Download Theological Justifications for Violence in Iran in the 80s

The Researcher: the Canadian Journal for Middle East Studies
August 2015, Vol. 1, No. 1, pp.30-40
ISSN: 2369-5986 (Print), 2369-5994 (Online)
Copyright © The Author(s). 2015. All Rights Reserved
Published by Institute for Middle East Studies, Canada (IMESC)
DOI:
FromEvin1ToKarbala42:TheologicalJustificationsforViolenceinIraninthe80s
AminMansouri
[email protected]
Abstract
The Islamic regime of Iran systematically executed thousands of its political and religious dissents
throughoutthe80s,andjustifieditshideouscrimeswithQur’anicwarrants.Inthispaper,Iexplorethree
genocidal mechanisms, by which the Quran provides warrants for Muslims to commit genocide and
massacre. The Islamic Regime of Iran, under Khomeini’s leadership, has used these warrants either to
justifykillingsofitsout-grouppoliticalprisonersortoprovokeitsin-groupsupporterstosacrificetheir
lives for the regime in the war between Iran and Iraq. Demonization, dehumanization, and glorifying
death are three discussed mechanisms in this paper, which were imbued with Qur’anic justifications.
Finally, the jihad and the warring (qitaal) are addressed as a Qur’anic license in actualizing the
aforementioned genocidal potential of the Quran. Finally, I underscore the importance of the warring
(qitaal)versesintheQuran,whicharemostlyneglectedbyscholars.Khomeinilargelyreferredtothese
verses.
Keyword:
Radicalism,Karbala,PoliticalIslam,Iran,Islamicrevolution
1
- Evin prison is a symbol of the Islamic Regime’s hideous crimes after the revolution against its political and religious dissents. In
this prison, many prisoners perished.
2
- Karbala 4 was a military operation of Iran against Iraqi’s forces, which was resulted in thousands death toll of Iranian soldiers. The
failure in this operation is chalked up to the regime’s insistence in using human waves as a strategy to continue the war.
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Demonizing others
“What shall we Christians do now with this rejected cursed people, the Jews?”(Luther, cited in
Probst, 2012, p.1)
Many scholars argue that demonizing others foreshadow future genocidal atrocities (Card, 2010;
Jones, 2008; Stern, 2003; Waller, 2007; Jones, 2006; Probst, 2012). For example, perpetrators
firstly demonized Jews, Tutsis, indigenous people of America, and Oceana. Thee perpetrators
considered the world an arena of cosmic battle between good and evil, whereby their victims
were demonized as satanic forces. In contemporary history, religious perpetrators follow the
same pattern with their assault on so-called ‘demonic forces’. For instance, Osama Bin Laden
launched his jihad against the West because he identified the West as the symbol of demon that
should be exterminated (Agathangelou &Ling, 2004). Christopher J. Probst (2012) also explores
how anti-Semitic tendencies, by which Jews are demonized, are originally rooted in Luther’s
thought and have religious provenance. Does the Quran grant demonizing mechanisms that
facilitate the “final solution”?
In the Qur’anic verses, such as 3: 151, 4: 89, 9: 5, 29, and 73, 48: 29, and 61: 10-12, different
groups of people are demonized. However, on should notice that the Quran does not endorse
racial demonizing and/or dehumanizing because it explicitly maintains: “o mankind! Lo! We
have created you male and female, and have made you nations and tribes that ye may know one
another. Lo! The noblest of you, in the sight of Allah, is the best in conduct. Lo! Allah is knower,
aware” (Quran 49:13)3. As Mohammad Omar Farooq argues in the collection edited by Jacobs,
Islam has been more moderate regarding races than other religions condemning any racial
approach in such verses (2009, 145-146).
But who are these demonized groups in the Quran and how should Muslims approach them?
Generally, koffars (disbelievers), moshrekun (idolaters), and monafeqon (hypocrites) are the most
frequented demonized in the Quran. Since the first two are almost interchangeable in the context
of the Quran, koffars (disbelievers) and monafeqon (hypocrites) will be discussed in this part of
the paper. Then I elaborate how Khomeini adopted these Qur’anic justifications to delegitimize
his political opponents.
