Download Michael Brudno

Michael Brudno
Hist 103A
5/10/1999
“Beware of the ruling powers! for they do not be-friend a person except for their own
needs: they seem like friends when it is to their advantage, but they do not stand by a man
when he is hard-pressed.” The Talmud
The era of the Civil Wars was a tumultuous one for the inhabitants of the Roman
Empire. For almost twenty years, from 49 to 31 BCE, there was continuous warfare. First
Caesar fought Pompey, then the second triumvirate faced off against Brutus and Cassius,
and finally Marc Anthony struggled against Octavian. Mixed in-between were such
“minor” affairs as the campaign against king Juba in Africa and the wars against Sextus
Pompey. These wars affected not only the residents of Rome and Italy, but also the
provinces and nominally independent countries, like Egypt and Judea, which lay in the
Roman sphere of influence. It is in the provinces and independent countries where most
of the fighting took place. The wars brought heavy taxation and conscription to Italy, the
provinces, and almost any other entity which had either soldiers or money which the
Romans could confiscate.
Judea during this time period was an independent entity, ruled by local officials.
At the beginning of the period it was ruled by the high priest Hycarnus. After a period of
Parthian control, who appointed Antigonus high priest, Herod was granted the throne by
the Romans. Although nominally independent throughout the period, it did not have the
man power to resist either Roman or Parthian encroachments upon its territory. It had no
choice but to blow with the prevailing wind. And when it was unclear which side Judea
should pick in an upcoming struggle, the choice was often made for her: only one or two
legions at her borders would usually prove a sufficiently convincing argument. As a result
Judea was often on the wrong end of the inter-Roman squabbles. [Need to expand more]
In 49 BCE Julius Caesar crossed the Rubicon and invaded Italy proper. This
signaled the beginning of the first stage of the Civil Wars. Shortly thereafter Pompey,
Caesar’s opponent, decided to flee Italy and set up his base in Greece instead. Following
him were Lucius Lentulus and Caius Marcellus, the two consuls, as well as many
senatores and equites. The fleet was almost entirely under Pompey’s command, and this
made it hard for Caesar to follow Pompey cross the Adriatic into Greece. Instead he left
for a campaign in Spain. This gave Pompey a year to raise forces and money throughout
the eastern provinces. According to Caesar, Pompey “extracted from Asia, from Syria,
from all the kings, dynasts, tetrarchs, and from the free communities of the Achaea the
large amount of money which he demanded, and had forced the tax companies of the
provinces which he himself held to pay him a vast sum.”i Although the bulk of Pompey’s
troops were Roman and Greek, Appian says that “almost all the nations that one meets in
making the circuit of the eastern sea sent aid to Pompey,” listing seventeen different
localities and ethnicities which contributed soldiers to the effortii. In January of 48 Caesar
crossed the Adriatic, and Marc Antony followed soon thereafter with reinforcements. The
campaign lasted until early August, when Caesar decisively defeated Pompey at the battle
of Pharsalus. The latter fled to Egypt, and Caesar followed in pursuit. Pompey was
murdered as soon as he landed in Egypt, while Caesar became embroiled in yet another
campaign, the Alexandrian War. At a crucial moment Mithridates of Pergamum arrived
with reinforcements, and Caesar won the campaign. At this point he sailed to Syria, and
then to Rome, ending the first round of the Civil Wars.
