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Utilitarianism
AN INTRODUCTION
H. Gene Blocker
H
ow can you tell if someone has “done the right thing” or not? And how
do you yourself decide what to do in various difficult situations? To
make such judgments, we human beings generally look to our society’s ethical theories for guidance. In the modern period (beginning with Descartes in
the 17th century), two main kinds of ethical theories have arisen—those
which judge the moral worth of an action by its consequences (consequentialist theories), and those which judge the worth of an action by the intentions of the person committing the action (nonsequentialist, or deontological
theories).
The most prominent consequentialist theory has been that of Utilitarianism, which was introduced in England in the early nineteenth century by
Jeremy Bentham, James Mill, and Mill’s son John Stuart Mill. Utilitarianism
says that the morality of an action should be judged by the nature of its
results. For example, suppose that a woman dies while trying to rescue three
children from a burning building; the children die as well. Utilitarianism
would say that the woman’s action was immoral, because it resulted in the
deaths of four people. The woman’s intention—to help others—would be
irrelevant. By contrast, nonconsequentialist theories would say that her
action was moral simply because she did what most universal codes of
“right” behavior would dictate—she tried to help others.
Consequentialist theories like Utilitarianism therefore define right in
terms of the degree to which an action promotes something good. Other
moral theories define good in terms of how much an action follows the dictates of morally right behavior, regardless of consequences. Thus, we may
say that consequentialist theories define “right” in terms of “good,” while
nonconsequentialist theories define “good” in terms of “right.”
UTILITARIANISM: AN INTRODUCTION HEDONISM OR ALTRUISM?
Although clearly there are profound differences between consequentialist
and nonconsequentialist moral theories, there is also much variation among
individual consequentialist theories. Specifically, they each offer different
viewpoints on what kind of good—protecting the environment, serving God,
etc.—our actions should try to achieve. Utilitarianism defines a “good” act
as one that generates human pleasure or happiness. According to Utilitarianism, an action is right if it promotes more human well-being than any other
action would. On its surface, Utilitarianism may thus seem hedonistic. However, by stressing the greatest pleasure for the greatest number, Utilitarianism also has an altruistic element.
Unlike many ethical systems that seem to have little practical relevance,
Utilitarianism exerted great influence on liberal social reforms in England
and the United States in the mid-nineteenth century. Jeremy Bentham’s
book, Principles of Morals and Legislation, became a guide for progressive
British legislators in the nineteenth-century reformist movement. It is easy to
see how reformers could use the “greatest happiness” principle to promote
social legislation that would benefit large numbers of people at the expense
of a privileged few. In a popular democracy, legislation is determined, indirectly, by the will of the majority. The “best” policies, therefore, are those
which benefit the majority.
Although different people want many different things in life, the Utilitarians believed that the only reason people wanted anything was that it
would bring them pleasure and happiness. Thus Utilitarianism’s popularity
has stemmed from two great strengths: it makes use of an obvious and universal principle, that people like pleasure and hate pain, and it seems to provide a useful “cost/benefit” decision-making tool for social legislators in
modern democracies.
CRITICS OF UTILITARIANISM
Like most moral (and indeed most philosophical) theories, Utilitarianism
faced many criticisms and manifested various changes in the attempt to
answer its critics. First, some observers complained that, by its emphasis on
the quantity of pleasure, Utilitarianism reduced human beings to the level of
animals. Specifically, because enjoying a good meal might be more pleasurable than reading a book of philosophy, Utilitarians would deem the dining
experience more “moral” than the book reading. John Stuart Mill sought to
answer this criticism by differentiating “quality” from sheer “quantity” of
UTILITARIANISM: AN INTRODUCTION pleasure. Thus he would have argued that reading a philosophy book might
be a “higher quality” pleasure than enjoying a good meal, and therefore better (though it would generate less quantity of pleasure than a good meal
would). As he put it, “Better to be Socrates dissatisfied than a pig satisfied.”
