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Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour 32:4 0021–8308 What’s in a Name? 451 What’s in a Name? An Examination of Social Identities JAMES WONG INTRODUCTION That social or group identities, categories by which individuals are classed and described, undergo change is obvious. But how do such categories change? This paper examines processes by which identities, such as national and sexual, transform. The first step is to investigate the nature of social categories. I argue that, unlike natural kinds, categories by which objects are classed in the natural sciences, social categories do not have fixed essences because of the heterogeneity of their constitutive elements. Furthermore, they are not static entities because of an intentional component as well as a recognitional component with identities. Not only do individuals identify or describe themselves in particular ways, such selfdescriptions must be recognized by others. I argue that recognition of one’s identity is necessary for one’s sense of self and that the harms of non- and misrecognition are on par with those caused by other injustices. Hence the importance of identity. However, once forged, we should not expect that the identity of any group is permanent. In reaction to how they are being categorized, members of a group can respond in ways such that the category by which individuals are described, their group identity, may change. Identities are, however, only potentially mutable, for alterations need not be realized nor always desirable. Before examining the character of social identities, it should be pointed out that the idea that identities are unstable resonates with much work on the subject in other disciplines. Some theorists, those in cultural studies for instance, take as a starting point that identities are unstable (Hall 1996, Seidman 1994). However, the mechanism by which identities become unstable at the level of individuals is not typically the focus of their discussions. For instance, Stuart Hall (1996), at various points, hints at the process by which group identities, such as nationalities, are contested. He writes that “instead of thinking of national cultures as unified, we should think of them as . . . a discursive device which represents difference as unity or identity” (italics original, Hall 1996, 617), and that “globalization does have © The Executive Executive Management Management Committee/Blackwell Committee/Blackwell Publishers Publishers Ltd. Ltd.2002. 2002 Published by Blackwell Publishers, 108 Cowley Road, Oxford, OX4 1JF UK and 350 Main Street, Malden, MA 02148, USA. JTSB3204C05 451 10/30/02, 1:43 PM 452 James Wong the effect of contesting and dislocating the centered and closed identities of a national culture. It does have a pluralizing impact on identities, producing a variety of possibilities and new positions identification, and making identities more positional, more political, more plural and diverse; less fixed, unified or trans-historical” (italics original, Hall 1996, 628). Notice that Hall’s insights about group identity focus on their status as discursive entities, one level up, as it were, from individuals and their behaviour. Steven Seidman’s analysis is closer to the argument presented in this paper. He tells us, for example, that “the meaning of signs, including the significations, of women and men, are always unstable, multivocal and subject to contestation. Since individuals are positioned differently with respect to the multiple axes (gender, class, race, sexuality) of social hierarchy, the meaning of gender will vary and exhibit a surplus of meanings” (Seidman 1994, 246). Seidman, however, does not examine in particular the mechanism by which the surplus of meanings of a particular identity or an individual’s position within the category, gender in this case, leads to the instability of that category. In this paper, I will present an account of the process by which certain categories, or kinds, may transform. THE CHARACTER OF SOCIAL IDENTITIES Many of us think of ourselves as an X or Y or Z, where X, Y and Z are collective, or social, identities. What, then, are the features of social identities? Perhaps, as a consequence of the success of the natural sciences studying “natural kinds”, categories for things studied by those sciences, such as atoms, planets and even mud, the term “identity” may suggest to some a kind of carved-in-stone permanence. For example, we now know that any atom with just one electron and one proton is hydrogen, and that atom will always be a hydrogen atom so long as it has the characteristics outlined in our current theories about atomic structure. Perhaps, there are permanent kinds with respect to groups of individuals as well. But does the static conception of natural kinds apply to social categories? Although we imagine many such groupings, such as a Canadian-identity or a gay-identity as having immutable essences, in fact these categories are hybrid and transitional (Zack 1999, 6). Take the category “Canadian”. This category, theoretically, includes women and men; native-born and immigrant; employed, unemployed and under-employed; White, Black, Chinese, Asian, Native and many more. In practice, of course, the