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Political Behavior, Vol. 23, No. 4, December 2001 ( 2002) JEWISH RELIGIOSITY AND POLITICAL ATTITUDES IN THE UNITED STATES AND ISRAEL Kenneth D. Wald and Michael D. Martinez Does religious commitment have a common political impact across national frontiers? To date, that question has been explored empirically only for Roman Catholics, who might be expected to behave similarly because of centralizing resources in their tradition. This article explores the extent of transnational political attitudes among Jews in the United States and Israel, two groups with less centralized authority structures and radically different religious situations. Parallel surveys of Jews in the United States and Israel, analyzed by OLS regression with the slope dummy approach, indicate that Jewish religiosity has a common influence on most political issues but often has much sharper effects in one society than the other. Given our expectation that Jews would exhibit lower levels of transnational similarity than Roman Catholics, the findings reinforce scholars who perceive religion as a potent transnational political factor. Key words: Jewish; Jews; religiosity; Israel; transnational; transnationalism; slope dummies; Orthodox; religious commitment. How do religious doctrines, institutions, practices, and beliefs shape political institutions and behavior both within and across state boundaries? Thanks to the development of a vibrant subfield in religion and politics, scholars have made considerable progress exploring that fundamental question. They have produced a substantial empirical literature on how religion shapes individuals’ political attitudes and behaviors within states. By comparison, the literature on between-state effects has not been as empirically well developed. Despite recognition of religion’s potential to influence political attitudes and behaviors across national frontiers (Keohane, 2001; Rudolph and Piscatori, 1997) and a S N L Kenneth D. Wald, Professor of Political Science, Department of Political Science, University of Florida, POB 117325, Gainesville, FL 32611-7325; ([email protected]). Michael D. Martinez, Associate Professor of Political Science, Department of Political Science, University of Florida, POB 117325, Gainesville, FL 32611-7325 ([email protected]). 377 0190-9320/01/1200-0377/0 2002 Plenum Publishing Corporation POBE 23(4) #4844 04-11-02 10:08:31 POB234$$33 S N L 378 WALD AND MARTINEZ plethora of attempts by various faiths to do so, the accumulated empirical evidence on their success has been much more limited. In this article, we take an incremental step in that direction by examining the transnational effects of religiosity on political attitudes among American and Israeli Jews. Building on Mattei Dogan’s䉳 famous comment about French Communist deputies, we ask, in effect, whether two Orthodox Jews, one who is American, have more in common than two American Jews, one who is Orthodox.1 䉳 Au: Source? RELIGION AS A TRANSNATIONAL FACTOR S N L Most comparative research on religion and politics has been conducted within nations (see, e.g., Haynes, 1998; Moen and Gustafson, 1991; Moyser, 1991; Sahliyeh, 1990). Whether focusing on Catholics (Whyte, 1981), Protestants (Wallis and Bruce, 1985), or Jews (Liebman and Cohen, 1990), the relatively few extant crossnational studies have been essentially descriptive, lacking strong theoretical development and systematic multivariate analysis.2 Because of those deficiencies, scholars have been unable to develop much of a purchase䉳 on the growing efforts to link religion and politics across national frontiers.3 In the contemporary period, these include campaigns to create a multinational political identity among Middle Eastern Muslims (Halliday, 1996; Piscatori, 1986; Roy, 1994), evangelical Protestants in North and South America (Brouwer, Gifford, and Rose, 1996), Scandinavian Lutherans (Karvonen, 1994) and members of the Orthodox Church in Eastern Europe (Karatnycky, 1998). These campaigns recall earlier Roman Catholic attempts to build continental political movements in Europe and Latin America (Kalyvas, 1996; Williams, 1967). These efforts presume that religious identities have the potential to carry a common political ethic, one that is manifested in the same way in different geographical settings. Is this assumption plausible? To date, we have located only one set of studies that empirically addresses the empirically by assessing the transnational political attitudes of a single religious group. The exception, a series of studies by Jelen and Wilcox (1997), utilizes global and continental samples to explore crossnational differences among Roman Catholics on abortion and gender attitudes (Jelen, O’Donnell, and Wilcox, 1993; Jelen and Wilcox, 1997; Wilcox and Jelen, 1993䉳). Despite major historical and cultural differences from one country to the next, the authors found strong relationships between Catholic commitment and support for traditionalist policies on women and reproduction. While the findings of this singular work suggest consistent religious-political linkages across national borders, there are reasons to believe that Roman Catholicism may be better positioned than other religious traditions to forge such ties. Roman Catholicism has a centralized international hierarchy with the POBE 23(4) #4844 04-11-02 10:08:31 POB234$$33 䉳 Au: OK? 䉳 Au: Not in refs. S N L JEWISH RELIGIOSITY AND POLITICAL ATTITUDES S N L 379 legitimacy to issue authoritative interpretations of Church doctrine and national leaderships that reinforce the teaching authority of the Church. That structure has consistently transmitted clear messages to Catholics on these topics. Under these circumstances, we would expect religiously committed Catholics in each society to internalize the Church’s position. In the language of comparative research, then, Catholicism constitutes a relatively “easy case” from which to test a transnational model of opinion formation. A more complete test of the predictions associated with transnationalism requires expanding the stock of cases to include religions without such strong central authority. “Hard cases” would include religious traditions that are less endowed than Catholicism with resources to promote strong crossnational uniformity. If we find the same patterns in those cases as in Catholicism, it would strongly support the theoretical expectations that religious identities are potentially powerful transnational forces. Judaism is a case that exemplifies factors that might mitigate transnational effects. Specifically, the tradition is less endowed than Catholicism with resources to promote strong crossnational uniformity. The diversity within Judaism is a function of religious development as abetted by diaspora. The religious tradition enshrined in Jewish sacred texts and commentary has periodically been disrupted by revivalist and reformist protests, leaving in their wake a