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A Refinement of the Concept of Household: Families, Coqesidence, and Domestic Functions’ DONALD R . BENDER University of Mimesola The concepts of “houseliold” and “fatndy” have been given a greater degree of precision i n recent yeurs by those scholars who have pointed out that the former i s a residence group that carries out domestic functions while the latter is a kinship group. The concept of “household,” haoing been analytically distinguished from that of ‘yamily,” is still burdened by the inclusion of two s o c a phenomena that are logicdly distinct and vary somewhat independently: co-residence and domestic functions.Social groups based on afjinal and consanguineal rdationships, co-residence, and domestic functions-ojten thought of as aspects of a single social phenomenon labeled by the term “family”-are in fact semi-independent variebles. T HIS paper will discuss inadequacies in the concept of “household” and provide a n alternative conceptual formulation. Although the analytical distinction between families and households made by several scholars during the past decade represents a simple but major achievement, the concept of houschold is still left in a confused state. It includes social phenomena that are logically distinct and, under certain circumstances, vary independently of each other. However, prior to analyzing and refining the concept of “household,” it may be useful to back u p a step. There is, as yet, no general consensus regarding the utility of conceptually distinguishing families from households. They are very frequently treated as synonymous, the terms being used interchangeably, and a great many definitions of the “family” still incorporate common residence as a n integral part. Under these circumstances, and since the thesis to be presented here presupposes the complete conceptual divorce of the household from the family, i t will be of value to comment first on this distinction. THE FAMILY AND THE HOUSEHOLD There are two basic grounds for making an analytical distinction between families and households: first, they are logically distinct, and second, they are empirically different. As to the first point, the referent of the family is kinship, while the referent of the household is propinquity or residence. Rohannan, who has done much to clarify this distinction, has indicated that kinship and propinquity “do not even belong to the same universe of discourse” (1963 :86) ; therefore, families, as kin- ship units, must be defined strictly in terms of kinship relationships and not in terms of coresidence. Keesing, in distinguishing families from households, has considered them as being based on two distinct principles of organization, kinship and locality respectively (1958: 271). If families in fact always formed households and if households were always composed of families, such a conceptual distinction would still be warranted, though i t might be considered simply an interesting mental exercise devoid of any real scientific utility. I n reality, there are numerous societies in which families normally do not form households, and even more instances in which households are not always composed of families. Consequently, adequate treatment of such societies necessitates that this distinction be made. The range of ethnographic situations i n which households and families differ extends from societies like our own, in which families ideally ought to occupy households and in fact most often do, to societies in which families and households ideally and in fact always differ. For the numerous instances in our society-instances that are considered unfortunate-in which father-husbands or children do not reside with the other members of their families, there are other societies in which these situations occur normally. One need not go to the controversial and frequently cited Nayar as described by Gough (1959, 1962) to find a society in which father-husbands-if indeed such can be said to exist among the Nayar-reside separately from their families. And one need not go to the equally controversial kibbutz asdescribed by Spiro (1954) to find 493 494 A merican Anthropologist a society in which children normally reside separately from their parents. The most frequent situation in which the members of a family normally do not all reside together is that in which the father-husband resides separately from the rest of his family. This situation occurs in several kinds of societal circumstances: where the separate residence of males from females and children reflects a sharp social separation between the sexes during adulthood; where sibling households are prevalent; where it is economically or militarily advantageous for the husbandfather to be separated from his family for considerable periods of time; and sometimes where polygyny is present. The former cases, where adult men reside separately from women and children and where siblings reside together but separately from their spouses, provide the most clearcut examples. In societies in which adult men reside permanently in a men’s house, families are never residential units. Likewise, sibling households, found, for example, as a dominant form among the Ashanti (Fortes el al. 1947), preclude the possibility of the family’s being a residential unit. It is unclear whether families can be considered co-residential units when the husbandfather is gone for considerable periods of time, sometimes years, for purposes of engaging in trade or warfare. And i t is likewise unclear if the family can be considered a co-residential unit when, as sometimes occurs among the Black Carib (Solien de Gonz&les1960:105), the husband-father’s job requires him to reside away from the rest of the family, though he considers their dwelling as home. On the other hand, if i t is unclear whether polygynous families have common residence when the husband and each of his wives have separate but contiguous dwellings, it is quite clear that polygynous families do not form common residential groups when the wives reside a t considerable distances from each other, as among the Navaho when a man marries unrelated women (Kluckhohn and Leighton 1946:lOO). I n addition to the situations in which husband-fathers reside separately from the rest of their families, there are numerous cases where children normally reside separately from their parents. Among the Ibo, for example, boys of five or six years of age leave their mother’s house to reside with other [69, 1967 boys of the same compound (Ottenberg 1965 : 22-23). Or there is the well-known case of Samoan children, who are able to choose the household in which they will reside