Download Benefit to Another at Cost to Self

©Springer International Publishing AG2016
Viviana Weekes-Shackelford
,
Todd K. Shackelford
and Viviana A. Weekes-Shackelford
Encyclopedia of Evolutionary Psychological Science
10.1007/978-3-319-16999-6_1476-1
Benefit to Another at Cost to Self
Terence Burnham1 (1)Chapman University, Orange, CA, USA
Terence Burnham
Email: [email protected]
Without Abstract
Synonyms
Benevolence; Niceness; Prosocial behavior; Selflessness
Definition
Altruism is defined as a voluntary costly act that benefits another organism, usually a conspecific (see
Table 1).Table 1
Altruism in a framework of effects on self and other(s)
Cost to another
Benefit to another
Cost to actor
Spite
Altruism
Benefit to actor
Selfishness
Mutualism
Introduction
The study of altruism dates back at least to Darwin, who wrote, “Can we consider the sting of the
wasp or of the bee as perfect which … inevitably causes the death of the insect”? (Darwin 1859)
(Chapter 6). Darwin wondered how suicidal bee stings could persist – shouldn’t the stinging bees lose
the evolutionary competition to other bees that do not commit suicide? There are currently five
accepted theories that explain altruism and one open debate.
All of the accepted theories share the same underlying logic. The genes that create the apparently
altruistic behavior benefit from the behavior. What appears to be altruistic is, in fact, selfish, when
viewed from the perspective of the genes.
Accepted Theory #1: Kin Selection
Kin selection (Hamilton 1964) explains costly acts as benefiting genes in relatives. A bee may die
when it stings an invader. This is bad for the individual bee, but good for the genes in the bee that are
also likely to be shared by the other bees in the same hive. Altruistic behaviors that benefit genetic
relatives help the underlying genes increase in the population.
Accepted Theory #2: Reciprocal Altruism
Reciprocal altruism (Trivers 1971) examines costly acts in the context of relationships. A person
might sacrifice for a friend today and be repaid in the future. One act, examined in isolation, appears
to be altruistic; when summed over the individuals’ lifetimes, however, the relationship benefits all
parties.
Accepted Theory #3: Indirect Reciprocity
Indirect reciprocity (Alexander 1979; Nowak and Sigmund 1998) sees future repayment as the
explanation for costly acts. Indirect reciprocity is similar to reciprocal altruism in counting costs and
benefits over an organism’s lifetime. The apparent altruism is repaid in the context of the relationship.
One difference, however, is that reciprocal relationship sees the repayment coming from the
individual who was helped, while indirect reciprocity allows repayment by third parties.
Accepted Theory #4: Costly Signaling
Costly signaling (Zahavi 1975) explains altruistic acts as part of a longer-term reputation management
strategy. The costly act may alter the reputation of the “altruist.” The ability to help out someone in
need may demonstrate, for example, health and vigor of the altruists. This perception of health and
vigor might change the behavior of other organisms in a way that more than compensates for the
altruist act.
Accepted Theory #5: Group Selection
Group selection (Wilson and Sober 1994) occurs when altruistic acts benefit the group in a way that
also helps the genes of the altruist. If groups break up and reform with sufficient regularity, then even
though the altruist does sacrifice for the benefit of the group, the genes of the altruist can increase as a
percent of the overall population.
Open Debate: Strong Reciprocity
Strong reciprocity (Fehr et al. 2002) is purported as the sixth explanation for altruistic acts. For
example, people in anonymous laboratory experiments in large cities will give money to strangers
under some circumstances (Kahneman et al. 1986). These altruistic acts cannot be repaid through any
of the five accepted theories. The participants are not kin, ruling out kin selection. The acts are
anonymous so cannot be repaid through direct or indirect reciprocity. Similarly, no signals can be sent
in an anonymous setting, so costly signaling is not possible. Finally, the participants are not in
evolutionary relevant groups, thus ruling out group selection (Burnham and Johnson 2005). Strong
reciprocity faces continued debate about its existence and relevance.
Conclusion
The field of altruism has undergone tremendous change in the last few centuries and decades. There
are five widely accepted explanations for altruistic behavior.
Cross-References
Adaptations to Detect Genuine Altruism
Aid to Kin
Altruism
Altruism Advertises Cooperativeness
Altruism Advertises Generosity
Altruism Among Non-kin
Altruism and Cost to Altruist
Altruism and Watching Eyes
Altruism Defined by Benefits Conferred
Altruism Displays Cooperative Potential
Altruism in Kin Selection
Altruism Norms
Altruist Detection
Altruistic Dispositions
Altruistic Punishment
Altruistic Punishment and Strong Reciprocity
Altruistic Punishment Enhances Reputation
Antisocial
Antisocial Behavior
C < Rb
Cheater Detection
Cheater-Detection
Cheater-Detection Adaptations
Cheater-Detection Adaptations and Cooperation
Cheater-Detection and Familiarity
Cheater-Detection and Social Perspective
Reputation
Reputation and Altruism
Reputation as a Context for Men’s Aggression Against Men
Reputation as Cooperator
Reputation as Reciprocator
Reputation for Aggression
Reputational
Reputational Consequences
Reputational Enhancement
Volunteerism
Willingness to Punish
References
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Burnham, T. C., & Johnson, D. (2005). The biological and evolutionary logic of human cooperation.
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