Hypocrites in the Quran are portrayed as those who pretend to be Muslims but “Allah beareth
witness that hypocrites indeed are speaking falsely” (Quran 63:1) because they do not believe in
God with their hearts. Thus, in the Quran, hypocrites are portrayed as those who gathered at night
to conspire against the prophet (Quran 4:81). The Quran also speaks of their acts of betrayal
against Muslim society and their sinful behaviors in verses such as 1: 10, 4: 83, 33: 4 and 37, 2: 8
and 9, 74: 31, 22: 53, 47: 20, and 9: 125. According to Sunni Islamic scholars, hypocrites did not
exist before the emergence of Islam among Arab tribes, and this term is also not found in the
Surahs revealed in Mecca (Alqirtabi, 1999, 54). In addition, some Shiite scholars like Morteza
Mutahari (cited in Morteza Motahhari, 2012) show the possibility of the emergence of hypocrites
in Medina.
With the immigration of Muhammad to Medina and establishment of an Islamic community, one
can observe the appearance of hypocrites in the Surahs revealed to Muhammad in the first capital
of Islam, Medina. Although hypocrites are mentioned in only one of the verses of ankabot
(spider) surah, believed to be revealed in Mecca (Quran 29:10-11). The term was frequently
revealed to Muhammad in Medina, when he already established the Islamic community under his
authority. In addition, the Muslims had small populations in Mecca and were living under
3
- In this essay, I used four English translation from the below online official Qur’anic website: www.Parsquran.com
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immense oppression. As a result, hypocrites naturally did not exist in this harsh time of the
Muslims.
The Quran speaks of hypocrites as the everlasting damned and cursed people. Hypocrites are
believed to suffer eternally in the worst place of hell (Quran 8:68, 33:73, 48:6, 4:145, and 66:9).
For instance, Allah orders the prophet to stage the jihad against hypocrites by maintaining, “O
prophet! Strive against disbelievers and hypocrites, and be stern with them. Hell will be their
home, a hapless journey's end” (Quran 9:73). The Arabic Be’s al-masir -which is wrongly
translated by Pickthall as “a hapless journey”, by Qarib as “an evil arrival”, by Shakir as” evil is
the resort”, and finally by Yusufali as” an evil refuge (indeed)”- means the worst place in hell.
Be’s in Arabic is used both as a verb and a noun. Whenever it is used as a verb, such as in this
verse, it means the “worst”. Accordingly, the exact meaning of this part of the verse is as below:’
hell will be their home, the worst destiny’. The worst destiny, which is the metaphor for the worst
status in hell, is designated for hypocrites. Mohammad Taqi Mesbah Yazdi, who maybe the most
fundamentalist Iranian Shiite scholar, in interpreting the similar Quranic verse (4:125), argues
that hypocrites are much worse than disbelievers (2002, 4).
Like Muhammad, Khomeini did not categorize Muslim dissents as hypocrites before the
establishment of Islamic regime. Khomeini on June 25, 1977 and February 21, 1978, before the
1979 revolution, spoke of monafeqin (hypocrites) in the history of Islam in general, but he did
not use this category to identify other political groups before the revolution. Two months after the
establishment of the Islamic regime, the term ‘hypocrites’ came into the political lexicon of
Khomeini, and he labelled those who were affiliated to mujahedin-e khalq (MEK) faction as
hypocrites. In his lecture delivered on June 13, 1979 in Qom city, Khomeini evidently
remembered that for one unknown person who visited the Ayatollah before the revolution, Islam
was only an instrument, not a goal, making this person and other persons like him/her hypocrites
(cited in Khomeini, n.d.a). It was the first time that Khomeini used the hypocrite category for the
members of mujahedin-e khalq (MEK) faction. Khomeini referred to them as the hypocrites more
than 120 times during his leadership. Given the fact that the mujahedins were Muslims like the
mullahs, they decided to demonize the mujahedins as the hypocrites. As a result, thousands and
thousands of them were raped, tortured, brought to confess against themselves publicly, and
finally executed before the death of Khomeini. The hypocrite label helped the mullahs to justify
the killings of many of their political prisoners.
