Download “Modernity exists in the form of a desire to wipe out whatever came

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“Modernity exists in the form of a desire to wipe out whatever came earlier, in the hope of
reaching at least a point that could be called a true present, a point of origin that marks a new
departure.” –Paul de Man1
We live in a time of unbridled and exponential technological advancement, a modernity
that rivals any age the world has ever seen. We have come to the point of renewable energy,
seeing the end of unnecessary pollution, abundant growth and efficiency in infrastructure, and
made it possible for people to live fuller and happier lives. We have questioned the world in
which we live, unlocking mysteries once thought of as impossible, enabling us to see into the
smallest aspects of our world and our universe at large. We have wiped out the ignorance of ages
past and unlocked a vast and beautiful age of modernity, but have we really come that far?
Coinciding with the magnificent feats of modern advancement, humanity has also
remained tied to the past, unable to sever the connections of pride, profit, oppression, possession,
and egoism. Self interest rules in our modern world, with monetary profit being the god of our
modern age. While we have subliminally deified money, religion rules the minds and actions of a
vastly divided planet of people, constantly struggling for dominance based on the loudly spoken
decree of an ever-elusive deified authority. On an individual basis, those privileged enough to
live on the upper echelons of society worry about the trivialities of materialism, egoism, and
staying on top of the system in which they live.
Egoism drives a vast majority of minds in our common civilizations, with stress placed
on constantly keeping up with technology and lifestyle choices, all for the striving toward a
better life. People have begun to distrust the others they exist around, making personal security
1
Paul De Man. "Modernity quotes & quotations." Find the famous quotes you need,
ThinkExist.com Quotations. http://thinkexist.com/quotes/with/keyword/modernity/
(accessed May 7, 2010).
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and personal advance the most important goal of one’s life. Our societies have become inundated
with personal electronic devices and social media sources, leading to a lifestyle of isolation,
separateness, and stagnation, where one’s identity is perceived through a personalized window in
cyberspace. The others in our life have become hindrances to our lifestyles if not in our same
social group, and anyone outside is deemed a radically different and hostile force to be reckoned
with.
How has such an advanced society still remained so far behind, so primal, and so
volatile? How has humanity as a whole missed out on and overlooked the advance in
interpersonal relationships? In such a modern world focused on severing ties with the inefficient
modes of the past, we still remain tethered to the stake of greed, ignorance, and egoism,
strangling ourselves in an attempt at progress and departure. We have overlooked the importance
of relational interaction in our modern era, making the others in our lives second to the allpowerful ‘I’. Our striving toward a new present in modernity has made its course, but our
personal actions have stunted us from a true departure.
In our determination toward a new present, could the answer to our current ailments be
found by looking in a mirror? Are the others in our life the key to unlocking justice, truth,
compassion, harmony, and the true departure? When looking at the past, the best teacher of all,
the answer to our questions can be found screaming at us, out of breath and red in the face,
begging to be let out of the corner, dusted off, and put in the spotlight. From the twentieth
century, to the eighth century, and beyond, a possible answer has stood out as a beautiful beacon
among the darkness of our egoism. The answer: the Other, an answer that has been staring us in
the face since the beginning of time. In order to investigate this ever elusive truth, we must take a
trek through time itself, starting in the late twentieth century with the philosophy of Emmanuel
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Levinas, followed by a journey to ancient India in the eighth century, investigating the ideals of
the bodhisattva path laid out by the revered monk Śāntideva, both providing a commensurate
account on how to live in a world filled with others, the ever pervading solution to our modern
dilemma.
To begin this journey, we find ourselves in Western Europe at the turn of the twentieth
century. The year, 1906, and Emmanuel Levinas was born to Jewish parents in the town of
Kaunas, Lithuania. Levinas grew up studying in his hometown of Kaunas, and in the city of
Charkow, Ukraine, acquainting himself with the Hebrew Bible and the great Russian novelists.
Toward the end of his studying philosophy in Strasbourg from 1924 to 1929, Levinas moved to
Freiburg in 1928, where he attended philosophical seminars given by Edmund Husserl and
Martin Heidegger, two great thinkers that would greatly influence Levinas’ philosophical
discourse. By 1930, Levinas had written his dissertation on the phenomenological philosophy of
Husserl and moved to Paris, France. After moving to Paris, Levinas attained many jobs at
universities in France and surrounding areas in the Mediterranean. Over the next few decades
after settling in France, Levinas was appointed professor of philosophy at the University of
Poitiers, after which working at the University of Nanterre. After receiving honorary
professorship at the Sorbonne in 1976, Levinas lived out the rest of his life, dying on Christmas
day of 1995.2
Although Levinas lived a full and happy life just shy of ninety years, the focus here is
specifically on his philosophy. In his academic endeavors, Levinas found himself confronted
with the philosophies of Edmund Husserl, Martin Heidegger, and Jean-Paul Sartre. In his earlier
years, Levinas was a proponent of Husserl’s ideas on phenomenology and Heidegger’s
2
All above information found in: The Encyclopedia of Philosophy: Supplement (New York:
Macmillan Reference Books, 1996). 297.
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phenomenological ontology. Phenomenology is the study of the development of human
consciousness and self-awareness as a preface to or a part of philosophy; and a philosophical
movement that describes the formal structure of the objects of awareness and of awareness itself
in abstraction from any claims concerning existence. In short, phenomenology is the study of
objects or phenomena that exist separate from one’s own personal existence, objects and
phenomena that can be measured and tested in all their attributes by all, thus “knowing” objects.
For phenomenologists, everything can be categorized based on its significance to one’s own
existence and the role that an object or phenomena has on one’s consciousness. Phenomenology
utilizes a distinctive method to study the structural features of experience and of things as
experienced. It is primarily a descriptive discipline and is undertaken in a way that is largely
independent of scientific, including causal, explanations and accounts of the nature of
experience.3
Jean-Paul Sartre’s philosophical discourse also had an effect on Levinas’ philosophical
standing. Sartre was an existentialist philosopher who was greatly influenced by Heidegger’s
masterpiece, Being and Time. In response to this book, Sartre went on to make many claims on
existentialism based on world changing ideas brought about by Heidegger. Sartre’s
existentialism is the study of what it means to be human, rather than in the world as such, and to
be human is characterized by an existence that precedes its essence.4 In short, existentialism
3
"Phenomenology [The Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy]." [The Internet Encyclopedia of
Philosophy]. http://www.iep.utm.edu/phenom/ (accessed May 7, 2010).
4
"Existentialism, Sartre’s [The Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy]." [The Internet
Encyclopedia of Philosophy]. http://www.iep.utm.edu/sartre-ex/ (accessed May 7,
2010).
