Popper and Xenophanes - ORCA
... It is next appropriate to summarise Popper’s commentary on this fragment. As he remarks, this passage goes beyond asserting the conjectural character of human knowledge, and presents a theory of objective knowledge, for which, even if you or I may say something true, neither you nor I nor anyone wil ...
... It is next appropriate to summarise Popper’s commentary on this fragment. As he remarks, this passage goes beyond asserting the conjectural character of human knowledge, and presents a theory of objective knowledge, for which, even if you or I may say something true, neither you nor I nor anyone wil ...
Epistemological Vs - Birkbeck, University of London
... But why all this creative reconstruction, all this make believe? The stimulation of his sensory receptors is all the evidence anybody has had to go on, ultimately, in arriving at his picture of the world. Why not just see how this construction really proceeds? Why not settle for psychology! (Quine ( ...
... But why all this creative reconstruction, all this make believe? The stimulation of his sensory receptors is all the evidence anybody has had to go on, ultimately, in arriving at his picture of the world. Why not just see how this construction really proceeds? Why not settle for psychology! (Quine ( ...
DAMIAN ILODIGWE OAKESHOTT`S CRITIQUE OF SOVEREIGNTY
... effectively, as noted, that our theories may be sound but fail to apply to concrete existential situations of political life.14 On Oakeshott’s view, the Achilles heel of rationalism consists precisely in failure to grasp the significance of the disjunction between logic and political life and the r ...
... effectively, as noted, that our theories may be sound but fail to apply to concrete existential situations of political life.14 On Oakeshott’s view, the Achilles heel of rationalism consists precisely in failure to grasp the significance of the disjunction between logic and political life and the r ...
Willful Ignorance and Self-Deception
... The issue has importance for a number of reasons. First, the task of distinguishing selfdeception from a kindred phenomenon such as willful ignorance can only help improve our understanding of each. Even if we already feel that the two phenomena are distinct, the exercise is of value in clarifying t ...
... The issue has importance for a number of reasons. First, the task of distinguishing selfdeception from a kindred phenomenon such as willful ignorance can only help improve our understanding of each. Even if we already feel that the two phenomena are distinct, the exercise is of value in clarifying t ...
minimalism and truth
... possibility is that “is true” picks out a non-natural -- gerrymandered, gruesomely disjunctive -property. 11 Another possibility is that “is true” picks out a non-explanatory, or at any rate nonsystematically-explanatory property; i.e. that the predicate plays no explanatory role in a suitably matur ...
... possibility is that “is true” picks out a non-natural -- gerrymandered, gruesomely disjunctive -property. 11 Another possibility is that “is true” picks out a non-explanatory, or at any rate nonsystematically-explanatory property; i.e. that the predicate plays no explanatory role in a suitably matur ...
Intuition, Belief, and Rational Criticisability
... Third, suppose that someone suggested a new mental kind, a propositional attitude that she claimed had so far been overlooked. It would be reasonable to request a demonstration that the new kind plays a role in a psychological or philosophical theory that cannot be played by already acknowledged ent ...
... Third, suppose that someone suggested a new mental kind, a propositional attitude that she claimed had so far been overlooked. It would be reasonable to request a demonstration that the new kind plays a role in a psychological or philosophical theory that cannot be played by already acknowledged ent ...
Notes on Epistemology
... II. Second Objection: The power of analyzing the assents is either a power of arriving at truth or it is not. If it is not, it will be of no avail to employ it in investigating the spontaneous assents; for by its use we shall learn nothing about them. If it is a power of arriving at truth, then you ...
... II. Second Objection: The power of analyzing the assents is either a power of arriving at truth or it is not. If it is not, it will be of no avail to employ it in investigating the spontaneous assents; for by its use we shall learn nothing about them. If it is a power of arriving at truth, then you ...
Scepticism with regard to Reason* David Owen, University of
... demonstrative argument, not just that it might be unsound, but that it actually turns into a probable argument. Fogelin (Fogelin 1993) argues that this is a consequence of Hume’s claim that “knowledge degenerates into probability”. Against Hume, Fogelin argues that “the fact that there may be some c ...
... demonstrative argument, not just that it might be unsound, but that it actually turns into a probable argument. Fogelin (Fogelin 1993) argues that this is a consequence of Hume’s claim that “knowledge degenerates into probability”. Against Hume, Fogelin argues that “the fact that there may be some c ...
