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Australian Geographer, Vol. 31, No. 1, pp. 5–19, 2000
Community, Place and Cyberspace
D.J. WALMSLEY, University of New England, Australia
It is over 30 years since the concept of community without propinquity was Ž rst
proposed. According to this concept, communities might be spatially far- ung, but nevertheless
close-knit, intimate and held together by shared interests and values, rather than by geographical proximity. Although the idea of community without propinquity has been heavily criticised,
the advent of advanced telecommunications and the emergence of cyberspace mean that a
reappraisal of the concept, and of the changing nature of community generally, is warranted.
The paper undertakes such a reappraisal. A review of the literature on cyberspace reveals
several reasons why the social effects of advanced telecommunications and the Internet might
be less than is sometimes predicted. Setting this discussion in the context of other social science
discourses on new urbanism, consumption rather than production as a basis for city life,
postmodernism, and ‘the third way’ in politics, shows that place and local community are, and
will continue to be, fundamental to the functioning of society. Cyberspace might have
annihilated distance but not place.
ABSTRACT
Community without propinquity; cybercommunities; cyberspace; information
technology; economy of signs; new urbanism; postmodernism; telecommunications; ‘the third
way’.
KEY WORDS
The notion of community has been of interest to human geographers for many years.
However, as in much of the rest of social science, the concept has been interpreted
loosely, with a result that the term has a high level of use, but a low level of meaning.
To some, a ‘community’ is speciŽ cally:
a relatively homogeneous human population, within a deŽ ned area, experiencing little mobility, interacting and participating in a wide range of local affairs,
and sharing an awareness of common life and personal bonds. (Dalton &
Dalton 1975, p. 2)
In other arenas, the term ‘community’ is used generally in an ideological sense to
describe what should be rather than what is. Between these two extremes, the term has
commonly been interpreted in one of three ways (Bell & Newby 1976): as a simple
description of the boundaries of a settlement; to denote a local social system centred
around interaction between people and institutions; and as ‘communion’, a particular
kind of human association founded on personal ties and a sense of belonging (Urry
1995).
Notwithstanding these differences in interpretation, there is a widespread realisation
that the nature of community in contemporary society is changing. This observation
was made strikingly by Webber (1963) over a quarter of a century ago. He observed
that instead of individuals having their greatest involvement (sense of community) with
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2000 Geographical Society of New South Wales Inc.
6
D. J. Walmsley
those among whom they lived (neighbours, as deŽ ned on the basis of nearness or
propinquity), a situation was arising where, at least for professional and managerial
groups, communities might be spatially far- ung, but nevertheless close-knit, intimate,
and held together by shared interests and values (communities based on common
interest rather than propinquity) (Walmsley 1988). Webber argued that such ‘communities without propinquity’ typiŽ ed middle- and upper-class American society by the
1960s. Moreover, he predicted that, as af uence and mobility spread, so ‘community
without propinquity’ would come to characterise society as a whole. From this perspective, it is interaction not place that is the essence of urban life (Webber 1964).
Predictably, Webber’s views have attracted a good deal of attention, and some
questioning. Criticism has centred on Ž ve points (Walmsley 1988; Walmsley & Lewis
1993):
(1) empirical evidence suggests that in many places communities are still based on
propinquity;
(2) urban redevelopment has shown the clear strength of links to local communities
and the social problems that can result if those links are ruptured;
(3) local areas and communities are increasingly important as political units;
(4) the need for a sense of belonging to place and to a local community may be an
innate human need; and
(5) economic recession and increases in the real cost of travel mean that mobility has
not increased to the extent that Webber anticipated.
Given these criticisms, it is not surprising that alternative explanations of community
change have emerged. For example, writing not much more than a decade after
Webber, Wellman (1978) suggested that communities might be breaking up (into
sub-cultures) rather than breaking down, a view congruent with more recent writing on
local attachment to place in a postmodern world (see Walmsley & Weinand 1997).
