Download FIGHTING CREEPING ISLAMIC FUNDAMENTALISM

WOMEN RESISTING CREEPING ISLAMIC FUNDAMENTALISM
IN INDONESIA1
By Prof. Dr Saskia E. Wieringa
Abstract
Indonesia’s New Order government (1966-1998) suppressed not only all forms of
women’s and social activism, following the destruction of the communist party and its
women’s mass organization Gerwani in a massacre, but also radical Islam. The
Reformasi period (after 1998) saw a revival of both Islamic hardliner groups and of
progressive women’s (mass) organizations and feminist discourses. This is complicated
by the process of regionalization that followed in the wake of political liberalism, in
which several regions legitimized their claims for autonomy in a revival of so-called
Islamic values which are mostly related to women’s dress codes and the control over their
behaviour and bodies. What counter discourses are progressive women’s groups
developing? What scope is there for Muslim feminism?
Key words
Islam, Indonesia, Muslim feminism
Introduction
1
An earlier version of this chapter appeared in a discussion on Islamization in Signs, Journal for Women in
Culture and Society, Vol. 32, nr 1, Autumn 2006, pp 1-; 7, another version was presented at the Euroseas
Conference in Naples 12-14.September 2007 (15 p).
1
When I first started working on this article in 2005, I wondered whether the growing
influence of hardliner Muslim groups in Indonesia was just a temporary phenomenon or
whether they had come to stay. I wavered between speaking of a wave (short term) or a
rising tide (longer term) of Islamic fundamentalism2. Indonesia, the country with the
largest population of Muslims in the world (commonly stated as 90% of its 220 million
inhabitants) has mostly been characterized by and praised for its largely moderate and
plural forms of Islam.
By 2009 it has become clear that Indonesia is in for a long period in which a
strongly conservative Muslim presence will try to make itself felt in all corners of society.
The tolerance and cultural and religious pluriformity that has characterised Indonesia for
so long is under vehement attack. Fortunately human, women’s and sexual rights groups
who are fighting to preserve the respect for human dignity and freedom, gender equity
and tolerance of diverse sexual orientations are gaining strength as well. Here I sketch the
context of the growth of Muslim hardliner views and I analyse the feminist
counterdiscourse. One of the characteristics of conservative Islam is the attempts to
enforce a strongly patriarchal normative heterosexuality that polices those within its
boundaries and marginalizes those outside. I will give some examples of how ordinary
Indonesian women face the enormous moral and religious pressures they are confronted
with.
2
I use the concept ‘fundamentalism’ in this article in a wide sense. It basically refers to those groups who
want to purify Indonesian Islam of its eclectic, pre-Islamic elements. In Indonesia many people speak of
‘Arabic Islam’, as many supporters of fundamentalism have either been trained in Saudi Arabia or
areinfluenced by the conservative Wahabi interpretation of Islam. There is a wide diversity of groups that
may be classified under ‘fundamentalism’, ranging from Islamic study groups, to political parties, to
hardliner militia’s and the Ulema Council. They usually demand one or more of the following: Islam to
become the state religion, or at least the application of Islamic law for Muslims, the implementation of
principles based on the syari’a on various aspects of public life, and the declaration that Islam is not only
sueprioir to other forms of social and religious life but also knows only one interpretation.
2
The decline of the support for pluralism and religious and sexual tolerance is indicated
amongst others by the attacks on Christian churches, the ban on the Jamaah Ahmadiyah
group, a Muslim minority sect, and the recent passing of the anti-pornography bill (20
October 2008). Moderate groups however denounce the rise of what they call ‘Arab
Islam’, and insist that Indonesia has its own, indigenous form of Islam, more tolerant and
inclusive than that of the foreign Arabs The growing presence on the streets of members
of conservative Islamic groups who are dressed in un-Indonesian ways, the women not
only sporting a jilbab (headdress), but covering their whole body in wide flowing garbs,
some even wearing gloves is an indication of the Arabisation of Indonesian society3. It is
worrying that the Nahdlatul Ulama (NU) and the Muhammadyah the two largest Muslim
organizations, with millions of members, have not come out in large numbers to criticise
the above measures. Radical Muslim groups brand those who voice their opposition to
the anti-pornography law as supporters of pornography, and opponents to the burning and
ransacking of Ahmadyah property as heretics.4
So far Indonesian Islam is characterized both by its diversity of practices and
beliefs, its incorporation of elements of other belief systems (Hinduism, nature religions,
see for instance Headley 2004) and for the ease with which it has come to accept
democracy after the fall of Suharto in May 1998. This having said, various tendencies can
be noted at present that point to a growing influence of fundamentalist groups. This is not
new, but the present manifestations are more powerful and far reaching than in the past
decades. For instance Indonesia has long been characterized by various art forms in
3
Women in the many Indonesian islands generally didn’t wear a jilbab, at most a kerudung, a loose shawl.
Mostly they went bare-headed
4
Jakarta Post November 28, 2008, quoting Islamic expert Woodward.
3
which crossdressing and erotic dancing were common, such as gandrung in Banyuwangi,
reyog in Ponorogo or jaipong in West Java (Anoegrajekti 2007, citing Scholte 1927). The
growing influence of Islamic teaching in which crossdressing was declared illicit and
erotic dancing was seen to offend morality made these traditional forms of art disappear
in many places. New in the present configuration is that the state takes over the role of
censor. National political processes encourage the Islamization of society in other ways
as well. As traditional Javanese religious beliefs and practices, such as the veneration of
the rice goddess Dewi Sri were associated with communism after 1965, her cult strongly
declined. In East Java for instance all moments in the cycle of rice growing would be
marked by a small ceremony for Dewi Sri. This custom has practically disappeared at
present. For the same reason the traditional trance dance Kuda Lumping is hardly
performed any more5.