Reid`s defense of common sense - Scholars Archive
... is sometimes misread as claiming that no defense could be given. Yet Reid does defend common sense. This paper explores how he does so. Before engaging Reid directly, however, I want to consider two other ways in which Reid is sometimes misread. First, Norman Daniels () reads Reid as follows: Re ...
... is sometimes misread as claiming that no defense could be given. Yet Reid does defend common sense. This paper explores how he does so. Before engaging Reid directly, however, I want to consider two other ways in which Reid is sometimes misread. First, Norman Daniels () reads Reid as follows: Re ...
Counterfactuals and Modal Epistemology
... the laws of physics. For one thing, it is an open question whether or not the true, actual laws of physics are metaphysically necessary.5 For instance, we may have a counterfactual with an antecedent which violates the actual laws of physics, but whether such an antecedent is metaphysically impossib ...
... the laws of physics. For one thing, it is an open question whether or not the true, actual laws of physics are metaphysically necessary.5 For instance, we may have a counterfactual with an antecedent which violates the actual laws of physics, but whether such an antecedent is metaphysically impossib ...
Forthcoming in Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 1996. HOW TO
... literature offers two possible answers to the question as to how this distinction is to be characterised. One view is that it is primarily a semantic distinction, to be defined in terms of possession of truth conditions, or some such. The other view is that it is primarily a psychological distinctio ...
... literature offers two possible answers to the question as to how this distinction is to be characterised. One view is that it is primarily a semantic distinction, to be defined in terms of possession of truth conditions, or some such. The other view is that it is primarily a psychological distinctio ...
Foundationalism
... If S’s belief B is justified but does not owe its justification to anything, then, a fortiori, it doesn’t owe its justification wholly to (i), (ii), or (iii). One might ask, however: if brute basicality is allowed, why not brute nonbasicality, the view that nonbasic beliefs are justified but do not ...
... If S’s belief B is justified but does not owe its justification to anything, then, a fortiori, it doesn’t owe its justification wholly to (i), (ii), or (iii). One might ask, however: if brute basicality is allowed, why not brute nonbasicality, the view that nonbasic beliefs are justified but do not ...
Truth, Value and Epistemic Expressivism
... a fact about games; it is also a fact about winning. Similarly, the fact that the aim of belief is truth is not just a fact about belief; it is a fact about truth. Of course, the nature and explanation of this fact, like its sister fact about belief, is a matter of dispute.17 Although they are disti ...
... a fact about games; it is also a fact about winning. Similarly, the fact that the aim of belief is truth is not just a fact about belief; it is a fact about truth. Of course, the nature and explanation of this fact, like its sister fact about belief, is a matter of dispute.17 Although they are disti ...
Cohen paper, revised
... from moral justification, legal justification, and the like. ‘Justification’ is clear enough: to say that a belief is justified is to say that it has some positive normative status, but we need to know which domain or dimension of appraisal it scores positively on. Because Cohen’s opponent can’t an ...
... from moral justification, legal justification, and the like. ‘Justification’ is clear enough: to say that a belief is justified is to say that it has some positive normative status, but we need to know which domain or dimension of appraisal it scores positively on. Because Cohen’s opponent can’t an ...
EXPERIENCE AND PERCEPTUAL BELIEF
... transcend the experiences that prompt them. More important, perceptual statements transcend introspective reports and cannot be validly derived from them. And it is perceptual statements about the world outside us that we need for the ‘empirical basis of science’. We cannot test scientific theories ...
... transcend the experiences that prompt them. More important, perceptual statements transcend introspective reports and cannot be validly derived from them. And it is perceptual statements about the world outside us that we need for the ‘empirical basis of science’. We cannot test scientific theories ...
Epistemic Reasons II: Basing
... the streets are wet” sounds like it could be literally true. Life is harder, however, due to the possibility of reasoning in the light (or darkness?) of false beliefs. Here we cannot straightforwardly replace causally relevant mental states with worldly facts. And surely false propositions are not c ...
... the streets are wet” sounds like it could be literally true. Life is harder, however, due to the possibility of reasoning in the light (or darkness?) of false beliefs. Here we cannot straightforwardly replace causally relevant mental states with worldly facts. And surely false propositions are not c ...
What Can We Know A Priori?1 C.S.I. Jenkins Draft only. Please
... Of course, sometimes we believe p only because it seems to us that things couldn’t be any other way, and when it transpires that they can our motivation for p disappears. But Devitt has not argued that anything of that kind is going on in this case. Moreover, there are various other motivations for ...
... Of course, sometimes we believe p only because it seems to us that things couldn’t be any other way, and when it transpires that they can our motivation for p disappears. But Devitt has not argued that anything of that kind is going on in this case. Moreover, there are various other motivations for ...