But who are koffars (disbelievers) and moshrekun (idolaters) in the context of the Quran? Koffars
(disbelievers) with its derivations appears 343 times in 310 verses, while moshrekun (idolaters)
with its derivations appears 141times and is mentioned in 166 verses. Disbelievers are those who
do not believe in Allah, the Quran, and the prophet (for example see: Quran 2:89, 98, and 217,
3:100, 4:140, 5:67, 6:89, 7:37, 10:2, and 29:47). Accordingly, Jews and Christians are among
disbelievers, as in the Quran it is clearly stated:
“[F]ight against such of those who have been given the scripture as [they] believe not in Allah
nor the last day, and forbid not that which Allah hath forbidden by his messenger, and follow not
the religion of truth, until they pay the tribute readily, being brought low”(Quran 9:29).
However, “those who have been given the scripture” is the translation of the Arabic “oto Alkitab” which is normally used for Jews and Christians in the Quran. Fight is the translation of the
Arabic word “qitaal”, not the jihad. As some scholars argue, the jihad, because of its philology,
has two meanings: the spiritual striving towards God and an armed conflict. As a result, these
scholars tend to interpret the jihad more spiritually (Ellen, 2004, p. 151-153; Nasr, 1987, p. 2830). But the term “qitaal” (warring) literally means armed conflict and does not have the
obfuscated meaning. In these verses, Muslims are ordered to fight (qatilo) with Jews and
Christians unless they accept to pay jezya (tribute) to Muslims. In another verse, the Quran
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clearly orders Muslims: “Slay the idolaters wherever ye find them, and take them (captive), and
besiege them, and prepare for them each ambush. But if they repent and establish worshipand
pay the poor-due [jezya], then leave their way free” (Quran 9:5). Therefore, Jews and Christians
have to pay jezya or convert or else their blood should be shed.
According to the majority of Shiite mullahs, whoever denies the existence of God and His
uniqueness, the prophecy of Muhammad, or the Day of Judgment is believed to be a disbeliever
(Koleini, 1995, 5; Haqani 2004, 144, Moqnieh, 1999, 36). Some scholars believe that even
deniers of Imam Ali (the first Imam of Shiite) are considered disbelievers (Hafez 2010, 65).
According to the latter group, Sunni’s are considered disbelievers as well. As one can see,
disbelievers are defined very exclusively in the context of Shiite Islam so that some Muslims
could effortlessly define out-group religious groups as disbelievers. But how should disbelievers
and idolaters be treated?
Allah ordered the prophet to fight disbelievers and idolaters and kill them wherever he finds them
(Quran 4:89, 9:73). The Quran says:
“They will be killed or crucified, or have their hands and feet on alternate sides cut off, or will be
expelled out of the land. Such will be their degradation in the world, and in the hereafter theirs
will be an awful doom” (Quran 5:33)
These tortures should be inflicted upon those who fight with God, the prophet, and sinners.
Committing sins grants a comprehensive warrant for some Muslims to eliminate as many people
as they want. This unprecedented violence against demonized others was largely used by the
Islamic regime in the 80s against Iranian Baha’is and communists who were considered
disbelievers.
In order to accomplish this, the regime formed a commission during the mass executions of the
1980s, to decide the fate of the lives of its political prisoners. The commission asked leftists:
“Are you Muslim? Do you believe in heaven and hell? Do you accept the holy Muhammad to be
the seal of the prophets? Will you publicly recant historical materialism? Will you denounce your
former belief before the cameras? Do you fast during Ramadan? Do you pray and read the holy
Koran? Would you rather to share a cell with a Muslim or non-Muslim? ….when you were
growing up did your father pray, fast, and read the holy Koran? (Abrahamian, 1999, 212). The
leftists could lose their lives by any wrong answer to the above questions because they were
considered as the disbelievers who should be executed. As Abrahamian argues, the slaughter of
1988 was similar to the massacres of leftists in Latin America but with an ironic difference: in
Latin America, the “inquisition methods were not used despite the catholic tradition” (1999, 217).
The death commission needed to first demonize some prisoners through the Qur’anic
justifications in order to justify their executions en masse.
Similarly, after the revolution of 1979, threats and attacks against Bahai’s took on genocidal
proportions. Baha’is have been exiled from schools, universities, and working places. Hundred of
houses of Baha’i people were destroyed, and systematic kidnapping and rape of Baha’i girls have
been reported. Since the Islamic Revolution in Iran, “more than 200 Baha’i have been executed,
and tens of thousands have been deprived of economic and educational opportunities” (Cooper,
2009, p. 172). The Islamic regime has always denounced Baha’i faith. Baha’is, like Communists,
have been regarded as disbelievers who could be exterminated by the Quranic warrants. Briefly,
demonizing others was a comprehensive mechanism through which the Islamic regime could
exterminate both out-group religious groups, as disbelievers, and in-group religious people, as
hypocrites, not to mention atheists.
