Download Normative Ethics Introduction Objectives

Normative Ethics
Introduction
Objectives:
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Understand what a normative theory of ethics is.
Understand how a normative theory of ethics is
constructed.
Understand what moral realism is.
Consider one objections to moral
realism: ethical relativism.
Consider the relationship between religion and
normative ethics.
Key terms and concepts
Normative ethics, p.
Normative, p.
Descriptive, p.
Euthyphro Dilemma, p.
Reflective Equilibrium, p.
Moral Realism, p.
Divine Command Theory, p.
Relativism, p.
Individual Relativism, p.
Cultural Relativism, p.
Nihilism, p.
Normative ethics is the discipline of ethics in which we are seek to find
some principle or set of principles that can be used to determine what actions are
right and what actions are wrong. Often philosophers have sought one ultimate or
fundamental principle of ethics that clearly defines which actions are right and
wrong. Well over two thousand years ago Plato in his dialog The Euthyphro has
Socrates seeking an answer to this very question.
In the dialog Socrates has been summoned to court and is being accused by
Meletus of corrupting the youth and “not believing in the gods” and on his way to
the court Socrates runs into Euthyphro. Socrates and Euthyphro begin making small
talk and Socrates learns that Euthyphro is on his way to court to charge his own
father with murdering a slave. Socrates thinks to himself that Euthyphro must really
know what makes an action wrong if he is so sure of himself that he is willing to
accuse his father of murder for accidentally killing a slave who was a criminal. To
our modern ears this might not sound that shocking but for Plato’s audience it
would have seemed quite preposterous to accuse one’s father of murder for killing a
slave, as slaves did have legal rights and a very important duty is to respect one’s
father. And on top of that the slave had acted criminally and the killing was
accidental. So, Socrates, claiming total ignorance on the subject, begins to inquire
from Euthyphro about the nature of right and wrong and what makes an action right
or wrong. Euthyphro begins are listing various actions that are right and various
actions that are wrong to give an answer to Socrates by various examples. But this
sort of answer is not the answer that Socrates is looking for. Socrates wants to know
why the actions that are right are right and why the actions are wrong are wrong.
We may all agree that murder is wrong but that doesn’t tell us why murder is
wrong. Socrates, being the philosopher that he is, wants to know a principle by
which we could actually determine which actions are right and wrong. Socrates was
attempting to engage Euthyphro in philosophical discussion of what is now called
normative ethics.
What does “normative” mean? It may help you to remember this if you think
about the more commonly used word “norm” or “social norm.” A social norm is how
one ought to behave socially and similarly an ethical norm is how one ought to
behave ethically. In philosophy normative theories are often contrasted with
descriptive theories. Descriptive theories are theories that describe something
about the world as it is. Scientific theories are descriptive. Scientific theories
describe how something behaves, whether atoms or humans. Normative theories
are theories about how we ought to behave. A descriptive theory of human nature
might tell us that we are not very altruistic beyond a limited group of friends and
family however a moral theory might tell us that we ought to be altruistic beyond a
limited group of friends and family.
Another way this distinction between normative and descriptive theories is
discussed as is the fact-value distinction. When doing ethics there are certain facts
that we work with, facts about intentions and motivations and facts about happiness
or suffering caused by actions. And in ordinary thinking we often times move from
an action causing some harm or suffering to that action be morally wrong. However,
one cannot determine whether an action is right or wrong simply based on scientific
or empirical facts. There must also be a normative principle involved at some stage
of the argument. Generally we consider murder to be wrong, however the following
argument is a non-sequitur:
1. Murder causes needless suffering.
2. So, murder is wrong.
To get the conclusion to follow we need an additional premise that states that an
action being described in the first premise violates some normative ethical
principle. Such an argument would look like this:
1. Murder causes needless suffering. (Empirical fact)
2. It wrong to cause needless suffering. (Normative Principle)
3. So, murder is wrong. (Specific Conclusion)
This divide between facts and moral judgments was first noted by David Hume
and is also often times referred to as “the is-ought gap.” Hume noted that often
times people move from one fact to another, is
statements, and then suddenly make an entirely When writing essays be
different kind of statement, an ought statement. mindful of the “is-ought gap.”
Nothing ethical follows from a fact. Or said You need to do more than
another way, to get an “ought” in the conclusion merely point out that some
of your argument you need an “ought” in the action causes suffering. You
premises of the argument (See the above need to invoke some moral
principle
thatonespecifies
whyto
examples for illustrations of this.) To make an ethical
argument
needs both
the
facts
of
the
situation
describe the facts (empirical) and then invoke some principle that states that the
constitute a moral violation.
facts are morally problematic (normative).
There are a number of normative ethical traditions and competing normative
ethical theories. Some of more common are virtue ethics, Kantian ethics, social
contract theories (contractarianism and contractualism), Utilitarianism, care
ethics, and feminist Ethics. In this course we will limit our attention to three types of
normative ethical theories: consequentialism, contractarianism, and
contractualism.
Our discussion of these theories will be far from exhaustive. We will not
cover all the various objections to the theories or all the variations of each type of
theory, but it will be enough for you to be able to draw upon them when thinking
about the issues in various disciplines of applied ethics as well as everyday life. In
your course you will probably move from discussion of our three normative ethical
theories to issues in applied ethics and will then have an opportunity to go back,
reassess, and reconsider the normative ethical theories we covered. This process is
what John Rawls called reflective equilibrium, whereby we bring our considered
judgments about certain issues to bear on ethical theory and vice versa until we feel
that our ethical theory most closely captures our considered judgments on all the
possible issues.
Considered
Judgements on
Various Ethical
Issues
A Theory of
Ethics that
best Reflects
our
Considered
Judgements
The way this works is that we have an approximate idea of our intuitions on a range
of issues (murder, rape, torture, civil liberties, distributive justice, abortion, animal
rights, etc.) and we try to come up with a principle that matches with our intuitions.
And then we attempt to specify our theory as precisely as possible. Then we set out
to test our theory by coming up with various examples, ideally examples that are
likely to falsify the theory. This process is similar to the way scientific theories are
tested in that the scientist looks for evidence that will either falsify the theory or
confirm it to a greater degree. The ethicist, rather than conducting experiments in a
lab, conducts thought experiments by considering the ethical implications of
various actions. A famous thought experiment is the trolley problem. It goes like
this:
You see a trolley that is out of control and is about to run over and kill five
people. You have the option to pull a switch and move the trolley onto
another track where there is only one person who will be killed.
Most people think we have a moral obligation to pull the switch, however it is not as
easy to explain why exactly that is.
Moral Realism
Moral realism is the view that there are facts about which actions are right and
wrong. Socrates was presuming moral realism in his questioning of Euthyphro and
Euthyphro was presuming moral realism in his responses to Socrates. In fact moral
realism is the view that we most of us presume to be true as act as if it is true. Our
legal system presumes so actions are right and wrong and in our every day thought
and behavior we judge some actions and right and some actions as wrong. Moral
realism is view that facts about right and wrong just as much a matter of fact as
scientific facts are a matter of fact. Just as there is a fact about Einstein’s theory of
relativity, it is either true or false, there is a fact about whether animals have rights,
and just as there is a fact about whether two plus three equals five there is a fact
about whether murder is right or wrong. In our consideration of various normative
ethical theories we will presume moral realism to be true, just as we do in our
everyday thought and discourse on ethics. However, before we get to our theories
we will consider a few key objections that have been raised against moral realism.
Ethical Relativism
Looking around at the variety of different cultural practices and beliefs about
what actions are right and wrong one might be tempted think that ethical facts are
relative to a particular culture. Ethical relativism is the view that there are no
absolute moral or ethical facts and that all ethical truths are relative to a particular
society or culture. We will consider several possible responses to this view.
The first is that it may be true that cultures have different ethical practices
but it may still be true that all cultures embrace some particular basic ethical
principles. So, some cultures might venerate their grandparents and serve them
hand and foot until they pass away while others might require the grandchildren to
kill their grandparents but this fact doesn’t necessary prove that these two cultures
have different values or endorse different ethical principles. What might be a
principle that could encompass both cultural practices? In other words what
principle could be invoked to justify both practices? And when considering those
questions it seems quite likely that there is a principle that could justify both
actions. So, one way of responding to relativist is that ethics is about finding the
universal principles in all cultures.