Here I will first sketch the historical background within which these developments must
be placed. I will then discuss the various faces of Islamic politicization as well as the
countertrends. In the last part I will present the voices of Indonesian women activists and
scholars, arguing that secularism by which feminists in several other Asian countries such
as India, react to the religious fundamentalism in their countries, is not attractive to the
majority of Indonesian feminist scholars and activists. Most of them advocate a
contextual, rights-based approach to Islam.
Historical background
5
These obeservations are based on visits to Lawang and Malang over the past 7 years.
4
The present Reformasi period in Indonesia cannot be understood without reference to the
genocide from October 1965 onwards that introduced General Suharto’s grabbing of the
presidency in 1966, and the ensuing 32 years of military dictatorship. After a putsch of
young army officers on 1 October 1965 young women belonging to the youth wing of the
communist party were accused of seducing, castrating and murdering the older generals
who were the victims of their younger colleagues. A mass campaign of hatred followed,
in which communism was associated with sexual perversion, as the women’s wing of the
communist movement was accused of training women to be whores and committing
atrocities. In the following months hundreds of thousands of people, possibly between 1
and 3 million, were brutally murdered, and tens of thousands detained.6 The New Order
was built on this imagination of itself as the destroyer of women’s unspeakable
debauchery and the restorer of social quiet – resting on the subordination of women
(Wieringa 2002, 2003). The ensuing state terrorism constructed on the spectre of
communism had profound political consequences.7 Until his abdication in 1998 Suharto
instilled a reign of terror in which all liberal, progressive thinking was prohibited. Only
after 1998 social activism can come to the open again, including liberal Muslim social
activism.
After 1998 two trends can be discerned: on the one hand a growing intolerance,
on the other hand a strengthening of the human rights discourse. The first trend can be
distilled by the spread of conservatism and radicalism to the core of society. Fanatical
6
Cribb (1990) estimates 500.000 people were massacred, other sources stipulate much higher numbers.
Amnesty International estimates 1 million people were murdered, Colonel Sarwo Edhie, the architect of the
murder campaign boasted that it was closer to 3 million. An exact figure cannot be traced, as the mass
graves have not been opened, and many of the dead were eaten by crocodiles and sharks (Wieringa 2002).
Nobody has been punished for this genocide.
7
Heryanto (2006) provides one of the most incisive analyses of the impact of state terrorism on Indonesian
political life. Surprisingly he ignores the gender dimensions of the propaganda of Suharto and is therefore
unable to grasp the reasons behind the success of this terror campaign.
5
militia-like groups such as the Islamic Defender’s Front (Front Pembela Islam, FPI) are
no longer the only ones spreading intolerance. Even the mainstream mass Muslim
movement Nahdlatul Ulema (NU) has shifted towards support for the Majelis Ulema
Indonesie (MUI), when it promulgated its fatwa declaring the Jemaah Ahmadiyah sect
heretical. The MUI has long been known for its rightwing position, issuing fatwa’s
against high heels, bras and other paraphernalia of women’s supposed depravity. Under
the leadership of Abdurrahman Wahid (Gus Dur) however the 40- million- member NU
has long been known for its staunch support of moderation and tolerance, Recently it
supported the MUI’s fatwa against liberalism, pluralism and secularism and condoned the
controversial anti-pornography bill.8 The MUI goes even further in its condemnation of
anything considered un-Islamic and recently banned yoga, as its practice might contain
Hindu spiritual elements.9 The MUI follows here the Malaysian Fatwa Council, which
has already condemned it. Fortunately the MUI, unlike its Malaysian counterpart, has no
power to support its fatwa’s legally. That meditation is an ancient practice in Indonesia,
and past presidents such as Sukarno and Suharto practised it regularly seems a point of no
concern. Not only the NU, most Islamic studies teachers in the country oppose pluralism,
as was revealed in a survey conducted by the Centre for Islamic and Society Studies at
Syarif Hidayatullah State Islamic University in Jakarta.10 They try to prevent followers of
other religions building houses of worship in Muslim neighbourhoods, prohibit their
students from celebrating ‘western’ religious events such as Christmas and tell their
students not to learn about other religions. The 2008 Report on the Conditions of
Freedom of religion and Faith noted a total of 265 cases of violence against religion in
8
Jakarta Post June 19 2008.
Jakarta Post 26 Nov 2008.
10
In total 500 teachers all over Java were interviewed. Jakarta Post 26 Nov 2008.
9
6
2008, up from 135 such cases in 2007. It found that the FPI and the MUI were behind the
majority of the attacks and that in many cases the state condoned such violence11.
But there are also encouraging signs. A growing movement of interfaith activists
takes to the streets to protest the sectarian unrest spread by groups such as the FPI. And
the rightwing militant groups are no longer treated with impunity. When a peaceful rally
to remind the public of the wisdom of the state ideology Pancasila on June 1 2008 at the
National Monument was attacked by members of the FPI, scores of ordinary members
and their leader Rizieq Shihad were ultimately detained and tried. However, the FPI was
not freezed, though it had clearly resorted to violence towards peaceful protesters, while
the Ahmadiyah’s movements, which has never resorted to violent methods, were
restricted.
