Download What`s in a Name? An Examination of Social Identities

Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour 32:4
0021–8308
What’s in a Name?
451
What’s in a Name? An Examination of
Social Identities
JAMES WONG
INTRODUCTION
That social or group identities, categories by which individuals are classed and
described, undergo change is obvious. But how do such categories change? This
paper examines processes by which identities, such as national and sexual, transform. The first step is to investigate the nature of social categories. I argue that,
unlike natural kinds, categories by which objects are classed in the natural sciences,
social categories do not have fixed essences because of the heterogeneity of their
constitutive elements. Furthermore, they are not static entities because of an
intentional component as well as a recognitional component with identities. Not
only do individuals identify or describe themselves in particular ways, such selfdescriptions must be recognized by others. I argue that recognition of one’s
identity is necessary for one’s sense of self and that the harms of non- and misrecognition are on par with those caused by other injustices. Hence the importance
of identity. However, once forged, we should not expect that the identity of any
group is permanent. In reaction to how they are being categorized, members of
a group can respond in ways such that the category by which individuals are
described, their group identity, may change. Identities are, however, only potentially mutable, for alterations need not be realized nor always desirable.
Before examining the character of social identities, it should be pointed out
that the idea that identities are unstable resonates with much work on the subject
in other disciplines. Some theorists, those in cultural studies for instance, take as
a starting point that identities are unstable (Hall 1996, Seidman 1994). However,
the mechanism by which identities become unstable at the level of individuals is not
typically the focus of their discussions. For instance, Stuart Hall (1996), at various
points, hints at the process by which group identities, such as nationalities, are
contested. He writes that “instead of thinking of national cultures as unified, we
should think of them as . . . a discursive device which represents difference as unity
or identity” (italics original, Hall 1996, 617), and that “globalization does have
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the effect of contesting and dislocating the centered and closed identities of a
national culture. It does have a pluralizing impact on identities, producing a
variety of possibilities and new positions identification, and making identities
more positional, more political, more plural and diverse; less fixed, unified or
trans-historical” (italics original, Hall 1996, 628). Notice that Hall’s insights about
group identity focus on their status as discursive entities, one level up, as it were,
from individuals and their behaviour. Steven Seidman’s analysis is closer to the
argument presented in this paper. He tells us, for example, that “the meaning
of signs, including the significations, of women and men, are always unstable,
multivocal and subject to contestation. Since individuals are positioned differently with respect to the multiple axes (gender, class, race, sexuality) of social
hierarchy, the meaning of gender will vary and exhibit a surplus of meanings”
(Seidman 1994, 246). Seidman, however, does not examine in particular the
mechanism by which the surplus of meanings of a particular identity or an
individual’s position within the category, gender in this case, leads to the instability of that category. In this paper, I will present an account of the process by
which certain categories, or kinds, may transform.
THE CHARACTER OF SOCIAL IDENTITIES
Many of us think of ourselves as an X or Y or Z, where X, Y and Z are
collective, or social, identities. What, then, are the features of social identities?
Perhaps, as a consequence of the success of the natural sciences studying “natural
kinds”, categories for things studied by those sciences, such as atoms, planets and
even mud, the term “identity” may suggest to some a kind of carved-in-stone
permanence. For example, we now know that any atom with just one electron and
one proton is hydrogen, and that atom will always be a hydrogen atom so long as
it has the characteristics outlined in our current theories about atomic structure.
Perhaps, there are permanent kinds with respect to groups of individuals as well.
But does the static conception of natural kinds apply to social categories?