and, in fact, a t different times normally reside in a variety of households (Mead 1928:36). Once this relatively simple distinction between households and families is made, it seems perfectly obvious. Of course, families do not cease to exist when their members reside separately. Nor do persons who reside together necessarily form families. Even so, the following statement made by Solien de Gonzaes in 1960 for the most part still holds true: “Few writers have distinguished between family and household on either a theoretical or on a descriptive level” (1960: 101). THE HOUSEHOLD: A DOMESTIC DWELLING UNIT Some attempts have been made at differentiating types of households. Solien de GonzQles, one of the few scholars to have clearly conceptualized the difference between households and families, has distinguished two types of households that contain kinsmen though not families. To households composed of only a married pair, she applies the term “affinal household.” In contrast, she applies the term “consanguineal household” to “a co-residential kinship group which includesno regularly present male in the role of husband-father” (1965:1542), a form of household quite widely found in the world, particularly in the Caribbean and South America. An alternative and more detailed scheme is provided by Bohannan (1963:94-98), who has classified households on the basis of the most fundamental kinship relationship found in the household. Of the eight social relationships found in the nuclear family, t h t most fundamental is defined as that which is the most stable and enduring, that which is the last to be broken in conflict situations. Thus there are households based on the husband-wife relationship, on the father-son relationship, on sibling relationships-in short on all of the eight nuclear family relationships with the possible exception of the mother-son relationship. However, these attempts a t refining the concept of the household overlook a basic problem with this concept as currently used. The principal problem with the concept of the household is not so much that i t has remained UEXDER] A Refinement of the Concept of Household relatively undefined and undifferentiated, though in fact i t has, but that i t contains elements that are both logically and empirically distinct. I n this sense, the same problem now exists with the concept of the household that existed with the concept of the family before the two were distinguished. Just as families and households can and do vary somewhat independently of each other, so households contain aspects that can and do vary independently. Although Bohannan, Keesing, and Solien de Gonzdes all have indicated that the referent of the concept of the household involves propinquity or locality, this is not exactly the case. The concept actually implies more than merely an aggregate of people residing together. I n addition to common residence, it implies a group of persons who together carry out domestic functions. As Solien de Gonzldes has indicated, “the household . . . implies common residence, economic cooperation, and socialization of children” (1960: 106). Similarly, Bohannan has stated that the household usually acts to fulfill the functions of providing food and shelter and of bringing u p children (1963:98). I n one sense, “household” refers to those persons who reside together; in another sense, it refers to a group of people carrying out domestic functions. I n the former sense, a household need not carry out domestic functions. I n the latter sense, a household need not reside together as a unit. I t is important, then, analytically to distinguish between co-residential groups and domestic functions. Co-residential groups have as their referent propinquity, while domestic functions have as their referent social functions. I t is quite obvious that persons residing together do not always carry out domestic functions. One need not leave our own society to demonstrate this. Also, there are numerous ethnographic instances in which domestic functions are carried out tiy groups whose members do not reside together. Such is the case in many societies in which men dwell in a special men’s house. Among the M u n d u r u d of South America (Murphy 1960), for example, villages are composed of two types of coresidential units: one composed of adult males, the other composed of women and chddren. The nuclear family forms a domestic unit in the sense that the husband-father provides his wife with game and fish. On this 495 level, then, the nuclear family forms a domestic unit but not a co-residential unit, and to use the term “household” in this context would be inaccurate, since the nuclear family forms a household only in the one sense, not in the other. But although the nuclear family is symbolically a domestic unit, for all practical purposes i t is not. This is because domestic functions are for the most part carried out through reciprocal interaction between the two groups: adult males and adult females. T h a t is, men usually hunt cooperatively, while all of the women of each women’s house cooperate in the preparation of food (with sometimes a simple division of labor occurring among the women). I n a sense, then, men as a unit present game and fish to the women, who in turn process i t as a unit and distribute the prepared food to their husbands and children. A t this level, the whole village forms the domestic unit, the sexual division of labor in domestic activities being at the village level. Another situation in which domestic functions are not all carried out by co-residential groups is found in societies in which married siblings reside together, which precludes the possibility of having husband and wife live together. Among the Ashanti, for example, the most common residential pattern is for each member of a married pair to reside with his own matrilineal kinsmen. Though not a co-residential unit, the family still carries out domestic functions. “A man must provide his wife and children with clothes at certain times of the year, and she must cook for him and the children, adding her self-grown foodstuffs to the meals” (Fortes el al. 1947: 168). One is dealing, then, not with two distinct social phenomena-families and householdsbut with three distinct social phenomena: families, co-residential groups, and domestic functions. All three frequently correspond, both ideally and in fact (this is reflected in at least one meaning of our folk term “home,” which implies a family residing together and functioning as a domestic unit). The three also can and sometimes do vary independently. There are, of course, three logically possible ways in which any two of the three could