐ by acting correctly according to Islam and spreading the messages to friends, family and neighbors. Others make political parties and depend on the institutional system while others believe in a violent approach (Wiktorowicz, 2003: 17-­‐18). In relation to the analysis, this will be utilized in focusing on the contrasts between the Muslim Brotherhood and the Salafi Movement. In general, Islamic activists prefer informal instead of formal institutionalization via personal relationships that are characterized by politics, economic activity and culture. Because of the fact that many regimes in the Middle East utilize strict control and repression, the Islamic activists mobilize and construct collective identities and solidarity within an authoritarian regime (Ibid.: 22-­‐23). In the analysis of social movements, it will be relevant to use the theoretical tool framing. It is described as the process of meaning construction. They represent ‘interpretive schemata that offer a language and cognitive tools to make sense of experiences and events in the world out there’. Framing is important for social movements to achieve an increase in support and members, since it includes individuals conceptualizing themselves collectively. There are three cores framing tasks for social movements; movements create frames that identify a condition as a problem that needs to be remedied and they find a target of blame. Then resolutions in the form of tactics and strategies are being offered. At last the movements give out a rationale to motivate support and collective action. In that way, these motivational frames are necessary in the aim of gaining more participants by convincing them that they should engage in activism. The biggest challenge in relation to framing is to transform a potential mobilization into an actual mobilization (Wiktorowicz, 2003: 15f) Given that the Muslim groups in Jordan are particularly popular, it will be interesting to look more into the term Muslim politics. It is defined as ‘the competition and contest over both the interpretation of symbols and the control of the institutions, both formal and informal that produce and sustain them’. This includes that Islamic movements often compete with the official frames since the regimes in the Middle East mostly are adhering to Islam as well. To regain more support from both people wanting a change of the current situation and from the people wanting an Islamic 25 transformation, some Islamists make use of an approach mixed of religious and nonreligious themes and elements (Wiktorowicz, 2003: 18). CHAPTER 4 – INTRODUCTION TO THE CASE 4.1 Historical Background Counting back to the 1500’s the area where Jordan is now situated was under Ottoman rule (1516-­‐1918). At that time the area was mostly inhabited by Bedouins. During World War I, the Arabs revolted against the Turks, and eventually the Ottoman Empire collapsed. The region, then named Transjordan, came under British mandate. The British supported the Hashemite, a dynasty regarded as descendants of the Prophet Mohammad. The Hashemite ruled the Hijaz i.e. Mecca and its surroundings under the emir Husayn ibn Ali until 1924. The two sons of the emir, Faysal I and Abdallah further came to rule Iraq and Transjordan as a reward from their British allies. Transjordan finally reached independence from the British in 1946 as the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan. The Hashemites have ruled the kingdom, from 1999 and onwards under King Abdullah II (Ryan, 2011a: 566f). The majority of the Jordanian population is Sunni Muslim and the minorities consist of Christian and Druze minorities. Despite differences, the religious divide is not the most significant partition. There are big divides between people with origins in the East Bank vs. the West Bank of the Jordan River, the former are referred to as East Bankers and the latter Palestinian-­‐Jordanian. There are many Palestinians in Jordan, some claim that they are even a majority of the population. The big number can partly be explained by how the country borders where drawn in the creation of the Jordanian state and partly by the large refugee-­‐
waves during the wars after 1948, where Jordan also started to give citizenship to Palestinians (Ryan, 2011a: 566f). The citizenship that many Palestinians were given was for a large part withdrawn after the civil war in 1970-­‐1971 – so-­‐called ‘Black September’. The Palestinian Liberation Army (PLO) and the radical Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine tried to seize control over Jordan. Planes were hijacked and blown up, hostages were taken and in 1971 the Jordanian Prime Minister Wasif al-­‐Tel was assassinated. The 26 response from the Jordanian regime to this coup has been described as brutal, and in the end King Hussein expelled the PLO who then escaped to Lebanon (Encyclopedia Britannica, 2013 “Jordan”). After Black September the Jordanian society suffered from a polarized identity that has influenced many levels of the country’s politics, from the grass roots-­‐ to the elite level. Palestinian-­‐Jordanians and East Bankers are represented in many segments of the society. The Palestinian-­‐Jordanians are however dominating the private sector and many of the most successful businessmen are indeed of Palestinian heritage. Further, they are demographically located in and around the capital Amman. The East Bankers, many with a tribal or Bedouin heritage, constitute a majority of the public sector and dominate the rural areas and smaller cities in Jordan. The tribes and clans of the East Bank played a large role in the creation of the Hashemite Kingdom as allies of the royals and the tribes have long composed the major actor in the security and military forces. The split national identity has also led to a tendency of blaming 'the other' for various social problems. Ryan reasons that these identity tensions are an obstacle for shaping united movements for political change in Jordan (Ryan, 2011a: 565ff). This division partly be one of the reasons for the challenging relationship between the two groups, since many East Bank Jordanians working in the security forces regard their function as protecting Jordan for external danger but also internal and in that way protecting Jordanian nationalism (Ryan, 2011a: 567). There are Palestinians who regard East Bankers as “less educated, tribalistic, backward, and chauvinistic”, and East Bankers who regard Palestinian-­‐Jordanians as a ‘rich profit-­‐driven elite who are privileged by the present regime politics, or as poor complaining refugees and a burden to society’ (Ryan, 2011a: 570). The legitimacy and power in Jordan derive from King Abdullah II. He is the one who has the last say, and act as a judge in case of differing and competing social interests. The Jordanian political system is an interaction between these social relationships and the neo-­‐patrimonial1 ruling system. In order to sustain the patriarchal and elite role, a leader needs loyalists and 1 “The term neo-­‐patrimonialism refers to a hybrid mode of rule in which informal political ties and exchanges suffuse the management of a state. In a neo-­‐patrimonial regime, the political chief executive and his agents exercise authority mainly through personal whim and material incentive rather than through ideology or the rule of law. Within the state, the distinction between private and public interests is purposely blurred, and officials occupy bureaucratic posts less to deliver public goods and services than to acquire personal wealth and status“ (Bratton, 2011:1680) 27 there is a whole set of mechanisms to secure that (Perthes, 2004: 35f). A ruling tradition in Jordan has been, as in many of the Middle Eastern countries, the threat of-­‐ or actual repression. This tool is enforced by a strong military, security and police force, that are part of the Politically Relevant Elite (PRE), and help keeping things stable when legitimacy is failing. But in comparison to other, less politically liberalized Arab countries, the repression card is likely to be kept very informal in Jordan, in order of keeping the king’s liberalized politics reliable and viable. Hence, not destabilize his legitimacy (Ibid.: 37). Jordan is a constitutional monarchy with a two-­‐chamber system. The king chooses the Prime Minister, and the Prime Minister further recommends candidates for the government. The parliament consist of 104 parliamentarians directly elected as the lower house or the Chamber of Deputies, and 40 royally elected upper house, or Senate, members. The upper house usually consists of strategically appointed loyalists of the Hashemites, whereas the lower house members are representatives of the people. The electoral system has however been criticized of gerrymandering2, thus benefitting royalists and tribal leaders, since the majority of the seats in the lower house are reserved for non-­‐partisan members, and the voting districts are not proportional (Ryan, 2011a: 564). The spokesperson of the lower house has traditionally worked as more of a mediator between the court, the legislative apparatus and the parliament instead of holding a power position (Perthes, 2004: 37f). To be exact, the electoral functioning today is a one-­‐person-­‐one-­‐vote formula. This demands voters to choose between tribally based candidates and ideological candidates (Albrecht, 2010: 118). Moreover it is relevant to mention that the electoral turnout in Jordan is very low. In the 2003 and 2007 elections, the turnout was between 50 and 60 percent i.e. over 40 percent of the possible voters in Jordan did not vote (Albretch, 2010: 123). In general terms, the people who are actually voting, chose the candidates they believe could provide services. This also favors the choice if political candidates as being being ‘good services providers’ (Albrecht, 2010: 125f). Many scholars classify Jordan as a liberal autocracy. Formally, the regime promotes pluralism in both the civil and institutional sphere and has a multi-­‐party system, but in practice the pluralism is not that institutionalized. Most of the parties do not have a worked out 2 “Gerrymandering is the deliberate manipulation of spatial boundaries to provide a political advantage to a particular group” (Beck, 2006:189) 28 programme nor do they have many active members (Perthes, 2004: 38). Even though the opposition can be a part of the elected parliament they cannot de facto make decisions that do not serve the will of the king. Unlike democracies, the parties and the legislative apparatus do not have the possibility of dismissing royal decisions and there are strict limitations to critical perspectives concerning those. The idea of partial inclusion of the opposition has a long tradition in Jordan and other Middle Eastern liberal autocracies. The aim is to avoid a situation where the regime would possibly lose their power to the opposition. By allowing controlled inclusion and by building alliances with the opposition the monarch’s position is better preserved. The opposition can also serve to highlight public opinions that the regime could not leave unacknowledged. In addition, because the king is not ideologically bound, he does not have to stay loyal to one single group, he can instead have a ‘divide and rule’ approach, and play out different groups against one another (Brumberg, 2003: 4f; Gandhi & Lust-­‐Okar, 2009: 404f). The possibility of entering a decision-­‐making position, hence, being a part of the PRE is more depending on personal affiliations, family status and geographical background than belonging to a certain institution, political-­‐, business – or professional alike. Alas, it is difficult to ascertain the influence of a person by just looking at his or her position (Perthes, 2004: 38). King Abdullah II several advisors, collaboration groups that in some senses have replaced the Senate. An example of this is the Economic Consultative Council (ECC), a group of well-­‐
educated, successful private sector representatives who have gained a lot of political influence. They are not outspoken democracy promoters or pro political reforms other than those concerning economical development, but they are still very eager to fulfill democratic reforms that come from existing or possible external donors (Perthes, 2004: 40f). The external factors are very important for Jordan given its geographic location and limited resources, so trends of economic gains chosen over democratic development can easily be found. Concerning western donors however, Jordan needs to show democratic intentions (Ibid.: 53f). What has been characterizing Jordanian politics since the mid 1980’s is a transition towards economic and political liberalization that has started and been withdrawn in accordance with 29 the domestic and international situation. An aspect that to some extent can explain the move towards liberalization is the semi-­‐rentier status of the country. A rentier state can be explained as a country that is strong in terms of resources and makes social contracts with its citizens. Instead of domestic taxation, rentier states depend on oil revenues, external donations and/or worker remittances. This puts the regime, if in control of these revenues, in a position quite far from its citizens, and the gap in-­‐between undermines the usual accountability measure that is a basic prerequisite for democracy (Sadik, 2011:2ff). The rentier state theory explores the obstacles for regimes to implement democracy, where the behavior of the state can ‘afford’ a lack of political development because of rents. The scarcity of oil in the rest of the world have, at certain points, made oil rents really beneficial and the consequence has been a lack of production in these countries (Ibid.). In the 1970’s and 1980’s the increased world oil prices gave a real boost to Jordan and the rent-­‐dependence equally gained momentum. The neo-­‐patrimonial state apparatus grew larger and became more and more institutional, with trends of nepotism and strengthening of the internal bonds between the ruling elite. A state employment was not limited to the elite as the state started to function as a security network that recruited from most groups in society. The benefits for working in the public sector were safety and subsidies, which is why more and more people started to work for the state rather than the private sector. When it came to political parties, unions and general expression of dissent, the state was not supportive. Apart