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Journal of Muslims in Europe 2 (2013) 115-136 brill.com/jome The Third Wave: Islamization of Europe, or Europanization of Islam? Maurits S. Berger Professor of Islam in the Contemporary West, Leiden University, Faculty of Humanities, Institute for Religious Studies, Senior research associate, Netherlands Institute of International Relations ‘Clingendael’, PO Box 9515, 2300 RR Leiden, The Netherlands [email protected] Abstract To understand the concerns and issues related to Muslims and Islam in Europe, this article makes use of a framework that qualifies ‘Islam’ as two manifestations of ‘physical’ and ‘virtual’ Islam and ‘Europe’ as two discourses defined as the political-legal and cultural-religious discourse. The resulting matrix of these four dimensions will be applied to several of the main issues of the interaction between Islam and Europe: the numerical presence of Muslims, their visibility, the legacy of centuries of European-Islamic interaction, and the (in)compatibility of Islamic and European values. Based on these examples, the author observes that the European concerns regarding ‘Islam’ mostly relate to virtual Islam and are dominated by cultural-religious discourse. The author therefore questions the often-heard two-choice question between ‘Europanization of Islam’ or ‘Islamization of Europe’, arguing that the real choice to be made in Europe is whether it will adhere to its political-legal values, such as liberalism, equalit and human rights, or will prefer its cultural-religious values. Keywords Islam; Europe; sharia; political-legal discourse; cultural-religious discourse; physical and virtual Islam Introduction After the battle of Poitiers in 732 AD and the siege of Vienna in 1683, the current migration of Muslims to Europe—in particular Western Europe—is perceived by some concerned European observers as well as some ardent Muslim preachers as the ‘third wave’ of Muslims into Europe. It is a notion with many reverberations in the European collective memory that now seems to be projected into the near future. Illustrative in this respect is the remark of then Eurocommissioner Bolkestein in 2004 that if Turkey were to be admitted to the © Koninklijke Brill NV, Leiden, 2013 DOI: 10.1163/22117954-12341260 116 M. S. Berger / Journal of Muslims in Europe 2 (2013) 115-136 European Union ‘Vienna would have been in vain.’1 Similarly, several articles have been written with the argument that the Europe and Islam are at crossroads with a choice of either Europe becoming Islamic or the Islam becoming European.2 In this article I will present a conceptual framework that will allow us to find our way in this labyrinth of concerns and issues related to Muslims and Islam in contemporary Europe, and to analyse the facts, fears and figures that are so often mentioned in this respect. The framework will qualify ‘Islam’ as two manifestations and ‘Europe’ as two discourses. The resulting matrix of these four dimensions will be used to discuss several of the main concerns related to the interaction between Europe and Islam. In doing so it is understood that the main perspective of the framework is the European response to Islam, more than the Muslim response to Europe; in the conclusion we will therefore return to the question that appears to be on the minds of many a European: will the future bring an Islamization of Europe, or a Europeanization of Islam? 1. A Framework to Study Islam in Europe 1.1 ‘Islam’ Scholars of Islam continuously point at the problematic use of the notion of ‘Islam’ which is interchangeably used as a religion, a culture, a presence of people or buildings, a ruling power, and so forth. The historian Hodgson in his seminal Venture of Islam introduced the term ‘Islamdom’ and the adjective ‘Islamicate’ to denote Islam as a culture and civilisation, separate from the notion of ‘Islam’ as religious doctrine.3 Although very useful, I find that a proper understanding of ‘Islam in Europe’ is served by another distinction, namely between what I suggest to call physical and virtual Islam.4 1 Mentioned in the Guardian (“In 1683 Turkey was the invader”, 22 September 2004) and The Weekly Standard (“Islamic Europe”, 4 October 2004). 2 See, e.g., Tariq Ramadan, “Europeanization of Islam or the Islamization of Europe”, in Islam, Europe’s Second Religion, Shireen T. Hunter (ed.) (Westport: Praeger Publishers, 2002), pp. 202218; Bassam Tibi, “Europeanizing Islam or the Islamization of Europe: political democracy vs. cultural difference”, in Religion in an Expanding Europe, Timothy A. Byrnes & Peter J. Katzenstein (eds.) (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), pp. 204-224. 3 Marshall G.S. Hodgson. The Venture of Islam, Volume One: The Classical Age of Islam (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1977), pp. 57-59. 4 This distinction will be elaborated in my A Brief History of Islam in Europe. Thirteen Centuries of Creed, Conflict and Coexistence (Leiden: Leiden University Press, forthcoming). M. S. Berger / Journal of Muslims in Europe 2 (2013) 115-136 117 ‘Physical Islam’ is represented by the mere presence of people called Muslims, on the one hand, and the visibility of their presence that can be identified as ‘Islamic,’ on the other hand. The visibility shows in behaviour and material expressions of Muslims that can somehow be denoted as, to use Hodgson’s terminology, either religiously ‘Islamic’ or culturally ‘Islamicate.’ Examples of behaviour are fasting and praying, and marital relations or forms of interaction between the sexes. Examples of material expressions of Islam are clothes, arts and buildings, but also the records of their intellectual and cultural life and ideas, ranging from the medieval philosophical texts to modern hip-hop clips on YouTube. The physical Islam serves as the ‘carrier’ of virtual Islam which we define as all immaterial or non-physical aspects of Islam, such as the tenets of Islamic orthodoxy, culture, ideas, messages and knowledge. But virtual Islam also includes the images and visions of what is considered ‘Islamic,’ by Muslims as well as non-Muslims, including imagined or real notions of conflicts between what is considered ‘Islamic’ and ‘European.’ The merit of the distinction between physical and virtual Islam is that it allows us to distinguish between the neutral observation of physical appearances, behaviour and expressions of Muslims, on the one hand, and the assessment of the meanings and values thereof, on the other hand. The recurring key question, of course, is how one defines the ‘Islamic’ nature of behaviour, expressions or values. This will be addressed in each of the discussions below. 1.2 ‘Europe’ The second notion, ‘Europe,’ will be represented in our framework by means of two discourses, the political-legal and the cultural-religious discourse, both of which take place within a geographical setting called Europe. It is the contention of this article that the interaction of these two discourses is crucial to understand the typical ‘European’ reaction to Islam in its physical and virtual forms. The political-legal discourse originates from values that are at the core of modern European legal and political systems, such as liberty, democracy, equality and rule of law. These values are elaborated in political and legal systems where they are enshrined in constitutions and in human rights treaties, in particular the European Convention on Human Rights. It must be noted that these values are not uniquely ‘European’ since they are shared by many more countries outside Europe. However, when applied to Islam, these values acquire in the European context a distinct ‘European’ character, as we will see 118 M. S. Berger / Journal of Muslims in Europe 2 (2013) 115-136 below. This is particularly the case when the political-legal discourse is confronted with the cultural-religious discourse. The cultural-religious discourse stems from another set of values that are often invoked as typically ‘European.’ But while the legal and political values are relatively easy to identify, the religious and cultural values are more ambiguous. The ‘religious’ dimension of this discourse refers to Christianity, either as a religious value-system or as a religious tradition or civilisation that is said to have shaped the unity that we call Europe.5 While for many this is a matter of study and polemics, others perceive it as a reality that needs to be embodied in political-legal discourse, as was the case in 2005 when politicians deliberated to introduce the term ‘Judeo-Christian civilisation’ in the preamble of the new European Union Convention, known as the ‘EU constitution’ (but this proposition was ultimately rejected).6 The ‘cultural’ dimension of the discourse represents values that are mostly not enshrined in laws but in customs and as such are held as self-evident truths. While the political-legal response to Islam is encapsulated by the notion ‘this is (not) allowed,’ the cultural-religious response will be more like ‘this is the way we do things around here.’ Finally, we need to demarcate the geographical setting in which these two discourses interact. Since we define ‘Europe’ in terms of discourses, this geographical setting is a matter of convenience and choice rather than principle: we could, for instance, expand our discussion to Russia or Turkey (since both are member to the European Convention of Human Rights, or because they have both been important players in European history), or leave them out (since they may arguably not share political, religious or cultural values that are considered ‘European’). Here, we will define Europe geographically in accordance to its water borders: the seas in the north, west and south, and the great rivers of the Volga and Dnieper and the Black Sea in the east. We will further use terminology like ‘Western’ or ‘Southeastern’ Europe with the explicit mention that these are not political but mere geographical indications. 5 James O’Connell, The Making of Modern Europe: Strengths, Constraints and Resolutions (Bradford: University of Bradford, University of Bradford Peace Research Report no. 26, 1991); Hugh Trevor-Roper, The Rise of Christian Europe (London: Thames and Hudson, 1965); Michael Wintle (ed.), Culture and Identity in Europe (Aldershot: Avebury, 1996). 6 Madeleine Heyward, “What Constitutes Europe?: Religion, Law and Ideology in the Draft Constitution for the European Union”, Hanse Law Review (2005), pp. 227-235; Iordan Bărbulescu and Gabriel Andreescu, “References to God and the Christian Tradition in the Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe: An Examination of the Background”, Journal for the Study of Religions and Ideologies, 24 (Winter 2009), pp. 207-223. M. S. Berger / Journal of Muslims in Europe 2 (2013) 115-136 119 With this brief introduction we will now proceed to apply this framework to four issues of concern that are often raised when discussing the interaction of ‘Islam’ and ‘Europe’: the number of Muslims, Islamic visibility, the legacy of centuries of European-Islamic interaction, and the (in)compatibility of Islamic and European values. 2. Interaction between ‘Islam’ and ‘Europe’ 2.1 The Numbers The physical presence of Muslims in the geographical area of Europe is not new. Muslim empires ruled in the Iberian Peninsula for nearly 800 years, in Greece for 500 years, in the Balkans for 300 years, and in Sicily for 100 years. As subjects under non-Muslim rule, Muslims stayed on even longer: they lived in Spain for 900 years and in Sicily 400 years, and have continued to live in Lithuania and Poland for over 600 years and in most Balkan countries for more than 500 years. However, since the late sixteenth century very few—if any— Muslims resided in the European region west of the line Warsaw-ViennaTrieste (a region that we will hereafter name ‘Western Europe’). The arrival since the 1960s in these lands of large numbers of Muslims resulting from family reunification was therefore a development that confronted the native Western Europeans with a situation that is a historical novelty. The number of Muslims that live in ‘Europe’ is an issue of recent concern raised mostly by American authors who appear very anxious about the increase of Muslims in Europe posing a demographic threat.7 Bernard Lewis in 2004 stated that Europe would have “Muslim majorities by the end of the 21st century,”8 and downplayed this prediction several years later with the remark that “in the foreseeable future” Muslims would constitute “significant majorities in at least some European cities or even countries.”9 Another persistent 7 See, e.g., Bruce Bawer, While Europe Slept: How Radical Islam is Destroying Europe from Within (New York: Doubleday, 2006); Claire Berlinski Menace in Europe: Why the Continent’s Crisis Is America’s, Too (New York: Crown Forum, 2006); Christopher Caldwell, Reflections on the Revolution in Europe (New York: Anchor, 2010); Walter Laqueur, The Last Days of Europe: Epitaph for an Old Continent (New York: St Martin’s Griffin, 2009); Mark Steyn, Lights Out: Islam, Free Speech And The Twilight Of Europe (Montreal: Stockade Books, 2009); Bruce Thornton, Decline & Fall: Europe’s Slow Motion Suicide (New York: Encounter Books, 2007); Bat Ye’or, Eurabia: The Euro-Arab Axis (Madison (NJ): Fairleigh Dickinson University Press, 2005). 8 Interview with German daily Die Welt, 28 July 2004. 9 Bernard Lewis, Europe and Islam (Washington: The AEI Press, 2007), p. 19. 120 M. S. Berger / Journal of Muslims in Europe 2 (2013) 115-136 number that circulates on the Internet is that Muslims will comprise “at least 20 per cent of Europe’s population by 2050.”10 These remarks are not mere mentions of facts but are meant to express impending disaster. Whatever the truth behind these numbers,11 what does this juggling with statistics mean in terms of our framework? We must first note that this preoccupation with numbers is mostly a Western European issue. This can be explained from the fact that the behaviour and expressions of Muslims in that region of Europe have received much attention from the perspectives of security and integration. In (South-)Eastern Europe, on the other hand, an Islamic cultural, institutional and architectural heritage has existed for centuries and continues in many places to do so. The simple question of how many Muslims live in Europe challenges us with two problems: quantifying Muslims and qualifying what is a Muslim. Let us start with the first, and leave the second question for the next paragraph. Counting Muslims is problematic since most European countries do not keep counts of their population on the basis of religion, so that one needs to make use of estimates. This explains why statistics change regularly. Re-calculations in Germany, for instance, conducted by the government in 2009, raised the previously used estimates of 3.1-3.4 million Muslims to 3.8-4.3 million, an increase of almost thirty per cent.12 On the other hand, re-calculations in The Netherlands in 2007 lowered the number of Muslims from 950 thousand to 850 thousand, a decrease of ten per cent.13 Another problem is the relative and absolute nature of these numbers and related percentages. For instance, the United Kingdom ranks third in all of Europe in absolute numbers of Muslims (after France and Germany), but takes 10 Closer inspection shows that the references all lead to the authoritative report by the economist Karoly Lorant (The demographic challenge in Europe, Brussels: European Parliament, 2005). However, the report shows that these figures are not Lorant’s, but he has used them under the heading ‘Those who are worrying about the growing Muslim population usually emphasise the following arguments’ and for this particular statement refers on page 12 of the report to the article by Timothy M. Savage, “Europe and Islam: Crescent Waxing, Cultures Clashing” (The Washington Quarterly 27 (2004), pp. 25–50). 