variety of denominations and tendencies. The Hasidic movement emerged early in the 19th century as a revivalist protest against what it claimed was the excessive legalism and formalism of mainstream Judaism. The possibilities of development further increased following the emancipation of European Jewry in the mid- to late-19th century. As Jews emerged from ghettos to participate more fully in European societies, Judaism itself was recast and reformulated to meet the new situation (Birnbaum and Katznelson, 1995). Challenged by the emergence of Reform and then Conservative variants of Judaism, the embattled upholders of tradition adopted the mantle of Orthodoxy. Each stream has developed its own understanding of Jewish law and reinterpreted the tradition according to its principles and needs. Although various groups assert that theirs is normative Judaism, none enjoys much legitimacy to interpret the faith outside its own membership. Strikingly, there is no single contemporary institution in Judaism with even putative global authority in the manner of the Vatican. The diasporic nature of Judaism further disrupted cohesiveness. As Judaism spread across the globe over the centuries, Jewish communities transplanted from the core to a periphery engaged in creative reinterpretation of tradition better to adapt to the host culture (Katz, 1996). As in other traditions, this adaptation took the form of highlighting or “foregrounding” those aspects of the tradition that resonated with the indigenous culture and deemphasizing (“backgrounding”) discordant components that made adaptation more diffi- POBE 23(4) #4844 04-11-02 10:08:31 POB234$$33 S N L 380 S N L WALD AND MARTINEZ cult. The form of Judaism that emerged in Cochin India, for example, was built on a foundation myth that paralleled Hindu legend, imposed what amounted to a caste system, and embraced Jewish analogs to Hindu ritual acts and symbols of purity. It was strikingly different from the Judaism that prevailed elsewhere. Though their adaptation was perhaps less drastic, Jews in the United States also drew on elements of the Jewish tradition that facilitated their successful incorporation into U.S. society. By the late twentieth century, Fishman (2000) observed, “the contents of liberal American and Jewish cultures . . . appear to many American Jews as almost identical” (p. 179). If such syncretism is common, then the spread of Judaism across the globe may not have produced a transnational religion, but rather a set of “national” religions sharing a family name but varying significantly from one another in matters of style and practice. Powerful though these decentralizing tendencies undoubtedly were, other aspects of Judaism may have worked against them. Judaism has a core text in the Hebrew Bible and a codified record of what is called the oral law in form of the Talmud. Apart from a very few isolated Jewish outposts in India and Ethiopia, the rabbinic interpretation of the Jewish tradition in the Talmud gained authoritative status among Jewish communities worldwide. Although far from monolithic in its characterization of Jewish law, the Talmud sets outer limits on the permissible interpretation of Jewish scriptures and thus imposes a considerable degree of cohesiveness on how the faith is understood. Moreover, the Jewish communities scattered around the globe partook of a common heritage. The shared historical legacy made Jews what is sometimes called a community of fate. Jewish religious holidays, with their emphasis on tribal traditions and their invocation of historical calamities, reinforced a sense of shared experience regardless of locale. The greatest calamity of the twentieth century, the Holocaust, further linked Jews in a bond of suffering that transcended national borders. Such a heritage may produce more uniformity than is commonly imagined in the face of such widespread physical dispersion. Looking specifically at the Israeli and U.S. Jewish communities, the largest in the world, one finds both convergence and divergence. Travel and communication have assuredly “shrunk the distance” between the communities, as globalization theory recounts (Keohane, 2001, p. 1), opening up vigorous twoway exchanges of people, ideas, and organizations. In the most internationalist wing of Judaism, the journalist David Landau (1993, pp. 38–40) writes that business deals are closed, marriages arranged, and philanthropies funded without much regard for national borders. Israelis are exposed to the political values of American Jewry through immigrants, who helped found and promote the Israeli peace, feminist, and environmental movements, and by the Israeli POBE 23(4) #4844 04-11-02 10:08:31 POB234$$33 S N L JEWISH RELIGIOSITY AND POLITICAL ATTITUDES S N L 381 offices of communal organizations from North America.4 Conversely, major Israeli political and social movements employ emissaries who try to win American Jewry to their side.5 These efforts may be offset to a degree by the dramatically different situation of Jews in Israel and the United States. As David Martin has suggested (1978, ch. 2), a religious group’s political orientation depends most fundamentally on whether it constitutes a majority or minority. Where the group is preponderant and enjoys state support, it is likely to exhibit considerable cohesion in political conflict against secular forces. Where the state is marked by religious pluralism and embraces no religious identity, however, Martin anticipates a more fluid linkage between religious commitment and political orientation. According to Liebman and Cohen (1990), the situation of Jews in Israel and the United States approximates these contrasting ideal types. As a minority that has thrived in a multicultural state that disclaims a formal religious identity, American Jewry has developed a distinctive liberal political culture. Israeli Jews, the dominant yet embattled majority in a Jewish state, have evolved a strikingly different political identity. Using similar surveys administered in both countries, Liebman and Cohen show that Israeli and American Jews often hold strikingly dissimilar political and social attitudes. If not two Judaisms, this social evolution has produced what Liebman and Cohen describe as two worlds of Judaism. However, the conclusions of this study rest on simple comparisons of marginal frequencies. Given the enormous compositional differences between the Jewish communities in Israel and the United States—particularly in terms of religious commitment—it is not at all clear that the differences are due to location. To reiterate, the lack of an authoritative hierarchy and the radically different religious situations of Israeli and American Jews make it likely that Jews will exhibit lower degrees of the transnational political patterns than what is observed in Roman Catholics. Our research goal is not to determine whether Jews in Israel make common political cause with Jews in the United States, nor do