from the political activity, economic interests where adhered, not through formal channels, but rather through personal informal patron-­‐client relationships. Hence, what can be seen as a red thread through the mid eighties is a clear behavior of renterism (Brynen, 1992: 81f). The economic prosperity declined bit by bit after the golden years. As a consequence, the Jordanian regime had to deal with their domestic situation, as the rents went down drastically and the government could not fulfill their part of the social contract with its citizens. Jordan’s budget deficit got bigger and the regime responded by lending money from European and American institutions. This move was a way of the state to save the semi-­‐rentier structures and maintain their power. The economic situation only got worse, and in the end the regime saw no choice but to take an IMF loan that only was granted if Jordan undertook a stabilization-­‐programme and slowed down the government expenditures. This meant that 30 subsidies on consumer goods got withdrawn and the business climate changed drastically. As discontent had already started to grow throughout society because of the worsened social conditions, the government needed to take measures to secure their power. To avoid revolts, the regime decided to start a liberalizing, and democratization process. In 1989, Jordanians were asked to go to the ballots for the first time in more than 30 years and King Hussein decided to annul the law against political parties. A protest movement criticized the virtual changes that the regime had started and demanded more actual democratic changes and measures taken against corruption. Given the situation, the king had to meet some of their demands and offered, as mentioned, the legislation of political parties, and moreover a lifting of martial law and loosening of restrictions on the media (Brynen, 1992: 93ff, Ryan, 2011b: 369ff). The following period did however not lead to implementation of a democratic programme, but instead the Jordanian regime as for example the leaders of Tunisia, Egypt, started a process of more deliberalization. The protestors’ demands that seemed to be adhered also caused a more cautious behavior of the regime, i.e. when the demands from certain groups in society grew stronger the regime answered with increased security measures that limited the citizens’ level of freedom significantly (Perhes, 2004: 374). Since King Abdullah II took over the throne in 1999, the political theme has been economic and technical development. These approaches favor the country’s bond with western allies and financial institutions and domestically it legitimizes the king’s neoliberal modernization initiatives (Perthes, 2004: 50). The major reforms for economic stability have been privatization, but there are still many mechanisms for the regime to control the economy. The regime sees the stability of the economy as their way of surviving, since the privatization of former state owned corporations would possibly lead to greater unemployment, and possibly political unrest, the regime and the elite see it as essential for the state to take in citizens in other instances of the state. Hence, the neoliberal views are not fully followed as the regime and the PRE sees allocation of resources as an indispensable matter of the state, which leads to the assumption that Jordan still partly is a ‘semirentier’. As the state serves it citizens it claims the citizens’ loyalty (Perthes, 2004: 51). When the call for democratic reform grow stronger among the Jordanians, the response of the king often refers to democratic transition according to classical modernization theory, where 31 democracy follows economic development, and is best implemented slowly from above. This can be seen as a move to diminish public demand and expectation, and instead focus on economic and technological development. Many scholars argue that the king uses soft power and slow reform to legitimize the lack of relevant political reforms (Perthes, 2004: 52). The ‘slow reform’ that the regime claims is happening, has at times under King Abdullah II, been replaced by reinforcement of traditional repression strategies, such as increased security demands as a consequence of emerging public opinion away from the king’s and elites norms. Other repressive acts have been dismissals, postponed elections and tightening legislation in the name of “state security”, such as a decreased freedom in the media and within associations (Perthes, 2004: 52f). Hence depoliticization and deliberalization have been trends since King Abdullah II took over the reign. The remarkable flexibility of the Jordanian, and many other Middle Eastern regimes, to work for democratic changes and then work against democracy has, until recently, been evident in the survival of the regime, when many Arab leaders have been thrown off their thrones because of their peoples’ unrest (Perthes, 2004: 374). In 2010 a wave of demonstrations started in Jordan and despite their currently smaller scale they are still continuing. The demonstrations began in the southern provinces of the country, spreading towards the capital Amman. The demands of the protestors showed a connection to the Arab uprisings that had started in Tunisia in late 2010, surging from one neighboring country to the other. In Jordan, the activists that started to gather weekly on Fridays, ranged from hundreds to thousands the following months. The difference of the protestors in Jordan compared to those in Tunisia, Egypt, Syria, etc., was the fact that many Jordanians did not call for a fall of their leader, but for reform of the leader’s, and the government’s politics (Ryan, 2011a: 564f). 4.2 Introducing the Muslim Brotherhood & Islamic Action Front In the following section the social movement the Muslim Brotherhood will be introduced which will bring us closer to answer the working question one; Which are the social movements in Jordan that have been most highlighted in the surge of the Arab Uprising? 32 The Islamist movement in Jordan is defined as the Muslim Brotherhood and their party the Islamic Action Front (IAF). In general the Islamist movement is considered as main oppositional party that is also the most popular and best organized oppositional force (Ryan, 2011, Meijer, 2005), even though there is no certainty about the Muslim Brotherhood and IAF’s size of popularity. The general talk about their popularity in Jordan is being challenged by the statement that the popularity of Islam is on the decline (Albrecht, 2010: 117). The agenda for change for the Muslim Brotherhood is; “the Muslim individual, up to the Muslim family, the Muslim community, and then the Muslim state” (Wiktorowicz, 2001: 94). The Muslim Brotherhood has a long-­‐term goal of establishing an Islamic state in Jordan and a has strong anti-­‐West, anti-­‐Christian orientation (CP 1, 2012). The Muslim Brotherhood was founded in Egypt in 1928 by Hassan al-­‐Banna and is defined as an Islamic reform movement. It has developed to become a challenge to the secular leadership in Muslim societies. Later on the movement was seen founded in other countries in the Arab region, such as in Sudan, Kuwait and Jordan (Wiktorowicz, 2001: 4). In Jordan the Muslim Brotherhood was founded in November 1945 by Abdul Latif Abu Qura. From the beginning, the movement has had a strong relationship to the Hashemite regime, which influenced the movement’s legal status as a charitable society, only a few months after it was founded. King Abdullah I could benefit from this strategic relation in the struggle against leftist and communist forces in the country. For that reason it can be explained why the Brotherhood in 1953 was granted legal status as an ‘organized group’ which involved that it could make more activities that were not only related to charity work and having a function as a ‘general and comprehensive Islamic committee’. The Brotherhood was also an active partner when the new Jordanian entity was formed and has since then played a central part in forming Jordan (Ibid.: 96). Both the regime and the Brotherhood gain success from their strong relation in the sense that the regime seek to remain power and control while the Brotherhood hopes to encourage a more Muslim society. In that way the Brotherhood seems more loyal than revolutionary, and this is related to their wish for making a reform from within (Ibid.: 93ff). The Brotherhood’s most essential function is claimed to be that it marginalizes revolutionary changes in the political and social system, for example pursued by more Islamic movements. The Muslim Brotherhood, and their position as being the strongest Muslim profile in Jordan, can be seen as challenging for the potential rise of other Muslim movements (Ibid.: 110). 33 In relation to how the Muslim Brotherhood organization is structured it is relevant to see this in an international perspective. The international Muslim Brotherhood movement is under leadership of the Egyptian Brotherhood and functions as a framework of consultation between the different Muslim Brotherhood groups worldwide. This relation is structured through three circles of association between the international Muslim Brotherhood and the respectively national group, which for our case is the Jordanian Muslim Brotherhood. The circles include that the leaders of the different Muslim Brotherhoods are obligated to follow decisions made by the movement’s general leadership and thereby have important political decisions approved before making them. This also concerns consulting about local issues that could have an effect on the international Muslim Brotherhood and make sure that the movement’s local action plan concerning policy, activity, organizational development and positions of local affairs is not in conflict with the movement’s overall strategy. Lastly, the leaders of the different Muslim Brotherhoods are responsible of spreading the principles of the movement (CP 2, 2011). It is uncertain what kinds of sources that contributes to the funding and financial support of the Muslim Brotherhood and it is believed to be one of the movement’s mostly protected secrets. The organizers of the economical resources state that the total amount of the funds comes directly from the members. Each administrative office in each respective sector has the responsibility for the administration of the economic activities. Regarding this, it is stated that external private donors also play their part in financial contribution, such as from the Persian Gulf and the West. The financial support is in addition coming from activities such as zakat (charity funds) in mosques and during public conferences, but also from investments in diverse companies and enterprises worldwide (CP 2, 2011). Furthermore, local zakat is claimed to make regular contributions to the Islamic parties whereto they in an international perspective get support from the Gulf, private Saudis and maybe also the Saudi state (Albrecht, 2010: 238). Because of the fact that the Muslim Brotherhood in Jordan has always had a good relationship with the Hashemite regime, the movement has been given more space for social activism than other social movements, which rather have been repressed. The fact that the regime is used to 34 deal with the Brotherhood, has allowed them to efficiently maneuver through formal organizations in civil society (Wiktorowicz, 2001: 101). In the late 1980’s the regime invited the Muslim Brotherhood to participate in political terms. The Muslim Brotherhood had several demands to the government before willing to participate, such as that the government was obligated to implement Islamic religious law in economics, education and the media (CP 1, 2012). Even though there have been areas of confrontation between the regime and the Brotherhood, as for example in relation to the West and economic liberalization, Wiktorowicz claims that the Brotherhood has always stayed loyal to the regime and the political system without using violence or operating underground (Wiktorowicz, 2001: 99). Following new legislation in Jordan and the passing of the political party law, in 1992, the Muslim Brotherhood in Jordan established a political wing, the Islamic Action Front. The IAF consist of both movement and independent Islamist activists and was primarily established to have political influence. After the election in 1993, the Muslim Brotherhood had become the largest faction in the Jordanian parliament (CP 1, 2012). After Black September in 1970, the Muslim Brotherhood got permission from the state to work relatively liberated in the Palestinian refugee camps which strengthen their relationship to the Palestinians. For that reason IAF is also considered as the political party of the Palestinians (Albrecht, 2010: 122). Later on the steady relationship between the regime and the Brotherhood was challenged. This was especially in relation to the Hashemite regime making peace with Israel in 1994 and the Muslim Brotherhood becoming more radical. In this way the Muslim Brotherhood started to play an important role in the opposition against the regime, which was seen when several thousand people participate in Friday demonstrations (CP 1, 2012). The more updated strategy of IAF is to have a parliamentary occurrence and their demands focus on two objects, constitutional changes and an electoral law. The first includes; an elected prime minister; less power to the king concerning his capacity to dissolve the parliament & government; less power to the royal court and finally security sector interference in political life. The second object concerns an electoral law that both deals with virtual districts and the under-­‐
representation of urban areas, which is related to the fact that the party gains strong support, form those areas (ICG, 2012: 15). In relation to IAF’s hope for an electoral law, it joined the National Front for Reform together with East Banker reform supporters. The demand is that “[..] half the parliament would be elected under a proportional national system and the other 35 half under a majoritarian system at the governorate level” (Ibid.). Concerning the electoral law, IAF would be ready to compromise even more if their demand about constitutional change was considered as well (Ibid.). The internal dynamics in the Muslim Brotherhood are described as being between the so-­‐called hawks and doves. The hawks are related to Hamas and the doves wish to participate in the national political process. Whether IAF will be willing to participate in future parliamentary processes depends on details concerning the electoral law (Ibid.). In relation to this, the Hashemite regime’s fear for a so-­‐called ‘Hamasization’ of the Muslim Brotherhood and the IAF, has increased since 2006 where members of the Jordanian Muslim Brotherhood not only referred to Iraq’s leader of al-­‐Qa’eda Abu Musab al-­‐