Despite these criticisms and alternatives, Hall (1997) has recently made a case for
revisiting Webber’s work. In Hall’s view, Webber might simply have been ahead of his
time. Implicit in calls for a re-evaluation of Webber is recognition of the importance of
information technology (IT) and its potential for communicating at a distance. Certainly, the advent of advanced telecommunications poses a challenge for those social
scientists interested in the changing nature of community, because we now live in an
age characterised by the emergence of cyberspace (Kitchin 1998). This term denotes:
a conceptual ‘spaceless place’ where words, human relationships, data, wealth,
status and power are made manifest by people using computer-mediated
communications technology. (Ogden 1994, p. 715)
The advent of cyberspace has introduced what McLuhan once described as ‘life at
hyperspeed’ (Matathia & Salzman 1998, p. 98), and has enabled contact to be maintained between geographically separated individuals and groups very easily and relatively cheaply. Economic aspects of cyberspace have received a great deal of attention
(Castells 1996; Graham & Marvin 1996), often tied to the idea of globalisation, global
markets, and a borderless world (Ohmae 1990). Social aspects of cyberspace—and the
issue of what community might mean in the society of the future—have received much
less attention. This is unfortunate, because changes to the nature of work, mobility and
leisure, coupled with advances in telecommunications, potentially enhance the
prospects for social interaction and thus redeŽ nition of ‘community’. This paper
therefore seeks to meet Hall’s challenge for a re-evaluation of ‘community without
Community, Place and Cyberspace
7
propinquity’. It aims to do so by outlining the possible social impact of cyberspace. In
doing so, it puts forward the view that the social effects of cyberspace might be less than
is sometimes predicted. The paper also argues that any consideration of the social
impact of cyberspace needs to be set in the wider context of other academic discourses,
notably those relating to ‘new urbanism’, consumption, postmodernism, and the
emergence of a ‘third way’ in politics. The paper shows that resistance to the homogenising global forces inherent in advanced telecommunications adds weight to the
proposition that local communities will have continued signiŽ cance.
Cyberspace and its impact
Essentially, cyberspace refers to computer-mediated communications systems and
virtual reality technologies. As such, it is ‘probably one of the most universally
over-hyped terms of the latter part of the twentieth century’ (Kitchin 1998, p. ix).
Many see cyberspace, IT, and telecommunications generally as having the potential to
change fundamentally the nature of economy, society, politics and geography. Others
are more sceptical. Before looking at the sceptics, it is appropriate to examine the
argument that massive social change is imminent.
Among those commentators who see vast social changes resulting from rapid technological change, cyberspace is seen to be undermining or modifying the urban fabric and
urban lifestyle for three main reasons: cyberspace is altering the space–time continuum;
cyberspace is changing the basis for communication; and cyberspace is blurring the
distinction between ‘the real’ and ‘the virtual’. From this perspective, the three critical
components of virtual reality are that it is inclusive, it is interactive, and interaction
takes place in real time (Kitchin 1998, p. 8). In this sense, cyberspace is attractive
because it can be liberating. It can be thought of as providing an opportunity for some
people to move from ‘the here and now’ into a world with far fewer constraints. Proof
of the impact of cyberspace is seen in the fact that there are some 2000 ‘virtual cities’
extant in cyberspace (Nieuwenhuizen 1997), and the fact that, by 1996, GeoCities
(cyberspace communities created by Beverly Hills Internet’s WWW) had attracted over
820 000 ‘residents’ (Matathia & Salzman 1998, p. 156).
Notwithstanding the attraction of such new ‘settlements’, many argue that cyberspace is primarily important in altering the way of life in existing settlements. In this
context, it has become accepted orthodoxy that telecommunications networks can to
some degree substitute for travel. Thus, ‘a range of telebased services are seen simply
to displace the need for physical movement between home and work, while urban
functions will no longer have a physical presence as services are delivered in electronic
form’, thereby causing the ‘dematerialisation’ of cities (Graham & Marvin 1996,
pp. 243, 254). In other words, physical cities become unnecessary at the same time as
virtual cities become attractive. In part, the phenomenon of ‘cybercommunities’ has
also been facilitated by the way that growing leisure time has potentially increased the
opportunity for social relations, and thus has provided increasing chances for excursions into cyberspace. One of the central paradoxes of contemporary society is therefore
that ‘people are able to “travel” so fast electronically that they do not actually need to
move at all’ (Graham & Marvin 1996, p. 255).
Clearly, given the apparent enthusiasm for ‘cybercommunities’, there is an urgent
need to study the impact of IT, telecommunications and cyberspace on society.
Graham and Marvin (1996) have distinguished four different approaches to such study.
