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Blitzkrieg Título: The Blitzkrieg Myth: How Hitler and the Allies Misread the Strategic Realities of World War II (Book). De: Goedeken, Ed, Library Journal, 03630277, , Vol. 128, Fascículo 20 Base de datos: Literary Reference Center Texto completo en HTML The Blitzkrieg Myth: How Hitler and the Allies Misread the Strategic Realities of World War II (Book) Escuchar Descargar MP3 Ayuda Sección: Social Sciences Mosier, John. The Blitzkrieg Myth: How Hitler and the Allies Misread the Strategic Realities of World War II. HarperCollins. Dec. 2003. c.351p. photogs. maps. index. ISBN 0-06-000976-4. $27.50. HIST Continuing to shake up the stodgy world of military history, Mosier (English, Loyola Univ.) follows up his Myth of the Great War with what will certainly be an equally controversial study of World War II. Mosier, who writes with an easy confidence that may not be completely justified, challenges the cherished beliefs of many military historians that Hitler's successes were the result of his brilliant use of armor and the air force, as argued by two prominent military theorists, J.F.C. Fuller and Giulio Douhet. Mosier believes that, although tanks and planes were important battlefield weapons, more often than not the infantry played a crucial role in either Allied or Axis success and that the German army was better led and better trained than the armies it opposed. Mosier critically examines several of the most important conflicts, including D-Day, North Africa, and the Battle of the Bulge, each time pointing out where myths have arisen. This fascinating book will bring out the military traditionalists in full force, who will again condemn Mosier for either coming to the wrong conclusion or using his facts incorrectly. But that is what makes history fun! Recommended for all history collections. ~~~~~~~~ By Ed Goedeken, Iowa State Univ. Lib., Ames Copyright of this work is the property of Media Source, Inc. and its content may not be copied without the copyright holder's express written permission except for the print or download capabilities of the retrieval software used for access. This content is intended solely for the use of the individual user. Número de acceso: 11750367 he Blitzkrieg Legend: The 1940 Campaign in the West. Idioma: English Autores: Baillergeon, Rick (1) Fuente: History: Reviews of New Books; Spring2006, Vol. 34 Issue 3, p91-91, 1/3p Tipo de documento: Book Review Información de la publicación: Taylor & Francis Ltd Descriptores: BLITZKRIEG Legend: The 1940 Campaign in the West, The (Book) BOOKS -- Reviews FRIESER, Karl-Heinz GREENWOOD, John T. LIGHTNING war NONFICTION Información del documento: Essay last updated: 20060915 Afiliaciones del autor: 1 U.S. Army Command and General Staff College ISSN: 03612759 Número de acceso: 22337338 Base de datos: Literary Reference Center A Lightning Read Escuchar Descargar MP3 Ayuda Sección: Fact and Comment "With all thy getting get understanding" The Blitzkrieg Myth: How Hitler and the Allies Misread the Strategic Realities of World War II-- by John Mosier (HarperCollins, $27.50). This provocative book tosses military-history hand grenades on almost every page, challenging just about every generally held notion about World War II. The fundamental thesis: that the "airpower theories of men like [Italian aviator Giulio] Douhet and the Blitzkrieg theories of men like [English General J.F.C.] Fuller--both proposed to strike directly into the heart of the enemy, to win the war in one swift and decisive stroke"--are fundamentally false. Mosier is absolutely right in that neither airpower nor armor alone would prove decisive in that cataclysmic conflict. But the early World War II German offensives went far beyond what Douhet and Fuller were proposing. Unfortunately for the Allies, German Blitzkrieg or "lightning warfare" involved more than armor or airpower. Even by 1918 the Germans had mastered the art of rapid, mobile attacks by integrating brilliant infantry tactics with various oft-superior or new weapons systems. What they did in 1940 was to add tanks and effective ground-to-air support to the formula and catastrophically disrupted the French command and control systems, which, in turn, crippled their ability to direct military counterstrokes. German intelligence had factored in the French army's fatally slow reaction to their assault through the Ardennes Forest. The Germans came perilously close to achieving similar results against the Russians in 1941. Not until late 1942 did the Allies begin to catch on. Even if you take issue with some of Mosier's interpretations, you'll find this a superb read. Contrary to myth, fortifications played an important role in prewar planning for both Germany (as the Allies ruefully discovered in 1944) and France. France had more tanks than Germany, and most were superior in design. Strategic bombing cost the Allies dearly. Erwin Rommel's reputation is grossly overinflated, and British commander Bernard Law Montgomery's is badly underrated (Monty's insufferable personality has blinded most historians to his very real