Download Avoiding "Eternal Dishonor"

Avoiding “Eternal Dishonor”1: The U.S. Motivations behind Voluntary Repatriation in the
Korean Armistice, 1950-1953
Statement by President Truman on the Armistice Negotiations, May 7, 1952, In “The United States and the Korean
Problem” in United States Congressional serial set. 11675, 62.3,h3w
1
2
Introduction
The Korean War, while often termed “The Forgotten War”, is a subject that consistently
gains more attention from scholars.2 For the last half a century, historians have debated the
causes of the war, analyzed the military strategies utilized by both sides, and discussed its overall
impact on both the countries involved and those loosely associated with the war effort. One
widely discussed element of the war was the armistice that the Communists and the United
Nations diplomatic leaders agreed upon. Historians scrutinize the inability of all of the members
of the ceasefire to come to a satisfactory decision quickly, blaming China and the North Koreans
for evading any real discussion and attempting to tire the United Nations Command (UNC)
However, what has perhaps received less attention is the United Nations’, particularly the United
States’ role in the prolonged conclusion of the Korean War.
What the armistice negotiations ultimately boiled down to was a fight, on the side of the
South Koreans and the United States’-led UNC, for the inclusion of voluntary repatriation of
prisoners-of-war in the ceasefire.3 This meant that instead of having all POWs repatriate to their
respective nations at the end of the war, the armistice would allow them to choose where they
returned. As the war escalated, UNC guards of POW camps began to learn that they should
expect heavy resistance if they tried to force many Chinese and North Korean soldiers to go back
to their home countries for fear of permanent imprisonment, enslavement, or death. In a war
fighting to protect people from oppressive forms of government, the UNC saw forcible
repatriation as both hypocritical and inhumane. However, besides humanitarian notions, in a war
essentially over ideology, this concept also held a lot of weight; if POWs refused to go back to
2
Clay Blair, The Forgotten War: America in Korea 1950-1953, (New York: Times Books, 1987).
Donald W. Boose, Jr., “United Nations Command (UNC),” In Encyclopedia of The Korean War: A Political,
Social, and Military History, ed. Spencer C. Tucker (New York: Checkmark Books, 2002), 679-680.
3
3
their communist motherlands—China and North Korea—it would suggest to the citizens of other
communist and borderline communist states that their way of life was inferior to that of those in
other nations.
The Communists had a lot to lose over the acceptance of this issue in the armistice, but
the United States, as the new Leader of the Free World and the driving force in the United
Nations, had both a lot to gain from the success of non-forcible repatriation, and a lot to lose if
they settled to an agreement without it. This essay examines why the United States defended this
concept with unshakable resilience. With the thousands of men’s lives, both American and
foreign, dependent on the conclusion of a ceasefire, it is important to understand why the United
States could not afford to agree to an armistice without voluntary repatriation, politically,
militarily, and ideologically.
The fate of the prisoners-of-war not only relied on the United States, but was also
controlled by the outcomes of American intervention. Few scholars have studied the effect that
non-forcible repatriation had on the lives of these prisoners. David Cheng Chang, in his
dissertation "To return home or ‘Return to Taiwan’: conflicts and survival in the "Voluntary
Repatriation" of Chinese POWs in the Korean War," thoroughly explains the role of the POWs
themselves in gaining the right to voluntary repatriation, with a focus on the Chinese prisoners.
The Chinese POWs were in a complex position, influenced by Communist threats, anticommunist threats, propaganda, and those keeping them as prisoners, making UNC POW camps
a dangerous and confusing place to be.4
4
David Cheng Chang, "To return home or "Return to Taiwan" : conflicts and survival in the "Voluntary
Repatriation" of Chinese POWs in the Korean War," (University of California, 2011).
4
The notable author, Ha Jin also paints a picture of the lives of the prisoners in his
historical-fiction novel War Trash. He shows the inner struggles Chinese prisoners dealt with in
having to take sides on the matter of repatriation.5 Following the story of Chinese POW who
knows English, he shows the terror wrought by both the Communist and anti-communist factions
of the camp, as well as the despair that came with realizing that one may have to compromise
their family, their ideology, or both to navigate the prison camps during the process of
repatriation.
Even with the growing literature on the conditions of the prisoners and of the prison
camps, many historians gloss over the United States’ role in instituting voluntary repatriation in
the Korean Armistice. Scholars such as Clay Blair, author of The Forgotten War: America in
Korea 1950-1953, recognize the push for the voluntary repatriation doctrine as both a
humanitarian feat of the United States, as well as a propaganda scheme, yet historians have paid
little attention to what the United States precisely hoped to gain from supporting non-forcible
repatriation.6 To understand all cases of American intervention in international affairs, including
the Korean War and the battle for voluntary repatriation, we not only need to understand the
impact it has on other nations, but we need to also analyze why the United States makes the
choices it does. Through looking at both the causes and the effects, we can better assess the
levels of practicality, the necessity, and the magnanimity in current and potential U.S.
interventions.
By looking through White House documents—including letters, conversations, and
meetings—as well as memoirs of leading figures, opinion pieces of the time, and speeches, I
5
6
Ha Jin, War Trash, (New York : Vintage International, 2005).
Clay Blair, The Forgotten War, 964.
5
have attempted to bring together a picture of the American motivations in handling the Korean
Armistice, focusing on the POW issue. Looking through multiple lenses not only shows the
differences (and similarities) between the private and publically declared incentives of the United
States, but also gives a look at how those motivations altered with a change in the presidency.
Both the Truman and Eisenhower administrations had goals for the reputation of the nation, but
as we will see, international diplomacy was often handled to preserve party-based interests of
each administration. Through putting all of the opposition to the Korean War, and particularly to
the prolonged armistice talks, in contrast with the potential gains of the successful inclusion of
voluntary repatriation in the armistice, we can start to see even the most principled cases of
American interventionism from a more critical approach.
In order to do this, we have to look at a variety of sources. In this essay, I evaluate
primary source materials ranging from publications in the New York Times to memoranda of
conversations in the White House, as well as memoirs from key American figures during the
Korean armistice negotiations and official government messages to the public. To supplement
the primary source material, I have used the Encyclopedia of The Korean War: A Political,
Social, and Military History, edited by Spencer C. Tucker, as well as renowned histories on the
Korean War, such as Bruce Cumings’ The Origins of the Korean War, and William Stueck’s The
Korean War in World History. Using these sources, I have attempted to develop an allencompassing picture of the United States’ role in the Korean War and in the armistice
negotiations.
Part one begins our exploration into this issue by examining the causes of the war and the
part the conflict played in the general scheme of the Cold War, while also establishing the roles
of the North Koreans, South Koreans, United Nations, Americans, Chinese, and the Soviets in
6
the conflict. Part two will focus on the development of the POW problem in the context of the
United States’ involvement in the Korean War. Part three will establish the disadvantages the
United States faced through taking on the task of demanding voluntary repatriation for the
Korean War POWs. From understanding of the origins of the problem , especially within the
context of the opposition the United States government faced to prolonging the Korean War, part
four will dive deeper into the United States’ motivations—domestic, international, military, and
humanitarian—in demanding the inclusion of voluntary repatriation in the ceasefire of the
Korean War. We will see that while the leaders of the United States initially pushed for nonforcible repatriation due to humanitarian principles, they ultimately utilized the issue for anticommunist propaganda, as a method of saving face, to promote their reputation abroad, and to
gain much-needed support domestically. While agreeing with historians like Blair, who label the
encouragement of the voluntary repatriation doctrine as both a humanitarian move, as well as a
propaganda campaign, I will argue that support for non-forcible repatriation was more complex,
involving military considerations, domestic political issues, and the fate of the United Nations.
I. Historical Background
The Korean War is a unique war in its origins. The foundations of the Korean War trace
back to the Japanese occupation of Korea, before WWII even started. The Japanese did not
prepare Korea for political independence during their rule. In fact, no other occupying nation had
tried so hard to destroy Korea’s basic cultural and political institutions. Children were educated
in Japanese and the Korean language was banned altogether. Very few Koreans, even the
aristocratic elite, had any political voice.7 The Japanese occupation limited the Koreans’ political
choices to either joining an anti-communist group and helping Japan fight the Pacific War, or
7
Louis Hayes, Political Systems of East Asia: China, Korea, and Japan (Armonk: M.E. Sharpe, Inc., 2012), 91.
7
resisting colonial rule and risking potential penalties.8 On top of the political oppression, the
Japanese did not build an industrial infrastructure that could keep Korea economically
independent. All of Korea’s resources were exploited for the benefit of Japan. Ultimately, when
the Japanese occupation ended, they left Korea with a complete lack of stability.9
Korea lacked stability not only because of what the Japanese had taken away from them,
but also because of what they had given them while they occupied the peninsula. Giving Koreans
factory jobs in the city had showed the agricultural peasants a new lifestyle. Japan left Korea
with an improved transportation system and exposure to an organized bureaucracy—the
Japanese had given Koreans a taste of a better life without helping the nation truly transform into
a functional, industrialized nation.10 Politically, since Koreans were denied real bureaucratic
positions, factions grew amongst the few Koreans that had any power. Leaders could not come to
conclusions on how a new political regime would approach fundamental questions, such as
whether or not there should be private ownership, what social practices they would institute, and
how to distribute rudimentary resources.11
While each contained their factions, the Japanese occupation essentially had spurred two
rival uprisings: the Korean Nationalists, who submitted to and advocated a Western, capitalist
ideology, and the Korean Communists, supported Marxist philosophy. Syngman Rhee, an
American-educated, controversial, and deeply anti-communist Korean led the Korean
Nationalists in a movement for Korean independence.12 The North Korean Communists looked
8
Bruce Cumings, The Origins of the Korean War, (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press), c1981-c1990., 1981,
32
9
Hayes, Political Systems of East Asia, 91.