Although we imagine many such groupings, such as a Canadian-identity or a
gay-identity as having immutable essences, in fact these categories are hybrid
and transitional (Zack 1999, 6). Take the category “Canadian”. This category,
theoretically, includes women and men; native-born and immigrant; employed,
unemployed and under-employed; White, Black, Chinese, Asian, Native and
many more. In practice, of course, the category is not nearly so inclusive. Members
of visible minorities who are born in Canada may still on occasion get asked, but
where are you from really? It would appear that for some Canadians, it is not
possible for such individuals to have been born in Canada, to be Canadians
really. The point that I want to make, however, is that given the multiple intersections in social categories, such as “Canadian”, “academic” and so on, these groupings can change. For instance, national and cultural identities change owing to
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immigration, inter-marriage, demographic shifts and other mechanisms. Criteria
defining these categories are forged by various stakeholders, and such criteria
can, in principle, change. There are no essences, no Platonic forms, defining
such categories with which individuals identify and/or by which they are classed.
Perhaps “race” and “sex” can be thought of as having essential properties like
hydrogen. We should note, however, that “race” is not a scientific category (Hall
1996, 617). Of course, that has not stopped individuals from linking race with
science illegitimately. The claim that “race” is not a scientific category, however,
does not gainsay that it is an important moral category, especially in light of past
and present injustices suffered by some groups.1 Nonetheless, genetic differences,
like that for skin colour cannot be used to distinguish one group of individuals
from another, as there is as much genetic diversity within each “race” as between
different “races”. To put the matter slightly differently, there is as much genetic
similarity between “races” as within each “race”. Recent studies of mitochondrial
DNA by population geneticists suggest that there is tremendous similarity in
genetic material among human populations.2 In the case of “sex”, a person’s
genotype is not sufficient to determine one’s sex, as the case of transsexuals has
made plain. So, even in the case of “race” and “sex”, one can argue that they do
not have essences; that they are unlike natural kinds. Notice though, I am only
claiming that social identities are not like Platonic forms, not that there is no
such thing as identities or that identities are unimportant.
THE IMPORTANCE OF IDENTITY
But why are identities important? Why do individuals struggle to establish and
affirm their identities? Charles Taylor tells us that recognition by others of the
person one is, is central to having a meaningful life for that person ( Taylor 1992,
32).3 As an illustration of the importance of recognition, consider the following.
A person can imagine herself to be an equal of others, but without due acknowledgment by others as such, that person will constantly run up against the disagreeing looks and glances, disapproving words and deeds of others, and will end
up recognizing that she is not the equal of others, at least not yet.4 As a consequence, that individual will lead a frustrated and devalued life. Frantz Fanon
articulated this clearly in describing his interactions with whites,
[When] I had to meet the white man’s eyes . . . an unfamiliar weight burdened me. The real
world challenged my claims. . . . Negroes are savages, brutes, illiterates. . . . I was walled in: no
exception was made for . . . my knowledge of literature or my understanding of quantum
theory (Fanon 1967, 110, 117).
Walled in: one can sense the frustration and anger in Fanon. His life was less
meaningful because of the lack of due recognition of who he is, a black person
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equal to others. Such was, and still is, the case for blacks and other visible minorities. Imagine the damage done to the individuals of a group when they are
considered not to be fully civilized, as the Native peoples of North America were
by European and other settlers (Taylor 1992, 26).
The above account of the importance of recognition for one’s sense of self
does not entail that such recognition is easily granted. Indeed, it is often gained
only through struggle and resistance. Think of the struggle by women, gays and
lesbians, the disabled and other groups to have their voices heard. Indeed, the
struggle for recognition by diverse groups, as Nancy Fraser observes, has dominated late twentieth-century political conflicts and may well have supplanted
earlier struggles for social justice in perceived importance (Fraser 1997, 11).
Today, groups, under banners of nationality, ethnicity and race, gender and
sexuality, disability and many more, are contesting various forms of domination
manifested in the grammar of representation and social practices in mainstream
culture. The development of such trends underscores the importance of recognition: one’s identity, be it individual or collective, needs to be recognized, and
individuals are willing to struggle to affirm that identity.
The importance of recognition of one’s identity by others is further supported
by considering the conditions under which individuals can pursue a good life.