category is not nearly so inclusive. Members of visible minorities who are born in Canada may still on occasion get asked, but where are you from really? It would appear that for some Canadians, it is not possible for such individuals to have been born in Canada, to be Canadians really. The point that I want to make, however, is that given the multiple intersections in social categories, such as “Canadian”, “academic” and so on, these groupings can change. For instance, national and cultural identities change owing to © The Executive Management Committee/Blackwell Publishers Ltd. 2002 JTSB3204C05 452 10/30/02, 1:43 PM What’s in a Name? 453 immigration, inter-marriage, demographic shifts and other mechanisms. Criteria defining these categories are forged by various stakeholders, and such criteria can, in principle, change. There are no essences, no Platonic forms, defining such categories with which individuals identify and/or by which they are classed. Perhaps “race” and “sex” can be thought of as having essential properties like hydrogen. We should note, however, that “race” is not a scientific category (Hall 1996, 617). Of course, that has not stopped individuals from linking race with science illegitimately. The claim that “race” is not a scientific category, however, does not gainsay that it is an important moral category, especially in light of past and present injustices suffered by some groups.1 Nonetheless, genetic differences, like that for skin colour cannot be used to distinguish one group of individuals from another, as there is as much genetic diversity within each “race” as between different “races”. To put the matter slightly differently, there is as much genetic similarity between “races” as within each “race”. Recent studies of mitochondrial DNA by population geneticists suggest that there is tremendous similarity in genetic material among human populations.2 In the case of “sex”, a person’s genotype is not sufficient to determine one’s sex, as the case of transsexuals has made plain. So, even in the case of “race” and “sex”, one can argue that they do not have essences; that they are unlike natural kinds. Notice though, I am only claiming that social identities are not like Platonic forms, not that there is no such thing as identities or that identities are unimportant. THE IMPORTANCE OF IDENTITY But why are identities important? Why do individuals struggle to establish and affirm their identities? Charles Taylor tells us that recognition by others of the person one is, is central to having a meaningful life for that person ( Taylor 1992, 32).3 As an illustration of the importance of recognition, consider the following. A person can imagine herself to be an equal of others, but without due acknowledgment by others as such, that person will constantly run up against the disagreeing looks and glances, disapproving words and deeds of others, and will end up recognizing that she is not the equal of others, at least not yet.4 As a consequence, that individual will lead a frustrated and devalued life. Frantz Fanon articulated this clearly in describing his interactions with whites, [When] I had to meet the white man’s eyes . . . an unfamiliar weight burdened me. The real world challenged my claims. . . . Negroes are savages, brutes, illiterates. . . . I was walled in: no exception was made for . . . my knowledge of literature or my understanding of quantum theory (Fanon 1967, 110, 117). Walled in: one can sense the frustration and anger in Fanon. His life was less meaningful because of the lack of due recognition of who he is, a black person © The Executive Management Committee/Blackwell Publishers Ltd. 2002 JTSB3204C05 453 10/30/02, 1:43 PM 454 James Wong equal to others. Such was, and still is, the case for blacks and other visible minorities. Imagine the damage done to the individuals of a group when they are considered not to be fully civilized, as the Native peoples of North America were by European and other settlers (Taylor 1992, 26). The above account of the importance of recognition for one’s sense of self does not entail that such recognition is easily granted. Indeed, it is often gained only through struggle and resistance. Think of the struggle by women, gays and lesbians, the disabled and other groups to have their voices heard. Indeed, the struggle for recognition by diverse groups, as Nancy Fraser observes, has dominated late twentieth-century political conflicts and may well have supplanted earlier struggles for social justice in perceived importance (Fraser 1997, 11). Today, groups, under banners of nationality, ethnicity and race, gender and sexuality, disability and many more, are contesting various forms of domination manifested in the grammar of representation and social practices in mainstream culture. The development of such trends underscores the importance of recognition: one’s identity, be it individual or collective, needs to be recognized, and individuals are willing to struggle to affirm that identity. The importance of recognition of one’s identity by others is further supported by considering the conditions under which individuals can pursue a good life. Will Kymlicka (1989) argues that contemporary liberal societies ought to recognize and support individuals’ identities, including