The growing strength of human rights groups is also manifested by the recent
indictment of a former general, accused of involvement in the murder in 2004 of
prominent human rights activist Munir. Former general Muchdi Purwoprandjono is the
first high ranking military officer to face criminal charges in Indonesian history.
Although he was ultimately not convicted, this case proves that the culture of impunity
among officers in the security apparatus is no longer sacrosanct 12.
The growing visibility of women’s rights and sexual rights groups is another sign
of the increasing interest in a rights discourse. Though the progressive women’s
movement failed to stop the promulgation of the anti-pornography law, they did protest it
vigorously. The women’s mass organizaton KPI (Kongres Perempuan Indonesia), the
National Women’s Rights Commission (Komnas Perempuan) and the Association of
11
Jakarta Post 14 January 2009.
International Herald Tribune 7 October 2008. However, his boss, Abdullah Hendropriyono, cannot be
touched yet.
12
7
Women Lawyers (LBH-APIK) all issued letters of protest and staged demonstrations.
Lesbian and Gay rights groups are becoming more sophisticated as well. The Jakarta Gay
and Lesbian Film Festival draws thousands of visitors, and groups like the Ardhanary
Institute and Arus Pelangi (Rainbow Current) conduct trainings, organize email lists and
issue publications. The National Human Rights Commission recently spoke out against
the lack of gay and lesbian rights.13
Rising tide of Islam?
In Indonesia there have always been fundamentalist groups fighting for an Islamic state,
which sometimes resulted in open rebellions (Boland 1982, Effendy 2003). From that
perspective the spate of terrorist attacks a few years ago is just the latest phase of an
always-present undercurrent of intolerance in Indonesian Islam. In fact Indonesia, which
is officially a secular state, is neither fully secular nor theocratic. Religion, particularly
Islam, is very important in public life. In 1945 independence was declared and the state
philosophy of Pancasila was adopted. The Pancasila is based on the belief in God,
nationalism, humanitarianism, social justice and democracy. The Pancasila guarantees
religious pluralism. Since then various Islamic groups have been fighting to include the
so-called Jakarta Charter in the constitution which is based on the Pancasila. This charter
would guarantee the imposition of Syari’ah law for Muslims. The latest attempt to accept
the Jakarta Charter was defeated in 2003 by the highest state body, the MPR (Senate). At
13
Jakarta Post November 27 2008.
8
the time the FPI vowed that a cultural war would be waged to impose Islamic practices
all over the country.14 And this seems to be what is happening at present.
Islam throughout Indonesian history
Islam and nationalism have always been closely interwoven in Indonesia. The first massbased nationalist organization was the Sarekat Islam (Islamic Association), established in
the early 20th century. Sukarno, later the country’s first president, was adept in integrating
both Islam and Communism in his concept and practice of nationalism. After
independence was proclaimed in 1945 an anti-colonial war broke out (1945-49) in which
the future identity of the Indonesian state was fiercely contested; Islamist groups fought
for the establishment of an Islamic state, as indicated above. In the end a secular
constitution was adopted. Other insurgencies supported by Muslim groups flared up in
the late 1950s. As a result political Islam was discredited during the latter years of
Sukarno’s rule. After the communists were massacred in late 1965/early 1966 and
Sukarno replaced by Suharto, Muslim groups hoped for a comeback in the political arena.
However the all-powerful army did not allow that to happen. Instead Islam was relegated
to the social realm. Paradoxically, as Effendy (2003) argues, this meant a consolidation of
major Islamic groups. The two major mass-based rival groups, the moderate, syncretist
NU and the more rigidly ‘reformist’ Muhmmadiyah, both with millions of members,
grew closer to each other.
At the same time, to thwart the comeback of Communism, it was made obligatory
to belong to a religious affiliation. Suharto’s New Order state was built on women’s
14
Personal communication Nursyahbani Katjasungkana, member of the MPR at the time and prominent
member of the Muslim National Awakening Party in the present parliament.
9
social, political and sexual subordination, a policy justified by both anti-Communist and
Islamic sentiments. Various laws were enacted in which women’s subordinate position
was entrenched, such as the 1974 marriage law (see Katjasungkana and Wieringa 2003).
When Suharto’s power began to wane in the early 1990s two trends emerged which
eventually strengthened the return of political Islam. On the one hand opposition to
Suharto’s brutal politics began to be rallied under Islamic banners. On the other hand
Suharto himself increasingly sought a justification for his rule in the use of Islamic
symbols. He set off on the haj to Mecca and lifted the ban on wearing the jilbab. After
that Father Suharto would always wear his Muslim head cap, while his eldest daughter,
who had political aspirations, began to wear the jilbab. The Association of Indonesian
Muslim Intellectuals (ICMI) was founded and the president set up religious courts and
ordered the compilation of Islamic law, to serve as a legal basis for these courts.
After Suharto’s fall the hopes of political Islamic groups were raised again, and
no less than 42 new Islamic parties were set up in preparation for the 1999 elections (out
of over 140 new parties). In spite of the high expectations of the Muslim parties,
Indonesians voted overwhelmingly secular; only 10 Muslim parties managed to get one
or more seats. This pattern was repeated in the latest election, in 2004. By this time a new
fundamentalist party staged an impressive performance, winning 7% of the seats. The
appeal of this PKS (Partai Keadilan Sosial, Social Justice Party) lies in its fight against
corruption and poverty, which the successive governments of the ‘reformation’ (after
1998) period did little to eradicate.