First, there is the point of view best described as technological determinism. This is the
8
D. J. Walmsley
notion that technology shapes destiny so that ‘ultimately, how we live, where we live
and near whom we live depend on the underlying forces inherent in technological
evolution and subsequent economic change’ (Pascal 1987, p. 597). Second comes an
approach based on a blend of futurism and utopianism. This highlights the space–time
convergence inherent in advanced telecommunications, noting particularly the way that
this can liberate people from location. Tof er’s (1981) ‘third wave’ is an example of this
approach which tends to emphasise electronic cottages and telecommuting. The third
approach is, in some senses, the opposite argument, and can therefore be labelled
dystopianism. According to this perspective, telecommunications are not separate from
society. Rather they are part and parcel of contemporary capitalism. Therefore, any
attempt to understand cyberspace needs to look at the broader political economy of
advanced industrial society, thereby bringing to light the fact that telecommunications
are not neutral, but rather beneŽ t different groups in society differentially, leading
eventually to the demise of ‘the civic’ and the rise of ‘the private’ (Graham & Marvin
1996, p. 100). One of the best know ‘dystopic’ views is Orwell’s (1949) Nineteen
eighty-four. Finally, there is what is commonly called the social construction of technology
approach. This approach recognises that telecommunications are part and parcel of
society but, unlike the dystopians, advocates of this approach put the emphasis on how
society can shape the way telecommunications are developed. In this sense, technological development is seen as a social process, not a predetermined one. The impact of
telecommunications is seen to stem from a myriad individual human decisions, and the
power of human agency is therefore very important (Graham & Marvin 1996, p. 106).
Despite this variety of views, there is no common agreement on which approach is
most appropriate. In this sort of intellectual vacuum, the power of value-based argument is great. Thus, if commentators are inclined to the view that telecommunications
are liberating, it is easy to mount such a case. Advocates of IT can see cyberspace as
supporting new forms of social relations, like television and radio in earlier times,
producing a different sort of society from that which presently exists (Jones 1995). This
change can be envisaged because, in cyberspace:
identity—once described as rational, stable, centred and autonomous—becomes unstable, multiple, diffuse,  uid, and manipulable because the disembodied nature of communication and relative autonomy allows you to be
accepted on the basis of your words, not your appearance or accent. (Kitchin
1998, p. 11)
Put simply, some claim that on-line communities are set up so that they are free from
real-world constraints, and thus able to serve as arenas for new types of social
relationships (Rheingold 1994; Featherstone & Burrows 1995). Fewer gatekeepers
means more freedom, according to this argument.
Enthusiasm for cybercommunities has been particularly evident in Australia, although it is not clear whether this has anything to do directly with overcoming the
nation’s inherent tyranny of distance. For example, Spender (1995) has written approvingly of new communities on the net, and of the new human values that are being
forged. Elsewhere, overseas, Negroponte (1995, p. 7) has propounded a rather extreme
view that socialising in digital neighbourhoods will make physical space irrelevant.
More generally, there is a signiŽ cant literature suggesting that telecommunications do
not merely shrink distance, so much as render the concept of ‘friction of distance’
entirely meaningless (Gillespie & Williams 1988). This, of course, brings into question
the very basis of the ‘geography’ that many people take for granted. O’Brien (1992) has
Community, Place and Cyberspace
9
written about ‘the end of geography’. Others have hinted at ‘the end of the city’. After
all, the function of the city is to overcome time with space by making communications
easier through minimising space constraints in order to overcome time constraints (the
close packing of interacting units). In contrast, the function of telecommunications is
to overcome space with time by making communications easier through minimising
time constraints in order to overcome space constraints (the electronic networking of
interacting units) (Graham & Marvin 1996, p. 115). One rather striking example of the
inroads being made by telecommunications is the appearance of cyberspace funerals
where relatives can watch and participate without the trouble of travel (Nieuwenhuizen
1997, p. 57).
There are certainly some sections of society where cybercommunities hold out the
tantalising prospect of improvements to lifestyles. Two of the most often cited are
shopping for the disabled and housebound, and socialising for youth. In the case of the
former, access to electronic shopping is thought to provide those who have mobility
problems with a level of retail access that is greater than at present (Graham & Marvin
1996). In the case of youth, cyberspace is thought to enable individuals or groups to
carve out a new territorial domain by providing a means of organising forms of
socialising, such as raves, frowned upon by authority Ž gures (Gibson 1999; Hil &
Bessant 1999). However, it is important to note that neither of these examples involves
anything that is fundamentally new. Shoppers have had mail-order retailing for a
considerable time, and youth have commonly used the electronic media, such as
television and radio, for ‘their social atlas and role models’ (Latham 1998, p. 276).
Cautionary notes on cybercommunities
The possibility that cyberspace might simply be facilitating trends that have been
around for a time suggests that we need caution in interpreting the impact of telecommunications and cyberspace, lest we become servants to enthusiasm. In this regard,
there are 12 reasons why cybercommunities might produce less signiŽ cant changes to
contemporary social life than is sometimes suggested. The reasons are highly interrelated, and some of them stem from earlier criticisms of the concept of ‘community
without propinquity’. Together, they show the need to view cyberspace critically,
despite the tendency for IT-based initiatives to be applauded in many areas (for
example, distance education, telecommuting, service delivery).
