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«The built-in destabilizer of the International Monetary System - or the Triffin Dilemma – is at the origin of the global crisis. The SDR could fix it» or “How to create a more symmetrical system that provides a better control of international liquidities » Christian Ghymers Robert Triffin International - UCL U de Namur - Session 29 April 2016 Overview 1) The right question: the global crisis and the IMS 2) What is International Monetary System (IMS) ? - The failure of the “floating dollar-standard” as a system and the impact upon demand-for-money - The move to a managed float under $ standard - The “Bretton Woods 2 & 3”: the Greenspan’s monetary bubbles leading to financial crisis 3) The Triffin’s IMS = “International Monetary Scandal” and the need for deeper reforms 4) The “Bretton Woods-1” system, the Triffin’s dilemma and is persistence (asymmetries) 5) What to do for solving the asymmetry chain? The first best 6) What is feasible right now? 1. The global crisis and the IMS RTI is raising an embarrassing question: what kind of IMS reforms could help to get out of the present crisis? RTI tries to contribute to progress in the IMS reform with Triffin’s main idea: to create an IMS based upon a multilateral reserve currency Right moment for focusing again upon the main IMS caveats: status quo unsustainable, rising risks with the persistence of the imbalances, international rebalance of macrofinancial power, currency-war prospects, overindebtedness, inefficiency of monetary policies ... The coming deepening in the global crisis opens a window of opportunities for deeper reforms on the systemic features The G-20 under Chinese Presidency in 2016… 1. The global crisis and the IMS In particular, the hypothesis of a causal link between the asymmetry in the present IMS based upon the US $ as the main reserve currency and the global crisis deserves more attention. The presented thesis: the inability of IMS to provide adequate degree of global liquidities => global creditboom => global crisis => need for radical monetary reform for ensuring a symmetrical IMS This thesis is not new: Robert Triffin developed it untiringly as soon as the 1950s, inclusive in the US (White House), IMF (creation of the SDR and Art. VII), and other international tribunes I draw intensively upon Triffin’s analysis and spirit for creating a global “win-win game” through the IMS 2. What is an International Monetary System ? “System” means an agreed and structured way for organizing international payments (“n” currencies). = Public good for ensuring the main “coordinating” functions: 1) providing adequate liquidity for fluctuating levels of trade (i.e. preventing international waves of excess or scarcity of international currency) 2) providing means or tools for correcting global imbalances without net contraction in global demand and preventing conflicting practices (unfair protections damaging trade and capital movements); 3) Issuing a set of coherent rules, tools, institutions for warranting a minimum of coordination for preserving the public good of stable monetary and economic conditions 2.1. IMS main role is solving the “n-1” issue n currencies = n-1 “degrees of freedom” = n-1 exchange rates = n-1 current-account balances = n-1 domestic policies Indeed: when the US spends more than it earns, the Rest of the World becomes automatically a net saver making loans to the US economy, alternatively when China wants to save more than it invests, the Rest of the World becomes automatic debtor of China: (Y A) i 0 (Y A)ni 0 In fact the same is true in a single economy between n individual agents: if one spends less, held monetary balances rise => less liquidity for the rest which has to borrow it This is why the Central Bank emerged as an additional agent (n+1) charged to “validate” (without creating inflation) the net result of n choices with respect to liquidity by issuing or destroying passively its own liquid debt used by n = the lender of last resort i.e. no net debt for the Central Bank contrary to a private one issuing the national currency 2.2. … but most economists seem to reject for IMS what they accept at national level… Economists do fully agreed at national level upon the need for a Central Bank above all the others banks But not at world level in spite of facing the same n-1 issue and the same need for a systemic “external” n+1 agent = denying to tackle the basic issue of the mechanical spillover of any national macroeconomic development => opposite changes in the Rest of the World “n” economies = n-1 “degree of freedom” => need to find some institutionalized consensus and a nominal anchor. This is the role of any IMS: for example, the Gold standard created an “external” n+1 currency (Gold) for establishing “n” degrees of freedom in relative prices (exchange rates), Bretton Woods 1 pretended to solve this thanks to IMF monitoring, but with n currencies, the $ was supposed to abandon any domestic objective => inevitable failure by its inner logics 2.3 …and opted for floating as an automatic pilot after the failure of Bretton Woods 1 • The need for international currency is the same as for national money: there is a demand for a liquid asset universally accepted for payments (easier to chose an external one to the parties: a 3rd one + network externalities = tends to a single standard) • Getting liquidity is conflicting: not all agents could get more if no one accepts to issue more liquid debts (not all able) • This is valid for individual agent as well as any individual economy: there is a th need either for a n passive economy or for a n+1 currency in order to clear net conflicting decisions • => need for regulating international liquidity in the same way as for any domestic liquidity • Monetarist response (M. Friedman): floating rates => impede external spillovers => makes each Central Bank to control effectively its domestic liquidity => world liquidity under control => both external and internal stability • Facts show the contrary: floating fails to internalize national policies 2.4 The (strong) implicit conditions for a floating regime becoming an IMS 1.Pure floating across all the n currencies => total segmentation between the “n” money supplies, “any policy mistake would remain domestic” 2. Stable demand for domestic money (no impact of currency fluctuations) and no demand for international reserves (float makes unnecessary key-currency) for not creating links between currencies through their respective demands : this implies that big international portfolio adjustments (with wild move in R) would not affect any national demand for money! = to assume no financial globalization ! 3. Perfect symmetry among currencies (no key-currency, no “fear-forfloating” i.e. economies with similar weights and policy credibility) 4. No spillover effects from one economy to others (R supposes to internalize all), and no policy divergence or good policy coordination 5. Speculation would always be stabilizing (no herding, no self-validating speculation, no-chartist) A pure floating is an unrealistic doctrine (not for individual economies, but as a generalized “system”): markets cannot provide stability without institutions and rules, $ floating creates strong spillovers upon the world, floating looks coherent but relies upon unrealistic assumptions • 1) 2) 3) 4) 5) 6) 2.4. The floating experience failure as a System: doctrinal illusion “$ float” 1973-1985 showed existence of strong $ spillovers which explain world monetary waves: Supply-side monetary links subsisted since pure float impossible: exchange-rate interventions by non-US central banks ($ fluctuations => debt values => “fear-to-float”) => additional demand for $ reserves Demand-side links in the “domestic-demand-for-money” (Mc Kinnon): currency substitution => effects upon domestic demands for money = floating could not internalize but amplified $ spillovers and $ needs Global gross capital flows in $ => a single financial cycle (Shin, Rey) => Contrary to academic theory, the demand for international reserve increased with the floating regime (need to protect against uncertainty costs + need to prevent pro-cyclical changes in R => pro-cyclical national policies (globalization => too big K inflows => overvaluation => credit boom=> debts => financial crisis + exchange rate crisis) Feedback of $ international status upon US monetary policy through lower US long-term interest rates The international demand for money tends to be concentrated upon a single currency for operational reasons: monetary standard searches 2.5. The persistent asymmetry of the $ standard under floating regime • • • • • Under a “peg” => 2 different demands for money: domestic one, demand for $ liquid assets, CB stabilizes them by intervening Under floating currency competition/substitution => domestic and international demands are confused => uncertainty and demand for reserves as demand for money are unstable (R expectations) Mc Kinnon argument: when the $/€ was expected to depreciate, $ yields and € yields => changes in both demands for domestic moneys: for $ for € since interest