10
Cumings, The Origins of the Korean War, 66.
11
Cumings, The Origins of the Korean War, 99
12
Priscilla Roberts, “Syngman Rhee,” In Encyclopedia of The Korean War: A Political, Social, and Military History,
ed. Spencer C. Tucker (New York: Checkmark Books, 2002), 624-628.
8
towards Kim Il Sung, who had helped advocate a communist people’s democracy, which later
proved to become a centrally organized authoritarian system.13 Both revolutionary movements
had grown in number and in power, with the Communists having sought assistance from the
Chinese and the Soviet Union, and the Nationalists gaining support from the United States.14
Leaders of each party had escaped Japanese rule by taking refuge in supportive nations, and
quickly returned to fight for power at the end of WWII.15
Internally, neither movement had enough power and support to overcome the other.16
However, a seemingly domestic issue quickly gained international attention. As early as the
Cairo Conference in 1943, the Allied powers recognized that Korea would face serious
challenges once they attained freedom from the Japanese. They did not believe that Korea was
ready to run itself independently, so they agreed to put Korea under Allied occupation.17 While
the Allied powers discussed a four-way trusteeship—under the United States, the Soviet Union,
Britain and China—at the Yalta Conference in early 1945, the Potsdam Conference sealed the
fate of Korea to undergoing temporary occupation underneath two nations, the US and the
U.S.S.R.18 As the world would come to find out, the differences between the American and
Soviet occupation only reinforced the political divide within the worn-torn nation, making the
reunification between North and South Korea increasingly less possible.
Dong-man Suh, “Korea, Democratic People’s Republic of: 1945-1953,” In Encyclopedia of The Korean War: A
Political, Social, and Military History, ed. Spencer C. Tucker (New York: Checkmark Books, 2002), 331-333.
14
Allan R. Millet, “The Korean People: Missing in Action in the Misunderstood War, 1945-1954.” In The Korean
War in World History, ed. William Stueck (Lexington: The University Press of Kentucky, 2010), 15
15
Millet, “The Korean People,” 19.
16
Millet, “The Korean People,” 15.
17
Conrad Schirokauer and Donald Clark, Modern East Asia: A Brief History. 2nd ed., ( Boston: Houghton Mifflin
Company, 2008), 336.
18
Sherman Pratt, “Korea: History, 1945-1947,” In Encyclopedia of The Korean War: A Political, Social, and
Military History, ed. Spencer C. Tucker (New York: Checkmark Books, 2002), 347.
13
9
Ideological differences between the U.S.S.R. and the United States became apparent in
post-war these negotiations. The United States had a different vision for rebuilding Korea, as
well as other war-torn nations, than the U.S.S.R. did. However, in order to maintain equality, the
agreement reached at the Potsdam conference in 1945 allowed each victorious country to have a
say in how to run and organize the defeated country.19 Korea was divided into North and South
Korea, where the North was occupied by the U.S.S.R. and the South was occupied by the United
States.
The division of Korea presented a unique set of problems. The Soviet Union had entered
the war against Japan only a day before the United States dropped the atomic bomb on
Nagasaki.20 Initially, President Roosevelt welcomed Soviet assistance in the effort against Japan,
and he had invited the Soviet Union into the potential three-way trusteeship, between the US,
China, and the U.S.S.R.—which eventually turned into the four-way trusteeship, and finally the
two-way trusteeship—over Korea after the war. He knew that including the Soviet Union in the
Pacific front would help the U.S. defeat the Japanese more quickly, and remaining on good terms
with the U.S.S.R. was crucial to securing their help.21 However, since the U.S.S.R. had already
occupied Manchuria, the U.S. quickly became suspicious and aware of the Soviet Union’s
growing sphere of influence in the East, especially once the war against the Japanese came to a
close. Many began to speculate that the Soviet Union entered the Pacific War in order to have a
voice in rebuilding the East in the post-war negotiations.22
19
Hayes, Political Systems of East Asia, 95.
Schirokauer and Clark, Modern East Asia, 335.
21
Mark P. Barry, "The U.S. and the 1945 Division of Korea: Mismanaging The 'Big Decisions.'," International
Journal on World Peace 29.4 (2012): 39.
22
Barry, “The U.S. and the 1945 Division of Korea,” 39.
20
10
Regardless of its intentions in entering the war against Japan, the U.S.S.R. did, in fact, get
its opportunity to assert influence in North Korea. When the U.S.S.R. occupied North Korea
after the war, it set it up as a nation that solely relied on other communist nations for economic
support; the only country it traded with was the Soviet Union, aside from limited trading with
Hong Kong and the Communist-controlled Manchuria.23 Not only was North Korea
economically dependent on the U.S.S.R., but North Korea’s leader, Kim Il Sung, and his
administration also relied on support from Stalin.24 Kim Il Sung had risen to power with the
economic aid of the U.S.S.R., and completely continued to rely on them fully.25 Between the end
of WWII and the start of the new decade, the U.S.S.R. had supported the North Korean
Communists’ increasing hostility towards South Korea, as well as their drive to occupy the rest
of the peninsula.
While the Soviet Union clearly played a role in setting up the stage for the Korean War,
they were not the only foreign power that contributed to the problem in Korea. Before WWII,
neither the United States nor the U.S.S.R. had given Korea much consideration to Korea in their
world views.26 However, the post-war nation provided an opportunity for the U.S.S.R. and
presented a problem to the U.S.; the U.S.S.R. suddenly had access to many unstable nations that
were susceptible to communist conversion, and the United States had to justify their post-war
intervention in the nations freed in a war against imperialism to the international community that
had watched the U.S. free the nations.27 The trusteeship under the U.S.S.R. and the U.S. took
some time to materialize, and by the time it did, there were already two distinct regimes in North
Kathryn Weathersby, “The Soviet Role in the Korean War: The State of Historical Knowledge.” In The Korean
War in World History, ed. William Stueck (Lexington: The University Press of Kentucky, 2010), 65.
24
Weathersby, “The Soviet Role in the Korean War,” 65.
25
Weathersby, “The Soviet Role in the Korean War,” 65.
26
Cumings, The Origins of the Korean War, 102.
27
Schirokauer, 336; Cumings, The Origins of the Korean War, 131.
23
11
Korea and South Korea.28 President Franklin Roosevelt had desired to contain the spread of
communism in the east, and he had hoped that bringing the Soviet Union into an international
contract made within the United Nations would prevent the U.S.S.R. from starting something
like the Korean War.29 However, letting the Soviet Union stay in Korea at all allowed for the
national division and the conversion of many North Koreans to the communist ideology.
Due to both the problems in domestic politics and in influence of the increasingly torn
international community, tensions built up on either side of the 38th parallel past the point of
containment. On June 25, 1950, North Korea launched an invasion into South Korea, quickly
pushing South Korean forces, as well as the United Nations forces that had remained during the
temporary occupation, to the southern-most point of the peninsula.30 America and the United
Nations reacted quickly, driving the Communists back towards the dividing line in a matter a
months. With the rapid success of the UN and South Korean troops, North Korea called in for
reinforcements. By mid-October, China joined the Communists, truly turning a civil war into an
international affair.
With the arrival of China in the Korean War, the UN suddenly met a force that they could
not hope to defeat.31 A war that began with intensions to unify a broken country turned into a
war of words, propaganda, and fruitless truce negotiations within a year. For three years after the
North Korean invasion, men from both sides fought on while diplomats from the United States,
the United Nations, South Korea, China and North Korea sought a ceasefire that satisfied
everyone. There were a number of issues each side had to agree upon, such as where to put the
28
Hayes, Political Systems of East Asia, 99.
Cumings, The Origins of the Korean War, 130.
30
Clay Blair, The Forgotten War, 317-319.
31
Donald W. Boose, Jr., “Truce Talks (July 1951-July 1953),” In Encyclopedia of The Korean War: A Political,
Social, and Military History, ed. Spencer C. Tucker (New York: Checkmark Books, 2002), 653.
29
12
demilitarized zone that divided North Korea from South Korea. However, it soon became
apparent that three issues made a quick ceasefire impossible: the North Korean and Chinese
proposal for inclusion of the Soviet Union in the military armistice commission (MAC), the UN
and South Korean suggested ban on airfield repair and construction, and the UN demand for nonforcible repatriation of the prisoners-of-war after the ceasefire. The UN believed it was
inappropriate for the Communists to rebuild during peace negotiations, recognized that the
Soviet Union would not act neutrally if they were given a position in the armistice negotiations,
and thought anything but voluntary repatriation was inhumane. Of course, the Communists felt
differently on all three of these issues, making it difficult to come to any conclusions.32
By the second year of negotiations in 1952, none of these questions had found
satisfactory conclusions. The China and North Korea refused to acknowledge that the Soviet
Union, just because it was not actively participating in the Korean War, was far from a neutral
nation. The UN negotiators continued to decline the request of China and North Korea to include
the Soviet Union in the MAC. The way they saw it, the Soviets had clear intentions to spread
communism in Korea and the rest of the East, so allowing it to supervise the logistics of the
ceasefire would put the UN at a distinct disadvantage in the scheme of the Cold War. Similarly,
the UN delegates found the Chinese and North Korean desire to continue to rebuild and even
construct new airfields during a ceasefire disconcerting.
