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December 21, 2016 Economics Group Our Favorite Charts of 2016 Special Commentary The Gettysburg Address, containing just 272 words, is famous for its concise yet powerful message. Oft-forgotten, however, is that President Lincoln was not scheduled to be the featured speaker. Edward Everett assumed that role, and in a speech preceding Lincoln’s, he delivered a 13,607-word oration. Everett wrote to Lincoln the next day: “I should be glad, if I could flatter myself that I came as near to the central idea of the occasion, in two hours, as you did in two minutes.” While economic phenomena frequently demand complex and detailed analysis, it’s often the simple and succinct approach that proves most effective and memorable. Enclosed you’ll find the charts we believe tell the economic story of 2016, and we hope that our explanations heed the lessons history has to offer on brevity. Thank you for subscribing to our commentary, and we wish you and your families the best in 2017. This report is available on wellsfargo.com/economics and on Bloomberg at WFRE. Our Favorite Charts of 2016 December 21, 2016 WELLS FARGO SECURITIES ECONOMICS GROUP Doing More with Less Manufacturing employment in the United States peaked in 1979, well before the implementation of NAFTA and the advent of Chinese industrial prowess. Although manufacturing employment has declined nearly 40 percent on balance since 1979, manufacturing production has doubled over that period. In other words, American manufacturers have been able to increase output over the past three decades by lifting productivity. In short, foreign trade may have played a role in reducing employment in the manufacturing sector since 1979, but the imperative to lift productivity would have depressed factory jobs even if NAFTA had never come into existence. For further reading, see “U.S. Trade with Canada and Mexico: A Short Primer” available upon request. Production & Jobs in Manufacturing Sector Index, Jan 1979=100 240 240 200 200 160 160 120 120 80 80 40 40 Manufacturing Production: November @ 202.6 Manufacturing Employment: November @ 63.2 0 0 79 84 89 94 99 04 09 14 Source: U.S. Departments of Commerce & Labor and Wells Fargo Securities 2 Our Favorite Charts of 2016 December 21, 2016 WELLS FARGO SECURITIES ECONOMICS GROUP Reaching the Economy’s Full Potential Despite continued employment gains, real GDP growth once again disappointed in 2016. Sluggish labor productivity growth, or output per hour worked, has played a key role in this disconnect between employment and economic output. Productivity growth over the past few years has languished near historic lows and has led the Fed and other forecasters to downwardly revise their estimates of potential GDP growth. Productivity growth is a fundamental driver of rising living standards over the long-run, and, without an improvement, a tight labor market and acceleration in wages will come with the trade-off of lower corporate profits or higher inflation. For further reading, see “Working Hard or Hardly Working?” available on request. Nonfarm Productivity Two-Year Moving Average, Year-over-Year Percent Change 5% 5% 4% 4% 3% 3% 2% 2% 1% 1% 0% 0% Labor Productivity: Q3 @ 0.4% -1% -1% 60 64 68 72 76 80 84 88 92 96 00 04 Source: U.S. Department of Labor and Wells Fargo Securities 3 08 12 16 Our Favorite Charts of 2016 December 21, 2016 WELLS FARGO SECURITIES ECONOMICS GROUP A Bigger Slice of the Pie Labor’s share of income in the economy has been getting squeezed since the early 1990s and is illustrative of many households’ economic anguish that was a defining factor in the 2016 election. Although still quite low compared to prior periods, labor’s share of the pie has been growing more recently. A rising share of labor income is typically only seen in the second half of an expansion and is another indication that the economic cycle is in late innings. However, given the low starting point, the income shift this time around may be less ominous and instead help to sustain consumer spending. For firms facing higher input costs though, the relatively