rate moves make holders of $ liquid assets to ask for $ bonds (slowing upward adjustment of $ yields) and € holders to sell € bonds (slowing downward adjustment in € yields) => capital outflows from the $ to the € equivalent to shift in domestic demand for money So this money-demand-side link acts in a destabilizing way: effective liquidity in the US and effective liquidity in the € area => monetary management more difficult When the $ went up (1980-85), the restrictive US monetary stance was amplified in the rest of the world through the same destabilizing link 2.6. The pragmatic move to a managed float under a persistent $-standard regime • As academic theories proved to be wrong and as the dollar remained dominant (“dollar-standard” regime) but IMS still incoherent (rather a “non-system”) policy makers move to a complex architecture: • After the failure of the floating-rates leading the world to a deep recession in 1981-82, the US recognized in early 1985 the need for interventions and coordination: Reagan II (James Baker) organized the first attempt of a collegial monitoring of world liquidity and exchange rates through the G-5/7 and 3 successive ad-hoc agreements: the “Plaza” (February 1985) G-7 Tokyo Summit (1986) and “Le Louvre” (February 1987) • These 3 agreements (G-5/G-7) put in place a “multilateral surveillance” with indicators through only peer pressures among the main players (in fact for isolating the German Bundesbank, the only independent Central Bank on that time) • The IMS became so a “managed exchange-rate regime” with “soft-target-zones” (not binding) and (voluntary) policy mix coordination in a G-7 directory • PROGRESS; the link was now two-ways: external stability <=> internal stability at the same time for being mutually supportive (like in the EMS since 1979) 2.7. The Bretton Woods-2/3: the de facto floating-dollar standard remains asymmetric … • However, this new system failed too: the massive interventions for stabilizing the $ (Louvre) created a new international monetary wave in 1987 with a new world inflationary wave in 1989 (same link through money supplies as BW I), the Japanese financial/real estate bubble, and same pro-cyclical fiscal policies everywhere • Lack of nominal anchor and remaining dominance of the US monetary policy => preparing the next monetary wave, with Alan Greenspan piloting it in a strengthened “Keynesian way” (“cheap money”). • The $ remained indisputably the major key-currency and the only one providing all the features for being the international money. • The other reserves currencies (DM, FF, £, ¥, CHF) increased their financial shares but not the monetary one (insufficient scales on the interbank market) • The emergence of the € has been changing slowly the financial weight of the $ but not its monetary weight (in the monetary segment i.e. for very-short term exchange-rate markets) 2.8. …leading to the Asian crisis 1997 and to Bretton Woods-3 by developing huge demand for US $ liabilities by emerging countries. • The Asian crisis = result of US monetary expansion evacuated towards Asian financial markets • Since it affected both economies-without- sound-policies and economies-with-sound-fiscal and monetary policies => need for pilling-up reserves for preventing “sudden-stop” in capital flows and for self-protection against pro-cyclical waves • => demand for $ assets => maintaining a “BW” i.e. an amplification of money creation + exempting the “world’s banker” from any discipline (exorbitant privilege: external deficit financed with its own currency) • => back to Triffin Dilemma again: world growing demand for “safe” US T-Bills =>debt overhang => destroying trust in $ assets • + exorbitant privilege: US assets in foreign currencies but US debt in depreciating $ = net gain of $1 trillion 2002-2007 (R. Clarida) 3. The Triffin’s IMS or the “International Monetary Scandal” • The inner nature of the $-standard IMS explains that the US is pushed towards overconsumption financed by emerging (and poorer) economies. + recurrent credit-boom => boom-bust crisis • = paradox that the richest becomes the net savers benefitting from resource transfer from poorest economies • Current paradigms in economics impede to explain this paradox and the IMS defects • = IMS is at odds with the orthodox paradigm of rational expectations, efficient markets and optimizing agents (DSGE); academic research assumes credit/financial cycles away (ex. Modigliani-Miller theorem), there was a doctrinal obstruction for integrating credit cycles into macroeconomic frameworks and the need for an IMS 3. 