Suharto’s successor Habibie and his generals however engaged on a more
controversial tract. They lacked the former president’s legitimacy and found themselves
10
hard put to control the pro-democracy forces. In an effort to curb their continuing
demands Habibie and his allies started training new state-sponsored militias, who not
only defended the new president, but did so in the name of Islam. These militias helped
further the process of Islamization.15
Political Islam in Indonesia
What are at present the faces of politicised Islam in Indonesia? The above mentioned
PKS is an important actor. It got the majority in Jakarta’s regional council and has gained
a wide influence on student campuses and among the educated middle classes. Wherever
it acquires power it sets about implementing various regulations such as banning the sale
of alcohol, and curtailing gambling and prostitution. Hizbut Tahrir, a group that
advocates the establishment of a caliphate, has also quietly increased its following. It has
staged various non-violent marches and protests around the national parliament (eg
protesting the proposal to legalize abortion). In August 2007 it managed to stage a mass
meeting of some 80.000 participants.
In the second place various public debates were held in 2006 and 2007, all
centering around the perceived Muslim identity of Indonesia. These included the furore
against the ‘drilling dance’ of Inul (ignoring the fact that Indonesia has a long tradition of
female performers who sing and perform erotic dances, such as the ronggeng) and the
debates triggered by the ‘polygamy award’ intended to promote the institution of
polygyny (see for an analysis of these debates Van Wichelen, 2007)16 . In 2008 an
15
Arial Heryanto in Jakarta Post June 6 2008.
Inul Daratista was a village dancer, touring with a band of dangdult music. She invented a dance with
gyrtaic movement which were widely regarded as erotic. Her ‘drilling dance’ bacem the topic of a major
controversy. Conservative (and possibly jealous) singers and clerics calling for a prohibition of her
16
11
important debate was waged on the anti-pornography law which was ultimately adopted o
30 October of that year 17. Before it was adopted the draft anti-pornography law went
through many versions. The draft bill was hotly protested by a inhabitants from
predominantly Christian regions such as Menado, and from the Hindu island Bali. Artists
complained that freedom of speech and cultural expression would be curtailed, tourist
agencies that the ban on sexual clothing would chase away tourists. In the end bikinis are
allowed on tourist beaches, but several controversial issues still remain. One is the
definition of ‘deviant forms of intercourse’ which includes intercourse with corpses or
animals, as well as oral sex and lesbian and gay sex. Another contentious issue is the call
to civil groups to take action when they notice anything pornographic going on. This in
fact legitimizes raids by a group like the FPI against gay and lesbian meetings.
Another element of increasing Islamist discourse was the debate on the issue
whether a woman could be president. Both in the 1999 and in the 2004 elections this was
hotly discussed (Effendy 2003, Munti e.a.2005). Forgotten were the days when powerful
queens ruled part of the archipelago (for instance in Aceh and Majapahit). However this
discourse seems as much to have been instigated by political opportunism as by religious
fervour.
A third phenomenon linked to fundamentalism is the presence of various
paramilitary groups who regularly resort to violence. One of these is the already
mentioned FPI (Front Pembela Islam, Islamic Defender’s Front) which has been active in
Jakarta, raiding bars and nightclubs during the fasting month of Ramadan. It has also
performance. The case of the polygamy award concerns a rich businessmen with four wives who
promulgated an award to promote the pleasures of polygyny.
17
A recent effect of this law is the prohibition of Jaipong dancers to wear ‘sexy ‘ costumes, by the governor
of west Java. Performers testify that the dance has almost disappeared. Jakarta Post 9 February 2009.
12
uttered threats against gay and lesbian groups and is opposed to pluralism and religious
tolerance. Another group is the Al Qaieda-linked Jema’ah Islamiyah (JI), widely held
responsible for various gruesome terrorist attacks. When the Bali bombers were executed
in the beginning of November 2008 JI’s leader Baashir declared them martyrs.
The Indonesian state and Muslim leaders took some time to overcome their
resistance to accept the presence of Islamic terrorist groups in the country. They opposed
President Bush’s identification of Islam with terrorism and were therefore slow to react to
the first signals of indigenous jihadist groups ( Hasan 2005). After the first Bali bomb
(2002) Indonesian jihadism is recognized and widely attributed to the spread of Saudi
Wahabism. Moderates denounce it as un- Indonesian, even un- Islamic.
Among the various mainstream conservative groups the already mentioned MUI
is one of the most powerful. Established in 1975, it has the power to issue fatwa’s
(religious decrees, Hooker 2003) and has recently considerably stepped up its activities..
In July 2005 for instance it issued 11 fatwa’s, discrediting liberalism (in which feminism
is included), pluralism, secularism, interreligious marriages and interfaith prayers,
endorsing polygyny and declaring women’s migrant labour abroad as un- Islamic. The
present conservative president, Yudhoyono, endorsed them. The effects of these fatwa are
widespread. Though they lack legal power, they legitimize the use of violence. For
instance attacks on premises of the Ahmadiyah movement, which is considered heretical
by the MUI, on churches and on the Liberal Islamic Network were perpetrated with
impunity. No arrests have been made in these cases, though the attackers made little
effort to hide their identities. The more conservative trend on morality, supported by the
president, has hardly been protested.