stronger position of households may encourage them to test their pricing power and lead to higher inflation. For further reading, see our series on full employment, available upon request. Labor Income Share Compensation of Employees as a Share of Gross Domestic Income 60% 60% 59% 59% 58% 58% 57% 57% 56% 56% 55% 55% 54% 54% 53% 53% 52% 52% 51% 51% Labor Income Share: Q3 @ 53.7% 50% 50% 47 52 57 62 67 72 77 82 87 92 97 02 07 12 17 Source: U.S. Department of Labor and Wells Fargo Securities 4 Our Favorite Charts of 2016 December 21, 2016 WELLS FARGO SECURITIES ECONOMICS GROUP Feeling the Squeeze While nominal wages are rising at the fastest pace of the expansion, labor productivity has continued to languish. As a result, unit labor costs have drifted higher and will likely put further pressure on company profit margins over the next year unless companies can pass on costs via higher selling prices. Companies have thus far been hesitant to pass on higher costs. Profits as a share of GDP have fallen over the past two years, indicating compression in corporate margins. For further reading, see our Annual Economic Outlook Nonfinancial Domestic Profits Share of Gross Value Added of Nonfinancial Corporations 16% 16% 14% 14% 12% 12% 10% 10% 8% 8% 6% 6% 4% 4% 2% United States: Q3 @ 13.4% 2% 1980-2015 Average: 11.2% 0% 0% 80 82 84 86 88 90 92 94 96 98 00 02 04 06 08 10 12 14 16 Source: U.S. Department of Commerce and Wells Fargo Securities 5 Our Favorite Charts of 2016 December 21, 2016 WELLS FARGO SECURITIES ECONOMICS GROUP The Missing Middle Income growth has improved across the income distribution, but the top and bottom quintiles have experienced the fastest growth since the recession ended according to Bureau of Labor Statistics data. All quintiles have seen slower income growth relative to past cycles. Labor productivity and inflation are fundamental drivers of nominal wage growth and both have increased at a particularly slow pace this cycle, which has weighed on income growth. For further reading, see our series on full employment, available upon request. Income Growth During Economic Recoveries Percent Change 6 Years After Recession End, Before-Tax Income 25% 25% 20% 20% 15% 15% 10% 10% 5% 5% 0% 0% Avg of Prior 2 Recoveries 2009-2015 -5% -5% Lowest Quintile Second Quintile Middle Quintile Fourth Quintile Highest Quintile Source: U.S. Department of Labor and Wells Fargo Securities 6 Our Favorite Charts of 2016 December 21, 2016 WELLS FARGO SECURITIES ECONOMICS GROUP Generational Growing Pains Wage growth has strengthened over 2016, but remains well below its pre-recession pace. Compositional shifts in the workforce, however, help to explain why growth in average hourly earnings remains relatively subdued. An increasing number of Baby Boomers who are at the peak of their careers and command high average hourly earnings are retiring. At the other end of the jobs ladder, Millennials with relatively little experience—and therefore low average hourly earnings—have been entering the workforce in droves. Looking at the Atlanta Fed Wage tracker, which includes only workers who were employed one year to the next, shows wage growth has been noticeably stronger over the past year and much closer to rates that prevailed in prior cycles. For further reading, see our series on full employment, available upon request. Average Hourly Earnings vs. Atlanta Fed Wage Growth Tracker; YoY % Chg. of 3-MMA 6% 6% 5% 5% 4% 4% 3% 3% 2% 2% 1% 1% Atlanta Fed Wage Growth Tracker: Nov @ 3.9% Average Hourly Earnings (Prod. & Supervisory): Nov @ 2.4% Average Hourly Earnings (Total Private): Nov @ 2.6% 0% 0% 97 99 01 03 05 07 09 11 13 15 17 Source: U.S. Department of Labor, Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta and Wells Fargo Securities 7 Our Favorite Charts of 2016 December 21, 2016 WELLS FARGO SECURITIES ECONOMICS GROUP Mobile Millennials The two fastest growing categories of consumer spending among Millennials (Ages 18-34) are food away from home and entertainment, underscoring the current nonmaterial nature of Millennial spending. There are some early signs however that this trend may be