Yet, as one New York Times article voiced that as “knotty” as these two issues appeared,
“both might be considered practical military or military political matters capable of a concrete
solution.”33 The real source of delay in the negotiations came from the question of voluntary
32
Ibid. 654
Lindesay Parrott, “Reds Accuse U.N. of Germ War Tests on Korea Captives,” The New York Times, March 23,
1952, 1. http://search.proquest.com/docview/112506651?accountid=13554
33
13
repatriation. On this question, as the Times article articulated, “the rival ideologies [came]
squarely into conflict.” The United States and the United Nations argued that it was inhumane to
force POWs back home against their will, especially with the understanding that their home
nations were likely going to treat them as traitors who should have died for their country before
surrendering to enemy captivity.34 This argument turned what was normally used as military
negotiation tool into a group of individual human beings, with the UN fighting for the individual.
However, fighting for the individual proved to hit the heart of the ideological differences each
side was ultimately fighting for. As General Matthew Ridgway, the UNC commanding general
for the majority of the truce negotiations stated, “it is the principle which is anathema to them
[the Communists] since the question of the individual versus the state is the essential difference
between democracy and communism.”35
With such a philosophically charged problem, it is no surprise that voluntary repatriation
delayed the ceasefire. However, a two year stalemate over what had historically always been a
logistical issue raises some questions. What exactly made this issue create such tension between
the fighting sides? How important was voluntary repatriation to the United States as a
humanitarian victory? Was it worth the loss of thousands of lives of American, South Korean,
and UN soldiers? What would have been the consequences if the U.S. had compromised on the
issue of non-forcible repatriation?
This essay hopes to answer some of these questions. By focusing on the motivations of
the United States presidents and their administrations throughout the Korean War, it is evident
that there was a lot to gain from successfully incorporating voluntary repatriation into the
Boose, “Truce Talks (July 1951-July 1953), 654
Walter G. Hermes, Truce Tent and Fighting Front, (Washington, D.C.:Office of the Chief of Military History,
United States Army, 1966), 146-7.
34
35
14
armistice, but equally just as much to lose by agreeing to a ceasefire without it. As we will
discover, the initially humanitarian intentions behind the United States’ demand for non-forcible
repatriation were manipulated by the desire to save face internationally and domestically and to
secure an advantage in the overarching fight against communism.
II. A Problem on Our Hands
At the onset of the Korean War, no one suspected that the exchange of POWs would
provide one of the greatest dilemmas in agreeing to an armistice. In regards to POW exchange—
according to the Article 118 of the Geneva Convention, written just a year before the war—the
only responsibility of nations who accepted the Geneva Convention as international law was to
return all prisoners to their country of origin immediately following an armistice, treaty, or
truce.36 This was emphasized due to the Soviet Union’s actions after the war was over; instead of
immediately letting their German and Japanese prisoners-of-war go back to their homes, the
U.S.S.R. kept them and forced them to help repair the damage the war had caused.37 The Geneva
Conventions were updated to help protect those prisoners without considering how such a
statement could limit possibilities in POW negotiations in the future. Even through the first year
of the war, the United States saw no reason to press the issue of non-forcible repatriation and,
although neither the U.S. nor its communist enemies (People’s Republic of China and North
Korea) had ratified the particular document regarding POWS, accepted the terms presented by
the Geneva Convention as humanitarian in nature.38
36
Hermes, Truce Tent and Fighting Front.
Hermes, Truce Tent and Fighting Front.
38
"United States Position Regarding a Cease-Fire in Korea," National Security Council Report #95, December 13,
1950, In The Korean War and Its Origins,
http://www.trumanlibrary.org/whistlestop/study_collections/korea/large/documents/pdfs/ci-4-9.pdf#zoom=100;
Zsolt Varga, “Geneva Convention of 1949,” In Encyclopedia of The Korean War: A Political, Social, and Military
History, ed. Spencer C. Tucker (New York: Checkmark Books, 2002), 224.
37
15
As the war progressed, the United States and United Nations combined forces became
increasingly aware of a threat of resistance to repatriation amongst the prisoners held in the
United Nations Command POW camps. The first indication that POWs in this war were going to
play a different role than in wars past came from the North Korean prisoners. As more fell into
the hands of the UNC, many complained that they were neither communist nor North Korean,
indicating that the Communists had forced these South Koreans into their army. Once the
Chinese entered the war, the UNC forces commanding the POW camps listened to a similar story
told by the incoming Chinese prisoners. Many claimed that their loyalty belonged to the Chinese
Nationalist Party, and that they had been impressed into the Chinese Communist military.39
This development raised a great number of issues, ranging from logistical to ideological:
Was this issue the responsibility of the military, or should the UN Command approach it
politically? Would the enemy even agree to non-forcible repatriation—was the idea of nonforcible repatriation a concept that even occurred as a possibility in communist philosophy? If
not, would the UNC’s demand for non-forcible repatriation jeopardize the lives of American and
UN troops held in enemy captivity? If so, who would mediate the prisoner exchange, and
therefore take on the duty of caring for non-repatriated prisoners? If they did not pursue the
issue at all, would the non-communist prisoners revolt from within the camps and during
repatriation, putting the lives of the UNC forces in danger? Was it the Free World’s moral
obligation to defend the choices of these prisoners?40
39
Hermes, Truce Tent and Fighting Front, 2.
Dean Acheson, Present at the creation; my years in the State Department, (New York: Norton [1969], 1969), 653;
Kearney, “The Heart of PW Issue,”; “U.S. Bars New Red Plan on Prisoners: Opposes Sending Men Out of Korea to
Long Detention in Neutral State,” The New York Times, April 27, 1953, 1; Edmond Taylor to Mallory Browne, With
Attachments, February 19, 1952, In The Korean War and Its Origins,
http://www.trumanlibrary.org/whistlestop/study_collections/korea/large/documents/pdfs/kp-4-15.pdf#zoom=100;
Telegram to Dean G. Acheson With Related Correspondence, November 14, 1952, In The Korean War and Its
40
16
This was the first time the discussion of the concept of non-forcible repatriation actively
prevented any armistice. However, the world had, in fact, encountered a similar problem at the
end of WWII. When Robert McClure, chief of the Army Psychological Warfare branch first
suggested that the U.S. and the UN demand that the enemy accept non-forcible repatriation, he
reminded the Chief of Staff of the horrors of forcing Soviet prisoners to return to their oppressive
government after World War II.41 Many of the soldiers committed suicide instead of going back
to the U.S.S.R., and those who did return and expressed anti-communist views were sent to the
Gulags. Dwight D. Eisenhower, who was a general at the beginning of the Korean War and who
the people elected president before the final year of the war, remembered the repatriation of the
U.S.S.R. prisoners as a tragedy that he would never allow himself to oversee again.42
While memory and regret of the post-WWII situation in the U.S.S.R. aroused
humanitarian sentiments in those intertwined in the Korean War, those dictating the United
States’ role in the war announced publicly, and repeatedly, that defending non-forcible
repatriation was simply the right thing to do. The Department of State claimed in a press release
that it was “a fundamental humanitarian principle vital to the whole Free World,” and Secretary
of State Dean Acheson himself declared that he did not want “to compromise the human
principles”43 In a letter to a concerned father of a questioning young man, Secretary Acheson
reinforced this attitude about the U.S. involvement in the war, suggesting that it was only natural
Origins, http://www.trumanlibrary.org/whistlestop/study_collections/korea/large/documents/pdfs/kp-317.pdf#zoom=100; Hermes, Truce Tent and Fighting Front, 3.
41
Demaree Bess, “The Prisoners Stole the Show in Korea,” The Saturday Evening Post 225, no. 18 (November,
1952): 36.
42
Walter H. Judd, "'The Real Test is Our Moral Strength'." Vital Speeches Of The Day 20, no. 14 (May 1954): 427.
43
Statement by the Department of State on the Exchange of Prisoners of War, May 15, 1953, In “The United States
and the Korean Problem” in United States Congressional serial set. 11675, 80; Acheson, Present at the Creation,
696.
17
and right for a young adult to question the administration, while encouraging the father to remind
his son of the principles that the U.S. was founded on and its commitment to them.44
The New York Times also aided in proclaiming the humanitarian principles. The Times
chose excerpts from the Acheson report to the UN Assembly Committee on U.S. Conduct of the
Korean War that highlighted America’s altruistic motives in the war. Acheson, as the paper
reported, stated that the United Nations “would have been quite satisfied to have all prisoners
returned, provided no humanitarian considerations of the matter,” and they “could be perfectly
happy if there were not other considerations, no humanitarian considerations, and simply to
exchange prisoners and forget about them.”45 One article, featured by the Times ensured the
American people that the United States and the United Nations, when interrogating the POWs in
the camps on their desire to go home, used questions “loaded in the favor of the Communists.”46
III. Pressure to End the War
While America preached a story of natural rights, the tale did not change the minds of
everyone. The U.S. involvement in the Korean War was controversial from the beginning, and
supportive public opinion, both domestically and abroad, only declined as the war continued.