NOTES ON LOGIC 1913
... case of its truth and the case of its falsehood. We call this the sense of a proposition. In regard to notation, it is important to note that not every feature of a symbol symbolizes. In two molecular functions which have the same T-F schema, what symbolizes must be the same. In "not-not-p", "not-p, ...
... case of its truth and the case of its falsehood. We call this the sense of a proposition. In regard to notation, it is important to note that not every feature of a symbol symbolizes. In two molecular functions which have the same T-F schema, what symbolizes must be the same. In "not-not-p", "not-p, ...
Phenomenal Concepts and the Private Language
... about subjective states. Moreover, these ways of thinking are only available to people who have had those experiences themselves. This certainly looks like the kind of thing Wittgenstein was against. Still, we should not be too quick. Clearly Wittgenstein did not want to rule out all possible termin ...
... about subjective states. Moreover, these ways of thinking are only available to people who have had those experiences themselves. This certainly looks like the kind of thing Wittgenstein was against. Still, we should not be too quick. Clearly Wittgenstein did not want to rule out all possible termin ...
The Principle of Four-Cornered Negation in Indian Philosophy P.T.
... Up to this point philosopher found that it was possible to doubt the truth of every statement, and even said that they could doubt whether they doubted. Do the "doubting and denial" and "the doubting and denial of doubting and denial" imply that there is no reality with a fixed nature? A thoroughgo ...
... Up to this point philosopher found that it was possible to doubt the truth of every statement, and even said that they could doubt whether they doubted. Do the "doubting and denial" and "the doubting and denial of doubting and denial" imply that there is no reality with a fixed nature? A thoroughgo ...
Not Every Truth Can Be Known (at least, not all
... omniscience [1, 5], these answers do not address the question I take to be asked by Fitch’s paradox. I say this because upon reflection, the principles motivating a knowability thesis in fact undercut its application in a case such as p ∧ ¬Kp. Consider any truth p, of which we are ignorant. Given th ...
... omniscience [1, 5], these answers do not address the question I take to be asked by Fitch’s paradox. I say this because upon reflection, the principles motivating a knowability thesis in fact undercut its application in a case such as p ∧ ¬Kp. Consider any truth p, of which we are ignorant. Given th ...
Knowledge and the curriculum - Brunel University Research Archive
... multifaceted phenomenon. The requirements for a curriculum for learning mathematics are, after all, quite different from curricula concerned with, for example, car mechanics, aviation, brain surgery, beauty therapy, citizenship, critical thinking, and so on. It is also important not to think of thes ...
... multifaceted phenomenon. The requirements for a curriculum for learning mathematics are, after all, quite different from curricula concerned with, for example, car mechanics, aviation, brain surgery, beauty therapy, citizenship, critical thinking, and so on. It is also important not to think of thes ...
AN OBVIOUS-BASED ACCOUNT OF EPISTEMIC POSSIBILITY
... that they will be borne out.”6 3. A referee suggests making a small point explicit, and then says, “I know no one will get confused about this, but it’s possible someone will.”7 4. “I know I have hands, even though it’s possible I’m a handless brain in a vat.”8 1Stanley ...
... that they will be borne out.”6 3. A referee suggests making a small point explicit, and then says, “I know no one will get confused about this, but it’s possible someone will.”7 4. “I know I have hands, even though it’s possible I’m a handless brain in a vat.”8 1Stanley ...
Postmodernism in a Nutshell
... expert. Where the expert is aware of his knowledge the philosopher is not, but poses questions. In light of this uncertainty, Lyotard states that his portrayal of the state of knowledge “makes no claims to being original or even true”, and that his hypotheses “should not be accorded predictive value ...
... expert. Where the expert is aware of his knowledge the philosopher is not, but poses questions. In light of this uncertainty, Lyotard states that his portrayal of the state of knowledge “makes no claims to being original or even true”, and that his hypotheses “should not be accorded predictive value ...
Creative Reasoning
... problem, which emerges from an imagined interrogation. Suppose you believe that Q. Then someone asks you a legitimate question concerning the basis of your belief that Q. You respond by citing reason R1. You are then legitimately asked about your basis for believing R1. You cite reason R2. Then you ...
... problem, which emerges from an imagined interrogation. Suppose you believe that Q. Then someone asks you a legitimate question concerning the basis of your belief that Q. You respond by citing reason R1. You are then legitimately asked about your basis for believing R1. You cite reason R2. Then you ...