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A Refinement of the Concept of Household: Families,
Coqesidence, and Domestic Functions’
DONALD R . BENDER
University of Mimesola
The concepts of “houseliold” and “fatndy” have been given a greater degree of precision i n recent yeurs by
those scholars who have pointed out that the former i s a residence group that carries out domestic functions
while the latter is a kinship group. The concept of “household,” haoing been analytically distinguished
from that of ‘yamily,” is still burdened by the inclusion of two s o c a phenomena that are logicdly distinct and vary somewhat independently: co-residence and domestic functions.Social groups based on afjinal and consanguineal rdationships, co-residence, and domestic functions-ojten thought of as aspects
of a single social phenomenon labeled by the term “family”-are in fact semi-independent variebles.
T
HIS paper will discuss inadequacies in
the concept of “household” and provide
a n alternative conceptual formulation. Although the analytical distinction between
families and households made by several
scholars during the past decade represents a
simple but major achievement, the concept of
houschold is still left in a confused state. It
includes social phenomena that are logically
distinct and, under certain circumstances,
vary independently of each other.
However, prior to analyzing and refining
the concept of “household,” it may be useful
to back u p a step. There is, as yet, no general
consensus regarding the utility of conceptually distinguishing families from households.
They are very frequently treated as synonymous, the terms being used interchangeably,
and a great many definitions of the “family”
still incorporate common residence as a n integral part. Under these circumstances, and
since the thesis to be presented here presupposes the complete conceptual divorce of the
household from the family, i t will be of value
to comment first on this distinction.
THE FAMILY AND THE HOUSEHOLD
There are two basic grounds for making an
analytical distinction between families and
households: first, they are logically distinct,
and second, they are empirically different. As
to the first point, the referent of the family is
kinship, while the referent of the household
is propinquity or residence. Rohannan, who
has done much to clarify this distinction, has
indicated that kinship and propinquity “do
not even belong to the same universe of discourse” (1963 :86) ; therefore, families, as kin-
ship units, must be defined strictly in terms of
kinship relationships and not in terms of coresidence. Keesing, in distinguishing families
from households, has considered them as being
based on two distinct principles of organization, kinship and locality respectively (1958:
271).
If families in fact always formed households and if households were always composed
of families, such a conceptual distinction
would still be warranted, though i t might be
considered simply an interesting mental exercise devoid of any real scientific utility. I n
reality, there are numerous societies in which
families normally do not form households,
and even more instances in which households
are not always composed of families. Consequently, adequate treatment of such societies
necessitates that this distinction be made.
The range of ethnographic situations i n
which households and families differ extends
from societies like our own, in which families
ideally ought to occupy households and in
fact most often do, to societies in which families and households ideally and in fact always
differ. For the numerous instances in our society-instances
that are considered unfortunate-in which father-husbands or children
do not reside with the other members of their
families, there are other societies in which
these situations occur normally. One need not
go to the controversial and frequently cited
Nayar as described by Gough (1959, 1962) to
find a society in which father-husbands-if
indeed such can be said to exist among the
Nayar-reside separately from their families.
And one need not go to the equally controversial kibbutz asdescribed by Spiro (1954) to find
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A merican Anthropologist
a society in which children normally reside
separately from their parents.
The most frequent situation in which the
members of a family normally do not all reside together is that in which the father-husband resides separately from the rest of his
family. This situation occurs in several kinds
of societal circumstances: where the separate
residence of males from females and children
reflects a sharp social separation between the
sexes during adulthood; where sibling households are prevalent; where it is economically
or militarily advantageous for the husbandfather to be separated from his family for considerable periods of time; and sometimes where
polygyny is present.
The former cases, where adult men reside
separately from women and children and
where siblings reside together but separately
from their spouses, provide the most clearcut examples. In societies in which adult men
reside permanently in a men’s house, families
are never residential units. Likewise, sibling
households, found, for example, as a dominant
form among the Ashanti (Fortes el al. 1947),
preclude the possibility of the family’s being a
residential unit.