General Douglas MacArthur, who led the U.S. forces into Korea, had told the American mothers
that they could expect their sons to come home before Christmas of 1950.47 When the Chinese
intervened—to the at least apparent surprise of MacArthur, Truman, and the State Department in
the press—letters from angry parents and wives flowed into the President Truman’s office. One
44
Clarence E. Moullette to Dean Acheson, January 19, 1951, In The Korean War and Its Origins,
http://www.trumanlibrary.org/whistlestop/study_collections/korea/large/documents/pdfs/kp-8-13.pdf#zoom=100.
45
“Exceprts from Acheson Report to U.N. Assembly Committee on U.S. Conduct of Korean War,” The New York
Times, October 25, 1952, 4.
46
Murray Schumach, “U.N. Tells Full Story of Poll of Prisoners,” The New York Times, April 26, 1952, 1.
4747
Duane L. Wesolick, “MacArthur, Douglas,” In Encyclopedia of The Korean War: A Political, Social, and
Military History, ed. Spencer C. Tucker (New York: Checkmark Books, 2002), 402.
18
father accused Truman of being “directly responsible” for the death of their son, suggesting that
President Truman keep his letter on display in his “trophy room.”48 Other letters disagreed not
only with the ongoing war, but with the desire for non-forcible repatriation specifically. One wife
wrote to her senator, declaring that her husband was “worth more than 500 Communist prisoners
of war,” while a father wrote to President Truman, stating that he “would not trade the life of one
American boy for all of the Koreans.”49 Another wife respectfully reminded her senator, Senator
Paul Douglas that the United States’ “FIRST obligation” was to its own soldiers, proposing to
begin a petition to bring them home unless he responded with information that could convince
her otherwise.50
Truman not only got angry letters, but he took on the greater political consequences of
the Korean War as well. Support for his administration fell, and to many, his foreign policy
appeared weak.51 While poor public opinion is always unfavorable, Truman did not plan to run
for reelection in 1952, so its entire legacy was at stake. Moreover, Truman’s choices influenced
the success of his party. One editorial to The Saturday Evening Post predicted how an armistice,
even a temporary one, could benefit the Democratic candidate, Adlai Stevenson, governor of
48
William Banning to Harry S. Truman, ca. 1953, In The Korean War and Its Origins,
http://www.trumanlibrary.org/whistlestop/study_collections/korea/large/documents/pdfs/8-16.pdf#zoom=100.
49
Francis Case to Harry S. Truman With Reply From Robert A. Lovett, October 1, 1952, In The Korean War and its
Origins, http://www.trumanlibrary.org/whistlestop/study_collections/korea/large/documents/pdfs/kp-121.pdf#zoom=100; James T. Mayall to Harry S. Truman With Reply From William D. Hassett, June 13, 1952, In
The Korean War and Its Origins,
http://www.trumanlibrary.org/whistlestop/study_collections/korea/large/documents/pdfs/kp-1-17.pdf#zoom=100
50
Correspondence Between Paul Douglas and Harry S. Truman, With Attachments, June 12, 1952, In The Korean
War and Its Origins, http://www.trumanlibrary.org/whistlestop/study_collections/korea/large/documents/pdfs/kp-118.pdf#zoom=100
51
Correspondence Between James E. Noland and Harry S. Truman, August 29, 1950, In The Korean War and Its
Origins, http://www.trumanlibrary.org/whistlestop/study_collections/korea/large/documents/pdfs/ki-1110.pdf#zoom=100.
19
Illinois in the election, whereas the absence of an agreement would work in the favor of the
Republican candidate, Dwight D. Eisenhower.52
The Republican Party utilized the Korean War as political leverage too, blaming
Truman’s administration for MacArthur’s unexpected and humiliating defeat at the Battle of the
Yalu.53 A Times article did not help the Truman administration or the Democratic Party, calling
attention to “Acheson’s great blunder” at the beginning of his appointment as Secretary of
State—in addressing America’s foreign policy objectives, he specifically left out Korea as an
area of political and military interest, leading the Communists to believe they could quickly take
Korea without getting the United States involved.54
Of course, the most severe domestic opposition both Truman and Eisenhower faced—
although Truman more so than Eisenhower—came from Senator Joseph McCarthy. The
Republican senator from Wisconsin had started wild accusations of communism within the U.S.
government near the end of WWII, and they only escalated as the repercussions of the war
unfolded.55 Secretary of State Dean Acheson quickly became a victim of such accusations when
the Korean War broke out. His “great blunder” fueled McCarthy’s belief that people within the
State Department were in cahoots with Russia in “a conquest of terror” similar to those of
Genghis Khan and Hitler.56 Acheson had left Korea out of the Far East policy, so according to
McCarthy’s logic, the State Department clearly wanted to “deliver vast areas and millions of
Bess, “The Prisoners Stole the Show in Korea.”
Arthur Krock, “’Mistakes’ of Korea War Again a Political Issue,” The New York Times, June 28, 1953, E3.
54
Krock, “’Mistakes’ of Korea War,”; Claude R. Sasso, “Stalin, Josef,” In Encyclopedia of The Korean War: A
Political, Social, and Military History, ed. Spencer C. Tucker (New York: Checkmark Books, 2002), 613.
55
Priscilla Roberts, “McCarthy, Joseph R.”, In Encyclopedia of The Korean War: A Political, Social, and Military
History, ed. Spencer C. Tucker (New York: Checkmark Books, 2002), 421.
56
John Fenton, “M’Carthy Brands Korea a ‘Betrayal’,” The New York Times, June 30, 1951, 2.
52
53
20
people into communist slavery without having it appear that we pushed them.”57 Every move by
Truman, and even the Republican Eisenhower came under McCarthy’s scrutiny; with McCarthy
at the height of his political influence, the executive branch could hardly afford to let the war
continue, much less make any decisions that may have appeared sympathetic to the
Communists.58
Ultimately, the war did Truman and the Democrats no favors. At the beginning of 1953,
Dwight D. Eisenhower replaced Truman in the Oval Office and appointed John Foster Dulles as
the new Secretary of State. Although they won the election, the new administration did not
escape the difficulties brought on by the Korean War. As the Times reported, Acheson had not
wanted to “commit the new administration to an involved plan [for Korea] that, if accepted,
might land General Eisenhower and Mr. Dulles in difficulties in which they could then blame
their predecessors,” so the U.S. and the UN had made no formal plans for ending the war or
settling on an armistice when Eisenhower took office.59
Not only was the war at a stalemate, but the international community looked towards the
new administration for a way out of the war. One Dutch editorial expressed concerns, saything
that the new administration was isolationist, an unflattering image for the representing party of
the leader of the Free World.60 Great Britain pressured the United States to accept the resolution
proposed by the neutral India—in which the Communists and the UN would agree to a ceasefire,
let all prisoners who wanted to repatriate go home, and then leave the rest to a repatriation
“M’Carthy Urges Acheson be ‘Fired’,” The New York Times, May 16, 1950, 14.
Roberts, “McCarthy,” 422; “Dulles, McCarthy Views on Rhee’s Revolt Differ,” The New York Times, June 19,
1953, 2.
59
Thomas J. Hamilton, “Reticences of Eisenhower Influence U.N. Talk on Korea,” The New York Times, November,
26, 1952, 3.
60
From Mr. Hanes to Mr. Bonbright, July 22, 1953, The papers of John Foster Dulles and of Christian A. Herter,
1953-1961. The White house correspondence and memoranda series.
57
58
21
committee made of neutral nations.61 Domestically, politicians worried that Eisenhower’s
administration was uninterested in shifting America’s “Europe-first” policy to give the
increasingly threatening East more attention in foreign policy. Senator Walter Judd of Minnesota
worried that a lack of a reformed plan for the Far East would resemble Acheson’s foreign policy,
undermining the strength of the new administration.62
Regardless of political standing, all political and military leaders understood that
continuing a war in Korea could quickly lead to a conflict beyond America’s capacity to control.
Both the Truman and the Eisenhower administrations considered the size and power of the Red
Armies a serious threat. Both Truman and Eisenhower had both taken careful steps to avoid a
war with China, including Truman’s risky move of firing MacArthur. From the earliest U.S.
National Security Council reports, it is clear that while unifying Korea was ideal, preventing a
full scale war in Asia would take priority when making all decisions throughout the course of the
war. In fact, the ultimate plan was to merely limit the spread of communism past the 38 th parallel,
not to take chances by pushing it out of Korea entirely.63 A
cheson’s statements from report to the U.N Committee on U.S. involvement in Korea
were carefully worded, and widely publicized, as to not suggest that the U.S. was pursuing any
direct confrontation with the Chinese. He reiterated that the only reason the UN went to Korea
was to reunify the broken nation, or, if nothing else, protect South Korea from falling under the
Elizabeth D. Schafer, Nehru Jawaharlal (1889-1964),” In Encyclopedia of The Korean War: A Political, Social,
and Military History, ed. Spencer C. Tucker (New York: Checkmark Books, 2002), 481; Thomas J. Hamilton,
“Eden Urges Enemy Yield on Captives to End Korean War,” The New York Times, November 12, 1952, 1.