we compare (or contrast) the entire Jewish community to other religious traditions within either country. Rather, we seek to determine whether the degree of religiosity affects Jews’ political attitudes in the same way in the two countries. We have framed the discussion in terms of polarities—transnational similarity as suggested by globalism advocates versus the strong national patterns anticipated by Martin and demonstrated at the aggregate level by Liebman and Cohen. We can also envision a middle ground where religiosity exerts the same kind of effect in both societies but the impact is appreciably stronger in one society than the other. We offer a design that can detect any of these patterns. POBE 23(4) #4844 04-11-02 10:08:31 POB234$$33 S N L 382 WALD AND MARTINEZ RESEARCH DESIGN The data for this article, obtained from the Roper Center, are from parallel surveys of adult Jews in the United States (n = 848) and Israel (n = 1011) conducted by the Los Angeles Times (1998) and Yedioth Ahronoth䉳 in March 1998.6 Both surveys utilized telephone interviewing, and the questionnaires were similar, though not identical, in content. Whatever their shortcomings, these studies constitute the only extant parallel surveys conducted with a probability-based sampling design and a bank of questions that allow scholars to examine the religious-political linkages among Israeli and American Jews. We know from prior research within each country that religious salience structures the political attitudes of Jews in the United States and Israel (Arian and Shamir, 1999a; Cohen, 1983; Kotler-Berkowitz, 1997; Peres, 1995) and is a prime source of differences within each community over the questions that constitute our dependent variables (Freedman, 2000, pp. 162–216). Hence our principal question is whether religiosity’s effects on political attitudes are similar in our samples of American and Israeli Jews. We approach this question by employing regression analyses with slope dummy variables on the pooled U.S.-Israeli sample (Hanushek and Jackson, 1977, pp. 106–108). The basic model can be represented as 䉳 Au: Not in refs. Y = a + b1 Israel + b2 Religiosity + b3 Israel * Religiosity + b4 . . . k control variables + e S N L This formulation, with a dummy variable for Israeli residence, comparable measures of religiosity, and an interaction between them, allows us to address several questions. First, an estimated non-zero b1 coefficient would tell us that there are significant differences between the least religious Israeli Jews and the least religious American Jews, notwithstanding differences in the control variables. A zero b1 coefficient would indicate that any differences between the least religious Israelis and American Jews on the dependent variable could be explained by some combination of ethnicity, income, age, and other control variables. The b2 coefficient describes the relationship between religiosity and the dependent variable among American Jews. The b3 coefficient, which measures the effect of the interaction between the Israeli dummy and religiosity, is crucial to our main question. Generally, a zero b3 coefficient indicates that the effects of religiosity on the dependent variable are similar in the two countries, providing support for the thesis of transnational effects of religious commitment. A non-zero b3 coefficient indicates that, ceteris paribus, the effects of religious commitment are different among the Jewish populations in Israel and the United States, or as Liebman and Cohen (1990) suggest, Judaism’s effects on political attitudes depends on the national context. POBE 23(4) #4844 04-11-02 10:08:31 POB234$$33 S N L JEWISH RELIGIOSITY AND POLITICAL ATTITUDES S N L 383 The key independent variable, religious commitment, was derived from comparable questions about religious self-identification in the two surveys (see appendix䉳 for details). Social scientists have measured religious affiliation by focusing on belief, behavior, or belonging. Belief measures have been especially useful for pietistic faiths that utilize doctrine as a lodestone of affiliation, but do not work nearly so well for nonpietistic faiths, such as Judaism, that value deed over creed. Scholars have utilized behavioral measures—specifically, observance of key rituals—in several studies of Judaism, but such an approach is less appropriate in a comparative study such as this one. First, Jewish Israelis live in a world that facilitates observance of religious tradition. The daily and yearly calendar is organized around the Hebrew tradition, kosher food is easily accessible in public facilities, and many religious holidays are occasions for family celebration. The striking contrast with the American reality makes a simple comparison of ritual acts highly suspect as an indicator of genuine religious commitment across the two societies. Even if we had confidence in the behavioral measures, the two surveys are not compatible on this dimension. In the Israeli sample, questions about ritual behavior were not asked of those respondents who picked the “Orthodox” or “Haredi” label, while the American survey asked the questions of the entire sample. Thus, the surveys do not provide comparable measures for a crossnational behavioral scale. The third way of assessing religious commitment, measuring sense of belonging through self-identification, has become increasingly common in the literature. This approach offers a compelling theoretical rationale. As research on social categorization strongly indicates, “mere” identification with a label has a powerful influence on the development of group-based attitudes (Hogg and Abrams, 1988; Tajfel, 1981, 1982). As Turner noted, (1982) “individuals who share a common identification of themselves . . . often . . . share no more than a collective perception of their own social unity, and yet this seems to be sufficient for them to act as a group” (p. 16). Working from that assumption, political scientists have developed a “social heuristics” model that incorporates self-identification to predict vote choice and attitude formation (Brady and Sniderman, 1985; Sniderman, Brody, and Tetlock, 1991). The selfidentification approach seems appropriate to Judaism, a religious tradition with different forms distinguished by unique views of religious authority, ways of celebrating rituals, and contrasting approaches to religious identity. Accordingly, we employed self-identification with specific labels as our primary method of assessing group affiliation and validated it where possible with behavioral indicators. For both the American and Israeli samples, respondents were arrayed on a Religiosity continuum from the least to the most Orthodox style of Judaism.7 In ascending order of religiosity, American respondents were classified as non- POBE 23(4) #4844 04-11-02 10:08:31 POB234$$33 䉳 Au: Appendix A? S N L 384 S N L WALD AND MARTINEZ religious (26%), Reform (34%), Conservative/Reconstructionist (30%), and