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focuses on a human existence that precedes essence, meaning that the individual existence of a
human being is the only thing that is known for certain, and this precedes any essence or
phenomenological categorization of externalities. “I” only know that “I” exist and “I” cannot
control or give reason to anything outside of myself because its existence is in question and
radically opposed to my own existence.
With the phenomenological ideology mentioned above, the ego of an individual takes
precedence as a possessor, codifier, and namer of objects and phenomena, including other
people. With the views of existentialism aforementioned, the only thing that one can know for
certain is his or her own ego and the experiences attached to it, thus excluding a vast majority of
other beings from his or her scope on existence. This is where Levinas’ philosophy comes to a
decided break from phenomenology and existentialism, realizing that there is more to existence
than such narrow minded views on a personal existence based on egoism. In 1961, Levinas wrote
his acclaimed book, Totality and Infinity, along with various other accompanying works, as an
attack on the entirety of Western Philosophy, including Heidegger’s ontology, in an attempt to
show why philosophy has not been faithful to the most important facts of human existence and
how it’s basic perspective should be replaced by another one.5 In so doing, Levinas opened up
the door to an entirely new view of philosophy and the relationship that occurs between the self
and the Other6.
5
The Encyclopedia of Philosophy: Supplement (New York: Macmillan Reference Books, 1996).
297.
6
“The other qua other is the Other.” Emmanuel Levinas. Totality and Infinity: An Essay On
Exteriority (Pittsburgh: Duquesne University Press, 1969). 71. This capitalized Other is
absolutely other in its essence as a specific being separate from “me”. When other is not
capitalized, it signifies the meaning of other as the general idea of being separate or
different.
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To begin with Levinas’ theory, we must begin at the source of the problem: the self. The
self is generally ruled by the principle of autonomy, which is the quality or state of being selfgoverning.7 Autonomy is good in its own regard because it implies an inherent freedom of will
and choice, but in conjunction with egotism, autonomy leads to the self viewing its thoughts,
actions, and judgments as supreme and inerrant. According to Levinas, “The existence of an ego
takes place as an identification of the diverse. So many events have happened to it, so many
years age it, and yet the ego remains the same!”8 Our egos consist of the accumulation of
experiences throughout our lives, and the opinions, habits, likes, and dislikes that we condition
ourselves to lead us to form a separate self. Through such an ego-driven autonomy, views such
as phenomenology and existentialism are able to take root, basing themselves in the conscious
experiences of the individual ego. When one lives in a state of ego-driven autonomy, the
individual immediately seeks any desire, want, or need out with no concept of the repercussions
of such actions on others. Such people live in a world that revolves around the all-powerful “I”,
and anything exterior that poses a challenge or threat is dealt with in a phenomenological manner
by the object or Other being codified, categorized, judged, possessed, and oppressed.
Within such an egocentric view of life, there is a lack of free and uninhibited questioning
and investigation of anything outside of the self and its views. When one thinks that his or her
opinions and experiences are truth in and of themselves, the ultimate injustice is created through
a lack of free inquisition in the individual and in his or her actions and thoughts. Levinas states in
his essay, Philosophy and the Idea of Infinity, “With opinion the most subtle and treacherous
7
"Autonomy - Definition and More from the Free Merriam-Webster Dictionary." Dictionary and
Thesaurus - Merriam-Webster Online. http://www.merriamwebster.com/dictionary/autonomy (accessed May 7, 2010).
8
Emmanuel Levinas. "Philosophy and the Idea of Infinity" (In The Continental Ethics Reader.
1 ed. New York: Routledge, 2003). 43.
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poison seeps into the soul, altering it in its depths, making of it an other.”9 Within such a system
based on egotistical motives, the self seeks sameness, and anything exterior that presents itself as
a phenomenon is made sense of by making it relatable to the same. This system poses a problem
in its fabric, making personal opinion the sole authority, and any external being is seen as a
threat because it is vastly other and unknown. Such a view extols ignorance, selfishness, greed,
and possession due to the lack of free thought and proposition of the world in which one lives.
In living in egocentric autonomy, the Other that “I” am confronted by becomes an
obstacle to me and poses a challenge to “my” freedom as an autonomous individual. Instead of
allowing an-other to be an Other, the self seeks to remove the Other’s power and freedom by
possessing and oppressing the Other by grasping its essence and making the Other a concept.
Through such a possession, the Other is completely judged and identified by the ego, and the
Other’s independence is taken away. Such a possession maintains the reality of others being
separate and different to “me”. This reduction of the power and freedom of others leads to the
looming question: do we possess men, or do they possess us? In both cases, there is a combating
of freedoms, which leads to a war between the Other and the self. Does the Other exercise his or
her power on me by belittling my freedom and power, or do “I” reciprocally belittle the Other
with my power? Such a war between the self and the Other is fought on intangible grounds,
grounds constituted on rhetoric, skill, and forces of the mind. Through rhetoric, the ego
approaches the other with ruse, seeking to coerce him or her into submission and control by
skillful means.
In warring with the others around us, we have to view our actions in an objective light,
the light of justice. In “my” attempts at codifying and possessing the Other, am “I” justified in
9
Ibid. 44.
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doing so? Do “I” feel it just if the Other seeks to dominate and possess “me”, as “I” seek to
dominate and possess him or her? Are attacks against the Other merited or justified on the
ground of freedom? On such warring, Levinas states:
Heidegger shows in what intoxication the lucid sobriety of
philosophers is steeped… A system and tradition (in the
West) where the same (“I”) dominates the other, in which
freedom, even the freedom that is identical with reason,
precedes justice. Does not justice consist in putting the
obligation with regard to the other before oneself, in putting
the other before the same?10
Freedom in this sense depends on the state of Being11 in a being. If a being exists in true
freedom, if a being is Being, and “I” allow him or her to exist as such, then such a being is
experiencing Being in its truest form. Being directs existence, ethically indifferent, as a heroic
freedom, foreign to all guilt with regard to the other.12 In allowing the Other to exist in true
Being, there comes with it a lack of guilt and injustice in the self. This objective view toward the
Other through the lens of freedom leads to a form of transcendence in the ego where the ego’s
position changes from dominator and possessor into a coexistent being among other beings; an
intermediary is found in justice that expunges egoism.
Adding to this change in the ego, there also exists an attribute within the ego that drives
its actions: desire. Every egotistical action is done out of a desire for an intended effect or
product. When an ego uses this sense of desire in an unjust or selfish manner, only the ego
profits, and such profit is impermanent, thus leading to the clinging to such desire. Desire,
however, does not have to exist in the realm of injustice where the ego is central; it can exist in a
10
Emmanuel Levinas. "Philosophy and the Idea of Infinity" (In The Continental Ethics Reader.
1 ed. New York: Routledge, 2003). 46.
11
Being implies the overarching essence of truly and freely existing, not the singular being that
exists as an individual.