62
Telephone Conversation with Congressman Judd March 6, 1953, Minutes of telephone conversations of John
Foster Dulles and of Christian Herter (1953-1961).
63
National Security Council Report 81, "United States Courses of Action With Respect to Korea", September 1,
1950, In The Korean War and Its Origins,
http://www.trumanlibrary.org/whistlestop/study_collections/korea/large/documents/pdfs/ki-17-1.pdf#zoom=100.
61
22
influence of communism.64 Such fear continued and grew as the Korean War pressed on,
especially once China intervened. General Omar Bradley pushed for a negotiation of peace that
would help deter a future war against the Soviets, warning that general war with China and the
U.S.S.R. would be devastating. If the UN Command let the war spread into China, Bradley
cautioned, everyone would risk trading “the small deadlock in Korea, for a larger stalemate in
China.”65 As the war went on, the UN risked further Chinese agitation, leading them closer and
closer to tensions that a ceasefire in Korea may not overcome.
The Truman and Eisenhower administrations faced, yet, a final source of pressure to
settle the POW question and bring the war to an end. This came from within the POW camps
themselves. While many of the POWs in UNC camps had either been forced into either the
Peoples’ Volunteer Army or China or into the North Korean forces, or simply held no strong
loyalty to the Communist governments, some were fiercely dedicated Communists who saw
opportunity in their compromised position. Once the idea of voluntary repatriation circulated
around the camps, those faithful to the Communists’ cause considered themselves as active
combatants in the war and began resistance, in the form of riots, against the proposal.66 The size
and scale of the riots was not fully realized until the UNC forces began screening the prisoners in
order to determine their repatriation preferences.67 The Communists refused to adhere to the
order and rules of the camp and rejected screening.68
“Excerpts From Acheson Report.”
Omar N. Bradley, “Our Hope for a Lasting Peace,” Vital Speeches of the Day, 18, no. 14 (May 1952): 445.
66
Matthew B. Ridgway, The Korean War: How we met the challenge: How all-out Asian war was averted: Why
MacArthur was dismissed: Why today's war objectives must be limited, (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1967) 209.
67
“U.N. Prisoner Camp Scene of Violence,” The New York Times, January 22, 1952, 3; Robert Alden, “Communist
Prisoners Wage New Kind of War,” The New York Times, December 21, 1952, E5.
68
Acheson, Present at the Creation, 705.
64
65
23
Violent riots persisted and Communist plans grew more complex. In what Blair calls a
“vicious and massive propaganda attack,” the Communists utilized lies and their POWs to
humiliate and to bring down the United States and the United Nations.69 They accused the UN of
using germ warfare, suggesting that they had spread dangerous bacteria throughout North Korea.
This propaganda campaign was only complemented by another Communist tactic; the
Communist forces allowed select soldiers to get taken as prisoners into the UNC camps to help
organize a resistance movement within the camps. UN forces had to use force to combat the riots,
giving the Communists the material they needed to portray the UN guards as inhumane,
bloodthirsty enemies.70 To the huge embarrassment of the U.S., the Chinese forces within the
POW camp on Koje-do (an island off of South Korea) captured General Francis T. Dodd and
forced him to admit to false accusations of maltreatment within the camps amongst other
demands.71 As humiliating as it was, the U.S. could not maintain effective control within the
camps, and as resistance grew, the lives of the both the prisoners and the camp guards were
increasingly endangered.72
IV. Motivations
Demanding that the armistice between the UN forces and the Communist enemy include
a commitment to non-forcible repatriation brought on significant difficulties, yet both the
Truman administration and the Eisenhower administration pursued it. While, publicly they
declared that the United States was simply committed to the humanitarian principles inherent to a
democratic society, there was more they could gain from it. In the ongoing fight against
69
Clay Blair, The Forgotten War, 966.
Ibid.
71
Jinwung Kim, “Koje-do Prisoner-of-War Uprising (7 May-10 June, 1952),” In Encyclopedia of The Korean War:
A Political, Social, and Military History, ed. Spencer C. Tucker (New York: Checkmark Books, 2002), 326-328;
Acheson, Present at the Creation, 654.
72
Bess, “The Prisoners Stole the Show in Korea.”
70
24
communism, the United States needed any leverage they could get against their enemy. When
introduced to the concept of non-forcible repatriation, the Truman administration quickly saw its
potential anti-communist propaganda. Colonel Paul C. Davis of the Psychological Strategy
Board wrote to the State Department, suggesting that they use the POW situation to develop the
United States’ “propaganda position”.73 Although Acheson worried about how the non-forcible
repatriation proposal would affect the return of all UN troops, he too saw the “possible
psychological warfare advantages.” These advantages outweighed the possibilities of UN
soldiers refusing to repatriate, especially having heard no indication that the Communists held
many Communist sympathizers in their camps.74
A year after the armistice, Senator Judd reflected in a speech given to The Executives
Club of Chicago that one of the great gains of the war was the propaganda that stemmed from the
POW issue. He stated, “Witness the prisoners of war, 74 percent of whom—Communist
prisoners in Korea—said they would die rather than go back to China. The great benefit of the
Korean war was that it gave time for the truth about Communism to leak out.”75 Walter Hermes,
author of Truce Tent and the Fighting Front, an official military history of the Korean War,
confirmed the use of the POW situation as “a propaganda lever.” “If a large proportion of the
prisoners in UNC hands refused to return to communism,” Hermes states, “the adverse publicity
would be hard to combat, no matter how it was rationalized. Unusual as the doctrine of voluntary
73
Memorandum For the Record, Paul C. Davis, January 24, 1952, In The Korean War and Its Origins,
http://www.trumanlibrary.org/whistlestop/study_collections/korea/large/documents/pdfs/kp-4-2.pdf#zoom=100.
74
Dean G. Acheson to George C. Marshall, August 27, 1951, In The Korean War and Its Origins,
http://www.trumanlibrary.org/whistlestop/study_collections/korea/large/documents/pdfs/kp-4-7.pdf#zoom=100.
75
Judd, “The Real Test is Our Moral Strength,” 434.
25
repatriation might be, its humanitarian aspects were bound to appeal to a large part of the
world.”76
There was a clear political advantage in promoting voluntary repatriation, but the U.S.
expected to achieve a military advantage as well. When Brigadier General McClure suggested
using the prisoners as a tool of psychological warfare in the Cold War, he thought beyond how
the concept would gain support internationally. He believed that if the enemy forces felt that the
UN Command would provide asylum from their oppressive homes, then enemy soldiers would
resist imprisonment less and may even willingly accept UN imprisonment.77 Not only would the
threat of non-forcible repatriation help in the Korean War, but as Acheson wrote in his memoirs,
the policy would serve as a significant deterrent to future acts of Communist aggression. If
Communist leaders knew that their soldiers had an opportunity to defect, and moreover, that they
would defect if given the opportunity, adding an element of risk to any potential physical
confrontation.78 From the very onset of the war, the Truman administration fully intended to
create plans to promote enemy defection. “[T]he treatment of POW’s, after their transfer to
places of internment, shall be directed toward their exploitation,” and “use for psychological
warfare purposes,” wrote the James Lay, the Executive Secretary in a draft of the United States
Courses of Action with Respect to Korea to the National Security Council.
When the war fell into the hands of Eisenhower and his administration, they, too, saw the
military advantage in voluntary repatriation. In a speech delivered to the American Legion in
September 1953, Secretary of State John Foster Dulles claimed that not only was enemy
defection beneficial to the U.S., but that an armistice without it would be detrimental. He stated
76
Hermes, Truce Tent and Fighting Front,144.
Hermes, Truce Tent and Fighting Front, 2.
78
Acheson, Present at the Creation, 653
77
26
that the “Soviet leaders hoped that the Korean Armistice would establish a principle that would
discourage future defections and thus make their Red Armies more dependable.”79 This was
particularly important to the Eisenhower administration because as the situation in Korea was
coming to a close, the conflict in Indochina gained strength, so it was necessary to limit the size
of the Communist forces in any way possible.80
Of course, the U.S. and the UN Command did not just hope for psychological warfare
and propaganda benefits from the use of voluntary repatriation; they also hoped to prevent the
Communist forces from using destructive propaganda against them and even to protect the safety
of the troops running the POW camps. As discussed before, the UN forces had difficulty
maintaining control of the Communist riots and faced humiliation, especially after the Chinese
captured General Dodd. The stipulations Dodd was forced to agree to in order to guarantee his
safety was a great victory for the Communists—word got around and people began to believe
that the UN Command was treating its prisoners in the most heinous of ways.81 However, the
Communists were not the only prisoners who posed a serious threat to both the United States’
reputation and its safety. The Chinese Nationalists and the South Korean supporters that found
themselves in the POW camps threatened violent resistance to repatriation, which also would put
everyone in danger once repatriation day game.
Worse, yet, was President Syngman Rhee’s influence over the South Korean POWs in
the UN camps. Rhee was adamant that the UN must not stop fighting until Korea was reunited,
much less waiver its demand for voluntary repatriation. As The New York Times reported, Rhee
saw an armistice without reunification as “as a death sentence for Korea and a danger to the
John Foster Dulles, “Korea: Deterrents to New Aggression.”
