Download 2. General Age regularities of Personality development.styles

№ 2. General Age regularities of
Personality development.styles
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In recognition of the complexity of personality, it has been said that every person is in
certain respects like all other people, like some other people and like no other person.
What this means is that, although all human beings share the biological features
that are universal to the species, they also hold membership in a particular society and
take on the characteristics of certain people in that society. In spite of all these physical,
social and cultural uniformities, however, each person in the world remains wholly
unique.
You can say that about yourself that in the long history of the human race and the
lengthier future that lies ahead, there has never been and will never be anyone quite likes
you. The way you think, feel, perceive and behave has a pattern which, in its finest
details, will never be duplicated. You simply cannot be cloned!
Your individual personality is created by a combination of unique factors- your
biology, constitution, temperament, genetic structure, social development, motivational
patterns, specific family and cultural environment and life experiences. All these
contribute both to your individuality as well as to your similarity to others.
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The idea that you are what you are and that you
can never be replaced is mind-boggling, not only
for you, but for the personality theorist and
researcher whose challenge it is to integrate these
many aspects and dimensions of personality into a
coherent framework.
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We begin our discussion of the topic of
personality with the search for a theoretical
framework within which to understand the
complexity of human personality. Theorists have
addressed this challenge have adopted one of two
alternative orientations or conceptions.
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The first is the descriptive view which
emphasizes the structure of personality, either in
terms of major behavioral dimensions called
personality traits or in terms of personality types.
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The second is a developmental orientation in
which the task is to describe how personality
develops and how individuals adapt to their diverse
environments
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Trait theory
A trait is a stable and enduring attribute of a person that is
revealed consistently in a variety of situations. Were a trait
theorist to study all possible characteristics that can be used to
describe individuals, the number of possibilities would be
overwhelming.
The most cited number in the psychology of personality
may be 17,953. This is the number of distinguishing adjectives
that Gordon Allport and Henry Odbert (1936) were able to extract
from the English language when they set out to create a dictionary
of trait names that could be used to distinguish one person's
behavior from another. Thirty years later, Warren Norman (1963)
developed a pool of some 40,000 trait-descriptive terms. Using
experimental and statistical methods, however, Norman was able
to reduce this number dramatically.
He began his search for simplicity by creating a set of
paired polar opposite adjectives from the list. Statistical analysis
revealed that five personality traits seemed to account for the way
in which ratings by subject grouped together.
Surface traits are considered the overt expressions of
personality. Speaking figuratively, these attributes are close to the
surface and are expressions of more basic traits of personality.
Using a statistical method called factor analysis, sixteen source
traits were identified.
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Type theory
Types are broad inclusive patterns of traits on which some psychologists have
attempted to classify people. Perhaps the most famous of all typologies is that of
introversion-extroversion first described by Carl Jung. According to Jung, the extrovert is
outgoing, exuberant, lively and inclined toward direct action. The introvert presents the
opposite side of the behavioral coin and is more prone to thoughtful reflection. This
attractive typology unfortunately shares the two major shortcomings of all simple
typologies.
First, typologies put people into extreme categories that apply only to a few
individuals. As with most dimensions of human variation, the graduation from
introversion to extroversion is a continuous one on which people are normally distributed.
Most people fall in the middle of the dimension and show both introversion and
extroversion to a degree. Second, in their simplicity, typologies ignore one of the most
important facts about personality that it is multidimensional and consists of many
attributes.
The task of establishing theoretical unification, or integration, within a psychological area
is one of determining relative superiority among conflicting accounts. As many recent
articles have shown, however, traditional assessment criteria (novelty, quantifiability,
accuracy, parsimony, replicability) do not provide such integration (Staats, 1987;
Wertheimer, 1988; Groot, 1990).
