Download 3142_0_Sociologists and Social Movements A Case Study of Xin

Sociologists and Social Development:
A Case Study of Xin Qiushui, a Sociologist
By Zhidong Hao
University of Macau
A paper presented at the 9th annual conference of
The Hong Kong Sociological Association
on
December 8, 2007
Contact Information
Department of Sociology
University of Macau
Taipa, Macau, China
Tel: +853-397-8474; Cell: +86-136-8030-9910
Email: [email protected]
*This project has been sponsored by the Research Committee of the University of
Macau. The author would like to express his gratitude for this support.
2
Sociologists and Social Movements:
A Case Study of Xin Qiushui in China’s Rural Development
“The philosophers have only interpreted the world, in various ways; the point, however,
is to change it.” (Italics original)
–Marx, “Theses on Feuerbach,” 1845
In China’s modern history, sociologists have played a significant role in China’s social
movements, which may range from the Chinese Communist Revolution to the economic and
political reforms since the 1980s, despite their close to 30 years of general dormancy between
1949 and 1979. Although to change the world, as Marx would like intellectuals to do, is not
the only role sociologists play, understanding the various roles of sociologists in China’s
social development is essential in understanding not only China’s development but also
sociologists’ raison d’être.
This article first attempts to establish an analytical framework of the role of sociologists. Are
sociologists supposed to interpret the world only, or are they supposed to change it? Are there
other roles? How do we understand them? Then the paper traces the role of earlier
sociologists from the 1920s onwards from the perspective of this framework. The paper will
focus on the example of Xin Qiushui, a professor, sociologist, and activist from the Social
Science Academy of Anhui Province, in dealing with poverty in rural areas and designing
rural election reforms. The evidence shows that while functioning as professionals exploring
how the world works, sociologists can also get more involved in social and political
processes to bring their knowledge to bear on their moral concerns. Indeed, sociologists do
have many roles to play, including professional, critical, and organic. In addition to a
historical-comparative analysis, the paper utilizes the data obtained through interviews with
Xin and field trips to two villages (2007) where Xin worked on his projects.
A theoretical framework of the role of sociologists
The theme of the 2004 meeting of the American Sociological Association in San Francisco
was “public sociology,” featuring Michael Burawoy’s presidential address on the theme.
What does public sociology really mean? Should public sociology be a brand of sociology,
like the sociology of the family, or is it something else? Then in 2007, the University of
California Press published the debate by 15 eminent sociologists on politics and the
profession in the twenty-first century.1 It highlights the role of sociologists, and indeed all
intellectuals, or knowledge workers, in the socioeconomic development of any society.
For Burawoy, in the disciplinary division of labor there are professional sociology, which
supplies the methods, knowledge, and conceptual frameworks and is the sine qua non of other
sociologies; critical sociology, which confronts the pressing social problems of the time and
is the conscience of professional sociology; policy sociology, which serves a goal defined by
a client and provides solutions to problems; and public sociology, which, representing the
interests of humanity, addresses the issues of value and purpose rather than the matters of
1
See Dan Clawson, Robert Zussman, Joya Misra, Naomi Gerstel, Randal Stokes, Douglas L. Anderson, and
Michael Burawoy (eds.) Public Sociology: Fifteen Eminent Sociologists Debate Politics and the Profession in
the Twenty-first Century (Berkeley, Los Angeles 2007).
2
3
technique and is bound to civil society.2 There are concerns about this division, especially the
addition of pubic sociology.
Some (e.g., Lynn Smith-Lovin, Aruthur Stinchcombe, and Patricia Hill Collins) are afraid
that the politicization and ghettoization of sociology, which public sociology might foster,
will actually hurt sociology as a profession and placing those who do public sociology into an
underclass. It would threaten the core tasks of generating professional knowledge for its own
sake.3
Others offer an even more serious critique. Orlando Patterson and Immanuel Wallerstein, for
example, both thought that Burawoy’s distinctions are false. Patterson thinks that public
sociology may take three forms: discursive, where sociologists engage the public, especially
the nonsociological audiences; active, civic, especially political engagement, similar to what
Burawoy’s policy sociologists do; and professional. In other words, Burawoy’s distinctions
are all public in essence, although in different ways. Similarly, Wallerstein believes that all
sociologists should perform three functions: intellectual, similar to Burawoy’s and Paterson’s
professional; moral, to consider the moral implications of our work, similar to Burawoy’s
critical and Patterson’s discursive sociology, although not necessarily so; and political, to
consider the best way to realize a moral good as sociologists understand it.4 This last role is
similar to Burawoy’s policy and public sociologies, and Patterson’s active, civic and
politically engaged role of sociologists.