combine. I n the Ashanti case mentioned, families carry out domestic functions but d o not reside together. The situation in which domestic-residential units (“households”) do not contain families is very widespread. It might be mentioned here that even in our own 496 American Anthropologist society, where families ideally and in fact most often do form domestic-residential units, there are numerous instances in which households are not composed of families? I know of no ethnographic case that fits the third combination, that is, where families form residential but not domestic units, though it is certainly conceivable that such a n arrangement could exist. Once these analytical distinctions are made, more accurate comparisons are possible. I’resently, the term “household” is being applied to noncomparable phenomena. Even more basic, with ethnographers aware that domestic functions, co-residential groups, and families d o not necessarily correspond, more accurate observations and descriptions would undoubtedly result. I t is well established that once social scientists identify a social phenomenon with a label, there is a great danger that they may overlook important variations that the label is unable to handle. Although in good ethnographies one can frequently determine the exact nature of the social unit termed a “household,” the term very often adds more confusion than clarification. Equipped with these distinctions, Irene Ott, a University of Minnesota graduate student who has carried out a preliminary study of extended families in a rural Minnesota German-American community, has found that a t times in our own society families, co-residential groups, and domestic functions do not directly correspond. The families studied extended over three and four generations and were highly variable in their form. Whereas various subunits within the extended families (not always nuclear families) were frequently functionally significant for different reasons, all extended families as completc units were functionally significant in that the adult male members jointly operated the farm or farms involved. Residence was consistently virilocal and usually also patrilocal, though this tells little of the nature of the co-residential groups. Complete extended families sometimes occupied a single farm house, sometimes two farm houses on the same farm, sometimes farm houses on contiguous farms, and sometimes farm houses on noncontiguous farms. Some degree of residential privacy existed for aU [69, 1967 nuclear families with young children and for older couples whose children were grown, though in some cases this may have meant merely a private bedroom, with the rest of the house shared by other extended-family members. Although in some instances nuclear families were almost completely functionally autonomous, except for the joint operation of the farm land, in many instances domestic functions were distributed to various segments of the extended family. A description of a single case will illustrate the point. This three-generation extended family was composed of a man, his wife, and two sons and their families. The eldest male, his wife, and one son and his family occupied the family farm house, the older couple having a bedroom on the first floor and the younger couple and their children occupying bedrooms on the second floor. Rooms other than the bedrooms were shared in common b y both the natal and conjugal families. The second son and his wife and children occupied a trailer, also on the family farm. The entire unit clearly formed a single extended family. When questioned regarding whom they considered to be members of their family, they indicated that all three nuclear families composed their “family,” though they also felt that the term could be applied to the nuclear families as well. The farm was run by all three nuclear families, or more specifically by the three adult males. The eldest male handled the finances and record keeping, while the two sons did most of the manual labor. General farm expenses were handled out of the general farm income, atlministered by the eldest male. Each son received a percentage of the income from a dairy operation for some of the needs of their own conjugal families. One son raised chickens to increase the money he could have for his conjugal family. For some purposes, the two nuclear families occupying the family farmhouse formed a single domestic unit, involved with the preparation and consumption of food and with housework. Within this domestic unit, a division of labor existed. The eldest male and his wife were responsible for redecorating the house and providing household furnishings for that p a r t of the house used in common. Food was generally purchased b y them for the entire domestic unit, whereas i t was pre- BENDER] A Refirtemenl of the Concept of Household pared by the eldest female and her daughterin-law. The two adult women also took care of the canning and freezing of food. Normally, these domestic activities carried out by the two nuclear families occupying the single house were carried out independently by the conjugal family occupying the trailer. For the most part, then, domestic activities were carried out by the groups that resided together in the same house. However, for purposes of child rearing, each nuclear family tended to be independent. And, in another context, all three nuclear families formed a single domestic unit in that the eldest female did the gardening and handled the care and maintenance of clothing for the entire extended family. CO-RESIDENTIAL GROUPS AND DOMESTIC FUNCTIONS Thus far, no precise meanings for the concepts “co-residential group” and “domestic functions” have been designated, though their meanings can be inferred from the manner in which they are used. In the context in which they are used, the meanings may seem quite obvious. However, concepts that seem quite obvious frequently become very allusive upon close analysis. It is undoubtedly for this reason that deceptively obvious concepts such as “family” often are left undefined, defined only vaguely, or defined in terms of examples. Rather than leave the concepts of co-residential group and domestic functions deceptively obvious, an attempt will be made to identify them precisely and in such a manner that they may be useful conceptual tools. Co-residence In anthropology, residence has been conceptually tied directly to kinship. Residence is nearly always treated in terms of residence classification, and the latter has been concerned with kinsmen and where they live. Moreover, traditional residence classification has been formulated on the basis of a single kinship relationship, the