But for the sake of argument let’s assume that there is a culture that shares
absolutely no ethical values with another culture. I actually find this wildly
implausible but let’s assume it for the sake of the argument. There is a still a
decisive way to respond to the relativist, which is that even if ethical practices are
completely relative ethical facts are not necessarily relative to cultures. Think about
ethical facts as similar to scientific facts. Various cultures have believed various
things about the origin of the earth, however there are facts about the origin of the
earth that are completely independent of the various beliefs of different cultures.
Some cultures have undoubtedly had false beliefs about the origin of the earth. Our
present culture probably has some false beliefs about the origin of the earth. But the
facts are the facts independent of whether they are recognized by all cultures, some
cultures, or no cultures. The same goes for mathematics, geology, astronomy,
biology, psychology, sociology and every other science that contains facts. And the
moral realist would argue that the same is true about ethics, that there are ethical
facts independent of any particular culture’s knowledge of those facts and
independent of any particular culture’s ethical practices.
One way to think about the mistake the relativist is making is that he or she is
mistaking descriptive facts, facts about what cultures believe or do, and
normative principles. Remember nothing ethical follows from a mere statement
of fact, whether it is a fact about human psychology, sociology, or cultural
anthropology.
Divine Command Theory
Now, before we move on we will consider one possible objection to normative
ethics, divine command theory. Divine command theory is not exactly an objection
to normative ethics but rather a competing normative ethical theory that many of
you have probably come across at some point in your life, although without realizing
it as such. Divine command theory is theory in which the rules of morality are divine
commands or commands of God. The most historically influential version of divine
command theory is the ethical theory found in in Torah or the old testament of the
Bible which states that the commandments of morality, the Ten Commandments,
are the commands of God and that one should follow them because God says we
should.
Divine command theory was also a popular and influential ethical view in
Plato’s time in Athens Greece. Eventually Euthyphro suggests a version of Divine
command theory by claiming that whatever the gods command is the right action.
Socrates responds with a type of argument known as a dilemma. A dilemma is a type
of argumentative strategy that begins with an either-or statement in which both
options are unattractive to the person one is arguing with. The two options are
sometimes referred to as the “horns” of the dilemma i.e. you don’t want to have to
grab, or be stabbed by, either one of the horns. The dilemma suggested by Socrates
is that “Either (a) an action is pious because the gods love it or (b) they love it
because it is pious.” Let us now see why this is such a dilemma. If one chooses option
(a) that an action is pious because the gods love it then it seems to make morality
arbitrary. One might respond to this claim by asking, “What if the gods declared
killing babies to be morally permissible?” To which the obvious answer seems to be
“No.” The alternative is (b) that gods love actions that are pious. So, the original
questions remains in full force which is “What makes actions right or wrong, or
pious (as Socrates calls it)?” Another way to think about this is that even God must
have reasons for loving right actions or wrong actions. Assuming God exists, we
wouldn’t want to think that he prohibits murder, theft, and requires kindness
merely randomly. He must have good reasons for why he proscribes certain things
and prescribes other things. And, if that is the case then it makes sense to think
about God’s reasons for saying that some actions are right and some are wrong. So,
because God must have reasons for choosing some actions as right divine command
theory doesn’t work as a normative ethical theory. Here is the Euthyphro dilemma is
chart form:
(a) Either an
action is
pious because
the gods love
it
If you choose
this horn then
right and
wrong is
random
(b) Or the
gods love it
because it is
pious
If you choose
this horn of
the dilemma
then it actions
are right and
wrong
independtly
of the gods
command
The
Euthyphro
Dilemma
Ethics based on Reason
A common, though far from obvious at this point in your study of philosophy,
theme running through my critique of the objections to moral realism, relativism
and divine command theory, is that reason is the foundation of ethics and provides
good reason to think there are such things as moral facts i.e. that moral realism is
true. The three theories we will consider all rely on reason as the foundation of their
basic normative principle, although the three theories suggest different things that
reason commands of us. Two of the theories, consequentialism and
contractarianism, have similar conceptions of what reason is but different
conceptions of what exactly reason commands while contractarianism has a vastly
divergent conception of reason. As we learn more about the theories we will learn
more about the fundamental conception of reason each theory employs and what
the theories suggest as following from their particular conception of reason. I’m
sure that was pretty confusing but be patient and it will become more clear just
what the preceding paragraph is about as we go on.
So, now let’s move on to consider our three ethical theories:
consequentialism, contractualism, and contractarianism.
Chapter 1
Consequentialism
Objectives:
Key terms and Concepts:
We will begin our discussion of normative ethics by considering
Consequentialism, and in particular one type of consequentialist theory known as
“utilitarianism.” We will being with this type of ethical theory as it is the simplest of
the three theories we will be discussing. However don’t let the simplicity of the
theory fool you as many of the implications of the theory or not particularly easy to
grasp. This is because utilitarianism is actually a very radical departure from the
typical way we think about ethics. In contrast Kant’s contractualist theory of ethics
seems complicated but is actually quite intuitive and matches well with most of our
basic ethical intuitions.
Jeremy Bentham and John Stuart Mill, are the founders of the
utilitarianism, which has been very influential over the past several centuries.
Utilitarianism is a type of consequentialist ethical theory. Consequentialist theories
determine the rightness of an action exclusively by its consequences.
Utilitarianism is one type of consequentialist ethical theory that specifically
looks at the happiness and suffering caused by an action, which are together
referred to as utility, to determine the rightness and wrongness of an action.
Utilitarianism is sometimes summarized in a slogan as the “greatest good for the
greatest number.” However a more precise formulation is “the greatest net balance
of happiness over unhappiness,” but importantly not as happiness for the most or
the most happiness, without considering the suffering involved. Bentham talked
about a utility calculus where we could literally add up the units of positive utility
and subtract all the units of negative utility and get an exact number of units of
utility produced by each action. Bentham was known to say “pushpin (a common
game played in bars at the time) is as good as poetry” as a way of stating that all
pleasure counted equally, which at the time was a somewhat radical notion.
According to Bentham the types of things that can make one pleasure better than
another are its duration, quantity, intensity, achievability, etc.
According to utilitarianism utility is only thing that is fundamentally good,
which makes utilitarianism a kind of hedonistic theory. Hedonism is a theory about
what is valuable. According to hedonism pleasure is the only thing that is
fundamentally valuable. Actions that maximize utility are referred to as “optimific.”
What we are going to refer to as utilitarianism or consequentialism is a type of
utilitarianism called act utilitarianism. According to act utilitarianism an action is
morally required if and only if it maximizes utility. The utilitarian calculus includes
all the consequences of our actions to the end of time, which includes their effects on
every single sentient being that will be affected by our actions.
However there are many many other types of utilitarian and consequentialist
theories. Just to give you some idea these include:
Preference Utilitarianism: an action is morally required if and only if is
maximizes preference satisfaction.
Negative Utilitarianism: an action is required iff it minimizes suffering.
Expected Consequences Utilitarianism: an action is required iff it
maximizes expected utility.
Rule Utilitarianism: an action is required iff it is dictated by a rule that if
followed by everyone would produce the most happiness
Some have argued that utilitarianism would morally obligate us to actively
exterminate all sentient life, in the most painless way possible of course. Others
have take the less extreme view and merely argued that we obligated to make sure
no new life comes into existence but not to destroy existing life. Later we will
consider rule utilitarianism in more detail.
Having outlined the basics of the theory let’s now consider some of the
attractions of utilitarianism. The primary attraction and strongest consideration in
favor of utilitarianism is that it seems to justify conventional moral wisdom.
According to the theory slavery, rape, and killing are wrong, because they make
people (very) unhappy. In other words utilitarianism provides an explanation of
why the things we think are wrong are indeed wrong.