I largely agree with Patterson and Wallerstein on their distinctions. Indeed, all the sociologists
are public, but in different ways. In his work on the role of intellectuals, Zhidong Hao has
developed an analytical framework of intellectuals, which can be used to understand the role
of sociologists or the different sociologies as well.5 First of all, there is what he calls the
professional role. This is something that everybody I mentioned above seems to agree,
although they sometimes call it the “intellectual” role. The professional sociologist attempts
“to throw light upon, to analyze, the social reality under investigation.”6 While doing so, he
or she strives to be neutral and objective. It is true that it is impossible for sociologists to be
completely neutral or objective. As Wallerstein points out, by claiming to be value neutral or
academically objective, “one is burying (and thereby denying) the implicit moral and political
choices that are in fact being made.”7 Indeed, at every level of research, the sociologist is
faced with value judgments: what to study, how to study it, what evidence to choose, how to
interpret findings, how to present them, etc. To use Wallerstein’s own words, “it is
intrinsically impossible to keep one’s values from entering one’s scientific/scholarly work.”8
Nonetheless, as Wallerstein also points out, the professional’s work is subject to criticism of
one and all, and it has to be reasonably robust, logically defensible, and historically plausible.
The professional’s intellectual analyses “are to be sure always tentative and open to revision,
See Robert Zussman and Joya Misra, “Introduction,” in Dan Clawson et al. (eds.) Public Sociology, pp. 5-6.
Ibid., pp. 10-12.
4
Ibid., pp. 14-16.
5
See Zhidong Hao, Intellectuals at a Crossroads: The Changing Politics of China’s Knowledge Workers
(Albany, New York: SUNY Press, 2003). In recent years, I have used the framework to analyze the role of
intellectuals in the formation of national identity across the Taiwan Strait, and in rural development, as this
current paper does.
6
Immanuel Wallerstein, “The Sociologist and the Public Sphere,” in Dan Clawson et al. (eds.) Public Sociology,
(Berkeley, Los Angeles 2007), p 171.
7
Ibid., p. 171.
8
Ibid., p. 170.
2
3
3
4
but that does not mean that they are incapable of being taken as sound and momentarily true,
meaning that the results may be employed by others in their subsequent analyses as
presumptively correct and as evidence that reinforces the analyses of subsequent
scientists/scholars.”9 In other words, it is still possible to be relatively objective and neutral,
although it is impossible to be completely value free.
The second role Zhidong Hao has used in his analysis of intellectuals is critical. This
corresponds to Wallerstein’s moral role of sociologists, i.e., to consider the moral
implications of their work. This is the role of the conscience of society. It is also what critical
sociology and public sociology does, to use Burawoy’s words. This role confronts the
pressing problems of society, and representing the interests of humanity, it addresses the
issues of value and purpose. In Hao’s analysis, this role is most concerned about the fairness
and justice of the time. In his analysis of China’s critical intellectuals, human rights and
democracy are their most important values. They are critical of the powers that be, may they
be the government or businesses or a social movement. And they are most concerned about
the disadvantaged in society, just as the left in the U.S. does. They are the public intellectuals
doing public sociology in that they publish in the mass media calling people’s attention to the
unfairness and injustice of society, and they serve the role of the conscience of society. This is
the public sociology in Frances Fox Piven’s conception: public sociology cannot be neutral
and it has to be dissident and critical. Such sociologists are concerned about the poor, the
working class, the racial minorities, women, and the marginalized and the down-and-out of
all descriptions.10
But this role stops there. It is the organic role of intellectuals/sociologists that does what
Burawoy calls policy sociology, which serves a goal defined by a client, whether this client is
from the left, right, or middle, the bourgeoisie, or the working class. This is the active, civic,
and political role of sociologists Patterson and Wallerstein mentioned above. Such
sociologists may take an active part in a social movement, work as an official in the
government, or serve as advisor to business corporations. They are thus organic to a client.