marriage relationship. On such a basis, of course, a minimum amount of information is given regarding the nature of residential groups. Furthermore, since husband and wife live separately in sonic societies, not all cases are classifiable. Thus, of the many residence terms that have been formulated to apply to married couples, 497 the only term that comes close to coping with such cases is the negative term “duolocal,” indicating simply that husband and wife reside separately. The shift in the application of residence terms from the married pair to the married individual made by Fischer (1958) resolves this particular problem and others as well, though this usage still tells little about co-residential groups. Bohannan has shifted the focus of residence classification from the marriage relationship to the household. I n doing so, he keeps residence tied directly to kinship by basing his classification on the most fundamental of the eight basic nuclear family relationships found in the household. I n a limited sense, this system of classification is consistent with Bohannan’s emphasis on the fact that families do not necessarily form households and that households do not necessarily contain families. I n a more basic sense, however, Bohannan is inconsistent. I n distinguishing families from households, he has indicated that families are kinship groups that must be defined strictly in terms of kinship relationships. I n contrast, households are based on a distinct definitional criterion-propinquity (Bohannan 1963:8687). From this i t follows that i t is no more legitimate to classify households in terms of kinship relationships than i t is to classify families in terms of residence, unless i t is specified that only one category of households is being classified-that category which includes households containing kinsmen. There is no reason why residence should be tied exclusively to kinship. No necessary connection exists between the two. On the contrary, not only are kinship groups of various forms sometimes dispersed, but co-residential groups are sometimes nonkinship groups. Since residence classification developed as an aspect of kinship studies, i t is understandable that residence in anthropology has been tied directly to kinship. But no matter how important residence classification may be in the area of kinship, to be a useful concept in the present context the concept of residence must be separated from kinship. I n addition to being used exclusively in the realm of kinship, the concept of residence has the additional problem of having multiple meanings, often confused and not all equally appropriate in the comparative study of social organization. In our own society, with a highly sedentary population, the concepts of residence 498 A merican Anthropologist and dwelling are often equated with specific physical dwellings, fixed in one place. Such usage is of little value in the cross-cultural study of residence. Co-residential social units need occupy neither physical dwellings nor specific places. Nomadic or transhumant populations, for example, may occupy physical dwellings, and people, houses, and material items may be arranged in a definite spatial pattern, but the dwellings themselves may be moved at regular intervals. Likewise, there are a few societies in which co-residential groups occupy neither a physical dwelling nor a specific place, the Nambikwara of South America and the native Australians being examples. Rather than focus attention on the places where people reside or on the physical dwellings in which they reside, the object of study here is the social group that forms the coresidential unit. Specific places, dwellings, material objects, and the like become relevant only as they are culturally defined as important characteristics of co-residing groups. Placing an emphasis on the group that forms a co-residential unit, rather than on the place, allows the distinction to be made between aggregates of people that occupy space in a patterned and systematic manner and the situation in which groups form co-residential groups: there is a difference between a group occupying an apartment and the entire aggregate of persons who occupy the apartment building. All social groups can have a spatial dimension, can be localized for one purpose or another. Co-residence, as used here, is not synonymous with the total range of situations in which there is group propinquity, but rather represents one variety of group propinquity. It here refers to living together, which is minimally characterized by a proximity in sleeping arrangements and a sentiment similar to that expressed in our folk concept of home. Co-residential groups can exist on different levels within the same society. Just as an extended family may function as a group for some purposes while the constituent nuclear families function as groups for other purposes, so the former may be a co-residential group occupying, perhaps, contiguous dwellings, while the latter form smaller co-residential units occupying single dwellings. Such a pattern is frequently found in polygynous families in Africa, where mother-child units form the [69,1967 smallest co-residential units, the entire polygynous family forms a larger co-residential unit, and the entire compound forms a still larger co-residential unit. Actual physical boundaries separating co-residential groups may be minimal, as when members of a family occupy contiguous hammocks in a large village house. The degree to which co-residence, as a form of group Propinquity, forms a significant aspect of social groups varies greatly. Instances range from those in which co-residence is almost completely epiphenomenal to the social grouping to those in which the group is based primarily on propinquity. Co-residence is epiphenomenal to another principle of social grouping to the extent that groups simply take up space in the process of their members’ living together. There are many instances, however, in which co-residence is not merely epiphenomenal to other principles, but is, in part, the basis for the existence of that group. Such is the case in many societies in which the principles of kinship and propinquity are combined to form what are frequently designated as household groups-groups composed of persons, usually but not necessarily family members, who occupy a specific dwelling. The Burmese ain-daung is an example, referring to a dwelling and to the group that resides there, usually composed of family members but also frequently including more remote kinsmen and servants. I n addition to acting as a principle of social grouping, propinquity can be a causal factor in the formation of groups, as