12
Emmanuel Levinas. "Philosophy and the Idea of Infinity" (In The Continental Ethics Reader.
1 ed. New York: Routledge, 2003). 46.
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realm of infinitude as well. Since desire is unquenchable in its very nature, the desire based on
egotism and autonomy exists on a phenomenological and existential basis.
We tend to desire tangible things because they are easily attainable and we have studied
their effects on our consciousness and existence. In so doing, we develop habits directed toward
certain objects or phenomena over others, habits that have been cultivated based on a sense of
investigation of the objects of our desire. Such habits, in turn, form our identities and opinions.
For example, “I” know that beer intoxicates “me”, and because of this, “I” desire the tangible
effects that beer has on “my” consciousness. When “I” study and inquire into the phenomena of
such intoxication, “I” learn how beer is made, its ingredients, the chemical processes that happen
upon its fermentation, and so on. Once “I” enquire into the essence of beer, “I” know beer, and
“I” then desire beer because “my” ego forms a liking to the feeling of intoxication, the concept of
“beer”, and its image in “my” ranges of sensory perception. Selfish desire leeches onto material
and impermanent things, forming a haphazardly built identity of various likes, dislikes, and
opinions. A world thus exists of volatile identities that cling to impermanence, repetition,
opinion, and easily attainable, yet fleeting, pleasure.
In the realm of infinite Desire13, there is something vastly different than a tangible desire
and satiation. Desire in the infinite sense is a desire that is in and of itself, unquenchable. Levinas
uses the expression infinity14to describe a reality that surpasses all that can be contained, grasped,
or understood by human consciousness and yet determines the basic structure of human
subjectivity.15 Levinas attributes infinity to the idea that the infinite cannot be deduced or
13
Capitalized Desire implies an infinitely greater desire than impermanent, selfish desire in an
existential and phenomenological sense.
14
l’infini.
15
The Encyclopedia of Philosophy: Supplement (New York: Macmillan Reference Books, 1996).
259.
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constructed by the human mind, that it is a thought that thinks more than it can think. Thus, the
desire for infinity is something that overflows its boundaries as a desire, remaining unquenchable
and unknowable. Since “I” can never truly know infinity, it becomes absolutely opposed to “me”
as a material, mortal being; infinity becomes wholly Other. Infinity is experience as experience,
and it cannot be contained or mastered by “my” subjective efforts. As being an experience,
infinity is an absolute relationship with the exterior that is not integrated into the same; “I” must
therefore shed my ego and its coinciding opinions in order to proceed toward the ground of
freedom, truth, and justice. “I” must question my egotistical existence and inquire into the
essence of truth through freedom of thought and proposition.
By existing in a realm of freedom, focused on justice and truth, our relationships with
others are allowed to reach their full potential. The idea of infinity is an idea that exceeds the
thought that thinks it, being completely above and beyond “my” grasp and comprehension.
Levinas posits that our relationships with others directly mirror our connection to infinity, being
unable to truly grasp and take hold of the Other in his or her true essence; the Other forever
remains a mystery to “me”. Although all human beings are finite, the encounter with the Other
confronts “me” with the infinite insofar as the incomprehensible fact of the Other’s reality
coincides with, or rather is, the absolute command or claim that is the core of all morality.16
Every being is part of infinity, or Being as a whole, and since the Other is an aspect of infinity,
“I” can only dominate or possess him or her via “my” unjust crimes, ruses, and exertions of
power. In such a confrontation with the infinitude of the Other, the Other resists “me” with his or
her freedom, forcing “me” to measure myself against him or her in an open region of infinite
unfamiliarity.
16
Ibid. 260.
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This confrontation is the ground on which Levinas bases his entire philosophy. This
interaction of two beings, the self and the Other, takes place in an arena of infinitude, freedom,
justice, and truth. This confrontation is what Levinas would call “The Situation” and within this
bare, raw, and open meeting, two beings approach one another in complete freedom. This
meeting is a meeting of the face-to-face relation. With this meeting, there are no strings attached,
only an unbiased and open gaze into the face of the Other. In this face-to-face relation, “I” allow
the Other, in all his or her freedom, to reveal him or herself to “me” freely, thus opening “my”
existence to an infinity that “I” can never comprehend, control, or possess. Of this meeting,
Levinas says, “The conjuncture of the same and the Other, in which even their verbal proximity
is maintained, is the direct and full face welcome of the Other by me.”17
In this ultimate situation of the face-to-face meeting, “I” lose my power as a selfish,
autonomous ego, and a dimension of infinity is opened up between “myself” and the Other,
ending the tyrannical reign of “I”. This situation is where the egotistical close-mindedness of
existentialism is thwarted. In this very moment, “I” realize that “I” am not alone; “I” realize that
“I” exist in a world full of Others, a vast array of beautifully and infinitely autonomous Others.
In such a world, there is no room for egoism, greed shows its face as purely unjust, and
ignorance is swept away in the face of the Other. The confrontation with “the face” awakens
“me” to the infinite responsibility of “my” being-for-the-other.18 Addressing the situation,
17
Emmanuel Levinas. Totality and Infinity: An Essay On Exteriority (Pittsburgh: Duquesne
University Press, 1969). 80.
18
The Encyclopedia of Philosophy: Supplement (New York: Macmillan Reference Books, 1996).
260.
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Levinas states, “Experience, the idea of infinity, occurs in the relationship with the Other. The
idea of infinity is the social relationship.”19
In this face-to-face meeting with the Other, one is captured by the gaze of the Other.
When you meet with the Other in a relational meeting, the gaze of the Other transports you to an
ethical level of responsibility. Levinas says that, “… the face is meaning all by itself. You are
you. In this sense, the face is not ‘seen’. It is what cannot become content, which your thought
would embrace; it is uncontainable, it leads you beyond.”20
The situation allows us to see infinity in the gaze of him or her to whom justice is due.
We can feel the penetrating gaze of the Other as he or she addresses us, and we can look into the
face of the Other as they stand before us, but this interaction is far more than mere perception.
When we merely look at and perceive the face of the Other, we have the ability to be transported
into an infinitude, but we are not taken into the ethical relationship with the Other by appearance
alone. For the face-to-face situation to hold any gravity there must be more than sight, there must
be a discourse.
In order to truly know the Other for all that they carry in their autonomous identity, we
must strive for an open relational discourse founded in freedom. On this discourse, Levinas says,
“Language institutes a relation irreducible to the subject-object relation: the revelation of the
Other. In this revelation only can language as a system of signs be constituted… The relationship
of language implies transcendence, radical separation, the strangeness of the interlocutors, the
19
Emmanuel Levinas. "Philosophy and the Idea of Infinity" (In The Continental Ethics Reader.
1 ed. New York: Routledge, 2003). 47.