Since they are committed to a given organization, as Wallerstein points out, they are “called
upon to follow the swings of position at the expense of intellectual consistency or even
honesty,” which is why they frequently get disillusioned and hence break intellectually and
politically with the groups they have supported.11
But Hao’s comparison with Burawoy, Patterson, and Wallerstein stops there. Indeed, the three
roles are “linked functions and sequential, but nonetheless each function involves a quite
different task,” as Wallerstein points out.12 And they are overlapping, and these roles are ideal
types. But we can still say that at one time and on certain issues, an intellectual/sociologist is
mainly performing one role rather than the other. For example, if one writes in a professional
journal, one is likely to perform a professional role. But if sociologists write in a popular
political magazine, they can perform a critical role, critical of the government, the businesses,
or a social movement. And if they are part of the government, businesses, or social
movements, then they are organic intellectuals. They may all be public, but critical
intellectuals/sociologists are more public than professional and organic intellectuals. Again
these are ideal types, and in reality an intellectual does play overlapping roles.
9
Ibid., p. 172.
Frances Fox Piven, “From Public Sociology to Politicized Sociology,” in Dan Clawson et al. (eds.) Public
Sociology, pp. 163-66.
11
Wallerstein, “The Sociologist and the Public Sphere,” p. 170.
12
Ibid., p. 171.
10
4
5
Before we move to our case analysis, I’d like to look briefly at the history of Chinese
intellectuals/sociologists’ role in the twentieth century. That way, we will be better able to
understand the role of intellectuals/sociologists today.
A brief historical background of China’s intellectuals, especially sociologists, in social
movements
In the development of Chinese sociology, we can probably also discern three trends: the
professional, the critical, and the organic. Back in the 1910s when sociology was first
developed in China, L.K. Tao (陶孟和) and John S. Burges (步济时, 1883-1949) organized
interviews and surveys of several hundred coolies in Beijing about their income, and living
and working conditions.13 Tao also studied living expenses in Beijing (1930). And Burges
studied 42 of the 128 guilds in Beijing. Li Jinghan 李景汉 studied coolies and craftsmen in
Beijing, and described their living conditions. Other sociologists like C.G. Dittmar (狄特莫)
and Sidney D. Gamble in 1914 surveyed 195 households around Tsinghua University, 93
workers at Tsinghua, and found that 79% of people’s income was spent on food (恩格尔系
数). A social survey of Beijing found that in 1917 the city had 811,556 people, the 4 th largest
in China and 7th largest in the world, with 70-75% Han, 20-25% Manchu, and 3% Muslim.
There were no sidewalks, so vehicles and pedestrians crowded the streets. There were no
property taxes. Li Jinghan （李景汉）and others surveyed the social conditions in Ding
Xian county in Hebei in the 1920s and edited a book entitled《定县社会概况调查》. In the
1920s Pan Guangdan (潘光旦) surveyed 317 respondents, readers of the newspaper Pan was
editing, and found that young people largely followed traditional values although they were
against arranged marriage. Mai Qingceng (麦倩曾) studied prostitution in Beijing and found
that in 1923, the registered brothels numbered 332, with different statuses, and 45 of them
were considered as high class, located at the commercial center of the city, i.e., “eight
streets,” or 八大胡同. The reasons for prostitution included the population imbalance (more
males), the poverty of women, the economic decline of the Manchus, and number of refugees
in Beijing at the time. Wu Zelin (吴泽霖 1898-1990) compared ethnic minorities in the U.S.
and in China. Lin Yaohua (Lin Yueh-hwa) did a sociological study of familism, and Fei
Xiaotong studied peasant life in China (Jiangcun Jinji, or “economy in the Jiangcun village”
in Chinese, and “peasant life in China” in English) in 1939.
It is fairly clear that these sociological studies are professional in nature. But one can still see
their politics, their moral concerns with the disadvantaged groups when they chose to study
them. This is why Wallerstein says that it is impossible for the researcher to be completely
neutral and value free, and their politics is embedded in their research, even if they may claim
to be only professional. Nonetheless, their politics may still be different from the other two
groups who largely played a critical and/or organic role(s).
The critical sociology was mainly demonstrated in Marxist sociology, represented by Qu
Qiubai 瞿秋白, Cai Hesen 蔡和森, Peng Shuzhi 彭述之, Deng Zhongxia 鄧中夏, Yun
Daiying 惲代英, Zhang Tailei 張太雷, Xu Deheng 許德珩, Li Da 李達, Mao Zedong 毛澤東,
Zhang Wentian 張聞天, and Chen Hansheng 陳翰笙.14 These people believed that either in
For the information in this paragraph, see Yan Ming 閻明，Yimen Xueke yu Yige Shidai: Shehuixue zai
Zhongguo 一門學科與一個時代：社會學在中國 (One discipline and one time: sociology in China (Beijing:
Tsinghua Univ. Press, 2004), pp. 17-8, 21-3, 31, 47-66, 68-72.
14
See Ibid., pp. 190-211.