reversing as home ownership and transportation spending have begun to recover. It is difficult to say for certain how much of the overall trends in consumer spending by category is driven by pure demographic change and those driven by cyclical factors. That said, there is clear evidence of increased diversity of the Millennial generation relative to prior age demographics, which suggests, based on prior evidence, a structural change in the tastes and preferences of the population. For further reading, see “Non-Material Millennials” available upon request. Millennial Expenditure Growth Year-over-Year Percent Change & Change from 2012 to 2015 20.0% Year-over-Year Percent Change Recovering Expanding Share of Average Total Expenditures <5.5% 15.0% Food away from Home 5.5% - 8.0% 10.0% >8.0% Transportation 5.0% Housing-Owned Alcohol Entertainment 0.0% Apparel Housing-Rented Food at Home -5.0% Decelerating Contracting -10.0% -20.0% -15.0% -10.0% -5.0% 0.0% 5.0% 10.0% 15.0% 20.0% 25.0% Percent Change from Three Years Ago Source: U.S. Department of Labor and Wells Fargo Securities 8 Our Favorite Charts of 2016 December 21, 2016 WELLS FARGO SECURITIES ECONOMICS GROUP Two-Percent Inflation: Time to Pop the Champagne? Disinflationary fears finally began to dissipate in 2016 after the stabilization and subsequent recovery in energy prices put headline inflation on more firm footing. Core inflation, which excludes the volatile food and energy components, is also running near 2 percent across a variety of metrics amid relatively strong inflation for services such as shelter and medical care. The inflation side of the Fed’s dual mandate is now within sight and should be supportive of multiple rate hikes in 2017. For further reading, see our Annual Economic Outlook Alternative Inflation Measures Year-over-Year Percent Change 5% 5% Core CPI: Nov @ 2.1% Core PCE: Oct @ 1.7% Cleveland Fed Median CPI: Nov @ 2.5% Atlanta Fed Sticky CPI: Nov @ 2.5% Dallas Fed Trimmed-Mean PCE: Oct @ 1.8% 4% 4% 3% 3% 2% 2% 1% 1% 0% 0% 05 06 07 08 09 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 Source: U.S. Department of Commerce, U.S. Department of Labor, Federal Reserve System and Wells Fargo Securities 9 Our Favorite Charts of 2016 December 21, 2016 WELLS FARGO SECURITIES ECONOMICS GROUP Appreciating Appreciation After more than a decade, U.S. home prices rose to an all-time high in 2016, according to the S&P CoreLogic Case-Shiller U.S. National Home Price Index. The new record marks the end to a four and a half year recovery, as home prices have climbed more than 35 percent above the trough reached in 2012, recouping the losses that occurred during the housing bust. Adjusted for inflation, however, prices remain about 16 percent below their 2006 peak. We expect the pace of home price appreciation to slow modestly in the year ahead, rising about 4.4 percent year over year in 2017. For more, see “2017 U.S. Housing Market Outlook” available upon request. U.S. Real vs. Nominal Home Prices S&P CoreLogic Case-Shiller Home Price Index Jan. 2000=100 200 200 180 180 160 160 140 140 120 120 100 100 * Real = HPI Deflated w/CPI 80 80 Real Home Price: Sep @ 129.8 Nominal Home Price: Sep @ 184.8 60 60 00 02 04 06 08 10 12 14 16 Source: S&P, U.S. Department of Labor and Wells Fargo Securities 10 Our Favorite Charts of 2016 December 21, 2016 WELLS FARGO SECURITIES ECONOMICS GROUP The Trend Goes On Earlier in the year, Moody’s/RCA Commercial Property Price Index (CPPI), which measures the change in commercial property prices by key property types, softened due to a steep decline in the office-central business district (CBD) in major markets. The overall index stands nearly 50 percent above its prerecession peak, with much of the increase concentrated in apartment and office-CBD properties in major markets. Despite reaching cycle-highs, the overall rate of growth has started to slow. Some of this is attributable to lower transaction volume and tighter lending standards, but we are also seeing slower cross-border transactions as investors look beyond key sectors and reach for yield. For further reading, see our latest