their membership in minority cultures. Without such acknowledgment, individuals will not be able to pursue projects that are constitutive of a good life for them. Liberal theorists maintain that a good life is one in which an individual be allowed to pursue various projects which are of value to them, but without infringing on the liberty of others. The background beliefs informing these projects give meaning to their lives. They are an integral part of a person’s identity, and are constitutive of the person’s sense of “self-respect” (Kymlicka 1989, 163). A key source of such beliefs is the culture(s) or communit(ies) in which a person is located. But, imagine a situation in which what a person considers to be important, a key component of her identity, is not acknowledged in the cultural and institutional structure of the society in which she finds herself. It is likely that the person would feel diminished. Following John Rawls, Kymlicka lists “self-respect” as one of the primary goods necessary for the pursuit of a good life by individuals, such as basic material needs as well as some natural abilities (Kymlicka 1989, 62). Without a sense of self-respect, then, it would not be possible for individuals to pursue a good life. Hence, the importance of an individual’s identity, including his or her membership in a minority group. As Charles Taylor reminds us, nonrecognition or misrecognition [of a person’s identity] can inflict harm, can be a form of oppression, imprisoning someone in a false, distorted, and reduced mode of being. . . . [Non- or misrecognition] shows not just a lack of due respect. It can inflict a grievous wound, saddling its victims with a crippling self-hatred. Due recognition is not just a courtesy we owe people. It is a vital need (Taylor 1992, 25–26). © The Executive Management Committee/Blackwell Publishers Ltd. 2002 JTSB3204C05 454 10/30/02, 1:43 PM What’s in a Name? 455 Harms stemming from non- or misrecognition are every bit as serious as other forms of injustices, such as the familiar ones that are rooted in a person’s or group’s socio-economic status (Fraser 1997). Without such due recognition of one’s identity, a person’s self-worth would be diminished, as the Fanon passage and other real life examples illustrate. IDENTITY AND IDENTIFICATION I have suggested earlier that categories describing groups of persons are vulnerable to large-scale developments, such as immigration. I want to focus on the mechanism by which such collective identities can, in principle, change. Although we think of ourselves as an X or a Y or a Z, we are only speaking metaphorically. Group, or social, identity is not inherently a part of the person. Identity isn’t predetermined like the colour of our eyes, hair and skin; it involves an intentional element. Individuals identify with a group (Williams 1995, 8–9). The category under which a person is classed and that individual are analytically separate. Should the various practices and other cultural and institutional supports—captured in the idea of a “form of life”—needed to sustain that group identity be destroyed, the person would not cease to exist, although she or he will feel a loss (ibid.). As an additional illustration, one can choose to be totally identified by the group to which one subscribes; but, equally, one can choose otherwise. A person can choose to identify herself with a particular national identity, but again she can distance herself somewhat (or entirely) from such an identity. Even in identifying herself totally with a particular identity, it is nonetheless that person’s choice. She could have just as easily resisted the category attributed to her by others. Take, for instance, the efforts of gays and lesbians to resist the characterization of themselves by straights and to seize control of the category “gay/lesbian” for themselves, which they have to a significant extent. The discussion here is connected to the earlier examination of the importance of recognition. Individuals choose to identify themselves with a particular group identity because they sees themselves reflected in that category. They resist being thus categorized because they do not see themselves, their identity, recognized by that category. Peter Berger and Thomas Luckmann made a similar point in their pathbreaking work, The Social Construction of Reality (1966). They argued for a distinction between a person’s “identity” and the identity-type (Berger and Luckmann 1966, 174). According to them, there is “slack” between an individual’s perception of the group of which she is a member, her “identity”, and the general conception of that group, what Berger and Luckmann called the “identity-type”, which are generated by “specific historical social structures” (ibid.). They use the distinction between “identity” and “identity-type” to examine the dialectic between subjective understanding and the social aspects of reality, which are beyond the person’s © The Executive Management Committee/Blackwell Publishers Ltd. 2002 JTSB3204C05 455 10/30/02, 1:43 PM 456 James Wong control. Such interplay allows for changes in the individual as well as the group and the society in which the person is situated. The notion of resistance described above, however, is circumscribed. Suppose a person