13
5
6
the countryside or in the city, China’s problem was one of exploitation and suppression of the
poor by the rich. Only revolution can help the Chinese society achieve equality and progress.
As we know, these intellectuals/sociologists went on to become revolutionaries and joined the
communist movement. They transformed themselves from critical to organic intellectuals.
On the other hand, one could also transform from professional to organic intellectual or
sociologist, and in a different social movement. While the above critical intellectuals joined
the revolution, others started a movement to rebuild the rural China. These included Yang
Kaidao 楊開道，Li Jinghan 李景漢，Yan Yangchu 晏陽初, Liang Shumin 梁漱溟，and
Chen Xujing 陳敘經. Their professional studies of China led them to believe that the way to
change China was to change the Chinese culture, especially the culture in the countryside. So
these scholars started a social movement called xiangcun jianshe 鄉村建設運動, or rural
construction movement. They not only studied rural society, but worked to improve it.15
After 30 years of dormancy, Chinese sociology has again become a discipline of study since
the late 1970s. By 1999, there were already over 30 sociology departments, and over 500
universities offer sociology courses. Every province had institutes of sociology in their
academy of social sciences. Altogether there were over 3,000 sociologists.16 Judging from
their work, once can still discern the three roles they are playing: professional, critical, and
organic, although sociologists embody these roles in sometimes very different ways than the
sociologists we have just discussed above.
Understandably, because of the political restrictions still prevalent in China, almost no
intellectuals/sociologists, as organic intellectuals, can start a revolutionary movement like
Mao and his comrades in the 1920s. And they cannot be overly critical, either, since that may
land them in difficulties if not in jails. So most resort to their professional role. But as we
explained earlier, this does not mean that they are not political, but it does mean that they are
more professional than critical and organic. So they study social structures (the family, social
stratification, migration, organization, community, etc.), social behavior and social
psychology (culture and society, national character, etc.), social development and
modernization, social conflict and social systems, etc.17
Yes, there are critical or what people tend to call “public” intellectuals/sociologists who write
in the mass media (books or newspaper and magazine articles) to attack corruptive practices
in the state and society. In 2005, Nanfang Renwu Zhoukan (a Chinese weekly) organized the
election of 50 public intellectuals who have effected China’s development. Only three
sociologists (Li Yinhe, Zheng Yefu, and Yang Dongping) were on the list. It is true that the
others (economists, political scientists, lawyers, writers etc.) got on the list mainly because of
their concern with social problems. But the small number is one indication that few
sociologists are playing a critical role. Or if they do, their influence is not as much as that of
other intellectuals. The election of public intellectuals was not necessarily done in a scientific
way, and one can continue to debate whether one is a public intellectual or not. It nonetheless
15
See Ibid., pp. 76-101, 171.
For the above information, see Yang Jianhua, “Xulun” (Preface) in Gu Yingchun and Yang Jianhua (eds.) 20
Shiji Zhongguo Shehui Kexue: Shehuixue Juan (Social sciences in the 20th century: sociology) (Guangzhou,
Guangdong Jiaoyu Chubanshe, 2006), pp. 17-8.
17
See Gu Yingchun and Yang Jianhua (eds.) 20 Shiji Zhongguo Shehui Kexue; and Zhongguo Shehui Kexue
Yuan Shehuixue Yanjiu Suo (the sociology institute at the Chinese academy of social sciences) (ed.), Zhongguo
Shehuixue Nianjian 1999-2002 (the yearbook of Chinese sociology: 1999-2002) (Beijing: Shehui Kexue
Wenxian Chubanshe, 2004).
16
6
7
reminds us of the limited influence critical sociologists have in the sociopolitical and
socioeconomic development in China. Sociologists do write in newspapers and magazines,
but their influence is not that clear.
But the role of organic intellectuals/sociologists is very different. This is the role of policy
intellectuals/sociologists or those who are involved in social movements. In China now
independent social movements like Falun Gong or the Chinese Democratic Party organized
by Wang Youcai, Xu Wenli and others in the 1990s are almost impossible. The most they can
do is some underground activities. But the policy intellectuals have enjoyed some influence
since the reform in the 1980s. For example, Fei Xiaotong was influential in the state policy
on township enterprises. Lu Xuyi, a sociologist from the Chinese Academy of Social
Sciences, has had an influence in China’s rural policies, although he is not happy with the
extent of influence he can exert, as he explained at the 17th annual conference of the Chinese
Sociological Association in Changsha in 2007.