The Ž rst reason for caution lies in the fact that information is only as useful as the locale
in which it is available. Cyberspace might provide abundant and almost universal
information, but Kitchin (1998) cites the problems faced by a homosexual able to join
cybercommunities of homosexuals, but living in a homophobic world. Similarly, no
amount of information can overcome problems of material deprivation. The material
basis of life cannot be overlooked, no matter how attractive cyberspace might be.
Secondly, it needs to be remembered that IT does not annihilate markets and many
location-Ž xed phenomena. Despite cyberspace, there remains a need to be at a certain
place at a certain time to access some of the activities associated with that place. For
instance, many forms of business require negotiation and argument. Cyberspace has
not annihilated the central business districts (CBDs) of the world. Firms still pay very
high rents for CBD locations that serve as a base for electronic commerce and
face-to-face contact.
Thirdly, access to cyberspace is unequal. Fostering cyberspace might therefore be a way
of promoting a more polarised society. An extreme example of this is to be seen in
10
D. J. Walmsley
Graham and Marvin’s (1996, p. 130) claim that there is more telecommunications use
in Tokyo than in the whole of Africa. More prosaically, information-rich and information-poor suburbs are emerging in many cities, leading to the prospect of electronic
ghettos. This inequity in IT provision might exacerbate the tendency towards increasing levels of inequality (Walmsley & Weinand 1997) with dire consequences. To put
things starkly, there are many areas of rural Australia where telecommunications cannot
support high-speed links to the Internet and where, as a result, the idea of cyberspace
is not very meaningful. Likewise, there are many people with little ability or inclination
to use the Internet.
Fourthly, it needs to be noted that a major use of telecommunications is to facilitate
face-to-face meetings (Kitchin 1998, p. 90). In this sense, telecommunications complement travel for both social and business reasons. World cities thrive partly because of
their accessibility by air. In this context, it is salutary to note what happened with earlier
telecommunication innovations. The Ž rst message sent by Samuel Morse on the
telegraph was a question ‘What hath God wrought?’ (Nieuwenhuizen 1997, p. ix). This
recognised that what was a great beneŽ t to the American interior was also a great leap
into the unknown. Similarly, Alexander Graham Bell’s Ž rst words on the telephone
were to his assistant: ‘Watson. Come here, I want you’ (Pool 1977, p. 12). Less modest
sentiments tend to surround cyberspace. This is despite a caution from Kitchin (1998,
p. 82) that:
the vast majority of social spaces on the Internet bear a remarkable resemblance to real-world locales. As such, many on-line interactions are in fact
situated in real-world protocols, undermining the potentially liberating effects
of being on-line.
Fifthly, one corollary to what has been said above is that cyberspace could encourage
like to communicate with like. This, in turn, could encourage dysfunctionality in society:
communities based upon interests and not localities might well reduce diversity and narrow spheres of in uence, as like will only be communicating with
like. As such, rather than providing a better alternative to real-world communities cyberspace leads to dysfunctional on-line communities while simultaneously weakening communities in real space. (Kitchin 1998, p. 90)
At the same time, it might be that the choice afforded by cyberspace will encourage
individuals to identify with overlapping, and perhaps hierarchically structured, communities, thereby weakening their commitment to any one community (Guest & Lee
1983). In this way, increasing use of IT might destroy the ‘commonality’ that derives
from the experiences that people have in common. This argument accords with the
view that, for many, reading a newspaper is not something that is done critically and
intelligently, but rather equivalent to splashing around in ‘a communal bathtub’
(Walker 1968, p. 71, quoted in Nieuwenhuizen 1997, p. 45). For many, media use
serves mainly to provide information and ideas that can be used as a basis for general
social interaction. In this regard Pay TV might detrimentally affect the role of previously free-to-air sport as a language of everyday discourse.
Sixthly, cybercommunities can be very transitory. Maffesoli (1989), for example, has
described on-line communities as ‘neo-tribes’ in so far as they are groups that form and
re-form on the basis of temporary modes of identiŽ cation. The transitory nature of
much contemporary life is a point explored thoroughly by Harvey (1989) in his
Community, Place and Cyberspace
11
examination of time–space compression and its role in capital turnaround. According
to Harvey, there are Ž ve effects of such compression:
(1) accentuation of volatility and the ephemeral in such things as products, fashions,
and values, and a pandering to passing consumer tastes;
(2) an emphasis on instantaneity and disposability, encapsulated in the throw-away
society;
(3) encouragement of ‘short-termism’, exempliŽ ed by a focus on contracts rather than
commitments;
(4) an emphasis on signs and images, together with the continual reinvention of images
as earlier ones become jaded; and
(5) hyper-reality and the replication of events and locales to make them ‘more real than
the real’ (see Urry 1995, p. 177).