20
Emmanuel Levinas. Ethics and Infinity: Conversations With Philippe Nemo (Pittsburgh:
Duquesne University Press, 1982). 86-87.
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revelation of the Other to me.”21 Only through discourse can we truthfully experience the Other,
and by this discourse egotism dissolves in the sea of the absolutely foreign. According to
Levinas, “We call justice this face-to-face approach, in conversation. If truth arises in the
absolute experience in which being gleams with its own light, then truth is produced only in
veritable conversation or in justice.”22 The Other teaches “me” on ways that “I” know nothing of
in “my” compilation of experiences, and through such knowledge, “I” grow in my knowledge
and experience of the world and its infinite minutiae.
In approaching the Other in the situation, there exists a concept that completely
obliterates the individual ego and allows for the true ethical treatment of the Other to take place.
On this concept, Levinas says, “…this gaze is precisely the epiphany of the face as a face. The
nakedness of a face is destituteness. To recognize the Other is to recognize a hunger. To
recognize the Other is to give. But it is to give to the master, to the lord, to him whom one
approaches as ‘You’ in a dimension of [majesty].”23 In viewing the Other we are viewing an
existent equal, yet we need not view the Other as equal, for this assumes a moderation that could
be easily transgressed or violated by either side of the relationship. Levinas states, “Truth is
bound up with the social relation, which is justice. Justice consists in recognizing in the Other my
master.24 Equality among persons means nothing of itself; it has an economic meaning and
presupposes money, and already rests on justice—which, when well ordered, begins with the
Other.”25 In viewing the Other as greater than yourself, you therefore diminish the primacy of
your own ego, making the needs and revelation of the Other top priority. In so doing, the Other’s
21
Emmanuel Levinas. Totality and Infinity: An Essay On Exteriority (Pittsburgh: Duquesne
University Press, 1969). 73.
22
Ibid. 71.
23
Ibid. 75.
24
Emphasis added.
25
Ibid. 72.
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needs are taken care of and he or she is approached in complete revelry, allowing the ethical
relationship to flourish. Levinas expounds even more on this relation, saying:
The first word of the face is the ‘Thou shall not kill.’ It is
an order. There is a commandment in the appearance of the
face, as if a master spoke to me. However, at the same time,
the face of the Other is destitute; it is the poor for whom I
can do all and to whom I owe all. And me, whoever I may
be, but as a ‘first person,’ I am he who finds the resources
to respond to the call.26
The Other is “my” master, to whom “I” owe all, and “I” am he who finds the resources to
respond to the call. This statement alone is enlightening, inspiring, and attractive, urging us to
respond with compassion and justice to the ones whom we show the most neglect. The
relationship with the Other implies responsibility. We owe the Other our concerned peace and
attention. On responsibility Levinas states, “… I speak of responsibility as the essential, primary,
and fundamental structure of subjectivity. For I describe subjectivity in ethical terms. Ethics,
here, does not supplement as preceding existential base; at the very node of the subjective is
knotted in ethics understood as responsibility.”27 The face of the Other implies an incumbent
responsibility for the Other, a responsibility that we need not neglect. This responsibility is
ethical insofar as there is an unwritten contract between the self and the Other that is signed in
the gaze, a responsibility to live for, protect, and respect the Other. Levinas would argue that this
responsibility for the Other is one sided, on the part of me, and should not wait for reciprocation.
The Other’s responsibility is the Other’s job; “my” job is to autonomously exist responsibly for
the Other. Levinas states, “Responsibility is what is incumbent on me exclusively, and what,
26
Emmanuel Levinas. Ethics and Infinity: Conversations With Philippe Nemo (Pittsburgh:
Duquesne University Press, 1982). 89.
27
Ibid. 95.
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humanly, I cannot refuse… I am I in the sole measure that I am responsible, a non-interchange I.
I can substitute myself for everyone, but no one can substitute himself for me.”28
Could it be that the answer to the brutal force of the ego is so simply organic, so infinitely
desirable? If the Other has an insatiable hunger that needs tending, then so do “I”, for “I” am an
Other. Our hunger is for the freedom, truth, and justice found in infinity and consciousness, a
hunger and desire that are unquenchable. If the Other is the closest thing we have toward
satiating our desire for infinity, and vice versa, we should continuously strive toward the infinite
wellspring of the Other, the only relief to our ego-parched lips, washing us in unfettered
Consciousness.
Through Consciousness, the gaze “I” partake in with the Other allows “me” to experience
a taste of infinity manifested in the Other, giving “me” a conscience to deliver justice and
relinquish freedom to the one whose face “I” have just experienced. The gaze of the Other
catapults “me” out of my selfish autonomy in to a state of inquisitive justice and freedom,
flowing with spontaneity and goodness, focused on the unquenchable desire for infinity. Infinity
is waiting in the gaze of every human being on earth; do we have the desire to gaze back,
question and inquire with selfless and receptive free thought?
This philosophy given by Levinas is a direct attempt at a true account of the plight of
human existence and the searching for its solution in a world that we would perceive as modern.
In his brilliant inquiry into the philosophies and challenging of the philosophers that preceded
him, Levinas broke into a truth that extends beyond casual human thought and reaches into the
depths of our consciousness as beings. Levinas beautifully explored the world for what it can be
outside of egoism, and provided a view of life that astounds, inspires, and challenges. Levinas
28
Ibid. 101.
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grabbed hold of a responsibility for others that beckons out of a world engulfed in egoism and
extended it into our modern era. Levinas says, “… A truly human life cannot remain satis-fied in
its equality to being… it is always getting sobered up… being is never its own reason for
being… the famous conatus essendi29 is not the source of all right and all meaning.”30
Yet, before Levinas, this same potential answer to our modern dilemma existed for
centuries, set forth by a man named Śāntideva in his celebrated book, The Bodhicaryāvatāra. In
our trek toward a new departure, we must first go farther back in time to the heart and birthplace
of a massive civilization. Our journey takes us to eighth century India, home to Hindus, Jains,
Muslims, and Buddhists. Our passage takes us to investigate the bodhisattva path of Mahāyāna
Buddhism, a path that has as complex a history as it does theory and application. To understand
the bodhisattva path, one must first understand where Mahāyāna Buddhism originated, and why
this path is deemed necessary for living a fulfilling and beneficial life for others.
Buddhism originated in India with the life and teachings of the historical Buddha, who is
generally believed to have lived from 566-486 BCE.31 From the teachings of the historical
Buddha, Buddhism grew into a vast and intricate religion. This earliest form of Buddhism is
known throughout Southeast Asia as Mainstream Buddhism, with the Theravāda sect, “the
teaching of the elders,” being the only tradition that still exists today.32 Around Common Era,
there arose a new and different form of Buddhism that challenged the ideal of the earlier sects,
and broke away from the previously instituted form of Mainstream Buddhism. This new form of
Buddhism is called The Mahāyāna, and its differences from Mainstream Buddhism are
29
Translates to the struggle of life, of being, of existence; natural selection; survival of the fittest.