11 See for elaborate studies on this topic Göran Larsson, “The Fear of Small Numbers: Eurabian Literature and Censuses on Religious Belonging”, Journal of Muslims in Europe, 1 (2012), pp. 142165; Birgitte Schepelern Johansen and Riem Spielhaus , “Counting Deviance: Revisiting a Decade’s Production of Surveys among Muslims in Western Europe”, Journal of Muslims in Europe, 1 (2012), pp. 81-112. 12 Haug, Sonja, Stephanie Müssig, Anja Stichs, Muslimisches Leben in Deutschland (Berlin: Bundesamt für Migration und Flüchtlinge, 2009), p. 80. 13 Centraal Bureau voor Statistiek [Central Statistics Agency], press release “Ruim 850 duizend islamieten in Nederland” Wednesday 24 October 2007. M. S. Berger / Journal of Muslims in Europe 2 (2013) 115-136 121 sixteenth place (after Belgium and Sweden) in percentage.14 Also, the picture can change dramatically depending on the scope one takes. For instance, the percentage of Muslims is close to 12 per cent in Bulgaria and 6-8.5 per cent in France, but less than 4 per cent in the European Union.15 Such differences apply in particular on a domestic scale. While the overall percentage of Muslims in the Netherlands in 2011 was 6 per cent, it was 28 per cent in the city of Amsterdam and 37 per cent in Rotterdam.16 Similar demographic differences between cities and countryside can be observed in most European countries.17 The European anxiety about these numbers is expressed in both culturalreligious and political-legal responses. The first will be discussed at length in the next paragraphs as it relates to visibility, history and values. The politicallegal response regarding the physical presence of Muslims pertains mostly to urban policies aimed at preventing ‘ghettoization’ of neighbourhoods or schools, either to pre-empt a concentration of a social-economical weak population, or to promote ‘integration’ of these immigrant communities. However, two caveats must be made here. First, most of these policies are aimed at immigrants of foreign origin, and only occasionally to Muslims.18 Second, insofar as these policies are indeed aimed at Muslims, then such policies are based on the assumption that a ‘Muslim’ can be identified in a definitive manner. This brings us to the question of qualifying Muslims: on what basis is one to categorize persons as Muslim—or, for that matter, Catholic, Jew, or non-believer.19 One acceptable method would be by asking people themselves. Recent research has shown that this approach leads to a significant lowering of the number of Muslims: in the Netherlands, many Iranians and Alevite Turks 14 UK: 2.7 million, 4.8% (2011 Census); France: 3.5-5 million, 6-8.5% (Sonia Tebbakh, Muslims in the EU—Cities Report: France (New York: Open Society Institute, 2007, pp. 11-13); Belgium: 0.4-0.45 million, 4% (Rijksregister, 2006); Sweden: 0.25-.35 million, 1.8-3.5% (Göran Larsson, Sweden, pp. 9-11). 15 Author’s calculations based on numbers and percentages that average what government and independent agencies have produced so far. 16 Numbers listed by the Centraal Bureau voor Statistiek [Central Statistics Agency], 25 May 2011. 17 See the European city profiles in the online studies of Open Society Foundations (www .soros.org). 18 For example, a member of the city council of Rotterdam, a Dutch city with a large Muslim population, in 2005 expressed his concern that if a Muslim party were to be formed it might acquire a majority leading to “strange things, like polygamy, honour killings, forced marriages, suppression of women” (Interview with Pastors in Metro, 12 March 2005). 19 M. Brown “Quantifying the Muslim Population in Europe: Conceptual and Data Issues”, Journal of Social Research Methodology, 3 (2000), pp. 87–101. 122 M. S. Berger / Journal of Muslims in Europe 2 (2013) 115-136 do not consider themselves ‘Muslim;’20 similarly, in Germany, 40 per cent of the Iranians consider themselves without religion and more than 10 per cent declare themselves as Christians,21 while only 7.5 per cent of the Turks defined themselves as “quite religious;”22 in France, 59 per cent of the North Africans and Turks identified themselves as “Muslim” and 20 per cent as “without religion;”23 and in Sweden, only one third of the Muslims indicated they are “practicing.”24 But even these surveys do not tell us everything about the religiousness of a person. An atheist Jew can still call himself a Jew, a self-declared Catholic may only go to church at Christmas. With regard to Muslims, Albania is a case in point: it is arguably the only European country with a Muslim majority population (70 per cent Muslim), but scholars have indicated that many Albanians are actually not Muslim believers.25 If this is the case, then Islam serves as an identity-marker more than an indication of faith, presenting an entirely different array of ‘Islamic’ values than if the Albanians were all pious and devout Muslims. 2.2 The Visibility of Islam What, then, defines a Muslim? If we cannot gauge someone’s beliefs, we might look at the person’s expression of religiousness. Our attention consequently shifts to the visibility of Islam as manifested by behaviour and material expressions of Muslims. This corresponds with the current trend of looking at Muslims: while prior to the late 1990s politicians, publics, media and academics discussed immigrants in terms of their culture and identity,26 since then the 20 Marieke van Herten, “Het aantal islamieten in Nederland” in Religie aan het begin van de 21ste eeuw (Den Haag: CBS, 2009), pp. 35-40. 21 Haug et al., Muslimisches Leben in Deutschland, 2009, p. 12, p. 87, pp. 302–320 22 Kaya, Ayhan and Ferhat Kentel, Euro-Turks. A Bridge or a Breach between Turkey and the European Union? A Comparative Study of German Turks and French Turks (Brussels: Centre for European Policy Studies, 2005), p. 61. 23 Sylvain Brouard and Vincent Tiberj, Français comme les autres: enquête sur les citoyens d’origine maghrébine, africaine et turque (Paris: Les Presses de Sciences Po, 2005), p. 23. 24 Mentioned in Göran Larsson, Muslims in the EU—City Report: Sweden (New York: Open Society Institute, 2007), p.11. 25 Xavier Bougarel, “The role of Balkan Muslims in building a European Islam”, EPC Issue Paper No. 43 (Brussels: European Policy Centre, 23 November 2005), p. 16; Gyorgy Lederer, “Contemporary Islam in East Europe”, online publication by NATO Academic Forum, May 1999 (available online at: http://www.nato.int/acad/fellow/97-99/lederer.pdf ). 26 E.g., Tariq Modood and Pnina Werbner (eds), The Politics of Multiculturalism in the New Europe: Racism, Identity and Community (London: Zed Books, 1997). M. S. Berger / Journal of Muslims in Europe 2 (2013) 115-136 123 focus of attention has shifted towards their religious quality. That has raised the question as to what should be considered ‘Islamic’: is that everything a Muslims does, or must it be prescribed by Scripture? In the latter case, can Islam be considered a valuable source of information to describe or predict Muslims’ behaviour? To avoid these problematic issues, I suggest discussing the visibility of Islam as a form of physical Islam, subdivided into behaviour and expressions. Behaviour that we may classify as typically ‘Islamic’ is in the first place of course related to religious rituals, such as prayer, fasting, burial and observing dietary laws. From a European perspective, the responses to these behaviours are generally positive. According to the political-legal discourse, these practices pertain to the freedom of religion and are therefore allowed, even though the question has arisen at times whether these practices could be refused. For instance, on several occasions Muslim demanding spaces for their ritual 5-minute prayer came into conflict with employers or colleagues who argued that such behaviour pertains to the private domain and should therefore not be allowed or accommodated at work.27 The cultural-religious response is also relatively positive to these particular manifestations of Islamic practices, although problems have arisen in this domain as well. For instance, some practices such as the dietary rules of halal food and the prohibition of alcohol may clash with the European custom that social events usually involve alcoholic beverages, and often take place at cafes or bars. In addition to these known religious rituals, new forms of behaviour have arisen in Europe that Muslims have attributed to Islam and that have caused conflicts within European societies. One is the so-called female circumcision, or female genital mutilation. It is a custom deeply rooted in some countries and cultures—such as Egypt and Somalia—and considered by many nationals part of their religion. In general, this practice is not recognized in Europe as a religious ritual, and in most countries persecuted as a criminal offense.28 Another rule that is embraced by some European Muslims is their refusal to have physical contact with the opposite sex, which in some instances may 27 See for a general discussion: Douglas Hicks, Religion and the Workplace, Pluralism, Spirituality, Leadership (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003). 