It is unclear whether families can be considered co-residential units when the husbandfather is gone for considerable periods of time,
sometimes years, for purposes of engaging in
trade or warfare. And i t is likewise unclear if
the family can be considered a co-residential
unit when, as sometimes occurs among the
Black Carib (Solien de Gonz&les1960:105), the
husband-father’s job requires him to reside
away from the rest of the family, though he
considers their dwelling as home. On the other
hand, if i t is unclear whether polygynous
families have common residence when the husband and each of his wives have separate but
contiguous dwellings, it is quite clear that
polygynous families do not form common
residential groups when the wives reside a t
considerable distances from each other, as
among the Navaho when a man marries unrelated women (Kluckhohn and Leighton
1946:lOO).
I n addition to the situations in which husband-fathers reside separately from the rest
of their families, there are numerous cases
where children normally reside separately
from their parents. Among the Ibo, for example, boys of five or six years of age leave
their mother’s house to reside with other
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boys of the same compound (Ottenberg 1965 :
22-23). Or there is the well-known case of
Samoan children, who are able to choose the
household in which they will reside and, in
fact, a t different times normally reside in a
variety of households (Mead 1928:36).
Once this relatively simple distinction between households and families is made, it
seems perfectly obvious. Of course, families do
not cease to exist when their members reside
separately. Nor do persons who reside together
necessarily form families. Even so, the following statement made by Solien de Gonzaes in
1960 for the most part still holds true: “Few
writers have distinguished between family
and household on either a theoretical or on a
descriptive level” (1960: 101).
THE HOUSEHOLD: A DOMESTIC
DWELLING UNIT
Some attempts have been made at differentiating types of households. Solien de GonzQles, one of the few scholars to have clearly
conceptualized the difference between households and families, has distinguished two types
of households that contain kinsmen though
not families. To households composed of only
a married pair, she applies the term “affinal
household.” In contrast, she applies the term
“consanguineal household” to “a co-residential kinship group which includesno regularly
present male in the role of husband-father”
(1965:1542), a form of household quite
widely found in the world, particularly in the
Caribbean and South America.
An alternative and more detailed scheme is
provided by Bohannan (1963:94-98), who has
classified households on the basis of the most
fundamental kinship relationship found in the
household. Of the eight social relationships
found in the nuclear family, t h t most fundamental is defined as that which is the most
stable and enduring, that which is the last to
be broken in conflict situations. Thus there
are households based on the husband-wife
relationship, on the father-son relationship,
on sibling relationships-in short on all of the
eight nuclear family relationships with the
possible exception of the mother-son relationship.
However, these attempts a t refining the
concept of the household overlook a basic
problem with this concept as currently used.
The principal problem with the concept of the
household is not so much that i t has remained
UEXDER]
A Refinement of the Concept of Household
relatively undefined and undifferentiated,
though in fact i t has, but that i t contains elements that are both logically and empirically
distinct. I n this sense, the same problem now
exists with the concept of the household that
existed with the concept of the family before
the two were distinguished. Just as families
and households can and do vary somewhat independently of each other, so households contain aspects that can and do vary independently.
Although Bohannan, Keesing, and Solien
de Gonzdes all have indicated that the referent of the concept of the household involves
propinquity or locality, this is not exactly the
case. The concept actually implies more than
merely an aggregate of people residing together. I n addition to common residence, it
implies a group of persons who together carry
out domestic functions. As Solien de Gonzldes
has indicated, “the household . . . implies
common residence, economic cooperation, and
socialization of children” (1960: 106). Similarly, Bohannan has stated that the household
usually acts to fulfill the functions of providing food and shelter and of bringing u p children (1963:98). I n one sense, “household”
refers to those persons who reside together;
in another sense, it refers to a group of people
carrying out domestic functions. I n the former
sense, a household need not carry out domestic functions. I n the latter sense, a household
need not reside together as a unit.
