Download Philosophers for the City: Aristotle and the Telos of Education

Philosophers for the City:
Aristotle and the Telos of Education
Elizabeth C. Shaw
THE LIFE DEDICATED to intellectual pursuits is
commonly understood as rarefied and
prohibitively esoteric—a life suited to
the few rather than the many. Often referred to as the contemplative life, it is
associated with images of monastic isolation and is often deemed a life dedicated to (or even perhaps wasted on)
puzzlings and musings that are useless
from a practical perspective. Such a life
grates on the pragmatic mindset and is
subject to severe criticism, with critics
decrying it as unproductive, self-indulgent, antisocial, and indeed stultifying
inasmuch as it inhibits the flourishing of
the human qua social and political animal. The absent-minded professor, ineffectual and irrelevant, is, for example, a
stock figure of popular entertainment.
Aristotle, however, saves this life from
these and other sorts of criticisms, as he
consistently maintains that theoria
springs from the natural human condition and is ineluctably bound up with the
fullness of social living.
Inasmuch as the city needs its proper
parts, namely citizens, it needs education. Training and education produce
virtue in citizens, and the virtue of the
city lies in the virtue of its proper parts.1
Thus education is essential for the formaELIZABETH C. SHAW is a doctoral candidate in
philosophy at The Catholic University of America.
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tion of citizens, and hence for the existence of the city. In the Politics, Aristotle
addresses at length the issue of education. He discusses both why the city needs
it and what sort it should be, and he gives
specific recommendations regarding particular subjects that ought to be studied.
The principle that what is lower or worse
exists for the sake of what is higher or
better2 runs through this discussion (as,
for example, the body is for the soul and
the appetites are for the intellect), and
this logic culminates in the view that
what is for its own sake is best. In asserting
that theoretic reason is the highest thing
in man3 and maintaining that leisure or
leisured activity is that which exists for
its own sake, that which is the end of all
other activities (including education),4
Aristotle leads us to the conclusion that
the best possible activity of leisure involves the employment of theoretic reason. As such, education must ultimately
be for the sake of the theoretic life.
Having drawn this conclusion, we observe that education at once serves civic
life and yet can be seen in some sense to
extend beyond the city—beyond the practical, political life. The theoretic life, the
life of the philosopher, is free and noble,
while other forms of political or civic life
are oriented to what is useful and bound
to necessities. Education serves the practical life insofar as it forms citizens for the
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city; but ultimately education, like all
progress-oriented activities, is for the sake
of that which is for its own sake. Education does not merely produce citizens
and rulers, it produces philosophers.
Aristotle notes that men are perfected
and made virtuous by three things: nature, habit, and reasoned speech or logos.5
A man’s nature is a necessary but not
sufficient condition for virtue. As such,
the natural state of the soul is not properly described as virtuous.6 Education is
needed to perfect what is mere potential
provided by nature, as “all art and education aim at filling up nature’s deficiencies.”7
Furthermore, Aristotle notes that education fulfills an important role in clarifying man’s view of his goals. All men “aim
at the good life and happiness,” but some
“go wrong at the start in their search for
happiness.”8 That is to say, some err in
their initial conception of their goal, as is
evident, for example, from the varied opinions regarding happiness that Aristotle
critiques in book 1, chapter 5 of the
Nicomachean Ethics. In order to live and
act properly for the sake of the good life,
men need correctly to establish “the aim
and end of their actions,... [and] the ascertainment of the actions leading to that
end.”9 Given Aristotle’s view of the primacy of sense experience with respect to
the establishment of concepts in the
mind, it is proper to note that in order to
conceive of the end which is the virtue
and nobility of the good life, men need to
be exposed to and experience this virtue
or nobility, at least on some level.10 Education provides this exposure and experience that, in turn, permit the conception of the proper aim and goal of the
good life.11
What sort of education does Aristotle
propose for the city? With a view to cultivating a citizenry open to political rule
“rather than those fit only to rule and be
ruled despotically,” Aristotle’s proposed
education has the general goal of fosterModern Age
ing the habits of freedom.12 This education should be uniform and public: “inasmuch as the end for the whole state is one,
it is manifest that education must necessarily be one and the same for all and that
the superintendence of this must be public.”13 It is improper to regard any individual citizen as purely of or belonging to
himself. Indeed, the term “individual citizen” might seem oxymoronic, for, strictly
speaking, each citizen is part of the city
and belongs to the city. The individual’s
education is for the sake of the city. Public education is needed to teach citizens
to subordinate private goods to the public good.14 And, as Aristotle states, “matters of public interest ought to be under
public supervision.”15 Thus it is clear
Aristotle maintains that civic policy is to
override individuals’ decisions regarding education.16
Aristotle praises Sparta as a good example of centralized public education.