Will Kymlicka (1989) argues that contemporary liberal societies ought to recognize
and support individuals’ identities, including their membership in minority
cultures. Without such acknowledgment, individuals will not be able to pursue
projects that are constitutive of a good life for them. Liberal theorists maintain
that a good life is one in which an individual be allowed to pursue various
projects which are of value to them, but without infringing on the liberty of
others. The background beliefs informing these projects give meaning to their
lives. They are an integral part of a person’s identity, and are constitutive of the
person’s sense of “self-respect” (Kymlicka 1989, 163). A key source of such beliefs
is the culture(s) or communit(ies) in which a person is located. But, imagine a
situation in which what a person considers to be important, a key component of
her identity, is not acknowledged in the cultural and institutional structure of the
society in which she finds herself. It is likely that the person would feel diminished. Following John Rawls, Kymlicka lists “self-respect” as one of the primary
goods necessary for the pursuit of a good life by individuals, such as basic
material needs as well as some natural abilities (Kymlicka 1989, 62). Without a
sense of self-respect, then, it would not be possible for individuals to pursue a
good life. Hence, the importance of an individual’s identity, including his or her
membership in a minority group. As Charles Taylor reminds us,
nonrecognition or misrecognition [of a person’s identity] can inflict harm, can be a form
of oppression, imprisoning someone in a false, distorted, and reduced mode of being. . . .
[Non- or misrecognition] shows not just a lack of due respect. It can inflict a grievous wound,
saddling its victims with a crippling self-hatred. Due recognition is not just a courtesy we owe
people. It is a vital need (Taylor 1992, 25–26).
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Harms stemming from non- or misrecognition are every bit as serious as other
forms of injustices, such as the familiar ones that are rooted in a person’s or
group’s socio-economic status (Fraser 1997). Without such due recognition of
one’s identity, a person’s self-worth would be diminished, as the Fanon passage
and other real life examples illustrate.
IDENTITY AND IDENTIFICATION
I have suggested earlier that categories describing groups of persons are
vulnerable to large-scale developments, such as immigration. I want to focus on
the mechanism by which such collective identities can, in principle, change.
Although we think of ourselves as an X or a Y or a Z, we are only speaking
metaphorically. Group, or social, identity is not inherently a part of the person.
Identity isn’t predetermined like the colour of our eyes, hair and skin; it involves
an intentional element. Individuals identify with a group (Williams 1995, 8–9).
The category under which a person is classed and that individual are analytically
separate. Should the various practices and other cultural and institutional
supports—captured in the idea of a “form of life”—needed to sustain that group
identity be destroyed, the person would not cease to exist, although she or he will
feel a loss (ibid.).
As an additional illustration, one can choose to be totally identified by the
group to which one subscribes; but, equally, one can choose otherwise. A person
can choose to identify herself with a particular national identity, but again she
can distance herself somewhat (or entirely) from such an identity. Even in identifying herself totally with a particular identity, it is nonetheless that person’s
choice. She could have just as easily resisted the category attributed to her by
others. Take, for instance, the efforts of gays and lesbians to resist the characterization of themselves by straights and to seize control of the category “gay/lesbian”
for themselves, which they have to a significant extent. The discussion here is
connected to the earlier examination of the importance of recognition. Individuals
choose to identify themselves with a particular group identity because they sees
themselves reflected in that category. They resist being thus categorized because
they do not see themselves, their identity, recognized by that category.
Peter Berger and Thomas Luckmann made a similar point in their pathbreaking work, The Social Construction of Reality (1966). They argued for a distinction between a person’s “identity” and the identity-type (Berger and Luckmann
1966, 174). According to them, there is “slack” between an individual’s perception
of the group of which she is a member, her “identity”, and the general conception
of that group, what Berger and Luckmann called the “identity-type”, which are
generated by “specific historical social structures” (ibid.). They use the distinction
between “identity” and “identity-type” to examine the dialectic between subjective
understanding and the social aspects of reality, which are beyond the person’s
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control. Such interplay allows for changes in the individual as well as the group
and the society in which the person is situated.
