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THE KOREAN DEBACLE
BY
BIMBO OSIFESO (Ph.D)
DEPT. OF POLITICAL SCIENCE
ADEKUNLE AJASIN UNIVERSITY
AKUNGBA-AKOKO
+2348032370389
[email protected]
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ABSTRACT
Twice in 1945,first at Yalta, second at Posdam, the ‘Big three’ leaders -Wiston
Churchill, Franklin Rooseveltl (replaced later by Harry Truman)and Joseph Stalin - met
to design a new world order.
But the parleys floundered; they ended without
agreement, and the façade of Allied unity began to crumble. Indeed, the war’s end shot
both the United States and the Soviet Union into prominence of power as the only two
great powers with enough military muscles to whip others into line.
GreatBritain, with other major victors, had exhausted themselves and slipped
from the apex of world-power hierarchy. The war’s end, in effect, transformed global
politics. Itchanged the distribution of global power from multi-polarity to bipolarity. Thus
during the Cold War, the US and the Soviet Union used the fledging UN not to keep
peace but to pursue competition with each other. The Korean war, for example, was
historic. It was the first test of America’s containment policy. Also, it marked the first
test case for the newly created UN. The UN itself became entangled in the Korean war
for two reasons.
First, was America’s overwhelming influence in the organization.
Second, was the absence of the Soviet Union from the Security Council of the UN. The
Soviets were temporarily boycotting the Council to protest its exclusion of Communist
China. Although the shoot- out war ended in July 1953, but Korea remains divided into
two states today – North and South Korea. Indeed, the cold war still casts shadows
over Korea’s geostrategic landscape. This article aims at providing an insight into how
the United States manipulated the UN as its instrument of foreign policy in Korea.
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Origin of Conflict
The Second World War ended in 1945, and the search for a new world order, the
United Nations began shortly thereafter. Yet this approach through a supernational
structure soon engendered rivalry primarily between two superpowers, the United
States and the Soviet Union, as subsequent events, such as Korea (1946-1948), would
suggest. Nothing had more accentuated this verity than what transpired at the London
meeting (January 10 – February 14, 1946) of the United Nations.
As the 51 members of this supreme body huddled in London, each delegation
hauled a sachet veil of position papers on the items on the agenda. The United States,
of course, was by no means an exception. In fact, United States policy planners went to
London anticipating the General Assembly or Security Council consideration of certain
substantive (that is, non-organisational) problems, with an established U. S. position on
some 29 such issues, including Korea.
That Americans seemed to regard the UN as a kind of supper-structure or supergovernment that could guarantee peace if only devotion to it was absolute is to say the
least. Imbued with this euphoria, President Harry Truman on March 19, 1946, in stating
the general expressions of the U.S. position, wrote in part:
The participation of the American representatives in the actual
establishment of the institutions provided in the Charter of the UN; and in
the initial work of the General Assembly regarding the urgent problems
confronting the 51 members of the UN today is vital to all Americans. The
U. S. supports the Charter. The U.S. supports the fullest implementation
of the principles of the Charter. The U.S. seeks to achieve the purposes
of the Charter and the U.S. seeks to perfect the Charter as experience
lights the way. (see: US Foreign Relations, Vol. VI, 1946).
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This presidential statement of the intent of the U.S. foreign policy and diplomacy
in the novel dimensions of international relations involving the UN was one of the many
remarkable verbalizations of official U.S.views on general aspects of U.S. – UN
relations during the period under review.
The difficulties in Korea were caused by the post – 1945 antagonism between
the United States and Soviet Union; they stemmed from what happened after the
military forces of both nations had crushed the Japanese imperialists in Korea. Earlier,
in the Cairo Declaration of December 1943, the United States, Britain and China had
expressed their determination to ensure a free and independent Korean nation. This
pledge was later reaffirmed in the Postdam Declaration of July 25, 1945, when the
Soviet Union had decided to partake in the war against Japan.