Another attraction of utilitarianism is its impartiality in that everyone’s
interests count equally. No one’s pleasure or pain is counted less than anyone else’s
pleasure or pain. Another attraction of utilitarianism is that it gives us a method for
making difficult moral decisions. All we need to know to solve moral dilemmas are
the consequences involved in all the possible choices. Utilitarianism explains why
moral prohibitions (against lying, stealing, etc.) may sometimes be broken, and
exactly in what cases we can break them. In summary utilitarianism seems to
explain many of our most basic intuitions regarding what actions are right and
wrong in a clear and concise theory. What the utilitarian wants to say is “At bottom
all the talks about morals, ethics, duties, obligations, virtues, the golden rule, rights,
and all the other things people say when talking about ethics really just comes down
to whether an action has good consequences. And if it does have the best
consequences of all the available actions then it is the right action.” But is it really
that simple? Before we get to that let’s just elaborate on a few more features of
utilitarianism.
The Moral Community
The moral community consists of those whose interests we are morally obligated to
consider for their own sake. According to utilitarianism, the moral community
consists of all beings capable of suffering. Bentham famously remarked “the
question is not “Can they reason?, Nor can they talk?, but Can they suffer?” Many
ethical theories have restricted the moral community to human beings or those that
are rational. In this sense utilitarians like Bentham and Mill were way ahead of their
time on issues like women’s rights and animal rights, loosely speaking that is.
Utilitarianism and Rights
I say loosely speaking because Bentham characterized rights, which are the
foundational concept of most ethical theories, as “non-sense on stilts.” Strictly
speaking there is no place for rights within a utilitarian framework. So, when we say
that “utilitarianism provides a justification for animal rights” this is more of an
expression rather than a precisely true account. As we shall see within a utilitarian
frame even humans don’t have rights. This will of course be problematic. There is
however a sense in which a utilitarian can endorse talk of rights, when such talk has
good consequences, but they cannot actually endorse a literal conception of rights.
Agent Neutrality
Consequentialism is agent neutral in that it does not give any preference to the
agents desire, preferences, happiness, or life. An agent may be obligated to sacrifice
any or all of the above. An agent is required to consider his own happiness and the
happiness of his family and friends as being no more important than the happiness
anyone else one the planet.
Utilitarianism and Long Term Consequences
Discussions about utilitarianism often turn to the long-term consequences of an
action. Someone might argue, as I have suggested above, that utilitarianism is
problematic because it doesn’t prescribe any specific duty or obligation to one’s
family. There seems to be something strongly counterintuitive about such a view.
The utilitarian will most probably agree, and say that although we don’t have any
special duty to our family members in most cases the optimific action will be one
that prioritizes caring for one’s family members more than strangers. An appeal to
long-term consequences is one way that a utilitarian can answer various objections
to the theory. However, such responses can also be somewhat contentious because
in most cases it is not particularly clear what the long-term consequences of an
action are.
Assessing Actions and Intentions with a Utilitarian Framework
One very counterintuitive feature of utilitarianism is that morally
praiseworthy actions are not necessarily the right actions according to
utilitarianism. Generally we praise someone for doing the right action and condemn
them for doing the wrong action. This does not mean that there is not a way to talk
about right or wrong intentions but there is no intrinsic connection between the
rightness and wrongness of an action and the intentions of the agent. For example,
an agent could do something horrible, like kill someone, yet the action could turn
out to be the right action because the person murdered was himself a serial killer.
This is because actions are evaluated exclusively on the actual consequences of the
action. Again, this is very counterintuitive.
One way to think about evaluating motivations, within a utilitarian framework, is
that the right motivations are the ones that have the best consequences. So, just like
actions intentions are evaluated on their consequences. However it makes sense to
say that the right intentions are the ones that have the best overall consequences,
which opens of space for arguing that a person had the right intentions even though
the action they did was actually wrong. The right action is the action that maximizes
actual utility in a given situation and the right intention is the intention maximizes
overall utility. But again these will not always match up. This is a little strange in
that you could have an action that would be the wrong action but still be morally
praiseworthy and an action that would be the wrong action but morally
blameworthy. Let’s consider the following examples, the first two of which are the
counterintuitive ones:
A: You see a drowning man and decide to save his life. This is a morally
praiseworthy action that turns out to be the wrong action because the
drowning man is actually Hitler.
B: You see a drowning man and decide not to save his life. This is a
morally blameworthy action that turns out to be the right action because
the drowning man is actually Hitler.
C: You have a significant amount of extra money and you give a large
amount of money to disaster relief.
D: You have a significant amount of extra money and you don’t give any of
it to disaster relief.
And here is an illustration of how praiseworthy and blameworthy actions can be
either right or wrong depending on their consequences:
Right Action
Wrong Action
Praiseworthy
C (give money to disaster A (Save Hitler)
relief)
Blameworthy
B (Let Hitler drown)
D (Don’t give money to
disaster relief)
Objections to Utilitarianism
To deepen our understanding of the theory let’s consider some common possible
objections to the theory. I will ultimately suggest that there is one objection, the
“injustice objection”, that is conclusive against the theory.
How do we know what action has the best consequences?
In considering which actions are right and which are wrong we must consider all the
possible consequences of our action, which leads to an epistemological problem.
Epistemology is the study of what is knowable and an epistemological problem is a
problem regarding the possibility of gaining knowledge. There is an epistemological
problem regarding the fact that utilitarianism tells us we can never really know
what the right action is. Knowing which action is the right action seems to be
impossible because we can never know the consequences of our action to the end of
time.
There are two possible responses to such a criticism. The first just to say that
one of the implications of utilitarianism is that we never know which actions are the
right actions. In ethics there are just certain facts that we will never know, just like
in science there are certain facts we will never know, like how many atoms are
contained in the universe. Although the problem is a little more sever in ethics
because if this line of reasoning is correct we can never be sure whether any action
is truly the right action or not. A second and somewhat complimentary line of
response to this type of criticism is argue that although we don’t know which
actions are the right actions we can nevertheless evaluate a person’s intentions
based on their likely consequences. In this case we would, in a sense not care so
much which action is the right action. So the theory would tell us the right action is
the one that has the best consequences but that a virtuous agent would not attempt
to perform the right action but be more concerned to have the right intentions.
Utilitarianism is too demanding
There are three areas in which one might be inclined to think that utilitarianism is
too demanding: deliberation, motivation, and action. Utilitarianism seems to be too
demanding in requiring an excessive or impossible amount of deliberation in order
to determine the right action. There seems to be no way to know which action is the
one with the best consequences, overall and until the end of time considered as to
how it affects every sentient organism on the planet. On a utilitarian account the
right motivations are the ones that produce the most happiness. So, utilitarianism
seems to suggest that one needs to have the motivations of a saint, to always be
motivated to maximize utility. And utilitarianism implies that we are always doing
the wrong thing because its standard of right action is so high. This is true even
when we do good things. Say you give twenty dollars to a homeless person. From a
utilitarian perspective this might still not be the right action. The right action might
be to let him move in with you and to help him get on his feet. Utilitarianism seems
to imply that the right life is a life of extreme self-sacrifice to constantly perform
actions that maximize utility. In our ordinary way of thinking about actions we tend
to think of some actions as superogatory, admirable and praiseworthy but not
necessarily required, but according to utilitarianism all right actions are required
One possible response to this line of objections is that, as Peter Singer says in
his essay “The Singer Solution to World Poverty,” it is just a fact that humans don’t
often if ever perform the right action and that is just the way it is. Such a fact doesn’t
mean that we can’t strive to perform better actions rather than worse ones. And
maybe we shouldn’t be focused on performing the right action and avoiding the
wrong action but just increasing utility as much as we can, given the limits of our
psychological condition.
The Impartiality objection
Utilitarianism seems to require one to be completely impartial, however many
people feel they have special duties to certain people (children, parents, spouses,
countrymen, humans, etc). As suggested earlier, one way around this is to argue
that caring for one’s family is generally optifimic if we consider all the consequences
and therefore according to utilitarianism caring for one’s family is generally the
right thing to do. Although the utilitarian has to admit that in some cases it is right to
prioritize the happiness of other persons over the happiness of ones family.
The Integrity Objection
Here is a simple argument that might capture one’s intuitions regarding the role
integrity in ethics:
1. If utilitarianism is correct then acting with integrity is not morally relevant to
the morality of an action.