I t is important, then, analytically to distinguish between co-residential groups and
domestic functions. Co-residential groups have
as their referent propinquity, while domestic
functions have as their referent social functions.
I t is quite obvious that persons residing together do not always carry out domestic functions. One need not leave our own society to
demonstrate this. Also, there are numerous
ethnographic instances in which domestic
functions are carried out tiy groups whose
members do not reside together. Such is the
case in many societies in which men dwell in
a special men’s house. Among the M u n d u r u d
of South America (Murphy 1960), for example,
villages are composed of two types of coresidential units: one composed of adult
males, the other composed of women and chddren. The nuclear family forms a domestic
unit in the sense that the husband-father
provides his wife with game and fish. On this
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level, then, the nuclear family forms a domestic unit but not a co-residential unit, and to use
the term “household” in this context would be
inaccurate, since the nuclear family forms a
household only in the one sense, not in the
other. But although the nuclear family is symbolically a domestic unit, for all practical purposes i t is not. This is because domestic functions are for the most part carried out through
reciprocal interaction between the two groups:
adult males and adult females. T h a t is, men
usually hunt cooperatively, while all of the
women of each women’s house cooperate in
the preparation of food (with sometimes a simple division of labor occurring among the
women). I n a sense, then, men as a unit present game and fish to the women, who in turn
process i t as a unit and distribute the prepared
food to their husbands and children. A t this
level, the whole village forms the domestic
unit, the sexual division of labor in domestic
activities being at the village level.
Another situation in which domestic functions are not all carried out by co-residential
groups is found in societies in which married
siblings reside together, which precludes the
possibility of having husband and wife live
together. Among the Ashanti, for example,
the most common residential pattern is for
each member of a married pair to reside with
his own matrilineal kinsmen. Though not a
co-residential unit, the family still carries out
domestic functions. “A man must provide his
wife and children with clothes at certain times
of the year, and she must cook for him and the
children, adding her self-grown foodstuffs to
the meals” (Fortes el al. 1947: 168).
One is dealing, then, not with two distinct
social phenomena-families and householdsbut with three distinct social phenomena:
families, co-residential groups, and domestic
functions. All three frequently correspond,
both ideally and in fact (this is reflected in at
least one meaning of our folk term “home,”
which implies a family residing together and
functioning as a domestic unit). The three
also can and sometimes do vary independently.
There are, of course, three logically possible
ways in which any two of the three could
combine. I n the Ashanti case mentioned,
families carry out domestic functions but d o
not reside together. The situation in which
domestic-residential units (“households”) do
not contain families is very widespread. It
might be mentioned here that even in our own
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American Anthropologist
society, where families ideally and in fact
most often do form domestic-residential units,
there are numerous instances in which households are not composed of families? I know of
no ethnographic case that fits the third combination, that is, where families form residential but not domestic units, though it is certainly conceivable that such a n arrangement
could exist.
Once these analytical distinctions are made,
more accurate comparisons are possible. I’resently, the term “household” is being applied
to noncomparable phenomena.
Even more basic, with ethnographers aware
that domestic functions, co-residential groups,
and families d o not necessarily correspond,
more accurate observations and descriptions
would undoubtedly result. I t is well established
that once social scientists identify a social
phenomenon with a label, there is a great
danger that they may overlook important
variations that the label is unable to handle.
Although in good ethnographies one can frequently determine the exact nature of the
social unit termed a “household,” the term
very often adds more confusion than clarification.
Equipped with these distinctions, Irene Ott,
a University of Minnesota graduate student
who has carried out a preliminary study of
extended families in a rural Minnesota German-American community, has found that a t
times in our own society families, co-residential
groups, and domestic functions do not directly
correspond. The families studied extended
over three and four generations and were
highly variable in their form. Whereas various
subunits within the extended families (not
always nuclear families) were frequently
functionally significant for different reasons,
all extended families as completc units were
functionally significant in that the adult
male members jointly operated the farm or
farms involved.