when the mere proximity of aggregates of people who reside near each other results in the formation of formalized relationships and groups, a kind of situation well documented by Michel (1954). Under some circumstances kinship features can be epiphenomenal to co-residence. All the women and children occupying a women’s house among the Mundurucd are, in fact, related through uterine links, since residence is matrilocal. This matrilineality is epiphenomenal to the fact of co-residence and matrilocality, since descent is formally traced patrilineally among the MundurucG (Murphy 1960). Domestic Functions As a folk concept, our term “domestic” refers to those activities associated with the household or the home. Furthermore, it connotes female activities more than male ac- il Refinement of the Concept of Household 499 tivities. Where the term has been used by this reason, they are most frequently carried BENDER] social scientists, it is generally used with no modification from its vague folk meaning, Bohannan has used the idea of domestic rights in an analysis of the marriage contract. Following the distinction between families, which are kinship groups, and households, which are local or spatial groups, Bohannan has distinguished kinship rights from domestic rights in the marriage contract. He has stated that the rights in a wife, which a man acquires at marriage and which form the basis of the household, can be called “domestic rights.” Such rights include his right to live with her and to form with her a basic unit defined by the division of labor between the sexes.. . .The precise and detailed content of those rights varies from one culture to the next. What does not vary is that wherever the family does form a basis for household formation. . there are domestic duties and there is a division of labor between the sexes [1963:78]. . This analysis makes sense when it is assumed that households represent a single social phenomenon. However, when i t is realized that co-residence and domestic functions do not necessarily coincide, then a further complication arises, for if the domestic rights that are exchanged between husband and wife at marriage are those associated with co-residential groups, then i t follows that the same rights and duties are not domestic rights when husband and wife reside separately as members of different co-residential groups. Because the rights are not necessarily any different under the two circumstances, it does not seem reasonable to make such a distinction. Among the Ashanti, for example, there is no indication that the right of a husband to expect that his wife will prepare his meals and the right of a wife to expect that her husband will help provide for her and her children differ a t all in those cases in which husband and wife reside separately and those less frequent cases in which they reside together. The basic feature of “domestic” activities is not that they are necessarily associated either with families or with co-residential groups, but that they are concerned with the day-to-day necessities of living, including the provision and preparation of food and the care of children. They differ from various other economic and social functions in that they are well suited to be carried out by small groups in a wide range of societal circumstances. For out, at least in part, by co-residential families. They can be, and often also are, carried out by co-residential units that are not families, and in a few instances they are carried out, in part, by families that are not co-residential units. Within the same society, domestic functions are frequently carried out by more than one kind of small group, and in highly specialized industrial societies they can be to a great extent efficiently taken over by specialpurpose groups. And human ingenuity is such that nearly all domestic functions can be carried out by special-purpose groups; witness the Israeli kibbutz as described by Spiro. DEFINING THE FAMILY STRUCTURALLY I have said that families, co-residential groups, and domestic functions represent three distinct social phenomena. Implicit here is that the family is a strictly kinship phenomenon and, as such, is best deiined strictly in terms of kinship relationships. This is because families, as a variety of kinship grouping, vary independently of co-residential groups and of domestic functions. To include the criteria of co-residence and domestic functions in the definition of the family results in the absurdity of having to deny the existence of families when their members do not reside together or when they do not form domestic units. This in no way implies any sort of primacy of social structure over social functions, nor does it deny the importance of co-residence. I n fact, viewed from one point of view, social functions can be considered to be more basic than specific forms: it is frequently said that social groups exist to carry out certain functions that are requisites for biological or for societal survival, Likewise, co-residence can be equally as important as kinship as a basis for forming .social groups, and in some instances kinship may be epiphenomena1 to COresidence. I n fact, it is widely recognized that unilineal descent systems may in some instances have resulted from a particular form of residence. It does not follow from this, however, that kinship is a residential phenomenon or vice versa. That families as structural units need not be co-residential units has been clearly demonstrated and requires no further discussion. The relationship between the family as struc- 500 American Anthropologist tural type and as social function does require further consideration, however. The general statement has been made that domestic functions should be distinguished from families on logical grounds, and that in fact the two vary independently of each other. It has not been demonstrated that there are no specific domestic functions that are invariably associated with families. Likewise, i t is possible that there are social functions other than domestic that are invariably associated with families. Although logically it seems most consistent to define kinship phenomena-in this instance the family-strictly in terms of kinship relationships, empirically i t would not be incorrect to include certain social functions in the definition of the family so long as these functions were invariably associated with families. This problem does not arise with nonfamilial kinship groups or with nonkinship groups, because i t is recognized that whereas such groups may carry out a variety of functions, no specific function is invariably associated with a given type of structural unit. It