13
Another conservative force are the thousands of pesantren, Islamic boarding
schools. Some of them have been linked with preparing their students for the jihad. In
general they oppose liberalism and feminism as un-Islamic. Their leaders, kyais, are an
important moral and political force. Many of their young, brilliant students have been or
are being trained in Saudi Arabia. On their return they appear to be rather more
influenced by hardliner thoughts than the present leaders of the pesantren, kyais
belonging to the NU.
Regional autonomy
While these developments are going on at the national level, Indonesia has embarked on
a process of decentralization that has far reaching consequences for the position of
women. In 1999 the law on regional autonomy was signed; implementation started in
2001. This law gives wide powers to regional governments, particularly in the social and
economic fields. The regions aspiring to such autonomy set about creating their own
regional identity, which many locate in Islamic values and in patriarchal customary rights
(adat). Aceh is the first province that has decided to implement Shari’ah law in 2002.
Already women lawyers of the women’s legal aid organization, APIK (Asosiasi
Perempuan untuk Keadilan, Women’s Association for Justice) are hampered in their
work, as they cannot be alone in the streets, at night, catering to their clients. After the
2004 tsunami syaria law was even more strictly applied, ostensibly to save women’s
honour from the dangers of the proximity of so many foreign aid workers. For the first
time in Aceh’s history the Hudood ordinances were applied, and the Shariah police and
vigilante groups specially target women (APWLD 2008 and Noerdin 2007). For instance
14
in December 2006 beauty parlors were raided and 13 beauticians arrested for wearing too
tight dresses but no head scarves, while two male clients were detained because their hair
was being cut by female hairdressers. Protesting voices complained that minor crimes
such as these were being prosecuted, while serious offences, such as corruption, go
unpunished.18
Noerdin e.a. (2005) who analysed the regulations that 9 of these newly
autonomous regions promulgated, concluded that women’s rights are widely violated by
them. Women’s political agency is being curtailed, conservative dress codes are imposed,
the definition of prostitution may be so widened as to include any woman who is on the
streets at night. In general they find that these Perda try to limit women to the domestic
sphere.
Many of these bylaws are not in line with the constitution, which guarantees
religious pluralism. Yet this doesn’t seem to bother the regional lawmakers. As Romli
(2008) argues, an Islam which is based on a authoritarian and totalitarian interpretation
and does not take into account the rich and varied traditions of Indonesia, cannot do
justice to the needs and aspirations of the millions of Muslims in the country. Islam can
only become strongly embedded in the hearts of minds of Indonesians when it is in line
with the multiple cultural patterns in Indonesia.
Recently a new head of the Constitutional Court has been appointed, Mahfud,
who served as defence minister under the administration of Gus Dur. He said ‘Sharia
bylaws are not constitutionally or legally correct because, territorially and ideologically,
they threaten our national integrity. He warned the enforcement of sharia-based
ordinances runs counter to the Pancasila principles of social justice since they
18
Jakarta Post December 21, 2006.
15
discriminate against minority groups.19 Sexual rights groups voiced similar concerns.
Arus Pelangi director Rido Triawan demanded already in 2006 that dozens of regional
bylaws should be revoked as they discriminate against sexual minorities. He cited the
anti-prostitution bylaw in Palembang of 2004, in which prostitution is defined to include
homosexuality, lesbianism, sodomy, sexual harassment and ‘other pornographic acts’.20
Feminist discourses
What discourses do feminist scholars and activists deploy in relation to the process of
growing fundamentalism which has so many direct and indirect negative consequences
for women’s position? It has to be noted that this is not new. Already around 1900 RA
Kartini, one of the first Indonesian feminists, protested against a religious practice which
marginalized women.
In present feminist discourse, as indicated above, the process of Islamization as
such is rarely a topic of discussion. Usually particular elements, such as the growing legal
inequalities are discussed. Secondly, opposition to the above is almost always voiced
within a discourse of Islam, not in secular terms. Secular women’s groups do not
command mass appeal, though they will collaborate with more religiously oriented
groups. The largest progressive mass organization of women, the KPI (Koalisi
Perempuan Indonesia), which has tens of thousands of members, is neither fully secular
nor religious. They collaborate with Muslim women’s mass organizations at the local
level, such as the Fattayat, and at state level advocate that women’s rights and human
rights are compatible with the Qur’an. Thirdly the major concepts used by Muslim
19
Jakarta Post August 23, 2008.
20
Jakarta Post October 3, 2006.
16
feminists, both within the KPI, the earlier mentioned APIK or outside of these groups, are
those invoked by women’s activists in other parts of the world as well, patriarchy and
women’s rights.
The outcome is that a Muslim feminist discourse is built around the reform of
Islam along gender sensitive terms, incorporating women’s rights, such as those
contained in the UN Women’s Charter, CEDAW and the Beijing Platform of Action21.
Contrary to what conservative Muslims claim, that these rights are western and not
applicable to Islam, Muslim feminists insist that these rights are universal and in
conformity with the basic principles of Islam.
This discourse began to be built in the late 1980s. An important rallying point was
a seminar organized in 1991 by a group of activists around Lies Marcoes (Marcoes-Natsir
and Meuleman, 1993). In that seminar the case was made that a contextualized
interpretation of Islam, based on the egalitarian spirit of the major texts would be able to
defy the patriarchal tendencies by which contemporary practice and doctrine was
characterized. This discourse was long prepared by both Muslim feminist activists such
as Wardah Hafidz, and the traditional mass-based Muslim women’s organizations
belonging to the NU (Muslimat and Fattayat) and Muhammadyah (Aisyah). Although
these organizations were still under the control of their original men’s groups and are in
general rather conservative, the idea that women had the right to interpret Islamic
teachings had been planted there. The first feminist organization to reappear after the
21
CEDAW is short for the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women.
