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INVESTMENT NEWSLETTER MONTHLY REPORT FEBRUARY 2015 MACROECONOMIC ENVIRONMENT Much analysis has been done on this topic. What has been found is that from 1950 to 1984, years where the month of January saw a positive return were predictive of a positive return for the entire market with approximately 90% probability. In the opposite case, years with a negative return in January were predictive of a negative return for the year approximately 70% of the time. There is a theory in the financial markets which is known as the “January effect”. This theory suggests that there is a seasonal anomaly where stock prices increase in January more than in any other month. In a similar vein , there is another saying which states “As January goes, so goes the year”. This is also known as the “January barometer” and it suggests that if the month of January is a positive month then the year will also be positive, and vice-versa of course. Looking at equity markets during January 2015 (see chart below), if the latter theory comes true, then we are perhaps in for a positive year in Europe and maybe the emerging markets but the USA will lag. However, looking closer at the strong performance of the European equity markets in January, investors should also perhaps be aware that it is very unlikely that this trend can continue without a correction at some point. Chart 1 Source: Bloomberg. MSCI equity market indices for January 2015. The first month of 2015 was also packed with a series of political and economic events which added to an increase in volatility. The main focus of attention was on the European Central Bank (ECB) monetary policy meeting of the 22nd. It was already a generally accepted fact that the ECB would announce some form of quantitative easing (QE) programme but the size and format of this QE intervention was open to much speculation. Following that there would be the Greek elections on January 25th and with that the possibility of Greece exiting the Eurozone. Finally, if that wasn’t already enough, 1 the US central bank (the Fed) was scheduled to meet on January 27th/28th. However, in the days leading up to the ECB meeting, the Swiss National Bank (SNB) surprised the markets on January 15th by declaring that it would no longer peg its currency at a level of 1.20 versus the euro. The QE which would almost certainly be launched the following week by the ECB would also probably lead to a depreciation of the euro and so, mechanically, lead to an appreciation of the CHF. It would be difficult and expensive for the SNB to stand in the way of such a market move. Therefore ING Luxembourg S.A. - 52, route d’Esch L-2965 Luxembourg - T.+352 44 99 1 - www.ing.lu INVESTMENT NEWSLETTER MONTHLY REPORT FEBRUARY 2015 2 in anticipation of the ECB’s action, the SNB decided to abandon the currency peg. At the same time the SNB lowered the interest rate for deposits to -0.75% from -0.25%, as a way of discouraging further currency inflows. The immediate impact on the foreign exchange rate was swift and violent, the €/CHF rate plummeted from 1.20 to around 0.96. The Swiss equity market index closed down -8.67% on the 15th and also lost a further -5.96% on the 16th. As we reached the end of the month, the EUR/CHF rate had recovered slightly to around 1.05 and the equity market had rebounded about 6% from its January 16th low point. already very low and bank liquidity is abundant opens the door to the question of what is the utility of additional monetary creation in the current environment? On the other hand, not implementing QE would have led to a drastic deterioration in the financial markets that the ECB could not afford to trigger. The ECB’s QE announcement was historic but it was also the central bank’s final trump card. The ECB can buy time for Europe’s policy makers but this cannot continue indefinitely. Europe’s politicians are relying too much on monetary policy instead of taking the painful steps to restructure labour markets and improve competitiveness. As expected, on January 22nd the ECB finally entered the global QE arena. Instead of keeping some aces up its sleeves, the ECB decided to play its full hand all at once and announced a QE programme that was bolder than expected. The arguments supporting this QE decision had already been known for some time; low inflation expectations, negative inflation rates, a bleak outlook for growth and disappointing results from earlier liquidity measures. With the launch of this programme, the ECB was announcing that additional asset purchases are necessary to counter the weaker than expected inflation dynamics and the heightened risks of a prolonged period of low inflation. In more detail, the ECB announced