2. Acting with integrity is morally relevant to the morality of an action.
3. So, Utilitarianism is not correct.
The above argument is the type of argument made by Bernard Williams in his essay
“A Critique of Utilitarianism” and here are the two examples he uses:
Example 1: A man is told by an evil dictator that if executes one innocent
person then the lives of nine others will be spared and if he refuses all ten
will be executed.
Example 2: A poor scientist who is having trouble supporting himself and his
family is offered a lucrative job to make chemical weapons, and the weapons
will be made with or without his participation.
In both cases utilitarianism tells us it is wrong to act with integrity and refuse to kill
an innocent person or make chemical weapons. Another example that is often used
is that of the Gestapo and the crying baby. Imagine you are a Jewish family that is
hiding and the Gestapo is searching the house looking for Jews. You are hiding in an
underground bunker with the rest of your family, including a small infant. The baby
begins to cry. If you don’t cover its mouth you will all be found and killed, and if you
do the baby will die. Is it right to kill a baby to save your life and the life of your
family members? Utilitarianism seems to say it would be positively wrong to not kill
the baby. However, what Williams argues is that although it may not be wrong to kill
the baby it is not wrong to not kill the baby. The utilitarian can respond to this
objection by stressing the value of intentions, independent of consequences. A
utilitarian theory could determine the right action in terms of consequences but still
prioritize right intentions over right actions. Although one might begin to wonder
what role consequences really play in the theory if the utilitarian is constantly
forced to retreat to a view that prioritizes right intentions over right actions to meet
various objections.
The Injustice Objection
The injustice objection is the most serious and ultimately fatal objection to
utilitarianism. The other objections pose problems but there are reasonable and
legitimate utilitarian responses to them, however I don’t find either of possible
responses to this objection satisfying. Consider the following examples.
Example 1: There is a hate crime committed. Riots and ethic violence are
beginning to break out. To prevent further ethic violence the president of the
country decides frame an innocent person and execute him. Let’s further
imagine this innocent person is a homeless man with no family or friends.
Example 2: Imagine a doctor goes around harvesting the organs of homeless
people to save the lives of well-loved important people in society.
In both of the examples it seems like a wrong action has been committed however
from the utilitarian perspective these are the right actions. This objection hinges on
the view that individuals have rights and that it is wrong to violate those rights.
Utilitarianism has no real way to account for rights, remember that Bentham said
that rights were non-sense on stilts. Here is an argument based upon the above
examples against Utilitarianism:
1) If a moral theory is correct then it will never require us to commit serious
injustices.
2) If utilitarianism is correct then it will never require us to commit serious
injustices.
3) Utilitarianism sometimes requires us to commit serious injustices.
4) So, utilitarianism is not the correct moral theory.
How might a utilitarian respond to this argument? Since the argument is valid there
are really only two options, the utilitarian must either deny that the first premise is
true or deny that the second premise is true. A utilitarian can try to argue that
injustice is never optimific. This will usually involve some long-term consequences. I
personally do not find this response very plausible. For this to response to work it
must be true not only that there never has been a case where injustice was optimific
but that it is not even logically conceivable that injustice could ever be optimific,
which I believe is implausible.
The second option is what we call “biting the bullet” in philosophy jargon.
The diehard utilitarian will have to bite the bullet on this one and admit that
sometimes it is not only permissible but morally required to infringe on someone’s
or a group of individual’s rights and perform and injustice upon them. Moreover
they can go on the offensive and claim that the argument merely begs the question.
The first premise is obviously false if utilitarianism is true. So, this argument is not a
conclusive argument against utilitarianism but it does show that utilitarianism is
strongly in conflict with certain deeply held beliefs that almost all of us share.
However, because utilitarianism does not countenance individual rights no
society has ever been founded on utilitarian principles. This includes but John Rawls
and Robert Nozick, the two most famous political philosophers of the 20th century,
despite their widely diverging approaches to political philosophy. Both Rawls and
Nozick drew inspiration from Kant and the social contract tradition. The injustice
objection is the most challenging for the utilitarian to address. This does not mean
that there are no utilitarian answers to meet this objection but what it shows is that
utilitarianism, despite its many attractions, fails to adequately capture the spirit of
our moral thinking. Oftentimes in philosophy there are no conclusive objections to a
position but the objections serve to highlight what a person who takes that position
is really committed to and help us to see if we want to be committed to that position.
Utilitarian Metaethics and conception of reason
The utilitarian claims that we ought to maximize utility, which is the essentially the
basic normative claim of utilitarianism. Bentham doesn’t offer much in the way of
justification for this claim, and Mill’s argument for this claim, which we will not
cover here, has well documented problems (If you are interested you search “Mill’s
desirability argument” and find information on his argument.). Henry Sidgwick does
however offer an argument to try and show the validity of the claim that we ought to
maximize utility. In arguing for the principle of utility he says:
“. . .I obtain the self evident principle that the good of any one individual is of
no more importance, from the point of view (if I may say so) of the Universe,
than the good of any other . . . And it is evident to me that as a rational being I
am bound to aim at good generally, - so far as it is attainable by my efforts, not merely a particular part of it. From these two rational intuitions we may
deduce as a necessary inference, the maxim of benevolence in abstract form:
viz. that each one is morally bound to regard the good of any other individual
as much as his own, except in so far as he judges it to be less, when
impartially viewed . . .
What Sidgewick is arguing is that it is a basic principle of reason that we ought to
consider our own happiness as no more important than any other persons
happiness and that we therefore ought to strive not only for our own happiness for
to maximize happiness. Here is a reconstruction of such an argument:
1) It is rational to seek to maximize happiness generally rather than merely
seek to maximize my own happiness because reason is impartial and values
each person’s happiness as much as anyone else’s happiness. (Premise)
2) If X has the capacity for rational thought then X ought to act rationally. (If P
then Q.)
3) If X has the capacity for rational thought then X ought to act to maximize
happiness. (If P then Q.) (This is just a slightly modified form of the previous
conditional, which substitutes a specific instance of rationality rather than
stating a more general principle of rationality.)
4) I have the capacity for rational thought. (P.)
5) So, I ought to seek to maximize utility rather than merely seek to maximize
my own happiness. (Q.)(this is just follows from the previous conditional)
Utilitarianism employs what we will call an altruistic conception of reason, which
means that reason commands us to act altruistically. This is in contrast to the next
theory we will cover which employs a merely prudential conception of reason. If
reason is merely prudential then reason commands us to act only in our own self
interest whereas if reason is altruistic it commands us to act in ways that benefit
other despite how it effects us. When we say that reason commands us to do X we
mean that X is a principle of reason or also that it would be rational to do X. So on
the altruistic conception of reason it might be rational to sacrifice one’s life for a
cause or to save one’s family or even a stranger however on the prudential
conception of reason it would never be rational to sacrifice one’s life for any person
or cause. You have probably heard the basic form of an altruistic conception of
reason many times, and it goes something like “How would you like it if someone
did that to you?” And from the fact that you probably wouldn’t like it is somehow
supposed to follow that we ought not to do that to someone else. How does that
work you might wonder? The key point is that there is a universal or objective point
of view, the rational point of view, and the idea that a rational agent has some sort of
obligation to act rationally. So, subjectively we tend to value our own happiness
more than the happiness of others, certainly more than the happiness of strangers,
but objectively our happiness is not more important than anyone else’s happiness.
That is pretty straightforward. The second big step in the argument is that as
rational beings we ought to act rationally. This is somewhat more controversial as it
is not as immediately clear why we ought to act rationally in some cases. There is
certainly a kind of logic to thinking the view that we ought to sometimes act in our
own best interest rather than always acting from an objective point of view. We
won’t try to settle that question here but at least we get some idea of the type of
reasoning that could lead one to think that one ought to act to maximize happiness
for all sentient beings rather than merely acting in a way that brings one pleasure.
In the last chapter we will consider this argument in more detail as we compare it to
Kant’s argument that is similar in form but slightly different. In short, Kant’s
argument will be seen to be more true to our actual intuitions because although it is
true that rationally we should not put our interests before then interests of others it
does not exactly follow that we ought to seek maximize happiness, which is why our
intuitions don’t support utilitarianism and why the injustice objection is substantial.
But, we’ll be in a better position to see this a bit later.