Department of States Breakfast, Memorandum of Conversation at White House, March 24, 1953, The papers of
John Foster Dulles and of Christian A. Herter, 1953-1961. The White house correspondence and memoranda series.
81
“What Price UN Pledge to the Anti-Red POW’s?” The Saturday Evening Post 226, (October 31, 1953): 10.
79
80
27
whole free world.”82 He encouraged resistance to repatriation, and, near the end of the war, he
staged an outbreak of 25,000 North Korean POWs.83 Rhee’s insistence on reunification put the
U.S. and the UN in a tight situation. During the outbreak, the UN troops had to choose, in the
moment, whether or not to use force on the escaping prisoners; if they had, they risked the
hypocrisy involved in using force against those “whose only motive,” as Major General Herren,
commander of the Korean Communication Zone stated, “was to resist return to Communist
control.”84 However, not controlling the outbreak had the potential to suggest U.S. and UN
approval of Rhee’s actions. This not only threatened to quash any progress in the armistice
negotiations, but also had the potential to ignite an even greater dispute between the UN and the
Communist forces.
While potential war against China weighed heavy on the minds of the U.S. military and
the administrative powers, there were other conflicts and potential conflicts that required U.S.
attention, resources, and a settlement in Korea. The Eisenhower administration in particular
recognized Korea as only one country faced by global threat of Communist aggression. The
public hoped and expected President Eisenhower to bring an “honorable end” to what
Eisenhower had called “’the most dramatic and painful phase’ of the world-wide struggle against
communism”, as well as settle the growing conflicts in other parts of Asia—particularly
Indochina.85 Korea had shown the world that the nations that had faced colonialism, both before
and during WWII, suffered unstable economies and governments that were vulnerable to falling
into the hands of Communist forces.
Lindesay Parrott, “Rhee Rebuffs Eisenhower; Prisoner Escapes Continue,” The New York Times, June 19, 1953, 1.
Vincent S. Kearney, “The Heart of the PW Issue,” The Saturday Evening Post 89, (June 6, 1953): 274-275.
84
Parrott, “Rhee Rebuffs Eisenhower."
85
Alden, “Communist Prisoners Wage New Kind of War.”
82
83
28
In the minds of U.S. politicians, how the conflict in Korea ended was sure to have a direct
impact on the strength of potential Communist forces in Indochina, and handling the problem in
Indochina was quickly taking priority over Korea. At a White House breakfast, Eisenhower and
Dulles concluded that the UN Command could at least keep the Communist aggression in Korea
localized, whereas Indochina was in closer proximity to the rest of Asia and Europe.86 While the
Eisenhower administration began shifting its focus from Korea to Indochina, they were not going
to back away from the principle of voluntary repatriation. In a conversation with John Hickerson,
an assistant secretary of state for the UN, Secretary of State Dulles explained that agreeing to an
armistice without it could have grave consequences. If the UNC and the Communist forces
agreed to handle the POW issue post-armistice, it would leave the UNC POWs in captivity,
while simultaneously allowing the Communists “an opportunity to build up their forces of shift
to Indochina.”87
How the Korean War ended did not only have an impact on the strength of the
Communist forces, but also on the strength of the United Nations. By the onset of the war, the
UN was barely five-years-old and had yet to face a conflict that was the size and magnitude of
the Korean War. From the beginning, the United States hoped that they could work with the UN
to face the Communist aggression, knowing that an international stand against it would have a
greater impact than if America stood against it on her own.88 The U.S. National Security Council
reports continually reiterated that the majority of the UN should strongly support any major war
86
Department of State Breakfast, Memorandum of Conversation at White House, March 24, 1953.
Priscilla Robers, “Hickerson, John D.” In Encyclopedia of The Korean War: A Political, Social, and Military
History, ed. Spencer C. Tucker (New York: Checkmark Books, 2002), 246-247; “Telephone Conversation with Mr.
Hickerson,” Minutes of telephone conversations of John Foster Dulles and of Christian Herter (1953-1961), March
23, 1953.
88
National Security Council Report 81, "United States Courses of Action With Respect to Korea", September 1,
1950, 2.
87
29
decision before acting on it.89 Putting the war in the hands of the UN was a mixed blessing—it
took full responsibility of the outcome of the war out of the hands of the U.S., but a failed
attempt to secure peace in Korea risked destroying the young, peace-keeping institution.
As the chances of reunification dwindled, faith in the UN rested on its ability to enforce
voluntary repatriation. As the Times reported, the UN had “given birth to an idea new in modern
warfare—that prisoners are not mere military units of ‘personnel’ of armies but human beings of
thought and conscience, not to be herded back to fight again for a cause they had renounced.”90 It
was a concept “officially linked” to the UN, and both the Truman administration and the
Eisenhower administration were well aware of it.91 In a press release in the spring of 1952,
Truman declared that forcible repatriation would result in “misery and bloodshed to the eternal
dishonor of the United States and of the United Nations.”92 Similarly, Dulles emphasized in a
speech that since the United States was the driving force behind the United nations, it has a
growing responsibility and that it must live up to its reputation.93
The success of the UN not only depended on the ability to negotiate with the enemy, but
also on the willingness of member nations to negotiate with each other. During the negotiations,
UN members generally agreed that non-forcible repatriation was ideal. However, there was
disagreement on the logistics of handling the prisoners. In his memoirs, Secretary of State
Acheson wrote that disagreement over this issue “would bring disillusionment in the United
States regarding collective security which would not be confined to Korea but would extend to
89
"United States Courses of Action with Respect to Korea,", Report 81/2, James S. Lay, Jr. to National Security
Council, November 14, 1950, In The Korean War and Its Origins,
http://www.trumanlibrary.org/whistlestop/study_collections/korea/large/documents/pdfs/ci-4-9.pdf#zoom=100, 3.
90
Lindesay Parrott, “Korea Prisoner Issue is Heart of Deadlock,” The New York Times, April 20, 1952, E6.
91
Hermes, Truce Tent and Fighting Front, 9.
92
Statement by President Truman on the Armistice Negotiations, May 7, 1952.
93
John Foster Dulles, “Korea: Deterrents to New Aggression,” Vital Speeches of the Day 19, no. 24 (October 1953):
738.
30
NATO and other arrangements of the same sort.”94 The United States worried throughout the
war that the conflict within the UN would prevent any agreement between the Communists and
the UN on the issue, but with so much invested into the issue, neither the UN nor the U.S. could
let that happen.
While the United States, as the driving force of the UN, needed positive gains from the
Korean conflict, they also had domestic concerns as well. The possibility of a failed
confrontation in Korea threatened both the U.S. Constitution and the reputations of the
administrations responsible for beginning and ending the war. With McCarthyism running
rampant, there was increasing support for an amendment to the Constitution that would have
given the Senate the power to disapprove of all “executive agreements.”95 In other words,
Congress could overpower the president’s decision to sign pacts with other nations that would
alter the allocation of power in the government or affect the rights of American citizens in a way
that was unacceptable under the law of the land.96 This movement, headed by Senator Bricker, a
Republican senator from Ohio, was a direct response to Truman’s declaration of war against
North Korea. Supporters of the Bricker Resolution, as the proposed amendment came to be
called, believed that the lives of American soldiers had been compromised as a result of
obligations Truman had agreed to indirectly by post-WWII agreements with members of the UN.
“More than a million young men have been drafted, billions of dollars expended and thousands
of casualties suffered,” one editorial claimed, as a result of a war that Congress never declared.97
94
Acheson, Present at the Creation, 702.
Priscilla Roberts, “Knowland, William Fife,” In Encyclopedia of The Korean War: A Political, Social, and
Military History, ed. Spencer C. Tucker (New York: Checkmark Books, 2002), 325.
96
“Our System Could be Made Over by Treaty!” The Saturday Evening Post, May 16, 1953, 10.
97
“Our System Could be Made Over by Treaty!”
95
31
In Bricker’s own words, he stated, “The resolution which I introduced intends to say to
the rest of the world that the inalienable rights of the American people are not for barter by
anybody, anywhere, anytime—and if the State Department doesn’t understand that, it’s time it
woke up and began to understand the Constitution.”98 With Bricker asserting that the State
Department ignored American’s basic rights and with portions of the public and many senators
believing that the Korean War was unconstitutional, the Truman and Eisenhower administrations
could not afford to have nothing come from the war.99 As Under Secretary of State Walter Bedell
Smith (who served under both administrations) argued, such a limitation of executive power
would make it impossible for U.S. decision making to keep up and oppose Communist
movements.100 Dulles himself stated that he thought the amendment took the America “back to
the days of the Confederation,” worrying, on a more serious note, that such changes could not
only have an impact on recent events with the Communists, but could affect the power of NATO
to have troops stationed all around the world.101
V. Conclusions
In the beginning of 1953, the U.S. saw a change in leadership and the Soviet Union
suffered a loss. Eisenhower began taking a much more aggressive stance against communism,
and Stalin, the driving force behind the Communist movement (even if he only worked behind
the scenes in the Korean War) was dead. Whether they felt threatened by new president, or had
concerns about the future of communism now that Stalin had passed, the Communists conceded
Charles E. Egans, “Bricker and Smith Clash on Treaties,” The New York Times, April 29, 1953, 16.