The Beijing PFA was adopted in 1995.
17
destruction of the women’s movement in 1965/6, Yasanti (set up in the Central Javanese
city of Yogyakarta in 1982) was set up by some young Muslim activists22.
At present many Muslim feminist scholars debate the ways Islam can be reformed
to incorporate women’s rights and to become more gender sensitive. Munir (2005)
advocates a hermeneutical interpretation of the Qur’an in order to incorporate the context
in which this reformist religion emerged. APIK lawyers Munti and Anisah (2005) claim
that Islam is for the whole of humanity, women included. They distinguish between the
basic principles of Islam which are unchangeable and fiqhi, the thoughts of the ulama,
who are only human after all and therefore prone to biases. They advocate legal reform in
Indonesia in which gender biases introduced by these fallible fiqhi are eliminated. Said
(2005) is also concerned with legal reform. By deconstructing and contextualising
theological thought he attempts to ‘actualise’ Islamic theology to include human and
women’s rights. This text is a scathing critique on an Islam that ignores violence against
women, the growing poverty among women and other violations of women’s rights. The
method proposed is a transformative theological epistemology that includes human and
women’s rights. This concept is in line with that advocated by Muslim feminist lawyers
such as APIK’s founder Nursyahbani Katjasungkana, who introduced the concept of
gender-sensitive transformative legal aid (Katjasungkana 2003).
The Muslim scholar Hasyim (2006) also focuses on jurisprudence, giving a
genealogy of fiqh, as a product of Medieval Islam, which explains its patriarchal
character. He uses a deconstructivist methodology and advocates a new fiqh, suitable for
22
Under the New Order of President Suharto the women’s movement was controlled by the state. Wives of
civil servants were active in the various Dharma Wanita groups, rural women were organized by the PKK
(Pendidikan Kesejahteraan Keluarga, Family Welfare Education). After Yasanti in Jakarta the women’s
documentation centre Kalyanamitra was set up and other progressive women’s groups followed. They had
to be very careful not to be associated with Gerwani.
18
our times, in which gender equity is protected. This is possible, he argues, for unlike the
Qur’an and the sunna, the figh is not static, but changeable. The weaknesses of fiqh can
be remedied by adhering to a careful process of ijtihad, open debate and interpretation.
The new fiqh al-nisa (women’s fiqh) he proposes has to be in line with human rights and
guarantee gender justice. For this it is necessary to reevaluate misogynist interpretations
of certain hadiths, and the patriarchal opinions of several fiqh scholars. This fiqh must
also be based on women’s thoughts and aspirations.
A broad range of women’s organizations is involved in these debates and
struggles. The major groups are the already mentioned women’s legal aid centre APIK,
the Women’s Research Institute and the mass-based KPI (Koalisi Perempuan Indonesia,
Coalition of Indonesian Women)23. An ally is the secular women’s human rights
commission. The Domestic Violence Law, introduced by APIK, was strongly supported
by this commission24.
Another powerful voice is that of Musdah Mulia, the former head of the Gender
Unit of the otherwise very conservative Ministry of Religion, presently teaching at a
major Islamic university. An influential ally is also Shinta Nuriyah, the wife of NU leader
and former president Abdulrachman Wahid. She has stimulated the gender analysis of the
major textbooks used in the conservative pesantren, the so-called yellow books.
In 2000 a group of young Muslim women split off from a Muslim human rights
organization to form the pluralist, progressive Muslim women’s organisation "Rahima", a
centre for training and information about Islam and women's rights. It focuses on
23
These groups are linked to a number of influential women , such as Nursyahbani Katjasungkana
presently a member of parliament for the NU-based PKB party. She set up APIK and was the first president
of KPI. Its present president is Masruchah, a former leader of Yayasan Kesejahteraan Fattayat
24
When President Megawati realized she was about to lose the presidential elections in 2004 she suddenly
remembered the women’s electorate and passed the law
19
women's empowerment with an Islamic perspective. Its Board of Management features
some of Indonesia's best-known Muslim intellectuals and activists, both male and female.
Originally Rahima's focus was on the training and dissemination of information
concerning women’s rights within Islam to local community Muslim groups and
pesantrens (Islamic boarding schools) but since then, Rahima has extended its network to
women's NGOs, Islamic women organisations, university groups, inter-faith women's
groups, political parties and the mass media. It has its own publication, Swara Rahima
(Voice of Rahima). Rahima addresses a wide range of issues, including rape, AIDS,
sexuality, veils, syaria law in Aceh and sexuality in general. It always couches its
arguments within an Islamic discourse, much as the group Sisters in Islam in Malaysia
(Ng, Mohammad and Beng Hui, 2006).
The above mentioned women’s groups take up a wide range of issues, most of
which bar on women’s position in Islam. An example is women’s political leadership
(Megawati has again announced to stand for her party in the 2009 elections), women’s
position in the household and in marriage (divorce, polygyny), and women’s right to
interpret the Qur’an and the hadith. With the help of gender analysis these feminists
deconstruct the present interpretations of women’s kodrat (religiously ordained
position)25. They stress that the kodrat should only refer to the actual physical differences
between women and men, which are small, and not to the social construct that is built on
top of them (see for instance Munti e.a.2005). Through an analysis of the context in
which certain hadiths and Qur’anic texts appeared this discourse directly confronts such
groups as the MUI who, they charge, stereotype women. Although there are far reaching
differences among these individual scholars and between the various groups, they do
25
See Wieringa 2002 on the contested nature of the women’s kodrat.
