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-Rizzo,Farrugia&Co.(Stockbrokers)Ltd.–Malta-http://rizzofarrugia.com-
IstheEuropeanbankingcrisisreturning?
LastThursday,fearsoverthehealthofoneofPortugal’slargestbankstriggeredasharp
declineacrossinternationalequitymarketsespeciallyinthebankingsector.Meanwhile,
yieldsonPortuguesegovernmentbondsrosereflectingdecliningprices.
ThedevelopmentsinPortugalalsotriggeredadeclineinGovernmentbondpricesofthe
otherperipheralEurozonenationssuchasItaly,Spain,GreeceandCyprus.Ontheother
hand,amidarenewedflighttoquality,Germanbondpricesincreasedwithyieldsdroppingto
theirlowestlevelin14months.Manyinternationalcommentatorsarguedthatthisreaction
verymuchresembledthecontagionwitnessedafewyearsagoattheheightoftheEurozone
sovereigncrisis.
Sowhatsparkedtheequitymarketsell-offandcontagioninthebondmarketsofperiphery
countries?
Untilrecently,BancoEspiritoSanto(BES),whichwassetup94yearsago,wasPortugal’s
largestprivatesectorbank.Remarkably,BESwastheonlyoneofthetopbanksinPortugal
thatdidnotrequireagovernmentinjectionduringthecountry’ssovereigndebtcrisis.The
majorityshareholderwastheEspiritoSantofamilyviatwocompanies,aholdingcompany
EspiritoSantoInternational(ESI)andEspiritoSantoFinancialGroup(ESFG),abankingand
insurancecompanybasedinLuxembourg.ESIowns25%ofBESandESFGholdsastakeof
another26%.ESIalsohasamajorityshareholdinginamajorfundmanagerinPortugal.
Earlylastweek,ESFGannouncedthatESIwasexperiencing‘materialdifficulties’afterit
failedtopaytheinterestonsomeofitsshort-termdebtinstruments.Theproblemshad
startedsurfacinglastMaywhentheBankofPortugalorderedanauditofBES,ESIandESFG
followingconcernsthatESIwasstruggling.Theauditorsdiscoveredaccountingirregularities
atESIandBESadmittedthatESIwasinseriousfinancialdifficulties.
FollowingthenewsofESI’sdifficultiesinpayingtheinterestonitsdebt,thespeculationon
thepossibleexposureofBESandESFGtoESIledtoasuspensionoftheequitiesofboth
companiesontheLisbonstockexchangelastweek.However,sHhortlybeforethe
suspensionlastThursday,thesharepriceofBEShadalreadylost19%atthestartofthe
day.Meanwhile,theinternationalratingagencyMoody’simmediatelydowngradedthe
bank’screditratingbythreenotchestoCaa2–aratingrepresentingadefaultsituation.
Inabidtoquellmarketspeculationaboutits€1.15billionexposuretotheothercompanies
oftheEspiritoSantofamily,BESissuedapressreleaselateThursdayeveningexplaining
thatithad€2.1billioninexcesscapitalbeyondtheminimumregulatoryrequirements.The
pressreleasealsonotedthat“thepotentiallossesresultingfromtheexposuretothe
EspiritoSantoGroupdonotcompromisethebankscompliancewiththeregulatorycapital
requirements”.
DespitetheassurancesfromBESaswellasthoseofthegovernmentandtheBankof
PortugalthatBESisring-fencedfromtheproblemsoftheEspiritoSantoGroupandthatits
solvencyisnotatrisk,investorsfearedthatthefullextentofBES’sexposuretotheEspirito
SantoGroupmaynothaveyetbeenfullydisclosed.Somecommentatorsestimatedthat
theexposurescouldleaveBESwithacapitalshortfallofupto€3billion.Portugal’sprime
ministeralsoconfirmedthatPortuguesetaxpayerswouldnotbecalledintobailoutfailing
banks,makingitcleartherewouldbenostatesupportforBES.
Portugal’sbankingproblemshadanimmediatenegativeeffectonthePortuguese
government’sborrowingcostsandthiscouldcomplicatethecountry’sabilitytorecoverfrom
theirsovereigndebtcrisis.Infact,10-yearyields,whichhaddroppedtoalmost3%inrecent
weeksfromover13%inFebruary2012,jumpedto4%lastweekonthenewssurrounding
BES.Likewise,governmentbondyieldsoftheotherEurozoneperipherynationshadalso
declinedsteadilyfromtheirveryhighlevelsatthepeakofthecrisis(aclearsignalthatthe
marketbecamemorecomfortablewiththecreditworthinessofsuchcountries).However,
lastweek’sdevelopmentsinPortugalconfirmedtheweakhealthofsomeofthebanksinthe
peripherycountriesandthedifficultieswhendealingwithstrugglingfinancialinstitutions–a
clearsignalthatthedebtcrisisisnotyetover.