28 Michael Miller, Responses to Female Genital Mutilation/Cutting in Europe (Florence: UNICEF Innocenti Research Centre, 2004). The United Kingdom is the first and so-far only country that has specifically criminalised female genital mutilation (Female Circumcision Act of 1985, expanded and changed into the Female Genital Mutilation Act of 2003). 124 M. S. Berger / Journal of Muslims in Europe 2 (2013) 115-136 cause problems in jobs where social interaction is considered vital,29 or in the case of medical treatment.30 The issue of gender separation is a typical example of a conflict between the political-legal freedoms that allow for such practices, on the one hand, and the cultural-religious position of ‘this is how we normally do things here,’ on the other hand. In addition to behaviour, visibility of Islam manifests itself as a material expression. This takes place in a variety of forms, whereby the uneasiness within Europe mainly focuses on religious dress and mosques. Here, we find an interesting distinction between western and (South-)Eastern Europe: in the case of mosques, one may feel that a sixteenth century mosque in Sarajevo (Bosnia), an eighteenth century Shari’a court in Xanthi (Greece), or a nineteenth century wooden mosque in Bohoniki (Poland) ‘belongs’ there merely for the fact that it had been there for a long time, but the erection of such structures in Western Europe is often criticized for being ‘out of place’ or otherwise undesirable. Public criticism increases with the shape of the structure (the more traditional Islamic, the more objections raised) and the height of its minaret. The latter especially is the source of scorn and rejection, possibly because it is perceived as a symbol of Muslim domination.31 The Swiss 2009 referendum result prohibiting the building of minarets (not mosques) is quite telling in this respect, because it was at that time a country with only four minaret-holding mosques.32 Interestingly, the orthodox strands among European Muslims— the so-called Salafis—also joined the chorus of critics, arguing that the typical mosque with dome and minaret is not Islamic at all but representative of cultural additions to the originally simple structure of a walled and partly roofed courtyard. So while the simple brick and concrete mosque structures used by militant Salafis may look quite ‘integrated’ into the European architectural landscape, they are the buildings that are often under scrutiny by national intelligence services, unlike the ostentatious mosques that get all the public 29 Rafic Banawi and Rex Stockton, “Islamic values relevant to group work, with practical implications for the group leader”, The Journal for Specialists in Group Work, 18 (1993), pp. 151-160. 30 Tabassum Fatima Rehman and Sophia F. Dziegielewski, “Women Who Choose Islam. Issues, Changes, and Challenges in Providing Ethnic-Diverse Practice” International Journal of Mental Health, 32 (2003), 31-49. 31 Stefano Allievi, Conflicts over Mosques in Europe. Policy issues and trends (London: Alliance Publishing Trust, 2009), pp. 45-46; Jocelyne Cesari, “Mosque Conflicts in European Cities: Introduction”, Journal of Ethnic and Migration studies, 31 (2005), pp. 1015-1024. 32 Stéphane Lathion, “The impact of the minaret vote in Switzerland,” in Mosques in Europe. Why a solution has become a problem, Stefano Allievi (ed.) (London: Alliance Publishing Trust, 2010), pp. 221-223. M. S. Berger / Journal of Muslims in Europe 2 (2013) 115-136 125 attention.33 In Southeastern European countries, on the other hand, the new construction of ‘Arab’ style mosques funded by Gulf States has been the source of concern for a growing influence of Salafism.34 The distinction between western and Eastern Europe is also apparent with regard to religious dress. While the head scarf, or the turban and kaftan of the mufti or of Muslim theologians may be a common sight in Bulgaria, Macedonia, Eastern Greece or Bosnia, it definitely was not in the other parts of Europe until recently. Indeed, the opposition against the Islamic dress, and in particular the head scarf, has been particularly passionate in Western Europe.35 It must be borne in mind, however, that Islamic dress is also becoming an issue in Southeastern European countries: the recent increase of conservative forms of religious dress has alarmed many as a sign of upcoming orthodoxy—or socalled ‘Wahhabism’—which is deemed by many Muslims contrary to the traditional form of Islam.36 While the mentioned objections and reservations against mosques and religious dress are mostly of a cultural-religious nature, the head scarf and more recently the full face veil (niqab or burqa) have acquired a prominent position in the political-legal discourse. Freedom of religion, freedom from discrimination and the freedom of ‘personal autonomy’ are strong European arguments in favour of the head scarf and niqab, but the question is whether this freedom may be curtailed in specific circumstances, such as in uniformed or public services, in public institutions or at confessional schools. This dilemma between political-legal and cultural-religious arguments is aptly illustrated by the French law of 2011 banning the face veil (niqab): while the State Council advised against such ban on the basis of the political-legal principle of personal autonomy which allows a woman to freely wear what she wishes,37 the legislature 33 For the Dutch case, see Eric Roose, “Fifty Years of Mosque Architecture in the Netherlands,” Electronic Journal of Oriental Studies, 8 (2005), pp. 1–46. 34 Azra Aksamija, “Contested identities: identity politics and contemporary mosques in Bosnia and Herzegovina”, in Mosques in Europe. Why a solution has become a problem, Stefano Allievi (ed), (London: Alliance Publishing Trust, 2010), pp. 318-354. 35 Jennifer Selby, “Hijab” in The Oxford Handbook of European Islam, Jocelyne Cesari (ed.), (Oxford: Oxford University Press, forthcoming). 36 Velko Attanassof, Islamic Revival in the Balkans (thesis) (Monterey: Naval Postgraduate School, March 2006); Kenneth Morrison, Wahhabism in the Balkans (London: Defence Academy of the United Kingdom, 2008). 37 Conseil d’Etat, Etude relative aux possibilités juridiques d’interdiction du port du voile intégral, 25 March 2010 (available online at: www.conseil-etat.fr/cde/media/document/avis/etude_vi_ 30032010.pdf.). 