2. The “International Monetary Scandal” is a time-bomb for the world economy • Triffin dilemma = the mechanism explaining that the US plays the role of the “consumer-of-last-resort”, useful for emerging economies, but implying a depreciation trend for the $ which is undermining its role • This “system” works as far as the emerging countries wins more from their undervaluation that what reserve accumulation costs them (lower yields + sterilization + transfer of real resources to the US) • Anyway, the system is flawed by a logical incoherence = time-bomb it is our common interest to stop it • But problem if US becomes a normal debtor, who would play the “deficit-economy –of-last-resort” ? Rational and orderly way = being cooperative => changing the IMS by creating a WCB and a n+1 new standard for preventing contractionary adjustments or “beggar-myneighbor” measures 3.3. The solution: a symmetric system with a neutral standard (SDR) and a regulated multilateral issuance • The present SDR is not adequate since it has nor market circulation neither market attractiveness • However easy to transform present SDR basket into a genuine global money: merely a multilateral decision (needs 85% of IMF votes) • IMF could issue SDRs and spur their use for international clearing while private sector would develop it in parallel (increasing scales) • The reason for private use is that the average would necessarily be better than the $ alone as key-currency • The reason for public use (reserve and standard unit) is to be symmetrical, sharing better the exchange-rate risk between debtors and creditors, and to provide a tool for managing world liquidities (= Keynes 1944/Triffin 1960) • Issuance of SDRs would allow for a counter-cyclical policy worldwide solving the deflationary bias of external adjustments and the inflationary bias of the $ standard 4. The Bretton Woods I (1944-1971/73) The Bretton Woods Conference July 1944 • John Maynard Keynes (Bancor = n+1th) a new currency issued by a World Central Bank for symmetrical adjustments, opposed to Harry White (Unitas = n+1th) a mere basket but without WCB (for obliging deficit economies adjust). US government refused a supranational currency, imposing the $ as the nth currency, offering to to play the role of anchoring the system with the $ convertibility in gold at $35 $ The main defect of national key-currency system: The Triffin Dilemma (1957, 1960) • Robert Triffin was the only one making clear since the beginning that the “BW-I” would collapse (soon or later) for deep incoherence (lack of a supranational currency making unsustainable a dual role for the $) • Triffin Dilemma expresses the incompatibility between a national currency and a key- international currency: impossibility for a national currency to ensure credible domestic stability and feeding the world with needed liquidities: meeting the global demand for reserves is done through a permanent increase in US liquid indebtedness => BoP deficit destroying credibility as a key-reserve. So meeting its international role leads to losing credibility that this role requires, meeting domestic role makes impossible the international one without endangering the domestic one and vice-versa Robert Triffin (1911-1993) in UCL, Louvain-La-Neuve, Belgium Triffin’s dilemma is still alive: universal value of the Triffin’s asymmetry • Triffin’dilemma was shaped initially for condemning the use of a national currency as the main international reserve instrument in a peg-system against the US $ • Majority of the profession believed that moving to a general floatingregime would eradicate the dilemma • But this was an academic illusion • Triffin alone continues to explain that the “$-regime” was based upon a “built-in destabiliser” for the world economy • The reason is a simple, basic principle: money is a pure liquid liability of the central bank “US-economy” the demand for foreign reserves in $ from the (n-1) non-$ economies => cheap, automatic capital inflows to the US economy => chain of asymmetries creating imbalances and w monetary waves Back to the core of the problem: Triffin dilemma is still acting as a “built-in destabilizer” • Triffin dilemma is independent of the exchange-rate regime: any general use of a national currency as the main international reserve instrument creates big asymmetries and spillovers • Majority of the profession still believes that moving to a general floating-regime would eradicate the dilemma • But this is an academic illusion: for 2 reasons: 1) demand for US $ reserves increased with floating (linking