Zaqawi as a martyr but also made the effort to visit his family to condolence for their loss after he was killed by American forces (Albrecht, 2010: 131). Through The Islamic Centre Charity Society (ICCS) that was licensed in 1963, the Brotherhood operates different activities such as building schools and health care facilities. With the influence of financial support, including the ones from the royal family, these activities grew in the 1970’s. Some of the most crucial initiatives are educational institutions, where an Islamic perspective is remained, such as through Islamic classes and events. Furthermore, the Islamic Hospital in Amman that promotes Islamic values, whereto an example for this is that the workers are obligated to pray five times a day (Wiktorowicz, 2001: 101ff). With the establishment of the ICCS it also provided employment to the middle class, which underlines the statement concerning that the Muslim Brotherhood, is seen as a movement for the professional middle class (Albrecht, 2010: 127). With the expectation of the NGO’s established by the royal family members, the ICCS in the 1990’s was acknowledged as the biggest and most financially solvent SMO in Jordan. It is stated that ICCS has the strongest institutionalized infrastructure, financial means and strong ties to the people in a long-­‐term perspective (Ibid.: 122). As effective functions influenced by members of the Brotherhood, the Society for the Preservation of the Qur’an be mentioned, that is working at the Ministry of Awqaf. It intends to promote the requests of Islam believing that “there is no way man can be happy unless they take their knowledge from the Qur’an, read it, and understand” and teaches Muslims to read and memorize the Qur’an, Shari’a and the Sunna. The Society for the Preservation of the 36 Qur’an has opened up for hundred of centres all around Jordan, which also gives better access to civil society (Wiktorowocz, 2001: 105f). These kinds of initiatives and activities are not political, but have a political effect in the sense that they have a social service function. The Muslim Brotherhood can take advantage of these activities and organizations to gain contact with the communes. In that way the Muslim Brotherhood can be seen as ‘a grassroots attempt to promote a religious message through formal organizations in civil society’ that cooperate with the regime (Ibid.: 108f). In the aim of clarifying the roots and organization of the Muslim Brotherhood, the historical development can be divided into four tactical periods: 1. 1950’s: Mostly missionary work through the mosques and other religious institutions. 2. 1960’s: They promoted Islam through education. 3. 1970’s: Became more active in relation to professional associations and formed grassroots organizations. 4. 1980’s & 1990’s: They became more directly involved in politics such as participating in parliamentary elections, joining the government’s cabinet and most importantly forming the party IAF (Wiktorowicz, 2001: 97). 4.3 Introducing the Salafi Movement In the following section the social movement the Salafi Movement will be introduced which will bring us closer to answer the working question one; Which are the social movements in Jordan that have been most highlighted in the surge of the Arab Uprising? The word Salafi originates from the Arabic salaf which means ‘to precede’. Salaf refers to the first three generations of Muslims: the forefathers (al-­‐salaf al-­‐salih) who accompanied the Prophet Mohammed, their followers (al-­‐tabi’un) and the followers of those (tabi’un altabi’in). Salafis are strictly followers of the Qur’an and the Sunna of the Prophet, believing that these sources are the only ones of true religious understanding. From the Salafis’ perspective, these three generations commanded the pure understanding of Islam, since they learned directly from the Prophet Mohammed. Throughout this understanding, it is indicated which actions and behaviors that are allowed. Interpretations that are not understood from these original sources are looked upon as misrepresentation that negatively influence Muslims and their 37 straight way to God. The Salafi Movement encourages reform (islah) and renewal (tajdid) in the hope of encouraging Muslims to follow the Qur’an and Sunnas whereas loyalty to this will create the perfect Muslim society. Since they view the past as being this ideal community, they are hoping to regain the former dimensions. Thereby the goal for the Salafi Movement is to endorse their understanding of Islam (Wiktorowicz, 2001: 111f). By following this they believe in achieving salvation and protection on the judgment day (Ibid.: 120). In relation to this, the Salafi Movement wishes to compete those that try to renew the society, (mubtadi’un) since they are not considered as teaching the ‘true’ Islam and thereby leading people into perdition. This includes western and other foreign cultures (Ibid.: 117). During the 1970’s when people traveled to nearby countries such as Syria and Egypt to study, they learned about the belief of the Salaf. The Salafi Movement in Jordan started to rise as an effect of these individuals returning with their enlightment. The Jordanian Salafi Movement was mainly strengthened by the Syrian Salafi sheikh Nasir al-­‐Din al-­‐Bani that moved to Jordan in 1979. At the same time Jordanian soldiers who were also dedicated to the Salafi activism, returned from the war in Afghanistan, which influenced the movement to take a more militant position. It resulted in a divide within the Salafi movement between the Quietist Salafis and the so-­‐called ‘Jihadi groups’. The latter group grew stronger in 1991 after the Gulf War, as a reaction to the increase of non-­‐Muslim foreign troops in the holy country of Saudi Arabia (Wiktorowicz, 2001: 120f). It is believed that a revolutionary struggle against the regime can be necessary in the hope of creating a true Muslim state. According to this, there is a significant internal debate among Salafis whether jihad is accepted or not (Ibid.: 122). The Hashemites are by several Jihadis in Jordan considered as nonbelievers (kafirs) because of the fact that they implement policies such as liberalism and are acknowledging Israel. Takfir is defined as declaring someone a kafir, and consequently it is the right and duty of a Salafi to conduct jihad towards that kafir. Takfir is however relying on a set of rules, which the Jihadi and the Quietists disagree upon, which have created a large divide between them internal groups (Ibid.: 123f). The Jordanian Jihadis do not have strong financial capacity, which influences their weak reformist grouping. This is also mirroring the claim that many Jihadis come from relatively poor condition. (Ibid.: 127). Regionally, the Salafis are based in Amman and its surroundings but they also have a strong support base in Zarqa (Davies, 2011). Even though they are still becoming more popular, the nonviolent Quietist in the Salafi Movement 38 are generally considered as the most dominant branch. It is challenging for the Jordanian regime to distinguish between these two divisions within the Salafi Movement, since they both follow the same principles and references from the Qur’an and the Sunna (Ibid.). Another challenge for the regime related to the Salafis is that either of these two directions is working through a political structure, as the Muslim Brotherhood, but instead considers themselves as in ‘total contradiction with the system’ (Wiktorowicz, 2001: 127f). The whole Salafi Movement is however banned in Jordan since 2005 (Davies, 2011). The Salafi Movement is mobilized through an individual level, transforming individuals in the hope of creating a more Muslim society. This can be seen through education and research, which is not described as revolutionary but as guardians of true faith (Wiktorowicz, 2001: 124f). The relationship between the student and the teacher is described as being the most important social tie in the Salafi community (Ibid.: 138). The Quietist Salafis receive financial resources from Saudi regime and other governments to propagate their beliefs. Individual sheiks are also financially supported for implying a nonviolent Salafi set of guidelines (Ibid.: 124f). Another way they are structured is seen through the SMO Qur’an and Sunna Society established in 1993, which function is to teach about the Salafi understanding of Islam and through this, strengthen the hope for a better society (Ibid.: 129). The reason that the Salafi Movement is not functioning as a formal organization is because the Salafis see this as surrender to regime control and thereby they would lose their religious truthfulness. Instead, they mobilize through communication with individuals, which take place within social networks including friendships, Salafi scholars and their teaching in private homes (Ibid.: 132f). In relation to recruitment there are two very important Islamic groups: The Islamic Missionary Society (Jama’at Tabligh) and the Muslim Brotherhood. In relation to the first, the recruitment strategy includes sending out missionaries to recruit more supporters. In relation to the second, it occurs when a person decide to dedicate himself to the Salafi belief, which usually include inspire others to follow him (Ibid.: 136). The Salafi network is defined as having a high degree of fluidity with no hierarchical leaders. Instead it contains several people with the titles scholars and sheikhs that people gain through an informal process of recognition, but is not to be considered as being formal or official. Thereby, the movement is led by many leaders overlapping each other whom are 39 students and knowledge-­‐seekers. That being said, Mohammed Nasir al-­‐Din al-­‐Bani were till his death in 1999 is still seen as the greatest Salafi scholar in Jordan, and his students are regarded as being Saladis of the ‘next level’ (Wiktorowicz, 2001: 137f). As an informal network, the Salafi Movement does mosque-­‐related activities where the Salafi sheiks giving lectures about Muslim rituals and understandings from a Salafi perceptive. Hereby, they are especially focusing on recruiting new young members, to influence the next Muslim generation (Wiktorowicz, 2001: 140f). 4.4 Introducing the Popular Mobilization In the following section the social movement the Popular Mobilization will be introduced which will bring us closer to answer the working question one; Which are the social movements in Jordan that have been most highlighted in the surge of the Arab Uprising? There is a long tradition of protest in Jordan and it is possible to ascertain a trend in the behavior of the Jordanian civil society; that of their long-­‐lived will to reform the politics of the regime. Since 1989, the amount of periods of protest have increased and similar attempts by the government to calm the protesters down by co-­‐optation and informal actions. In contrast to the Muslim Brotherhood and the Salafi Movement, who have a clear religious focus, there are many groups that have a secular perspective on Jordanian society and politics. Tariq Tell (2012) refers to the non-­‐religiously oriented movements as ‘popular mobilization’ that he claims began even before the Arab uprisings. The groups within the Popular Mobilization span from workers3 and Youth Movements, to Leftists and non-­‐partisan protestors (Abu-­‐Rish & Tell, 2012). Jordan has several reform coalitions both party-­‐led ones and non-­‐party-­‐based ones. An example of the latter is Jordanian Campaign for Change (Jayeen). Jayeen is merging many of the different movements, but it has a dominance of East Bankers and some claim that they are reinforcing isolanist views, hence alienating 3 Both unions and workers without union affiliation, because the state has limited the ability of workers to create unions (Adely, 2012) 40 Palestinians. However, the members of Jayeen are all working for ‘genuine democratic reform’ (Ryan, 2011b: 382). Another example of different groups collaborating is when different political groups unite. This is for example seen via the Higher Committee for the Coordination of National Opposition Parties (HCCNOP) where IAF colaborated with both leftist and secular parties. But these initiatives rarely have a big impact since they do not work for development through long-­‐term programs for change. Instead they cooperate for the short-­‐term relation that aims to pressure the regime on specific problems (Albrecht, 2010: 79f). The demands of the protestors in Jordan are in several senses diverse, but many of them also align on specific matters, mainly opposition to economic liberalization. According to Ryan there are six demands that constitute the coherence of the different Jordanian movements that took to the streets in 2010 & 2011 and even up to today; “(1) they want parliament to be a body that actually legislates, rather than simply implementing cabinet initiatives or royal decrees; (2) they all want government to be drawn from the elected representatives of the people—that is, they want a more truly parliamentary system, rather than a royally appointed government separate from parliament; (3) they all demand an end of the ‘one person one vote’ electoral system, potentially replaced with a mixed electoral system, coupled with the ability for voters to cast multiple votes (up to the number of representatives for a given district); (4) they all call for fewer restrictions on media, press and publications, including a shift away from timid and often self-­‐censored reporting, and an end to mukhabarat interference in the media and in public life in general; (5) they all demand an end to corruption and the establishment of a more independent judiciary to hold the corrupt accountable for their actions; and (6) many want districts that are equal in size rather than gerrymandered, although this point remains controversial among democracy activists” (Ryan, 2011b: 383f). According to the secular-­‐liberal organizations the biggest barrier for activities is the minimized amount of economical resources. For this reason the organizations accept foreign funding, even though it is challenging the ability for operational autonomy. In this sense they 41 believe that more money makes them stronger in the struggle against Islamism (Albrecht, 2010: 87). According to Albrecht the foreign funding is the reason that the secular-­‐liberal groups still survive, even though it undermines their activism because of accusations of disloyalty (Ibid.: 89). 