Chapter 2
Contractarianism
The first major normative ethical theory we discussed was Utilitarianism,
which defines the right action as the one that maximizes utility. Utilitarianism is the
prominent type of Consequentialist ethical theory, which more generally defines the
right action in terms of the consequences the action produces. However, the next
two theories we will discuss are very different and require the agent to proceed in
their ethical reasoning very differently than an agent would if he or she were
reasoning in a consequentialist manner. Consequentialist theories, in their basic
form, define something as good and then require the agent to maximize that good
thing. However, social contract theories require the agent to consider his role as one
member of a society in which all members agree certain rules, the social contract,
and then to act according to the previously agreed upon rules, regardless of the
consequences. Social contract theories determine the rightness and wrongness of
actions based on rules rather than on the consequences of any particular action. The
two different types of social contract theory are known as contractarianism and
contractualism. Although both think about right and wrong in terms of the social
contract the two theories are actually very different. First we will cover
contractarianism.
Thomas Hobbes is the founder of contractarian ethical theory and in this
section we will be considering his theory of ethics as found in his book The
Leviathan.
One of the main advantages of contractarianism is that it provides a completely
naturalistic and empirical explanation of ethics. Morality is a natural phenomenon
that arises in the natural world by the simple mechanism of self-interest.
Contractarianism begins with the simple notion of a “state of nature.” The state of
nature is the pre-contract state of human beings or what life would be like without a
social contract. In his book Leviathan Hobbes describes the state of nature as a “war
of all against all . . . in which the life of man is solitary, poor, nasty, brutish and
short.”
The Prisoner’s Dilemma
The situation of those in the state of nature is sometimes referred as “the prisoner’s
dilemma.” A prisoner’s dilemma is a situation where everyone would be better off
by cooperating but in attempting to minimize risk and maximize gain, through the
direct pursuit of self-interest, both become worse off.
Imagine two mafia hit men, Franky and Joey, are being interrogated for a
murder. They are each independently offered a plea bargain if they confess so that
they will only get 2 years in jail and if they don’t confess and are found guilty they
will get life imprisonment. They will be found guilty if they don’t confess and their
partner confesses. And of course if neither confess they will go free as there is no
actual evidence of the crime. What should they do? This is a prisoner’s dilemma. If
they both keep quiet then they both walk. But if one confesses then the other will get
life imprisonment. So the safest bet in the situation is to confess and take the two
years rather than risk life imprisonment. Notice how by acting purely out of selfinterest both fail to maximize their self-interest. It would have been in both their
interest to cooperate with each other and for neither of them to confess.
The prisoner’s dilemma is analogous to the state of nature. The state of
nature is a prisoner’s dilemma because by attempting to maximize self-interest
everyone is made worst off. To get out of the state of nature we need two things:
rules that work to everyone’s benefit if followed and someone to enforce the rules.
To get a better idea of how this works let’s now look at Hobbes has to say in the
excerpt from his book Leviathan.
Thomas Hobbes’ Leviathan
Hobbes begins the section of the book in which he describes the state of nature with
the assertion that everyone is roughly equal. This is not some philosophical or
religious statement about the absolute dignity of all persons. It is a crude statement
of the facts the facts of life. What Hobbes means when he says that everyone is
roughly equal is that, “The weakest has strength enough to kill the strongest.” In the
state of nature, no matter how strong you are you can be killed by someone else or
by a group of other people. Certainly there are differences in strength and natural
abilities but Hobbes’ point is that in spite of the differences in ability there is no one
who can lay permanent claim to anything because there will always be someone or
some group of individuals to challenge them. Hobbes is making the point that no one
has more of a natural right to goods in the state of nature than anyone else, which
was actually quite a radical view at this time in Europe when kings and ruling
classes claimed a natural right to greater wealth and position in society.
And because everyone is roughly equal, in this sense, there arises
competition and fighting and which leads to what Hobbes calls a state of war, a state
of war of everyman against everyman where “everyman is enemy to everyman” and
“there is no security.” Hobbes paints a bleak picture of what life would be like in the
state of nature. He says there is:
. . . No industry because the fruit of industry is uncertain, No navigation or
trade by sea, no commodious building, no large moving equipment, no
knowledge of the face of the earth, no account of time, not arts, no letters, no
society
And most importantly there is “continual fear and danger of violent death.” And
famously “the life of man, solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and short.” The state of
nature is a bad place to be and the best thing anyone can do for themselves is to do
whatever it takes to get out of it.
You may have heard the expression “all is fair in love and war”, although the
expression didn’t originate from Hobbes he does agree that nothing is unjust in a
state of war. This is because there is no such thing as justice or right and wrong in
the state of nature:
“The notions of right and wrong, justice and injustice have there no place.
Where there is no common power, there is no law; where no law, no
injustice. Force and fraud are the two cardinal virtues.”
So, in a state of war everyone has a right to everything or more precisely to
everything they can get their hands on, by hook or crook or as Hobbes says by force
or by fraud. Hobbes’ basic principles are the following:
1) In the state of nature one ought to use “all helps and advantages of war”
2) But one ought to endeavor for peace because peace is always preferable to
war
3) One ought to be willing to give up his right to everything if others are also
willing to do so
He says:
. . . as long as this natural right of every man to everything endureth, there
can be no security to any man, how strong or wise soever he may be, of living
out the time which nature ordinarily alloweth men to live. And consequently
it is a precept, or general rule of reason: that every man ought to endeavor
peace, as far as he has hope of obtaining it; and when he cannot obtain it, that
he may seek and use all helps and advantages of war. . . From this
fundamental law of nature, by which men are commanded to endeavor
peace, is derived this second law: that a man be willing, when others are so
too, as far forth as for peace and defence of himself he shall think it
necessary, to lay down this right to all things; and be contented with so much
liberty against other men as he would allow other men against himself.
In summary, in the state of nature everyone has a right to everything, and we can
get out of the state of nature by agreeing to renounce our right to everything if
others are also willing to do so.
The title of Hobbes’ book is Leviathan, which is a mythical sea monster
mentioned in the Old Testament. One of main ideas that Hobbes is attempting to
argue for in his book is the absolute necessity of a monarch powerful enough to
ensure that all members of society obey the rules of the social contract for face his
wrath. The commonwealth ensures that the punishment for breaking contracts is
sufficiently great and reliable such that it is not in anyone’s interest to break a
contract or more generally act unjustly in any way. He says:
“Therefore before the names of just and unjust can have place, there must be
some coercive power to compel men equally to the performance of their
covenants, by the terror of some punishment greater than the benefit they
expect by the breach of their covenant, and to make good that propriety
which by mutual contract men acquire in recompense of the universal right
they abandon: and such power there is none before the erection of a
Commonwealth.”
The Fool Objection
The most prominent objection to contractarianism is known as “the fool objection.”
Hobbes describes the fool as someone who thinks that he doesn’t have to follow the
rules of the social contract. Hobbes asks “Is it against one’s interest to follow
through with contracts made?” and he thinks that it is in one’s interests to not break
the rules of the contract.
He says two basic things in response to the fool:
(1) Something may work out in your favor but that doesn’t mean it is wisely
done. Breaking the rules of the contract is risky.
(2) If you break your covenants you are removing yourself from society and
putting yourself back into the state of nature, which is a bad thing. You will
not be able to be received by any society. You might happen to fool some
group of people but it is not wise (rational and prudential to assume that you
will be able to do so).
Here is a more formal reconstruction of (2):
1) A rational person always prefers a state of peace than a state of war.
2) If you break contracts (act like a fool) then you are removing yourself from a
state of peace and putting yourself in a state of war.
3) No breaking of a contract is ever guaranteed to go undetected.
4) The odds of one’s being detected, no matter how small, and punishments that
might result from that breach of contract always make it irrational to break a
contract.
5) So, breaking a contract is never rational.
Premise 4 is the crucial premise that seems somewhat implausible, although 1 also
seems somewhat suspect as well. One thing that it looks like is that Hobbes’
argument really only works with the assumption of very sever penalties for
breaking the social contract, and an argument could be made that none of the
modern liberal states would meet this standard. It is possible to modify Hobbes’
argument to show that in most cases it is rational to follow the rules of the social
contract so that acting like a fool is generally irrational. However, this is in conflict
with our standard intuitions on morality. We don’t think murder is wrong when
there is a reasonably high likelihood of being caught and punished, we tend to think
that murder is always wrong.