Residence was consistently virilocal and
usually also patrilocal, though this tells little
of the nature of the co-residential groups. Complete extended families sometimes occupied
a single farm house, sometimes two farm
houses on the same farm, sometimes farm
houses on contiguous farms, and sometimes
farm houses on noncontiguous farms. Some
degree of residential privacy existed for aU
[69, 1967
nuclear families with young children and for
older couples whose children were grown,
though in some cases this may have meant
merely a private bedroom, with the rest of the
house shared by other extended-family members.
Although in some instances nuclear families
were almost completely functionally autonomous, except for the joint operation of the
farm land, in many instances domestic functions were distributed to various segments of
the extended family. A description of a single
case will illustrate the point.
This three-generation extended family was
composed of a man, his wife, and two sons and
their families. The eldest male, his wife, and
one son and his family occupied the family
farm house, the older couple having a bedroom
on the first floor and the younger couple and
their children occupying bedrooms on the second floor. Rooms other than the bedrooms
were shared in common b y both the natal and
conjugal families. The second son and his
wife and children occupied a trailer, also on
the family farm.
The entire unit clearly formed a single extended family. When questioned regarding
whom they considered to be members of their
family, they indicated that all three nuclear
families composed their “family,” though
they also felt that the term could be applied
to the nuclear families as well. The farm was
run by all three nuclear families, or more
specifically by the three adult males. The eldest male handled the finances and record
keeping, while the two sons did most of the
manual labor. General farm expenses were
handled out of the general farm income, atlministered by the eldest male. Each son received a percentage of the income from a
dairy operation for some of the needs of their
own conjugal families. One son raised chickens
to increase the money he could have for his
conjugal family.
For some purposes, the two nuclear families
occupying the family farmhouse formed a
single domestic unit, involved with the preparation and consumption of food and with
housework. Within this domestic unit, a division of labor existed. The eldest male and
his wife were responsible for redecorating the
house and providing household furnishings
for that p a r t of the house used in common.
Food was generally purchased b y them for
the entire domestic unit, whereas i t was pre-
BENDER]
A Refirtemenl of the Concept of Household
pared by the eldest female and her daughterin-law. The two adult women also took care
of the canning and freezing of food.
Normally, these domestic activities carried
out by the two nuclear families occupying
the single house were carried out independently by the conjugal family occupying the
trailer.
For the most part, then, domestic activities
were carried out by the groups that resided
together in the same house. However, for purposes of child rearing, each nuclear family
tended to be independent. And, in another
context, all three nuclear families formed a
single domestic unit in that the eldest female
did the gardening and handled the care and
maintenance of clothing for the entire extended
family.
CO-RESIDENTIAL GROUPS
AND DOMESTIC FUNCTIONS
Thus far, no precise meanings for the concepts “co-residential group” and “domestic
functions” have been designated, though their
meanings can be inferred from the manner in
which they are used. In the context in which
they are used, the meanings may seem quite
obvious. However, concepts that seem quite obvious frequently become very allusive upon
close analysis. It is undoubtedly for this reason
that deceptively obvious concepts such as
“family” often are left undefined, defined only
vaguely, or defined in terms of examples.
Rather than leave the concepts of co-residential group and domestic functions deceptively
obvious, an attempt will be made to identify
them precisely and in such a manner that they
may be useful conceptual tools.
Co-residence
In anthropology, residence has been conceptually tied directly to kinship. Residence
is nearly always treated in terms of residence
classification, and the latter has been concerned with kinsmen and where they live.
Moreover, traditional residence classification
has been formulated on the basis of a single
kinship relationship, the marriage relationship. On such a basis, of course, a minimum
amount of information is given regarding the
nature of residential groups. Furthermore,
since husband and wife live separately in
sonic societies, not all cases are classifiable.