The notion of resistance described above, however, is circumscribed. Suppose
a person resists being categorized as myopic. She is resisting, perhaps, some of
the extra-logical connotations of being near-sighted. But that individual can’t
deny the fact that she needs corrective lenses in order to see as well as some
other people do. She can try to deny that, but she will run up against the reality
that she will need glasses fairly quickly. The constraints need not be just biological, however. A person growing up in England’s Midlands district would likely
speak with an accent characteristic of that region. If later on, that person were to
resist being categorized as “English”, or even “British”, she would still speak with
that distinctive accent, unless she takes lessons to eliminate it. The key point is
that resistance, or for that matter acceptance of a particular category, as in the
case of Canadians who are from visible minority groups, takes place against the
background of a certain facticity about the individual; and the person involved
can alter only some of those characteristics.
The considerations above of the intentional component of identity provide an
argument against those who claim that social categories have “priority” in matters of identity. Roger Scruton writes,
the condition of man requires that the individual, while he exists and acts as an autonomous
being, does so only because he can first identify himself as something greater—as a member of
a society, group, class, state or nation, of some arrangement to which he may not attach a
name, but he recognizes as a home (italics added, Scruton 1986, 156 cited in Hall 1996, 612).
The suggestion here is that a person isn’t whole unless she is first a member of a
group. Hence, collective or social identity has priority over a person’s sense of
self. Further, since group identity has such priority, changes to that identity are
unlikely, because the person is supposed to feel at home with that identity. There
will be strong resistance to any changes to that identity for that would mean
major dislocation. The discussion thus far suggests that we needn’t go so far as
Scruton to acknowledge one’s membership in a group is important for a person’s
identity. Further, if the discussion on the intentional component with identities is
right, then social identities are potentially much more unstable than the priority
of identity position suggests.
IMPLICATIONS: LOOPING EFFECTS
Since identification with a category requires a conscious effort by the individual
to identify herself with it, there is the potential that an individual may disagree
with the category under which she or he might be classed.5 This is in contrast
to “natural kinds”. Ian Hacking calls categories by which people are classed,
“human kinds,”6 and points out that they differ from natural kinds in at least one
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important respect. Take carbon dioxide. It is as good a candidate for being a
natural kind as anything we might imagine. It is also obviously the case that it
makes no difference to carbon dioxide what anyone thinks of it. Carbon dioxide
molecules don’t care if we hold them personally responsible for, say, the greenhouse effect. Yet, how people are classified may have a tremendous impact on
them. Furthermore, the difference it makes to those classified in a particular way
may bring about a change in that classification. Because individuals can act in
response to how they are being classified, human kinds may thus exhibit a
feedback cycle that natural kinds may not.7 Hacking (1994) calls this cycle—in
which a classification affects those classified and their response in turn brings
about a change in the classification—a “looping effect.”8
To focus our thinking about looping effects, consider the category “homosexual”. Homosexuals, as a kind of person, may seem to have been with us
always. But as Michel Foucault and others have argued, while there has always
been same-sex sexual activity, the idea of homosexuals as a kind of person with a
distinctive set of properties only emerged in the nineteenth century, thanks to the
proliferation of discourses by various self-styled experts on sexuality. Only then
did the homosexual become a “relevant” kind, often portrayed as deviant and
abnormal. Foucault tells us,
as defined by ancient civil or canonical codes, sodomy was a category of forbidden acts; their
perpetrator was nothing more than the juridical subject of them. The nineteenth-century
homosexual became a personage . . . a type of life, a life form, and a morphology, with an
indiscreet anatomy and possibly a mysterious physiology. . . . The sodomite had been a temporary aberration; the homosexual was now a species (Foucault 1979, 43).