Orthodox/Hasidic (11%). The nonreligious category includes those who volunteered that they had no religious affiliation and those who selected the “just Jewish” label. Consistent with other studies of this subgroup (Lazerwitz, Winter, Dashefsky, and Tabory, 1998), the respondents in the “just Jewish” category had minimal Jewish involvement and interaction. Overall, there was a strong, monotonic relationship between religious identification and a composite measure of observance in the American sample (tau-c = 0.535). The proportion of those who reported high levels of observance rose from 8% to 20% to 45% to 89% across the four categories. Because of this relationship, we are comfortable assuming that self-identification adequately taps religious behavior and what most scholars mean by the term religiosity. The corresponding divisions among Israeli Jews were antireligious (21%), secular (35%), traditional (27%) and Orthodox/Haredi (17%).8 In the survey, a large proportion of respondents (56% in all) initially indicated they were secular. Based on prior studies of the Israeli public (Levy, Levinsohn, and Katz, 1993), this large category appears to conflate both the truly secular— those who are totally nonobservant—and Israelis who mean only to indicate that they do not practice the Orthodoxy that constitutes normative Judaism in Israel. To distinguish between the two groups among the nominally secular, we used the term “secular” for respondents who performed two or more of the ritual acts that are common markers of Jewish religious observance—attending worship services on the High Holy days, regularly lighting candles on the Sabbath, fasting on the Day of Atonement, or maintaining a kosher home. Those who fell below this minimal threshold were labeled as “antireligious.” Apart from their ritual behavior, auxiliary analysis confirmed that the two groups of secular Israeli Jews did indeed differ in their distance from traditional Judaism. By arraying respondents in this manner, we do not mean to suggest an exact equivalence such that Reform Jews in the United States are identical to the Israeli seculars or that Conservative Jews in America practice the same type of Judaism as Israelis who select the “traditional” label. Rather, we are suggesting a parallelism of degree on a continuum where the endpoints are absence of Jewish religious behavior and closeness to Orthodoxy. From comparable or identical questions in the two surveys, we constructed four dependent variables—ideology, affect for Palestinians, support for Oslo, and support for Orthodoxy in the Israeli state. As noted above, these variables were selected in part because previous research within the two societies indicated they were influenced by respondents’ religious identity. If we are searching for transnational religious effects, these are variables that should show such patterns. But these dependent variables satisfied two additional criteria. First, in a broad sense, each measure has some salience to Jewish POBE 23(4) #4844 04-11-02 10:08:31 POB234$$33 S N L JEWISH RELIGIOSITY AND POLITICAL ATTITUDES S N L 385 communities in both Israel and the United States. While we should anticipate differences between Americans and Israelis in their knowledge and attentiveness to the issues represented by the four items, the stimuli are common referents for Jews in both nations. The second attractive quality of the dependent variables, an implicit ordering from broad to narrow or, in the context of our general discussion, from global to local, introduces some variability among them. Of the four dependent variables, ideology is clearly the broadest concept and taps into a global discourse that might well be understood the same way in the two societies. The ideology questions in the parallel surveys were similar, although the Israeli survey used “left” and “right” rather than “liberal” and “conservative” and presented three rather than two gradations for each wing. We collapsed both scales into right, center, and left. The support for Orthodoxy measure is at the other end of the continuum. American Jews may well have opinions on this question as evidenced by the ferocious reaction of the community to past proposals to redefine Jewish identity in Israel by exclusively Orthodox religious standards. Nonetheless, the status of Orthodoxy is much more consequential for Israelis because they live in a state that allocates coercive power to government-appointed religious authorities.9 The religious policy composite asked respondents if they approved of allowing non-Orthodox rabbis to perform marriages and conversions in Israel and if women should be allowed to be rabbis. Both phenomena are common in the dominant Reform and Conservative denominations of American Jewry but forbidden under the Orthodox establishment in Israel. In addition, respondents were asked to select between civil law, religious law, or some combination of both for the state of Israel. Coded to indicate support for Orthodox authority, these items scaled at 0.59 in the American sample, 0.67 among Israeli Jews. We believe the two other scales, attitudes to Palestinians and views of the peace process, stand midway between ideology and Orthodoxy on this dimension. As the ubiquitous “We Are One” theme attests, American Jews have a strong interest in Israel’s security—whether they live there or not. Indeed, support for Israel rivals Holocaust consciousness as a pillar of contemporary Jewish identity in the United States (Woocher, 1986). Yet, the question still resonates among Israelis in a way it does not for American Jews simply because they most directly bear the burden of Israel’s precarious existence. The peace process variable was based on three questions about attitudes to the Oslo Accords, the return of West Bank territory to the Palestinians, and establishment of a Palestinian state. These items formed a composite Pro-Peace scale with a Cronbach’s alpha of 0.64 in the United States and 0.74 in Israel. A related scale, designated Palestinian Affect, tapped attitudes to the Palestinians through questions about Yasser Arafat’s approval rating, the sincerity of POBE 23(4) #4844 04-11-02 10:08:31 POB234$$33 S N L 386 WALD AND MARTINEZ his commitment to peace, and respondents’ level of sympathy for the Palestinian people. The three items had a respectable Cronbach’s alpha of 0.68 in Israel but just 0.51 in the U.S. sample.10 Judging from the reliability statistics calculated for the scales, these items do not cohere as tightly in the minds of Americans as they do for Israelis. In addition to religiosity, the regression models include a set of predictors that have frequently been linked to political attitudes in both countries. These include Age, Gender, Ethnicity, Income, Education, and loss of a family member during the Holocaust. While age, gender, ethnicity, and Holocaust experience were created from identical questions, it required considerable recoding to render the income