The travails of Judea during this period were probably not very different from
those of other countries in a similar situation. According to Josephus when Caesar
stopped in Rome after Pompey’s flight, he “freed Aristobulus from his bonds, and
resolved to send him into Syria, and delivered two legions to him.”iii Aristobulus was the
brother of Hycarnus the High Priest, whom Pompey had earlier brought to Rome and who
was the other main contender for the high priesthood. Consequently sending him into the
east in order to try to sieve dissent into provinces under Pompey’s control would have
been a reasonable action, and it is quite likely that Caesar would have done something
like this. It is very unlikely, however, that Caesar would have been willing to send troops
on such a dangerous expedition. The pro-consul in Syria was Scipio (whose actions in
that capacity will be discussed lower), a staunch member of the Pompeyan camp. He had
under his command the two Syrian legions as well as many auxiliaries, and he was in the
process of raising more troops. Attacking him with just two legions, no matter how
popular their leader, was an extremely risky undertaking. As the pro-consul in Gaul
Caesar had 8 legions under his command. This was not a large army, and Caesar would
have probably not risked losing a quarter of them on a mission with such a low
probability of success. In either case the troops never left Italy because, according to
Josephus, Aristobulus was poisoned by the Pompeyans. This action seems completely
logical from the Pompeyan point of view. Earlier Aristobulus had fled from Rome and
started a rebellion against the Romans in Syria. Josephus informs us that “Jews ran to
Aristobulus because of his former glory, as also because they should be glad of
innovation.”iv Usually Josephus is hesitant to write that Jews desired innovation, so the
fact that he puts it in makes the fact of the rebellion and its constituency certain. The
rebellion was put down after just one battle and Aristobulus was returned to Rome, but
the fact that he was able to raise eight thousand armed men in a very short time must have
been disconcerting to the Romans. This also happened at a time of quiet in the province,
before Crassus’ Parthian debacle. Currently the times were different. Caesar reports that
Scipio “demanded large amounts of money from the city-states and local rulers, likewise
exacted from the tax contractors of his province the payment owed for a two year period,
and made them advance as a loan the sum due for the following year, and required the
whole province to supply cavalry.”v Such harsh economic extractions would have
broadened the support any sort of revolt had. In order to reduce the chance of such, any
potential leaders of such a revolt were quickly killed: soon after the death of Aristobulus,
his son, Alexander, was beheaded in Antioch. He had led an earlier rebellion against the
Romans, but received a pardon. Josephus does not mention any new crime on his part. So
from the Roman point of view the execution could only be seen as a preventive measure.
All of these events provide us with a small glance at an aspect which Josephus
does not cover: the affairs in Judea between the start of the war in early 49 and the defeat
of Pompey in mid 48. It is almost completely certain that Hycarnus, the High Priest, and
his chief advisor Antipater had to follow a course supporting Pompey. Josephus does not
say anything about this. It is his wish to represent Antipater as a loyal supporter of Caesar
from the beginning to the end. Appian, however, in his list of 17 ethnicities which
contributed troops to Pompey lists the Jews. It is also highly unlikely that Judea would
have been able to resist Pompey’s forces. In fact there is some evidence of collaboration
between Antipater and Scipio. Whatever the consequences for the Romans, the murders
of Aristobulus and Alexander would not have upset anyone in Jerusalem: the two were
the principal contenders for the High Priesthood and their deaths made the position of
Hycarnus more secure. Another of Aristobulus’ children, Antigonus came before Caesar
at the end of the Alexandrian War and claimed that “it was by Antipater’s means that
Aristobulus was taken off by poison, and his brother beheaded by Scipio.” In his defense
Antipater does not address the accusation directly but rather says that both got what they
deserved, and that Scipio was justified in his actions. Considering that Scipio was at the
time of this event at war with Caesar, this was not the best defense. The reason that
Antipater chose it is, in all likelihood, that he could not deny the accusation itself, his
involvement in the deaths of Aristobulus and his son. This further raises the odds that the
two were killed as a favor to Antipater rather than because of any crime against the
Romans. This evidence, combined with Josephus’ silence on the issue and the statement
by Appian make it clear that up until the battle of Pharsalus Judea was firmly in the
Pompeyan camp.
When Antipater switched his support from Pompey to Caesar is not clear.
