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EVOLUTIONISM. SOME LOGICAL - EPISTEMOLOGICAL PUZZLES
ALEXANDRU ANGHELESCU, LAURENŢIU ROZYLOWICZ
Evolutionism. Some logical - epistemological puzzles. Some facts of biology bring changes into epistemology. The
vaccine-virus puzzle, the intelligent amoeboid system and the flower that uses strategies show the limitations of two
fundamental ideas of epistemology: the know-how and know that distinction and the idea that knowledge is a process.
In turn, epistemology, enriched by logical tools, shows to the biologist that we are obliged to apply to the non-human
world the same concepts we apply to humans; this results in a novel picture of life on Earth: even the most humble
beings seem to be endowed with some sort of intelligence. The evolutionist must take into consideration that some sort
of intelligence system may be involved in the evolutionary process of any being on Earth; only a steady research can
throw this idea away. On this path of research the evolutionist will find out that the idea of advance into the unknown is
quite difficult to conceptualize. Logic, with its concept of a logically valid scheme, may hold a key to the mystery.
Key words: evolution, interpretation of a non-human language, intension, extension, advance into the unknown,
logically valid scheme
1. HISTORY OF EVOLUTIONARY CONCEPTS
The joint presentation in 1858 of the selection theory by Charles Darwin and Alfred Russel Wallace
represented the basis of modern evolutionary thinking (Raby, 2001; Mayr, 2002). The paper „On the origin
of species by means of natural selection”, published by Darwin in 1859, explains the diversity of the living
world through natural selection, leading organisms to a gradual (i.e., step like) adaptive evolution. Therefore,
well-adapted individuals are more likely to have more offspring than their less well-adapted intra-specific
competitors. After the publishing of this theory, the fossils have been studied with the purpose of discovering
the ancestors of these extinct and extant species (Bowler, 2003). Moreover, biologists had begun searching
connections between the flora and fauna of different areas of the world, explaining them in an evolutionary
manner. Compared anatomy, systematic, biogeography, paleontology, have integrated this concept in their
researches (Futuyma, 2005).
The early synthesis of evolutionism contained among others orthogenesis, mutationism and later was
assembled into the first synthesis attempt of evolution, published by Fischer (1930). The background of this
modern approach can be found in Mendel’s experiments on plant hybridization, and later in population
genetics. The key idea is that both mutation and natural selection could lead to a gradual populational
change. The main advance in this theory is that it assigns a quantitative label to the fitness concept, now
defined as reproductive success. Other sources of variation are genetic drift, Hardy-Weinberg equilibrium, or
the founder effect (Futuyma, 2005). The theory of natural selection was demonstrated by Dobzhansky
(1951), working especially with fruit flies which synthesized the theoretical populational models with real
data. Mayr (1942) synthesized these modern theories in three theses: population evolution is produced
through numerous small mutations determined by natural selection; similar populations diverge gradually as
response to environmental differences; and macroevolution processes are extrapolations of these processes at
a geological scale.
Presently, genome decoding for an increasing number of species and new paleontological discoveries
lead to a new study direction in evolutionism (Futuyma, 2005), Per example, the study of Hox genes (genes
which set-up the organization of an organism) can address problems relating to the understanding of gradual
adaptation or novelty sources in evolution (Smocovitis, 1996).
2. THEORETICAL DIFFICULTIES OF EVOLUTIONISM
In this second part I will explore some theoretical difficulties of evolutionism. Its problems arise as
we go deeper into the theory. As a rule evolutionists set up the general explanatory scheme without really
trying to prove every point of the mechanism. They looked like one who says: this is an automatic watch and
this is an electronic one without explaining how an automatic watch works and how an electronic one works.
There is one problem left undecided by any form of evolutionism: the concept of “know” they use.
More than 2000 years of epistemology have produced many concepts of know. Here, I will consider that
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found in Einstein (1940), which takes two forms - a strong one and a weak one. The weak one asserts that to
know means to have a theory about a part of reality. The theory is true when its predictions are true. The
strong one asserts that to know means to modify the reality. The strong form includes the weak one, as you
notice.