Commercial Real Estate Chartbook, available upon request. Commercial Property Price Index Index 300 300 Apartment: Oct @ 274.9 Retail: Oct @ 183.2 Industrial: Oct @ 183.6 Office - CBD: Oct @ 281.2 Office - Suburban: Oct @ 149.3 250 250 200 200 150 150 100 100 50 50 05 06 07 08 09 10 11 12 13 14 Source: Real Capital Analytics, Inc. and Wells Fargo Securities 11 15 16 Our Favorite Charts of 2016 December 21, 2016 WELLS FARGO SECURITIES ECONOMICS GROUP We’ve Seen This Horror Movie Before…or Have We? House prices in China are on the rise again as shown by a nationwide index of house prices that has surpassed the previous peak reached in April 2014. Although house prices appear to be rising everywhere, prices in the so-called Tier-1 cities of Beijing, Guangzhou, Shanghai and Shenzhen have skyrocketed. The People’s Bank of China (PBoC) has guided interest rates lower over the past year or so and the government has instructed banks to relax lending standards. Not only have these policies stimulated more home-buying, which has pushed up house prices, but they have also caused housing starts to strengthen this year. However, based on China’s lower financial leverage position and smaller residential mortgage exposure to the financial system compared to the U.S. during the height of the housing bubble, we believe that most households in China could withstand a meaningful decline in house prices and not deal a devastating blow to the country’s financial system. For further reading, see our Annual Economic Outlook. China House Price Index by City Type Existing Homes; 2011=100 190 180 170 190 Tier I Cities: Nov @ 177.9 180 Tier II Cities: Nov @ 110.8 Tier III Cities: Nov @ 99.9 170 160 160 150 150 140 140 130 130 120 120 110 110 100 100 90 2011 90 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 Source: CEIC and Wells Fargo Securities 12 Our Favorite Charts of 2016 December 21, 2016 WELLS FARGO SECURITIES ECONOMICS GROUP SOEing the Seeds of Destruction Some analysts fret about a “hard landing” in the Chinese economy, caused by excessive debt. We have never placed much stock in these doomsday prognostications. That said, the debt-to-GDP ratio of the Chinese business sector exceeds 170 percent at present—the comparable ratio in the United States is about 70 percent—so debt issues in China should not be idly dismissed. Rather than a sudden implosion of the Chinese economy, we worry that China may eventually slip into a Japanese-like stagnation. State-owned enterprises (SOEs) in China are inefficient relative to their private-sector counterparts, as illustrated by slower growth in value added in the former. However, SOEs employ more than 60 million individuals, so the Chinese government is not likely to close them down, at least not in a rapid manner. In our view, the government will continue to lean on Chinese banks to keep the SOEs afloat. Over time, capital may become increasingly misallocated to inefficient SOEs. The Chinese economy could eventually face its own “zombification” just as Japan did when its asset-price bubbles popped in the early 1990s. For more, see “Does China Face a Japanese-Like “Lost Decade”?” available upon request. Chinese Industrial Value Added Year-over-Year Percent Change 28% 24% 28% State-Owned: Oct @ 3.4% All: Oct @ 6.2% 20% 20% 16% 16% 12% 12% 8% 8% 4% 4% 0% 0% -4% -4% 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10 11 12 13 14 16 Source: CEIC and Wells Fargo Securities 13 24% Our Favorite Charts of 2016 December 21, 2016 WELLS FARGO SECURITIES ECONOMICS GROUP Low Rates and High Debt: A Ticking Time Bomb? While U.S. Treasury yields are often viewed through a financial market lens, it is important to remember that they represent the cost of financing the national debt. Despite a doubling in the size of the debt as a share of the economy since 2008, historically low Treasury yields have kept net interest spending by the federal government near record lows. A sustained upward shift in the yield curve, however, will begin to gradually boost the share of budget resources needed to service the national debt. As President Trump and Congress weigh fiscal policy