Ibid. 122.
31
The Encyclopedia of Religion, Second Edition (Macmillan Reference Books USA, 2005).
1061.
32
The Encyclopedia of Buddhism (New York: Macmillan Reference Books, 2003). 492.
30
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significant, but one specific and large belief separates the two sects: how to properly attain
liberation from a cycle of rebirths and a world full of suffering. The Mainstream Buddhist ideal
for attaining liberation is found in the form of an arhat, a practitioner whose goal is to attain
personal liberation in his own immediate lifetime, while the goal of The Mahāyāna is to become
a bodhisattva, a practitioner whose goal is to become a Buddha by compassionately helping to
liberate others from suffering.
In order to understand these differing forms of liberation, a look at Buddhist ideology is
necessary. According to The Encyclopedia of Religion and Ethics, “The Buddha has said that, as
salt is the only flavor of the sea, the only flavor of his doctrine, the true doctrine or religion, is
the flavor of deliverance, or of nirvāṇa.”33 Nirvāṇa is defined by Rupert Gethin in his book, The
Foundations of Buddhism, as the ‘blowing out’ of the fires of greed, hatred and delusion; the
ultimate goal of Buddhist practice; the unconditioned.34The Buddha saw that ordinary beings
tend to act selfishly, thinking of short-term personal gains rather than considering the future
consequences of actions, their deeds create the causes of future unhappiness for themselves. Due
to such selfishly motivated actions, the Buddha went on to claim that such actions have
consequences manifested through karma, ones volitional actions, which may be good, bad, or
neutral. Coinciding with karma, is the concept of rebirth, or saṃsāra, which hinges on one’s
karmic actions in a lifetime; if one’s karmic actions are bad, they will be reborn to a lower realm
or position, if one’s karmic actions are good, they will attain a favorable rebirth in a higher realm
or position. This cycle of rebirth is constant and unending, and the only way for one to end such
suffering is to attain mokṣa, or liberation. This cycle of rebirth is driven by greed, hatred, and
The Encyclopedia of Religion and Ethics (Volume VIII), (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons,
1922). 330.
34
Rupert Gethin. The Foundations of Buddhism (New York: Oxford University Press, 1998).
320.
33
Fogleman 18
ignorance, and the key to liberation comes in overcoming such vices. The Buddha would say that
you are responsible for your own liberation, and that everything that happens to you depends on
your own efforts. Liberation for the Buddha is thus a state of mind, a drive toward overcoming
saṃsāra through the dissatisfaction with living in a system of ignorance and suffering.
In Buddhism, the problem associated with existence takes place in cognition, and the
solution to this problem lies in the restructuring of one’s mental state. According to John Powers
in his book, Introduction to Tibetan Buddhism, “…worldly existence is full of traps that beguile
the unwary and blind them to the harsh realities of cyclic existence. Life is full of suffering,
aging, and death, but most of us overlook these and focus on momentary [selfish] pleasures.”35 In
order to achieve a state of dissatisfaction with such a life, one must become familiar with the
Four Noble Truths propounded by the Buddha. On the night of his enlightenment, the Buddha
gained insight into these Four Noble Truths while he was meditating underneath the Bodhi Tree.
According to John Powers, these truths are: (1) The Truth of Suffering; (2) The Truth of the
Origin of Suffering; (3) The Truth of the Cessation of Suffering; and (4) The Truth of the
Eightfold Path, which overcomes suffering.36
The First Noble Truth, The Truth of Suffering, is explained by Gethin as, “a basic fact of
existence: sooner or later, in some form or another, no matter what they do, beings are
confronted by and have to deal with suffering.”37 Suffering exists in the forms of physical pain,
emotional turmoil, aging, sickness, death, and more, and by understanding that suffering
constantly exists, one can begin to cultivate dissatisfaction with the suffering that exists in life,
and seek to expunge it. The Second Noble Truth, The Truth of the Origin of Suffering, is that
35
John Powers. Introduction to Tibetan Buddhism (Ithaca, NY: Snow Lion Publications, 1995).
65.
36
Ibid. 65.
37
Rupert Gethin. The Foundations of Buddhism (New York: Oxford University Press, 1998). 60.
Fogleman 19
suffering has a basis and according to Gethin it is, “the thirst for the objects of sense desire, the
thirst for existence and the thirst for non-existence.”38 According to John Powers, “[The]
Buddha…identified this basis as desire motivated by ignorance. Beings suffer due to their
afflicted desires, and the way to overcome suffering lies in eliminating them.”39 By realizing that
selfish, ego-driven desires cause the suffering that is seen in the world, one can finally seek
suffering’s elimination.
The Third Noble Truth, The Truth of the Cessation of Suffering, leads one to realize that
suffering does not have to exist. Gethin says of this Noble Truth, “The cessation of craving is,
then, the goal of the Buddhist path, and equivalent to the cessation of suffering, the highest
happiness, nirvāṇa.”40 Through such elimination of craving by realizing its cause, ignorance and
suffering have no ground to hold on to, thus making suffering extinct in one’s ego. The Fourth
Noble Truth, The Truth of the Eightfold Path, which according to Gethin is, “Buddhist practice
proper,”41 provides an eightfold plan to restructure one’s cognitive structure and abolish the
suffering brought about by one’s ego. Powers states, “The path is commonly referred to as the
‘Noble Eightfold Path’ because it is divided into: (1) correct view; (2) correct intention; (3)
correct speech; (4) correct action; (5) correct livelihood; (6) correct effort; (7) correct
mindfulness; and (8) correct meditative absorption.”42 Through the generation and perfection of
these eight disciplines, one is able to exit the cyclical pattern of suffering in saṃsāra, and attain
liberation through enlightenment, ultimately leading to nirvāṇa.
38
Ibid. 70.
John Powers. Introduction to Tibetan Buddhism (Ithaca, NY: Snow Lion Publications, 1995).
67.
40
Rupert Gethin. The Foundations of Buddhism (New York: Oxford University Press, 1998). 74.
41
Ibid. 79.
42
John Powers. Introduction to Tibetan Buddhism (Ithaca, NY: Snow Lion Publications, 1995).
68.