In the debate on public sociology, which we discussed at the beginning of the paper, Massey
mentions the influence of the American sociologists on Capitol Hill. He says that as an
organization, the ASA’s influence is minuscule. But as individual sociologists, that influence
can be crucial. He cites his own example of using his professional knowledge that he has
accumulated throughout years regarding housing segregation and Mexicans’ immigration to
the U.S. He says that he and his colleagues were able to influence the law making at the
Capitol Hill regarding these important issues, which could improve the lives of millions of
people influenced by the laws.18
The Case of Xin Qiushui (辛秋水)
Massey’s example is also what we are looking for in the role of sociologists in China’s
development, and how they affect the lives of people in China. The following pages examine
the role of Xin Qiushui, one such intellectual/sociologist. We’d like to see what roles he has
played: professional, critical, and/or organic, and how he plays those roles. We are hoping
that the analysis will help shed light on the work and influence of sociologists.
Who Is Xin Qiushui
Xin Qiushui is a senior researcher at the Anhui Academy of Social Sciences. When he was a
college student in Nanjing in 1948, he organized student movements against the
Kuomingdang (KMT) rule. Facing the danger of being arrested, he went to the liberated areas
ruled by the Chinese Communist Party. So after 1949, he was employed as a staff member at
the China-Soviet Union Friendship Association. In 1957 he was made a “rightist” because he
was a little bit critical of the lack of the freedom of speech in China in his article to Wenhui
Bao, a Shanghai newspaper, even if he was a resolute follower of socialism, and loved Mao
Zedong from his heart. He made this very clear in the same article for which he was
criticized. 19 Nonetheless, he was sent to labor reform camps (farms) for 14 years, and
countryside (his own home village) for another 8 years until he was restored of his name in
1979. He was then assigned a job at the Anhui Academy of social Sciences. He began to do
Douglas S. Massey, “The Strength of Weak Politics,” in Dan Clawson et al. (eds.) Public Sociology.
Some information on Xin comes from “Zhuiqiu” (In pursuit of something), an autobiographical essay he sent
me. Other information comes from my interviews with him in the past two years.
18
19
7
8
research in sociology, even though he was trained in law in college before 1949. And he
started his sociological career.
What Does He Do?
In the 1980s, he did over 30 research projects and wrote a report on each. In the
autobiographical essay he wrote, he cited the example of corruptive practices in state-owned
enterprises in the initial stage of market economy. Both the purchase and sale of raw
materials and industrial products had to be facilitated by bribery. For example, an enterprise
from Anhui had to bribe the enterprise in Henan and Shandong in order to buy the kinds of
machine parts they needed. Corruption did not restrict itself to the industrial enterprises. It
spread to government agencies as well as educational institutions. Xin’s report on this nationwide problem reached Hu Yaobang, the then CCP’s General Secretary, through the provincial
leaders in Anhui. It was published as internal documents for only the eyes of the leadership as
well as in People’s Daily, the public national newspaper of the CCP. It then became part of
the CCP’s efforts to curb corruption at the early stages of economic development.
His study on the single men in the countryside is also fascinating, and the process interesting.
He found that in an area in Feixi county, Anhui province, nine out of ten who committed a
crime were single men. In that xiang (the district below the county but above the village)
about 6% of the population was single men. Why were there so many single men in the
countryside, and why did they commit crimes? Xin’s research found that because of poverty
in the countryside, girls tended to move to richer areas, so the men there simply did not have
enough women to marry, unless they were especially talented or had exceptionally good
family background. Things became worse with the “one child policy” in the countryside.
Female infanticides were wide spread because families needed men not only to continue the
family line but to till the land. What would happen to the parents if their female child married
somebody in some other parts of the country? And who would support them in their old age?
Peasants do not have the social security measures available to them as in the cities. Again
Xin’s report got to Hu Yaobang and was published as various internal documents as well as
national newspapers. This helped push for not only the research of the sociology of the family,
but also the reform of the population policy in China. 当然，辛秋水不是唯一提出这个问题
的人，但是他至少较早促使中央重视这个问题的人之一
In the 1990s, Xin’s work was focused on what he calls “wenhua fupin” (the cultural help of
the poor) and the elections reform in “cunmin zizhi” (the village self-governance). I will now
discuss these two projects that he initiated in Anhui.20
The idea to help the poor in culture rather than in material ways came to his mind when he
found that to simply give materials like grain and clothes to poor peasants was not able to lift
them from poverty. Peasants needed to get the knowledge and training in developing
agricultural and other products that they could sell on the market. So with the support of Lu
Rongjing, the then CCP Secretary of Anhui province, he first started his experiment in
Tengyun village at Lianyun xiang, Yuexi county of Anhui in 1988. This was one of the
poorest areas in all of China. He did three things. First he started a library in Tengyun village
20
The information regarding the two projects comes from both his talks given at the Sociology Department at
the University of Macau in June 2007 (see my personal notes), and the book written by Xin Qiushui and Wu
Licai, Wenua Pinkun yu Pinkun Wenhua (Cultural poverty and the poverty of culture) (Xi’an: Shanxi Renmin
Jiaoyu Chubanshe, 2001), especially pp. 187-213.