and education variables comparable. We will use ideology to predict the three attitudinal scales. Consistent with the literature on Israeli political behavior (Peretz and Doron,䉳 1996, p. 535), we will assume that ideology precedes partisanship and use party identification only as a predictor of the attitudinal scales.11 䉳 Au: Not in refs. ANALYSIS S N L The results of the analysis for the four dependent variables, arrayed in Table 1, include the basic set of predictors described in the previous section plus the slope dummies for the entire set of control variables and the dummy variable coded 0 for Americans and 1 for Israelis. In these rich and complex equations, we focus primary attention on the coefficient representing the interaction between religiosity and Israeli residence, listed in the third row. A significant, non-zero coefficient for this slope dummy provides evidence for a situational pattern, while a slope dummy that fails to reach the threshold of statistical significance reinforces the transnational hypothesis. Although we summarize the impact of other predictors in the equation, they do not bear directly on our central research question about the transnational or situational impact of religiosity. The first column of coefficients in Table 1 portrays the factors that influence ideological self-identification with the left/liberal end of the political spectrum. Religious Orthodoxy strongly diminishes the probability of identification with the left wing of the political spectrum in both countries, but the effect is significantly sharper in Israel. The equation for ideology also tells us that age, higher levels of education, and gender (women) promote ideological identification with the left to the same degree in the two countries. We computed predicted values for typical respondents in the regression equation to clarify and illustrate the sharper effect of religiosity on ideology in Israel. Our average respondent is a 44-year-old female Ashkenazi with an average income and education and who did not lose a family member in the Holocaust. U.S. and Israeli Jews with those typical characteristics and who are POBE 23(4) #4844 04-11-02 10:08:31 POB234$$33 S N L JEWISH RELIGIOSITY AND POLITICAL ATTITUDES 387 TABLE 1. Impact of Religiosity Among American and Israeli Jews Ideology Israel Dummy Variable Religiosity Israel * Religiosity Ideology Israel * Ideology Party Israel * Party Age Education Female Income Ashkenazi Holocaust loss Israel * Age Israel * Education Israel * Female Israel * Income Israel * Ashkenazi Israel * Holocaust Loss 0.245 −0.200*** −0.178*** 0.004* 0.091* 0.215** −0.040 −0.042 −0.037 −0.002 −0.047 −0.102 0.054 0.013 0.159 Constant 2.101*** Adjusted R2 SEE Number of Cases 0.224 0.733 1477 Peace Process Palestinian Affect Orthodox Authority −1.617 −0.506*** 0.207 0.704*** 0.371* 0.027 0.502** −0.006 0.000 −0.560** 0.312*** −0.104 0.251 0.009 −0.050 0.534* −0.206* 0.066 −0.242 −1.846* −0.324** 0.223 0.058 0.707*** −0.025 0.715*** 0.001 0.209 −0.265 0.053 0.065 −0.030 −0.004 −0.174 −0.100 −0.017 −0.510 0.148 −2.490** 0.894*** 0.269* −0.370** −0.193 −0.232 0.062 −0.017*** −0.138 −0.005 −0.287*** 0.173 −0.194 0.013* 0.107 −0.183 0.199* −0.115 0.312 −0.941 −0.518 1.669* 0.318 1.894 1242 0.194 1.998 1366 0.382 1.771 1323 Note: Entries are unstandardized regression coefficients. *p < .05; **p < .01; ***p < .001. S N L farthest removed from Orthodoxy are, on average, left of center ideologically. American nonreligious Jews lean a little further to the extreme (2.58 on our 3-point scale) than Israel’s antireligious Jews (2.41), but on the whole, they are very close ideologically. The more Orthodox in both societies are more conservative ideologically, but the magnitude of the difference is much more dramatic in Israel. Orthodox Jews in the United States are, on average, near the center of the ideological spectrum (1.98), while Israel’s Orthodox are well to the right (1.27). Again, the effects of religious affiliation on ideology are similar in kind, but their magnitude is much greater in the Jewish state. There is evidence of a transnational religious-political linkage in the positive and significant coefficient for religiosity but signs of a䉳 situational pattern in the greater linkage among Israelis. The next two columns report attitudes to the peace process and affect toward Palestinians, and the transnational pattern is dominant. Religiosity has POBE 23(4) #4844 04-11-02 10:08:31 POB234$$33 䉳 Au: OK? S N L 388 S N L WALD AND MARTINEZ the same (negative) impact on support for the peace process in the two countries. The typical least religious of Israelis have slightly higher scores on the peace process scale than the typical least religious American Jews do (0.46 to 0.01). But, as both Israeli and American Jews move toward Orthodoxy, they move away from Oslo (−0.44 for Israelis, and −1.51 for Americans). It is useful to note that ideology also works in the same way across national borders. Greater tendency to identify with the left promotes support for Oslo, but the effect is somewhat stronger in Israel. In contrast, other variables’ effects in the two populations differ. Attitudes to the peace process among American Jews are unrelated to partisanship, a variable that powerfully structures Israeli assessments. On the other hand, gender and income affect American Jewry but do not produce any significant impact on the support for the peace process in Israel. While attitudes are structured differently in the two countries, religiosity’s effect is similar. A similar pattern emerges for affect toward Palestinians, the dependent variable in column 4. The slopes for religious affiliation are comparable in the two countries. Greater religious commitment diminishes pro-Palestinian sentiment among both American and Israeli Jews. Typical American Orthodox Jews have even less favorable opinions about the Palestinian people and their leader (−0.71) than do the average Israeli Orthodox (−0.53), although American nonreligious are more inclined than Israeli antireligious toward more sympathetic views of the Palestinians (0.26 compared to −0.23). While religiosity’s effect is transnational, other variables in the equation show that the configuration of attitudes toward Palestinians is nonetheless quite distinct according to nationality. Neither ideology nor partisanship conditions the attitudes toward Palestinians among American Jews. By contrast, both variables strongly influence how Israelis think about their Arab neighbors. Even after the full set of controls and slope dummies are included, the Israel dummy remains extremely powerful and shows the Israelis notably cooler to the Palestinians than are Americans. This seems to indicate purely national patterns that cannot be attributed to compositional differences between the two societies. On the assumption that questions of religious authority are precisely what divide Jews into camps, we expected the religious policy measure to