Dehumanization
Many scholars argue that dehumanization of other people is a pretext for genocide, mass murder,
and terror ( Day and Vandiver, 2000; Totten and Bartrop, 2008; Jones, 2008). One can be cruel
enough to kill many when he/she is mentally convinced that victims are not human because they
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belong to an inferior race, another religious group, or because of their behavior. As Kelly M.
Shutter (2008) quotes Sam Keen (1986),
“Traditionally we have maintained this practice of unthinking by creating dehumanizing
stereotypes of the objects of our violence and reserving our rational thought for determining the
weapons, strategies, and tactics we will use in destroying ‘them’”(2008, 40 ).
For instance, Hitler used to refer to Jews as the spiders who suck the blood of the economy. By
doing so, Hitler could justify the termination of millions of the Jewish people (Shutter, 2008, 41).
Hitler also used comic books to create dehumanized images of the Jewish people and other
enemies in different archetypes such as beasts, reptiles, and insects (cited in Zimbardo, 20062014). Dehumanization has a central role in transforming ordinary people to systematic killers
(Zimbardo, 2007). This section discusses how the Quran can be used to dehumanize some
warrants to dehumanize other people.
In the Qur’anic verse 7: 179, Allah speaks of those who cannot accept Islam, as their hearts do
not understand and their eyes do not see. According to this verse, God cannot approve the faith of
Muslims unless it comes genuinely from their heart. Except for these honest believers, the rest are
“livestock” and “cattle”. One can find similar dehumanizing verses in 25:44 and 47:12 in which
disbelievers are described as “cattle” and “livestock”, ” they are farther astray” (25:44), “and the
fire is theirs” (47:12). Thus, some believers can justify their terrors or atrocities by applying these
proto-genocidal verses to out-group persons, who are dehumanized.
This definition of true faith as well as dehumanization of others was largely used by the Islamic
regime in the 80s. As Iragh Mesdaghi, an Iranian political prisoner in the 80s, writes, Asadollah
Lajevardi, the warden of Evin prison at that time, provided a new definition of Islamic
repentance. Lajevardi believed that the political prisoners should not only express their regret and
come to repent of their sins, but instead, they have to prove that they are changed. He expected
the political prisoners, who expressed repentance to avoid painful tortures or impending
execution, to participate in torturing others, being newsmongers and informers for him in the
prison, or executing their friends who still resisted to prove that they truly changed (Mesdaghi,
2003, 278). But this cooperation did not save their lives and the regime eventually executed all of
those who cooperated with Lajevardi’s conditions to have its crimes buried. This may be because
they could not have proved that they really changed, but it is also because the Islamic repentance
is only for humans, not for those who already were dehumanized.
Glorifying the death
“Islam grows through sacrifice and the martyrdom of its cherished ones”
(Khomeini, cited in Bonney, 2004, 238)
Ernest Beckers (1973) substitutes the sexual desire, raised by Sigmund Freud, with the terror of
death as the existential problem. Beckers argues that terror of death emerges in our childhood by
witnessing horrible events such as the death of others. By growing up, children come out of their
fantastic world by accepting the reality, which is the mortality of life. To overcome this natural
weakness, heroes are created through which one can glorify his/her death. As he writes,
humankind are physically mortal; however, their symbolic world resists against this reality and
escapes it by creating heroic archetypes by which one overcomes death and is able to achieve
“transcendence of his vulnerability and human limitations”(1973, 109). As Beckers writes,
“Man breaks through the bounds of merely cultural heroism; he destroys the character lie that had
him perform as a hero in the everyday social scheme of things; and by doing so he opens himself
up to infinity, to the possibility of cosmic heroism, to the very service of God” (1973, 91).