Using as inspiration one of Hintikka’s analysis of the Newtonian method (Hintikka, 1974: 110), I
will describe in more details the elements presupposed by Einstein’s concept of know. First, the reality is
divided into objects; to these objects are ascribed properties. Objects form classes: the chairs, the birds, the
dogs, etc. Some logicians call them extensions. A member of a class is identified by the properties which all
members of that class share. Some logicians call them intensions. There are also relations between the
objects, which translate into relations between the properties of the objects.
Based on what is known about properties and relations it is possible to make methods\strategies to
manipulate the objects, such as making a car and driving it on a road from point A to point B. We might have
here a logical puzzle or even a logical paradox. But what I am sure of is that we get here an epistemic point.
I challenge two basic ideas of epistemology: the distinction between to know that and to know how
and the very idea that knowledge is a process. To challenge means, here, to show some of theirs limitations.
Let’s see that that I labeled the paradox of Identity1:
I: (a) Object X has property Y
(b) Object X is a chair
____________________
(c) Chair is the object that has property Y
Or
II: (b) object X is a chair
(c ) chair is the object that has property Y
______________________
(a) object X has the property Y
and the rest
III:(a)
IV:(b)
V:(c)
VI: (c)
(c).
(a).
(a).
(b).
(b)
(c)
(b)
(a)
Apparently, we have here six combinations of (a), (b) and (c). In fact we have only one situation,
when (a), (b) and (c) are true at the same time, no matter theirs arrangements in I…VI. It was believed that
the truth of the premises and the logically valid scheme make the conclusion true. It was believed that: there
is T1, when the truth of 2 of them (among (a), (b), (c)) is known and that there is T2, when, due to the
insertion of 2 of them in a logically valid scheme, the truth of the conclusion is established. I assert that there
is only one instant, when the 3 are true in the same time, whatever theirs arrangements in I…VI. Therefore,
logic appears to deal with something slightly different then the voyage of truth. Logic gives a kind of a
description of the possible relations between the actors of the play. I…VI describe the same structure from
six different angles; it describes the relation between them in 6 different ways. For centuries it was believed
that the logic which Aristotle “discovered” put the pupil against the master. No: actually Aristotle’s
“Organon” proves Plato’s epistemology right: There is innate knowledge; the pupil explained the master’s
theory of Ideas. Those who did not understand this fact did not study Plato’s “Parmenides” (be it by Plato or
not…).
The idea that knowledge is a process means that at a certain moment one knows nothing, or not
much, than his\hers knowledge grows. If knowing is a process, how do we advance? Intensions and
extensions come together, in the same instant of time. Induction is a good myth. There is no “logic” of
induction”. The word “logic” has different meanings in the expression “logic of induction” or “inductive
logic”. Induction is one of the poorest explanations of those who try to explain the success of science. We
need better concepts if we want to explain to ourselves how we know.
I proceed by introducing three situations of knowledge:
1) M0, when no human being knows. We will notice that this situation is very difficult to imagine.
This is the ideal moment zero when humans started to know. The first thing humans have to do at M0 is to
start making differences: “to construct” the objects, to say so. But this may be impossible at M0, because
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I assert that this is one of the senses of Plato’s 3rd man argument. It goes on the lines of the skepticism of Francis
Sances and of Stroud’s aeroplane-spotters manual (Stroud,1984: p.80)
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extensions and intensions are known at the same time. At M0 we are not in the situation of a child which
learns from an adult what a chair is (by pointing the finger to a chair, by explanation, etc...). At M0 non one
knows.
Imagine the moment when the humans saw for the first time some animals. There is no moment in
time T1 when only the extensions are known and the intensions are not known. This would be: they knew
that those animals in front of them were rabbits, but they did not know the characteristics of the rabbits. They
knew that those were rabbits because they knew what rabbits are. We can recognize rabbits because we
know what rabbits are. There is no moment in time T2 when they knew what rabbits are, but they did not
know if those animals in front of them were rabbits or not (and they could see then clearly).
