Popper and Xenophanes - ORCA
... It is next appropriate to summarise Popper’s commentary on this
fragment. As he remarks, this passage goes beyond asserting the
conjectural character of human knowledge, and presents a theory of
objective knowledge, for which, even if you or I may say something true,
neither you nor I nor anyone wil ...
Epistemological Vs - Birkbeck, University of London
... But why all this creative reconstruction, all this make believe? The stimulation
of his sensory receptors is all the evidence anybody has had to go on, ultimately,
in arriving at his picture of the world. Why not just see how this construction
really proceeds? Why not settle for psychology! (Quine ( ...
DAMIAN ILODIGWE OAKESHOTT`S CRITIQUE OF SOVEREIGNTY
... effectively, as noted, that our theories may be sound but fail to apply to concrete existential
situations of political life.14
On Oakeshott’s view, the Achilles heel of rationalism consists precisely in failure to grasp
the significance of the disjunction between logic and political life and the r ...
Willful Ignorance and Self-Deception
... The issue has importance for a number of reasons. First, the task of distinguishing selfdeception from a kindred phenomenon such as willful ignorance can only help improve our
understanding of each. Even if we already feel that the two phenomena are distinct, the exercise
is of value in clarifying t ...
minimalism and truth
... possibility is that “is true” picks out a non-natural -- gerrymandered, gruesomely disjunctive -property. 11 Another possibility is that “is true” picks out a non-explanatory, or at any rate nonsystematically-explanatory property; i.e. that the predicate plays no explanatory role in a
suitably matur ...
Intuition, Belief, and Rational Criticisability
... Third, suppose that someone suggested a new mental kind, a propositional attitude that she claimed had so far been overlooked. It would be
reasonable to request a demonstration that the new kind plays a role in
a psychological or philosophical theory that cannot be played by already
acknowledged ent ...
Scepticism with regard to Reason* David Owen, University of
... demonstrative argument, not just that it might be unsound, but that it actually turns into a
probable argument. Fogelin (Fogelin 1993) argues that this is a consequence of Hume’s claim
that “knowledge degenerates into probability”. Against Hume, Fogelin argues that “the fact that
there may be some c ...
Notes on Epistemology
... II. Second Objection: The power of analyzing the assents is either a
power of arriving at truth or it is not. If it is not, it will be of no
avail to employ it in investigating the spontaneous assents; for
by its use we shall learn nothing about them. If it is a power of
arriving at truth, then you ...
Reid`s defense of common sense - Scholars Archive
... is sometimes misread as claiming that no defense could be given. Yet
Reid does defend common sense. This paper explores how he does so.
Before engaging Reid directly, however, I want to consider two other
ways in which Reid is sometimes misread.
First, Norman Daniels () reads Reid as follows: Re ...
Counterfactuals and Modal Epistemology
... the laws of physics. For one thing, it is an open question whether or not
the true, actual laws of physics are metaphysically necessary.5 For instance,
we may have a counterfactual with an antecedent which violates the actual
laws of physics, but whether such an antecedent is metaphysically impossib ...
Forthcoming in Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 1996. HOW TO
... literature offers two possible answers to the question as to how this distinction is to be
characterised. One view is that it is primarily a semantic distinction, to be defined in terms
of possession of truth conditions, or some such. The other view is that it is primarily a
psychological distinctio ...
... If S’s belief B is justified but does not owe its justification to anything, then, a fortiori, it doesn’t
owe its justification wholly to (i), (ii), or (iii). One might ask, however: if brute basicality is
allowed, why not brute nonbasicality, the view that nonbasic beliefs are justified but do not ...
Truth, Value and Epistemic Expressivism
... a fact about games; it is also a fact about winning. Similarly, the fact that
the aim of belief is truth is not just a fact about belief; it is a fact about truth.
Of course, the nature and explanation of this fact, like its sister fact about
belief, is a matter of dispute.17
Although they are disti ...
Cohen paper, revised
... from moral justification, legal justification, and the like. ‘Justification’ is clear enough: to say
that a belief is justified is to say that it has some positive normative status, but we need to know
which domain or dimension of appraisal it scores positively on. Because Cohen’s opponent can’t
EXPERIENCE AND PERCEPTUAL BELIEF
... transcend the experiences that prompt them. More important, perceptual statements
transcend introspective reports and cannot be validly derived from them. And it is
perceptual statements about the world outside us that we need for the ‘empirical basis
of science’. We cannot test scientific theories ...
Epistemic Reasons II: Basing
... the streets are wet” sounds like it could be literally true. Life is harder, however, due to the possibility
of reasoning in the light (or darkness?) of false beliefs. Here we cannot straightforwardly replace
causally relevant mental states with worldly facts. And surely false propositions are not c ...