4.4.1 The Labor Movement The Labor Movement is not a new phenomenon in Jordan, but it has nonetheless been reinforced since the end of the first decade of the millennia. Tell and others claim that the present uprising started in the summer of 2009, when port workers in Aqaba started protesting. The reason for the protests was losses of job and lack of housing compensation, as the conditions seemed to be ignored when the regime started selling out the port land to a Gulf state. A sit-­‐in involving thousands of people was ruptured by ‘darak’ (gendarmes) resulting in many injured and further, drawbacks in salary and working conditions for the initiators (Adely, 2012). The unions’ and workers’ strikes also spread to other sectors the coming period. ”Journalists called for editorial freedom. Day laborers and other public-­‐sector workers demanded greater financial accountability and accused public officials of corruption. The phosphate workers were motivated partly by accusations of corruption in the privatization of the Jordanian phosphate company” (Ibid.) Union activities are limited in Jordan, since the law “[..] provide no mechanism for establishing new unions and requires workers to present their grievances via official unions rather than through strikes or protest”(Adely, 2012). The Arab uprisings nevertheless put some pressure on the regime to ease their restrictions on protest activities in public spaces. Initiators of protest actions were previously obliged to have a license but as per 2011, the regulation was amended to only acquire information about the planned activities to the authorities (Ibid.). The general demand of the labor movement is the freedom of creating independent unions but many also opted a political agenda and aligned with the other movements that took to the streets (Ibid.). The key aspects that make the Labor Movement come together with other protestors was “focused on economic policies, corruption and greater political participation” 42 (Adely, 2012). Hence, the neoliberal politics of the regime and their lack of accountability have led to a broader anger and discontent (Ibid.). 4.4.2 The Youth Movement After the Arab uprisings had broken out and grown strong in many MENA countries, Jordan experienced a movement spreading from the southern parts of the country, to end up in Amman. In the southern districts of Tafileh, Karak, Ma’an and Theiban, many grass roots youth movements flourished and started to function as big mobilizers. The Youth Movements (Shabab) have mainly focused on economic matters, where opinions against Amman-­‐centric politics concerning investments, development, corruption and privatizations are the greatest points of unity. These movements are primarily region-­‐based and according to Ryan, the most known are the Karak Popular Youth Movement, the Free Tafileh Movement, and the Ma’an Popular Movement for Change and Reform (Ryan, 2011b: 384f). Throughout the project we will refer to the combination of them as the Youth Movement. The geographic and demographic aspects should not go unnoticed since they have significance, specifically concerning the demands of these movements. The more rural parts of Jordan are very fragile to economic changes. An example is the population of Tafileh that are very dependent on jobs in the public sector and the army. This is explained by their lack of favorable agricultural conditions and possibilities of trade given their location. When the government decreases its expenditures to the public sector, the military and additionally cut subsidies on food and gas the population of the area is fatally affected. These conditions can be applied on many districts outside Amman, especially in the south, which is why it is no surprise that political unrest is growing strong right there. The demonstrations in Tafileh started just as regional economic demands in 2010, but in a few weeks the demands switched to more general political reforms (ISG, 2012: 11). The southern Youth Movements are by some scholars seen as rather insignificant, but on the other hand they are reflecting sentiments of many Jordanians that due to certain proceedings of deteriorating economical and political conditions, blossoms at times of uncertainty (Ibid.). Another example of youth mobilization is the 24 Shabab Movement that tried to gain more 43 participants through social media and create a platform for a broader coalition – both in terms of regional and participant diversity. Undoubtedly inspired of the spirit of the Tahrir Square protests in Egypt, they organized weekly Friday protests and a sit-­‐in at the Ministry of Interior Circle in 2011 (ICG, 2012:16). The participants come from different socio-­‐economic and ethnic backgrounds and the pro-­‐democratic slogans was for example, “[..] Calls for an elected, parliamentary government; an elected senate; an independent judiciary; accountability for corruption; civil and media liberties; free education and health care; economic reforms; and an end to security apparatus interference in public life” (Ibid.) Another initiative that was organized by Youth Movements trying to reach out to a broader audience is the Hashtag debates, a public discussion forum on reform and democracy in Jordan (Ryan, 2011a: 575). There have also been many Youth Movements collaborating with traditional parties, as a way of getting broader public support for their demonstrations and activities (Ryan, 2011b: 387). 4.4.3 The Leftist Movement Apart from being secular, the leftist movement is also pro-­‐reform, and Tell even remark that the Leftists are more republican than most of the other secular groups (Abu-­‐Rish & Tell, 2012). The Leftist Movement has been taking part of the larger popular mobilization, but they are also very established as a part of the traditional political opposition. There are several leftist parties, most notably; “the Jordanian Communist Party (JCP), the People’s Democratic Party (PDP, better known as Hashd and linked to the Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine), the Popular Unity Party (PUP, linked to the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine), and two Jordanian Arab Socialist Ba’ath parties (one historically with links to Syria and one to Iraq).” (Ryan, 2011b: 374f). The oppositional parties have a tradition of being capable of mobilizing the streets in a significant way, but today they are considered as small and weak. This is seen through the fact that most of them have less than hundred members and not many financial resources. In this sense, before the uprising in Jordan 2011, these other political parties have been giving little competition to IAF (Albrecht, 2010: 122f). The Leftist Movement is often seen as flawed by internal disputes, lacking unity in their objectives 44 and strategies (Omari, 2013). In terms of support, these parties are outweighed by Islamist movements and parties, whom they also have formed alliances with since the 1980’s, mostly for tactical reasons and in the search for a ‘pluralist reform’ (Schwedler & Clark, 2006). The leftist parties are also under much criticism from the reform-­‐orientated for letting themselves be absorbed by the regime structure and not contributing to any actual political change. Furthermore Hisman Bustani argues that the leftists in Jordan were among the firsts to push for an “isolationist post-­‐colonial identity as one on which a national liberation movement can be based” (Bustani, 2011). The isolationist identity refers to the nationalist spirit that separates Palestinians from Jordanians these sentiments have been promoted by different groups, supported by the government (Ibid.). As mentioned, the Popular Mobilization has attracted a diverse scale of Jordanians. Thus there is an identity divide within the Jordanian society that also effects the Poplar Mobilization, that of East Bankers and Palestinian Jordanians. Ryan claims that the East Bankers dominated the ‘pro-­‐democracy and pro-­‐reform demonstrators’ in the uprising, at least when it comes to the alternative-­‐ and not the traditional opposition. But both groups are represented over class divides, political orientation and civil society. The sometimes so polarized picture of East Bankers on the one hand and Palestinian-­‐Jordanian on the other is not accurate if looking on the participants in demonstrations of the past few years. There are however extreme views in both groups (Ryan, 2011a: 570). 45 CHAPTER 5 -­‐ ANALYSIS 5.1 Analytical Structure Throughout the previous chapter, the first working question; which are the social movements in Jordan that have been most highlighted in the surge of the Arab Uprising? has been addressed via the introduction of the social movements; the Muslim Brotherhood, the Salafi Movement and the Popular Mobilization. This puts us in a better position of answering the second working question; what are the social movements’ goals and how do they mobilize? throughout this chapter. In relation to the analysis of the religious groups, the Muslim Brotherhood and the Salafi Movement, we will include the crucial point by both Tarrow and Wiktorowicz, that to understand a social movement, it is important to include the cultural dimensions as well. For that reason we will bring in dimensions from IA as a starting point and framework of the analysis of the religious groups, and afterwards continuing the analysis of the movements’ political and economical ability to mobilize. In relation to the last analytical chapter, we will be focusing on the three groups that we have previously presented as the Popular Mobilization. Our aim is to analyze the contentious politics that have been noticed in Jordan 46 and in that section we are focusing on the Labor Movement, the Youth Movement4 and the Leftist Movement as they have all been active, and often collaborated in the last few years. Because of the fact that we are analyzing several groups in the last analytical chapter, it is crucial to underline that regarding their similar goals they may mobilize in different ways, whereto the analysis of the Popular mobilization, will at times be comparative. 5.2 Analysis of the Muslim Brotherhood In the analysis of this Jordanian social movement we find it crucial to specify that we consider the Muslim Brotherhood as the main organization whereto IAF is seen as the political wing. In this sense, we regard them as interconnected and depending on each other, but at times we will analyze their mobilization and goals separately since they differ from one another. This especially concerns our understanding of Muslim Brotherhood supporters as activists whereto the political activists in relation to IAF are regarded as practicing Muslim politics. However, both the Muslim Brotherhood and IAF equally act according to their Muslim belief, where the cultural set of identity, culture and post-­‐materialism are central. In contrast to other social movements in Jordan who are more focused on economic and particular issues, we regard the cultural set of the Muslim Brotherhood and IAF as the root for their repertoires. The theoretical perspective dealing with the rise of Islamic activism in relation to historical processes is interesting in the Jordanian context. As mentioned before the Jordanian economy has been influenced by the regime’s tactic of liberalization and privatization. Since the 1990’s, there have been waves of neoliberal initiatives, especially after King Abdullah II took over the power, and started to conjoin with western allies and financial institutions. Having these historical facts explained, the Islamic social movements in Jordan are seen as a force of resistance towards these economical changes and modernization processes. According to Wiktorowicz the Muslim Brotherhood is cooperating with the regime and defined as ‘a grassroots attempt to promote a religious message through formal organizations 4 The Karak Popular Youth Movement, the Free Tafileh Movement, and the Ma’an Popular Movement for Change and Reform 47 in civil society’. To understand the goals of the Muslim Brotherhood we have to recognize their religious conviction, understood through for example the mobilization of the Society for the Preservation of the Qur’an believing that “there is no way man can be happy unless they take their knowledge from the Qur’an, read it, and understand”. As being the political wing of the Muslim Brotherhood, we consider IAF as having the same religious understanding. Wiktorowicz reminds us to not only classify a movement’s opportunities as political but also as determinants of cultural, economic and social factors. In relation to the Muslim Brotherhood and their opportunities of mobilizing, it is essential to acknowledge their hold of the following; the established Muslim cultural context, the international economical support and the regional scope in MENA region. In contrast to opportunities are threats; whereto the western secular modernization is seen as opponent, which underlines why the Muslim Brotherhood finds it crucial to fight for their cultural heritage. The mobilization of the Muslim Brotherhood has changed over the years. Two ways of mobilizing that we consider as most important is through SMO’s and the political party IAF. For that reason we find it crucial to bring in RMT and the three fields of mobilization structure. Via the establishment of schools and medical clinics, the Muslim Brotherhood use different organizational mobilizations and can in that way be related to the second field of mobilization structure. This is analyzed to be realized via the Society for the Preservation of the Qur’an teaches Muslims to read and memorize the Qur’an, shari’a and the Sunna and furthermore that the ICCS functions as a medical clinic whereto Islamic messages also are preached. We consider IAF to represent the first field of mobilization, because of its political mobilization of being a political party. Hereto, the third field of mobilization can be analyzed as the missionary tendencies in which the representatives from the Brotherhood use the agenda of starting at an individual level in the hope of reaching a Muslim state. In