Seventhly, coupled with the possibly transitory nature of cybercommunities is the risk
of superŽ ciality. McLaughlin et al. (1995) see on-line communities as pseudo-communities, in that they are built on superŽ cial exchanges, little responsibility, and escapism.
In simple terms, such communities can become ‘communities of limited liability’ where
individuals join for ‘brief respites of participation for the sole purpose of being
recharged by the power of the community’ (Matathia & Salzman 1998, p. 98), before
withdrawing to pursue non-community-oriented ends. Community participation can
thus become a pragmatic and self-interested activity.
The eighth cautionary note to be borne in mind when contemplating the potential
signiŽ cance of cybercommunities is one of scale. IT might facilitate the emergence of
‘mega-communities’ resulting from the view of ‘the world as one place’ (Graham &
Marvin 1996, p. 177). Linked together on a global scale by shared interests—in many
senses, a very large-scale ‘community without propinquity’—such mega-communities
run the risk of weakening interpersonal relationships by attenuating them.
Inhabitants of this mega-community interact with an inŽ nitely larger number
of people than their forebears in more deŽ ned communities did. Yet almost all
of the relationships they experience are essentially conditional, rather than
absolute. Relationships between human beings are increasingly dominated by
choice, and much less by obligation. Individuals are more anonymous within
their surroundings, and thus are less constrained by the ties of social obligation … People who can readily relocate to another social environment are
less likely to worry about the consequences of their activities in their current
environment. (Tanner 1999, pp. 46–7)
In short, mega-communities might be unstable and plagued by the tyranny of choice.
If an individual can surf the Internet, why worry about any particular issue?
Ninthly, there exists the possibility that the global reach of cyberspace creates a
reciprocal need for a Ž rm link to locality, possibly even a home base (Norberg-Schultz
1971).
The so-called ‘conquest’ of terrestrial space may have been accomplished
technologically and economically but it has not yet been accomplished at a
human level because it seems, at least experientially, that people become
bound to their locality and have their quality of life reduced when this
‘bonding’ is broken. (Seamon 1979, p. 9, quoted in Walmsley 1988, p. 63)
12
D. J. Walmsley
Tenthly, cyberspace might be characterised by an unacceptable lack of human contact.
The drudgery of the  at screen has been widely noted in telecommuting, as have the
isolating possibilities of working from home. Nieuwenhuizen (1997, p. 33) has been
particularly forceful in addressing this point:
It is already possible to do basic shopping and banking via the telephone and
predictions are that in the cyber-community of the future there will be fewer
and fewer reasons to leave home. We may substitute cyberchat for the real
thing; virtual shopping for the real variety; and we may visit a cybercafe and
stare at a blinking screen instead of enjoying coffee with a friend. We are
promised increased opportunities to work from home and study from home,
but what if these merely lead to a further winding back of human contact?
To many people, shopping is very much a social activity that takes them away from
home to locations where they can see other people and be seen. Looking and socialising
might be every bit as important as buying.
The eleventh possible limitation of cybercommunities relates to a lack of privacy. The
same IT that liberates also produces the smart card and the surveillance system.
Electronic banking runs the risk of producing an individual proŽ le hitherto unavailable.
Life in cyberspace generates electronic trails just as inevitably as soft ground retains
footprints (Mitchell 1995). Targeted marketing is becoming increasingly important, as
too is targeted political campaigning. Perhaps this is a sign of society becoming
increasingly fragmented? We will certainly be ‘fooling ourselves if we think that the
separately wired castles the superhighway promises will offer us anything like the
privacy we like to think we can have behind a high fence on a suburban quarter acre
block’ (Nieuwenhuizen 1997, p. 59).
Finally, only the most primitive of technological determinists can overlook the fact
that we need organisational change in society to take full beneŽ t of IT. This is because it is
organisational innovations that have ensured that ‘new technologies have been economically successful and culturally emblematic of the modern world’ (Urry 1995, p. 142).
To take a simple example, railways did not foster widespread travel until Thomas Cook
invented a system of vouchers. In this context, it is worth noting that the world is still
a richly textured set of places. IT, telecommunications and cyberspace might be
thought to have massive homogenising in uences, but this is a view that needs to be
considered very critically. Globalisation, another over-hyped word closely linked to
cyberspace, is not an ‘international steamroller’ that overpowers individual nationstates and businesses. The ‘local’ is still vitally important even in the world of business.