The Role of Reason in Contractarianism
In contractarian ethical theory what is rational is what is moral, which will also be
the case with the next theory we will discuss. But contractarianism has a very
different account of what is rational than our next theory, contractualism, has. In
contractarianism what is rational is whatever is in one’s self-interest, which is also
what is moral. This will pose some problems, as we will see shortly. The
contractarian formula is: Morality = Rationality = Self-Interest. The action that is
rational and moral is the action that is in one’s self-interest and the action that is in
one’s self-interest is the action that is moral and rational. Murder, rape, torture,
genocide and anything else that might be considered immoral are considered moral
if they are in one’s self-interest.
Contractarianism employs what is called, in philosophical jargon, a
prudential conception of reason. This means that reason is merely prudential rather
than what might be called universal or objective. In the previous section on
utilitarianism we saw with Sidgwick’s argument for the principle of utility a theory
that employed a universal or objective conception of reason such that what was
rational was what was in the best interest of everyone. Contractarian theories do
not countenance such actions as rational and employ a very narrow conception of
reason.
Advantages of Contractarianism
Contractarianism offers a clear metaethical justification of moral rules. And this
justification is rooted in self-interest, which is an undeniable source of motivation.
Contractarian ethical theory provides a naturalistic and scientific explanation of
what morality is and how it arises. Expressing this sentiment David Gauthier in his
essay “Why Contractualism?” he says, “Morality faces a foundational crises.
Contractarianism offers the only plausible resolution of this crisis.” If you feel that
morality must somehow be tied to egoistic motivations a theory like this will be
attractive. The other two theories we will consider, utilitarianism and
contractualism, don’t necessarily have quite as strong of an answer to the “Why be
moral?” question. Their answer is going to be that as a rational being you have
reason to act rationally, but the contractarian can offer a much stronger answer
which is that being moral is in your self-interest. The catch is that it then becomes
moral to act in ways that are normally considered immoral when those actions are
in one’s self-interest.
Objections to Contractarianism
The Fool Objection
Hobbes tries to show that even the person who is entirely self-interested ought
(prudentially) to follow moral rules/laws of society. I don’t think he is successful in
doing so and I find this objection to be decisive against contractarianism. The
problem this objection presents is that any instance, or any possible instance, where
it would be to one’s advantage to break the rules of the social contract casts strongly
conflicts with our intuitions about these issues. Essentially according to
contractarianism one ought not to lie, steal, kill, etc. except when it is to one’s
advantage. The problem is that because contractarian theory equates morality with
self-interest in cases where it is to one’s advantage to act “immorally”, that is in a
way that we normally consider immoral, it is actually the moral action. So, the
contractarian is forced to say that murder is sometimes the rational and moral thing
to do. Consider the following example: You are stranded on a deserted island with
someone. As he is dying he tells you about some money in an anonymous Cayman
Islands bank account and asks you to donate the money to a country club in his
name. According to utilitarianism one ought to donate the money to an organization
that can do more good with it. This is a somewhat plausible answer but as
previously discussed this is also somewhat problematic. But, contractarianism
implies that we morally ought to take the money for ourselves, that is the morally
correct thing to do, and that just seems wrong.
The Moral Community
Another problem is that contractarianism doesn’t seem to countenance moral duties
to people outside our contract, this could include animals, children, other societies,
intelligent life on other planets, etc. What this means essentially is that we have no
moral duties or obligations to anyone who we do not benefit from by treating with
moral consideration. Animal rights are a good example of the types of moral
obligations that contractarianism doesn’t countenance. Consider the following
argument:
1. If a theory is the right ethical theory then it will provide some rights to
animals.
2. Contractarianism doesn’t provide any rights to animals.
3. So, contractarianism is not the right theory.
This of course will be an issue we will discuss in depth a bit later but as a preview a
standard approach to animal rights, that could be seen as contractarian, is that, as
Jane English says, animals get their rights second hand. By this she means that
certain behaviors are unacceptable not because it is wrong in and of itself to treat
animals in a certain way but it is wrong because treating animals poorly would
predispose one to treat other persons, who are members of the social contract,
poorly. Although someone who thinks it really is wrong to treat animals cruelly, in
and of itself, might find such a response unsatisfying. There is also an analogous
problem when we consider our obligations to future generations. Simplistically
since ethics, for the contractarian is all about self-interest he or she has no
obligations to future generations since he or she has nothing to gain from them.
There is no point in making a mutual agreement with entities that have no bearing
on our self-interest.
Overall, we can see that contractarianism is strongly in conflict with many of our
common intuitions about ethics. This is most clearly seen in the fool objection. We
believe that the moral thing to do is different from the self-interested thing to do.
And many believe that we have moral obligations to beings that we don’t benefit by
treating with moral concern, like animals.
Chapter 3
Contractualism
Contractualism vs. Contractarianism
Contractualism shares a set of features with contractarianism, which often leads
them both to be classified as different types of social contract theories, which they
are. The similarity lies in the similarity between the normative ethical principle of
both theories, which is something along the lines of “an action right if and only if it
wood be agreed to by all parties.” However this similarity masks some very
important differences. Although in both theories a certain set of rules that all parties
agree to, or would agree to, that determines what actions are right or wrong the
theories use different definitions of reason which leads to significant differences in
what types of actions are consider right and wrong. In contractarianism reason is
nothing more than self-interest, whereas in contractualism reason takes on a moral
role dictating not merely what is in our self-interest but what we ought to do even if
it conflicts with our self interest. So, in contractualism the problematic connection
between self-interest/reason and morality is severed and according to
contractualist ethical theory it will often be the case that reason/morality prescribes
actions that are against one’s self-interest. Notice that contractualism employs a
similar conception of reason as utilitarianism does in that both theories consider
that the rational action is the one taken with reference to a universal or objective
conception of reason.
In contractarianism the rules of morality arise as a matter of fact based on
groups of self-interested individuals pursuing their self-interest. Groups of human
beings agree to follow certain rules as long as other members of the group are
following them out of self-interest. And the rules of morality are determined by
what these self-interested individuals would in fact agree to, and anything they
would not agree to is not a legitimate moral principle. But in contractualism the
rules of morality arise by an idealized mutual agreement wherein all the members
of the moral community agree to principles that benefit everyone. So, in
contractualism the driving force is not self-interest but respect for the other
members of the contract. In contractualism you have a group of self-interested
individuals trying to get the most by negotiating a set of rules that others will agree
to but will never the less benefit them the most, whereas in contractualism you have
a group of individuals deliberating about what set of rules is fair and respects the
needs of all the members of the group.
This difference is largely a result of a different definition of equality. Hobbes
claimed that all were equal, in the state of nature, in that “even the weakest has
strength to kill the strongest” and then from there once a commonwealth is
established we can then say that all members are equal in that they all have the
same rights. But in contractualism a much more robust sense of equality is built into
the initial terms of the contract. Right from the beginning of deliberation all
members deserve equal consideration and respect with regard to the principles the
contractors will choose. All members of the moral community are equal in that they
are all equally “the subject of a life”, to borrow a phrase from Tom Regan, and
deserve equal consideration and respect.
This much more traditional and robust sense of equality is due to the
different definition of reason that contractualism uses. According to
contractarianism reason commands us to pursue our self-interest and nothing more.
But according to contractualism reason commands us to acknowledge that our ends,
desires, and happiness are no more important than anyone else’s. Reason is an
objective and impartial voice that views us as merely one member of a group. These
key differences are illustrated in the following chart:
Contractarianism
Contractualism
Reason
Self-interest:
Other-interest: reason commands us to curtail our
reason commands pursuit of self-interest when it conflicts with the
us only to pursue interest of others
self-interest
Equality
Equal Strength: the Equal Dignity: all members of the
weakest can kill the community are equally important
strongest
moral
Here is a nice summary from the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy’s entry
on contractualism:
Contractarianism has its roots in Hobbes, whose account is based on mutual
self-interest. Morality consists in those forms of cooperative behaviour that it
is mutually advantageous for self-interested agents to engage in. (The most
prominent modern exponent is David Gauthier. See Gauthier 1986.)