Another criticism pointed to the fact that Utilitarianism seemed to
endorse or at least allow a kind of expediency of the moment. For example,
Utilitarians would argue that if hanging an innocent person for a particular
crime actually discouraged crimes of that sort, then the hanging would be a
moral act. Worse, Utilitarians would believe that the enslavement of a people
would be moral if it produced a net increase in the overall pleasure of society
as a whole. To answer this accusation of expediency, Utilitarians sought to
distinguish “act utilitarianism” from “rule utilitarianism.” Act utilitarianism
judged actions by their immediate consequences—and so would be subject
to the charge of expediency. Rule utilitarianism judged the moral rule behind
an action, rather than the action itself, according to the “greatest happiness”
principle. It then judged the action by how much it conformed to the moral
rule. In this way, the Utilitarians hoped to make rule utilitarianism immune
to the expediency criticism.
A third criticism involved the question of how to measure pleasure.
From the outset, opponents of Utilitarianism doubted that pleasure could be
accurately quantified, especially given that the consequences of a single
action could unfold over many generations and influence thousands of people. To answer this objection, some contemporary Utilitarians have opted for
either a monetary “cost/benefit” analysis (i.e., how much money does a particular action cost versus how much income will it generate?) or a simple
“preference” test (of two actions, which do most people prefer?).
As you read the selections below, ask yourself whether pleasure is the
same as happiness. If not, how might they differ? Also, think about whether
pleasure is the only thing we desire for its own sake. Finally, how well do
you think Utilitarianism conforms to our moral intuitions?
SUGGESTED FURTHER READING
Baier, Kurt. The Moral Point of View. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1958.
Bailey, James W. Utilitarianism, Institutions, and Justice. Oxford: Oxford University
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Bentham, Jeremy. Deontology. Bowring, J. (Ed.). London and Edinburgh, 1843.
Berger, Fred. Happiness, Justice, and Freedom. Berkeley: University of California
Press, 1984.
UTILITARIANISM: AN INTRODUCTION Bonner, John. Economic Efficiency and Social Justice: The Development of Utilitarian Ideas in Economics from Bentham to Edgeworth. Brookfield, VT: E. Elgar
Publishers, 1995.
Brandt, Richard. Ethical theory. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1959.
Brandt, Richard. A Theory of the Right and the Good. Oxford: Oxford University
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Broad, C. D. Five Types of Ethical Theory. London: K. Paul, Trench and Trubner,
1930.
Donagan, Alan. The Theory of Morality. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1977.
Foot, Philippa. Virtues and Vices. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1978.
Frey, R. G. Utility and Rights. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1984.
Hare, R. M. The Language of Morals. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1952.
Hare, R. M. Freedom and Reason. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1963.
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Lyons, David. The Forms and Limits of Utilitarianism. Oxford: Clarendon Press,
1965.
Lyons, David. Rights, Welfare, and Mill’s Moral Theory. Oxford: Oxford University
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Melden, A. I. “Two Comments on Utilitarianism,” in Philosophical Review, vol. 60,
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UTILITARIANISM: AN INTRODUCTION Rashdall, Hastings. The Theory of Good and Evil. Oxford: Oxford University Press,
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Sen, Amartya and Bernard Williams (Eds.). Utilitarianism and Beyond. Cambridge:
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Slote, Michael A. Goods and Virtues. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1993
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Smart, J. J. C. “Extreme and Restricted Utilitarianism,” in Philosophical Quarterly,
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Smart, J. J. C. An Outline of a System of Utilitarian Ethics. Melbourne: Melbourne
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Smart, J. J. C., and Bernard Williams. Utilitarianism: For and Against. Cambridge:
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Stevenson, C. L. Ethics and Language. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1944.
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Toulmin, Stephen. The Place of Reason in Ethics. Cambridge: Cambridge University
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Urmson, J. O. (1953). “The Interpretation of the Philosophy of J. S. Mill,” in Philosophical Quarterly, vol. 3, 1953.
UTILITARIANISM: AN INTRODUCTION Urmson, J. O. “Saints and Heroes,” in A. I. Melden (Ed.), Essays in Moral Philosophy. Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1958.
Williams, Bernard. Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1985.