When the first humans saw the animals later called rabbits they might have assumed that there were
a class of animals with characteristics X and Y and Z. When, by (suppose it) try and error, they arrived at the
real characteristics of rabbits (say X and Y, and they eliminated Z), in that instant of time, the intension and
the extension of “rabbits” were discovered - at the same time. That later started the process of spreading the
knowledge… it is a different story.
2) M2012, today. We know some things about the world we live in (what we were able to grasp from
planet Earth and from the instruments we constructed on planet Earth and sent into space). We use what we
already know (or assume to know) so that we grasp more knowledge.
3) MW′. Imagine that a human spaceship arrives at one point in space. One astronaut walks out of
the spaceship, and he is connected with the spaceship by a kind of rope. He steeps foot in one region of the
space of the universe (let’s call it: SU) and he perceives no object in the SU. He steps back from the SU and
perceives objects again. He, then, steeps back in the SU and perceives no object (no sound, no imagine, no
smell that can help his brain to identify an object we know). Some other colleagues join in and the same
happens. The general idea is that in the SU none of the knowledge we humans possess today (logic,
mathematics, chemistry, physics, biology, etc.) can be applied and no human is able to “construct” even one
object. In the SU chemistry and physics are different and/or unknown. In the SU no human is able to know.
It is as if someone reads something as 01024212417272017241023272 and has no idea if this
signifies something or not. The following is a text which carries a message: “Pitagoras is the master who
invented the very word “philosophia”. The predicate predicated of itself is the description of God used by
this philosopher. The poet uses the liar paradox (when he said that he cannot understand the predicate
predicated of itself); “the pending is a reader’s homework”. Let’s call it Text A. While the following carries,
apparently, none:
“erfgjhevckuygfjhiueygqjheiefrgiehfbv58745igkvvt6c4t84u5yl3jhregidv6ft9owu5jy4hgrsd7fywv45oy8g87c
wyn48owbc8475tvobwiu4e5rygs9o87b 749tgvwn45t w94576tf2n5y4gwuygi”. Let’s call it Text B.
What do we do if we want to know if Text B is a nonsensical succession of signs or an encrypted
message? We try to use a method. Text A is the image of our world, while Text B is the image of a world to
be known, of a world which we have no idea if it is known-able or unknown-able.
The question is: how do we start knowing? How do we break into the Text B? For the difference
between Text A and Text B is not the difference between:”sunet innoapte (o) lunalinlucestecorcodusecad”
and “rarelunacreutansordifanfluueiner”. The first might be the world known, an orderly world, while the
second might be the world almost known. No, here I speak of a world completely unknown, of a world
whose degree of order-ability is unknown.
One fundamental presupposition of physics and chemistry is that in all corners of the universe the
same physical and chemical truths are to be discovered. We have no idea if trillions of light years from
planet Earth, in who knows what galaxy, the physical and chemical truths are the same as the ones we
assume to have discovered here, in our corner of the universe.
We will have to start making differences; presuppose that that and that are chairs and rocks. But we
can follow no strategy. For to have a strategy means to already know one part of reality: what objects there
are, what properties do these objects have, what relations do exist between the properties of these objects. A
strategy is step 4, while knowing extensions and intensions is step 1. I call it the fallacy of misplaced
knowledge. If we cannot use a strategy to break down the unknown in the SU, than can we know? Probably,
by luck .We could continue to play with constructing classes of objects with characteristics ad infinitum. If
all that we perceive by our senses, does not result in one object (but one object may mean a whole extension;
or it could be an extension with only one object; etc.) in our brain, than, we will know nothing in the SU.