Nevertheless, the Spartan example serves
as a warning against improperly focused
education: the Spartan constitution and
system of education were established
“with a view to conquest and war.” Oriented thus to the vulgar, Sparta lost its
empire as it lost the noble life.17 As such,
Aristotle highlights the necessity of an
education designed for free and noble
ends.
On Aristotle’s view, education is for
the sake of developing virtues, both moral
and intellectual. As the means to virtue
are nature, habit, and reason, correspondingly the modes of education are habituation and reasoned speech.18 Habit rules
over nature, and reason rules over both
habit and nature—“men often act contrary to their acquired habits and to their
nature because of their reason.”19 Generally speaking, habituation is the mode of
education for the moral virtues and reasoned speech or logos the mode for the
intellectual virtues, though the two are
bound up together. Indeed, the development of moral virtue contributes to that
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of intellectual virtue; moreover, it is not
proper to view habituation as a process
divorced from rationality.
Aristotle is ever focused on education
as training for freedom. Regarding physical education: “The bodily habit therefore should have been trained by exercise, but not by exercises that are violent,
and not for one form of labour only, as is
the athlete’s habit of body, but for the
pursuits of freemen.”20 Children ought to
be directed in their play—“exercise
should be obtained by means of various
pursuits, particularly play. But even the
games must not be unfit for freemen, nor
laborious, nor undisciplined.”21 Even the
basic training of the body must be carefully done, with an eye to freedom, the
reason being that the education of the
body is for the sake of the soul.22 With
higher ends in mind, Aristotle does not
take even physical education lightly.
The education of the emotions or appetites is also necessary for freedom. Insofar as emotions involve perceptions
and beliefs, they are “potentially rational
and educable.”23 The education of the
emotions is a process of habituation, the
end of which is the possession of moral
virtue. The process is not mindless, as the
possession of virtue itself is not mindless.
For example, if one is to become goodtempered, one is not to be habituated
simply to avoid anger; rather, through the
cultivation of practical wisdom or
phronesis one becomes skilled at assessing situations and determining what emotional responses they call for, among
which anger is included inasmuch as in
some cases it is appropriate.24
By the process of habituation one acquires moral virtue, and one becomes
liberated from natural inclinations and
passions. Habituation is effective because
people enjoy not only what is natural or
what is rational but also what they become accustomed to: “people do with
pleasure many things that are not naturally pleasant, once they have become
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accustomed to them.”25 The possession
of moral virtue is essential, not simply
inasmuch as it frees one from one’s natural passions, but also in that it serves as
the foundation for higher virtue; it frees
one for higher achievements.26 Moreover,
while temperance and justice ought to be
possessed by all, they are more likely to
be possessed “more especially when men
are at peace and have leisure” to undertake intellectual pursuits.27
Aristotle considers whether students
should “practise pursuits that are practically useful, morally edifying, or higher
accomplishments.”28 While maintaining
that citizens ought not to be kept inordinately busy with the vulgar pursuits of
business and labor,29 he does concede
that certain useful skills and practices
should be learned: “the young must be
taught those useful arts that are indispensably necessary; but it is clear that
they should not be taught all the useful
arts, those pursuits that are liberal being
kept distinct from those that are illiberal.”30 Studies should exclude those activities which are deemed vulgar, namely
“all such arts as deteriorate the condition
of the body, and also the industries that
earn wages; for they make the mind preoccupied and degraded.”31 He asserts that
there exist certain subjects that should
be studied not because they are useful or
necessary, but because they are liberal
and noble; curiously, however, he fails to
specify what these are.32 Study should not
be too intensive, even in the liberal subjects that are suited for freemen, but rather
only “up to a point, [for] to devote oneself
too assiduously and carefully is liable to
have...injurious results.”33 Even the liberal subjects can be studied illiberally.