Concepts like ‘the global car’ have proved largely illusory ‘because differences in market
place, tastes, needs and preferences have turned out to be more pervasive and less
susceptible to change than anticipated’ (Linge & Walmsley 1995, pp. 2–3). CommodiŽ cation is by no means the monolithically evil force it is sometimes portrayed to
be. Pure examples of ‘Coca-colonisation’ and ‘McDonaldisation’ are very rare, because
big corporations often show more sensitivity to local conditions than is commonly
realised (Jackson 1999). Additionally, consumption of international commodities can
often re ect reasons other than the homogenisation of society, as with Punjabi youth in
London using Coca-Cola and McDonalds as a means of distancing themselves from a
parental culture that might be oppressive (Gillespie 1995, quoted in Jackson 1999).
In short, there are many reasons why cybercommunities might not have the impact
that some of their advocates suggest. Care therefore needs to be taken in exploring the
changing nature of ‘community’ in contemporary society. In addition to the cautionary
Community, Place and Cyberspace
13
points made in this section, any serious study of community should also take stock of
work on new urbanism, consumption rather than production as a basis for society,
postmodernism, and arguments proposing a ‘third way’ in politics, because discussion
of each of these issues lends support to the view that cyberspace might have less of an
impact than is sometimes believed.
New urbanism
Any discussion of the changing nature of community needs to recognise that the sorts
of changes identiŽ ed by Webber in his account of ‘community without propinquity’
triggered counter-arguments about the nature of society in the late twentieth century.
Instead of accepting Webber’s (1963, 1964) prediction of increasing mobility, some
commentators, particularly in the Ž eld of town planning, have questioned what society
ideally should be like. Although interpretations vary, this body of work has generally
been labelled ‘new urbanism’ (Bressi 1994; Duany & Plater-Zyberk 1994; Katz 1994).
In the Australian context, the main features have been set out by de Villiers (1997).
Basically, ‘new urbanism’ is a movement in planning designed to enhance localism in
urban life. It emphasises association, and therefore density rather than sprawl; it
emphasises local geographical areas as bases for community, and therefore gives priority
to pedestrians over cars as a way of encouraging street life; it emphasises ‘walkability’,
and therefore promotes mixed land uses rather than homogeneous zoning; and it
attempts to foster friendliness, and therefore emphasises public rather than private
space. In some senses, then, ‘new urbanism’ is a movement that can be seen as a way
of contesting some of the centrifugal forces inherent in cyberspatial technologies.
Essentially, new urbanism involves the opposite of ‘community without propinquity’. It
puts the emphasis in urban life squarely on ‘geographic, place-based community, where
people have what matters to them most: personal contact made possible through
friendlier streets and walkability and variety and personalism’ (Matathia & Salzman
1998, p. 154).
‘New urbanism’ represents an attempt to plan the world in a particular way. It is as
yet too early to judge the degree of success attaching to the initiative. However, its very
existence highlights opposition to many of the traits that characterise cybercommunities. The discourse of ‘new urbanism’ is therefore evidence of resistance to the totalising
impact sometimes attributed to IT, telecommunications, and cyberspace.
The shift from production to consumption
Another discourse that needs to be factored into any consideration of the changing
nature of community is that surrounding the possibility that contemporary cities are
shifting from being centres of production to being centres of consumption. Zukin
(1992), for instance, has been prominent in promoting the view that the city of the
future will change ‘as consumption of space is abstracted from the logic of industrial
production’ (Graham & Marvin 1996, p. 157). There is certainly increasing evidence
that places in cities are being restructured as centres for consumption, in the sense that
they provide the context within which goods and services are compared, evaluated,
purchased and used (Urry 1995, p. 1). Because places themselves can be ‘consumed’,
there develops an ‘economy of signs’ geared to the economic and cultural transformation of different places into consumable items (Lash & Urry 1994). Also, because
places can be ‘consumed’, the sense or character of a place becomes important. Such
‘sense of place’ is not, of course, something that is given; rather it is something that is
14
D. J. Walmsley
culturally constructed. What is very much at issue, therefore, is the image of the place.
Often image-making is linked to a place’s signiŽ cance in terms of arts, tourism and
leisure. Despite cyberspace and ‘virtual reality’, domestic and international tourism
continues to grow. Increasingly, the consumption of places and the consumption of
goods are interdependent. For example, in Urry’s (1995, p. 28) view, images of places
are routinely used in the symbolic location of products and services (for example,
advertising with a rural idyll or beachside lifestyle as a backdrop); living in or visiting
certain places often involves certain types of consumption (for example, local food,
tickets to local attractions); and certain types of product can only be obtained by
visiting a particular place (for example, studio-based artwork). Locality is, in short, very
important. However, understanding the signiŽ cance of locality is by no means straightforward. Locality is very much an outcome from social and spatial processes that
happen to produce ‘particular combinations of social relations with a given geographically delimited area’ (Urry 1995, p. 63). The nature of these processes is not of concern
here. The critical point in this analysis is that place, and the communities associated
with places, are still vitally important in contemporary life.