Suppose that we will want to construct instruments in order to be able to better perceive in the SU. How
would we know what instrument to construct? A theory - neutral instrument we need, as – in a different
context A. Gruenbaum (in Putnam, 2001) asked for. If we have to choose between competing instruments,
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we choose instrument A and not instrument B, using some criteria. If the instrument A proves to be
successful, it means that the criteria we used to choose instrument A is a criteria which encrypts (in itself)
knowledge (s. Plato, “Parmenides”,132a6-b11, for the so called third-man argument). We get into the
problem of the criteria of the criteria of the criteria… ad infinitum. Therefore, we were not in the situation of
one which knows nothing at all. Once the criteria we have used to choose between the competing
instruments A and B gives us positive results (i.e. we gain knowledge using the instrument A), it means that
that criteria encrypted in itself knowledge. Therefore, there was no M0 in MW’. To make the scenario even
more powerful, assume that the method of elimination (we try all instruments we can invent until one of
them is successful) does not work either. Elimination works when the possibilities that are to be eliminated
are not many. Knowing the number of possibilities that are to be eliminated already represents knowledge.
But when one does not even know how many possibilities are to be eliminated the search for the
Holy Grail might seem the easiest endeavor. If we have a situation when the possibilities that are to be
eliminated are billions…our only hope would be luck.
The situation of MW’ is similar to that of interpreting a non-human language. According to Quine’s
pupil, the principle of Charity and the idea that logic is common to all human beings make possible the
interpretation of a human language. Dummett and his pupils also considered the 3-valued logic (Davidson
went on only with two-valued logic); others, like G. Sandu will show that there is also the IF logic, while M.
Stokhof would point the finger to the DP Logic. In short, the Logic which in Davidson’s vision is common to
all human beings keeps on growing by the day. In the case of a non-human language we may not use the idea
that human and non-human beings share the same logic (whatever that logic might be). We remain only with
Charity, that is: with the idea that the non-human being who tries to communicate with us says something
which has sense and not just a succession of sounds without any meaning. We know that the MW’ has an
ontology, that there are objects, with properties, etc., as we know that the non-human being speaking to us
says something.
M0. It was pointed out that the way back from M2012 to M0 will mean passing from humans to
monkeys, for we developed from monkeys, or -as it looks today- from Ardi. This is where evolution comes
into place. It was argued that knowledge was passed from monkeys/Ardi (via genes?) to humans in the
process of evolution. And from monkeys/Ardi we have to go back to another form of life. The question is:
where do we have to stop? At the simplest form of life? (what a “form of life” is exactly?) So it is argued, in
an evolutionist fashion, that the search for M0 must lead to the search for the simplest (or oldest?) form of
life. Well, again, this may prove to be more difficult than the search for the Holy Grail. And even if we
manage to discover the simplest (or oldest?) form of life, we still have to answer the question: how did it
start knowing? For if it was to be, that simplest\oldest form of life had to know something in order to survive
and evolve into another being. To be means to know, as the “father Parmenides” would put it. That
simplest\oldest being did not have an M0: from the moment it started to exist, it knew something. We notice
here one presupposition of evolutionism: that there was a start, whether the start of the universe (the BingBang or whatever), or of life (or both). What if there was no start at all? Here we notice another deep
presupposition of these scientists: everything has to have a beginning (and an end?). That everything must
have a beginning (and an end) it is just a quite poor induction from what we notice on planet Earth: humans
come into being and die, birds do the same, etc., etc. But that the universe in itself is (as?) a huge being with
a beginning (and an end?) it is just a too long jump from what we assume to know about the Earth and its
around – ings to what we do not know. The same is valid for that simplest\oldest\first being of evolutionism.
And this difficulty reminds us of another problem of evolutionism: the very concept of “nature”. One
can come across sentences as: “Nature does Y”, “As always nature takes care of its …”. What this “nature”
is looks as a deeper mystery that what God in itself would be. The ambiguous and – sometimes nonsensical –
“nature” seems to have taken the place of God in the explanatory scheme of the evolutionism. This “nature”
is endowed with almost magical powers; this “nature” knows all and does all. All that an evolutionist cannot
explain is put in the basket of “nature”. To these evolutionists, the actors of evolutionism do not think, the
thinking is done by this “Nature”.