Foucault’s historical claims are not uncontroversial, but, regardless of one’s
position on when the kind “homosexual” originated, we should at least be able
to agree that it has undergone further alterations. This has occurred, at least in
part, as a consequence of looping effects. Those classified as homosexual (and
so as deviant and immoral) rebelled against this categorization. They have
succeeded for the most part in taking control of the category “homosexual” for
themselves. Indeed, instead of “homosexual”, they are now “gay” or “lesbian” or
“queer”. As a result of their struggles, the way in which individuals involved in
same-sex relationships are classified has undergone a shift, from a derogatory
term “homosexual” to terms such as “gay” and “lesbian” that have positive value
for those classified and which have general acceptance by the mainstream. Without
doubt, the kind, “homosexual”, is a category imposed by others. The categories
“gay” and “lesbian”, however, would seem to have been adopted autonomously
by the gay and lesbian community itself. Furthermore, the new classifications
take on a dimension that was not present in the old one, namely a political one.
Identifying oneself as gay or lesbian is often seen now as a political act.
I am oversimplifying here. The change in public discourse did not take place
overnight. For example, just as the media initially resisted accepting the category
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“black” or “African-American” used by blacks themselves, sticking instead to terms
such as “Negro” or “Coloured”, the use of the term “homosexual” in the media
persisted for some time as well and has not entirely dropped out of popular use.
Furthermore, “homosexual” isn’t a term that has an exclusively negative connotation. Similarly, “gay” and “lesbian” can be used as terms of abuse. My point is
simply that there has been a shift in the classificatory terms generally used and in
the way people belonging to these groupings are typically presented.
The kind, “homosexual”, has thus completed one loop. That need not be the
end of the story, however. Looping of the categories “gay” and “lesbian” may
still be possible, as suggested in a recent Canadian example chronicled in The
Globe & Mail, a Canadian newspaper. The story describes a number of young
women who engage in same-sex relationships, but who do not connect their
sexual activity with the politics of sexual identity. They see their sexual activity as
independent of the category of “lesbian”. One woman tells us that the gaystraight dichotomy is to be dropped. “Women,” she says, “don’t have to assume
a radical political struggle just because they want to have sex with another
woman.” Another woman tells us that, “I sleep with women, women I’m attracted
to . . . and I sleep with men I find attractive. I don’t stay up at night thinking
about whether I’m bisexual or anything else. . . . I think we’re past the politics of
that” (Nolan 1999). Such an attitude about sexual relations is supported by some
lesbians and gays. For them, this is the result of the gay revolution: men and
women have control over their sexuality. The goal, according to one gay activist,
is for women and men to “own and experience their sexuality” (ibid.) For others,
however, this is just one more instance of heterosexual encroachment, one more
instance of gay chic. They take offense to the idea that they might just be part of
some “breeder voyeur’s” experiment.
Such comments suggest a tension in standard notions of “gay” and “lesbian”
and the newer notion of being “queer” within the gay and lesbian community.
Why do I say “suggest” only? Because the comments are taken from one case. It
would be foolhardy to claim at this point that the categories of gay and lesbian
have been displaced by the category “queer”, but a strain is present.9 For some
lesbians and gays, these young women are part of the same movement (the gay
revolution) to which they belong. For others, however, the young women are
“outsiders”. Not only are these young women not part of the struggle against the
dominant ideologies of sexuality and gender by gays and lesbians, their actions
frustrate such struggles. But it is the ambiguity of the position of these young
women which poses a challenge to the idea of “lesbian” itself. The actions of
these young women may yet lead to a new more inclusive conceptual terrain. Their
action may prompt changes to both the category of “queer” and the category of
“lesbian” itself. As The Globe & Mail article suggests, these young women have the
support of some lesbians already. Their action may spur other lesbians to revisit
the issue of sexual identity, and what it means to be a person whose sexuality is
anything but mainstream, including the gay and lesbian mainstream. There is,
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then, at least the possibility that the behaviour of these young women and their
supporters will help bring about further transformations to the category. For the
transformation to take hold, however, the power relations that undergird the
categories of “gay”, “lesbian”, “queer” and “straight” will have to be configured
anew.
I don’t want to overstate the point here. Such behaviour may or may not lead
to a change in the category under consideration. Not every attempt at a loop
succeeds. The point, however, is that an important element in this potential
transformation is the dialectical relation between individuals and the category by
which they are classed/described. The transformation, if it occurs, will occur, in
part, as a result of a looping effect. In principle, this is an on-going process. So,
we shouldn’t think that a particular identity would not continue to change.