Thus, people could be convinced to sacrifice their lives for higher values. Mass murders, terrors,
genocides, and other atrocities stem from this idealized hero or superego for which human beings
could kill until their last minute. These people are normally under the huge influence of leaders
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who remove the burden of responsibility from their shoulders. Thus, believers enthusiastically do
whatever leaders want to become “holy heroes” (Beckers, 1973, 138). Hitler, Stalin, Mao,
Khomeini and many of charismatic leaders believed in such a heroic task for themselves to
transform the world by their “holy heroes”. This charismatic influence of Khomeini is well
described by Robin Woodsworth Carlsen, who visited Khomeini during one of his emotional
speeches, “ [Khomeini] was a flowing mass of light that penetrated into the consciousness of
each person in the hall” (n.d.). Through his Charismatic power, Khomeini created a heroic system
by which many Iranian youth were convinced to sacrifice their lives for Khomeini. This section
studies how Khomeini blended this heroic system with Qur’anic justifications.
God orders the Muslims who exchange the life of this mundane world with the next spiritual
world to fight in His way and, in return, He will bestow upon them the vast reward, which is His
heaven. Here again, the Arabic term “yoqaatil” (4: 74) is used, which is the plural present tense
of the root word “qitaal” (armed struggle), not jihad with its opaque meaning. Heaven is
promised for martyrs. Similarly, God says that he Himself already bought the lives and wealth of
believers who “slay and be slain” (Quran 9:11) and grants the foz al-azim to these fighters. Here
again, the Arabic “yoqatal” (armed struggle) is used, not jihad. The Arabic “foz al-azim” is
translated by Pickthall as “the supreme triumph”, by Shakir as ”the mighty achievement”, by
Qarib as ”the mighty winning”, and finally by Yusufali as “the achievement supreme”; however,
one should consider the fact that this “win” or “triumph” is not an earthly victory in the context
of the Quran. For, in the Quran “foz al-azim” is frequently used for heaven as a reward for true
Muslims (Quran 4:13, 9:72, 89, and 100, 45:30, 57:12, 61:12, 64:9, and 85:11). Evidently, the
Quran glorifies death in God’s way by considering the eternal salvation in heaven for those who
kill in His way and eventually get killed in armed struggles.
Moreover, in the Quran (3:169), Allah clearly considers never-ending life for martyrs by
maintaining, “Think not of those, who are slain in the way of Allah, as dead. Nay, they are living.
With their lord they have provision”. In this verse, terror of death, which according to Beckers is
the impetus for the creation of heroic archetypes”, disappeared and, in turn, believers could enjoy
everlasting life and pleasures by fulfilling this heroic archetype. Thus, charismatic Muslim
leaders, such as Khomeini or Bin Laden, could provoke believers to become holy heroes through
sacrificing their lives for Allah. Ayatollah Khomeini repeatedly summoned this verse and the
verses with similar meaning such as 4:74, 2:218, in his speeches, letters, and messages during the
eight years war between Iran and Iraq in the 80s to praise those believers, sometimes as young as
eleven years old, who had become holy heroes or martyrs during the war. For instance,
Khomeini, in his message in the gratitude of martyrs, wounded in action, and disappeared
soldiers in 1986/08/11, interpreted this verse by maintaining that we are profane human beings
and, in result, cannot understand what the “provision” and pleasure with Lord means. For, this is
beyond our capabilities to capture these spiritual pleasures gained by sacrificing one’s life for
God (cited in Khomeini, n.d.b).
As scholars such as Richard L. Rubenstein argue, mullahs have a different moral system
compared to the Western modern morality, as they glorify death for Iranian people instead of
preaching values of life because mundane life for them is too unworthy (Jacobs, 2011, 112). This
moral system is evident in Khomeini’s provocative speeches, as he never stopped demanding
teenagers and youth people to glorify their lives in the war. Consequently, more than 600,000
Iranians were killed up to 1985 (Travis, 2010, 396). But this system is not different; it indicates
the typical human being’s failure before the existential terror of death for which heroic
archetypes were created. Khomeini’s famous words, “kill us, it makes the nation stronger” should
be regarded as this typical failure which resulted in hundreds of thousand lives lost (cited in
Khomeini, 2012). Beckers’ analysis explores Khomeini’s irony: because of his fear of death, he
created the system, by which many Iranian people lost their lives to become the holy heroes or
the martyrs. He continued the war, which could have been done in 1982 rather than 1988, which
indicates Khomeini was entrenching his own heroic system of martyrdom by the war.