The core problem of evolutionism was that it could not explain how a being can evolve. To evolve
means to know the direction of the “successfully” evolution, to know that only that and that ear, eye or finger
would better suit that and that being. Now, that we humans try to design robots, we better understand what it
really means for a surrogate being to have that and that leg, eye, movement ability. We conduct research,
long and steady research, in order to understand why, how and when a robot must receive that or that
superior ability. As Zeno would put it : a being knows that it needs that or that superior ability before even
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knowing it; it arrives before starting. A being never has an M0. To it, knowledge looks as an encrypted
message: once a bit is decrypted, it comes all along.
The theory of the genetic drift looks more adapted to such criticism. It goes only with arbitrary
evolution, due to chemical constrains. The genetic drift theory implies that evolution was possible. The
Earth was endowed with elements of life which allow for evolution. The genetic drift theory moves the
explanatory scheme from the explanation of the process to the explanation of the possibility of the process
(and it leaves the business of this explanation to others). In the explanatory scheme of the genetic drift theory
some combinatorics of some say – fundamental - elements can lead to an advance. If by accident (and a
limited number of possibilities to be “exploited“) that and that combination comes out, than evolution takes
place. To them evolution is like a slot machine.
Evolutionism cannot separate evolution and the epistemic “process”. If all beings learn in theirs life
time we have to see what place this learning takes in the process of evolution.
The problem of Darwin was that he could not understand that logic acts as, to follow Russell, a kind
of kantian sunglasses. If some people – today - believe that logic is optional, I answer that logic is
compulsory. The sunglasses of Bertrand Russell are still there. And we cannot change them as fashion
changes. I add that the first color of these sunglasses is given by logic. It might even be said that logic is
Kant’s sunglasses. What can we be sure of today is that a logically valid scheme encrypts in itself
knowledge. Here, a logically valid scheme correctly describes what relations can stand between the actors of
the intension-extension play, whatever the actors are. A logically valid scheme gives us at least some general
information on the Earthly world. As long as we modify the Earth, we are sure that our logical sunglasses do
not misguide us. If they are an instrument or not, this is a different story.
I would say that the advocates of the genetic drift theory would have to find out if logic takes any
place into theirs explanatory scheme.
The idea that logic is a Kantian sunglass already gives us a partial answer to the MW′ and the
interpretation of a non-human language puzzles:
There is an, let’s say, intimate and yet not completely known relation between the ontology
of this corner of the universe and logic. If logic does not work at MW’ it might be because its ontology is
different.
If a non-human language cannot be interpreted it might be because the logic used by its
speakers is different
Let’s go back to the distinction between know- how and know-that.
To really know means ( as we agree today):
to possess a method\strategy to obtain something
to explain the knowledge to others (thus spreading knowledge) by using a language or\and
other ways of transmitting information
Solve problems
Here we get some puzzles:
a)
The vaccine-virus puzzle. This puzzle shows us that some knowledge is probably encrypted
into our genes, and that we cannot yet explain where we got this knowledge from and also that the knowhow and know-that distinction has its limits.
b)
Knowledge in the “animal” world.
a) A vaccine, in some cases (say: for hepatitis) is made out of some parts of a dead virus. This is
done for the intent is to foul the human organism (make it believe that the virus entered into the organism) so
that the organism produces the elements it needs in order to defend itself from the attacks of the virus. This
means that our organism knows how to defend itself. A vaccine is not a professor teaching a defensive
strategy to our organism; the organism knows the defensive strategy.
Is the knowledge which the organism has a know how or a know that? An expert in viruses would be
able to explain why and how the organism builds its defenses, but many billions of humans (whose
organisms know the defensive strategy) will not be able to explain it. In short: billions of humans do not
know how to defend themselves from a virus, but the organisms of these billions of humans know how to
defend from that same virus. And this is why the vaccine works. The core of the puzzle is: this knowledge
which the organism has is a known or an unknown knowledge? Or, as Lao Zi said: “zhī bù zhī, shàng. bù zhī
zhī,bìng .[…].shèng rén bù bìng. yĭ qí bìng bìng, shì yĭ bù bìng” (My translations) To know that one/ you
does not know is good. To not know that one/ you knows is sick…The sage is not sick. Because he is sick of
this sickness, he is not sick. (Lao Zi, 1988)).