20
demonstrate an at times remarkable flexibility and willingness to collaborate, such as on
the VAW law (though not without competition and jealousy). The effects of their efforts
are mixed. The VAW law was passed, but so was the anti-pornography law. Recently
progressive women received another blow, when on the eve of the start of the campaign
for the next parliamentarian election (April 2009) the election bill was declared
unconstitutional by the Constitutional Court (December 2008). Women parliamentarians
had fought hard to include a clause which stipulated that parties had to nominate women
candidates for minimally 30%.
As elsewhere, fundamentalist groups also have a strong women’s following, who
adopt strict Muslim dress codes and glorify women’s domestic and reproductive roles. In
the above cited case of the Minangkabau, members of Aisyah and Muslimat supported
the regional bylaws thayt curtailed women’s rights, saying it was in accordance with
Islam. Women members of the PKS and other hardliner Muslim groups such as the
Hizbut Tahrir have staged demonstrations in which many more thousands of women
appear that the numbers the progressive women’s groups are able to mobilize.
Marginalized women’s voices
Conservative Islam is strongly supportive of a normative heterosexuality in which
women’s sexuality is interpreted in the light of women’s servility to men. The form of
heteronormativity associated with this ideology stipulates that women are married to a
man and sexually seve him. In fact the most used Indonesien term for making love is
‘melayani suami’ serving one’s husband.. Non-married women such as widows or
divorced women (which in Indonesia go by one name, janda, which thus comes to denote
21
a woman who has had sexual experience with a man but is presently unattached to a man)
sex workers and lesbians are seen as deviant or abjected and face various kinds of
harassment. Yet many of them find innovative ways to accommodate themselves with
Islamic teachings. The following excerpts from the life stories of the the narrators in an
oral history project I co-coordinated, detail the kind of pressure conservative Islam put on
women.26
In Eliana’s case religion played an important role in her marriage and subsequent
divorce. While still at school she had joined an usrah group. This community was
created in the days of the Suharto dictatorship, to teach students about religious
and social issues. Sexuality plays an important role in their classes. According to
usrah teachings, the wife has to be sexually subservient to her husband and accept
all his sexual wishes, even if they involve him taking a second wife. Eliana felt
very close to her spiritual leader and tried to behave sexually as she felt a good
Muslim wife would. She forced herself to give in to all sexual wishes of her
husband, including giving him a blow job and watching pornography with him.
Yet the religious leader blamed Eliana for not doing enough to please her husband,
which is why he needed a second wife. Her teacher even asked her if she might be
a lesbian, that she could not satisfy her husband. She played down her intelligence,
as both her spiritual leader and her husband agreed that it wasn’t nice for a man to
have an intellectually superior woman.
26
These interviews were collected in 2005, in a research project under the auspices of The Kartini Asia
Network. I coordinated this project together with Abha Bhaiya, Nursyahbani Katjasungkana and Irwan
Hidayana. The Indonesian researchers were Bernadet Sinta Situmorang, Endah Sulistyowat, Ratna Batara
Munti and Widjajanti Santoso.
22
Another narrator, Lia, told us the following story:
Lia is a young lesbian woman, living in Jakarta. She was brought up in a strict
Muslim family and has her own ways to accommodate her love for Santi with her
religion. She realizes that Islam prohibits homosexuality. Ideally, she feels, a
person’s religion must be a support for people, however, Islam doesn’t do that
because it always makes her suffer since it makes her feel she is a sinner.
But, she says, the basic principle that Islam teaches is to love others. As
long as she does that, Lia sees nothing wrong in her as one of God’s creatures. Lia
realizes that particularly in the interpretation of the verbal tradition of Islam, the
hadith, all manner of distortion might have entered. Lia wonders what was
originally taught about homosexuality in Islam and how it has been interpreted
over the ages.
Lia knows there are lesbians in the pesantren.27 Being a lesbian does not
prevent one from carrying out religious services, such as praying and doing good
deeds. If one has been a lesbian for so long that it feels as if it is one’s natural
character, and if one has been praying and fasting for many years, one cannot
change oneself to become a heterosexual, Lia decided.
So this is how she interpreted what happened to her in high school. Lia
kept praying to God asking whether her relationships with Santi was blessed or
not? If it wasn’t, surely God would have blocked her way, and if it was, God
would broaden her path? As after praying so hard Santi and she became closer, so
27
Traditional Islamic School, particularly in rural areas. See also Kholifah (2008) for an account of women
loving women in pesantren.
23
she decided that God endorsed it. But a slight uncertainty remains gnawing at her
up till now.
The above excerpts provide a glimpse to the dilemmas with which Indonesian women are
faced in negotiating in a day-to-day basis their lives and desires in a society that has little
space for an open discourse of women’s sexuality. The new media, particularly the
widespread use of internet, provides middle class women who have internet access with
new forms of support. ‘I already knew since I was 9, from the internet, that I was a
lesbian. Now I am looking for a partner’, wrote a 15 year old girl on the mail list of one
of the lesbian groups in Jakarta28. However, fundamentalist groups, who have seemingly
endless resources for the moment seem to be better poised to take advantage of tv,
internet and other media.