By contrast, any form of contractualism is grounded on the equal moral
status of persons. It interprets this moral status as based on their capacity for
rational autonomous agency. According to contractualism, morality consists
in what would result if we were to make binding agreements from a point of
view that respects our equal moral importance as rational autonomous
agents. Contractualism has its roots in Rousseau, rather than Hobbes: the
general will is what we would jointly will if we adopted the perspective of
free and equal citizens. Contractualism offers an alternative to
contractarianism. Under contractarianism, I seek to maximise my own
interests in a bargain with others. Under contractualism, I seek to pursue my
interests in a way that I can justify to others who have their own interests to
pursue.
As you might have recognized contractualism is much closer to our everyday moral
intuitions than either utilitarianism or contractarianism. In the basic contractualist
principles you might even recognize echoes of the golden rule.
Kantian Ethics and Contractualism
Kantian ethics is one tradition of ethical theory within the broader contractualist
tradition, although for much of the past several hundred years it has been the main
representative of contractualism. The above quote suggests Rousseau as the modern
day founder of contractualism, but one might also consider Locke as a contractualist
or proto-contractualist. We will primarily consider Kant as the main representative
of this tradition as he has certainly been the most influential contractualist, but we
will also consider John Rawls’ neo-Kantianism as a modern contractualist theory.
Side note: Kantian ethics is sometimes classified as a deontological, or duty based,
theory of ethics, which is usually contrasted with teleological theories of ethics, like
utilitarianism. Teleological theories proceed by defining the right action in terms of
some particular end (teleos) whereas deontological theory proceed in their ethical
reasoning by defining the right action in terms of a duty or set of duties (deon).
There are many ways in which the theories we are covering can be classified
however for our purposes we will think of Kantian ethics as a contractualist theory
of ethics. It is deontological but the duties are derived in a contractualist way which,
I believe, makes it more appropriate to classify it as a contractualist theory.
Here is a nice summary of Kantian Ethics by Allen Wood from his book
Kantian Ethics:
“Kant’s moral philosophy is grounded on several related values. Its primary
idea is that of the rational agent as a self-governing being. This is closely
related to the equal dignity of all rational beings as ends in themselves,
deserving of respect in all rational actions. These two values are combined in
the conception of an ideal community, or “realm of ends,” in which all the
ends of rational beings are to be combined in a single harmonious system as
an object of striving by all of them. These basic values, and their
philosophical grounding, are articulated in Kant’s two principle foundational
works in ethics: Groundwork for the metaphysics of Morals (1785) and the
Analytic of the Critique of Practical Reason (1788).” (Wood, 129)
The Categorical Imperatives
“Imperative” means command and “categorical” means that the commands of
morality are absolute commands, which allow no exceptions regardless of one’s
personal desires on the matter i.e. you may not want to do the right thing but you
have to. The categorical imperatives are Kant’s way of describing the fundamental
command of morality. Kant identifies three versions of the categorical imperative,
which he claims are equivalent. We will consider the second and third versions of
the categorical imperatives.
The Formula of Humanity
Formula of Humanity – Act in such a way that you treat humanity, whether in
your own person or in the person of any other, always at the same time as an
end and never merely as a means to an end.
This second version of the categorical imperative is the most intuitive and easiest to
use. It has also made its way into pop culture through sayings like “Love people and
use things, don’t use people and love things.” You might have heard something like
“She’s just using him” or “He used her.” With this version of the categorical
imperative the contractualist elements of Kant’s theory are becoming more explicit.
The contractualism is implicit in the FUL because our breaking the rule is only
meaningful in the context of everyone else following the rule. In this formulation
Kant introduces the idea of “humanity” and the idea that entities that posses
humanity are “ends in themselves.” He says:
Now I say that the human being and in general every rational being exists as
an end in itself, not merely as a means to be used by this or that will at its
discretion; instead he must in all his actions, whether directed to himself or
also to other rational beings, always be regarded at the same time as an end. .
.
By “humanity” Kant is referring to rationality. “Rational dignity” is another phrase
that Kant sometimes uses. By “dignity” Kant refers to a special value that is
independent of any “market value” something or someone posses. One person might
be a billionaire and another homeless and penniless but both have equal dignity or
equal moral worth. Kant says:
. . . everything has either a price or a dignity. What has a price can be replaced
by something else as its equivalent; what on the other hand is raised above
all price and therefore admits of no equivalent has a dignity. What is related
to general human inclinations and needs has a market price; that which . . .
but that which constitutes the condition under which alone something can be
an end in itself has not merely a relative worth, that is, a price, but inner
worth, that is, dignity.
Here is the crucial paragraph where Kant offers the argument for the principle:
The foundation of this principle is: rational nature exists as an end in itself.
Man necessarily conceives his own existence as being so: so far then this is a
subjective principle of human actions. But every other rational being regards
its existence similarly, just on the same rational principle that holds for me:
so that it is at the same time an objective principle . . . Accordingly the
practical imperative will be as follows: So act as to treat humanity, whether in
thine own person or in that of any other, in every case as an end withal, never
as a means only . . .
Kant’s argument for the formula of humanity something along the following lines:
1. From a subjective point of view I consider myself as an “end in itself.”
2. Every other person’s subjective view they consider themselves as an “end
in itself.”
3. From an objective point of view, or the perspective of reason, every
persons is an “ends in itself.”
4. So, as a rational agent capable of taking the objective point of view I ought
to treat all persons as ends in themselves.
In the next formulation Kant further develops the idea of rational beings as
ends in themselves.
The Formula of Realm of Ends
Formula of Realm of Ends – “act in accordance with the maxims of a
universally legislative member of a merely possible realm of ends”
(Groundwork 4:439)
What is a realm of ends? A realm of ends is a “union of different rational beings in a
system by common laws.” Kant describes the realm of ends as “merely possible” to
indicate that this is not an actual state or group that we are part of but rather it is a
way of thinking about oneself in relation to others. It is not a physical place but a
way of thinking. The realm of ends is a way of talking about all the ends of all the
members of the realm of ends, how they are all connected, and how to best respect
the various ends of all the members of the realm of ends. Here are some helpful
quotes from Allen Wood on what Kant is getting at in his Formula of Realm of Ends:
The realm of ends is not a state of affairs but a system of purposive activity
shared by different rational beings who stand in social relationships to one
another – they respect one another as ends in themselves and choose to live
according to a common set of objective moral laws expressing this mutual
respect. This is why they choose to share a common set of ends that brings
the happiness of each into harmony with the happiness of all others, and why
each one chooses to limit the pursuit of her own happiness in such a way that
it can belong to such a shared, purposive system.” (Wood, 266)
“The realm of ends is a way of representing maxims to which each member is
bound in belonging to the end.” (Wood, 267)
“Kantian ethics differs from ethical theories whose style of practical
reasoning is oriented to producing the best states of affairs by making the
primary thing the relationships between rational beings, and the terms on
which rational beings relate to one another. The basic thing is that rational
beings should follow a common set of laws or principles expressing their
self-respect and their respect for one another as ends in themselves and the
idea that they are legislators in a common of the laws to which they are
subject.”(Wood, 268)
“Our task is to respect the rights of persons (and the right more generally)
and to set as ends those instances of goods falling under the rubrics of our
own perfection and the happiness of other toward which we are capable of
making a meaningful contribution with our limited powers in our limited life.
The larger practical context for our action is not the highest good (regarded
as “the greatest good overall”) but the realm of ends. That is to say, it is not
an encompassing consequence to be brought about but a web of
relationships between rational beings in which all their particular ends can
be shared and all are respected as ends in themselves.” (268-9)
In the final formulation, the fundamental moral command is to act in such a way that
we respect all other rational agents as ends in themselves. What this formulation
adds, compared to the formula of humanity, is that some actions may not look like
they use anyone as a means to some end of yours but nevertheless an action may
ultimately affect how others are able to pursue their ends. So, to act morally is to act
as a conscientious and considerate member of an ideal community and to curtail the
pursuit of ones own ends when they conflict with laws that all members would
agree to follow.
John Rawls’ Neo-Kantianism
John Rawl’s very influential work A theory of Justice is a self-described neoKantian approach to ethics. Rawls is primarily concerned with what rules the
members of a fair society would chose to live by and how to best determine what
those rules would be. He describes his conception of justice as “justice as fairness.”