Hence the temporary division of Korean into two zones of occupation, Soviet and
American, separated by the 38oparallel. The primary objective of this demarcation was
to facilitate the surrender of the Japanese troops:
the Soviets would disarm the
Japanese north of the parallel, the United States south of it. But as it turned out, this
military expediency in 1945 later became the, de facto, present- day political reality of
Korea. Had the split not occurred Korea would probably have been one nation today.
The Japanese having capitulated, the United States sought to implement the
Postdam Agreement restoration of Korean unity.
Acting Secretary of State Dean
Acheson asked General Douglas Mac Arthur to open negotiations with the Soviet by
arranging for an early meeting of the Joint U.S. – Soviet Commission as stipulated in
the Moscow Communiqué. The Communiqué had previously provided for the creation
of a provisional Korean Democratic Government.
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The Moscow Conference of three Ministers on Korea – Britain, United States,
and Soviet Union -- had also specified measure for solutions on urgent administrative
and economic questions affecting the region. Furthermore, the Communiqué not only
had put off the creation of a National Korean Government but also, on the contrary, had
provided for rendering of assistance towards forming such a government on the part of
representatives of the Soviet Union and the United States.
Thus it was decided to form a Joint Soviet – American Commission which must
consult with Korean political parties and public organizations in accelerating the creation
of Korean government. A trusteeship was, therefore, established for five years only. In
passing, the announcement of the trusteeship had touched off revolts and riots in
Korea, and the Soviet Union had seized the opportunity to tag this decision on the
United States, even though it was the former’s proposal.
U.S. POLICY
The U. S. policy in conducting the negotiations with the Soviet regarding the
initial powers and functions of the Joint Commission was, thus, partly stated as follows:
1) to formulate plans for the creation of a provisional Korean
government, in consultation with Korean democratic parties and social
organizations and with a view to the presentation of these plans for the
considerations of the Governments of the Soviet Union, China, Britain
and the United States, prior to final decision by the two governments
represented on the Joint Commission 2) to work out measures, with
the participation of the provisional Korean government, for helping and
assisting political, economical and social progress of the Korean
people, the development of democratic self-government and the
establishment of the national independence of Korea.
These
measures should include plans for a system of government to
eliminate zonal arrangements in northern and southern Korea. 3) to
take those steps which it (the Commission) considers desirable for
establishing permanent coordination of economic – administrative
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matters between the U. S. Command in south Korea and the Soviet
Command in northern Korea…. b) the U. S. members of the joint
Commission are to regard the formulation of plans for the creation of a
provisional Korean government as the first and most pressing political
task.... The U. S. Commander in Korea should, without delay,
encourage the various Korean political factions to reach fundamental
agreements on the political, economic and social policies to be applied
by the new government, including essentially democratic reforms.
(see: Foreign Relations, 1946, Vol. VIII).
The Russian version, according to H. Merrell Benninghoff U. S. Political Adviser
in Korea, substituted the word “guardianship” to the word “trusteeship”, and additionally,
the clause for developing an agreement relating to Korean trusteeship by four powers –
China, Britain, United States and Soviet Union-
for a maximum of five years was
omitted and stated that the Joint Commission’s proposal would be turned over to the
four guardians.
Meanwhile, a Korean provisional government headed by Kim Koo, which the
United States disavowed and so might only be represented in the parley as a party, was
already in existence. However, the first two meetings deadlocked over discussion of
agenda. And when the final meeting of U. S. and Soviet representatives finally opened
on January 18, 1946, the Soviets agreed to discuss such issues as:
1) Supplying electric power to south Korea from northern Korea; 2)
permitting commerce in commodities such as rice, raw materials,
fuel, industrial equipment and chemicals between northern and
southern Korea; 3) uniformrepresentations of the parts and of the
water born commerce between northern and southern Korean
ports; 4) establishing joint United States and Soviet control posts
along the boundary zones of military responsibility; and movement
of Korean citizens from one zone to the other.
But they skipped the inclusion of the adjustment of the 38o parallel in the agenda. (see:
US Foreign Relations, Vol, VIII, 1946)
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The United States delegation to the Conference wanted the 38 th parallel barrier
completely removed with regard to exchange of persons and information between both
areas; whereas the Soviets flatly refused to consider this stand because they viewed
the problem as one of exchange and coordination between two adjoining but separate
zones of responsibility, an obstacle to the reunification of Korea.