For all courses of study the key is what
end one has in mind when one undertakes to study: to be truly liberal, the end
must be one’s own sake, the sake of one’s
friends, or moral virtue. “[T]he man who
follows the same pursuit because of other
people [that is, the politician or leader]
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would often appear to be acting in a menial and servile manner”—wholly unsuitable for a freeman.34 All in all, citizens’
education should prepare them to “do
what is necessary and useful, but still
more...what is noble.”35
Aristotle discusses four subjects that
he maintains ought to be learned: reading
and writing, gymnastics, drawing, and
music. His treatment of these four illustrates some of the nuances in his thought
regarding the useful and the necessary
subjects, and why or whether they should
be studied. Reading and writing are useful but also necessary, and “ought to be
studied by the young not only because of
their utility...but also because they may
lead on to many other branches of knowledge.”36 Though useful and arguably servile with respect to greater pursuits, reading and writing do not render those who
study them similarly servile. On the contrary, these subjects equip us for greater
pursuits. Gymnastics should be studied
for its contribution to manly courage.37
The training of the body, provided it is not
done to excess, promotes the development of moral virtue—another example
of the lower’s being for the sake of the
higher. A student ought to learn drawing
for “this study makes a man observant of
bodily beauty.”38 It is not to be learned
with a view to its usefulness, since “to see
utility everywhere is entirely unsuited to
men that are great-souled and free.”39
Rather, drawing is intended to initiate
one into the theoretic life, as it promotes
the consideration of beauty for its own
sake.
Aristotle devotes a considerable
amount of time to the discussion of music, a subject that he describes as neither
useful nor necessary for business or economic life. Despite its uselessness in these
arenas, it has some value insofar as it may
“influence…the character and…the
soul.”40 He argues that music makes “our
souls enthusiastic, and enthusiasm is an
affection of the soul.” It produces pleaModern Age
sure, and insofar as virtue consists in
“feeling delight and love and hatred
rightly,” music provides an opportunity
for one to practice virtue, as it were—to
be appropriately pleased by the representations of virtuous characters and
noble actions. As such, music can serve to
habituate one “in feeling pain and delight
at representations of reality,” which is
not unlike responding to actual situations in real life.41 He notes that fluteplaying, which precludes the integration
of speech into music, is less than ideal: it
can in no way address the reasoning part
of the soul and hence has no effect on the
intellect, the implication being that when
music includes words it addresses both
reason and the unreasoning part of the
soul.42 Children ought to learn to play
musical instruments for the same reason
that infants are given rattles—in order to
keep busy and out of trouble—but they
should not devote too much time to performing music.43 Performing as a professional musician renders oneself servile,
and it is likely to vulgarize or to distort the
body in ways that are inappropriate for
freemen.44 Notwithstanding the caveats
and qualifications, Aristotle’s treatment
of music reveals the great value to be
found in the seemingly useless things.
Aristotle asserts that these useless
subjects, which are to be learned “merely
with a view to the pleasure in their pursuit,...are ends in themselves, while the
forms of learning related to business are
studied as necessary and as means to
other things.”45 The useless or liberal subjects are for their own sakes, not utility’s,
and thus they are best and highest. They
are the noble things to be pursued for no
reason other than their pleasantness. Indeed, it is proper to understand that leisure or leisured activity is the end of all
work and occupation. Leisure “seems itself to contain pleasure and happiness
and felicity of life. And this is not possessed by the busy...; for the busy man
busies himself for the sake of some end as
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not being in his possession, but happiness is an end achieved.”46 Leisure is not
mere play or rest, as these are inseparable
from occupation and simply serve the
purpose of refreshing and restoring a
person for further work. Play, rest, and
work are really subservient to leisure.47
Leisure can be considered the essential
element of a meaningful life, and a combination of the best aspects of work and
play.
Human life would be condemned to an eternal alternation between pain or labor and
unmeaning diversion were it not for the fact
that nature itself points to the possibility of
a way of life or an activity that combines the
seriousness of occupation with the pleasures of play.48
Given that leisure is not mere play or
rest, it is necessary to determine the proper
activities for leisure.49 Aristotle seeks to
address this issue in his discussion of the
noble or liberal subjects; these studies
are pleasant and for their own sakes and
hence appropriate leisurely undertakings.