AfurtherriseinyieldsonPortuguesegovernmentbondsmaycompromisethecountry’s
effortstotapthebondmarketsregularlyinthecomingyearstofundaseriesofbond
redemptions.Thishasalreadyledsomeinternationalcommentatorstospeculatethat
eventuallyPortugalwillneedtorestructureitsdebttobeabletocomeoutofitsdebtspiral.
Thegovernment’sfinancesarestretchedasdebtlevelsjumpedfrom94%to129%ofGDP
overthepastthreeyearspartlyduetothesevereausteritymeasuresundertakenaspartof
theEUandIMFrescuepackage.Adebtrestructuringprogrammewillinevitablyimplylosses
forholdersofPortuguesegovernmentbonds.
“ThemostrecentdevelopmentsinPortugaland
theweakereconomicdataelsewherecouldlead
totheEuropeanCentralBankadopting
quantitativeeasing(QE),i.e.moneyprintingin
asimilarwaytowhathappenedinboththeUS
andtheUK.”
ApartfromthedevelopmentsinPortugal,therenewedanxietyacrossfinancialmarketswas
alsocausedbythepublicationofsomeweakdatafromthetwolargestEurozoneeconomies
andabankruninBulgaria.RecentstatisticsindicatethattheGermaneconomicrecovery
appearstobeslowingwhileFrancecouldslipbackintorecession.Meanwhile,lastmonth
therewasabankrunattheBulgarianfourth-largestbank,CorporateCommercialBank
(Corpbank),aftermediareportsindicatedthatitstopshareholderwasinvolvedinsome
suspiciousbusinessdeals.Thebankrun,whichdrainedCorpbank’sdepositsbymorethan
20%inafewdays,spreadquicklytoanotherbankandthegovernmentintervenedwitha
protectivecreditlineofUSD2.3billion.Afteranumberofinitiativesfailedtokeepthebankin
operation,earlierthisweekitwasannouncedthatCorpbankwillceasetooperate–another
starkreminderoftheproblemsthatstillexistinsomepartsofthebankingsector.
ThemostrecentdevelopmentsinPortugalandtheweakereconomicdataelsewherecould
leadtotheEuropeanCentralBankadoptingquantitativeeasing(QE),i.e.moneyprintingina
similarwaytowhathappenedinboththeUSandtheUK.SuchadecisionbytheECBwould
befurtherproofoftheeconomicproblemsstillevidentinEurope.QEiscertainlymore
difficultinamonetaryunionwithfragmentedfinancialmarketsthanintheUSortheUK,
wherethecentralbanksusedQEpartlytohelpthehousingmarketandthecorporate
sector.WhilesomeeconomistsarguethatwithoutQE,theeurozoneeconomywillmost
probablygetstuckinalongperiodoflowgrowthandultra-lowinflation,othersbelievethat
QEmayhavenegativeconsequencesonfinancialstabilityduetoassetbubblesthatthis
maycreate.Infact,theQEbytheFederalReserveandtheBankofEnglandledto
increasinglybuoyantequityandbondmarketsacrosstheglobeasthesetwomajorcentral
banksinjectedthefinancialsystemwithhugelevelsofliquidity.
Theeventsofrecentweeksandtheimpactonbothequityandbondmarketsagain
highlightstheimportanceforinvestorstokeeptheelementofriskinperspectiveandnotto
followthe‘herdinstinct’.Equityandbondmarketsareboundtobecomeincreasinglyvolatile
followingtheirstrongrallyoverrecentyears.Investorsshouldthereforecontinuetoseek
professionaladviceperiodicallytoensurethattheirinvestmentportfoliosareconstantly
positionedtoreflecttheirriskappetiteandfinancialobjectives.
ArticleprintedfromRizzo,Farrugia&Co.(Stockbrokers)Ltd.–Malta:
http://rizzofarrugia.com
URLtoarticle:http://rizzofarrugia.com/financial-articles/weekly/is-the-europeanbanking-crisis-returning/
Copyright©2017Rizzo,Farrugia&Co.(Stockbrokers)Ltd.-Malta.Allrightsreserved.