39
Fogleman 20
Nirvāṇa is the goal of a Buddhist, the Buddha being the first and perfect example of its
attainment, and this is where the dissention in views between Mainstream and Mahāyāna
Buddhism comes in. Within Mainstream Buddhism, which existed since the life and death of the
Buddha, the ideal of a Buddhist practitioner is to become an arhat. According to The
Encyclopedia of Religion, “… the term arhat signifies persons who have reached the goal of
enlightenment or nirvāṇa. In the Pali canon the arhat emerges not simply as the revealer of the
religion or the person worthy of receiving gifts but as one who has attained freedom of mind and
heart, has overcome desire and passion, has come to true knowledge and insight, has crossed
over the flood and gone beyond…”43 The Encyclopedia of Religion and Ethics states, “Every
Buddhist should aim at the attainment of arhatta (saintship); and the most significant type, or the
only standard, of this attainment is found in the personality of the Buddha who is one of the
arhats.”44 Early Buddhist practitioners never strived to be Buddhas in and of themselves, they
were rather content to have as their Master the only Buddha who appeared in this world-period,
yet their moral ideal was always directed towards the perfection of an arhat, who was nothing
but a Buddha in his moral perfection. An arhat is a disciple of the Buddha, or one who has heard
the Buddha’s teachings, and reveres the supremacy of the Buddha as the great Teacher. The
objective of an arhat is to attain liberation from suffering by meditating steadfastly on the
Buddha’s teachings and putting them into practice. The goal of an arhat is thus one of personal
means, with the drive to extinguish all of one’s own suffering within their lifetime.
The aim of an arhat is, however, viewed as flawed, and the adherents of Mahāyāna
Buddhism found fault with the end-goal of Mainstream Buddhism. The Encyclopedia of Religion
43
44
The Encyclopedia of Religion. 476.
The Encyclopedia of Religion and Ethics (Volume V), (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons,
1922). 450.
Fogleman 21
and Ethics states, “…accordingly, while styling their own creed Mahāyāna (‘great vehicle’), true,
great, and profound doctrine of salvation, they characterized the creed of their predecessors as
Hīnayāna (‘little vehicle’), an inferior, imperfect, inefficient doctrine of salvation.”45 The goal of
an arhat is to attain nirvāṇa in one’s immediate lifetime, striving toward inner personal
perfection and liberation. This view, however, is in and of itself egotistical and selfish, with the
goal being one of personal attainment, and practitioners of The Mahāyāna saw this as an
incomplete path toward salvation. This division between Mainstream and Mahāyāna Buddhism
centered around a new model of liberation over the ideal of the arhat, claiming the superiority of
the bodhisattva ideal, which emphasized following the Buddha’s footsteps in spirit.
On the difference between the two schools, The Encyclopedia of Religion and Ethics
says, “…the characteristic difference between the two schools, or between the ideal of the arhat
and bodhisattva, consists in this, that, while the former sees in self-culture the first requisite of
morality, the latter insists on the necessity of altruistic actions and thoughts, even for the sake of
self-culture, as in the case of the Buddha’s former lives.”46 The goal of the bodhisattva is
radically different than that of the arhat, viewing enlightenment as far more than personal mental
discipline and cultivation. The bodhisattva’s goal is to act out of great compassion and altruistic
virtue, working for the benefit and sake of others, in order to lead them to the same liberation
that an arhat would seek to find. In The Bodhicaryāvatāra, Śāntideva stresses the importance of
the bodhisattva in helping to relieve other’s suffering due to the combined suffering of everyone
else being greater than his own. The bodhisattva path makes it possible for all beings to help
each other on the way to salvation and attain the realization of the communion of spiritual
The Encyclopedia of Religion and Ethics (Volume VIII), (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons,
1922). 330.
46
Ibid. Volume V. 452.
45
Fogleman 22
fellowship. The Encyclopedia of Religion and Ethics continues, “What is, therefore, more
essential for them than any act is the awakening of the radical good, the fundamental
nature…from which these acts and moral practice derive their source. This is called
bodhicitta.”47
Bodhicitta, or, “the mind of awakening,” is, according to Powers, “the altruistic intention
to become awakened for the sake of others.”48 Bodhicitta is where The Mahāyāna differs from
Mainstream Buddhism via the bodhisattva path. It is first the goal of the bodhisattva to generate
bodhicitta, and from there, the bodhisattva is able to use the virtues and perfections of the
Buddhist path to affect the people around him. The bodhisattva is not interested in mere
liberation alone, but is intent on becoming a Buddha through generating and showing
compassion, joy, peace, and altruism toward others, just as the Buddha himself accomplished in
his lifetime. Mahāyāna Buddhists view the career of the bodhisattva as the most complete path
toward liberation, seeking to mimic the life and actions of the Buddha himself, and hopefully
reach Budhahood, if not liberation from saṃsāra. Now that a foundational history has been laid
of how Mahāyāna Buddhism came about and the reason for its appearance, one can look at the
main ideals of the bodhisattva given by the medieval Indian monk, Śāntideva.
We do not know much concerning Śāntideva49, but we do know that he was an Indian
Buddhist monk, philosopher, poet, and scholar who is generally believed to have lived between
685 and 763 CE. Śāntideva was an adherent of the Prāsaṅgika branch of the Mādhyamaka school
47
Ibid. 454.
John Powers. Introduction to Tibetan Buddhism (Ithaca, NY: Snow Lion Publications, 1995).
93.
49
The following biographical information was found through both:
Śāntideva. The Bodhicaryāvatāra (New York, Oxford University Press, 1995), and
John Bowker. The Oxford Dictionary of World Religions (New York: Oxford University Press,
1997).
48
Fogleman 23
within Mahāyāna Buddhism and is generally accepted as being a devotee of the great celestial
bodhisattva Mañjuśrī, the patron saint of wisdom. Śāntideva is said to have lived in Northern
India in the state of Bihar, and is associated with the great Buddhist monastery of Nālandā, a
monastery known for its intellectual presence and prestige. Although Śāntideva’s life is shrouded
in mystery and legend, what is known for certain is that he is the author of two important
Mahāyāna Buddhist texts, the Śikṣā Samuccaya, and his masterpiece, the Bodhicaryāvatāra. In
the Śikṣā Samuccaya, the ‘Compendium of Discipline,’ Śāntideva groups together extracts from
Mahāyāna sūtras, comprising a work that deals with the conduct and behavior of a Mahāyāna
Buddhist monk. According to The Oxford Dictionary of World Religions, In the
Bodhicaryāvatāra, “Śāntideva describes the various steps to be taken by one pursuing the
bodhisattva path to enlightenment from the production of the thought of enlightenment
(bodhicitta) through the practice of the Perfections to full enlightenment…in order to promote
selflessness and compassion.”50 In such a view, a bodhisattva obliterates all sense of being ‘a
self’ in a practical and beneficial way toward others. The Bodhicaryāvatāra is considered one of
the most compelling works of Buddhist literature, and from this book, we will see the true
importance of the bodhisattva path.