abilities). The book gives the heroic Dutch of 1940 their due, rightly blasts the Allied campaign in Italy and gives a first-rate account of the RussoFinnish Winter War of 1939-40 in which casualties for the Finlanders were about 68,000 and for the Russians, 500,000 to 1 million. Mosier rightly emphasizes the disastrous role French leaders played in 1940--France's position was even more precarious in the early weeks of WWI, yet the French rallied to save themselves. But he unfairly criticizes Winston Churchill's actions in May 1940-Winnie would have been derelict in his duty had he not had backup plans to evacuate the British army from France, particularly given the shockingly panic-stricken defeatist attitude of the French government. PHOTO (COLOR) ~~~~~~~~ By Steve Forbes, Editor-in-Chief Copyright of this work is the property of Forbes Inc. and its content may not be copied without the copyright holder's express written permission except for the print or download capabilities of the retrieval software used for access. This content is intended solely for the use of the individual user. Número de acceso: 13344456 http://web.ebscohost.com/ehost/pdfviewer/pdfviewer?sid=41b46489-3b6c-47aa-a35a933b4ad9b754%40sessionmgr112&vid=3&hid=24 Frieser, Karl-Heinz, with John T. Greenwood The Blitzkrieg Legend: The 1940 Campaign in the West Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press 496 pp., $47.50, ISBN 1-59114-294-6 Publication Date: October 2005 For the avid book reader, there is the constant quest to find the perfect book. Ah yes, the perfect book. It is the one that is superior in every regard and contains all those extra features you yearn for. For myself, that quest has ended after reading Karl-Heinz Frieser’s brilliant The Blitzkrieg Legend: The 1940 Campaign in the West. It is a book superior in all facets and includes all those added features that I desire in this genre of military history volumes. The Blitzkrieg Legend was first published in German in 1995. Frieser (a colonel in the German Army and a department head at the Military History Research Institute of the Bundeswehr [MGFA]) worked extensively with John Greenwood for nine years to translate his work into English. The end result is a book that impeccably takes readers from the initial planning of the 1940 German attack against the Allies through the miraculous escape of the British at Dunkirk. In between, Frieser dispels myths and interprets the true factors behind the German success. Certainly, the biggest myth Frieser convincingly dispels is that the Germans did not plan the 1940 Campaign as a true “blitzkrieg,” nor had a “blitzkrieg” strategy, as many historians have previously surmised. Frieser concludes that the German rout was achieved by other key factors instead of a “blitzkrieg” plan of attack. In fact, Frieser states, “What is called blitzkrieg thinking did not develop until after the campaign in the west. It was not the cause but rather the consequence of the victory” (349). Frieser lays out a compelling argument for his readers. In the interest of conciseness, I cannot detail all the strengths of The Blitzkrieg Legend. However, I would like to highlight a few that will appeal to prospective readers. First, Frieser displays his extensive research by including a superb eighty-page section of notes at the end of the book. Second, the author intersperses more than forty color maps (detailing planning and execution) and sixteen diagrams to complement his words. It is these extra features that make this such a superb volume. Finally, Frieser possesses that innate ability to keep his readers constantly engaged. In this regard, you must give due credit to Greenwood’s ability to translate the work into English. Without question, The Blitzkrieg Legend is an important work. It will be of great value and interest to those not only seeking knowledge on this campaign, but those who want to dissect a true turning point in the conduct of war. There have many other superb books written on the 1940 Campaign (Robert Doughty’s Breaking Point and Alistair Horne’s To Lose a Battle quickly come to mind). However, I believe Karl-Heinz Frieser has now set the standard for books on this subject. RICK BAILLERGEON U.S. Army Command and General Staff College Copyright © 2006 Heldref Publications Citino, Robert M. The German Way of War: From the Thirty Years’War to the Third Reich Lawrence: University Press of Kansas 428 pp., $34.95, ISBN 0-7006-1410-9 Publication Date: November 2005 From start to finish this scholarly and lively overview of military operations stresses the German predilection for a short war of movement (Bewegungskrieg) and tolerance for initiative on the part of local commanders (Auftragstaktik) that grew from the Prussian military tradition. Robert M. Citino, a professor at Central Michigan University, describes in clear, sometimes colloquial language the personalities and intricate details of battles and wars over three centuries emphasizing victories and instructive defeats. The many place names, however, could use more maps to prevent discouragement in the casual reader. Isabel Hull took a far