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An analysis of historical timeline demonstrates how Khomeini continued the war in order to
maintain his martyrdom system. On 20 June 1982, Saddam Hussein, the president of Iraq,
proposed a ceasefire with Iran. Khomeini, however, rejected the deal until 1988. The majority of
the Western observers blame Iran (or Khomeini) for the extra six years of war because of its
resistance to the (Tucker, 2010). Also, on 28 September and 5 October 1980, 28 Jun and 5
November 1981, 10 Jun 1982, and 7 Jun 1983 Iraq proposed a ceasefire, ultimately rejected by
the Islamic regime. Similarly, on 12 Jun 1982, 25 February 1986, and 20 July 1987, a UN
Resolution called for a ceasefire that was never accepted by the regime. Although the Iraqis did
not want to keep Abadan and Khorramshahr, two occupied cities of Iran, refused peace talks until
1988 (Karsh, 2002, 9-11). In addition, Nehzat-e Azadi (The Freedom Movement of Iran), as one
of the most prestigious Iranian political organizations that composed the provisional government
after the Islamic revolution, protested against the continuation of the war after the liberation of
Khorramshahr on October 26, 1980 (cited in Nedayeazadi, n.d.). Last but not least, some scholars
argue that Iran’s provocative policy in supporting Shiite militia groups in Iraq was the main
reason for triggering the war (Pelletiere andJohnson, 1991, 28; Travis, 2010, 395-396). These
facts prove that Khomeini needed the war so the heroic system could endure.
Eventually, the ceasefire was approved on 20 July 1988; however, Khomeini’s unhappiness with
the end of the war is evident throughout his message to Iranian people at that time. While he was
praying at his home, the official radio of the regime released this message,
“Happy are those who have departed. Unhappy am I that I still survive... Taking this decision is
more deadly than drinking from a poisoned chalice. Accepting the [UN] resolution does not mean
that the question of war has been solved. By declaring this decision, we have blunted the
propaganda weapon of the world devourers against us. But one cannot forecast this course of
events indefinitely” (Karsh, 2002, 79).
As one can see, Khomeini was forced to accept the ceasefire after the eight years war, as he
created the heroic archetype of martyrdom, which could have lasted until the liberation of
Jerusalem in his failed aspiration. But one should not neglect the fact that the last part of the
above quotation is warning and proto-genocidal because it observes the war and terror as an
ongoing process that could be sparked again. Obviously, Khomeini’s heroic system, which is
rooted in the Quran, is responsible for the death of hundreds of thousands in the war. Also, this
system, which has been maintained by the current supreme leader of Iran, namely, Khamenei,
could provoke believers to commit genocides and mass murders against others, as it is a waroriented system and, inherently violent.
Jihad: A Swift Path towards Allah
“We are ordered to crush you”4
Dehumanization, demonization, and glorifying death, the three discussed notions with genocidal
potential in the Quran, justified the mass murders of both in-group followers and out-group
political dissents of Khomeini in the 80s. As I discussed, these beliefs were appropriated these
potentials have been actualized by the Islamic regime in different ways after 1979 revolution. The
following discusses how the Jihad could actualize their genocidal potential. Therefore, although
jihad has an opaque philological meaning, scholars have mostly neglected the role of qital verses
in waging genocides and crimes against humanity. Finally, I argue that Khomeini largely
actualized his genocidal intents in the 80s by evoking these verses in his rhetoric.
The jihad has widely grabbed the international attention, as in the twentieth century the jihad
against those who have occupied Muslims’ lands, normally in Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Iraq,
has been the weapon for mass killings in forms of suicidal attacks or fight until the last breath
(Bloom, 2006, 30-31). The emergence of the jihad, as Charles T Dravis argues, should be
4
Interrogator of Mahdieh Mohammadi, an Iranian political prisoner (cited in amnesty. 2012)
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considered an anti-colonialist response of Islamic countries (2007, 16). This argument should be
considered in the light of Western modernization of of Islamic countries through which Islamic
criminal laws, such as Tazir (Islamic punishment) were excluded from their penal system. As a
result, Shari’a (Islamic Jurisprudence) and Siyasa (politics) were separated in many Western
colonies (Peters 2005, 125- 142). This modernization, employed by secular dictators in Muslims
countries, led to half-modern and half-traditional governments in Egypt, Ottoman Empires, and
Iran. The emergence of fundamentalists such as Seyyed Qutb in Egypt and Khomeini in Iran,
which attempted to revive Islam through the jihad, the most controversial part of Islamic
international criminal law (Malekian 2011, 176), was the fundamental response to this Western
colonialism/modernization. For instance, it is widely acknowledged that radical observations of
Seyyed Qutb on the jihad is not only against the Western demonized countries, but also against
corrupted secular governments in Islamic countries ( see Jacobs, 2009; Bergesen, 2006;
Musallam. 2005; and Khatab; 2006).