Unlike the American authorities in South Korea who had placed much stock to
Mr. Byrnes’ remark of December 30, 1945, that the joint Commission working with the
provisional Government “may find it possible to dispense with a trusteeship”, the Soviet
authorities in Korea had stated that the trusteeship was “the meat of the Moscow
Communiqué, adding that opposition to it was subversive. (see: US Foreign Relations,
Vol, VIII, 1946).
Paradoxically, the Soviet who had excruciated the Americans on trusteeship now
seemingly embraced it. Indeed the Soviet delegation had stated that Koreans were not
ready for the Soviet form of democracy, which suggests that the Soviets perhaps
desired trusteeship so that they might utilize it for cultivating their doctrines on Korea.
Democracy connotes one thing to the Soviets, and quite another to Americans.
To the latter, it means, among other things, freedom of speech, assembly and press
whereas for the Soviet democracy is primarily the welfare of the masses.
This
divergence of viewpoints coloured the whole proceedings and was undoubtedly
responsible for the failure of the Conference to achieve any substantial result.
When the Joint Commission adjourned sine die on May 8, 1946, negotiations
looking toward the creation of a Provisional Korean Government came to an abrupt halt.
Thus, the United States was faced with the prospect of an indefinite prolongation of the
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present unnatural division of Korea and the postponement of all plans for the creation of
a trusteeship or an independent Korean government.
U.S. Objectives
It is necessary, therefore, at this point to re-examine U. S. policy in Korea and
how under that impasse this might best be attained. Fundamentally, United States
objective with regard to Korea, simply stated, was the independence of Korea. Korean
independence was important not only for the sake of Koreans themselves but also as a
means of strengthening political stability throughout the far East. The bottom line here
was simple. The domination of Korea by either Japan or the Soviet Union would, then,
further endanger Chinese control of Manchuria, thereby lessening the prospect of
creating a strong and stable China – a must for political stability in the far East.
Because of the division of Korea, United States mission in the area could only be
attained through agreement with the Soviet Union. If an agreement over Korea was to
be reached, it was imperative that the United States strictly observe the Moscow
Agreement. As President Truman succinctly put it:
Korea has been for many decades the focus of international
rivalries and I consider one of the principal objectives of our
policy there to be to prevent Korea from again becoming the
source of future conflict... The furtherance of our policy of
winning Korean support for our concept of democracy for our
program of action within Korea can be effective in facilitating
agreement with the Soviets.(see: US Foreign Relations, Vol,
VIII, 1946).
Meantime, the Moscow Commission held repeated meetings between 1946 and
1947 but failed to reach agreement on the basis for the establishment of a Korean
government and the withdrawal of occupational forces.Realizing the futility of any further
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rapprochement with the Soviets, the United States proposed in September 1947 that
the matter be placed on the agenda of the UN General Assembly. By a vote of an
overwhelming majority, the General Assembly adopted two resolutions on November
14, 1947, without Soviet concurrency; namely, first establishing a nine-nation UN
Temporary Commission on Korea (UNITOK) to observe elections of Korean
representatives to the National Assembly and second, providing for the transfer of the
functions of government from the occupying authorities and the withdrawal of
occupation forces possibly within 90 days, after a government had been formed.
These decisions met Soviets’ opposition.
They refused to permit the UN
Commission to enter their zone of occupation. This Soviet latest intransigence aided
the United States in considering the possibility of what would later become an inevitable
policy: a separate independent South Korea.
Obviously ambivalent about Soviets’
attitude, President Truman echoed this line when he wrote:
We hope very much it will be possible for the Korean Commission
to carry out its task throughout the whole area and we are by no
means convinced that it is a certainty that the Commission will be
denied entry into the northern Korea. Should the latter eventually
arise, however, we would still be eager to have the assistance of
the UN in our efforts to bring to the people of south Korea, who
constitute more than two-thirds of the total population of the
country, the freely-elected government which they so eagerly await.
(see: US Foreign Relations, Vol, VIII, 1946).