Discussions of the shift from production to consumption, and of the critical importance of locality in contemporary life, have often concentrated on the striking and the
spectacular, hence the literature on ‘spectacles’ in the cities of today. Sometimes these
spectacles can take the form of events that are held only at intervals, thus attracting
great interest. An obvious example of such ‘hallmark events’ is the Olympic Games.
More frequent ‘hallmarks’ might be annual grand prix (Hall 1992, pp. 197–201). Aside
from ‘hallmarks’, there are spectacles that are enduring, and yet overtly contrived. The
most striking here are those places ‘where styles and objects from all countries are
merged and where the fake substitutes for the real and in the process becomes more real
than the real’ (Kitchin 1998, p. 17). These ‘hyper-real’ places are exempliŽ ed by
Disneyland and Las Vegas. As with ‘hallmarks’, there are, of course, lower-order
examples of the same phenomenon. London’s Covent Garden is a case in point:
although relatively small-scale, it now has buildings that are pastiches of their former
selves (Castells & Hall 1995).
Postmodernism
The possibility of places capitalising on perceived difference to promote themselves
raises the issue of postmodernism, because there is a school of thought within postmodern writing in social science that holds that increasing differentiation might characterise
society in the future. In simple terms, postmodernism is against universal truths, what
are sometimes called ‘totalising metanarratives’. The central tenet is that there can be
no overarching theory of how society works, because society differs from place to place.
Moreover, ‘reality’ is very much a social construction, re ecting the characteristics of
the individuals making the constructions. In postmodernism, the emphasis is therefore
on heterogeneity, particularity, and uniqueness (Gregory 1989, p. 70). Place is seen not
just as the location where social processes are acted out. Instead, place in uences the
way in which those processes are actually constituted (Soja 1989). Postmodernism
argues that explanation must be contextual rather than nomological, that is to say,
events must be explained by the context in which they occur, rather than by reference
to universal laws or principles. Of course, an emphasis on social construction runs the
risk of discussion becoming enmeshed in relativism. Moreover, focusing on relative
social constructions might overlook the critically important material conditions that
Community, Place and Cyberspace
15
greatly in uence well-being. Nevertheless, there can be no doubt that some writers see
postmodernism as the product of the latest in a series of major changes to the
organisation of society that began with the Renaissance and the emergence of a form of
social organisation that fostered individuality at the expense of community allegiance
(Tuan 1982).
In many ways ‘the advent of a cyberspatial age conŽ rms the end of the modernist
period and our entry into a postmodern world’ (Kitchin 1998, p. x). It therefore holds
out the prospect of fundamental changes to the nature of community (Poster 1995).
Even the sceptics who suggest that the phenomena studied in postmodernism result
from a natural evolution in technology rather than a radical reconŽ guration accept that
signiŽ cant cultural repercussions are likely (Kitchin 1998, p. 97). Many of these
repercussions centre around the signiŽ cance of place and local community. McGrew
(1992), Beauregard (1995) and King (1995) have all argued that IT, cyberspace and
globalisation might bring with them opposition to the homogenising forces supposedly
inherent in these phenomena. In particular, King (1995) highlighted Ž ve polarities:
universalism–particularism, homogenisation–differentiation,
integration–fragmentation, centralisation–decentralisation, and juxtaposition–syncretisation. Just as cyberspace universalises, so it also relativises place and focuses attention on differences
and uniqueness. Just as cyberspace homogenises, so it encourages local groups to
interpret things in different ways. Just as cyberspace encourages large and enormously
powerful corporations, so it also fosters the fragmentation of nations along, for example, ethnic lines. Just as cyberspace leads to a concentration of power, so it can also
facilitate resistance by enabling small groups to access large audiences. And just as
cyberspace encourages time–space convergence, so it can also highlight local social and
cultural traits (Walmsley & Weinand 1997, p. 84). In short, resistance to change can
bring with it a renewed emphasis on local communities.
In the past, as geographical mobility increased and was democratised, so extensive
distinctions of taste were established between different places (Urry 1995, p. 130). The
same might happen with cyberspace. Indeed, place might become increasingly more
signiŽ cant. Thompson (1967) has shown how industrial capitalism ushered in changes
which saw society oriented to tasks instead of to time. Postmodernism might bring with
it an orientation to place. This might be linked to the emergence of a ‘self-service
society’ (Gershuny & Miles 1983). More and more ‘we entertain ourselves, drive
ourselves, feed ourselves, do up our houses, often using highly sophisticated material
goods’ (Urry 1995, p. 116). The locus and focus of such self-service is invariably the
place where we live. It is from this base that we interact with the world. Place, in simple
terms, is the ultimate positional good (Hirsch 1978). Its signiŽ cance transcends any
‘mobility’ brought by the Internet. Communities associated with places might be
expected to persist despite the existence of cyberspace.