8
9
for the entire xiang. He was able to obtain 6 tables, 32 chairs, 10 book cases, 4,000 books,
and 26 kinds of newspapers and magazines. In doing this Xin mustered support from various
kinds of government agencies, like the government’s propaganda departments, and
educational institutions, like the Academy of Social Sciences in Anhui, the provincial library,
and Yuexi Middle School. He hired two young people to manage the library. Quite a number
of peasants used the library and learned skills to plant mushrooms, raise ducks, and increase
grain production.
Second, Xin erected 35 newspaper bulletin boards in 11 of the villages in Lianyun xiang
since 1988. The newspapers included China’s Youth Daily, as well as provincial and local
newspapers. The information related to agriculture and legal matters were especially helpful
to peasants.
Third, they started a center for agricultural skills training. They invited local and provincial
experts to come to give lectures. In 1990 and 1991 alone, they held ten such training sessions,
and about 1,000 peasants participated in them. Again quite a number of peasants made money
and got rich through the help of such seminars.
With the support of again Lu Rongjing, the provincial Party secretary, Xin was able to spread
the practices to six counties where ten such cultural centers were established. Later on the
idea was incorporated into a larger project by the provincial government to revive culture in
the countryside. And it seemed that the entire province would take steps in wenhua fupin.21
The second major project Xin was engaged in was the reform in rural elections in the 1990s,
or the movement to improve village self-governance. In 1987, the 6th National People’s
Congress passed the law on the organization of the village committee (中华人民共和国村民
委员会组织法). The village would be governed by a committee that is democratically
elected. This is a revolutionary measure since it would set up another power center beside the
CCP Party committee at the village level. As one can imagine, all kinds of problems would
arise in the elections: the xiang Party officials’ interference, vote buying, the election of the
members of only one’s own family clan, etc.22 To improve the democratic processes in this
worthwhile development in rural areas, Xin Qiushui initiated zuhe jingxuan (election of the
entire committee rather than the individuals) in 1989. Groups of villagers will nominate the
candidates for the village committee head and the committee members. Then the candidates
for the head will organize his or her own committees. Finally, the villagers will elect one of
the two committees.
This election of an entire committee is apparently more effective than the election of
individuals for the following reasons. First, while forming a winning team, the village head
candidate has to take care of the interests of various groups in the village by inviting people
who are not only capable but also representative of various constituencies. As a result, the
committee is more representative than the one that is a result of the elections of its individual
members. In the latter method, there is generally no control as to who might be elected, so
clan problems would occur. Second, zuhe jingxuan makes it more difficult for the xiang Party
committee to control who can be elected because the members are directly elected by the
villagers. Third, it makes it less likely for the candidates to buy votes, since there is generally
21
See Xin Qiushui and Wu Licai, Wenhua Pinkun yu Pinkun Wenhua, p. 210.
See for example, Zhao Xiuling, Cunmin Zizhi Tonglun (An introduction to the village self-governance)
(Beijing: Zhongguo Shehui Kexue Chubanshe, 2004), 295-300.
22
9
10
no need for it. Various interests have been taken into consideration, especially the interests of
the major constituencies.23
At first, Xin Qiushui did it in Tengyun village we mentioned above, where he organized the
projects to help the villagers culturally. Now he was helping them politically in 1989. Since
then 18 years has passed. Although zuhe jingxuan has not been able to spread to many parts
of Anhui or China, it has persisted in over 700 villages in several counties (completely in two
counties and partly in five counties) in Anhui.
Xin Qiushui’s Politics and the Roles He Plays: Professional, Critical, and Organic
Now we are back to sociology and politics, and the role of intellectuals/sociologists. At the
beginning of the paper, we discussed the impossibility of political neutrality in sociological
research or practice. Although Xin Qiushui’s case may be a special one, it does demonstrate
this point vividly. From Xin’s autobiography, we know that he was a believer in equality and
democracy. He is from a big landlord’s family. He was so resentful of his own family’s
wealth built on peasants’ labor that he distributed his family land to the tenants who tilled it.