In particular, Khomeini was largely under the influence of Iraq’s al-Nahdha al-Islamiyyah (the
Renaissance or League of Islamic Awakening Party); this was the response of the Iraqi Shi’a to
the British colonialism under Sheikh Muhammad Taqi Haeri al-shirazi’s leadership. On June
1920, he issued a jihad fatwa against the British forces in Iraq, which resulted in 1000 Iraqi
people killed and 450 dead British soldiers. This movement had a huge influence on Khomeini’s
mind. The United States took over the British role in Iran, as they organized and supported a coup
against Mossadeq’s administration in 1953 (Bonney, 2004, 234-238), and helped Mohammad
Reza Shah Pahlavi to take the helm of political power in Iran. Mohammad Reza Shah continued
the secular reforms started by his father, Reza Shah, against which Khomeini stood as an
uncompromising opponent. As one can see, the emergence of jihadist ideologies in Iran was due
to the Western-inspired modernization of Iran in which the shari’a was separated from the siasa.
Thus, the jihad is not inherently part of Islam as some scholars argue (Esposito, 2002;
Rubenstein, 2010), but it historically underscored in the twentieth century in different Muslim
countries.
Many scholars point that jihad has an opaque meaning because it is used for both armed struggle
and personal striving towards God (Firestone, 1999; Watt, 1953; and Esposito, 2002). As Ellens
(2007) argues, the jihad mostly means the personal striving towards Allah and not necessarily
armed conflict in the context of the Quran. In contrast, the warring (qital) lacks the ambiguous
literal meaning of the jihad in the context of the Quran because in Arabic it is used for the
warring and battle. As Firestone states, the holy war in the Quran is applied to the warring
(qitaal), not to the jihad (1999, 11). The following explores the warring (qital) in the Quran and
then it is argued that Khomeini largely referred to these verses both before and after the
revolution.
The warring (qitaal) is repeated in Quranic verses such as 2:154, 3:195, 4:74 and 89, 5:33, 8:17,
9:5 and 111, 22:58, and 33:61. For instance, Allah orders Muslims to “fight [qaatilu] in the way
of Allah against those who fight against you” and “slay (oqtolu) them wherever ye find them”
(2:190-191). The Arabic term “qaatilu” is derived from the root word “qitaal,” which means war.
But the Arabic verb “oqtolu” is derived from the root word “qatl,” which means murder. Thus,
the Muslims are allowed to slay those who fight against them. In other words, Muslims could
slay their enemies in the warfare (qitaal). This order is similarly mentioned again in 4:89, 9:5, and
111 in which the Muslims should slay those who fight with Islam. Thus, the warring verses
evidently grant the warrants for Muslims to actualize the genocidal potential of the Quran for
those who are categorized as hypocrites, disbelievers, and dehumanized unbelievers.
Khomeini largely used the warring verses in his lectures. In his lecture on November 1980,
criticized the mullahs who did not pay attention to the Qur’anic verses related to the warring
(qital), and only concentrated on the mercifulness of God (Iraj Mesdaghi 2004, p. 24).
Surprisingly, Khomeini referred to these verses, before the establishment of the Islamic regime,
as the Qur’anic absolute order when he was staying in Nofel Loshato, France. He referred to
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these verses three times between September 20, 1978 and October 20, 1978 in Nofel Loshato. He
had referred to these verses at least twenty times in nine speeches before the 1979 revolution.
Although Khomeini referred to the Jihad verses in his speeches and letters for many times, his
use of warring verses of the Quran indicate that he had a clear image of the oppressive nature of
his intended regime before the revolution. Also, Khamenei, as the next supreme leader, has
referred to the warring (qitaal) verses eight times after the Green movement (2009) and only four
times within twenty years of his leadership prior to the Green Movement, which indicates his
increasing hostility towards out-group dissents. As a result, no one is allowed to concentrate only
on the jihad in the Quran and, thus, by arguing that the jihad is the spiritual striving towards God,
not the armed conflict with others, disregards the critics.