What Can We Know A Priori?1 C.S.I. Jenkins Draft only. Please
... Of course, sometimes we believe p only because it seems to us that things couldn’t be any
other way, and when it transpires that they can our motivation for p disappears. But
Devitt has not argued that anything of that kind is going on in this case.
Moreover, there are various other motivations for ...
NOTES ON LOGIC 1913
... case of its truth and the case of its falsehood. We call this the sense of a
In regard to notation, it is important to note that not every feature of
a symbol symbolizes. In two molecular functions which have the
same T-F schema, what symbolizes must be the same. In "not-not-p",
Phenomenal Concepts and the Private Language
... about subjective states. Moreover, these ways of thinking are only available to people who have
had those experiences themselves. This certainly looks like the kind of thing Wittgenstein was
Still, we should not be too quick. Clearly Wittgenstein did not want to rule out all possible
The Principle of Four-Cornered Negation in Indian Philosophy P.T.
... Up to this point philosopher found that it was possible to doubt the truth of every
statement, and even said that they could doubt whether they doubted. Do the "doubting
and denial" and "the doubting and denial of doubting and denial" imply that there is no
reality with a fixed nature? A thoroughgo ...
Not Every Truth Can Be Known (at least, not all
... omniscience [1, 5], these answers do not address the question I take to be asked
by Fitch’s paradox. I say this because upon reflection, the principles motivating a
knowability thesis in fact undercut its application in a case such as p ∧ ¬Kp. Consider any truth p, of which we are ignorant. Given th ...
Knowledge and the curriculum - Brunel University Research Archive
... multifaceted phenomenon. The requirements for a curriculum for learning mathematics are,
after all, quite different from curricula concerned with, for example, car mechanics, aviation,
brain surgery, beauty therapy, citizenship, critical thinking, and so on. It is also important
not to think of thes ...
AN OBVIOUS-BASED ACCOUNT OF EPISTEMIC POSSIBILITY
... that they will be borne out.”6
3. A referee suggests making a small point explicit, and then says, “I know no one
will get confused about this, but it’s possible someone will.”7
4. “I know I have hands, even though it’s possible I’m a handless brain in a vat.”8
Postmodernism in a Nutshell
... expert. Where the expert is aware of his knowledge the philosopher is not, but poses questions. In light of this uncertainty, Lyotard states that his portrayal of the state of knowledge “makes
no claims to being original or even true”, and that his hypotheses “should not be accorded predictive value ...
... problem, which emerges from an imagined interrogation. Suppose you believe that
Q. Then someone asks you a legitimate question concerning the basis of your belief
that Q. You respond by citing reason R1. You are then legitimately asked about your
basis for believing R1. You cite reason R2. Then you ...
For a general discussion of skepticism, see Skepticism.Philosophical skepticism (UK spelling scepticism; from Greek σκέψις skepsis, ""inquiry"") is both a philosophical school of thought and a method that crosses disciplines and cultures.It is generally agreed that knowledge requires justification. It is not enough to have a true belief: one must also have good reasons for that belief. Skeptics claim that it is not possible to have an adequate justification.Skepticism is not a single position but covers a range of different positions. In the ancient world there were two main skeptical traditions. Academic skepticism took the dogmatic position that knowledge was not possible; Pyrrhonian skeptics refused to take a dogmatic position on any issue—including skepticism. Radical skepticism ends in the paradoxical claim that one cannot know anything—including that one cannot know anything.Skepticism can be classified according to its scope. Local skepticism involves being skeptical about particular areas of knowledge, e.g. moral skepticism, skepticism about the external world, or skepticism about other minds, whereas global skepticism is skeptical about the possibility of any knowledge at all.Skepticism can also be classified according to its method. In the Western tradition there are two basic approaches to skepticism. Cartesian skepticism, named somewhat misleadingly after René Descartes who was not a skeptic but used some traditional skeptical arguments in his Meditations to help establish his rationalist approach to knowledge, attempts to show that any proposed knowledge claim can be doubted. Agrippan skepticism focuses on the process of justification rather than the possibility of doubt. According to this view there are three ways in which one might attempt to justify a claim but none of them are adequate. One can keep on providing further justification but this leads to an infinite regress; one can stop at a dogmatic assertion; or one can argue in a circle.Philosophical skepticism is distinguished from methodological skepticism in that philosophical skepticism is an approach that questions the possibility of certainty in knowledge, whereas methodological skepticism is an approach that subjects all knowledge claims to scrutiny with the goal of sorting out true from false claims.