relation to this it is worth mentioning the mosques as a strong element in a formal mobilizing structure where representatives from the Muslim Brotherhood are active. The above mentioned is seen as concrete examples of how the Muslim Brotherhood acts and it is thereby relevant to bring in the theoretical term framing. The mobilization through IAF and ICCS, is being constructed in the sense that individuals conceptualize themselves in collectives and that strengthens their willingness to participate. The task of framing for the Muslim Brotherhood as a social 48 movement can be seen through their medical clinic or political party. These formal frames are responses to the need that the Muslim Brotherhood has seen in civil society; a need of increased medical resources; and a need of a new political direction in Jordan. Through these institutions they identify problems and create solutions. As mentioned the ICCS has created more employment for the population and IAF has demonstrated a chance for political change, whereas these initiatives can be acknowledged as motivating support and collective action. This underlines how initiatives and frames for mobilizing, like ICCS and IAF, are necessary for the Muslim Brotherhood to gain more participants and support. In that sense the Muslim Brotherhood and IAF as a social movement can be considered as having strong organizational resources from the perspective of RMT. But as mentioned by Meijer, the success of a social movement also depends on access to political institutions and processes of decision-­‐making. Therefore we will analyze to what degree the Muslim Brotherhood and IAF have political ability, and thus possess political space. Whenever IAF acts as the maker of claim, it is in general either the Jordanian state or an external agent such as the USA that is the receiver of claim. Since IAF is already considered as an established political party and because of the historically good relation between the Muslim Brotherhood and the Hashemite regime, the contention can be analyzed as being contained. In relation to this, it will be relevant to bring in the different mechanisms seen within a cycle of contention employed by IAF. Regarding the first mechanism diffusion the theoretical term scale shift is also mentioned, which we consider IAF to have achieved in the transformation from being a political party to be voted in to the parliament. The second mechanism exhaustion that concerns internal disagreements about who to lead and who should make the strategical choices is examined to be present within the Muslim Brotherhood between the hawks and doves. Looking back at the 2007 election, an example of this internal conflict between the groups is given. The doves supported a boycott of the election to put focus on the issues related to ‘electoral reform’ and pushed for a ‘real constitutional monarchy’ and more institutionalization. The doves won the debate and the IAF boycotted the election 2010 (El Amrani, 2011). Hereby exhaustion is expressed and underlines how influential this internal conflict is, since the debate between the groups, concerning whether or not to boycott the elections, is seen as one of the reasons for the worst electoral result in the history of IAF (Albrecht, 2010: 118). This example is also related to the third mechanism 49 within the cycle of contention, radicalization/institutionalization, where a social movement often goes in one of these directions. The example from 2007 can be analyzed as an expression of the fact that IAF’s internal conflict is between the two mentioned paths, which sometimes can be a crucial challenge. Nevertheless, when looking at the Muslim Brotherhood and IAF from an overall perspective, it shows that the social movement with its political party has chosen the more institutionalized path. In relation to the historically good relationship with the Hashemite regime, the Muslim Brotherhood is considered to have a contained approach, in the sense that they act through routines that are accepted by the regime and understood by the people. Looking back at 1953 when the Muslim Brotherhood was granted legal status as an ‘organized group’, that aspect specified their contained collective action. This relates to the four tactical periods from the 1950’s to the 1990’s, where a red thread of contained collective action is visible. This is observed as them going from missionary work in religious institutions to founding a political party. Concerning the possibility of a violent approach, seen from an overall perspective and as a regional movement, the Muslim Brotherhood in many of the Arab countries has always had a reputation of sometimes utilizing violent methods. But according to Wiktorowicz the Muslim Brotherhood in Jordan has never been violent. With that in mind, Wiktorowicz also emphasizes the importance of acknowledging different kinds of Islamic activists, which can be seen in relation to the hawks and the doves. As mentioned before, the hawks support Hamas, whom use violence to point across their messages. There have also been IAF representatives supporting Jihadist figureheads, (Davis, 2011) which shows interim support for the use of violence. Despite the argument that the Muslim Brotherhood thereby uses a more contained than violent collective action, it is clear that the movement is advocating more disruptive performances. These have been observed in relation to several of the movement’s contentious performances, such as the multiple boycotts of elections throughout the years. Furthermore, via recent performances in relation to the 2010 uprising, when the Muslim Brotherhood the 16th of January opted for a muted sit-­‐in in front of the parliament (ICG, 2012: 14). In continuation hereof it is interesting to question the movement’s position in the uprisings since 2010, where they have been considered as being in the background compared to other movements. As an example, the Muslim Brotherhood did not engage in the large protest ‘Day of Anger’ held the 14th of January 2011. The reason for the movement’s more neutral attitude 50 could be regarded as connected to the stable affiliation with the Hashemite regime. By using soft disruptive actions, as the sit-­‐ins can be defined as, the Muslim Brotherhood still appeal to their supporters as being an established oppositional movement. By not acting through a more radical disruptive approach that for example could lead into a violent collective action, they still have chances of keeping the steady relation to the Hashemite regime. Considering the larger context of Muslim politics, Islamists have played an immense role in the MENA region since the Arab uprisings started and naturally before that as well. The Muslim Brotherhood is as mentioned not particular for Jordan, but instead an international network that is most prevalent in the Middle East. Even though the politics of the Brotherhood and IAF are not always in accordance with the wider network, they have clear connections and mobilize in the same pattern. In that sense the Muslim Brotherhood and IAF are performing in a modular way. Similarly to the other social movements, the Muslim Brotherhood demanded an internal reform of the regime in the hope of gaining a parliamentary monarchy where the government is chosen by the people instead of the regime – thereby minimizing King Abdullah II’s power. Moreover, the Muslim Brotherhood demanded economic and social reforms in the hope of maintaining lower prices on common goods on subsidized (CP1, 2012). In relation to this, it will be natural to bring in the four kinds of responds from the target that is mentioned in SMT. The Muslim Brotherhood has met concession and toleration from the Jordanian population in the sense of its size, amount of supporters and its popularity. The state also shows concession and toleration in the acknowledgment of the movement and their political wing IAF. But in an overall perspective we consider the regime responding to the Muslim Brotherhood and IAF in a combination of concession and repression. As a party participating in the elections, IAF is simultaneously like the other political parties, if elected only gaining access to the Chamber of Deputies. As mentioned before, King Abdullah II will always have the last saying, which is also practiced through the Senate. In that way it can be analyzed that the potential power of the Muslim Brotherhood and IAF is being repressed even though the Hashemite regime recognizes them as respectively an organizational group and a political party. Another kind of repression of the Muslim Brotherhood and IAF is present when they want to demonstrate. It is not a matter of course that the regime allows the movement to protest, which among other 51 things depends on the target and thereby receiver of claim. At times the movement has been denied to hold specific protests because of the regime’s argument that ‘the situation is too dangerous’ (Wiktorowicz, 2001: 37). In spite of the repression, IAF has also recently used the political threat of boycotting elections, for example seen in 2010 because of the disagreement according to the ‘one-­‐man, one vote’ election law (Christophersen, 2010: 8). The regime agreed to make some changes concerning the election law, but these are referred to as superficial and it is claimed that the law is still discriminating against urban areas and favors the rural, tribal parts of the country (El Amrani, 2011). Based on the above analyzed, it is clear that the Muslim Brotherhood and IAF are practicing contentious politics since it involves contention, collective action and politics in a way that underlines their access to ‘political space’, even though there are limits to this space because of the authoritarian Hashemite regime. The working question two in relation to the Muslim Brotherhood is hereby addressed. 5.3 Analysis of the Salafi Movement According to IA a religious social movement must be analyzed through it’s religious beliefs which for the Salafi Movement is based upon a strict adherence to the Qur’an and further distancing themselves from external non-­‐Muslim influences in society. They regard themselves as guardians of the true faith, which we would consider as the origins of their repertoires. The targets of blame for the Salafi Movement are people that do not adhere to a strict Islamic way of life, and as many Islamic activists, they often see the West and its influence in Muslim countries as the scapegoat. The Salafi Movement is contesting the faith and very behavior of the common Jordanian including the political sphere. The movement is split into the Quietist Salafis, who are not openly protesting the regime, and the Jihadi Salafis that have been part of the performances alongside other Jordanian social movements since 2011. The performances by the Quietists is seen as teaching and cultivating as many as possible into their way of faith; so called da’wa, and the Jihadis are engaging in more rebellious direct ways of contention. In relation to the 52 state apparatus and the regime politics, the interpretation of takfir is the principal marker and determinant of repertoires between the Quietists and the Jihadis. In accordance with the main interpretations of Islam, “[..], if a Muslim ruler abandons the Islamic faith “in heart and soul”[i.e. he is being a kafir] takfir is applicable and the people have the right and duty to oust him” (Davies, 2011). As the Jordanian constitution is acknowledging Islam, permits an Islamic judiciary and furthermore that the king endorses these facts, the Quietists do not support the performance of takfir. They believe that jihad is a mechanism that can only be employed when a society is properly Muslim, and the Jordanian society has not yet reached that maturity. The jihadi practice is therefore seen as counterproductive, since it would not lead to gains for their faith, rather they fear that jihadi practice would lead to further disapproval from the population and the leaders of Jordan and thereby risk of persecution of the Salafis (Wiktorowitz, 2001: 124f). The Jihadis on the other hand, see it as their duty to exercise takfir against the regime since it is not applying the Muslim faith properly. From a Jihadi Salafi point of view, examples of the regime pursuing un-­‐Islamic actions and practices are; the allowance of sale of alcohol, concluding the peace treaty with Israel and supporting the U.S in the ‘war on terror’. The concrete goals of the Jihadi Salafis are the release of Salafi prisoners and further that a more throughout devotion to shari’a law should be implemented in Jordan (Davies, 2011). The Salafi Movement’s mobilization cannot be related to the first field of RMT structure of formal political mobilization, but to some extent we can argue that they do embrace some kind of mobilization through the second field. Not in a legal sense, but seen via the mobilizing of supporters through a school structure, as the student-­‐teacher bond is seen as an important mobilizer for them. The fact that this practice has to take place somewhere, either in the mosque or in private homes, is related to the third field, concerning the social networks and personal ties. Going back to the second field, the organizational work of the Salafi Movement can be seen in their SMO, the Qur’an and Sunna Society that however is very limited, both in terms of resources and number of members. In our interpretation the third field of mobilization, that of being described as informal is a significantly well-­‐fitted description to the mobilization of the Salafi Movement. The latter also aligns with what Wiktorowicz describes as a common way of IA. The structure of a movement and their consequent ability to access 53 political space, in combination with possible repression is determining the accomplishment of their claims, which we will subsequently elaborate. Concerning contention and its essential components maker of claim and receiver of claim, the Salafi movement, no matter of its internal division is the maker of claim. The claim making is however not that articulated by the Quietists as the Jihadis. Where the receiver of claim for the Quietists is the Jordanian society in general, the Jihadis express themselves more explicitly in directing their claims towards people in power, the regime in general and King Abdullah II in particular. The Salafi Movement can be classified as transgressive in that their contention is not conventional. The Jihadis violent type of collective action that escalated in 2005 caused the blacklisting of the Salafi Movement. The leader of the Jihadi Salafis was at that time the al-­‐