He then went on to join the revolution. This led to a bitter fight between him and his father.
While working at the China-Soviet Union Friendship Association, he was not afraid of
rocking the boat by making suggestions for improvement of its work. Had he not been
supported by Liu Shaoqi, the then Chairman of the PRC, he would have been in trouble
before 1957. And he finally paid dearly for the same outspokenness in 1957 when he was
dubbed a rightist and sent to labor camps and then the countryside for 22 years.
After he was restored of his name, he went on to do research concerning social problems
related to, for example, corruption in the government, the single-men phenomenon, female
infanticide, poverty in the countryside, and democratic elections. The topics of his research
are related to his moral concerns all along, the concerns he carried with himself even in the
22 years when he was in the labor camps and undergoing supervised reform in the
countryside.
What about the roles he plays, then? First of he is playing a professional role when he studied
the issues I mentioned above. In one of the books that I cited concerning the poverty of
culture and that he and Wu Licai co-authored, they analyze the various factors leading to
poverty including geographical, economic, psychological, etc. but conclude that a more
important reason is cultural. Here he is also playing an intellectual/professional role. Based
on his understanding of cultural problems in rural areas, he started his projects on wenhua
fupin and cunmin zizhi.
But wenhua fupin and cunmin zizhi are already social movements. So second, when he plays
these roles, Xin is being organic to a social movement. This is different from playing a
“pure” professional role. In fact, he is also being organic to the Party because it is the CCP
which has been fighting poverty in the countryside and instituting self-governance. This is
especially true when he wrote reports published internally for the eyes of the government
23
For more discussion on the benefits of zuhe jingxuan, see Cunmin Zizhi Bijiao Yanjiu Keti Zu (The research
group on a comparative study village self-governance), “Cunwei Hui Xuanju: ‘Zuxuan’ yu ‘Haixuan’ de Bijiao”
(The elections of village committees: a comparison of the election of the entire committee and the election of
individuals), pp. 36-8 in Wenhua Fu Pin yu Cunmin Zizhi (the journal on help with villagers culturally and
village self-governance), January-February 2006.
10
11
officials. These reports did lead to some reform movements in the rural areas, especially in
Anhui province. He is a policy sociologist, to use one of the terms Burawoy uses, which we
mentioned at the beginning of the paper. What he does is similar to what Massey does, to use
one’s professional knowledge to affect the direction of government policies, which we
discussed in an early part of the paper.
But no matter when he was playing a professional role or organic role, he was also being
critical. For example, he was critical of the one-child policy, and he was critical of the
elections practices, which is why he started his own reform. And he wrote articles in
newspapers criticizing corruptive practices in the government and society. This critical stance
has been consistent throughout his long career.
Conclusions and Implications of Xin Qiushui’s Example
What does Xin’s case tell us about sociologists and social development, then? First of all, our
case study of Xin’s sociology career substantiates Wallerstein’s observation that sociologists
play the three roles in their work: professional, moral or what I call critical and Burawoy calls
critical and public sociology, and political or what I call organic and Burawoy calls policy
sociology. Xin demonstrates these the three roles in his work, but one can still say that he
performs one role more than the other at any one time. For example, when he co-authored the
book on the poverty of culture, he was playing the professional/intellectual role. When he
wrote the internal reports, or organizing projects on wenhua fupin and village self-governance,
he was playing the role of an organic intellectual. When he wrote to a newspaper or magazine
criticizing the corrupt practice of Party officials, he was performing the role of a critical or
public sociologist.
Secondly, as we mentioned at the earlier part of the paper, to use Wallerstein’s words, policy
sociologists/intellectuals, when they are playing an organic role, are “called upon to follow
the swings of position at the expense of intellectual consistency or even honesty.” 24 For Xin
Qiushui, it is not that he has to change his positions from time to time to conform with the
swings of his clients. His frustration is that he finds it too hard to carry out his policy
suggestions despite the support he received from the provincial leaders. This is typical
experience of policy or organic intellectuals, although not necessarily for professional and
critical intellectuals.25
For example, wenhua fupin requires the support of local authorities and it requires them to
invest money in establishing libraries, newspaper bulletin boards, and running seminars
teaching peasants agricultural technology. But these are often not their priorities. Even when
the provincial authorities allocated funds to the local authorities for such projects, the funds
would get misused or reallocated to other projects. Xin Qiushui now believes that probably
such projects should be left to NGOs. But as I argued in another paper, the state needs to
shoulder the responsibility that belongs to the state. The NGOs can and should help, but the
major role should be played by the government authorities.26 But as a policy sociologist, Xin
Wallerstein, “The Sociologist and the Public Sphere,” p. 170.