is the family that is said to be universally associated with specific social functions. Moreover, i t is not families in all their varied forms that are said to universally carry out specific social functions, but one particular form of the family-the nuclear family. I n addition, the frequent assumption that this association is a necessary one makes it possible t o explain the assumed universality of the nuclear family in terms of social functions that are requisites for societal survival. Rather than deal with all of the many functions that at various times have been said to be family functions, the focus here will be on those functions identified by Murdock (1949) as universally associated with the nuclear family. Of those who have attempted to identify family functions, Murdock is the most frequently cited, undoubtedly because his conclusions are based upon a systematic sampling of societies throughout the world. The four functions identified by him as universally associated with the nuclear family are: sexual, economic, reproductive, and educational. There is no doubt that the functions of the regulation of sexual activity and of reproduction do take place within the family. Nevertheless, to relate these functions universally to the nuclear family is a somewhat dubious procedure. It represents a case 01 misplaced emphasis-misplaced in two ways: by focusing [69, 1067 on the nuclear family as such and by overlooking the exact nature of the relationship between kinship and man as a biological creature. It is certainly true, as Murdock has pointed out, that a n exchange of sexual rights always accompanies the marriage relationship. This exchange of rights is associated specifically with the marriage relationship, however, not with the nuclear family. These rights exist in marriages that have not resultcd in children and they exist in family types other than nuclear, as in polyandrous families when a woman receives sexual rights in several brothers and they in turn in her. The referent is not the nuclear family, but marriage. Sexual relationships are prohibited between parents and children and usually between siblings. Again, the referent is not the nuclear family as such, b u t the incest taboo, which, though i t includes the nuclear family, includes other kinsmen as well. Control of sexual activity occurs in the nuclear family because the latter contains a marriage relationship and because some of its members are included under a n incest taboo, but not because the sexual function is associated with the nuclear family as such. As to the relationship between the reproductive function and the nuclear family, two points may be made: this function is not universally associated with the nuclear family exclusively, and nuclear families can exist without this function. Both social and biological aspects of reproduction must be considered. If one considers the biological aspect, then, in societies in which premarital or extramarital relationships are allowed for females, it is not the nuclear family as such that is necessarily the reproductive unit, though it may be the child-rearing unit. T h e same is true in the case of polyandrous families, in which biological paternity is impossible to determine. If, on the other hand, i t is the social aspect t h a t is considered, then it would be possible to say that i t does not matter who the genitor is as long as a social father is identified. On this basis, however, the Trobriand nuclear family is not a reproduction unit, because biological paternity is not recognized and children do not have fathers, only mothers’ husbands. And, of course, nuclear families exist that d o not engage in the reproductive function when children are adopted. Rather than associate sexual and reproductive functions with the nuclear family as such, BENDER] A Refinement of the Concept of Household i t is more meaningful to look at the relationship between man’s biological nature and kinship. Kinship is a social phenomenon that has a referent in biology. The term “biological family” places emphasis on the fact that nuclear families can be considered as resulting from a sexually cohabitating pair having offspring. It is generally recognized, however, that the nuclear family is more accurately conceived of as a social unit than a biological unit. The relationship between biology and kinship is an indirect one. Biological factors as they relate to kinship may be emphasized, de-emphasized, ignored, or in some cases denied. Biological phenomena are always given social meanings. Sexual reproduction itself may be viewed in a variety of ways: i t may be considered inseparable from sexual relationships: partially separable, or, as among the native Australians and the Trobriand Islanders, completely separable as a biological phenomenon. I t is because man is a sexually reproducing animal, and because the family in one form or another is universal or nearly so, that families are usually, though not always, involved in sexual reproduction. Sexual reproduction is a prerequisite for both biological and societal survival and usually takes place in the context of the family. But reproduction and the family are different orders of phenomena, the first being biological, the second social, so that reproduction can, and frequently does, occur separately from the family. It is for this reason that sexual rights may be exchanged independently of any rights over potential children, as in concubinage; that parentchild relationships can be created through adoption rather than reproduction; that biological fatherhood can be ignored or denied; and that the entire sexual reproductive process can, under some circumstances, take place outside the family. Another function said by Murdock to be universally associated with the nuclear family is the economic function. Unlike the sexual and reproductive functions, the significance of associating economic functions with the nuclear family, with families in general, or even \\it11 kinship groups is doubtful, for nearly every social group has some economic aspects to its activities. Moreover, Murdock’s case rests on the economic cooperation that is said to exist between husband and wife (based on the division of labor by sex), between par- 50 1 ents and children (based on the division of labor by age), and between siblings. But to say that the nuclear family always carries out economic functions because a division of labor by age and sex occurs within that group is to misplace the functions. The division of labor by age and sex exists in the society as a whole and thus also in any social groups that contain persons of both sexes and of differentages, including all types of