exhibit a uniform relationship to religiosity. Somewhat unexpectedly, the data in the final column of Table 1 more closely resemble the mixed transnational/situational pattern of the ideology variable. Religion has by far the greatest impact on attitudes toward the public role of religion in Israel. As Jews in the United States move closer to the Orthodox endpoint of the religious continuum, they become more supportive of maintaining Orthodox privilege, the male rabbinate, and religious law. The pattern is accentuated among Israelis. Similarity between the two nationalities is greatest among the Orthodox, although even here, American Jews are more traditionalist (1.93, compared to 1.66). Sharper POBE 23(4) #4844 04-11-02 10:08:31 POB234$$33 S N L JEWISH RELIGIOSITY AND POLITICAL ATTITUDES 389 differences exist between the nonreligious in the United States (−0.76) and the antireligious in Israel (−1.83). Both groups tend to oppose traditional stances on the supremacy of religious law, the exclusive authority of Orthodox rabbis in Israel to perform marriages and conversions, and the ban on women in the rabbinate, but opposition among the Israeli antireligious is notably stronger than among nonreligious Jews in the United States. Overall, this dependent variable generated the mixed pattern that we recognized as a possibility earlier in this article. The finding that Orthodoxy inclines Jews in both countries toward deference to religious authority in Israel provides support for the transnational model, while the greater intensity of that relationship in Israel supports the situational model. Among the other variables in the equation, only ideology influences attitudes toward religious authority among both Israelis and Americans. In both countries, identification with the left undermines support for Orthodoxy. For American Jews, age and income reduce support for Orthodoxy, but these factors do not structure the attitudes of Israelis. The power of national factors is even more apparent in the Israeli dummy. The strong negative coefficient for this variable, coupled with the steeper gradient for religiosity among Israelis, attests that nonreligious Israelis were significantly less supportive than their American Jewish counterparts of state support for Orthodoxy. This pattern is consistent both with the marginal frequencies for this dependent variable and with prior research on the basis of interreligious conflict in Israel (Wald and Shye, 1994). DISCUSSION S N L Using parallel surveys of Jewish adults in the United States and Israel, we asked whether religiosity has a common political effect in the two societies or if the relationship between religious commitment and political attitudes varies by nationality. These two possibilities are compatible, respectively, with a transnational and a situational interpretation of Jewish politics. Looked at broadly, our findings are mixed with different patterns for various dependent variables. None of our measures demonstrated a pure “national” pattern consistent with the situational approach. At the other extreme, two measures conformed cleanly to the transnational hypothesis. For attitudes to the peace process and pro-Palestinian affect, religiosity pushed respondents in the same (negative) direction and to the same degree in both Israel and the United States. That left two measures that partook to some degree of both transnational and situational forces. In terms of ideology and state support for Orthodoxy, religiosity worked the same way in the two societies. As religiosity increased, respondents in Israel and the United States more closely identified with the right and favored a privileged position for Orthodoxy. Yet these cases POBE 23(4) #4844 04-11-02 10:08:31 POB234$$33 S N L 390 S N L WALD AND MARTINEZ deviated from the transnational hypothesis because religiosity had a much sharper impact in Israel than the United States. The two measures that exhibited only a transnational effect, the peace process and Palestinian affect, would appear to constitute the same symbolic domain for Jews in Israel and the United States. As Arian and Shamir (1999a, p. 266) recently noted, questions about the peace process and Palestinians “touch upon basic collective identity dilemmas of territorial and social communal boundaries” for Israelis. While these might appear to be Israeli “national” issues that do not have the same immediate impact for Jews in the United States, they resonate as well with Diaspora Jews. For many American Jews, it has been argued, Israel has become the major pillar of Jewish identity and represents a focus of loyalty for the worldwide Jewish community. In both countries, debates over the peace process have been polarized by religious commitment such that two Orthodox Jews, one American, often have more in common on the issue than two American Jews, one who is Orthodox (Freedman, 2000, pp. 162–216). What do these findings say about the value of the transnational and situational perspectives on political behavior? As noted, only two dependent variables exhibited a pure transnational effect and the tables䉳 do suggest striking differences in the binational sources of opinion in the two countries apart from religiosity. These patterns warn against a wholehearted verdict on behalf of the transnational hypothesis. Nonetheless, the transnational hypothesis does appear stronger than its situational competitor. Consider the striking differences between the effects of religiosity and income. With religiosity, we found clear transnationalism in the peace process and Palestinian affect, and situationalism in ideology and Orthodox authority only to the extent that those relationships were stronger in Israel (i.e., they move in the same direction as for American Jews). On the other hand, with income there is clearer evidence of situationalism. It is influential in the United States on Oslo and Orthodox authority, but not in Israel on either. Gender has a similar profile, affecting Americans but not Israelis on ideology and moving Jews in opposite directions on party and the Oslo peace process. Against these patterns, religiosity emerges in these four equations as the variable that most consistently exemplifies either a pure transnational effect or a situational effect that is a magnification (stronger relationship in the same direction). Some factors, religiosity being the exemplar, appear more transnational than others. Despite the qualifications introduced above, the findings of this study tend to reinforce those scholars who anticipate political uniformity among coreligionists in different societies. We had expected strong situational patterns, first, because Judaism lacks a global hierarchy that enjoys legitimate moral authority to apply religious teachings to social and political issues. Moreover, the different situations of Judaism in Israel and the United States was thought POBE 23(4) #4844 04-11-02 10:08:31 POB234$$33 䉳 Au: OK? S N L JEWISH RELIGIOSITY