MECHANISM OF CHANGE
The example presented above may shed light on the processes by which groups
undergo self-differentiation. Although groups and group identities are different
concepts, they are not unrelated. Groups pertain to communities; identities are
categories by which individuals within groups are classified. The process by
which group identities change is likely implicated in the dynamics by which such
groups self-differentiate.
In a recent article, Ermano Bencivenga proposes a provocative thesis about
self-differentiation within a group. He contends that such self-differentiation is
inevitable. Self-differentiation, he says, “is not an accident; it is a destiny”
(Bencivenga 1998, 220). Bencivenga arrives at this conclusion by challenging the
assumption behind the view that discriminatory behaviour, “the shifting into an
ingroup/outgroup mode” (Bencivenga 1998, 218), is caused by an outside influence. Such a position is supported by a “static” conception of groups and their
identities. On the static view, groups are categorized by genus and differentia.
Once identified, groups and their identities are fixed. “They are what they are,
period.” (Bencivenga 1998, 219). If individuals making up the group have no
prior conflicting interests, then any antagonism that shows up must be introduced external to the group. Without such outside influence, discriminatory
behaviour within the group would not otherwise have taken place.
Bencivenga contests the static conception of groups, and offers an alternate,
“dialectical”, conception:
Social agents and groups consisting of them are evolving structures, specifically structures that
constantly and autonomously come into conflict within themselves. If left alone, they will not
stay put (as the [static view] would have it): they will fall apart (Bencivenga 1998, 219).
He remarks that,
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precisely because [individuals] know each other well and are willing to cooperate (because they form a
coherent group), they will necessarily come apart—their one group will necessarily fragment
into conflicting ones. And the routine engineered . . . to “establish” intergroup dynamics will be used by them
as an occasion—an excuse—to realize this self-differentiation vocation (italics original, Bencivenga 1998,
220).
If Bencivenga’s claim about the dialectical conception of groups is right, then
self-differentiation is not only inevitable, but also will not require external input.
They are mere excuses, and differentiation of the group will take place by itself
regardless. It should be pointed out that how the process of self-differentiation
itself is initiated isn’t clear on Bencivenga’s account. He does not speak to this
issue directly in the article. Nonetheless, it is fair to say that, for him, the mechanism of change is strongly internal. By “internal”, I mean within the group itself.
However, Bencivenga’s internalist position is difficult to maintain. A closer
analysis of the example of the debates about the category “lesbian” tells us why.
The young women in the example occupy an ambiguous position in the gay and
lesbian community. Some view them as outsiders; others as fellow travelers of
the same movement. It isn’t clear that these young women are straightforwardly
members of the gay and lesbian community. Nonetheless, their behaviour have
sparked a debate between groups of individuals in the gay and lesbian community
on “lesbian” and other categories. The political process initiated was not entirely
generated within the gay and lesbian community itself, however. It was a response
to the behaviour of those young women in the example by individuals in the
community who consider them outsiders and others who accord them some
recognition that launched the feedback mechanism, which may or may not
succeed ultimately. It could be a passing occurrence. Nonetheless, the feedback
mechanism by which possible change to the category “lesbian” takes place is, on
this account, more complex than the internalist position suggested by Bencivenga.
That change to social categories in some cases involves external input is
further supported by the observation that categories describing communities
are susceptible to change owing to immigration, which is an external intervention. Recall that Stuart Hall tells us that globalization has the effect of dislocating
the identity of a culture (Hall 1996, 628). As the composition of the community changes, the identity of that group may change because individuals
may not identify themselves as a member of the original classification. They
may work together in a constructive politics to change the group’s identity, or
different groups may establish their own identities. Consider the choice by individuals from various ethnic minority groups in Canada to identify themselves
as hyphenated-Canadians, rather than Canadians. Alternatively, they may choose
to identify themselves as unhyphenated-Canadian. They don’t want to be
Chinese-Canadian, or French-Canadian, or Irish-Canadian. They just think of
themselves as Canadian. Regardless of which possibility, hyphenated or not, the
process by which identities in both cases are established, if successful, requires
both external and internal contributions.