monetary bases and reinjecting capital into the US economy) 2) monetary spillovers do exist even in pure floating through banking system: endogenous response of leverage and pro-cyclicality of cross border credit flows (recent empirical proofs by Shin & Hélène Rey, 2013, 2015) • After Bretton Woods-1 (1973) Triffin continued to claim in the desert that floating was no solution as a “non-system” of the US $-regime based upon a “built-in destabilizer” for the world economy driven by academic illusions impeding rational issuance of global liquidities 1) Demand for $ reserves => chain of asymmetries =>“Triffin built-in destabilizer” • The inner nature of money as a liability makes asymmetric any system using one of the “n” national currencies even in a floating regime (by the very nature of a Foreign reserve = $ asset ) • This Triffin asymmetry encompasses several biases through 2 main mechanisms : 1) the softening of the external constraint for the US resulting from the “automatic loans” by the (n-1) others => global imbalances (de-saving => US becomes the “consumer/borrower of last resort”); 2) the US monetary stance generates automatic liquidity spillover: multiplication abroad, any excess of US monetary base is duplicated by n-1 when they re-inject it in US economy, (not in the FED since they buy US T-Bills and CD on the market) • => Triffin dilemma = not just the “exorbitant privilege” but also an exorbitant management of world liquidity, incoherent with a rational IMS, although able to produce positive growth effects but at raising imbalances and risk costs The Triffin “built-in destabilizer” • These 2 channels are inter-related, forming a vicious circle: • channel 1 : Demand for $ reserves => lower US interest-rate => less fiscal discipline => excess of absorption => global imbalances • channel 2 => less US jobs => FED must react and apply Keynesian stimulates => multiplication abroad => + demand for reserves for resisting $ depreciation & growing financial risks: FED feeds imbalances and the excess of saving by some emerging economies => + imbalances => + demand for US Keynesian policies => + liquidity creation (FED feeds the imbalances) => + demand for reserves => pyramid of asymmetries: in external constraint as far as growing demand of US $ assets, in policy stances: can sustain longer Keynesian impulses with current account deficits, in cost of financing fiscal/ external deficits, in exchange-rate risks (invoicing and borrowing in $ shift the burden to Foreigners), in yields and valuation effects: excess return on US assets over US liabilities = big resource transfer to the US 2) Additional monetary spillovers due to growing gross cross-border credits, leverages and spreads • Even without interventions and reserves accumulation the US monetary stance impacts other Central Banks policies: fear of appreciation tends to diffuse monetary expansion (following FED policies with interest rates or money supply) • Even without CB followers, monetary spillovers from the FED affect liquidity through pro-cyclical movement in bank flows, leverages and spreads as a result of the dramatic increase in the gross cross-border operations of banks combined to pre-eminent role that the US dollar plays in global banking: depreciation of the US $ increases leverage outside and vice-versa (Shin Hyun Song 2012, 2014) • Therefore domestic financial conditions are affected by the FED: “the US shape the global financial cycle via the endogenous response of leverage and the pro-cyclicality of cross border credit flows, cross‐border flows and leverage of global institutions transmit monetary conditions globally, even under floating exchange‐rate regimes” (H. Rey 2013) The Joke of the “world saving glut” • The so-called “world-saving-glut” (WSG, Bernanke/Greenspan) is merely a “banking glut” when the US $ spillovers are considered • WSG is wrongly presented as an exogenous shift in Asian saving which lowers US long-term interest rates on which the FED would have no control, this relies upon academic assumptions of a perfect symmetry among currencies !! • Recognizing the existence of strong spillovers due to the asymmetries of the US $ as main international currency makes easy the explanation: the FED policies affect both other Central Banks and the global financial market conditions (especially in emerging economies) through asymmetry in Banking flows and leverage, creating an "international credit channel" that propagates the global financial cycle (as shown by the BIS, Shin, Rey and others) even more with pure floating • There is a positive