Brice P. Disque, “To Ratify Treaties,” The New York Times, August 2, 1953, E6.; “Our System Could be Made
Over by Treaty.”
100
Priscilla Roberts, “Smith, Walter Bedell,” In Encyclopedia of The Korean War: A Political, Social, and Military
History, ed. Spencer C. Tucker (New York: Checkmark Books, 2002), 601-602; Egans, “Bricker and Smith Class on
Treaties.”
101
“Telephone Conversation with Attorney Gen. Brownell,” Minutes of telephone conversations of John Foster
Dulles and of Christian Herter (1953-1961), April 6, 1953.
98
99
32
and the United States ultimately got what it wanted. With both sides granting some concessions,
they agreed to the controversial, yet satisfactory Indian resolution and signed the armistice on
July 27, 1953.102 This meant that all prisoners-of-war were repatriated within 60 days of the
armistice, and those who declined repatriation were put under the supervision of the neutral
nations repatriation commission (NNRC). The NNRC kept the POWs for 90 days, during which
time they were questioned by both sides. Before the armistice was signed, Operation Little
Switch took place, which included all sick and wounded POWS. Once they signed the armistice,
Operation Big Switch commenced, allowing the rest of the POWs to either repatriate or transfer
to the NNRC. During this time 75,823 of the 132,000 North Korean and Chinese POWS returned
home, while the rest remained in the hands of the NNRC. After NNRC questioning, 137 Chinese
and North Koreans decided to repatriate. Those who did not repatriate were given back to the
UN Command, who released them as civilians by the beginning of 1954. Over 56,000 prisoners
refused repatriation. Many of the Chinese POWs who chose not to repatriate settled in Taiwan,
and many of the North Koreans who chose not return to North Korea stayed in South Korea. Of
the nearly 13,000 UNC POWS kept prisoner by the Communists, only 359 chose not to
repatriate, initially, most of whom (335) were Koreans. However, many of them, particularly the
23 Americans who stayed behind later chose to repatriate back to the United States.103
All matters influencing the choices of the United States on voluntary repatriation came
down to the desire for saving the face of the new leader of the Free World, but labeling it purely
as propaganda simplifies the American support for the doctrine. However, the Korean War,
quickly recognized as just one chapter of the Cold War, was used by both the Communists and
Boose, “Truce Talks (July 1951-July 1953), 656.
Clayton D. Laurie, “Big Switch/Little Switch, Operations (1953), In Encyclopedia of The Korean War: A
Political, Social, and Military History, ed. Spencer C. Tucker (New York: Checkmark Books, 2002), 74-77.
102
103
33
by the United States as a propaganda generator. The American public expected a speedy victory
in the war, and when they did not get it, the U.S. had to compensate. The Truman administration
realized early on that the public believed the negative portrayals of its policy and action abroad,
and it needed a way to win back support.104 Both the American public and international opinion
expected Eisenhower to bring the U.S. out of Korea and into a better future.
It is the case that with the chances of Korean unification dwindling, the U.S. had to find a
way to spin the event as a success. A humanitarian motive would not only help convince the
worried mothers and wives at home that their sons and husbands had not fought in vain, but also
convince any neutral nations that communism was inhumane and a force of evil. However, the
United States, if it had not realized prior to June 25, 1950, quickly learned that they were going
to face the force of communism for some time, and it needed more than just persuasive
propaganda campaigns to combat it.
Militarily, a complete defeat in the Korean War was not an option if they were to
continue to gain momentum against Communist aggression. They hoped to gain an advantage by
encouraging anti-communist troops to dissent from Communist armies. They also hoped to use
this threat of dissention to deter future conflicts and give the United States more time to build
defenses if the Cold War were to heat up. Moreover, a complete failure in Korea was viewed as
synonymous as a complete failure of the United Nations. For the UN to fail, would mean both
the weakening of the international resistance to communism and the weakening of the U.S. as an
international leader. Finally, at home, U.S. leaders had to cling onto any public approval in the
midst of headstrong McCarthyism and the threat of an amendment that would limit the
104
Minutes of the National Security Council Meeting with Harry S. Truman, November 28, 1950, In The Korean
War and It’s Origins, http://www.trumanlibrary.org/whistlestop/study_collections/korea/large/documents/pdfs/ci-211.pdf#zoom=100.
34
president’s ability to make quick, necessary decisions in the event of Communist aggression in
foreign nations. Perhaps if they successfully reminded the American public that the U.S. was the
good guy, fighting for the rights of individuals, the executive branch could maintain dominance
in wartime decision making, which they perceived as necessary if they were to defeat
communism. The doctrine of voluntary repatriation was not just used for humanitarian notions
and wartime propaganda, but also as a military tool, a mechanism to secure the fate of the United
Nations, and the necessary proof needed to prevent potentially hazardous political movements,
like the sweeping fear of McCarthyism and the Bricker Resolution.
As we can also see, motivations shifted with the change in administration. The American
public had already placed the blame for the failure of the Korean War on President Truman.
More than anything, the president needed to find something to rally the people behind the
prolonged armistice negotiations, as well as a legacy that did not involve a lost war followed by
the violence that would have occurred had the armistice called for forced repatriation. Despite
the political differences and the language of opposition witnessed during the election of 1952,
President Truman did not want to leave his successor in the difficult position of implementing a
course of action that, particularly for Eisenhower, went against his moral code.
President Eisenhower, while not carrying the burden of committing the U.S. to the
Korean War, still had to find a way to get out of the conflict quickly and with some indication of
success. Eisenhower had future Cold War conflicts to handle, and if possible, avoid. He could
not have the reputation of backing down on an issue the United States government had
committed to so ardently, and needed to have some advantage, whether militarily or
psychologically, in the war against communism. With McCarthyism at its peak, Eisenhower had
to both prove his determination to stop the spread of communism, as well as prove that policies,
35
such as the Bricker Resolution, that would limit the president’s powers during such a critical
time did not need implementation. This forced him to prove that the Korean War was not a
failure, and that, as the president of the United States’, he was able to navigate an armistice that
met the American ideals.
Under both administrations, United States government used the POW issue to divert
attention away from its failure, however justified, to unify the broken Korea. More than just the
fate of Korea rested in the outcome of the war; the United States had to consider how the rest of
the Cold War would play out, how it could maintain its new status as an international leader, and
how it could prevent its own people from succumbing to irrational fear and speculation that the
men leading the country did not subscribe to the American ideals. This begs further research into
much of the POW issue, some of which has already been started.105 What were the thoughts of
POWs, on either side of the war, on repatriation? Did they want it enough to continue a stalemate
two years beyond the initial talks for a ceasefire? How did this decision ultimately affect the
lives of the POWs after the war? Did non-forcible repatriation have any impact on the events of
the Cold War as U.S. diplomats hoped? This essay only touches on the surface of the impact that
non-forcible repatriation had on the lives of Koreans, Chinese, and American soldiers in the
Korean War.
105
David Cheng Chang, "To return home or "Return to Taiwan" : conflicts and survival in the "Voluntary
Repatriation" of Chinese POWs in the Korean War," (2011).
36
Bibliography
“Dulles, McCarthy Views on Rhee’s Revolt Differ.” The New York Times, June 19, 1953, 2.
“Excerpts from Acheson Report to U.N. Assembly Committee on U.S. Conduct of Korean War.”
The New York Times, October 25, 1952, 4.
“M’Carthy Urges Acheson be ‘Fired’.” The New York Times, May 16, 1950, 14.
“Our System Could be Made Over by Treaty!” The Saturday Evening Post. May 16, 1953, 10.
“Telephone Conversation with Attorney Gen. Brownell,” Minutes of telephone conversations of
John Foster Dulles and of Christian Herter (1953-1961). April 6, 1953.
“Telephone Conversation with Mr. Hickerson,” Minutes of telephone conversations of John
Foster Dulles and of Christian Herter (1953-1961). March 23, 1953.
"United States Courses of Action with Respect to Korea." Report 81/2, James S. Lay, Jr. to
National Security Council, November 14, 1950. In The Korean War and Its Origins.
http://www.trumanlibrary.org/whistlestop/study_collections/korea/large/documents/pdfs/
ci-4-9.pdf#zoom=100, 3.
"United States Position Regarding a Cease-Fire in Korea," National Security Council Report
#95, December 13, 1950. In The Korean War and Its Origins.
http://www.trumanlibrary.org/whistlestop/study_collections/korea/large/documents/pdfs/
ci-4-9.pdf#zoom=100
“U.S. Bars New Red Plan on Prisoners: Opposes Sending Men Out of Korea to Long Detention
in Neutral State.” The New York Times, April 27, 1953, 1.
“What Price UN Pledge to the Anti-Red POW’s?” The Saturday Evening Post 226, October 31,
1953: 10.
Acheson, Dean. Present at the creation; my years in the State Department. New York: Norton,
1969.
Barry, Mark P. "The U.S. and the 1945 Division of Korea: Mismanaging The 'Big Decisions'."
International Journal on World Peace 29.4 (2012): 39.
Bess, Demaree. “The Prisoners Stole the Show in Korea.” The Saturday Evening Post 225, no.
18 (November, 1952): 36.
Blair, Clay. The Forgotten War: America in Korea 1950-1953. New York: Times Books, 1987.