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b.1) Nakagaki T. et al. (2004) have discovered that an amoeboid organism can solve a maze problem.
Solving a problem – in the human world - is considered to be a sign of possessing intellect and
intelligence…If an amoeboid organism can solve problems, are other non-human beings able to solve
problems? And if they are able to do it, does it mean that they know, as we human beings know?
b.2) Flowers do use strategies. It is known that some flowers trap insects by masquerading
themselves into some other (better say: real) flowers. If we apply to this case of biology the concepts which
we apply to humans we would have: the flower conducted research into the habits and eating preferences of
some insects on hers (flowers) menu. The flower finds out what the insects would like to eat, and prepares
the meal. The flower thinks, conducts extensive research, uses its memory, discovers, etc. To a human being
we would easily apply these concepts. To flowers we hesitate, for we know that flowers do not think. How
do we know this? Would it be (like) a computer program?
These puzzles rise some questions:
1)
Do non-human beings on Earth possess knowledge? And language? Do they transmit
knowledge from one to another? Do they have classifications? The answer seems to be “yes” to all of them.
The biologist called Aristotle was right in his research options… One possible explanation for the failure of
interpreting the languages used by other non-human beings on this Earth is that the logic used by them is
different. If this hypothesis proves true, we would have to give an answer to the question: does theirs logic
also encrypt knowledge? And to the next one: does the ontology of this Earth allow for different logics? Or
behind the supposed different logics there is one common logic, yet to be discovered? The same goes for a
non-earthly language. Note here that the success of interpretation may mean that the ontology of our corner
of the universe and that of the corner of the universe of the non-earthly being are identical. The next
generations will have a pleasant journey to go. The Quipo writing shows that a language takes different
forms.
The only strong differences are given by the fact that they do not seem to poses written languages
and that they do not seem able to manipulate planet Earth in the way humans do. Tragically, it is the human
being’s great ability to destroy the Earth which clearly differentiates us from other earthly beings. We seem
to be the being which can destroy any other being on Earth, while a virus - one of the earthly “things” which
can wipe out humans from the face of the Earth - is not even considered to be “life”.
2)
How was evolution possible? By pure physical and chemical constrains? By reason? Or by
both of them?
The evolutionist must take into consideration that humans introduced into the realm of “nature”
another kind of evolution: evolution by reason; once other earthly beings are “endowed” with reason, we are
obliged to ask ourselves if they can also introduce this kind of evolution into the realm of “nature”. One
cannot make sense of the idea of evolution without explaining the M0 and the advance from M0 to M2012
(or Mn).
The picture I have offered in this paper might help the evolutionist make a better choice. Some
logical tools might also prove to be helpful:
N(T 1…Tn )[T1…Tn]CpLNMq . (T1…Tx )(T 1…Tn)CpNq. (T1….Tx) N(T1…Tn)Cpq.
(T1…Tn)(T1…Tn)Cpq. (T1…Tn)(T1…Tn) CpDpq. (T1…..Tn)(T1….Tn)CMpq.[T1….Tn]p.
This epistemological voyage may also help some logicians to better understand that annoyingly ( and
ambiguous) term “our < logical> intuitions”, as one can find – par example- in “ the intuitive implausibility
of EFQ” (Read, 1988:21)
I may conclude saying that Quine’s master and Russell’s friend – Whitehead - was correct when he
said that the whole of the western philosophy “consists of a series of footnotes to Plato”(Whitehead, 1978:
39). This argument is a restatement of Plato’s “Meno’s paradox, refurbished by his “Parmenides”.
And what is all this argument valid for? If the other beings on this Earth would be “allowed” to
think, speak, know we might also understand, following Kant, that in this cold universe they have the same
rights to Being.
Acknowledgements
The author of the second part (Alexandru Anghelescu) would like to deeply thank Professor Hilary
Putnam for his comments on an early form of this argument. To Professor Gabriel Sandu for an argument of
one negation. To Adelaida Ioachim for hers idea on ,,evolution” from M2012 to M0 and the reversely passed
knowledge.
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