126 M. S. Berger / Journal of Muslims in Europe 2 (2013) 115-136 deemed the face veil contrary to the cultural principle that open-faced encounters in public are a matter of ‘social contract.’38 2.3 A History of ‘taking over’ The presence and visibility of Muslims in Western Europe has reinvigorated the century-old image of Islam as a religion that is out for conquest. While fears of an Islamic take-over may be prompted by physical Islam, the imagery belongs to the realm of virtual Islam. In the following we will discuss three perspectives of this imagery. The first is the historical narrative. According to scholars like Bernard Lewis and Bassam Tibi, we need to conceive of the unprecedented migration of Muslims into Europe as a ‘third wave’ that might prove successful after the first two ‘waves’ had been repelled at the battles of Poitiers (732 AD) and Vienna (1683).39 The anxiety of these scholars is reminiscent of the words by the famous eighteenth century historian Edward Gibbon when describing what Europe would have looked like if the battle of Poitiers had been lost: ‘Perhaps the interpretation of the Koran would now be taught in the schools of Oxford, and her pulpits might demonstrate to a circumcised people the sanctity and truth of the revelation of Mahomet.’40 Interestingly, the imagery of the two ‘waves’ may be psychologically powerful, but is historically debatable. In the case of the battle of Poitiers in 732 AD, historians have pointed out that the defeated Muslims were not an invasion army out to conquer the heartland of Europe, but one of the many raiding armies that for decades had crossed the Pyrenees for loot and spoils—a practice that they continued even after the defeat at Poitiers.41 With regard to Vienna, on the other hand, we may speak indeed of an ever-advancing 38 See the explanations of their respective law proposals by the Cabinet (Projet de loi interdisant la dissimulation du visage dans l’espace public (No. 2520, 19 May 2010)) and by the Socialist Party (Proposition de loi visant à fixer le champ des interdictions de dissimuler son visage liées aux exigences des services publics, à la prévention des atteintes à l’ordre public (No. 2544, 20 May 2010)). 39 Bernard Lewis, “The Third Wave: Muslim Migration to Europe”, New Perspectives Quarterly, 24 (2007), pp. 30-35; Bassam Tibi, Political Islam, World Politics and Europe (New York: Routledge, 2008), p. 1. 40 Edward Gibbon, The History of the Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire, Vol. IV (New York, J&J Harper, 1829, reprinted 1993 by Everyman’s Library), p. 336. 41 Robert Cowley and Geoffrey Parker, The Reader’s Companion to Military History (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 2001), p. xiii; Franco Cardini, Europe and Islam (London: Wiley-Blackwell, 2001), p. 9; David Lewis, God’s Crucible: Islam and the Making of Europe (New York: Norton & Company, 2008), pp. 178, 183. M. S. Berger / Journal of Muslims in Europe 2 (2013) 115-136 127 Ottoman army into Europe that was finally stopped and, from its defeat in 1683 onwards, was pushed back into what is now called Turkey. However, European contemporaries held different views of the Ottoman onslaught. The Protestants in the northern countries might have called the Turks the ‘scourge of God’ but under the maxim ‘the enemy of my enemy is my friend’ did not mind that the Holy Roman Empire got a serious beating from that same scourge.42 Also, the Protestants often expressed their admiration for the Ottoman religious tolerance of unbelievers (as opposed to the persecution by Catholics).43 The sixteenth century Protestant Dutch battle cry ‘Better Turkish than Papist [Catholic],’ used against the Spanish (Catholic) occupying forces, is quite telling in this respect.44 But even the Catholic French were not eager to help their Catholic Austrian archenemy against the Ottomans and adhered to their military alliance with the Ottomans dating from 1538 AD which was to last for two and a half centuries.45 In short, the ‘Europe’ as a representation of a Christian commonwealth that was saved from the Turk at the battle of Vienna in 1683 is a myth that was created retroactively, just like the battle of Poitiers served as a myth—probably retroactively spin-doctored by Charlemagne—to establish the Carolingian Franks as saviours of Europe. The second perspective related to the Islamic threat is the degree of historical interconnectedness between Islam and Europe. Two eminent contemporary scholars of Islam, the American professors Bernard Lewis and Richard Bulliet, provide an excellent illustration of how a selective use from the same historical sources may lead to different conclusions:46 Bulliet argues that Islam and Christianity share the same cradle of a common civilisation from which they parted ways ‘as siblings’ in the sixteenth century, while Lewis asserts that both civilisations have been at permanent loggerheads; Bulliet stresses the similarities in developments and experiences in the growth of the two civilisations, while Lewis emphasises their differences; Bulliet refers to religion as only one of the many factors that shaped Islamic identity, while Lewis puts religion 42 Andrew Wheatcroft, The Enemy at the Gate: Habsburgs, Ottomans and the Battle for Europe (London: Pimlico, 2009), pp. 18, 165-7. 43 Ahmad Gunny, “Protestant Reactions to Islam in late Seventeenth-Century French Thought”, French Studies, 40 (1986), pp. 129-140. 44 Voetius, ‘Over het mohammedanisme’, in: Liever Turks dan Paaps? De visies van Johannes Coccejus, Gisbertus Voetius en Adrianus Relandus op de islam, J. van Amersfoort and W.J. van Asselt (eds.) (Zoetermeer: Uitgeverij Boekencentrum, 1997), pp. 59-100. 45 William E. Watson, Tricolor and Crescent: France and the Islamic World (Westport: Praeger Publishers, 2003). 46 Richard Bulliet, The Case for an Islamo-Christian Civilization (New York: Columbia University Press, 2004) and Bernard Lewis, Europe and Islam, 2007. 128 M. S. Berger / Journal of Muslims in Europe 2 (2013) 115-136 centre stage to understand the Muslim; Bulliet argues for a legacy of a ChristianIslamic heritage, while Lewis differentiates between an Islamic civilisation on the one hand versus a Judeo-Christian civilisation on the other. The third perspective is the even more sensitive question as to what extent modern Europe is indebted to the legacy of the Islamic civilisation. Recently, literature has been prolific on the role of Islamic civilisation in introducing the medieval Europeans to Greek philosophers, advanced forms of agriculture and new crops, universities and libraries, commercial institutions like the check, trust fund and agency, and sophisticated forms of sciences like chemistry, astronomy and mathematics, and influences in architecture and arts.47 While these facts may historically be correct, the implications drawn from them are controversial. It is one thing to represent Islam as a “carrier civilisation” that had “little of their own to offer” but merely reproduced knowledge of Greek, Indian and Chinese origin that was of great use to Europeans.48 But it is quite another matter to argue that the Islamic civilisation has actually been at the cradle of pre-modern Europe and that it has kick-started Europe into its Renaissance and perhaps even introduced Europe to the notion of humanism, as is suggested in some of the aforementioned literature. Such conception would be very hard to stomach for quite a few Europeans. Although the notion of ‘taking over’ seems to reverberate through the centuries of European-Muslim relations, it has distinctly different meanings to the modern as opposed to the pre-modern European. To the pre-modern European ‘taking over’ meant the fear of actual conquest by Muslim armies. To the modern European, on the other hand, the notion of ‘taking over’ is much more nebulous. Conquest is surely not a realistic option, but other forms of domination apparently are. To some, the notion of an Islam that ‘takes over’ is represented by the physical presence of Muslims in Europe and, consequently, the values they bring with them. From our framework’s perspective, the Muslims in this view are considered (physical) carriers of these (virtual) values. This gives rise to two interrelated questions: Does the presence of Muslims in Europe represent a presence of Islamic values that contradict European 47 E.g., Jonathan Lyons, The House of Wisdom. How the Arabs Transformed Western Civilization (New York: Bloomsbury Press, 2009); Mark Graham, How Islam created the Modern World (Beltsville (Ml): Amana Publications, 2006); George Makdisi. The Rise of Humanism in Classical Islam and the Christian West (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press 1990); George Saliba, Islamic Science and the Making of the European Renaissance (Boston: MIT Press, 2011); Jim Al-Khalili, The House of Wisdom: How Arabic Science Saved Ancient Knowledge and Gave Us the Renaissance (New York: Penguin, 2011). 