AND POLITICAL ATTITUDES 391 likely to encourage the development of strong contextual patterns. Despite its status as a less centralized and more individualistic religious tradition than Catholicism, Judaism still appears to possess the resources that encourage global political behavior. We have thus added a measure of empirical ammunition to the arsenal of scholars who posit the emergence of transnational religion in an era of fading states (Rudolph and Piscatori, 1997). Acknowledgments. In the course of conceptualizing and writing this article, we have received valuable input from several of our colleagues in the Department of Political Science. We thank them for their input. Ken Wald is particularly grateful to the College of Liberal Arts and Sciences for providing the necessary research funds as part of the William G. Carleton Term Professorship. APPENDIX A S N L The sampling frame for the American survey stratified area codes and telephone exchanges between the Metropolitan Statistical Areas (MSA) containing an estimated 73% of the Jewish population of the United States and the remainder of the country. Respondents were contacted by telephone through random digit dialing. The overall response rate was 64%, and the sample was weighted to adjust for the greater cooperation rates among respondents living outside an MSA. In the American survey, respondents were screened so the sample contained only adults with at least one Jewish parent or who were raised as Jews or who considered themselves Jewish. The three questions used in the screen were similar to the supplemental questions used to identify Jewish respondents for the 1990 National Jewish Population Survey (NJPS; Goldstein, 1992, p. 84). As it did for the NJPS, this series of screens produced a substantial number of respondents with Jewish ties who nonetheless indicated they were practicing another religion. The rate of 15.7% for the Times survey corresponded closely to the 19% reported for the NJPS (Goldstein, 1992, p. 90). There is no hard and fast rule about whether such respondents should be considered Jewish for purposes of analysis. Our decision to drop the 133 respondents who identified with another religious tradition besides Judaism was motivated by a desire to obtain a sample that corresponded to the Israeli sample, which was limited to Jews. The Israeli survey, conducted by the respected Dahaf Institute, drew telephone numbers randomly from a list of all telephone exchanges and stratified respondents as kibbutz residents, settlers in the West Bank/Gaza, immigrants from the former Soviet Union, or Jews who did not fall into any of those categories. These were further stratified by type of settlement and geographic area. Owing to the high refusal rates of the ultra-Orthodox population, an oversample was drawn from areas with high concentrations of haredim. The response rate for all respondents was 78%. Comparison of the Israeli sample to official data indicated no need to weight the Israeli respondents. The male/female ratio was 49/51 in the population versus 47/53 in the sample. The reported vote for prime minister in 1996 among the sample of Jewish POBE 23(4) #4844 04-11-02 10:08:31 POB234$$33 S N L 392 WALD AND MARTINEZ Israelis was 55% for Netanyahu and 45% for Peres, virtually identical to the official figures reported in Jewish settlements by the Central Bureau of Elections (Arian and Shamir, 1999b, p. 6). We report on the religious composition of the sample in the text and note 6. APPENDIX B Question Wording for Variables. Where wording differed, Israeli item is on the left. Ideology: Politically, where do you see yourself? 1. EXTREME RIGHT 2. RIGHT 3. SOMEWHAT RIGHT 4. CENTER 5. SOMEWHAT LEFT 6. LEFT 7. EXTREME LEFT How would you describe your views on most matters having to do with politics? Do you generally think of yourself as very liberal, or somewhat liberal, or middle-of-the-road, or somewhat conservative, or very conservative? Partisanship: Whom did you vote for in last election for Prime Minister? Regardless of your party registration or how you have voted in the past, do you usually think of yourself as a Democrat, or a Republican, or an Independent, or as something else? (ACCEPT “DON’T THINK OF SELF THAT WAY” AS A VOLUNTEERED RESPONSE) (IF DEMOCRAT OR REPUBLICAN) Do you consider yourself a strong (Democrat/Republican) or not a very strong (Democrat/Republican)? (IF INDEPENDENT) Do you feel closer to the Democratic Party, or the Republican Party, or to neither party? Pro-Peace As you may know, in this peace agreement Israel agreed to return part of the West Bank and Gaza Strip to the Palestinians in exchange for peace and official recognition of Israel by the Palestinians. Having heard more, in general, do you approve or disapprove of the peace agreement between Israel and the Palestinians, known as the Oslo Accords? (IF APPROVE/DISAPPROVE) Do you strongly (approve/disapprove) or somewhat (approve/disapprove). S N L In your opinion, how much land should Israel be willing to give up on the West Bank in order to reach a peace agreement with the Palestinians: Should we [“they” in the POBE 23(4) #4844 04-11-02 10:08:31 POB234$$33 S N L JEWISH RELIGIOSITY AND POLITICAL ATTITUDES 393 US question] be willing to give up all of it, most of it, some of it, only what we [they] have already returned, or none of it? Do you approve or disapprove of there being an independent Palestinian state in the Middle East? (IF APPROVE/DISAPPROVE) Do you strongly (approve/disapprove) or somewhat (approve/disapprove). Palestinian Affect What is your impression of Palestinian Authority President Yasser (YAH-sir) Arafat (AHR-AH-FAT)? As of today, is it very favorable, or somewhat favorable, or somewhat unfavorable or very unfavorable—or haven’t you heard enough about him yet to say? What is your general impression of the Palestinian people? As of today, is it very favorable, or somewhat favorable, or somewhat unfavorable, or very unfavorable—or haven’t you heard enough about them yet to say? From what you know, do you believe that Yasser (YAH-sir) Arafat (AHR-ah-fat) is sincere when he says he wants to continue the peace process, or do you not believe he is sincere when he says this? Support for Orthodoxy Do you think Israel should be a state governed by civil laws, religious laws, or a combination of both? As you may know, currently only Orthodox Rabbis are permitted to conduct marriages and conversions in Israel. Do you favor or oppose allowing Reform and Conservative Rabbis to also perform marriages and conversions in Israel? (IF FAVOR OR OPPOSE) Do you strongly (favor/oppose) this or only somewhat (favor/oppose) this? Do you believe that women should be allowed to be Rabbis? Religiosity (see text for additional details) Are you: 1. HAREDIC JEW 2. ORTHODOX JEW (NON-HAREDIC) 3. CONSERVATIVE 4. SECULAR Is your personal religious affiliation Orthodox, or Hasidic (ha-SEE-dick), or Conservative, or Reform, or Reconstructionist, or “just Jewish”—or is your religious affiliation nonJewish? Ethnicity S N L Are you an Ashkenazi (OSH-ken-ah-zee), meaning that your family was originally from Eastern Europe or of Sephardic (suh-FAR-dick) descent, meaning your family was originally from the Middle East, Africa, or Spain? If you do not know you can tell me that too POBE 23(4) #4844 04-11-02 10:08:31 POB234$$33 S N L 394 WALD AND MARTINEZ Holocaust To the best of your knowledge, did anyone in your family die in the Holocaust? Income The average monthly expenses of a 4person family was on last February, 6,300 New Israeli Shekel. Taking this into consideration, your household size and expenses, are your household expenses are: 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. MUCH BELOW AVERAGE BELOW AVERAGE AVERAGE ABOVE AVERAGE MUCH ABOVE AVERAGE If you added together the yearly incomes of all the members of your family living at home last year, would the total of all their incomes be less than $20,000 . . . or more than $40,000 . . . or somewhere in between? (IF LESS THAN $20,000) Would the total of all their incomes be less than $10,000? (IF IN BETWEEN) Would the total of all their incomes be less than $30,000 or more than $30,000? (IF MORE THAN $40,000) Would the total of all their incomes be between $40,000 and $50,000 . . . or between $50,000 and $60,000 . . . or between $60,000 and $70,000 . . . or between $70,000 and $80,000 . . . or between $80,000 and $90,000 . . . or between $90,000 and 100,000 . . . or more than that? Education How many years of formal school did you complete? What is the highest grade of regular school or college that you finished and got credit for? (IF HIGH SCHOOL GRADUATE) After graduating from high school, did you complete some technical training like secretarial school, or art school, or trade school, or something like that? NOTES S N L 1. In Judaism, “Orthodoxy” refers not to pietism in general but rather to a specific denomination or tradition. 2. For a theoretically based comparison of evangelical Protestants in the United States and Canada, see Hoover, Martinez, Riemer, and Wald (forthcoming). In that study, the two groups took similar positions on political issues that had long been the subject of preaching within evangelicalism but diverged markedly on policy issues that were not covered by the groups’ religious tradition. Unlike the current inquiry, the study of Protestant evangelicals focused primarily on affiliation with a tradition rather than variations in religious commitment. 3. As a reviewer helpfully pointed out, transnational religiously based politics could take several POBE 23(4) #4844 04-11-02 10:08:31 POB234$$33 S N L JEWISH RELIGIOSITY AND POLITICAL ATTITUDES 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. S N L 395 forms. A scholar interested in central tendencies would ask if the religious group behaves the same way in different countries. That has been the main question asked in the comparative studies we cite. But transnationalism would also be evident if religious groups in different countries worked together to secure common political goals—such as debt relief or abortion restriction. In this article, we pose a third possibility—that variations in religious commitment are systematically related to political attitudes across national boundaries. As evidenced by the cases of Meier Kahane and Baruch Goldstein, the founder of Israel’s rejectionist “Kach” movement and the perpetrator of a massacre of Muslim worshippers respectively, American expatriates have also populated the far right of the Israeli political spectrum. Much of the funding for the expansion of Jewish settlements in Arab parts of Jerusalem has come from North American Jewry. In the ultimate demonstration of transnationalism in politics, Israeli-born activists in North America have raised considerable funding for Israeli parties and have subsidized cheap election flights to Israel for expatriates who wish to cast ballots (Nagourney, 1999). For detailed information on the conduct of the two polls, see the appendices. Details about sampling appear on pp. 11–12 of the Statistics Sheet for surveys # 407/408 prepared by the Los Angeles Times. The document is available for download at: http://www.latimes.com/news/ timespoll/stats/pdfs/407ss.pdf Orthodoxy, sometimes labeled “traditional Judaism” or “Torah Judaism” by its adherents, is customarily defined by its continuing commitment to the binding nature of Jewish law as spelled out by the Talmud. For a useful if controversial account of Orthodoxy, see Sacks (1993). In the most comprehensive recent survey of Jewish religious practices in Israel (Levy et al., 1993), respondents were divided into four categories based on self-reported level of observance—strictly observant (14%), observant to a great extent (23.5%), somewhat observant (41%), and totally nonobservant (21%). The distributions for the Times survey corresponded relatively well to the Guttman data, once we differentiated among the large proportion of Times’ respondents (56% in all) who initially indicated they were secular. This large category in the Times survey appears to conflate both the truly secular—those who are totally nonobservant—and Israelis who mean only to indicate that they do not practice the Orthodoxy that constitutes normative Judaism in Israel.䉳 Among this subsample of the nominally secular, we used the term “secular” for respondents who performed two or more of the ritual acts that are common markers of Jewish religious observance—attending worship services on the High Holy days, regularly lighting candles on the Sabbath, fasting on the Day of Atonement, or maintaining a kosher home. Those who fell below this minimal threshold were labeled as “antireligious.” Auxiliary analysis confirmed that the two groups of “nonreligious” Israeli Jews did indeed differ in their distance from traditional Judaism. The term “Haredi” is used in Israel to refer to the Ultraorthodox, regardless of nationality or rabbinic sect. In Israel, the state-supported Orthodox rabbinate has sole legal authority over questions of personal status for Jews. Hence, Israeli Jews live under Orthodox standards on issues related to marriage, divorce, adoption, burial, and other personal status matters (Abramov, 1976). In computing all three scales, each individual item was standard-scored before calculation of the composite value. Thus each scale has a mean near zero. While the American interview schedule contained the standard Michigan questions for partisan identification, the Israeli survey followed the international custom of asking respondents for whom they had voted in the most recent national election (the 1996 election for prime minister). The items were coded in a parallel fashion, such that Netanyahu voters and selfidentified Republicans were coded as right-wingers, while Peres supporters and Democrats were similarly classified on the left. 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