families. This is not strictly a nuclear-family phenomenon. It may be that in some instances particular economic aspects of the division of labor can be only carried out by parents in relationship to their children, not by unmarried persons or by married persons without children. It is also true that in some societies, as in our own, any economic roles played by parents in relationship to their children can also be played completely outside of the family situation. It is not only in the Israeli kibbutz that economic cooperation takes place primarily outside the realm of the nuclear family and that the division of labor by sex takes place in the society as a whole: the same is to a great extent true in the case of the Mundurud, already mentioned. The fourth universal nuclear family function identified by Murdock-considered by some as the most basic-is socialization. There are two issues involved here, one raised by Murdock and one raised by Parsons and Bales (1955). Murdock’s contention was that the nuclear family is everywhere the primary socializing agent. Parsons and Bales, in contrast, feel that there are certain aspects of the socialization process related to personality formation that can only be carried out by a small, nuclear-family-like group, which thus accounts for the universality of the nuclear family. It is very questionable whether the nuclear family as such is always the primary socializing agent. During infancy, children are frequently in almost continuous contact with their mothers, fathers playing a t best a relatively minor direct role, particularly in societies in which there is a sharp social and physical separation between the sexes. Young boys, it is true, frequently learn male tasks from their fathers, and girls from their mothers, though in societies in which boys reside with their mothers away from their fathers, the father’s role may still be relatively minor. Where children are free to live in households other 502 A merican Anthropologist than that of their parents, where children are in continuous contact with a wide range of kinsmen, where children live with their peers, and where nurses and servants are important, it is not unreasonable to suppose that the nuclear family may actually be of secondary importance as a socialization agent. If there are certain aspects of the socialization process that can only be camed out by the nuclear family, then the percentage of socialization carried out by the nuclear family may not be relevant. Parsons and Bales have formulated a psychoanalytically based, socialpsychological theory of socialization, which holds that adequate personality development requires a small group in which both adult male and female roles are performed. The ideal and the most obvious social group that is structurally adequate to carry out this function is the nuclear family. It does not automatically follow, if the theory is correct, that the nuclear family is the only kinship group that can carry out this function, a point made by Fallers and Levy (1959). Nor does it automatically follow that such a group need be kinship based. I n fact, there is the distinct possibility that a society could exist with somewhat less than ideal socializing agencies. There are, of course, specific instances in our own and other societies in which socialization takes place in groups that are structurally inadequate by the criteria of Parsons and Bales. It might be argued that a society can exist with a few inadequately socialized individuals, though the majority must be adequately socialized. On the other hand, it is equally arguable that all individuals in a given society could be socialized by a structurally inadequate groupthough, if the theory is correct, i t would follow that all members of that society would achieve somewhat less than ideal personality development, Because there is strong evidence to indicate that the nuclear family is not always quantitatively the most important socializing agent, and because there is not conclusive evidence to indicate that any aspect of the socialization process requires the nuclear family as the socializing agent, to incorporate the socialization process in the definition of the nuclear family is of questionable value. It would be even less useful to incorporate i t in the definition of families in general, for extended families are frequently economically important a t the same time that they play almost no role in [69, 1967 socialization. By incorporating the socialization function as a part of the definition of the family, one runs the danger of discovering social groups that are structurally nuclear families but are not primary socializing agents. As Goldschmidt has pointed out (1960), there is no reason to assume that specific functional requisites for societal survival must necessarily be carried out by particular institutions such as marriage or the nuclear family. The search for functions that are universally associated either with families in general or with nuclear families in particular is certainly a legitimate task. Since families, however, have been defined and classified primarily in terms of their structure, the inclusion of specific functions as a part of the definition can only lead to confusion, unless i t is reasonably certain that the relationship between form and function is an invariable one. For if they do not necessarily go together, then one is left with the alternative of excluding from the category of “family” all cases in which the function is not associated with the form. Spiro (1954) ran into this problem with his study of an Israeli kibbutz: a t first, hr considered the position that the nuclear family did not exist because it did not carry out the nuclear-family functions identified by Murdock, and that the whole kibbutz could he viewed as an extended family. There is a much broader problem involved here, which has to do with the classification of society in general and the related problem of the relationship between social structure and social functions. Society has been broken up and categorized in a variety of ways, frequently in the same book by the same author. One means of classifying all social groups and social institutions is in terms of so-called principles of social structure or principles of social grouping. Thus Lowie (1948) has identified the following principles of social grouping, on which supposedly all social groupings are based: sex, age, kinship, co-residence and consciousness of kind. Firth, in his turn, has identified sex, age, locality, and kinship as some of the most fundamental principles oi social structure (1958:82). On a functional level, society is categorized for analytical