Josephus says that this occurred “after Pompey was dead, and after that victory Caesar
had gained over him.”vi Despite the strange phrasing (Pompey was killed after he lost the
battle) it is clear that the change in affiliation did not come until after the death, which in
turn came a month and a half after the battle of Pharsalus. There is more evidence to
move this event even later: The author of The Alexandrian War1 writes that Mithridates
1
The authorship of the book is unclear, but the author is almost certainly a contemporary of the events
the Pergamene “had been sent to Syria and Cilicia at the start of the Alexandrian war to
assemble reinforcements.”vii Josephus implies that he had already collected a sizable army
when Antipater arrived with three thousand troops: “ Mithridates of Pergamus was
bringing his auxiliaries, and was not able to continue his march through Pelusium, but
obliged to stay at Askelon, Antipater came to him conducting three thousand of the Jews,
armed men.”viii Thus the actual time when Antipater finally came to the aid of Caesar was
quite late in the campaign.
It may be surprising, in light of this, that Caesar rewarded the Judean rulers
generously at the end of the war. He dismisses all claims by Antigonus, the son of
Aristobulus to the High Priesthood, and reasserts Hycarnus in that position. He grants to
Antigonus Roman citizenship, as well as freedom from taxes. Finally he appoints
Antigonus “epitropos of Judea.” While this no more than affirmed Antigonus’ past
position as the chief minister of Hycarnus, it was a statement of support by Caesar, which
allowed Antipater to rely not only on the good will of Hycarnus, but also on Rome’s
authority. Josephus at this time presents also a very strange senatus consultum, which
indicates a league of friendship being formed between the Romans and the Jews. There
are several large inconsistencies in this piece. First and foremost it is dated in the ninth
year of Hycarnus. If the dating is to be believed then the treaty was approved by the
Senate many years before the war ever took place. Some scholars have tried to fix this by
ascribing the dating as a scribal error and claiming twenty nine was the year intended.
However several problems remain. It is doubtful that a senatus consultum would be dated
by the years of Hycarnus rather than by mentioning the consul. Finally the act completely
fails to mention Caesar, who was (according to Josephus) the prime mover behind the act
and certainly the most powerful man in Rome. The only conclusion that can be drawn is
that either the document is a fake or it is misplaced in its current position in the text.
Later in the book Josephus provides us with some decrees which do bear Caesar’s
name and could very well be authentic. Starting with XIV.190 he provides no less than 7
documents, all bearing the name of Caesar and granting various privileges to the Jews.
The first four of these are similar, dealing with the affirmation of the Hycarnus in his
post. The fifth one is of more interest. According to Caesar’s title, “imperator the second
time,”ix it is best dated to 47 BCE. He uses the same appellation in XIV.192, an act where
he also calls himself dictator the second time. In the act, Caesar sets a yearly tribute over
Judea, but exempts them from the tribute on the Sabbatical year. He also hands over
Joppa to Hycarnus, and makes the tribute from that city payable directly to Jerusalem,
while exempting the city from Roman tribute. He also makes it illegal for any Roman
governor or other official to raise auxiliaries in Judea or raise money for the upkeep of
troops. Finally he grants several honors on Hycarnus and to his ambassadors, including
the right to sit among the senators to observe gladiatorial fights, and the right to be
introduced to the Senate by either the dictator or master of the horse. All of this when
combined do not constitute “honors that the Romans paid to our nation,”x the heading
Josephus decides to give this section. Although the letter does provide some honors for
the rulers of the Judea, the most important, perhaps, being that all answers to their
petitions be returned in at most ten days, for the country of Judea this act, even if
enforced most strenuously, did almost nothing. At the same time Caesar took everything
that he wanted. While Judea would not be a source for Roman troops, this was not a big
loss. During the Alexandrian War Antipater, according to Josephus, who in turn sites
Strabo as his source, appeared to Caesar’s aid with only three thousand troops, about a
half a legion in size. Yet even this small number is doubtful. Caesar himself, in a decree
which Josephus puts down, says that Hyrcanus “came to our assistance in the last
Alexandrian war with fifteen hundred soldiers.” The second source seems more reliable
as it was initially written closer to the event. Losing these troops would not have worried
the most powerful man in Rome. At the same time the wars had been taking their toll on
the treasury, and Caesar needed money. The tribute which Caesar was instituted was not
completely new: After conquering Judea in 64, [CHECK!!!] Pompey made Jerusalem a
tributary. This was as punishment for the city for shutting its gates before him. In all
likelihood the tribute did not include all of Judea, but just the capitol. Hence the ruling
that “all the country of the Jews, excepting Joppa, do pay a tribute yearly for Jerusalem”xi
could be seen as a broadening of the old tribute to include a larger area. That is the
impression Thus the act as a whole provided exactly what Caesar needed, that is money,
while making some token concessions in areas which he did not consider important and
granting honors on the rulers of Judea, rather than the country, an activity which did not
cost him much. Caesar would not have been anxious to replace the rulers of Judea
because he understood that they basically had no choice but to go along with Pompey,
and he was willing to take actions which would fortify the positions of both Hycarnus
and Antipater, and contribute to the stability of the kingdom. When it was advantageous
to stir up rebellion in Judea he tried to send Aristobulus into it. But after the war he
wanted a return of stability, and Aristobulus’ son, Antigonus, could not get Caesar to
agree with the argument that the principality was due to him. Caesar followed a policy of
doing what was best for Rome now. Old allegiances and alignments did not concern him
much.