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The two examples above of potential looping suggest that an internalist
account of self-differentiation is incomplete. They do not, however, demonstrate
that self-differentiation within a group cannot take place without external input.
That discussion is beyond the scope of this paper. But they do show that the
process in some cases involve both external and internal developments.
CONCLUDING THOUGHTS
In this paper, I argued that social identities require both an intentional and
recognitional component. Because individuals identify themselves with a particular
category, identities themselves are susceptible to change via the feedback mechanism of looping. Of course, such choices take place against a background of
interests and power, which play out in multiple ways. Again, consider the choice
by individuals from various ethnic minority groups in Canada to be identified as
unhyphenated-Canadians. Whatever one thinks of such identification, these cases
certainly occur. Power pervades the articulation of an identity in such cases. It
permeates not only the interactions between individuals from minority groups
with the dominant culture, but also those between individuals within the particular
groups themselves. The complexities of the power relations, and their reverberations, in such cases are unique, and a discussion of these issues will have to
wait for another occasion. But clearly, choosing to be identified as a Canadian,
or some other category, does not guarantee that being recognized as such
is successful. To succeed it would appear that the category is generally acceptable to the community. Members of extremist groups would no doubt want
to change the way their category is conceived, but this is unlikely to take place,
as very few individuals would accept their views. But with gays and lesbians,
at a certain time, the larger community was ready to accept that their lives
have positive value, so looping in the category “homosexual” was made possible.
Moreover, looping need not succeed on exactly the terms envisaged by a particular group. The larger community may accept only some changes. The
examination of looping effects highlights the possibility, and the difficulties, of
change, issues central to questions about identity. If the position advanced in this
paper is correct, then we can better understand the transformation of social
identities.10
James Wong, PhD
Department of Communication Studies
Wilfrid Laurier University
Waterloo, Ontario
Canada
N2L 3C5
[email protected]
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James Wong
NOTES
1
See Sundstrom 2002.
Douglas Wallace, who heads a team of researchers at the Emory University School of
Medicine, tells us that “what I have found astounding is that [the research] clearly shows
we are all one human family. The phylogeny in African goes back to the origins of our
species, but the fingers of L3 [technically called “halogroups”] are touching Europe and
Asia, saying that we are all closely related” (Wade 2000).
3
G.W.F. Hegel argued in the Master-Slave dialectic section of The Phenomenology of
Spirit that self-consciousness, or awareness of oneself as a subject or person, required others
recognize that one is, like them, a person. For an analysis of the master-slave dialectic, see
Taylor 1975, 148–157.
4
I say “not yet” because in Hegel’s dialectical scheme, it is from the “slave” pole that
full self-consciousness emerges, which include stages of armed struggle (Taylor 1975).
5
I am indebted to Andrew Latus for the following discussion on looping effects.
6
Hacking used the term “human kind” to contrast with natural kinds, but has more
recently taken to use the term “interactive kinds” instead to emphasize the kind of interaction as a consequence of self-conscious knowledge. (Hacking 1999, 103–108). The earlier
terminology of “human kinds” is, however, adequate for the purposes of this paper.
7
Or, at least, that non-conscious natural kinds may not. But can’t individual members
of a natural kind exhibit an unexpected property and in this way cause us to change the
way we think about the kind? Of course. But, unless members of the kind we are concerned with are conscious, they can’t do so by acting in response to the way they are
classified. No action, no loop.
8
Notice that the idea of “looping” goes beyond the common observation that how we
classify people may affect the way they act. To complete the loop the change in behavior
must result in a change in the way the classification is conceived.
9
For an account of the strain in the case of “gay”, see Archer 1999.
10
I would like to thank Andrew Latus, Brad Inwood and two referees for the journal
for their comments on an earlier version of the paper.
2
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