resists being categorized as myopic. She is resisting, perhaps, some of the extra-logical connotations of being near-sighted. But that individual can’t deny the fact that she needs corrective lenses in order to see as well as some other people do. She can try to deny that, but she will run up against the reality that she will need glasses fairly quickly. The constraints need not be just biological, however. A person growing up in England’s Midlands district would likely speak with an accent characteristic of that region. If later on, that person were to resist being categorized as “English”, or even “British”, she would still speak with that distinctive accent, unless she takes lessons to eliminate it. The key point is that resistance, or for that matter acceptance of a particular category, as in the case of Canadians who are from visible minority groups, takes place against the background of a certain facticity about the individual; and the person involved can alter only some of those characteristics. The considerations above of the intentional component of identity provide an argument against those who claim that social categories have “priority” in matters of identity. Roger Scruton writes, the condition of man requires that the individual, while he exists and acts as an autonomous being, does so only because he can first identify himself as something greater—as a member of a society, group, class, state or nation, of some arrangement to which he may not attach a name, but he recognizes as a home (italics added, Scruton 1986, 156 cited in Hall 1996, 612). The suggestion here is that a person isn’t whole unless she is first a member of a group. Hence, collective or social identity has priority over a person’s sense of self. Further, since group identity has such priority, changes to that identity are unlikely, because the person is supposed to feel at home with that identity. There will be strong resistance to any changes to that identity for that would mean major dislocation. The discussion thus far suggests that we needn’t go so far as Scruton to acknowledge one’s membership in a group is important for a person’s identity. Further, if the discussion on the intentional component with identities is right, then social identities are potentially much more unstable than the priority of identity position suggests. IMPLICATIONS: LOOPING EFFECTS Since identification with a category requires a conscious effort by the individual to identify herself with it, there is the potential that an individual may disagree with the category under which she or he might be classed.5 This is in contrast to “natural kinds”. Ian Hacking calls categories by which people are classed, “human kinds,”6 and points out that they differ from natural kinds in at least one © The Executive Management Committee/Blackwell Publishers Ltd. 2002 JTSB3204C05 456 10/30/02, 1:43 PM What’s in a Name? 457 important respect. Take carbon dioxide. It is as good a candidate for being a natural kind as anything we might imagine. It is also obviously the case that it makes no difference to carbon dioxide what anyone thinks of it. Carbon dioxide molecules don’t care if we hold them personally responsible for, say, the greenhouse effect. Yet, how people are classified may have a tremendous impact on them. Furthermore, the difference it makes to those classified in a particular way may bring about a change in that classification. Because individuals can act in response to how they are being classified, human kinds may thus exhibit a feedback cycle that natural kinds may not.7 Hacking (1994) calls this cycle—in which a classification affects those classified and their response in turn brings about a change in the classification—a “looping effect.”8 To focus our thinking about looping effects, consider the category “homosexual”. Homosexuals, as a kind of person, may seem to have been with us always. But as Michel Foucault and others have argued, while there has always been same-sex sexual activity, the idea of homosexuals as a kind of person with a distinctive set of properties only emerged in the nineteenth century, thanks to the proliferation of discourses by various self-styled experts on sexuality. Only then did the homosexual become a “relevant” kind, often portrayed as deviant and abnormal. Foucault tells us, as defined by ancient civil or canonical codes, sodomy was a category of forbidden acts; their perpetrator was nothing more than the juridical subject of them. The nineteenth-century homosexual became a personage . . . a type of life, a life form, and a morphology, with an indiscreet anatomy and possibly a mysterious physiology. . . . The sodomite had been a temporary aberration; the homosexual was now a species (Foucault 1979, 43). Foucault’s historical claims are not uncontroversial, but, regardless of one’s position on when the kind “homosexual” originated, we should at least be able to agree that it has undergone further alterations. This has occurred, at least in part, as a consequence of looping effects. Those classified as homosexual (and so as deviant and immoral) rebelled against this categorization. They have succeeded for the most part in taking control of the category “homosexual” for themselves. Indeed, instead of “homosexual”, they are now “gay” or “lesbian” or “queer”. As a result of their struggles, the way in which individuals involved in same-sex relationships are classified has undergone a shift, from a derogatory term “homosexual” to terms such as “gay” and “lesbian” that have positive value for those classified and which have general acceptance by the mainstream. Without doubt, the kind, “homosexual”, is a category imposed by others. The categories “gay” and “lesbian”, however, would seem to have been adopted autonomously by the gay and lesbian community itself. Furthermore, the new classifications take on a dimension that was not present in the old one, namely a political one. Identifying oneself as gay or lesbian is often seen now as a political act. I am oversimplifying here. The change in public discourse did not take place overnight. For example, just as the media initially resisted accepting the category © The Executive Management Committee/Blackwell Publishers Ltd. 2002 JTSB3204C05 457 10/30/02, 1:43 PM 458 James Wong “black” or “African-American” used by blacks themselves, sticking instead to terms such as “Negro” or “Coloured”, the use of the term “homosexual” in the media persisted for some time as well and has not entirely dropped out of popular use. Furthermore, “homosexual” isn’t a term that has an exclusively negative connotation. Similarly, “gay” and “lesbian” can be used as terms of abuse. My point is simply that there has been a shift in the classificatory terms generally used and in the way people belonging to these groupings are typically presented. The kind, “homosexual”, has thus completed one loop. That need not be the end of the story, however. Looping of the categories “gay” and “lesbian” may still be possible, as suggested in a recent Canadian example chronicled in The Globe & Mail, a Canadian newspaper. The story describes a number of young women who engage in same-sex relationships, but who do not connect their sexual activity with the politics of sexual identity. They see their sexual activity as independent of the category of “lesbian”. One woman tells us that the gaystraight dichotomy is to be dropped. “Women,” she says, “don’t have to assume a radical political struggle just because they want to have sex with another woman.” Another woman tells us that, “I sleep with women, women I’m attracted to . . . and I sleep with men I find attractive. I don’t stay up at night thinking about whether I’m bisexual or anything else. . . . I think we’re past the politics of that” (Nolan 1999). Such an attitude about sexual relations is supported by some lesbians and gays. For them, this is the result of the gay revolution: men and women have control over their sexuality. The goal, according to one gay activist, is for women and men to “own and experience their sexuality” (ibid.) For others, however, this is just one more instance of heterosexual encroachment, one more instance of gay chic. They take offense to the idea that they might just be part of some “breeder voyeur’s” experiment. Such comments suggest a tension in standard notions of “gay” and “lesbian” and the newer notion of being “queer” within the gay and lesbian community. Why do I say “suggest” only? Because the comments are taken from one case. It would be foolhardy to claim at this point that the categories of gay and lesbian have been displaced by the category “queer”, but a strain is present.9 For some lesbians and gays, these young women are part of the same movement (the gay revolution) to which they belong. For others, however, the young women are “outsiders”. Not only are these young women not part of the struggle against the dominant ideologies of sexuality and gender by gays and lesbians, their actions frustrate such struggles. But it is the ambiguity of the position of these young women which poses a challenge to the idea of “lesbian” itself. The actions of these young women may yet lead to a new more inclusive conceptual terrain. Their action may prompt changes to both the category of “queer” and the category of “lesbian” itself. As The Globe & Mail article suggests, these young women have the support of some lesbians already. Their action may spur other lesbians to revisit the issue of sexual identity, and what it means to be a person whose sexuality is anything but mainstream, including the gay and lesbian mainstream. There is, © The Executive Management Committee/Blackwell Publishers Ltd. 2002 JTSB3204C05 458 10/30/02, 1:43 PM What’s in a Name? 459 then, at least the possibility that the behaviour of these young women and their supporters will help bring about further transformations to the category. For the transformation to take hold, however, the power relations that undergird the categories of “gay”, “lesbian”, “queer” and “straight” will have to be configured anew. I don’t want to overstate the point here. Such behaviour may or may not lead to a change in the category under consideration. Not every attempt at a loop succeeds. The point, however, is that an important element in this potential transformation is the dialectical relation between individuals and the category by which they are classed/described. The transformation, if it occurs, will occur, in part, as a result of a looping effect. In principle, this is an on-going process. So, we shouldn’t think