feedback loop between loose monetary policy, fall in the volatility, rise in credit, capital flows and leverage, exchange rate movements and further fall in volatility (H. Rey, 2013) 5. What to do for solving the asymmetry chain? The final solution… • Principle very simple: updating of Keynes/Triffin plans • Let’s do worldwide what was done at national level = to create a n+1 liquid asset as the debt of a Multilateral Central Bank (MCB) issued against “n” domestic earning assets, and using it as reserve for official settlements • Concretely swapping a % of the domestic component of each national monetary base against this international currency, and imposing conventionally it for Central Bank settlements • Naming it “Multilateral Drawing Rights” MDR, as it corresponds to a closed basket made up with fixed amount of each participating currency The issuance mechanisms • Two kinds: 1) central banks swap a part of their domestic assets against the MDR which replaces the domestic assets in the counterpart of their monetary base at the same market value = no monetary creation: the world monetary base remains constant, the debit and credit are equivalent = no un-hedged position for the MCB • 2) MCB is allowed for issuing its own liability by accepting (limited and regulated) overdrafts in the national central bank accounts as a % of their deposits = pure monetary creation (increase the assets and liability sides of MCB) • The MCB overdraft facility is strictly regulated: not just as a % of the quotas but has to be voted, and is submitted to The issuance mechanisms • …assessment of the adjustments: for example, when inflationary pressures, the overdraft is cut for shifting the burden to the deficit economies, the reverse when facing negative output gaps. • => managed adjustment burden for reducing its impact on growth and job (basic idea from Keynes and Triffin) • On top of this room for multilateral technical management the MDR allows for a purely symmetric IMS, getting rid of the exorbitant privilege without any risk for world activity level • This symmetry comes from the neutrality of the issuance of the n+1 MDR with respect to the key-currencies: MDR is not anymore a debt of an economy but of the world The inner symmetry of the MDR • This symmetry comes from the rational neutrality of the issuance of the n+1 MDR with respect to the keycurrencies: each economy faces eventually the same degree of scarcity of the international liquidity (after the temporary flexibility of the multilateral overdraft facility) • This requires an additional condition: to regulate sterilized interventions for preventing to resist durably to the symmetric movement in monetary bases of deficit/surplus economies • Ex: CB of China substitutes (stable) MDR for (unstable) US $ T-bills; it sells T-bills on the market, shifts the $ from its US bank to its account at the FED (US monetary base is cut), The inner symmetry of the MDR • The MDR amount is taken from the FED deposit (or the FED overdraft) and increases the MDR deposit of the CB of China: no increase in global monetary base (as far as no sterilization in the US by increasing domestic assets of the FED), the US faces a debt in MDR and China accumulates MDR but increase its own monetary base = perfect symmetry easing the adjustment • Of course this is the perfect world to reach at the end of the reform, but these principles are applicable by steps and with progressive concentric circles • Concretely through strengthening the SDR The reasons for hope: world is changing fast and institutions do exist • Attractive win-win game when the risks are too high for all the stakeholders (US and China are in the same boat) • In 1944, Keynes fails because he advocated as the major debtor facing the major creditor (=> US reluctance) • Now, the US are the major debtor too big too fail but obliged to find a way-out facing the major creditor obliged to share responsibility for continuing to sell abroad • All the institutional devices needed for creating the MCB and the MDR are already there: IMF, SDR, Board, Art.. VII, • The precedent of the move from the ECU (SDR) to the € (MDR) helps and opens the way of progressive steps: transforming the SDR in an attractive asset, used as a parallel currency: the ELEC/LECE made a proposal in 1978 6. What is feasible right now? • IMS deficiencies expose the global economy to accumulating risks; in particular over-concentration of the official reserves on the dollar leads inevitably to the need for a diversification of reserve currencies; the potential massive currency