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J.R. Royce (1988) suggested that the traditional criteria had to do with the context of justification and that the solution
to the problem of indeterminacy would come from obtaining "the same kind of deep and penetrating analyses of the
discovery aspect" of our science (p. 63). That is, we must outline the careers of psychological positions as they
advance from weak to strong. Neither the application of a monolithic unifying principle (e.g., logical or uninomic
positivism) nor the collection of more data will be helpful (Tolman & Lemery, 1990). The required antidote is to
outline the successive types of positions in each area and evaluate their correspondence to aspects of the
developmental processes under study.
This chapter demonstrates how various 20th century positions on personality fit into a hierarchy of empirical and
theoretical maturity based on combined outlines of scientific discourse from Scheffler (1967/1982), Davydov (1984)
and Ilyenkov (1982). Although such match-ups are never perfect, the utility of this combined approach shows
promise.
In his book Science and Subjectivity, Israel Scheffler (1967/1982) advanced a steadfastly objectivist, but nonpositivist, account of the standard view of science. According to the standard view, facts provide the empirical data
which form observational laws. These are, in turn, related and explained by theoretical laws.
When one [theoretical] hypothesis is superseded by another, the genuine facts it had purported to account for are not
inevitably lost; they are typically passed on to its successor, which conserves them as it reaches out to embrace
additional facts (Scheffler, 1967/1982, p. 9).
The challenge for psychologists has been how to reconcile this standard view with the actual state of the science.
How are the various empirical and theoretical positions in psychology to be related and evaluated? To relate is to note
the succession of positions in a given area (e.g., personality); to evaluate is to assess the questions addressed by each
position, as well as their correspondence with various aspects of the area.
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Scheffler's (1967/1982) distinction between the empirical and theoretical levels of
science is effectively equivalent to Davydov's (1984) distinction between abstract and
substantial generalization and Ilyenkov's (1982) distinction between initial abstraction,
initial generalization, and concrete conception. The category of concrete description has
been added to expand Scheffler's empirical level.
Scheffler stated his aim as the "reinterpretation and defense of… objectivity"
(1967/1982, p. vii). He stressed that his "elaboration of the standard view [was] intended
as a basis for discussion" (p. viii). But there is a problem in Scheffler's two-tiered view
of science: It assumes that all empirical investigation is concrete (because it deals with
immediate experience), whereas all theory (because it goes beyond immediate
experience) is abstract. Both Davydov and Ilyenkov argue that such a view is
oversimplified. The task of empirical research, they suggest, is to catalog and classify
various aspects of an area. These empirical categories (whether they are specific or
general) may be either abstract (i.e., reveal superficial aspects) or concrete (reveal
essential or necessary interrelations). Truly theoretical thinking, however, is always
concrete because it is concerned with reconstructing the general developmental
transformations of the subject matter (Ilyenkov, 1982, p. 31; Davydov, 1984, pp. 14-15).
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For example, when presented with two equal sized cubes of metal, some of their different empirical
features, like color, weight and magnetism, may be useful starting points. Other superficial aspects
such as luster may not be useful. Generalized empirical information about their respective
malleability, electrical conductivity and corrosiveness can be obtained by further manipulation.
Empirical descriptive analysis of their crystalline structures reveals the origin of functional aspects
like stiffness and thermal expansion. However, knowledge of the genesis of such metals (e.g., in a
certain size star, meteor, blast furnace, or atomic reactor) represents a still higher, developmental
form of generalization.
For Davydov and Ilyenkov, the theory is this higher, concrete, form of generalization. Scheffler
(1967/1982), however, tended to use the term to refer to empirical generalization (initial or abstract
generalization in Ilyenkov and Davydov's terms). This left his outline vulnerable to anti-objectivism
which trades on the indeterminacy of abstract empirical investigations.
Therefore, Scheffler's empirical level has been stretched to include three stages (initial abstraction,
initial generalization and concrete description). This conforms to the view shared by Davydov and
Ilyenkov that most empirical research is abstract (e.g., artificial experimental milieus, generalized
correlations among surface features), while only some of it is concrete (e.g., non-obtrusive
observation, careful longitudinal studies). Scheffler's notion of the cumulative nature of theoretical
conceptions, however, is preserved in the resulting four-tiered view of science.