For more discussion on the dilemmas faced by various kinds of intellectuals, see Hao’s book, Intellectuals at
a Crossroads.
26
See Zhidong Hao’s article on “Guojia yu Shehui de Liangxing Hudong: Xiangcun Jiaoyu yu Nongcun Fazhan
de Chulu” (The productive interaction between the state and society: the way out for the rural education and
development) in Xiangcun Zhongguo Guancha Zhoukan (Weekly Observer of Rural China), No. 21, an on-line
journal on rural development, which can be accessed at
24
25
11
12
can only do this much. Under what circumstances will the state be doing more, then? This
leads us to Xin’s another project on zuhe jingxuan in village self-governance.
Village self-governance, especially zuhe jingxuan, seems to be a way that will guarantee that
the right people will be elected who will carry out the worthwhile projects of wenhua fupin.
Zuhe jingxuan does seem to have many of the benefits we discussed earlier. But why does it
not go very far, then? Not even Anhui province can implement zuhe jingxuan province-wide,
let alone in other parts of the country, even though some important members of the Chinese
Political Consultative Conference have raised the issue to the higher authorities. One of them
was Lu Rongjing, the former provincial Party secretary who supported Xin, and the other
Deng Weizhi, a former president of the Chinese Sociological Association.27
Actually Xin himself asked why zuhe jingxuan had such difficulty to be widely implemented.
The state government agency in charge of village elections would tell him that the key is that
the practice would lead to the weakening of the Party control in the countryside, although that
may be what he originally wanted. Indeed, some have called on the Party to withdraw from
the village level and stay only at the xiang level and above.28 That way true village selfgovernance would then be possible. But that would seem to be too revolutionary. So Xin’s
idea of zuhe jingxuan, though more rational and democratic, cannot go very far, at least not
yet.
Even zuhe jingxuan, however, cannot guarantee that things will run democratically. The Party
control is one factor. And there are many other factors like the economic development of the
village and the overall politics there. In summer 2007, I visited two villages that were models
of zuhe jingxuan. Indeed, the leaders were eager to foster the economic development of the
villages, and they were trying very hard in whatever ways possible. But they do not seem to
have the human resources to cope with the problems they were facing, like what to grow and
where to sell what they grow. I did see one of the libraries that was established in a village.
But it seems that it had not been used for a long time.
Nonetheless, Xin has had many successes. Although to sustain these successes, the support of
the overall political environment is still needed, close to 20 years of sociological practice is
illustrative of what sociologists can and cannot do, professionally, critically, and organically.
It is the accumulated efforts that count. In a day and age of public sociology and applied
sociology, Xin’s example sheds much light on what and how much sociologists can do in
bringing their knowledge to bear on their moral concerns and in effecting social change.
I’d like to conclude this paper with a quote from Frances Fox Piven, the ASA president in
2007:
I think that the practice of sociology involves not only the building of theory and
evidence about how group life works, how societies work, how social problems occur
and so forth, but I think it’s appropriate to bring to that work a kind of moral
sensibility. I do not agree with the notion that, on the one hand, we’re scientists or
http://www.ruralchinawatch.org/weekly_content.asp?id=767.
27
See Deng Weizhi and Lu Rongjing, “Guanyu Tuiguan Cunweihui ‘Zuhe Jingxuan’ An” (A proposal to widely
implement zuhe jingxuan), pp. 35-7, Wenhua Fupin yu Cunmin Zizhi (the journal on help with the poor
culturally and village self-governance), January 2004.
28
See the talk by Dai Qingliang at the a symposium on zuhe jingxuan, p. 18 in Wenhua Fupin yu Cunmin Zizhi
(the journal on help with the poor culturally and village self-governance), January 2004.
12
13
social scientists, and on the other hand, in our citizen life, we can go out and join a
demonstration. I think we should bring our knowledge to bear on our moral
concerns.29
Indeed, intellectuals or sociologists or scholars do play professional, critical, and organic
roles. That is what the Chinese intellectuals and sociologists have done either before 1949 or
thereafter. And it will be what they will do in the future. To know what they do and how they
do it may help them do it better. Hence this paper.
“An Interview with ASA President Frances Fox Piven,” in Newsletter of Peace, War and Social Conflict, a
section of the American Sociological Association, July 2007, p. 3.
29
13