substitution expose to the growing risks of destabilizing reserve composition arbitrages, of currency wars and of erratic fluctuations in global liquidity • It is therefore getting urgent to strengthen international cooperation for building a consensual path on how to move out of the present status quo • The IMF should be at the very centre of this enhanced cooperation and the key tool to move ahead should be the SDR, which is not a national liability and is managed collegially at the multilateral level What is feasible now? • Operationally, an IMF Substitution Account is the first necessary step as it provides an appropriate instrument to convert into SDRs reserve currencies (mainly dollars) in excess, making possible a consensual reserve composition shift without exposing the world economy to risky tensions in foreign exchange markets. Its working principles are simple and its creation does not require any change in the IMF statute. It allows for a shift away from the dollar as reserve-currency while maintaining the network externalities necessary for ensuring no breakdown in its role as a day-to-day transaction-currency • However, this necessary condition is far from being sufficient. Indeed, for the shift in reserve composition to be significant, some parallel actions are required: providing legal certainty, increasing rapidly depth, liquidity and volume of the SDR market, supporting the creation of the required market infrastructures for developing a private SDR market, in particular an interbank clearing arrangement. What is feasible now? • For the private SDR market to develop, a strong signal is needed from the official side and first of all from the IMF , which should multiply operations in SDRs. Second the World Bank and the other multilateral development banks, including the newly created ones, should lead the way in issuing SDR denominated liabilities and in promoting SDR denominated loans. National Treasuries and private borrowers will start issuing SDR denominated debt once the transaction costs will be competitive. All these actions are feasible in the present state of the IMF Statute. • The existence of a liquid private SDR market will allow Central banks to hold reserves in private SDR and to use them for exchange market interventions. • The next step consists in adapting the IMF Articles of Agreement for making a direct link between the private and the official SDR and making more attractive the interest rates paid on SDR assets. • Annex • Details about the main steps in IMS evolution • Way of a solution • Facts with charts Schéma analytique: solution du DTM. Bilan de la Banque Centrale Mondiale ACTIF A1 + A2 =total des avoirs de la BCM sur “n” pays: PASSIF (dettes) = Base Monétaire Mondiale P1+P2 = total des engagements liquides A1. “Bonds” nationaux (n pays) libellés en “n” monnaies nationales P1. Dépôts des « n » banques centrales en DTM en contrepartie des « n » bonds nationaux cédés à la BCM (la contrevaleur change tous les (valorisées au cours du marché contre le panier global du DTM) + A2. Prêts en DTM aux BC nationales des pays en déficit (en fonction de la conjoncture mondiale après vote jours selon le cours de change: 2.1 actif = 2.1 Passif, donc pas de risque de change) +P2. Dépôts de réserve en DTM des BC nationales (contrepartie des prêts de la BCM) Commentaires au schéma analytique du DTM au Bilan de la Banque Centrale Mondiale A1 Par swap la BCM reçoit une fraction convenue (20%) des avoirs internes des « n » BC des P1 En contrepartie des 20% d’avoirs cédés par les BC, la BCM émet des DTM en faveur des BC qui les gardent auprès de la BCM et les pays participants et les enregistre utilisent exclusivement pour au cours du jour en DTM (panier) solder les paiements entre BC. En tous les jours: cas d’épuisement pour l’une, ce swap ne crée pas de nouvelles possibilité de prêt par la BCM (2) liquidités mondiales A1 = P1 à tout moment A2 La BCM a la faculté de créer des P2 Les DTM créés en contrepartie DTM en prêtant aux BC des pays sont inscrits aux comptes des BC: en déficits lorsque ceux-ci ne sont celles en déficit paient celles en pas en inflation et que les « n » surplus: les pays en déficit membres approuvent (majorité s’exposent à un risque de change qualifiée): il y a création nette de car leurs prêts sont en DTM mais liquidité mondiale et possibilité leurs DTM partent vers les pays d’agir sur la conjoncture mondiale en surplus (symétrie pour tous face à A2 =P2 à tout moment, le monde ne la rareté des DTM fixée par s’endette pas par définition, donc peut collégialement par la BCM)