Conclusion
Whether the Muslim feminist voices will be able to strengthen the moderate Muslim
groups in society and make them more gender sensitive depends on many factors. These
include the strength and policies of the military, the influence of the Wahabists and
global politics and discourses on Islam. At the time of writing this article the outcome of
the 2009 parliamentary elections was not yet known. Reformasi has brought with it a
certain measure of political freedom. For the moment it seems conservative Muslim
groups have been able to gain the most space. However, the human/women’s rights
discourse has also proliferated. Recently for instance APIK called polygamy a marriage
28
Personal communication from the list moderator, Bonny, on 4 January 2009.
24
crime29. This is a new argument, in the struggle against polygyny, which has been ragings
since the days of the first feminists, such as Kartini..
29
Jakarta Post February 2 2009.
25
References
Anoegrajekti, Novi, 2007, Penari Gandrung: Kontrol Agama, Masyarakat dan Kekuatan
Pasar. In: Jurnal Perempuan 54, pp 51-73.
APWLD, 2008, Asian Pacific Forum on Women, Law and Development:
Fundamentalisms in Asia Pacific. Chiang Mai: APWLD.
Boland, B.J., 1982, The Struggle of Islam in Modern Indonesia. The Hague: Nijhoff.
Cribb, Roert, 1990, Problems in the Historiography of te killings in Indonesia. In: Robert
Cribb ed. The Indonesian Killings 1965-66; Studies from Java and Bali. Clayton: Centre
of Southeast Asian Studies, Monash University. Pp 1-45
Effendy, Bahtiar, 2003, Islam and the State in Indonesia. Singapore: ISEAS.
Hasyim, Syafiq, 2006, Understanding Women in Islam; an Indonesian Perspective.
Jakarta: Solstice.
Headley, Stephen C., 2004, Durga’s Mosque; Cosmology, Conversion and Community in
Central Javanese Islam. Singapore: ISEAS.
Heryanto, Ariel, 2006, State terrorism and Political Identity in Indonesia; Fatally
belonging. London: Routledge.
26
Hooker, M.B., 2003, Indonesian Islam; Social Change through Contemporary Fatawa.
Honolulu: University of Hawai’i Press
Khofifah, Dwi Rubiyanti, 2008, Contesting Discourses on Sexuality in Pesantren;
Negotiations and Resistance in the sexual life of Santriwati. Paper presented at IInd all –
Asia Conference of the Kartini Asia Network, Bali, November 2-5, 15 p.
Marcoes-Natsir, Lies M. and Johan Meuleman, eds, 1993, Wanita Islam Indonesia dalam
Kajian Tekstual dan Kontekstual. Jakarta: INIS.
Hasan, Noorhaidi, 2005, September 11 and Islamic militancy in post-New Order
Indonesia, in Nathan, K.S., and Mohammad Hashim Kamali, eds, Islam in Southeast Asia,
Political, Social and Strategic Challenges for the 21st Century. Singapore: ISEAS. Pp 301
– 325.
Katjasungkana, Nursyahbani, 2003, Gender asnd Transformative Legal Aid, analysis of
APIK, the Indonesian Women’s Association for Justice. Saitama, mimeo. 18 p.
Munir, Lily Zakiyah, 2005, Islam and Gender: Reading Equality and Patriarchy. In
Nathan, K.S., and Mohammad Hashim Kamali, eds, Islam in Southeast Asia, Political,
Social and Strategic Challenges for the 21st Century. Singapore: ISEAS.pp 191 – 209.
27
Munti, Ratna Batara, Ebcop Sophia and Farkha Ciciek, 2005, Respon Islam atas
Pembakuan Peran Perempuan. Jakarta: LBH-APIK.
Munti, Ratna Batara and Hindun Anisah, 2005, Posisi Perempuan dalam Hukum Islam di
Indonesia. Jakarta: LBH-APIK.
Noerdin Endriana, Lisabona Rahman, Ratna Laelasari Y., Sita Aripurnami, 2005,
Representasi Perempuan dalam Kebijakan Publik di era Otonomi Daerah. Jakarta;
Women Research Institute.
Noerdin, Edriana, 2008, Women in the Decentralized Aceh, in: Edriana Noerdin and Sita
Aripurnami eds: Decentralization as a Narrative of Opportunity for Women in Indonesia.
Jakarta: Women Research Institute: pp 173-219.
Ng, Cecilia, Maznah Mohamad and Tan Beng Hui, 2006, Feminism and the Women’s
Movement in Malaysia, an unsung (R)evolution. New York: Routledge.
Romli, Mohamad Guntur, 2008, Islam, Perempuan dan Kearifan Lokal, , In: Jurnal
Permemouan 57. pp57-69.
Said, Nur, 2005, Perempuan dalam Himpitan Teologi dan HAM di Indonesia.
Yogyakarta: Pilar Media.
28
Wieringa, Saskia Eleonora, 2002, Sexual Politics in Indonesia. Houndsmill: Palgrave.
Wieringa, Saskia Eleonora, 2003, The Bireth of the New Order State in Indonesia; Sexual
Politics and Nationalism. In: Journal of Women’s History. Vol. 15 no.1 Sprin, pp 70 – 92.
Wieringa, Saskia and Nursyahbani Katjasungkana, 2003, Sexual Politics and
Reproductive Rights in Indonesia. In : Development, Vol. 46, no. 2, June. Pp63-68.
Wichelen, Sonja van, 2007, Embodied Contestations; Muslim Politics and
Democratization in Indonesia through the Prism of Gender.. University of Amsterdam,
PhD thesis.
www.rahima.or.id
29