different view recently in her equally scholarly, though decidedly critical, Absolute Destruction. Citino’s models are Frederick the Great, who said wars should be short and lively (kurz und vives) and the elder Helmuth von Moltke who masterminded the wars of unification. He cannot ignore Napoleon, of course, but German heroes abound from Georg von Derfflinger at the time of the Great Elector to Heinz Guderian in World War II. The specter to fear most was a war of position (Stellungskrieg), leading to battles of attrition rather than annihilation. He finds a convenient scapegoat for the final destruction of the German Army in Hitler who withdrew the license to engage the enemy wherever a local commander found him and micromanaged Germany into a disastrous war of position in Russia. But he wastes no ink on the notorious “Hentsch mission” that resulted in the war of position on the Western Front during World War I, and he is totally silent about Falkenhayn’s strategy of attrition in the Battle of Verdun, the subject of Robert Foley’s recent German Strategy and the Path to Verdun. The spirit that motivated both the war of movement and the initiative of local commanders in the end took a back seat to the tradition of attacking regardless of the cost, that is, to Prussian militarism. The German Army exhausted the nation in World War I and survived to fight another war mostly due to the myths surrounding it and the politics of the interwar years. There are so many wonderful details and insights in this book that it is hard to criticize it too strongly. Experts and buffs alike will enjoy it. The author deliberately downplays the political and economic aspects of Germanwar making. He is therefore no slave to the shibboleths derived from Clausewitz to be found among advocates of large military budgets regardless of their impact. Wars won on the battlefield bring immense political prestige, Paul Kennedy’s warnings notwithstanding. Citino carefully defines a task for himself., to describe German military operations, and succeeds well within those boundaries. MICHAEL J. ZEPS, S. J. Marquette University Copyright © 2006 Heldref Publications Shephard, Ben After Daybreak: The Liberation of Bergen-Belsen, 1945 New York: Schocken Books 274 pp., $25.00, ISBN 0-8052-4232-5 Publication Date: November 2005 Shephard’s highly lucid book describes the British liberation that took place at the Bergen-Belsen concentration camp under strange circumstances and was followed by a chaotic policy of caring for the dead and living. Not everything during the liberation at Bergen-Belsen was heroic. Shephard’s research reveals the British knew what Belsen was as early as March 19, 1945 after debriefing Dr. Rudolph Levy, a Turkish Jew who had been released from the camp. The Germans, led by the commandant Jozef Kramer, met with the British forces on April 12 and agreed to surrender. What followed, however, was not what the British expected. Bergen-Belsen was a landscape of death. Shephard focuses on several important issues. The first deals with contradicting what might be called the traditional view that the British came into the camp and did the best they could with a death and medical situation they did not expect. Part of this is true, as Kramer failed to reveal initially the extreme conditions in Belsen. However, the considerable evidence amassed suggests that the British medical response to the devastation was inadequate. Mistakes were made in command structure, by medics, medical students brought from London, and by those in charge of food supplies, who thought that a flourbased mixture developed during the 1943 famine in Bengal, India, that took three million lives might help. More than two thousand inmates died because of eating the wrong food after liberation. Shepherd suggests that if the medical students achieved anything, it was restoration of a moral order among the survivors. Shepherd does acknowledge, however, a severe critique by Menachem Rosensaft (2000) in his book, that accused the British of indifference. The survivors were divided into two groups based on triage decisions. The largest number, of whom the British believed most would die, were left in the barracks. Those that seemed to have a possibility of survival were Spring 2006 91 http://web.ebscohost.com/ehost/pdfviewer/pdfviewer?sid=4273ed67-5d29-43bb-bb89ec481687b7d5%40sessionmgr115&vid=1&hid=122 http://web.ebscohost.com/ehost/pdfviewer/pdfviewer?sid=eafce2ef-6a33-489c-aff0e8d813c5c15f%40sessionmgr113&vid=1&hid=122 http://web.ebscohost.com/ehost/pdfviewer/pdfviewer?sid=c083d6ed-48b8-4550-bd90ac21bb37268e%40sessionmgr112&vid=1&hid=122 Copyright © 1995. All rights reserved. Copyright © 1995. All rights reserved. Copyright © 1995. All rights reserved. Copyright of Journal of Modern History is the property of University of Chicago Press and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. http://web.ebscohost.com/ehost/pdfviewer/pdfviewer?sid=42bba333-989f-43d1-8325feea1c6c9630%40sessionmgr114&vid=1&hid=122 http://web.ebscohost.com/ehost/pdfviewer/pdfviewer?sid=cbd4d565-fcaa-4fe1-895369c19f128786%40sessionmgr110&vid=1&hid=122