The Bodhicaryāvatāra consists of ten chapters, each dealing with a certain aspect of the
bodhisattva path from the benefits of enlightenment, to meditation on bodhicitta, to the
meditation on the concept of no self, or anātman. One of the most important and relevant
chapters in the Bodhicaryāvatāra, is considered by many to be the eighth chapter, entitled, The
Perfection of Meditative Absorption. In this chapter is found the cornerstone to bodhicitta and
the bodhisattva path: the meditation of the exchange of self and other. According to the Dalai
50
John Bowker. The Oxford Dictionary of World Religions (New York: Oxford University Press,
1997). 857.
Fogleman 24
Lama, “The main meditation on bodhicitta consists of considering oneself and others to be equal
and then exchanging oneself with others.”51 Śāntideva puts forth this idea as a meditation, a
meditation that when practiced, allows a bodhisattva to truly live like the Buddha. This idea of
exchanging oneself with others in Śāntideva’s Bodhicaryāvatāra becomes influential in
Mahāyāna Buddhism, equating oneself as equal to loved ones, inferiors, superiors, and peers, yet
allowing others to take precedence to one’s own needs and desires.
One of the main themes in this chapter is the concept of no self, or anātman, which
focuses on the meditation that one has no permanent and fixed self, and in so doing, one begins
to dissolve the clinging to an ego and its accompanying desires. On this doctrine, Gethin states,
“… Buddhist thought suggests that as an individual I am a complex flow of physical and mental
phenomena, but peel away these phenomena and look behind them and one just does not find a
constant self that one can call one’s own.”52 As a person, one is constituted by an accumulation
of experiences, memories, and opinions, but when those are removed, there is nothing that exists
to hold on to as a fixed identity or soul. Gethin continues, saying, “Language and the fact that
experiences are somehow connected fools us into thinking that there is an ‘I’ apart from and
behind changing experiences…”53 In realizing that there is no self behind one’s desires, the goal
of ceasing the clinging to desires becomes easier to attain, thus freeing energy to devote to
others.
During the first part of this chapter, Śāntideva addresses an assembly of monks, stressing
the suffering that comes from selfish desires and the clinging to their impermanent pleasure.
51
The Dalai Lama. A Flash of Lightning in the Dark of Night: A Guide to the Bodhisattva's Way
of Life (Shambhala Dragon Editions). 1 ed. (Boston & London: Shambhala, 1994). 96.
52
Rupert Gethin. The Foundations of Buddhism (New York: Oxford University Press, 1998).
139.
53
Ibid. 139.
Fogleman 25
After addressing the assembly of monks on abandoning selfishness and desire, Śāntideva states
in verse 90, “At first one should meditate intently on the equality of oneself and others as
follows: ‘All equally experience suffering and happiness. I should look after them as I do
myself.’”54 Śāntideva continues in verse120, stating, “Whoever longs to rescue quickly both
himself and others should practice the supreme mystery: exchange of self and other.”55
Śāntideva goes as far as to say that the exchange of self and other is the supreme mystery,
but why is this so? Is this concept that hard to grasp or is it that important? In response to a
person’s efforts to perpetuate his or her ego, Śāntideva states in verses 25 and 26, “joy at the
means to one’s own good is simply joy at one’s own good, just as distress at the destruction of
material good is really caused by the loss of comforts. Trees do not bear grudges nor is any effort
required to please them. When might I dwell with those who dwell together happily?”56
The Dalai Lama states, “From this attachment to ‘I’ arises all the harm, fear, and
suffering in this world.”57 Our consumerism, love and reliance on personal technology, jealousy,
and egotism all lead us into a place of isolation and egotism. If we continually exist on the
premise that we must perpetuate our own ego and accumulate wealth and material possessions,
we will forever be left with this feeling of discontent. Śāntideva continues in verse 109, stating,
“In fact, through acting for the good of others, there is neither intoxication nor dismay, nor desire
for the resulting reward, with a thirst solely for the well-being of others.”58 By eliminating the
harmful effects of desire, a bodhisattva is able to focus more attention towards others, helping
relieve their suffering in turn. In verse 94, Śāntideva states, “I should dispel the suffering of
Śāntideva. The Bodhicaryāvatāra (New York: Oxford University Press, 1995). 96.
Ibid. 99.
56
Ibid. 90.
57
The Dalai Lama. A Flash of Lightning in the Dark of Night: A Guide to the Bodhisattva's Way
of Life (Shambhala Dragon Editions). 1 ed. (Boston & London: Shambhala, 1994). 107.
58
Śāntideva. The Bodhicaryāvatāra (New York: Oxford University Press, 1995). 97.
54
55
Fogleman 26
others because it is suffering like my own suffering. I should help others too because of their
nature as beings, which is like my own being.”59
Because of the suffering we experience when we strive after things in the material world,
we have something unique: the feeling and knowledge of suffering and discontent. With such
suffering in mind, it is the goal of the bodhisattva to “understand that others suffer in the same
way as we do, to see that all are equal, and to reflect on what is wrong with egoism and on the
advantages of altruism.”60 Knowing that all other beings suffer just as we do makes the task of
generating bodhicitta and meditating on compassion that much more real and practical. In verse
104, Śāntideva says, “You may argue: compassion causes us so much suffering, why force it to
arise? Yet when one sees how much the world suffers, how can this suffering from compassion
be considered great?”61
Great compassion is the goal of the bodhisattva, with others being the main focus in life.
With no self to worry about, the bodhisattva is able to approach others with a truly
compassionate, joyful, and liberating heart. The concept of the exchange of self and other could
have very real and very profound effects in our world today. Imagine a world in which people
lived free from egotistical motive and looked after themselves and everyone alike. In such a
world where all beings look after the benefit of the others around them, there is no room for
suffering. In verse 129, Śāntideva states, “All the joy the world contains came through wishing
happiness for others; all the misery the world contains came through wanting pleasure for
Śāntideva. The Bodhicaryāvatāra (New York, Oxford University Press, 1995). 96.
The Dalai Lama. A Flash of Lightning in the Dark of Night: A Guide to the Bodhisattva's Way
of Life (Shambhala Dragon Editions). 1 ed. (Boston & London: Shambhala, 1994). 98.
61
Śāntideva. The Bodhicaryāvatāra (New York, Oxford University Press, 1995). 97.
59
60
Fogleman 27
oneself.”62 Exchange of self and other is the key to Mahāyāna Buddhism’s claim of superiority
over Mainstream Buddhism. To truly live as the Buddha lived is to compassionately and joyfully
exist for others, and only through this practice can the veil of suffering be torn down. We can all
become bodhisattvas, as long as we generate the proper bodhicitta for those around us. Suffering
does not have to be the constant plague of existence, the Buddha tells us so, and Śāntideva makes
its abolition all the more immediate.