48 Trevor-Roper, The Rise of Christian Europe, p. 141. M. S. Berger / Journal of Muslims in Europe 2 (2013) 115-136 129 values? And if so, does this contradiction represent a threat to Europe, either because the Islamic values impede integration of Muslims into European society or, worse, Muslims want to impose them on their environment? 2.4 Imposing Values The underlying assumption to these two questions is that a Muslim by merely being Muslim adheres to ‘Islamic values.’ We have seen in the previous paragraphs that the term ‘Muslim’ does not necessarily denote a devout believer, and neither is everything that a Muslim does inspired by Islam, or in accordance with Islamic orthodoxy, nor is everything that Islam prescribes adhered to by Muslims. In other words, reducing values upheld by Muslims to the tenets of Islamic theology is too simplistic, if not downright incorrect. On the other hand, there are Muslims in Europe who claim that they strictly adhere to precisely these tenets. But then again, they differ among each other on the correct interpretation of these tenets.49 And what European Muslims actually hold to be Islamic rules or tenets may very well differ from those upheld by Islamic orthodoxy, as for example is the case for those Muslims— again, we are unable to quantify them—who are developing adaptations of Islamic rules to the Western context.50 Islam as a religion in Europe, in short, is still in flux. It is therefore almost impossible to give definitions or general overviews of ‘Islamic values’ that European Muslims adhere to, since these values have been developing into a numerous forms of Islam, ranging from liberal and integrated to ultra-orthodox and isolationist interpretations of Islam.51 Since it is difficult to identify the Islamic values that Muslims in Europe adhere to, we might turn the question around and ask ourselves what European values are allegedly violated by Islamic values as invoked or practiced by Muslims in Europe. In this approach it is illuminating to distinguish between 49 See contributions Jocelyne Cesari and Sean McLoughlin (eds) in Section III of European Muslims and the Secular State, (London: Ashgate, 2005), pp. 129-196. Also Felice Dassetto (ed.), Paroles d’islam: individus, sociétés, discours dans l’islam européen contemporain (Paris: Maison neuve et Larose, 2000). 50 This is the so-called fiqh al-‘aqaliyyat. See, e.g., Alexandre Caeiro, Fatwas for European Muslims: The Minority Fiqh Project and the Integration of Islam in Europe (Utrecht: Utrecht University Press, 2011); Dilwar Hussain, “Muslim Political Participation in Britain and the ‘Europeanisation’ of Fiqh,” Die Welt des Islams, 44 (2004), pp. 376-401. 51 For categorisations of forms of Islamic religiosity see Brigitte Maréchal, “The Question of Belonging” in Muslims in the Enlarged Europe. Religion and Society, Maréchal et al. (eds.) (Leiden: Brill, 2003), pp. 6-18; Jocelyne Cesari, When Islam and Democracy Meet: Muslims in Europe and the United States (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004), pp. 43-64. 130 M. S. Berger / Journal of Muslims in Europe 2 (2013) 115-136 the European values that we have identified as the sources of the two European discourses: legal-political, and cultural-religious. We defined legal-political values as those that are enshrined in constitutions and human rights treaties, such as liberty, equality, rule of law and democracy. While Islamic theological tenets and scripture may contradict some such values—just like Christian and Jewish orthodoxies do—Muslim practice as well as surveys among Muslims show that many European Muslims support these values. Their participation in political processes is similar to that of native Europeans, as is their adherence to the laws of their respective societies.52 A 2007 Gallup polling indicated that Muslims in several European cities favour democratic institutions and denounce violence for a noble cause more than the general public.53 This may sound surprising in times when European Muslims express so much resentment towards their European environment, but it is not: Muslims may be angry about discrimination and Islamophobia in European societies, but they are in need of the basic freedoms and liberties provided by European legal-political system in order to maintain their religious and cultural identity.54 The other set of European values relate to the cultural-religious discourse. This is closely related to the complex notion of secularism which, to many observers, is where Islam clashes with European values.55 I would argue, however, that few Muslims have a problem with the notion of secularism as the separation of religion and state (which is a notion of the legal-political discourse), because that guarantees their freedom to practice their faith according to their own wishes and without state interference. But we may observe a clash between Islam and secularism when we describe secularism not as a political-legal value, but as a value of the cultural-religious discourse which we 52 See country reports in Jocelyne Cesari (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of European Islam, 2013, and the online country studies of Open Society Foundations (www.soros.org). 53 Gallup World Poll, Muslims in Europe: Basis for Greater Understanding Already Exists (Princeton: The Gallup Organisation, 2007). 54 See also Jytte Klaus, The Islamic Challenge: Politics and Religion (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), pp. 204ff. 55 See, e.g., Talal Asad, Formations of the Secular: Christianity, Islam, Modernity (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2003); Cesari and McLoughlin, European Muslims and the Secular State, 2005; Jose Casanova, “Religion, European secular identities, and European integration”, Transit 27 (2004), pp. 1-17; Jytte Klausen, The Islamic Challenge: Politics and Religion in Western Europe (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005); Olivier Roy, Secularism confronts Islam (New York: Columbia University Press, 2007); Armando Salvatore, “Power and Authority within European Secularity: From the Enlightenment Critique of Religion to the Contemporary Presence of Islam”, Muslim World, special edition ‘Islam and Authority in Europe’, 96 (2006), pp. 543-561. M. S. Berger / Journal of Muslims in Europe 2 (2013) 115-136 131 defined as values that are not enshrined in laws but in customs and are held as self-evident truths: ‘the way we do things around here.’ These values are to my mind central in the conflict with ‘Islam.’ The European public generally considers not shaking hands with members of the other gender insulting, and the wearing of head scarves degrading, to name the most conspicuous examples— even though the political-legal values allow for such behaviour. Similarly, European societies have developed the customary practice of not publicly manifesting religion, even though that is perfectly admissible by law. For example, religious dress in public has become rare, and even self-proclaimed Christian politicians will seldom refer to Scripture to make their point. This is often referred to as secularism, but I would argue that it is a typical European cultural tradition of dealing with religion in the public domain. If one were to compare this secularism to that of the United States, for instance, we observe a completely different tradition where religion plays a very prominent role in the public and political domain.56 Manifestations of Islam through growing orthodoxy are therefore considered more confrontational in Europe (both western and eastern) than in the United States. From this perspective, Talal Asad was right in expressing doubts about the possibility that Islamic traditions would be permitted to institute ethics of participation in a secular, and in particular in a European socio-political context due to the institutional rigidities of European secularism.57 But the problem of Islam and Muslims in Europe is not their adherence to values that are prohibited by law—on the contrary, the legal-political values allow for diversity and liberty—but by the cultural-religious objection ‘that is not how we do things here!’ And what adds fuel to this conflict is that much of the ‘Islam’ that is denounced by European cultural-religious values is actually allowed by European legal-political values. To illustrate this conflict between the two discourses we may take the example of Shari’a. Shari’a wavers between physical and virtual Islam: on the one hand it refers to institutions (‘Shari’a tribunals’ or ‘councils’) and to Muslim practices and, on the other hand, it refers to medieval manuals and general notions of what 56 For comparative analyses, see e.g., Peter L. Berger, Grace Davie, Effie Fokkas, Religious America, Secular Europe?: A Theme and Variation (London: Ashgate, 2008); Jackson, Pamela Irving & Peter A. Zervakis, The Integration of Muslims in Germany, France and the United States: Law, Politics and Public Policy, unpublished paper prepared for 2004 annual meeting of the American sociological Association, 2004; Cesari, When Islam and Democracy Meet, 2004; Barbara Metcalf, Making Muslim Space in North America and Europe (Berkeley/London: University of California Press, 1996). 57 Talal Asad, Formations of the Secular, 2003. 132 M. S. Berger / Journal of Muslims in Europe 2 (2013) 115-136 devout Muslims may regard it as ‘good’ and ‘just’ and others as backward and medieval. The different components of physical Islam therefore contribute to different views of virtual Islam: the behaviour of the Taliban contributes to an image of a Shari’a that is reprehensible, while pious Muslims elsewhere devoting their lives to charity may yet yield a completely different picture of Shari’a. In the case of Shari’a in Europe, the focus appears to be primarily on manifestations of physical Islam that take place outside Europe. Indeed, certain practices in Aceh, northern Nigeria, Iran, Saudi-Arabia or Pakistan are not promising forebodings of Shari’a. However, surprisingly little is known about notions and practices of Shari’a among Muslims in Europe. Based on what we know from research so far, we may tentatively determine that the devout and orthodox among European Muslims who want to live in accordance to the rules of Islam (‘Shari’a’), focus on four domains: religious rituals, family law, financial transactions, and interaction with the non-Muslim environment.58 If this is indeed the practice of Shari’a in Europe, then it is quite peculiar that the European Court of Human Rights in 2003 in its ruling of Turkey versus the Islamic Refah Party considered that “Shari’a clearly diverges from [the European] Convention [of Human Rights] values.”59 Given the context of the case this statement was understandable, because members of the Refah Party who were calling for Shari’a had been quite threatening in their remarks.60 However, from a legal point of view, the ruling is surprising because the Court surely did not mean that rules pertaining to prayer, fasting, marriage and burial are against European values? It appears therefore that the Court in its ruling regarded Shari’a as virtual Islam (the assumption that Muslims in Europe want to live in according what one witnesses abroad) rather than physical Islam (the actual practice of Muslims in Europe). If the actual practice of Shari’a in Europe is indeed limited to religious rituals, family law, financial transactions and interaction with the non-Muslim 58 Maurits S. Berger, “Applying Shari’a in the West” in Applying Shari’a in the West. Facts, fears and figures, Maurits S. Berger (ed.) (Leiden: Leiden University Press, 2013, pp. 7-12 (with extensive references to literature on Shari’a in Europe). 59 ECHR, Refah vs Turkey, 13 February 2003, Nos. 41340/98, 41342/98, 41343/98 and 41344/98. 60 These remarks included: ‘We shall certainly call to account those who turn their backs on the precepts of the Koran and those who deprive Allah’s Messenger of his jurisdiction in their country’; ‘This system must change. We have waited, we will wait a little longer. Let us see what the future has in store for us. And let Muslims keep alive the resentment, rancour and hatred they feel in their hearts’; ‘If anyone attacks me I will strike back. I will fight to the end to introduce Shari’a.’ (idem). M. S. Berger / Journal of Muslims in Europe 2 (2013) 115-136 133 environment, then the confrontation with European values is not as singular as the European Court of Human Rights stated: while many of these rules may be considered unacceptable from a cultural-religious perspective, many are allowed from a political-legal perspective. Europeans may object to head scarves or the refusal to shake hands of the opposite sex, or to a genderunfriendly system of religious rules, but freedom of religion and general liberties allow for such practices. (In some instances the opposite occurs, in that an Islamic practice is accepted from a cultural-religious perspective, but not from a political-legal perspective: in countries like Kosovo and Albania the head scarf is an accepted part of cultural-religious life, but is contested in state institutions, and Islamic finance enjoys popularity even among non-Muslims in Europe but its implementation is problematic under existing fiscal laws.)61 The interaction of the two discourses becomes particularly complex in the case of Shari’a pertaining to family law, especially marriage and divorce. According to the political-legal systems in Europe, Islamic family law may be institutionalised as part of the formal national law (as in the Greek province of Eastern Thrace), or it could be practised on a voluntary basis just like Jewish, Protestant and Catholic family laws are practised by informal so-called ‘religious courts’ (which exist in most European countries), or the formal and informal legal orders may be bridged by forms of mediation or arbitration.62 However, while these are allowances made by Europe’s political-legal systems, the many public and political protests against ‘Shari’a’ or ‘Shari’a courts’ are illustrative of the strong cultural-religious sentiments. The cases of Canada and England may serve as an example. In the Canadian province of Ontario, the proposition in 2004 by Muslims to establish an Islamic arbitration tribunal just like those that the Jews and Christians had had for decades, lead to such fierce opposition that that arbitration in family law matters was abrogated for all denominations in 2005.63 In the United Kingdom we see a similar situation of Muslim ‘tribunals’ or ‘councils’ modelling themselves in accordance with 61 An exception is the United Kingdom, where fiscal laws have been amended in 2003 to accommodate Islamic finance instruments (Rodney Wilson, Islamic Finance in Europe (European University Institute—Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies: RSCAS Policy Papers No. 2007/02, 2007); for a critical discussion see, e.g., Jonathan Ercanbrack, “The Regulation of Islamic Finance in the United Kingdom”, Ecclesiastical Law Journal, 13 (2010), pp. 69-77. 62 Maurits Berger, “Shari’a in Europe” in Oxford Encyclopaedia of Islam and Law, J. Brown (ed.), (Oxford: Oxford University Press, forthcoming in 2013). Also Mathias Rohe, “Reasons for the Application of Shari’a in the West” in Applying Shari’a in the West, Maurits Berger (ed.) (Leiden: Leiden University, 2013), pp. 25-45. 