that a particular identity would not continue to change. MECHANISM OF CHANGE The example presented above may shed light on the processes by which groups undergo self-differentiation. Although groups and group identities are different concepts, they are not unrelated. Groups pertain to communities; identities are categories by which individuals within groups are classified. The process by which group identities change is likely implicated in the dynamics by which such groups self-differentiate. In a recent article, Ermano Bencivenga proposes a provocative thesis about self-differentiation within a group. He contends that such self-differentiation is inevitable. Self-differentiation, he says, “is not an accident; it is a destiny” (Bencivenga 1998, 220). Bencivenga arrives at this conclusion by challenging the assumption behind the view that discriminatory behaviour, “the shifting into an ingroup/outgroup mode” (Bencivenga 1998, 218), is caused by an outside influence. Such a position is supported by a “static” conception of groups and their identities. On the static view, groups are categorized by genus and differentia. Once identified, groups and their identities are fixed. “They are what they are, period.” (Bencivenga 1998, 219). If individuals making up the group have no prior conflicting interests, then any antagonism that shows up must be introduced external to the group. Without such outside influence, discriminatory behaviour within the group would not otherwise have taken place. Bencivenga contests the static conception of groups, and offers an alternate, “dialectical”, conception: Social agents and groups consisting of them are evolving structures, specifically structures that constantly and autonomously come into conflict within themselves. If left alone, they will not stay put (as the [static view] would have it): they will fall apart (Bencivenga 1998, 219). He remarks that, © The Executive Management Committee/Blackwell Publishers Ltd. 2002 JTSB3204C05 459 10/30/02, 1:43 PM 460 James Wong precisely because [individuals] know each other well and are willing to cooperate (because they form a coherent group), they will necessarily come apart—their one group will necessarily fragment into conflicting ones. And the routine engineered . . . to “establish” intergroup dynamics will be used by them as an occasion—an excuse—to realize this self-differentiation vocation (italics original, Bencivenga 1998, 220). If Bencivenga’s claim about the dialectical conception of groups is right, then self-differentiation is not only inevitable, but also will not require external input. They are mere excuses, and differentiation of the group will take place by itself regardless. It should be pointed out that how the process of self-differentiation itself is initiated isn’t clear on Bencivenga’s account. He does not speak to this issue directly in the article. Nonetheless, it is fair to say that, for him, the mechanism of change is strongly internal. By “internal”, I mean within the group itself. However, Bencivenga’s internalist position is difficult to maintain. A closer analysis of the example of the debates about the category “lesbian” tells us why. The young women in the example occupy an ambiguous position in the gay and lesbian community. Some view them as outsiders; others as fellow travelers of the same movement. It isn’t clear that these young women are straightforwardly members of the gay and lesbian community. Nonetheless, their behaviour have sparked a debate between groups of individuals in the gay and lesbian community on “lesbian” and other categories. The political process initiated was not entirely generated within the gay and lesbian community itself, however. It was a response to the behaviour of those young women in the example by individuals in the community who consider them outsiders and others who accord them some recognition that launched the feedback mechanism, which may or may not succeed ultimately. It could be a passing occurrence. Nonetheless, the feedback mechanism by which possible change to the category “lesbian” takes place is, on this account, more complex than the internalist position suggested by Bencivenga. That change to social categories in some cases involves external input is further supported by the observation that categories describing communities are susceptible to change owing to immigration, which is an external intervention. Recall that Stuart Hall tells us that globalization has the effect of dislocating the identity of a culture (Hall 1996, 628). As the composition of the community changes, the identity of that group may change because individuals may not identify themselves as a member of the original classification. They may work together in a constructive politics to change the group’s identity, or different groups may establish their own identities. Consider the choice by individuals from various ethnic minority groups in Canada to identify themselves as hyphenated-Canadians, rather than Canadians. Alternatively, they may choose to identify themselves as unhyphenated-Canadian. They don’t want to be Chinese-Canadian, or French-Canadian, or Irish-Canadian. They just think of themselves as Canadian. Regardless of which possibility, hyphenated or not, the process by which