Thus, even liberal education can be seen
to be for the sake of something beyond
itself, namely, the activity and enjoyment
of leisure.50
Because “reason and intelligence are
for us the end of our natural development,”51 the highest, best, most pleasant
activities for man are to be found in the
intellectual life, the life of reason. Reason
itself comprises two types, namely practical reason and theoretic reason, and while
the theoretic life is not attainable by everyone, it is, among the possibilities for
man, the best life.52 So, among the possible activities to occupy leisure, the best
are those of the theoretic life. Thus education, being ultimately for the sake of leisured activity, extends beyond the practical life and has the theoretic life as its
highest possible goal.
How is the life of the politician to be
evaluated on the scale of leisureliness?
The political life is properly understood
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as essentially practical and not leisurely.
In fact, its goal is “to secure leisure and
the good things that are enjoyed in leisure”; thus political life is work or occupation.53 The life of the politician is not
the life of the philosopher. Though the
political ruler does indeed require leisure in order to act, the political actions
to which his leisure is devoted do not
constitute noble leisure.54 “[I]t is the business of the good lawgiver to study how a
state, a race of men or any other community is to partake of the good life and the
happiness possible for them.”55 The politician does not do politics for its own
sake, but rather for the sake of the city.
Even the so-called political philosopher,
of which Aristotle himself in writing the
Politics is an example, is concerned with
the useful and the necessary, not the free
and the noble. The political philosopher
might consider particular things that are
of interest to cities, such as systems of
military defense, or he might enumerate
and discuss the variety of political regimes, or he might serve to arbitrate
among different views of justice.56 As such,
he provides a service to the city: his work
is useful and for the city’s sake, not its
own sake. In contrast, the philosopher
who enters into the theoretic life by taking up the study of being as being, for
example, does what is purely and simply
for its own sake.57
Given this consideration of the distinction between the leisure of the politician and that of the philosopher, is it
proper to say, then, that the theoretic life
is of no value to the city? While it is true
that most men are simply incapable of or
not suited to the theoretic life, some or a
few are, and for them it is of eminent
value, while also being valuable in itself.
But considering this issue from the perspective of the city, it is significant to
note Aristotle’s discussion in book 2 of
the Politics, regarding the reasons why
men commit injustices and the remedies
for those inclined to do wrong. He obWinter 2005
serves that among those who do commit
injustices, some are driven “in order that
they may enjoy the pleasures that are not
associated with pains.” Such pleasures
are those of leisured activity, as distinct
from the pleasures of play and rest, which
are intimately connected with the pains
of toil and labor. For the men who seek
these pleasures there is “no cure for their
desires save that which is derived from
philosophy.”58 Hence, the theoretic life is
the only suitable diversion for those men
inclined to commit the worst transgressions. The theoretic life is a safe realm in
which the tyrannically inclined “can find
the freedom and activity they would otherwise seek through politics without incurring its risks: they have no potentially
rebellious slaves nor a ruler’s need for
bodyguards.”59 Perhaps more important,
the people of the city are spared despotic
rule through the anti-tyrannic device or
distraction of theoria.
Moreover, Aristotle notes that there is
a human tendency to regard despotic
rule as true statesmanship and to abhor
tyranny at home while admiring expansionist, despotic rule over others.60 This
regard for despotism is dangerous, as he
states:
to endeavor to attain the power to hold sway
over his own city.61
…it is not a proper ground for deeming a
state happy and for praising its lawgiver,
that is has practised conquest with a view to
ruling over its neighbors. This principle is
most disastrous; it follows from it that an
individual citizen who has the capacity ought
In other words, the tyrannical attitude
with respect to foreign affairs breeds tyrants on the domestic front. If there is
nothing higher than politics to be found
in the life of the city, tyranny will be a
perennial problem. In order to have a city
that is a “small community...fully dedicated to the pursuit of virtue and hence to
the best way of life,” it is necessary that
the extreme attitude of political partiality and dominance be transcended. The
theoretic life makes room for and promotes this transcendence.62
This analysis might seem to taint the
theoretic life with the very utility it is
supposed to lack. The theoretic life, precisely because it is for its own sake, saves
the city from despotism by siphoning off
tyrannical urges that might be breeding
in the community. As a manifestation of
the truth that the practical, political life
is not highest, philosophy makes itself
useful. Without planning, orchestrating,
or otherwise getting involved in the life of
the city, the theoretic life sustains the
city. As such, it could be said that philosophy is to the city as Aristotle’s unmoved
mover is to the cosmos. The theoretic life
is of ultimate value to the social life of the
city: far from inhibiting the activity of
humans qua political beings, it guards
and guarantees the very possibility of
such flourishing.