an expansion of the current asset purchase programme to include government bonds and supranational bonds. The ECB purchases will be limited to 33% of each issuer and 25% per issue. The programme will start in March and the aggregate size of the monthly purchases will be Euro 60 billion. The ECB intends to pursue this programme until at least September 2016 or until the path of Eurozone inflation is consistent with the ECB’s inflation objective of below, but close to, 2%. Next up on the January event list was the Greek elections. As had been widely predicted by the opinion polls, the anti-austerity party Syriza was the clear winner but they fell short of gaining an outright majority. Less than 24 hours after winning the election, the head of the far-left Syriza party, Alexis Tsipras, was being sworn in as prime minister having formed a coalition with the center right Independent Greeks. The impact of QE in the Eurozone is highly controversial. There is no guarantee that QE will work. Mario Draghi’s goal is to convince investors that he has a strategy big and bold enough to reinvigorate a depressed economy. Whether ECB purchases of government bonds will free up new lending space at banks is far from certain. The ECB can prepare the ground for more investment activity but it cannot force consumers to spend or companies to invest. This also requires structural reforms and fiscal support. Introducing QE at a time when financial asset prices are high, long term interest rates are In some respects the country is in better shape than in the summer of 2012. Growth of 0.7% in the 3Q of 2014 put Greece among the best performers of the euro zone. The public finances are also healthier than in 2012, thanks to the same austerity that Mr. Tsipras so detests. However, regardless of these improvements, the Greek economy remains fragile. Syriza and its supporters contest the terms of the bail-outs but Greece remains dependent on official support. The European bail out which was due to end last year has been extended to February 28th. Syriza rose to power after campaigning to cast aside austerity, backtrack on reforms and insist that Greece’s vast debt mountain be slashed. These promises won votes for the party but they also spooked investors. The Greek stock market slumped and Greek banks suffered their biggest one day drop ever on January 28th. Syriza’s pledges are also unacceptable to other European governments and the one that matters most is Germany. Could the clash lead to the result that everyone feared back in 2012: the “Grexit”, or Greece’s exit from the Eurozone. Mr. Tsipras insists that his country will stay in the euro and this policy is also backed by 3 /4 of the Greek public. ING Luxembourg S.A. - 52, route d’Esch L-2965 Luxembourg - T.+352 44 99 1 - www.ing.lu INVESTMENT NEWSLETTER MONTHLY REPORT FEBRUARY 2015 The probability of Syriza securing a formal write-off of some of Greece’s foreign debt (which totals a massive 175% of annual economic output) is very unlikely, particularly as the German government is strongly opposed to such a deal. A compromise is more likely, in which the creditors extend the maturities of Greece’s debt payments and offer lower interest rates (or even perhaps an interest rate moratorium). The problem is that Greece has already benefitted from such concessions in the past. More such gestures would not radically transform Greece’s economic outlook for the better. At the time of writing, there was perhaps some hint of a softer stance from Mr. Tsiparas who stated he was confident “we will soon manage to reach a mutually beneficial agreement, both for Greece and Europe as a whole”. He also said he was not 3 “seeking conflict”. The fact that Lazard Bank had been hired to advise on Greece’s debt burden is an indication that developments are moving quickly. Politics will pose a big threat to the Eurozone over the years ahead and how the Greek situation is handled might have big consequences elsewhere. We have already seen in Spain how thousands of people attended a rally for the leftist party Podemos. There is another saying which goes “beware of Greeks bearing gifts”. Perhaps in the current environment, we could change it to “beware of Greeks voting for gifts” ? ING Luxembourg S.A. - 52, route d’Esch L-2965 Luxembourg - T.+352 44 99 1 - www.ing.lu INVESTMENT NEWSLETTER MONTHLY REPORT FEBRUARY 2015 DISCLAIMER : If you would like personalised advice and more information about these switch recommendation,... please do not hesitate to contact your account adviser. 4 The opinions expressed in this report reflect the personal opinions of the analysts about the securities and issuers mentioned in this document. 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