Conclusion
This paper focuses on the genocidal potential of the Quran, which were used as the warrants for
committing massacres and genocides against those who do not fit into theological/political
framework by the Islamic regime of Iran. The Quran in particular and Islam in general are not
inherently genocidal text or religion. However, the genocidal potentials found in the Quran
require intellectual explanations and interpretations by moderate Muslims.
While Western religions tend to externalize their values in sociocultural influences” because they
are “inward-oriented religions” not “action-oriented” ones, according to J. Harold Ellens, Eastern
religions such as Confucianism “are characterized by a movement inward, (2007, 5). These
religions deal with a spiritual quest for the affectionate of almighty God, an aspiration for
ethereal happiness, and a feeling of Shekinah in the presence of God. Evidently, these religions
concentrate on this individual inward movement towards God and are, naturally, peaceful. Ellens’
argument is not free of criticism. For example, Buddhism has sparked a war against unbelievers
in Sri Lanka and Myanmar/Burma. Also, many scholars argue that Islamic mysticism (Irfan),
which could be categorized as “inward-oriented” understanding of the Quran, had had a large
political influence on Khomeini, and it had helped him to build up a very, unlike Ellen’s
understanding, hostility-oriented political system by which many of his opponents had been
exterminated after the revolution (for example see Dabashi, 1993, 459; Brumberg, 2001, 43).
Despite the fact that this argument indicates that the discussed genocidal potentials of the Quran
may not totally be abolished by the inward-oriented understanding of the Quran, it is still
plausible to have some moderate interpretations of the Quran through the lens of the Islamic
mysticism.
Islamic philosophy and mysticism are based on an individual and personal movement towards
God. Great Muslim sophists such as Ibn Arabi, Suhrawardi, and Roozbahan Baqli Shirazi were
interested in such a moderate Islam in which everyone has his or her own genos (individual
guiding angels)5 in alam al-mithal (imaginary world) that should be respected (See Suhrawardi,
2009; Corbin, 1977; and 1998). This individuation of genos is exemplified in Suhrawardi’s
famous words, “read the Quran as if it was revealed only for you” (Mohammadi, 1998, 98). Thus,
the Quran becomes the spiritual text in which everyone can find his or her genos (guiding angel)
or personal narration of salvation. This pluralization of genos contradicts any genocidal ideology
because of the fact that one cannot generalize and universalize his or her interpretation of the
5
Genos in Latin became the personal guiding angel of everyone. This angel is born with the person and passes away to another
world by him. As Giorgio Agamben mentions, the perfect realization of this personal angel is found in the ancient Iranian
angelology (2007, p. 9-13). According to this angelology, each one has a personal guiding angel which is called deana that
was translated as tebaa taam(Complete nature) in Islamic philosophy by thinkers such as Suhrawardi (1977, p. 464). This
personal guiding angel acquired a very essential situation in the Islamic sophism with different names. Thus, this Islamic
movement is against any sort of genocidal ideologies, as it emphasizes the significance of each person’s genos or personal
angel that should be respected, not eliminated.
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AminMansouri
Quran or, in other words, one cannot eliminate other genos’ by his or her genos. When I am
writing of more moderate aspects of Islamic mysticism, I am well aware of the potential dangers
crystallized in Khomeini’s thought. There is a long tradition of Islamic mysticism in which great
thinkers have encouraged patience, tolerance, and warm welcoming towards others; the tradition
in which a great sophists Abu al-Hassan al-Kharaqani frequently sated like this, “Anyone who
comes to this house, give him food and do not ask about his faith. Because, as he merits a life
next to the exalted God, no doubt he deserves a meal on my table” (cited in
ramashramsatsangshyamnagar, 2012).”
Unlike the politically motivated theology of repression held by Khomeini, the Sufi tradition has a
potential to provide Muslims with a more moderate interpretation of the Quran that could respect
the genos of others. Maybe this approach could prove the illegitimacy of the Islamic regime’s
crimes against humanity, which have occurred in the name of the Quran and Allah during the past
three decades, and especially in the 80s.
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