The political arena
It is not only social scientists with their arcane vocabulary who are interested in the way
in which cyberspace and telecommunications might be changing the nature of community. The issue is very much on the agenda in Australian politics, often associated
with calls for what is increasingly known as ‘the third way’ in politics, a path located
between market forces on the one hand and state planning on the other hand (Latham
1998; Tanner 1999). Some take the view that cyberspace poses major challenges to the
democratic process as we know it. At the federal or state level, these issues are not of
16
D. J. Walmsley
concern in this paper; emphasis is instead on the community level. Here we need to
remember that the in uence of cyberspace is not working in isolation from other
in uences. ‘The diversiŽ cation of work and social values has also loosened the glue of
social cohesiveness’ (Latham 1998, p. xxi). There is, however, little doubt that developments in telecommunications have changed the nature of society. The impact of
television and IT generally probably lies behind a loss of civic engagement, possibly
exacerbated by the entry of increasing numbers of women into the paid labour force.
For example, Latham (1998, p. 275) quotes Ž gures to show that, in the USA, the
generation born in the 1920s belonged to twice as many civic associations as those born
in the 1960s. Others fear that cyberspace might replace real-world, face-to-face interactions with on-line communication, thereby further diminishing the public sphere of life
(Lajoie 1996). The potential tension between the private and the public was recognised
by Latham (1998, p. xxiv) in his description of the new political landscape:
The political divide is now best conceptualised as a four-plane matrix, split by
the struggle between capital and labour; economic nationalism and economic
internationalism; the information rich and the information poor; and the
realignment of social relations between individualism and the community.
In other words, the tension between individual and community might be every bit as
important as more conventional class-based tensions.
Coming at a time when society runs the risk of becoming more polarised than before,
this concern for the demise of the public is worrying. One of the main concerns is the
marginalisation of certain groups. Tanner (1999, p. 43) has pointed out that:
enormous advances in transport and communications have been tremendously liberating. Yet greater freedom for all has been accompanied by greater
isolation and loneliness for many.
To many, widespread social exclusion in our society is as serious a problem as material
poverty (Giddens 1994, p. 90). This does not, of course, mean that we can ignore
material conditions. This would be unwise, because social and political marginalisation
and material poverty might go together. In rural Australia, some of the hardest
economic times are faced by socially isolated communities with poor IT links and
limited political power. The danger of ignoring the material basis of life in any
discussion of cybercommunities was portrayed starkly by Dyrkton (1996, p. 56): ‘In
Jamaica the breeze of the computer fan empties itself into an abyss of unrelenting
everyday life.’
Social marginalisation runs the risk of downgrading the social capital in many
communities (Putnam 1993). This in itself might be one good reason to be wary about
the impact of cyberspace, given the transitory and superŽ cial nature of the communities
that develop in cyberspace. It might be that society needs to question whether it should
encourage adoption of the highest available technology, irrespective of any adverse
social consequences (Jones 1995, p. 215).
Conclusion
This paper has examined the impact that cyberspace might be having on communities.
In particular, it has argued that there are many reasons for doubting what seem
to be exaggerated claims about the liberating effects of cyberspace. Some of these
cautionary notes become apparent from a close reading of the literature on IT,
Community, Place and Cyberspace
17
telecommunications and cyberspace. Other cautionary notes derive from associated
discourses relating to ‘new urbanism’, the centrality of consumption in contemporary
society, postmodernism, and political writings that might be grouped together under
the emerging descriptor ‘the third way’. The fundamental message of this paper is that
place and local community are, and will continue to be, fundamental to the functioning
of society. Place-based communities should not therefore be threatened by developments in cyberspace. Cyberspace might have annihilated distance, but not place
(Walmsley & Weinand 1997, p. 84). ‘Geography’, in the simple sense of place-to-place
differences, is becoming more, not less, important. This conclusion suggests that the
research agenda for geography should most certainly include a focus on the way in
which geographical variabilit y is constructed, packaged and marketed. Moreover, there
is an urgent need to explore how community and geographical differentiation impacts
on both migration  ows and business investment decisions. Reducing the friction of
distance makes the characteristics of places and communities all the more critical.
Correspondence: Professor Jim Walmsley, Division of Geography & Planning, School of
Human & Environmental Studies, University of New England, Armidale, NSW 2351,
Australia; e-mail: [email protected]
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