And for Rawls, like Kant if you remember his realm of ends formula, a fair society is
one in which we all agree to follow principles that we would all unanimously agree
to in founding a society into which we would then participate. And, how do we
determine what these rules are going to be? For the rules to be fair, according to
Rawls, we need to decide what they are going to be in way that is totally unbiased.
Rawls essentially takes Kant’s basic idea of a realm of ends and attempts to give a
precise formulation of how to determine which rules would actually be adopted by
the members of a realm of ends. The way he suggests we do this is by making use of
a theoretical device the calls “the original position.” We will learn more about the
details of Rawls’ theory in the section of distributive justice.
Tom Reagan’s Modified Kantian Ethics
One objection that can be raised about Kantian ethics is that gives a very special
privilege to rational beings without offering an adequate account of our moral
obligations to non-rational beings. For Kant it is rational beings that posses dignity
and humanity, which they posses only in virtue of their status as rational agents.
Kant argued that we ought not to mistreat animals, especially service animals like
dogs and cats because that would be ungrateful and would cause one to develop bad
more character due to such in gratitude however he didn’t really think we had
obligations to animals in any direct way. I believe this is problematic for Kantian
ethics but there is nothing inherent to the theory that requires us to only grant
dignity to rational agents. Tom Regan, whom we will read later, develops a Kantian
style approach to ethics that requires one to treat any being that is the “subject of a
life” with absolute respect, which includes many animals.
Chapter 4
Conclusion
In this last chapter I would like to summarize our discussion of the three different
theories that we have covered including the main arguments in favor and against
each theory and how to best relate the theories to each other. In the preceding
chapters I have suggested Kantian or contractualist approach to ethics to be the best
approach to ethics and I will summarize my arguments for this approach here again.
There are several ways to think about the relationships between the theories
we have discussed I believe the following to be the best:
Ethics
Prudential
Reasoning
Theories
Contractarianism
Universal
Reasoning
Theories
Utilitarianism
Contractualism
The above chart divides ethical theories into theories that rely on a prudential
conception of reason and theories that rely on a universal conception of reason. By
prudential conception of reason it is of course meant that such theories argue that
moral obligations are founded in self-interest. So, the reason to be moral is that
being moral is in one’s self-interest. Theories that employ a universal conception of
reasoning take it that we ought to act in a more objective way, we ought to base our
actions not on what benefits us individually but to act in such a way that we
promote the general good. With that basic classification of the theories let’s quickly
reconsider them.
Contractarianism
Contractarianism is ultimately untenable as an ethical theory as it is conflict with
our most basic assumptions about ethics. This might have been obvious from the
start in that ethics just clearly doesn’t seem like it is about self-interest, but rather
about doing the right thing even when it is against our self-interest. However, we
shouldn’t let initial uneasiness or disbelief dissuade us from further philosophical
investigation. However upon further inspection we find that the fool objection is
problematic for the theory. The fool objection seems to show that it is sometimes
moral to do things like murder and rape that we generally consider immoral. Our
considered judgments on these issues are simply that such things are never morally
permissible, which means that the theory fails square with our basic intuitions. Here
is an argument that shows this more formally:
1) The correct moral theory will never require us to commit murder.
2) Contractarianism sometimes requires us to commit murder.
3) So, contractarianism is not the correct moral theory.
And this leaves us with the following two theories to consider.
Universal
Reasoning
Theories
Utilitarianism
Contractualism
Utilitarianism
The problem with utilitarianism is that it seems very counterintuitive in its own
peculiar ways. We considered a number of objections but ultimately settled on one
was decisive, the injustice objection. Utilitarianism seems to require one to violate
the rights of others to maximize utility. Let us call this violation of the rights of
others injustice. One of the examples we considered was the organ harvesting
doctor who abducts homeless people in order to save the lives of persons whose
lives have more utility. The doctor seems to be acting in a way that maximizes utility
yet nevertheless his actions seem terribly misguided. Here is the formulation of the
injustice argument that we used earlier:
1) The correct moral theory will never require us to commit injustice.
2) Utilitarianism sometimes requires us to commit injustice.
3) So, utilitarianism is not the correct moral theory.
To see where exactly the argument goes wrong let’s consider Sidgwick’s argument
once again. Here is the argument:
1) It is rational to seek to maximize happiness generally rather than merely
seek to maximize my own happiness because reason is impartial and values
each person’s happiness as much as anyone else’s happiness. (Premise)
2) If X has the capacity for rational thought then X ought to act rationally. (If P
then Q.)
3) If X has the capacity for rational thought then X ought to act to maximize
happiness. (If P then Q.) (This is just a slightly modified form of the previous
conditional, which substitutes a specific instance of rationality rather than
stating a more general principle of rationality.)
4) I have the capacity for rational thought. (P.)
5) So, I ought to seek to maximize overall utility rather than merely seek to
maximize my own utility. (Q.)(This follows from (3) and (4) by modus
ponens.)
The problem here is in the maximization principle that is built into the first premise
of the argument. Let’s consider a modified version of (1):
1*) It is rational to seek to pursue happiness generally rather than merely
seek to pursue my own happiness because reason is impartial and values
each person’s happiness as much as anyone else’s happiness.
And with the modified premise we get the following conclusion:
5*) So, I ought to seek to promote overall utility rather than merely seeking
to promote my own utility.
The key is that the utilitarian maximization principle doesn’t follow from Sidgwick’s
basic insight that from the perspective of reason one’s own happiness is not any
more valuable than any other person’s happiness. Why is this? The best I can do is to
give you a very Kantian answer. It does not follow from the basic insight that are
happiness is not more important than the happiness of others that we have an
obligation to try to maximize happiness because it is not our job. Our job is to try to
be a good person, promote the happiness and well-being of others, be kind, fight
against injustice, etc. This is because we have no idea what we should actually do to
maximize happiness. How would you go about maximizing happiness for all beings
from now until the end of time? The best we can do is follow rules that respect other
agents, rules that all have agreed to and rules that if followed by all will promote the
general good. Who is to say that stealing organs or anything else that causes some
immediate harm will actually maximize happiness? So our main obligations are to
refrain from harming others to promote the happiness of others, but not to
maximize utility.
Contractualism
Contractualism, or Kantian ethics, is the theory that best captures our considered
judgments on a wide range of ethical issues, and it does not have the decisive
objections against it that contractarianism and utilitarianism have. Kant’s argument
for his categorical imperative doesn’t have the problem that utilitarianism has with
the maximization principle. Rather than starting from the premise that from the
perspective of reason one’s happiness is not more important than anyone else’s
happiness Kant starts from the premise that from the perspective of reason we
ought to treat others as ends in themselves because we treat ourselves as an end in
itself. Kant wouldn’t deny that we ought to promote the happiness of others, in fact
he considers that one of our main ethical duties, however he considers our first and
primary duty to be to respect others as ends in themselves. So, utilitarianism gets it
backwards you might say. It prioritizes the wrong principle. Once you prioritize
respecting others as ends in themselves then you can promote happiness without
worrying that you might cause some injustice. The utilitarian principle and the
Kantian principle are both principles of reason but the Kantian principle is prior to
the other. And when understood in this way we avoid the problematic judgments
that utilitarianism might lead one to make. Essentially there is nothing problematic,
meaning nothing that conflicts with our basic intuitions about ethics, in this theory.
And not only is the theory not in conflict with our intuitions but it helps us to clarify
our intuitions and be able to apply them to various cases in which we may be
uncertain of how to determine what the ethical choice is.
Conclusion
All we ultimately have when doing ethics is our intuitions. And it may be that our
intuitions are completely mistaken. What philosophy can help us do is clarify our
intuitions and make them consistent by rational reflecting upon them. And in doing
so we can come to hold more consistent beliefs about various ethical issues and
develop theories which help to provide us answers to new ethical questions. In the
end we are left with our intuitions and we are left with reason and we must do the
best we can to formulate answer based on our intuitions and reason. What I have
argued here is that Kantian ethics the best approach to ethics, meaning that it is the
approach that best represents our ethical intuitions and allows us the best way to
conceptualize how we approach new ethical questions.