UN Commission
The members of the UNTCOK --- Australia, China, El Salvador, France, India,
the Philippines and Syria -- had themselves definitely tried to keep Americans at bay on
the pretext that they were not being unduly influenced -- when in fact they were -- by
them.
Australia and Canada, for example, it seemed, adopted British policy which
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sought to keep the U. S. tied up in Korea by their willingness to prevent elections in
South Korea.
A south Korean government established under UN auspices, United
States had believed, would be in a strong position to treat with north Korean leaders
whenever Soviets’ control in this area slackened.
Invoking the negative attitude of the Soviet Union, the UNTCOK had stated
bluntly that it would be impossible for it to conduct an election in the north. Therefore,
the Commission referred back to the interim Committee the question whether to
“proceed with observance of elections in South Korea alone regardless of whether
resulting government is called a South Korea government or a National government for
all Korea”.(see: U. S. Foreign Relations, Vol. VI, 1948).
Meantime, a “British Bloc” or “Anti-American Bloc” was gradually building up. In
fact, the Commission for awhile stood five to three against holding an election in South
Korea. To counter this negativism, the State Department poured out dispatches to its
foreign embassies drumming up support for its policy in Korea. As Secretary of State
G. C. Marshall, who succeeded Mr. Byrnes, explained:
The ultimate objective of the U.S. in Korea is the establishment of a
unified and independent nation under a sovereign and democratic
government. The U.S… hopes and believes that any governing
authority which may result from UN intermediation… in South
Korea, will prove to be a force for the unification rather than for the
division of the country. (see: U. S. Foreign Relation, Vol. VI, 1948).
This apparently helped in killing the fire and swinging support to U,S. side, for the
UN Interim Committee on February 26 passed un-amended the American resolution to
hold elections in South Korea by a vote of 11 to 2, with 11 abstentions. The U.S.
applauded this decision as keeping with its avowed objectives in Korea. Thus South
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Koreans swarmed to the polls on May 10 to elect the Government of the Republic of
Korea, headed by Dr. Syngman Rhee.
Even the Commission which supervised the election disagreed over whether its
newly elected government should be recognized before the General Assembly had had
a chance to review its report and, thus, become diverted by an inconclusive debate on
its role in Korea. Moreover, the legality and illegality of granting a premature recognition
before UN procedures hung like a cloud in the State Department itself long enough until
a subtle decision could be reached. The United States Government announced on
August 12 its intention of carry on negotiations with “the New Government in
consultation with the UNTCOK concerning the implementation of further provisions of
the General Assembly” and disclosed the appointment of Mr. John J. Muccio as its
Ambassador. (see: U. S. Foreign Relation, Vol. VI, 1948).
Except for China which
recognized the new regime immediately, other nations awaited UN’ shot.
The General Assembly that convened on December 1948 was a rubber stamp.
After considering and approving both the reports of its Temporary Commission and
Interim Committee, the Assembly rammed through all the United States proposals on
Korea and adopted them.
In adopting a resolution holding the Government of the
Republic of Korea to be validly elected, the Assembly also passed other U.S. sponsored
resolutions, such as seating the delegation from Seoul; blocking similar attempts from
Northern Korean delegation; withdrawing of all occupying forces in Korea; and
reconstituting the commission on Korea.The United States pressed for the Commission
primarily to serve as a stabilizing and deterrent influence so that in case of any conflict,
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the UN would have at hand testimony from a duly constituted agency regarding its
nature and origin and regarding it the responsibility for its occurrence.
In
conclusion,
the
United
States foreign
policy and
diplomacy
were
indistinguishable from the goals and purposes of UN’s activities in Korea, for the
initiatives of what the UN did and accomplished in this region came from the United
States.
Nothing buttressed this position more than the fact that the United States
assumed the leadership role in the UN and was able to swing the latter’ decision to its
side. That the United States succeeded in manipulating the UN as its instrument of
foreign policy in Korea is not an overstatement, for when the UNTCOK was doubtful
about its role, the United States prodded the UN for positive action. The United States
pushed for election in South Korea and prematurely recognized that regime ahead the
UN with impunity.
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