63 See the elaborate report by Ontario’s Attorney General and Minister Responsible for Women’s Issues, Marion Boyd, Dispute Resolution in Family Law: Protecting Choice, Promoting 134 M. S. Berger / Journal of Muslims in Europe 2 (2013) 115-136 existing Jewish and Christian tribunals.64 As in the case of Canada, much criticism focuses—and justifiably so—on the negative sides of such practices, in particular those that are detrimental to the position of women.65 Similar criticism may be raised against the Jewish and Christian courts, but never as publicly and vocally as it was with Muslim courts. Moreover, most anxiety relates to the Talibanesque image of Shari’a and not on its practical uses and meanings to European Muslims. Consequently, allegations and impressionistic views—i.e. virtual Islam—keep dominating the many discussions about practices—i.e., physical Islam—just like the cultural-religious discourse maintains stronger overtones than the legal-political discourse when criticizing Islam and its practices. 3. Islamization of Europe, or Europeanization of Islam? What do these examples of interaction among the two manifestations of ‘Islam’ and the two ‘European’ discourses tell us with regard to the concerns and anxieties about ‘Islam in Europe’? We may observe that these interactions take place in two domains: one pertaining to forms of coexistence, and the other to forms of confrontation. The coexistence takes place in the physical realm, as people share work places, neighbourhoods, societies and countries. The term ‘sharing’ is here meant to be a factual situation that does not necessarily have to be one of exchange or tolerance, but can also manifest itself as discrimination or self-imposed segregation. These forms of coexistence appear throughout Europe, whereby its suddenness is a particular feature of Western European societies, unlike Southeastern Europe. The interaction by means of confrontation, on the other hand, is a mixture of the physical and virtual realms. The mere presence of Muslims, or a mosque, may be taken as a source of confrontation. I would argue, however, that it is not Inclusion (Ontario, December 2004, available online at: http://www.attorneygeneral.jus.gov.on .ca/english/about/pubs/boyd/). 64 There is quite some confusion, however, on the number of these tribunals that are active, and the extent to which they are operating within the national legal framework. Denis MacEoin, Shari’a Law or ‘One Law For all? (London: Civitas, 2009, 69) mentions the existence of 85 of such courts, but fails to indicate their exact activities and, moreover, bases its information mostly on newspaper reports. 65 E.g., Samia Bano, Islamic Dispute Resolution and Family Law (London: Palgrave MacMillan, 2011); Sonia Nurin Shah-Kazemi, Untying the Knot, Muslim Women, Divorce and the Shariah, (London: Nuffield Foundation, 2001); A. Shachar, Multicultural Jurisdictions: cultural differences and women’s rights (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001). M. S. Berger / Journal of Muslims in Europe 2 (2013) 115-136 135 the Muslim or the mosque as such that is the problem, but what he or she or it represents. This means that the confrontation can mostly be attributed to the virtual realm and everything that Islam represents. Indeed, the European image of what Islam represents is more persistent than what Muslims actually do, and this image is continuously fed by statistics and historical narratives. However, the presence of Muslims is not only static, but also manifests itself through Muslims’ behaviour and expression. We have evaluated the European response to this behaviour by means of the two discourses that we contend to be essential to Europe’s identity. Apart from acts of terrorism and violence perpetrated in name of Islam, most of the Muslims’ behaviour may very well fit in, or is allowed by the European political-legal system. It is the cultural-religious discourse that triggers most opposition against such behaviour. These observations may explain why the interaction between Islam and Europe is often asymmetrical since there appears to be little interaction between Islam and Europe, but mostly a European reaction to either physical or virtual Islam. From this preliminary conclusion we want to address the question posed at the beginning of this article: have Europe and Islam indeed reached a juncture that will prove crucial to their future, so that we are facing a choice between ‘Islamisation of Europe’ and ‘Europeanization of Islam’? From a European perspective the notion of ‘Islamization of Europe’ is not a neutral observation that Europe is witnessing more Islam than it had before; it is a notion of concern, possibly of fear. It is the anxiety about Europe losing its identity, irrevocably transforming into something that it should not. We have seen that it is hard to assess the exact numbers of Muslims in Europe, and that it is almost impossible to gauge their religiousness or Islamic values. And though Muslims in Europe seem to be increasingly devout and even orthodox, we cannot justify a causal link between the presence of Muslim in Europe and their alleged aim to impose their values on their European environment. Insofar as they claim space in the secular European domain for the manifestation of Islam, it appears to be exclusively for their own use. But even if we were to assume, for the sake of argument, that Muslims have agendas of domination, it is quite striking that Europeans demonstrate so little faith in the strength of their own values and structures to withstand the allegedly different Islamic values of a minority. Just as the notion ‘Islamization of Europe’ is biased because it reflects an anxiety, so is its mirror-notion ‘Europeanization of Islam’ biased because it reflects—from the perspective of many Europeans—an optimistic anticipation. It is the expectation that Muslims, under the influence of European liberalism and enlightenment, will transform their Islam into a moderate religion 136 M. S. Berger / Journal of Muslims in Europe 2 (2013) 115-136 befitting the European secular context. It is therefore dumbfounding to many Europeans that especially the younger generation of Muslims in Europe is more religiously orthodox than the previous generation: how can someone who is born and raised in a European secular, liberal society and education system return to religion even more strongly than his or her parents? The answer is too complex to be presented here, but the puzzlement about this alleged paradox is typical for Europeans; Americans, for example, will have less problems understanding this situation because they are much more accustomed to public intellectuals, scholars, scientists and politicians who also are devout believers. If there is any Europeanization of Islam, it is that Muslims in Europe have more freedom to practise their religion than they may have in Muslim countries. At present this freedom is used by many Muslims in Europe to pursue an orthodox interpretation of Islam, but this in itself does not justify the conclusion that such development is anathema to European values or identity. The two-choice question, therefore, is a misguided way to look into the future. If there ever was a choice with regard to the prospects of Islam and its role in Europe, it is a choice that Europe needs to make: will it adhere to its political-legal values, such as liberalism, equality, human rights and democracy, or will it prefer to emphasise its cultural-religious values? The burqa-bans in Belgium and France are a typical sign of the latter: irrespective of whether one agrees or disagrees with these bans, they were essentially a legalisation of cultural values, of ‘this is how we do things here.’ Such approach carries a distinct risk, however, because enshrining cultural values as law may confirm European cultural identities, but denies the values embedded in the European political-legal framework.