Qaeda related Al-­‐Zarqa, and the group committed several suicide bombings targeting hotels Amman, which led to around 60 deaths (Davies, 2011). The fear and distrust towards the whole Salafi Movement grew, the movement basically went underground and their contention was concealed until the spring of 2011. The fact that the movement, including both the Quietists and the Jihadis, are forbidden in Jordan further speaks for their nature of transgressive contentious. Concerning cycle of contention, the Quietists have mainly been recorded participating in contention via their performances of teaching and guiding people in the direction of the ‘true’ Muslim faith. The Jihadi Salafis were not the early risers of the 2010 uprisings, but rather they picked up on the general protest of dissent and signaling from other groups, and afterwards they decided to mobilize and take part of the protests. The mobilization of the Jihadi Salafis did not occur because they necessarily agreed with the other protestors, but because they saw an opportunity of expressing their demands, that was still directed towards the same claimant as many the other protestors (Davies, 2011). The above contentious performances underline that the Salafi Movement can be seen in the light of the mechanism diffusion. The second mechanism exhaustion was present for the Salafi Movement in relation to a decline in participation that was seen in 2005 after the regime banned the movement because of the mentioned bombings of hotels. The ban from the regime could be analyzed as increasing the 54 risks for the movement and thereby explain their limitation of activities, until 2011 where it took advantage of the diffusion. The mentioned example can also be related to the last mechanism radicalization/institutionalization where the Salafi Movement can be analyzed as following a more radical path. The Salafi Movement is somewhat the embodiment of Wiktorowicz’s social movement community since they do not intend to mobilize in the field of formal politics as they in general are in conflict with the system, institutionalism and democratic processes. The Salafis believe that a strengthening of its institution and creation of a formal movement would make them “[..] surrender to regime control and forfeiting religious integrity” (Wiktorowicz, 2001: 132). They are however in some sense accessing the civil society level through their recruitment processes that is built upon social networks and through other Islamic groups. Moreover, in relation to the fact that the Salafi Movement does not have a well-­‐defined leadership or a staked out hierarchy, this once again underlines its status as a social movement community, since this implies flexible leadership structures. The leadership is a combination of scholars and loosely proclaimed leaders or sheiks, with intersecting followers who are slightly tied to their financial supporters. This makes it hard for the regime, if they would want to limit the movement, since it is difficult to even target the group, and a repression of one branch of movement does not mean that the overall movement would stop acting out their performances (Wiktorowicz, 2001: 138). Since the ban of the Salafi Movement, there has rather been a tendency of acting in a more transgressive way. According to SMT, there are three different types of collective action that describes the performances of social movements; violent, contained and disruptive. The Salafi Movement is operating outside the boundaries of society and is therefore not considered as using contained forms of collective action. The performances of the Jihadi Salafis have historically been very violent, including suicide bombings and other unsophisticated actions. Since the comeback of the Salafi Movement in 2011 the Jihadi Salafis have however been practicing more moderate forms of collective action. In March and April of 2011 their performances included several demonstrations and sit-­‐ins. Violence has however still occurred both in underground performances and in protests. An example is a demonstration in Zarqa, where the protestors were armed with knives and clubs, ending in a clash with the police “leaving eighty-­‐three policemen wounded, with four in critical condition” (Davies, 2011). The collective 55 action performed by the Jihadi Salafis is henceforth a combination of violent and disruptive behavior, which will be contextualized in terms of the responses from target in the following. The kind of response from the regime towards the Jihadi Salafi movement has been repression. Except banning the Salafi Movement, the regime and the authorities did let the movement protest their discontent in 2011 and to begin with the police did not interfere in their performances. When the violence in the Jihadi Salafi demonstrations escalated in Zarqa in April 2011, as described above, the government however responded with raiding the homes of many Salafis. Consequently 146 activists were arrested for terror related crimes. The way that the regime has responded has hence been suppressive, but they have further invited Salafis to talks to try to calm down the protestors, and actually met some of their demands. The regime decided to free 4 Salafi prisoners in 2011. What can be seen from the above-­‐
described responses is that there have been different degrees of repression and even one occasion of a restrained concession towards one of the claims of the Salafis. In general they are however not tolerated and overall they are seen as a direct threat towards the regime. In relation to this the Jihadi Salafis are especially characterized as terrorists. By this analysis we have pointed out that the Salafi Movement is practicing contentious politics since it involves contention, collective action and politics. This practice concerns their Islamic goals and their unconventional mobilization. The working question two in relation to the Salafi Movement is hereby addressed. 5.4 Analysis of the Popular Mobilization The Labor Movement is not a new movement but its recent engagement, since 2009, has showed an explicit set of claims towards the regime. By that we see it as they are taking part in contentious politics and that they are claim makers. There are however multiple dimensions within this contention. Considering the workers direct claims for the betterment of working conditions, diverse compensation for job losses and housing conditions, the receivers of claim are naturally the employers and the regime. The regime would be the target and the employers the third party. In addition to that, the more political character of claims that tended to emerge in the movements’ protests, the other groups in the Popular Movement can 56 be seen as a ‘co-­‐claim makers’. As the Labor Movement is rather institutionalized, even if the regime does not allow them to organizing in a more sufficient way, through independent unions. But considering their character and rather conventional form of organizing, we would classify their mobilization and claim making as contained contention. The Youth Movement is in contrast to the Labor Movement not specifically affiliated with certain professions, they are rather unified in their political claims that also are directed towards the regime. The contentious politics concerning the Youth Movement is at large a relation between the different groups and the regime, whereto the most known youth movements are Karak Popular Youth Movement, the Free Tafileh Movement, and the Ma’an Popular Movement for Change and Reform. In that way we consider the above mentioned groups as the makers of claim and the regime as the receiver of claim. Because of the fact that the different movements have related demands and have risen in similar ways they are often referred to as the united Youth Movement. In this relation we consider the Youth Movement as the maker of claim and still, the regime as the receiver of claim. Thus, this could also be analyzed in a way where the maker and receiver of claim, are determined by geographical and demographical aspects; in the beginning of the 2010 uprisings, the most vocal makers of claim were to be found outside Amman. The discontent was not only directed towards the lack of democracy that characterizes the political system, but also towards the economical and developmental centralization to Amman. This can be seen in the light of privatization processes favoring many Palestinian-­‐Jordanian businessmen. The sense of injustice seemed to have a regional dimension that we would dissect as connected to the identity divide between East Bankers and Palestinian-­‐Jordanians. According to Ryan (2011a), many of the initial youth movement are of East Bank origin, which have also shaped their focus of dissatisfaction and their claims. Thereby the maker of claim is still considered as the Youth Movement, but the receiver of claim could be considered to include wealthy Palestinian-­‐Jordanian businessmen as ‘the black sheep’ because of the thought of them, being privileged by the regime’s neoliberal policies. This is consistent to the theory by Tarrow and Wiktorowicz, both arguing for the importance of bringing in cultural perspectives in the hope of recognizing the mobilization of a social movement. Moreover, we also consider the Youth Movement as different because of its more transgressive contention in the sense that this movement can be 57 characterized as a newly self-­‐identified political actor and that the actions involved are in opposition to the regime. The Leftist Movement has a reputation of being weak, even though they have a long history in Jordan. Except its weakness, the leftists are still making claims, directed towards the regime as the receiver of claims. Some, especially among the non-­‐party affiliated leftists express an even deeper will to reform the society, through an overthrow of the Hashemite monarchy (Abu-­‐Rish & Tell, 2012). Concerning the contention that the leftists are engaged in, we would classify it as contained because of leftists’ status as recognized, previously established actors and because of their several collaborations with other parties and movements. In the continuation of the above analysis, it is seen how the Youth Movement and the Labor Movement, compared to the leftists, have been strong actors in uprisings in 2010 and beyond. For that reason we will analyze the two first mentioned movements via the theoretical term cycle of contention and the related mechanisms. The Youth Movement in Jordan has been seen as an early riser as it managed to mobilize a big number of people in the southern provinces of Jordan that soon spread and finally ended up in Amman (Ryan, 2011: 367f). Apart from that, this cycle of contention can in addition be seen as started by the Labor Movement as they began to protest in 2009, in which case the Labor Movement is also seen as an early riser (Christophersen, 2013:1). The theoretical explanation of the early risers having specific demands that eventually are transformed into more general demands as the participants are increased, is aligning with what happened in the beginning of 2011, as the Youth Movements started off with economic demands related to the recent political moves specifically related to the different regions. The lack of development, jobs and money in the pocket had made numerous people angry, and the youth was especially exposed to these issues. In a similar way, the Labor Movement started to form new demands concerning their grievances because of the privatization that among other consequences had left many jobless. The demonstrations thereafter developed and other movements also felt the need to articulate their discontent, the demands started to transform into more general claims that involved not only the specific workers or groups of young people, but also political parties and non-­‐
partisan civilians. This process can be described as diffusion – when collective actions connect different actors and its opponents. Another element to diffusion is possible scale shift, which 58 in this context is present when the contention is changing from being rather scattered and diffused geographically, to reach a progress in uniting in collation and finding new frames, an example of this is the Jayeen movement. Moreover, the Popular Mobilization had its peak in 2011 at approximately the same time as an ‘awakening’ or ‘spring’ spread across the Arab world. While the protests have continued in many countries, with different outcomes, Jordan has seen an exhaustion or a fatigue, as the protests have downscaled in terms of participants even though their demands have not been explicitly met (Christophersen, 2013: 2f). In that way, exhaustion is another mechanism in the cycle of contention that we can relate to the Jordanian Popular Mobilization. Because of the fact that the riots in Jordan performed by these movements are still present and currently going on, we will not contribute with a specific analysis of the last mechanism radicalization/institutionalization. However, it can be commented that an overall perspective of their demands can be analyzed as being gained through institutionalization, but in the aim of achieving this it might include some radical performances. In the aim of understanding how the Popular Mobilization mobilizes we consider it relevant to bring in the three fields of structure from RMT. For a better overview, we will analyze the three movements separately and afterwards contribute with our understanding of why they mobilize together. In relation to the Labor Movement, we consider that it tries to mobilize through the first field, since it wishes to be considered as a legal institution that provides solidarity with the Jordanian workers and thereby strengthening the civil society. An obstacle to this is the fact that the union activities are limited in Jordan, which is seen in the law providing no mechanism for establishing new unions and that the workers should not express their discontent through strikes or protests. Since the Labor Movement in contrast to the legislature, actually is encouraging the workers to protest, their way of mobilizing could be analyzed as related to the third field, via social networks. The contentious politics have also reached a different dimension, where the youth movements have come together, forming alliances and platforms for debate. These alliances have