This understanding of scientific discourse can be used to assess 20th century positions on personality
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Early investigation involves initial abstractions at the empirical level. That is, particular
aspects or qualities of a phenomenon are selected as important for study. The
operational definitions of motivation (hunger, thirst, pain, and sex) are examples of such
initial abstractions (Brown, 1979). At this early stage of investigation, questions about
what aspects of a phenomenon to study for a particular purpose are favored over the
hunt for a crystallized definition of the whole phenomenon.
In the 1920s and early 1930s, personality researchers often published in the Journal of
Applied Psychology (Parker, 1991). The concern was to establish the advantages of
empirical study of personality over the former phrenological and graphology traditions
(e.g., Cleeton, 1924). These psychologists, while studying what were later to be called
traits, were "not particularly interested in developing personality theory" (Endler &
Parker, 1992, p. 179).
This emphasis of the part at the expense of the whole indicates the immaturity of an
early investigation. Hence, in 1938, Henry Murray characterized the area as "still in its
diaper enjoying random movements" (p. 21). The advent of disciplinary self-analysis [p.
154] regarding the validity of empirical procedures and clinical tests marked the
transition to a more standardized approach (e.g., Landis & Katz, 1934; Hertz, 1935).
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Initial (Abstract) Generalization
This stage involves the formation of categories and classification of types thought to apply to various aspects of the
phenomena (or segments of the population) under study. Two logically contradictory but empirically supportable
classes of categories were abstracted from the personality area. Trait categories included neuroticism, extroversion,
openness, agreeableness, and conscientiousness. Situationist categories included observational and vicarious
environmental influences (Bandura, 1973; Mischel, 1973).
Although Allport and Vernon (1930) recognized the need to situate the trait view within the broader context of
personality such concerns were subsequently dropped. Trait theory's tendency toward "methodolatry," a shift of
concern away from elaborating some causal process toward concern over statistical outcome (Danziger, 1990, pp.
111-112; Bakan, 1967, pp. 158-159), is a symptom of its abstractness.
In the purified trait approach, the question of whether traits exist as anything more than empirical convenience was
replaced with the question of how many traits are produced by which statistical method (i.e., Cattell versus Eysenck
versus McCrae and Costa). For instance, Digman (1990) lists the similar factors obtained by empirical studies
between the years 1949-1986 while taking the ontological status of personality traits completely for granted.
Although pure trait and situationist positions are rapidly becoming historical curiosities (Kendrick & Funder, 1988),
the continuous and discontinuous aspects of personality are often framed in terms of exclusive alternatives. Kagan
(1988) argues that there are either (A) "static entities" which don't change (essences which do not vary when the
organism or context does vary) or (B) "discontinuous constructs" which vary across contexts (pp. 617-619). A widely
used introductory text by Atkinson, Atkinson, Smith, & Bem (1990) describes the same issue as the "consistency
paradox" (pp. 543). Despite such logical difficulties, there has developed a distinct preference for eclectic and
longitudinal studies.
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Concrete Description
Concrete descriptive research focuses on the relations between the various classifications (e.g., traits, environment,
socio-historical events). Temporal relations between categories are also investigated to obtain a descriptive outline of
the area. In the mid-1970s, the interactionist approach attempted such an outline.
The interactionist argues that personality is not just a ripening of genetic traits, nor just the effect of varied situations
but both (Bowers, 1973; Pervin, 1977). The most recent proponents distinguish between mechanistic and dynamic
interactionism. Endler and Parker (1992), for instance, point out that the empirical methods used by mechanistic
interactionism (ANOVA and the IV-DV model) were not suited for developmental analysis. They suggest replacing
those empirical tools with the statistical technique of path analysis and programs such as LISREL which allow
bidirectional causal models to [p. 155] be tested (see Bynner & Romney, 1985).