changes next year, rising interest rates represent another potential budgetary challenge for policymakers. For more, see our coverage of the Monthly Treasury Statement, available on request. Net Interest Outlays vs. Federal Debt 4.0% 12-Month Moving Sum, Total Debt Held by the Public 80% Net Interest as a Share of GDP: Sep @ 1.3% (Left Axis) 3.5% Public Debt as a Share of GDP: Sep @ 75.7% (Right Axis) 70% 3.0% 60% 2.5% 50% 2.0% 40% 1.5% 30% 1.0% 20% 0.5% 10% 0.0% 0% 80 82 84 86 88 90 92 94 96 98 00 02 04 06 08 10 12 14 16 Source: U.S. Department of the Treasury, U.S. Department of Commerce and Wells Fargo Securities 14 Our Favorite Charts of 2016 December 21, 2016 WELLS FARGO SECURITIES ECONOMICS GROUP Probing for Risks with a Probit Model Our recession forecasting approach uses a Probit model to predict the chances of a recession during the next six months. Our preferred model has served us well; it started predicting (in realtime) a significantly higher probability of recession back in 2007. We also never joined the “double-dip” camp back in 2010-2012, largely because our Probit model did not indicate a highlikelihood of recession during that time period. In addition to our preferred model, we have built eight different models to capture the range of recession risk posed by alternative model specifications. The current average probability of these models (based on Q3 data) is 13.4 percent, and this method successfully predicted all recessions since 1980 without producing any false positives. For further reading, see “Recession Talks in the Spotlight: Should We Worry?” available upon request. Recession Probability Based on Probit Model Average of All Models 100% 100% Two-Quarter Ahead Recession Probability: Q3 @ 13.4% 90% 90% 80% 80% 70% 70% 60% 60% 50% 50% 40% 40% 30% 30% 20% 20% 10% 10% 0% 0% 80 82 84 86 88 90 92 94 96 98 00 02 04 06 08 10 12 14 16 Source: Wells Fargo Securities 15 Wells Fargo Securities Economics Group Diane Schumaker-Krieg Global Head of Research, Economics & Strategy 704-410-1801 212-214-5070 [email protected] John E. Silvia, Ph.D. Chief Economist 704-410-3275 [email protected] Mark Vitner Senior Economist 704-410-3277 [email protected] Jay H. Bryson, Ph.D. Global Economist 704-410-3274 [email protected] Sam Bullard Senior Economist 704-410-3280 [email protected] Nick Bennenbroek Currency Strategist 212-214-5636 [email protected] Anika R. Khan Senior Economist 212-214-8543 [email protected] Eugenio J. Alemán, Ph.D. Senior Economist 704-410-3273 [email protected] Azhar Iqbal Econometrician 704-410-3270 [email protected] Tim Quinlan Senior Economist 704-410-3283 [email protected] Eric Viloria, CFA Currency Strategist 212-214-5637 [email protected] Sarah House Economist 704-410-3282 [email protected] Michael A. Brown Economist 704-410-3278 [email protected] Jamie Feik Economist 704-410-3291 [email protected] Erik Nelson Currency Analyst 212-214-5652 [email protected] Misa Batcheller Economic Analyst 704-410-3060 [email protected] Michael Pugliese Economic Analyst 704-410-3156 [email protected] Julianne Causey Economic Analyst 704-410-3281 [email protected] E. Harry Pershing Economic Analyst 704-410-3034 [email protected] Donna LaFleur Executive Assistant 704-410-3279 [email protected] Dawne Howes Administrative Assistant 704-410-3272 [email protected] Wells Fargo Securities Economics Group publications are produced by Wells Fargo Securities, LLC, a U.S. broker-dealer registered with the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority, and the Securities Investor Protection Corp. Wells Fargo Securities, LLC, distributes these publications directly and through subsidiaries including, but not limited to, Wells Fargo & Company, Wells Fargo Bank N.A., Wells Fargo Advisors, LLC, Wells Fargo Securities International Limited, Wells Fargo Securities Asia Limited and Wells Fargo Securities (Japan) Co. Limited. Wells Fargo Securities, LLC is registered with the Commodities Futures Trading Commission as a futures commission merchant and is a member in good standing of the National Futures Association. 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