included youth, both small-­‐scale and big-­‐scale, that have been organizing as multiple claim makers where they have also involved what can be seen as a third party receiver of claim in form of more established groups and political parties. For that reason we would argue that the mobilization of the youth is similar to the third field of RMT structures, since it organized via the informal sector of social 59 networks and personal ties. As acknowledged political parties, we imagine that the leftist parties are classified as structured through the first RMT field, which is seen when they participate in elections and are present in parliament. We consider their willingness to cooperate with other movements as strong, which could be explained as a consequence of their weak position. Although the leftist parties are collaborating and the leftist activists without party affiliation mobilize together, they have many internal disputes, whereby they can be considered as many different makers of claim, aligning ideologically but not pragmatically. There are also many examples of the leftist parties’ collaborating with Islamic parties where they allied against the Jordanian regime’s relations with Israel. Domestically, they are working for democratic reforms mainly regarding the parliamentary-­‐ and the electoral system (Ryan, 2011: 378). An example of the collaboration is the HCCNOP, the coalition generally mobilize together around certain question, namely corruption and economical issues, “[..] but at a deeper civil society level each side, once it has obtained a significant result on a single issue, retreats to the safety of its ideological positions ad continues the pattern of rivalry between opposition actors” (Cavatora & Elananza, 2008: 573f). In that way the Leftist Movement mobilizes through collaborations with other movements, for example the Youth Movement and the Labor Movement. As mentioned before, the main argument for the Labor Movement participating in the riots with the other movements is because they share the same demands concerning focus on economic policies, corruption and greater political participation. In proportion to the Youth Movement, they can also be seen as mobilizing with a goal of getting more support and participants. This was for example seen via the 24 Shabab Movement where they applied to people through social media platforms such as Facebook. They tried to mobilize protests in terms of regional and demographical diversity, in the aim of creating immense protests. For at better understanding of how the Popular Mobilization organizes we will analyze how the different groups act, by using the theory concerning the three types of collective action. The Labor Movement’s collective action has led to different professional committees, which resemble unions. Some of these committees such as the port workers Steering Committee have eventually been acknowledged by the regime and gained the status of a union (Adely, 2012). Organizing committees through collective action is a rather conventional way of mobilizing, and since the will is to organize routines and establish a base for the protection of 60 workers, these kinds of actions can be considered as as contained actions. Implications considering this labeling would be the way that the Labor Movement is struggling with the implementation of their unions. With this in mind, their collective action can further be described as disruptive, since they have organized sit-­‐ins and demonstrations to express their demands, with many participants involved. An example is a sit-­‐in in 2009, where 3000-­‐4000 participants were reported and furthermore in 2011 the contentious performances grew radically, as more than 800 actions from the labor movement were reported (Ibid.). The actions of the Youth Movement are good examples of disruptive collective action. They have been engaging in many ‘traditional’ types of collective action, such as demonstrations. And in addition they have found new ways of mobilizing more people and unify in their claims, these types of disruptive actions have taken form in social media and through blogs. The Youth Movement have further used these forums to signal their presence and demands by “youth or ‘Shabab’ groups via Facebook, the groups and individuals stay connected through multiple social media platforms, not just through Facebook, Twitter and blogging but also simply through cell phone calls, texting and direct personal contact” (Ryan, 2011b: 386). The Leftist Movement has also participated in demonstrations and sit-­‐ins in 2010 and onwards (Ryan, 2011b: 367ff). In relation to that, their actual engagement could be discussed. Ryan quotes a democracy activist who declares that the leftists in Jordan are ”somehow Left without being progressive. They are old Left. Just oppositionist as a career. They still act like they are an opposition in exile. They don’t know how to work inside the system, even when they are in it” (Ryan, 2011b: 377). Hence, leftist parties are generally seen as inefficient in their claim making and mobilization but apart from that, their behavior must be considered as contained, in combination with a hint of disruptiveness. From an overall picture of the above analysis, we consider demonstrations and sit-­‐ins as the most common collective action that the three different groups participate in together via the Popular Mobilization. The contentious performances of the Labor Movement are in many ways resembling other union related performances that have occurred in different parts of the world at different points in history, such as demonstrations, slogans and protests. Since demonstrations and other forms of organizing protests through collective action are common in the formation of 61 unions, we do regard these performances as modular. The collective action of the Youth Movement is mirroring the contentious performances that have been seen in many of the countries in the MENA region since the Arab uprisings started in 2010 (ICG, 2012:16f). Their performances can to some extent be connected to other uprisings, and in that sense they are modular. The 24 Shabab Movement has continually been seen as motivated by the demonstrations at the Tahrir Square in Cairo, Egypt. Messages from other protest movements in the MENA region has further been spread through blogs and social media platforms which at some point inspired many Jordanians, especially activists within the Youth Movement (Ibid.). The Leftist Movement can rather be seen as a movement going from modular contentious performances to a more particular dimension. As we have pointed out, the leftist parties are often collaborating with the larger Islamic parties like IAF, but many of the parties have links to other likeminded parties in the MENA region. Examples are the Hashd Party that has ties to the ‘Democratic front for the Liberation of Palestine’ and the Ba’ath parties that before were linked to parties in Syria and Iraq (Ryan, 2011b: 374f). Hence, historically many leftist parties can be seen as modular, since they have had sister parties with similar tactics and programme in the wider region. But moreover, there has been a turn towards a bigger focus on actually gaining more seats in the Jordanian parliament and domestic reforms in which they have needed cross-­‐ideological allies. This could be seen as a shift towards more particular issues and performances instead of modular ones. In the aim of analyzing the responses from the target, we consider the claimant as being the Popular Mobilization and the target as the Hashemite regime. From a theoretical perspective, the different responses could be concession, repression, toleration or a combination of concession and repression. Since King Abduallah II is in charge he is considered the receiver of claim and even though there have been made some reforms these are by the majority regarded as merely cosmetic and symbolic. The king has often pointed out his concessions and that the wish is for Jordan to become democratic. A good example of this kind of reform or rather reshuffling is: In 2011, the Prime Minister was Samir Rifa’i, son of Zayd, scion of a powerful pro-­‐regime family and fourth in the family line to serve the Hashemites as prime minister. (..) [H]e seemed to be viewed as the 62 archetype of what many East Jordanians were complaining about: government ministers who were actually technocratic Palestinian businessmen. When the king complied with protesters’ demands, firing the entire cabinet, he replaced them with an East Jordanian former career military officer from the influential Abbadi tribe, Marouf Bakhit. Ministerial portfolios changed, but little else did”. Hence the reshuffling was a short-­‐term change aimed to clam down the debate (Ryan, 2011a: 571) In relation to accountability and corruption, the government has begun to take corruption allegations seriously in prosecuting and arresting several people with influential positions in Jordan; the mayor of Amman was arrested in relation to a casino scandal and a former intelligence officer has been sentenced for money laundering and misusing public funds. But since instrumental ways of corruption in the Jordanian society have not been taken by the horns, many sentences for corruption has after a while led to clearance of charges instead of proper implementations (Christophersen, 2013: 3). The regime claims that it has made an effort to strengthen democratization and meeting the demands of the protestors. But according to Ryan, these efforts have only been of a procedural character; ”the act of elections—without providing meaningful channels for genuine participation, transparency and accountability” (Ryan, 2011b: 371). In addition, the regime has proclaimed many committees in order to create dialogue about constitutional changes and an increase in democratization, which have not yet resulted in any worthwhile reforms (Ibid.). These efforts are a type of concession from the king and the government, but for the larger part of the protestors in the Popular Mobilization these measures are not regarded as viable. In that way the responses from the regime from an overall perspective can be analyzed as being a combination of concession and repression. Through the analysis above, it shows how the Popular Mobilization is practicing contentious politics since it involves contention, collective action and politics. Despite the limitations of an active civil society because of the policies of the Hashemite regime, the Popular Mobilization can still access a political space. The second working question in relation to the Popular Mobilization is hereby addressed. 63 CHAPTER 6 -­‐ DISCUSSION In the following chapter the research question what impact do social movement have on democratic processes in Jordan? will be addressed. The discussion will be framed from the mentioned understandings of civil society and democracy. Additionally, we will focus on the inherit paradox of these concepts, as they are very dependent on the context. Through the theoretical approach we have made an analysis that have sought to label and rationalize the mechanisms that are shaping social movements and their actions. At this stage we would like to reinvigorate the complexity of these mechanisms, in an eclectic manner, by putting the movements in contrast to the prejudices that are shaping the conception of the situation in Jordan. Therefore, this discussion will be built up around stereotypical images of the Muslim Brotherhood, the Salafi Movement and the Popular Mobilization, inspired by the analysis of them. In that way the third working question accentuating the hindrances for the highlighted social movements to take action including how they deal with these obstacles, will be addressed as well. In that way the discussion of the stereotypes will be conducted via different point of views upon democracy and civil society. 64 The Muslim Brotherhood can create a Muslim democracy! This is possible since it is an acknowledged social movement, they have the legal political party IAF and they have gained acceptance from both the population and the Hashemite regime. On the other hand, this political space can be questioned, since it can be argued that even though the Hashemite regime has been responding IAF with concession, it is also repressing it by not dividing the power that the upper house possesses. It could be argued that the Muslim Brotherhood and IAF still could gain influence, because of the historically good relationship with the regime, but then again – bringing in the Jordanian context out from an IA theoretical approach, underlines how King Abdullah II has been taking a more liberal and westernized approach, that cannot be emphasized as being consistent with the views of the Muslim Brotherhood. In that way it can be argued that the Muslim Brotherhood and IAF are being challenged in having impact upon democratic processes in Jordan. This is furthermore underlined by the argument that Islamist popularity is on the decline (Albrecht, 2010: 117). It can be argued that this hindrance is partly explained as a consequence of the electoral law, which is being challenged by the Muslim Brotherhood and IAF through disruptive performances such as protests, demonstrations and boycotts of the elections, in the hope of change. The regime responds to this fight with superficial changes of the electoral law but the implication still stays the same. From all of this, it can be argued that even though the Muslim Brotherhood and IAF are examples of forces of an active civil society, it does not include the fulfillment of democracy, which would have included a government that responded to the will of its people. This is coherent with Meijer’s argument that civil society can be present in an Arab context without leading to democracy. On the other hand, it can be argued that the Muslim Brotherhood is not representing civil society, which contains a secular mind-­‐set and a support for democratic reform. Despite the demands from the Muslim Brotherhood concerning an internal reform in the hope of gaining a true parliamentary monarchy, which can be seen as a democratic reform, the Islamic belief and Muslim culture assure that they are not secular in ideology. In that way the imagining of the Muslim Brotherhood and IAF gaining political influence, could be argued as being a compromise between Islam and democracy. Again, their position for regarding this can be considered strong because of the regional support