1. Pol 7.12.1332a33-6. 2. Pol 7.13.1333a21-2. 3. Pol
7.13.1333a27-8. 4. Pol 7.13.1333a35-7. 5. Pol
7.12.1332a39-40. 6. Randall R. Curren, “Education
and the Origins of Character in Aristotle,” Philosophy of Education 47 (1991): 204. 7. Pol 7.15.1337a13. 8. Pol 7.12.1331b39-41, 1332a4-6. 9. Pol
7.12.1331b27-30. 10. Curren, “Education and the
Origins of Character in Aristotle,” 205. 11. Richard Sorabji, “Aristotle on the Role of Intellect in
Virtue,” Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 74
(1974): 128. 12. Mary P. Nichols, Citizens and
Statesmen. A Study of Aristotle’s Politics (Savage,
Md., 1992), 154. 13. Pol 8.1.1337a23-6. 14. Jan H.
Blits, “Privacy and Public Moral Education:
Aristotle’s Critique of the Family,” Educational
Theory 35 (1985): 236. 15. Pol 8.1.1337a27-9. 16.
Richard Kraut, Politics. Books VII and VIII (New
York, 1997), 172. 17. Pol 7.12.1333b5-26. 18.
Nature’s contribution is “just there.” It does not
involve a process (aside from the applications of
habituation and reasoned speech), and hence is
not properly a part of education. 19. Pol
7.12.1332a5-7. 20. Pol 7.14.1335b8-12. 21. Pol
7.15.1336a27-30. 22. Pol 7.13.1334b25-9. 23. C. D.
C. Reeve, “Aristotelian Education,” in Philosophers on Education, ed. Amélie Oksenberg Rorty
Modern Age
35
(New York, 1998), 55. 24. Sorabji, “Aristotle on the
Role of Intellect in Virtue,” 126. 25. Aristotle,
Rhetoric 1369b18-19, quoted in Blits, “Privacy
and Public Moral Education: Aristotle’s Critique
of the Family,” 228. 26. Carnes Lord, Education and
Culture in the Political Thought of Aristotle (Ithaca,
N.Y., 1982), 39. 27. Pol 7.13.1334a25-6. 28. Pol
8.1.1337a39-42. 29. Pol 7.8.1329a1-5. 30. Pol
8.2.1337b4-8. 31. Pol 8.2.1337b12-14. 32. Pol
8.3.1338a31-4. 33. Pol 8.2.1337b15-17. 34. Pol
8.2.1337b18-21. 35. Pol 7.8.1333b1-3. 36. Pol
8.3.1338a39-41. 37. Pol 8.2.1337b26. 38. Pol
8.3.1338b2-4. 39. Pol 8.3.1338a13-16. 40. Pol
8.5.1340a6-7. 41. Pol 8.5.1340a11-25. 42. Pol
8.6.1341a25-7, 1341b8-10, and Kraut, Politics.
Books VII and VIII, 184. 43. Pol 8.5.1340b30-4. 44.
Pol 8.4.1339b7-10, 8.6.1341a4-9. 45. Pol
36
8.2.1338a9-14. 46. Pol 8.2.1338a1-4. 47. Nichols,
Citizens and Statesmen, 158. 48. Lord, Education
and Culture in the Political Thought of Aristotle, 55.
49. Pol 8.2.1337b33-5. 50. Lord, Education and
Culture in the Political Thought of Aristotle, 58. 51.
Pol 7.8.1334b15-17. 52. Pol 7.8.1333a23-31. 53.
Lord, Education and Culture in the Political Thought
of Aristotle, 197. 54. Lord, Education and Culture in
the Political Thought of Aristotle, 56. 55. Pol
7.2.1325a12-14. 56. Nichols, Citizens and Statesmen, 166. Aristotle does all of these things in the
Pol. See 1331a4-1; 1288b3, 23, 29, and 37; and
1282b23. 57. Cf. Aristotle, Metaphysics 1.1-2. 58.
Pol 2.4.1267a7-15. 59. Nichols, Citizens and Statesmen, 136. 60. Pol 7.2.1324b32-7. 61. Pol
7.13.1333b30-4. 62. Lord, Education and Culture in
the Political Thought of Aristotle, 194-7.
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