While this is an interesting move, dynamic interactionist are still focusing on correlations among prerequisites of
personality, not aspects of personality itself. Just as the details of personality are not found in genes (the biological
prerequisites for the personality), nor in any passive or active adaptation to an environment (the biological and social
conditions for the individual), they are also not found in the correlations between those two abstractions.
The interactionist position, while claiming a role for heredity and for environment, fails to account for the interaction
itself, i.e., human society. Societal events (e.g., war, economic depression, changing [social] norms) are considered as
external 'factors' that correlate with personality traits. A static view of development as the result of outside factors on
stable elements is assumed.
Dialectical logic has been missing from interactionist views (e.g., Magnusson, 1990). In contrast to the
supplementary linear empirical tools urged by interactionists, dialectical logic is a theoretical tool (Ilyenkov, 1977). In
the present case, it helps to distinguish between the logical contradiction of linguistic categories (e.g., continuity
versus discontinuity) and the objective contradictions of personality development (transformation of a biological
individual into a societal personality).
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Concrete Concepts
Concrete concepts involve the revelation of "necessary interconnections" among the abstractable properties of the subject matter (Tolman,
1991, p. 160; see also Bakhurst, 1991). These necessary interconnections are generally revealed by a developmental account of the
phenomenon.
An example of personality theory which approaches this explanatory stage, is A. N. Leontiev's (1978) theory of Activity. It explicitly uses a
dialectical materialist analysis and is an extension of the better known Vygotskian tradition (Tolman, 1983; Wertsch, 1986). According to
Leontiev, personality must be understood in terms of its development in societal relations from the initially biological and social individual.
The process is one of the individual's active appropriation of culture. In other words, the becoming of personality must be studied, as opposed
only to its prerequisites.
Contrary to trait theory, one is not born a personality but rather a biological individual. Also contrary to situationist theory, the basis is
biological individuality (i.e., the infant's characteristic level of physiological activeness, attention span, general mood). Personality develops
through the active internalization of culture under societal influences.
This must be distinguished from interactionist theory (where genes and environment "meet" culture). The child's inauguration into societal
practices is conceived not simply as the origin of particular beliefs, desires, hopes, intentions and so on, but as the source of the child's very
capacity to believe, to desire, and so on (Bakhurst, 1991, p. 78). The analytical tools used by the Activity approach to investigate how
biologically given processes are transformed into societal processes (joint action, appropriation, etc.) are outlined in Tolman (1988).
According to Leontiev (1978), the infant as an active biological individual is guided [p. 156] by, and also guides, the [nurturing] activity of
the primary care giver (joint action). This relationship is an aspect of [every part of] the infant's life (feeding, clothing, excretion, etc.). Such
reciprocal guidance is always relative to the biological and experiential development of the child. The way such ontogenetic development
proceeds is to be found in the relation between what the child can do by itself and what it can do with the help of others (see Vygotsky, 1978,
pp. 84-91, on the zone of proximal development).
The quality of the joint action is important. Western research on the differences between authoritative, authoritarian, indulgent, and
neglecting parenting demonstrated this point (see Maccoby and Martin, 1983). Despite its factorial methods, the research of Scarr and
McCartney (1983) on evocative interaction (where the child seeks out new societal relations) confirms Leontiev's theory.
• Conclusion
• Although this LECTURE focused on modern views of
personality, the same assessment methodology applies to
other core areas of psychology. This methodology
recognizes the historical value of initial abstractions on the
empirical level, but specifies the aim of scientific discourse
as the eventual concretization of the abstract through the
attainment of concrete generalization on the theoreticalexplanatory level. By elaborating the levels of scientific
discourse more fully, this methodology reveals the relative
maturities of empirical and theoretical positions in
psychology, making choices and integrations among such
positions attainable in principle.
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THANK YOU
• FOR THE ATTENTION
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