In Mahāyāna Buddhism’s religious complexity, it offers an answer to a world dominated
by suffering and egoism. Śāntideva grabs hold of the answer to egoism in The Bodhicaryāvatāra,
allowing us to practically and benevolently exist in a world saturated with others. This answer to
egoism extends, as we have seen, far into the future as well, providing a commensurate account
with Emmanuel Levinas’ philosophy of the Other. On the ground of freedom, truth, and justice
for others we find a way to navigate the world in which we live, enabling ourselves to shed our
egos and leave suffering as a distant memory in our minds.
Levinas and Śāntideva are drastically different men, existing in drastically differing
worlds. Levinas, a twentieth century Jewish scholar and philosopher, came up with his
philosophy in an attempt to combat the leading Western ideals of existence in a world that had
just seen the atrocities of two World Wars and the mass holocaust and genocide of an entire race
of people. In many ways, Levinas saw what unbridled egoism and suffering can amount to, and
his searching for an answer to such injustices caused him to come up with a philosophy that has
world changing potential. Śāntideva, an eighth century Indian Mahāyāna Buddhist monk,
developed his philosophy in an attempt to alleviate the sufferings of others in the quest to
emulate the Buddha’s life and teachings. Śāntideva may not have seen wars and genocide, but he
62
The Dalai Lama. A Flash of Lightning in the Dark of Night: A Guide to the Bodhisattva's Way
of Life (Shambhala Dragon Editions). 1 ed. (Boston & London: Shambhala, 1994). 107.
Fogleman 28
saw a flaw in the system of Buddhism, seeking to make its practice as monumentally effective
and efficient as possible. Through deep insight and meditation, Śāntideva saw the impracticality
of the self and its accompanying desires, coming up with a method of living that could ultimately
liberate the whole world from the snares of egoism and the suffering that accompanies it.
Levinas and Śāntideva grasped the idea of justice, truth, and freedom by viewing others
in a light of mystery and supreme importance. They both provide us with a commensurate
account on how to compassionately and joyfully take responsibility for the needs of others who
exist beside us. In viewing the Other in a face-to-face situation, I am bound to responsibility; I
see the hunger and need in him or her that I know exists inside myself. I know what suffering
feels like, I know what pain feels like, I know how it feels to be oppressed; therefore I also know
how it feels to love, to be compassionate, and to be joyful. The injustices of suffering and
oppression melt away in the face of the Other, enabling me to be catapulted into a realm of true
progress and positivism. When I treat the Other as I would myself, my ego remains my ego, but
only exists as selfless consciousness and has no selfishness attached to it; I remain autonomous,
free willed, and able to desire, but in the grasp of Desire, I know that I have an unquenchable
thirst for infinity that only the Other can sate, and vice versa.
We are shedding light on a supreme mystery, a mystery that although hard to find,
provides the avenue for true living to occur. When I see the Other, I must also realize that the
Other sees me as Other. I am the Other. The Other’s Other is Me. The Other’s Other is You. We
are all Others. With this in mind, we must realize our position in the balance of freedom. I have
the ability to be egotistical and selfish, but would I want someone to act egotistically and
selfishly, affecting me in a negative way? If I am the Other, would I want to appear hostile to
someone, or would I want to make the process of discourse and relation all the more easier by
Fogleman 29
appearing as open, joyful, compassionate, and receptive? I come into the world open and
vulnerable, easily hurt by the dominating arrows of the Other, but if I come unarmed and
insistent on justice, can the Other hurt me with advances, or in my gaze and my face is the Other
won by truth?
Time has shown us that history repeats itself; injustices remain constant, as do truths. In
our venturing toward a new departure, we must be willing to actually depart. In their nature,
people do not respond well to change, but we also realize that change is good, change provides
movement, change forbids stagnation. A new departure is possible, and although it may seem a
lofty ideal, it is possible. Where does it start? It starts in You. The only way to proceed and
progress is to change in yourself. I cannot force you to change, for this would be a violation of
my position as Other to you. You cannot force me to change, for you would overstep your
boundaries as Other. I can only change myself and you can only change yourself; through such
personal change, a transformation can be affected in others, not by force, but by action, pure,
unadulterated, and unbiased action showing itself as truth.
Action cannot start as monumental, it must start small. Like all things in life,
benevolence, compassion, and altruism take time to cultivate. The Confucian philosopher
Mengzi would say of this cultivation, “The feeling of compassion is the sprout of benevolence.
The feeling of disdain is the sprout of righteousness. The feeling of deference is the sprout of
propriety. The feeling of approval is the sprout of wisdom… In general, having these four
sprouts within oneself, if one knows how to [cultivate them], it will be like a fire starting up, a
spring breaking through! If one can merely [cultivate them all], they will be sufficient to care for
Fogleman 30
all within the Four Seas.”63 Mengzi’s account gives a perfect allusion to what is possible with
acting for others. All such action requires is the sprouting of benevolent, compassionate, and
altruistic qualities, and once cared for, such qualities will grow, enabling change to occur.
Realizing that egoism only leads to a continual cycle of tension and release, based in
selfishness and suffering, why would I want to continue to exist in such a state? If happiness and
growth are found in my relationships with others in a vast community, why would I not want to
seek the flourishing infinitude of satisfaction found in Others? If I realize that the only way for
me to grow in my self is to dive headfirst into the face-to-face gaze, discourse, and relationships
with Others, why would I not want to do so? If the Other exists in destituteness, then I exist in
destituteness. I have a hunger just as big as the Other, for I am the Other. I am hungry, I am
needy, I am incomplete, and I have an emptiness that cannot be filled by selfishly attaining
impermanent desires. I must exist for the Other as I need the Other to exist for me, for I have the
resources to help the Other, and the Other has the resources to enliven me with mystery, to help
me on my path, to awaken me to life.
Śāntideva has given us an idea that can change our, and Others, lives through
compassion, joy, and altruistic service. Levinas has provided us with an account of how our
egotism is unmerited, being nothing but a societal construct by those who came before us with
unjustified motives and incomplete understandings. Time has proven one thing: that we can learn
from it, grab hold to the beneficial things and eradicate the obsolete and harmful. We have the
ability to reach a new departure, our modernity has proven it so, but our ego’s are standing in the
way, lazily addicted to the profits of material gain, indifferent to the cries and sufferings of those
we afflict. We must eradicate our reliance to avariciousness and impermanent desires and realize
63
Bryan W. Van Norden and Mengzi. Mengzi: With Selections from Traditional Commentaries
(Indianapolis: Hackett Pub Co, 2008). 46-47.
Fogleman 31
that a world of opportunities exists just beyond our selves. We have the ability to wipe out the
generations of mal-intentioned thoughts that came before us, we have the ability to reach a new
present. We are at a point of a new departure; all we have to do is open our eyes to the gazes of
those around us and seek the infinity that exists therein.
“We are not bound to accept the status quo as right,
and history itself is not the final judge of history.”
–Emmanuel Levinas64
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