Before leaving Syria for Pontus, and eventually Italy, Caesar set up a distant
relation of his, Sextus Caesar, as governor of Syriaxii. Appian adds that a legion was left
under his control. Since Syria was a Roman province and because of its proximity to
Judea, the struggles which took place within were felt in Judea proper. The Roman
governor of Syria, although having no official power within Judea might nevertheless
become involved in local affairs. A good example of this is Crassus, who was the proconsul in Syria when he plundered the Temple.xiii Sextus Caesar assumed his office some
time in the summer of 47, and by the fall of 46 was already killed by his own troopsxiv.
The period when he was governor corresponded to the first appearance of Herod, the son
of Antipater, on the Judean scene. It also was a rare period of peace for the region, and it
presents an opportunity to look at the relationship of Romans toward Judea in a different
setting.
When Caesar left Syria and Antipater returned to Jerusalem endowed with many
honors from Caesar, “he made Phaesallus, his eldest son, governor of Jerualem, and of
the places that were about it, but commited Galilee to Herod, his next son, who was then
a very young man.”xv Herod showed himself well a a governor of Galilee, at least
according to Josephus. His main achievement was the slaughter of Hezekias, an archrobber who was plaguing the territory on the border of Galilee and Syria. The Syrians
were very happy about the event, with word eventually reaching all the way to Sextus
Caesar about the accomplishment. However this event was not greeted with as much
enthusiasm back in Jerusalem. Upon accusation of the mothers of those robbers whom he
had killed, he was ordered to stand trial before the sanhedrin. He arrived before it with an
armed guard, and also got a letter of support from Sextus Caesar. Nevertheless he foundn
himself likely to be convicted and fled from Jerusalem to Antioch. Once there, he was
appointed imperator of Celesyria by Sextus, and with his new troops crossed into Judea
The trial of Herod is a very interesting subject for study. The letter by Sextus
Caesar on Herod’s behalf is the first example that we see of the Romans interfering in
Judean affairs when there was no clear Roman interest. Before this a Roman governor
might plunder the province when in need of money, as Crassus did, or settle local
squabbles as to who should be the ruler, in the manner of Pompey in 64 and Julius
Caesar in 47 BCE. However the trial of a magistrate would be the type of local affair
which usually would have been below the notice of the Roman governor in Syria. The
reasons why Sextus Caesar became involved are complicated, and have a lot to do with
his personality, as well as with the Roman policy in the region.