37
Boose Jr., Donald W. “United Nations Command (UNC)” In Encyclopedia of The Korean War:
A Political, Social, and Military History, ed. Spencer C. Tucker. New York: Checkmark
Books, 2002, 679-680.
Bradley, Omar N. “Our Hope for a Lasting Peace,” Vital Speeches of the Day, 18, no. 14 (May
1952): 445.
Chang, David Cheng. “’To return home or "Return to Taiwan’ : conflicts and survival in the
‘Voluntary Repatriation’ of Chinese POWs in the Korean War." University of California,
2011.
Clarence E. Moullette to Dean Acheson, January 19, 1951, In The Korean War and Its Origins,
http://www.trumanlibrary.org/whistlestop/study_collections/korea/large/documents/pdfs/
kp-8-13.pdf#zoom=100.
Correspondence Between James E. Noland and Harry S. Truman, August 29, 1950, In The
Korean War and Its Origins,
http://www.trumanlibrary.org/whistlestop/study_collections/korea/large/documents/pdfs/
ki-11-10.pdf#zoom=100.
Correspondence Between Paul Douglas and Harry S. Truman, With Attachments, June 12, 1952,
In The Korean War and Its Origins,
http://www.trumanlibrary.org/whistlestop/study_collections/korea/large/documents/pdfs/
kp-1-18.pdf#zoom=100
Cumings, Bruce. The Origins of the Korean War. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press,
1981.
Dean G. Acheson to George C. Marshall, August 27, 1951. In The Korean War and Its Origins,
http://www.trumanlibrary.org/whistlestop/study_collections/korea/large/documents/pdfs/
kp-4-7.pdf#zoom=100.
Department of States Breakfast, Memorandum of Conversation at White House, March 24, 1953.
The papers of John Foster Dulles and of Christian A. Herter, 1953-1961. The White
house correspondence and memoranda series.
Disque, Brice P. “To Ratify Treaties,” The New York Times, August 2, 1953.
Dulles, John Foster. “Korea: Deterrents to New Aggression.” Vital Speeches of the Day 19, no.
24 (October 1953): 738.
Edmond Taylor to Mallory Browne, With Attachments, February 19, 1952. In The Korean War
and Its Origins,
http://www.trumanlibrary.org/whistlestop/study_collections/korea/large/documents/pdfs/
kp-4-15.pdf#zoom=100.
38
Egans, Charles E. “Bricker and Smith Clash on Treaties.” The New York Times, April 29, 1953,
16.
Fenton, John. “M’Carthy Brands Korea a ‘Betrayal’.” The New York Times, June 30, 1951, 2.
Francis Case to Harry S. Truman With Reply From Robert A. Lovett, October 1, 1952. In The
Korean War and its Origins,
http://www.trumanlibrary.org/whistlestop/study_collections/korea/large/documents/pdfs/
kp-1-21.pdf#zoom=100
Hayes, Louis. Political Systems of East Asia: China, Korea, and Japan. Armonk: M.E. Sharpe,
Inc., 2012.
Hermes, Walter G. Truce Tent and Fighting Front, (Washington, D.C.:Office of the Chief of
Military History, United States Army, 1966), 146-7.
James T. Mayall to Harry S. Truman With Reply From William D. Hassett, June 13, 1952. In
The Korean War and Its Origins,
http://www.trumanlibrary.org/whistlestop/study_collections/korea/large/documents/pdfs/
kp-1-17.pdf#zoom=100
Judd, Walter H. "'The Real Test is Our Moral Strength'." Vital SpeechesOf The Day 20, no. 14
(May 1954): 427.
Kearney, Vincent S. “The Heart of the PW Issue,” The Saturday Evening Post 89, June 6, 1953:
274-275.
Krock, Arthur. “’Mistakes’ of Korea War Again a Political Issue,” The New York Times, June 28,
1953, E3.
Laurie, Clayton D. “Big Switch/Little Switch, Operations (1953).” In Encyclopedia of The
Korean War: A Political, Social, and Military History, ed. Spencer C. Tucker. New York:
Checkmark Books, 2002, 74-77.
Memorandum For the Record, Paul C. Davis, January 24, 1952, In The Korean War and Its
Origins,
http://www.trumanlibrary.org/whistlestop/study_collections/korea/large/documents/pdfs/
kp-4-2.pdf#zoom=100.
Millet, Allan R. “The Korean People: Missing in Action in the Misunderstood War, 1945-1954.”
In The Korean War in World History, ed. William Stueck. Lexington: The University
Press of Kentucky, 2010.
Minutes of the National Security Council Meeting with Harry S. Truman, November 28, 1950, In
The Korean War and It’s Origins,
39
http://www.trumanlibrary.org/whistlestop/study_collections/korea/large/documents/pdfs/
ci-2-11.pdf#zoom=100.
National Security Council Report 81, "United States Courses of Action With Respect to
Korea", September 1, 1950, In The Korean War and Its Origins,
http://www.trumanlibrary.org/whistlestop/study_collections/korea/large/documents/pdfs/
ki-17-1.pdf#zoom=100.
National Security Council Report 81, "United States Courses of Action With Respect to
Korea", September 1, 1950, 2.
Parrott, Lindesay. “Korea Prisoner Issue is Heart of Deadlock.” The New York Times, April 20,
1952, E6.
Parrott, Lindesay. “Reds Accuse U.N. of Germ War Tests on Korea Captives.” The New York
Times, March 23, 1952, 1.
http://search.proquest.com/docview/112506651?accountid=13554
Parrott, Lindesay. “Rhee Rebuffs Eisenhower; Prisoner Escapes Continue.” The New York Times,
June 19, 1953, 1.
Pratt, Sherman. “Korea: History, 1945-1947.” In Encyclopedia of The Korean War: A Political,
Social, and Military History, ed. Spencer C. Tucker. New York: Checkmark Books, 2002.
Ridgway, Matthew B. The Korean War: How we met the challenge: How all-out Asian war was
averted: Why MacArthur was dismissed: Why today's war objectives must be limited.
Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1967..
Roberts, Priscilla. “Hickerson, John D.” In Encyclopedia of The Korean War: A Political, Social,
and Military History, ed. Spencer C. Tucker, New York: Checkmark Books, 2002, 246247
Roberts, Priscilla. “Knowland, William Fife.” In Encyclopedia of The Korean War: A Political,
Social, and Military History, ed. Spencer C. Tucker, New York: Checkmark Books, 2002.
Roberts, Priscilla. “McCarthy, Joseph R.”, In Encyclopedia of The Korean War: A Political,
Social, and Military History, ed. Spencer C. Tucker, New York: Checkmark Books, 2002.
Roberts, Priscilla. “Smith, Walter Bedell.” In Encyclopedia of The Korean War: A Political,
Social, and Military History, ed. Spencer C. Tucker, New York: Checkmark Books, 2002,
601-602.
Roberts, Priscilla. “Syngman Rhee.” In Encyclopedia of The Korean War: A Political, Social,
and Military History, ed. Spencer C. Tucker, New York: Checkmark Books, 2002, 624628.
40
Sasso, Claude R. “Stalin, Josef,” In Encyclopedia of The Korean War: A Political, Social, and
Military History, ed. Spencer C. Tucker, New York: Checkmark Books, 2002, 613.
Schirokauer, Conrad and Donald Clark. Modern East Asia: A Brief History. 2nd ed., Boston:
Houghton Mifflin Company, 2008.
Schumach, Murray. “U.N. Tells Full Story of Poll of Prisoners,” The New York Times, April 26,
1952, 1.
Statement by President Truman on the Armistice Negotiations, May 7, 1952, In “The United
States and the Korean Problem” In the United States Congressional serial set. 11675,
62.3,h3w
Statement by President Truman on the Armistice Negotiations, May 7, 1952.
Statement by the Department of State on the Exchange of Prisoners of War, May 15, 1953, In
“The United States and the Korean Problem” in United States Congressional serial set.
11675, 80
Suh, Dong-man. “Korea, Democratic People’s Republic of: 1945-1953.” In Encyclopedia of The
Korean War: A Political, Social, and Military History, ed. Spencer C. Tucker. New York:
Checkmark Books, 2002, 331-333.
Telegram to Dean G. Acheson With Related Correspondence, November 14, 1952, In The
Korean War and Its Origins,
http://www.trumanlibrary.org/whistlestop/study_collections/korea/large/documents/pdfs/
kp-3-17.pdf#zoom=100; Hermes, Truce Tent and Fighting Front, 3.
Varga, Zsolt. “Geneva Convention of 1949,” In Encyclopedia of The Korean War: A Political,
Social, and Military History, ed. Spencer C. Tucker, New York: Checkmark Books, 2002.
Weathersby, Kathryn. “The Soviet Role in the Korean War: The State of Historical Knowledge.”
In The Korean War in World History, ed. William Stueck. Lexington: The University
Press of Kentucky, 2010.
Wesolick, Duane L.“MacArthur, Douglas.” In Encyclopedia of The Korean War: A Political,
Social, and Military History, ed. Spencer C. Tucker. New York: Checkmark Books, 2002,
402.
William Banning to Harry S. Truman, ca. 1953, In The Korean War and Its Origins,
http://www.trumanlibrary.org/whistlestop/study_collections/korea/large/documents/pdfs/
8-16.pdf#zoom=100.