through the international Muslim Brotherhood community and not to forget the 65 financial resources they obtain. In contrast to this, the internal conflict between the hawks and the doves has earlier been brought up as an example of what could possible weaken the Muslim Brotherhoods profile. The fear for a strengthening of the hawks and the support for Hamas can be included as a postulate of not believing in a Muslim democracy. A prejudice concerning Muslim social movements is that their actions at times can be characterized as radical, which bring us to the next stereotype; The Salafi Movement is radical and a threat for democratization! They attack buildings, act violent and arm themselves in demonstrations they participate in. In that way their violent and radical disruptive way of mobilizing can be seen as the reason for why the Hashemite regime uses repression by not acknowledging them as a legal social movement and furthermore imprison some of the members. The Salafi Movement does not only protest against such hindrances, but has also been in dialogue with the regime, which can be seen as a more conventional approach. The fact that it resulted in emancipation of several prisoners could be argued as a positive result for the Salafis – this underlines that a collaboration with them as a social movement is possible. On the other hand, referring back to the above discussion of the Muslim Brotherhood, this strategy of concession and repression has continuously been practiced by the Hashemite regime. By responding to the different social movements’ demands by making some small changes, this assures the regime to keep the authoritarian power. For that reason it can be argued that it is necessary to act more determined in the aim of gaining influence in Jordan, like the Salafi Movement in fact does. Inspired by IA and according to the cultural context, the majority of the Jordanians believe in Islam and it can thereby be argued that the Salafi Movement is the only Muslim representative that tries to live up to the Islamic rules and Sharia law. Thereby it can be said that the Salafi movement is demanding an adherence of Islamic rules for the benefit of the Muslim people. A hindrance to this is the authoritarian rule whereas, as argued, it must be confronted, maybe even in the form of the Salafi belief in takfir, containing the right and duty to overthrow a kafir. Currently the Muslim Brotherhood can be considered as the strongest representative of Muslims in Jordan, which can be seen as a hindrance for the Salafi Movement to gain support from the population. Dealing with this, the Salafis have also been participating in the protests in the riots starting in 2010, which again could be argued as a less radical approach, normally 66 seen in an active civil society. Thereby the postulate concerning that the Salafi Movement’s actions performed by the Quietist, are contributing to a strong civil society, can be stressed. On the contrary, it can be brought up that the Salafi Movement via the jihadist approach does not live up to the substance of civil society such as being secular in ideology or supportive of a democratic reform. Critics of democratic transitions in the MENA region have at times stressed the prejudice that the populations in Middle Eastern societies actually want to follow the Qur’an and be living under an authoritarian rule. In that way the argument concerning a strong civil society without leading to democratization can be highlighted once again. But in strong contrast to this are the 2010 Jordanian riots where more equality and democratization have been demanded. In that way the Salafi Movement is put back in the light of being radical and a threat to the democratization in Jordan. Even more, the way the Hashemite regime responds to the Salafis by repressing them can be seen as a non-­‐tolerance towards radical and undemocratic approaches, which strengthen the hope for democratization. This leads us to the last stereotypical image; The Popular Mobilization is the answer to democratic processes in Jordan! They consist of thousands of participants demonstrating for more democratization and equality through non-­‐violent mobilization, they have a secular approach and are even willing to compromise with the Hashemite regime so that King Abdullah II can remain in his royal position. On the other hand, the Popular Mobilization is being repressed in the sense that the regime is not conceding their actual demands, and further the status of these movements have not been properly acknowledged. The Popular Mobilization is dealing with these hindrances by being disruptive through performances such as demonstrations, sit-­‐ins and organizing via social media platforms, which aligns with the common understanding that strengthening civil society promotes actual democratization. Another hindrance for the Popular Mobilization to gain influence could be seen their way of organizing that is considered as being too broad and in lack of structure. This critique concerns the Popular Mobilization as a united force, since they do not collaborate through an established political party as for example the IAF, nor do they propagate their claims through SMO’s such as the ICCS. A counterargument to this is brought up looking at the groups separately whereto the Labor Movement mobilizes through 67 unions and the Leftists via political parties such as the Communist party and the Ba´th parties. Considering the Youth Movement, it can be argued that the social media platforms such as Facebook and Twitter are sufficient compensations for formal institutions. This kind of mobilization could be seen as gathering more participants across ideology, religious beliefs and cultural backgrounds. This has previously been pointed out by Ryan whom underlines that the Jordanian uprisings unites different groups, such as the Jordan-­‐Palestinians and the East Bankers, which can be considered as a strength. The fact that the Popular Mobilization is very present in the debate, where they are pushing for equal rights, increased participation and against suppression of diversity is very related to the understanding of civil society and democratization concerning the eight criteria for democracy; such as free and fair elections, freedom of expression and alternative sources for information. This is not only emphasizing the argument that the demands are similar with the understanding of liberal democracy, but that it hopefully also bridges liberalization and democracy. The possibility for this has especially attracted foreign financial support, which could be seen as strengthening the ability to mobilize. In opposition it has been have pointed out how a consequence of foreign funding is seen when the secular oppositional movements, such as the Leftists, are being affiliated with groups inimically to Islamists, which strengthen the separation between them (Albrecht, 2010: 82). Thereby it can be seen as a force for the Popular Mobilization that they gain more international attention and solidarity, but the hindrance for this could be the challenging of their standpoints being changed. In continuation of this, there might be a limit of obtaining these so-­‐called western values since it can be questioned if the Popular Mobilization is even insisting on democratization as understood from a western perspective. After all, they only demand a reform and not an overthrow of the Hashemite authoritarian regime. In contrast to this is a reminder of the risk of having a too narrow definition of the concepts civil society and democracy. The Popular Mobilization may be an example of a social movement fighting for changes without letting ideology and religion being the foundation. A common tendency for social movements is the challenge of exhaustion as a result of personal costs and risks whereto it is a fact that the amount of participants and protests are declining. Since this also has been the case for the Popular Mobilization, it can be considered as a hindrance that limits the possible impact on democratic processes in Jordan. Thereby not completely denying the stereotype pointed out, as the Popular Mobilization being the answer to democratic processes in Jordan but as shown -­‐ there are several hindrances blocking the way to achieve this. 68 Through the discussion above we have answered the third working question concerning what hindrances there are for social mobilization in Jordan and how the different social movements are dealing with those obstacles. Furthermore we have addressed the research question, which in the following conclusion will be answered explicitly. CHAPTER 7 -­‐ CONCLUSION In the following chapter we will answer the research question; what impact do social movements have on democratization processes in Jordan? We will conclude and argue that the most highlighted social movements; the Muslim Brotherhood, the Salafi movement and the Popular Mobilization, all have different impacts on democratic processes in Jordan. Through the terms of the different theories, the most crucial in analyzing the Muslim Brotherhood is via RMT, IA followed by SMT since this social movement is seen as being resourceful and thereby it would have good chances of having an impact on the democratization processes. The applied theory shows; that the Muslim Brotherhood and the political party IAF via their organization in contentious politics are being contained; that their collective action consist of disruptive performances; that they have a stable relationship with the Hashemite monarchy; that they have a great financial funding; that they have support from the Jordanian population; that they are grounding their repertoires upon Muslim culture that they share with the majority of the Jordanians and lastly; that they are modular as the Muslim Brotherhood is a part of a bigger network. In that way we can conclude that the 69 Muslim Brotherhood is the Jordanian social movement that possess the strongest resources and the best organization structure and thereby via RMT considered as forceful. Through the terms of the different theories, the most crucial in analyzing the Salafi Movement is IA, RMT followed by SMT in the sense that they are strict believers of Islam but are scattered in their organization and do not get much support. Despite that they; at times institutionalize through religious forums; they are a radical informal force that mobilizes against ‘the attack on Islam’ and that; they are holders of disruptive and violent performances. In that way we can conclude that the Salafi Movement is the Jordanian social movement that is the most radical and thereby also a threat towards democratization processes. Thereby the Salafi Movement via IA mainly considered as an Islamic actor fighting for a narrow religious agenda with a limited focus upon resources and organization. Through the terms of the different theories, the most crucial in analyzing the Popular Mobilization is via SMT followed by RMT in the sense that even though the three movements are not strong in their combined organization, they posses resources for mobilizing through disruptive performances; signaling through their use of social media platforms as a forum to express freedom of speech; through their financial support from western organizations; through the democratic and inclusive culture upon which they base their repertoires and; through their force of uniting different groups. In that way we can conclude that the Popular Mobilization is the Jordanian social movement that, according to SMT and the understanding of civil society & liberal democracy is the most democratic actor concerning the values they are fighting for and their bottom-­‐up approach to reform. From the above stated, we can grasp an overall conclusion. According to the RMT and SMT, the Muslim Brotherhood should be the most influential social movement on democratic processes in Jordan. Which is strengthened by the analyses of them being the less repressed social movement of the Hashemite regime. Despite this, according to the understandings of civil society and democracy, it is the Popular Mobilization that can be concluded as the social movement in Jordan fighting the most for liberal democratic values and in that sense it is being the most potent movement to influence on democratic processes. In relation to this we can conclude that the Salafi Movement is rather a threat towards democratization. 70 CHAPTER 8 – FURTHER PERSPECTIVES In the following chapter we will bring up further perspectives concerning the aim to understand Arab uprising in relation to the used theoretical approaches and the understanding of democracy and civil society. The critique of SMT and RMT is formulated as being too attached to the western roots of origin whereto analyzing social movements in a Jordanian context it is more than relevant to bring in IA. This theoretical contribution challenges the understanding of democracy and civil society mostly concerning that a strong civil society should lead to democratization. In relation to this we want to point out the prejudice determined from a western context, arguing that the biggest hindrance for gaining democracy in Arab countries is being the presence of a strong Islamic belief. This is rooted in the narrow understanding of democracy as necessarily being secular. Thereto, an expanding of this understanding of democracy could be to believe in the opportunity of a Muslim democracy. Not necessarily agreeing with the stereotype saying that the Muslim Brotherhood is the answer to this. The belief of a Muslim democracy can be framed as a paradox, since the domination of one specific religion would undermine the beliefs in others. This is a crucial element in the liberal understanding of 71 democracy whereto the criteria freedom of expression is highly regarded. The highlight of this can be seen from the notion that a society will be more pluralistic by being secular instead of religious. These two kinds of societies include either to follow religious norms or so-­‐called democratic norms, not to forget that there can be high expectations to the different populations to fulfill the kinds of norms. In the continuation of this it can be questioned why it is even relevant to point out the different understandings of democracy and civil society. We consider this reflection in relation to the use of SMT and RMT whereto their western roots challenged understanding of social movements in Jordan. 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