identities in both cases are established, if successful, requires both external and internal contributions. © The Executive Management Committee/Blackwell Publishers Ltd. 2002 JTSB3204C05 460 10/30/02, 1:43 PM What’s in a Name? 461 The two examples above of potential looping suggest that an internalist account of self-differentiation is incomplete. They do not, however, demonstrate that self-differentiation within a group cannot take place without external input. That discussion is beyond the scope of this paper. But they do show that the process in some cases involve both external and internal developments. CONCLUDING THOUGHTS In this paper, I argued that social identities require both an intentional and recognitional component. Because individuals identify themselves with a particular category, identities themselves are susceptible to change via the feedback mechanism of looping. Of course, such choices take place against a background of interests and power, which play out in multiple ways. Again, consider the choice by individuals from various ethnic minority groups in Canada to be identified as unhyphenated-Canadians. Whatever one thinks of such identification, these cases certainly occur. Power pervades the articulation of an identity in such cases. It permeates not only the interactions between individuals from minority groups with the dominant culture, but also those between individuals within the particular groups themselves. The complexities of the power relations, and their reverberations, in such cases are unique, and a discussion of these issues will have to wait for another occasion. But clearly, choosing to be identified as a Canadian, or some other category, does not guarantee that being recognized as such is successful. To succeed it would appear that the category is generally acceptable to the community. Members of extremist groups would no doubt want to change the way their category is conceived, but this is unlikely to take place, as very few individuals would accept their views. But with gays and lesbians, at a certain time, the larger community was ready to accept that their lives have positive value, so looping in the category “homosexual” was made possible. Moreover, looping need not succeed on exactly the terms envisaged by a particular group. The larger community may accept only some changes. The examination of looping effects highlights the possibility, and the difficulties, of change, issues central to questions about identity. If the position advanced in this paper is correct, then we can better understand the transformation of social identities.10 James Wong, PhD Department of Communication Studies Wilfrid Laurier University Waterloo, Ontario Canada N2L 3C5 [email protected] © The Executive Management Committee/Blackwell Publishers Ltd. 2002 JTSB3204C05 461 10/30/02, 1:43 PM 462 James Wong NOTES 1 See Sundstrom 2002. Douglas Wallace, who heads a team of researchers at the Emory University School of Medicine, tells us that “what I have found astounding is that [the research] clearly shows we are all one human family. The phylogeny in African goes back to the origins of our species, but the fingers of L3 [technically called “halogroups”] are touching Europe and Asia, saying that we are all closely related” (Wade 2000). 3 G.W.F. Hegel argued in the Master-Slave dialectic section of The Phenomenology of Spirit that self-consciousness, or awareness of oneself as a subject or person, required others recognize that one is, like them, a person. For an analysis of the master-slave dialectic, see Taylor 1975, 148–157. 4 I say “not yet” because in Hegel’s dialectical scheme, it is from the “slave” pole that full self-consciousness emerges, which include stages of armed struggle (Taylor 1975). 5 I am indebted to Andrew Latus for the following discussion on looping effects. 6 Hacking used the term “human kind” to contrast with natural kinds, but has more recently taken to use the term “interactive kinds” instead to emphasize the kind of interaction as a consequence of self-conscious knowledge. (Hacking 1999, 103–108). The earlier terminology of “human kinds” is, however, adequate for the purposes of this paper. 7 Or, at least, that non-conscious natural kinds may not. But can’t individual members of a natural kind exhibit an unexpected property and in this way cause us to change the way we think about the kind? Of course. But, unless members of the kind we are concerned with are conscious, they can’t do so by acting in response to the way they are classified. No action, no loop. 8 Notice that the idea of “looping” goes beyond the common observation that how we classify people may affect the way they act. To complete the loop the change in behavior must result in a change in the way the classification is conceived. 9 For an account of the strain in the case of “gay”, see Archer 1999. 10 I would like to thank Andrew Latus, Brad Inwood and two referees for the journal for their comments on an earlier version of the paper. 2 REFERENCES A, B. (1999). The End of Gay (and the death of heterosexuality). Toronto: Doubleday. B, E. (1998). Discrimination from Within. Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour, 28 (3): 217–221. B, P.L. and L, T. (1966). 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