purposes in a complementary manner. Thus there are political systems, religious systems, economic systems, and the like. The concept of institution is sometimes on BENDER] A Refinement of the Cowept of Household this level of analysis, though a t other times i t is also on the structural level. I n the former case, associated with each function there are social groups, but nothing is implied regarding their structure. A wide variety of social groups can carry out a single function, and, conversely a single type of social group can carry out a variety of social functions. When used on a structural level, however, the concept of institution implies a given social form, such as the institutions of marriage and the family. In contrast to the position taken in this paper-that the family is best defined structurally since there are no conclusively established, invariable connections between specific family forms and particular family functionsFallers and Levy (1959) conclude on the same basis that the family is best defined functionally. They reason that the family as a concept is ill adapted for comparative analysis because of the incorrect assumption that specific structural units are invariably associated with specific social functions. Such an assumption is no longer made by anthropologists in the study of other social phenomena, they note: for example, in the study of political systems, to associate specific kinds of social groups with political functions is to overlook the facts that a wide range of social groups can carry out the same political function and that socalled political groups can carry out nonpolitical functions. Of all of the functions that have been attributed to the nuclear family, they believe socialization to be the most important. They agree with Parsons and Bales that small groups in which both adult male and female roles are played are structural requisites for adequate socialization, but they do not agree that this group need be the nuclear familyany small, kinship-structured group would be adequate. On this basis they conclude that the most useful definition of the family for general comparative purposes would be “any small, kinship-structured unit which carries out aspects of the relevant functions” (1959:Sl). There are major weaknesses in Fallers’ and Levy’s argument. They correctly indicate that if it is the adult male and female roles in a small-group situation that are of primary importance in the socialization process, it does not follow that the nuclear family is the only structurally adequate socializing agent; but they do not follow the argument to its logical conclusion: that the socialization agent need not be a kinship-based group. 503 There is a much more important problem with defining families functionally, however. The term “family” is now legitimately used by almost all anthropologists and sociologists to refer to a variety of kinship groups that contain both affinal and consanguineal relationships; as such, i t has proven to be an indispensable tool. But if Fallers’ and Levy’s definition were to be used, then nuclear families, polygynous families, polyandrous families, and extended families would be ‘Yamilies” in some instances and not in others. Under these circumstances, some other designation would have to be formulated for these social forms. If there are certain aspects of the socialization process that are invariably associated with some sort of small, kinshipstructured unit, which may be of a variety of forms, certainly such a unit should be identified with a label, but not with a label that has proven of great utility in another context. The issue as to the relative utility of focusing on social structures or social functions for purposes of comparative analysis is an important one, particularly when the desire is t o discover structures or functions that are universal because they are requisites for societal survival. As Fallers and Levy have pointed out, it has proven more useful for comparative purposes to define political systems and other such institutions functionally rather than structurally. Goldschmidt too has made a strong case for what he terms “comparative functionalism,” the comparative study of functional requisites for societal survival and of how they are institutionally carried out. He maintains that there are no invariable connections between forms and functions: while there are certain necessary functions that are usually associated with “marriage,” for example, these functions can be taken care of in part or entirely outside this institution. The point to be stressed, I believe, is one that has long been accepted in social science: social structure and social function are complementary concepts. But the fact that specific forms of the family may not have universal functions, or that specific forms of the family may not be universal, does not negate the utility of defining families structurally. On the contrary, because people in all societies recognize kinship relationships and use these relationships as a basis for forming social groups, and because these relationships can be organ- A merican Anthropologist 504 ized in only a certain number of logically possible ways, it is extremely useful to classify kinship groups in terms of structural types. Not all types need be found in all societies, nor need they be equally functionally important when they are found. SUMMARY Families (as specific types of kinship structures), co-residence, and domestic functions are three distinct kinds of social phenomena. Hitherto, co-residence and domestic functions have been mistakenly considered as inherent attributes of families. The first major analytical breakthrough came when families were distinguished from households, the former having as their referent kinship, the latter having as their referent presumably propinquity or locality. I n fact, this distinction left the job only half done, since the concept of the household, as formulated, included two distinct kinds of social phenomena: co-residential groups and domestic functions. While all three very frequently correspond, they also can and do vary independently. NOTES This paper is a revised and expanded version of one read at the annual meetings of the Central States Anthropological Society in St. Louis, April 28, 1966. 2 No numerical data are available in this regard. The census definition of households differs from that used here, consisting of all persons occupying a housing unit. According to the 1953 census, 28.6 percent of household units actually contained families (Click 1957). I REFERENCES CITED BOHANNAN, PAUL 1963 Social anthropology. 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