Ostensibly, according to Josephus, Sextus wrote the letter because “he was in fear
for the young man, lest he should be taken by his enemies, and brought to punishment.”xvi
This affection for Herod must have developed because Herod slew Hezekias and his gang
of robbers. If Herod had done anything else to deserve the gratitude of Sextus then
Josephus overlooked this in his narrative. This generally would not be sufficient reason
for a Roman governor to intervene in the affairs of an independent entity, a crime for
which he could suffer harsh consequences. If Hezekias was proving to be a truly major
problem Sextus had in his posession a full legion with which he could have brought him
to justice. Sextus had a clear objective in Syria. Gaius Caesar wrote that his main
objection to Scipio leaving the province in 49 to join Pompey at Dyrrhacum is that
“[Scipio] turned his back on the Parthian enemy on his borders, ... though the province
was deeply anxious and afraid of a war with Parthia.”xvii The new governor would haveto
make sure that the borders are well defended and that the populace feels secure. Also,
since he was the first governor after two years of having no one in charge he had to
demonstrate that the Romans were back not only as defenders but also as rulers. The best
way to advance such a cause would be to bring troops to the different cities under his
command, so that the populace would see that they were being both protected and ruled at
the same time. With the relation to nearby states, Sextus could not just enter their borders
without cause. So he searched for other ways. Since Herod did stop Hezekias, who was
apparently robbing the parts of Syria which border on Galilee, Sextus could easily use his
case to make sure that the Judean ruler, Hyrcanus, remembers that
In order to assertain the true reason, it is important to look at the mettle of the man who
was writing the letter. The character of Sextus Caesar is hard to ascertain: Appian, the
only historian who speaks about this directly, describes him as “a young man ... given
over to dissipation and who led the legion around everywhere in an indecorous
manner.”xviii All of the other descriptions we have of Sextus are purely factual. Caesar
mentions that he sent Sextus to collect a legion that had surrendered to him in Spain in 48
BCE.xix Dio Cassius writes that because Sextus “was not only quaestor but also a relative
of Caesar’s, Caesar had placed in his charge all of the Roman interest in that quarter.”xx
The most striking thing about Sextus Caesar is his inexperience. In the past, Roman
governors of Syria had been pro-consuls: Gabinus, Crassus, and Scipio had already
served as consuls in Rome before their appointment, and had experience in both
government and war. Sextus Caesar, if we believe Dio, was only a quaestor, on the very
first step of the Roman cursus honorum. While serving in this capacity a person would
generally be a lieutenant, assisting a provincial governor, and not ruling on his own.
Sextus was also relatively inexperienced as a military commander: he was given a legion
during the Spanish campaign, only a year before being appointed governor, and most
likely he did not have one in his command previously, since the commanders of these
were usually senatores, and Sextus would only have become one once he finished his
term as quaestor. The province of Syria was not an easy one to rule: it bordered not only
Judea, which could at worst be a minor annoyance, but also Parthia. The demise of
Crassus and his legions in a battle against th Parthians, only 10 years earlier, was by no
means forgotten. The fact that Julius Caesar appointed Sextus to this important post
shows that Julis had confidence in Sextus’ ability.
i
Julius Caesar, Civil Wars III.2 Trans. by J.M. Carter, Oxford University Press, 1997
Appian, Roman History II.71 Trans. by Horace White, Vol 2, The MacMillan Co, 1899
iii
Flavius Josephus, The Antiquities of the Jews XIV.123 Trans by W. Whiston, Hendrickson Pub., 1987
iv
Josephus, ibid. XIV.93
v
Caesar, ibid. III.31
vi
Josephus, ibid. XIV.127
vii
Alexandrian War 26 in Caesar, ibid.
viii
Josephus, ibid. XIV.128
ix
Josephus, ibid. XIV.202
x
Josephus, ibid. XIC.186
xi
Josephus, ibid. XIV.202
xii
Alexandrian War 66 in ibid.
xiii
Josephus, ibid. XIV.105
xiv
Appian, ibid. III.77, also Dio Cassius, see lower.
xv
Josephus, ibid. XIV.158
xvi
Josephus, Jewish War I.211
xvii
Caesar, ibid. III.31
ii
xviii
Appian, ibid. III.77
Caesar, ibid. II.20
xx
Dio’s Roman History, XLVII.26.3 Trans. by E. Cary, Vol 5, Loeb Classical Library
xix