Thus, of the many residence terms that have
been formulated to apply to married couples,
497
the only term that comes close to coping with
such cases is the negative term “duolocal,”
indicating simply that husband and wife reside separately. The shift in the application
of residence terms from the married pair to
the married individual made by Fischer (1958)
resolves this particular problem and others as
well, though this usage still tells little about
co-residential groups.
Bohannan has shifted the focus of residence
classification from the marriage relationship
to the household. I n doing so, he keeps residence tied directly to kinship by basing his
classification on the most fundamental of the
eight basic nuclear family relationships found
in the household. I n a limited sense, this system of classification is consistent with Bohannan’s emphasis on the fact that families do
not necessarily form households and that
households do not necessarily contain families.
I n a more basic sense, however, Bohannan is
inconsistent. I n distinguishing families from
households, he has indicated that families
are kinship groups that must be defined strictly
in terms of kinship relationships. I n contrast,
households are based on a distinct definitional
criterion-propinquity
(Bohannan 1963:8687). From this i t follows that i t is no more
legitimate to classify households in terms of
kinship relationships than i t is to classify
families in terms of residence, unless i t is specified that only one category of households is
being classified-that category which includes
households containing kinsmen.
There is no reason why residence should be
tied exclusively to kinship. No necessary connection exists between the two. On the contrary, not only are kinship groups of various
forms sometimes dispersed, but co-residential
groups are sometimes nonkinship groups.
Since residence classification developed as an
aspect of kinship studies, i t is understandable
that residence in anthropology has been tied
directly to kinship. But no matter how important residence classification may be in the
area of kinship, to be a useful concept in the
present context the concept of residence must
be separated from kinship.
I n addition to being used exclusively in the
realm of kinship, the concept of residence has
the additional problem of having multiple
meanings, often confused and not all equally
appropriate in the comparative study of social
organization. In our own society, with a highly
sedentary population, the concepts of residence
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A merican Anthropologist
and dwelling are often equated with specific
physical dwellings, fixed in one place. Such
usage is of little value in the cross-cultural
study of residence. Co-residential social units
need occupy neither physical dwellings nor
specific places. Nomadic or transhumant populations, for example, may occupy physical
dwellings, and people, houses, and material
items may be arranged in a definite spatial
pattern, but the dwellings themselves may be
moved at regular intervals. Likewise, there
are a few societies in which co-residential
groups occupy neither a physical dwelling nor
a specific place, the Nambikwara of South
America and the native Australians being
examples.
Rather than focus attention on the places
where people reside or on the physical dwellings in which they reside, the object of study
here is the social group that forms the coresidential unit. Specific places, dwellings,
material objects, and the like become relevant
only as they are culturally defined as important characteristics of co-residing groups.
Placing an emphasis on the group that
forms a co-residential unit, rather than on the
place, allows the distinction to be made between aggregates of people that occupy space
in a patterned and systematic manner and
the situation in which groups form co-residential groups: there is a difference between
a group occupying an apartment and the entire aggregate of persons who occupy the apartment building. All social groups can have a
spatial dimension, can be localized for one
purpose or another. Co-residence, as used here,
is not synonymous with the total range of situations in which there is group propinquity,
but rather represents one variety of group
propinquity. It here refers to living together,
which is minimally characterized by a proximity in sleeping arrangements and a sentiment similar to that expressed in our folk
concept of home.
Co-residential groups can exist on different
levels within the same society. Just as an extended family may function as a group for
some purposes while the constituent nuclear
families function as groups for other purposes,
so the former may be a co-residential group
occupying, perhaps, contiguous dwellings,
while the latter form smaller co-residential
units occupying single dwellings. Such a pattern is frequently found in polygynous families
in Africa, where mother-child units form the
[69,1967
smallest co-residential units, the entire polygynous family forms a larger co-residential
unit, and the entire compound forms a still
larger co-residential unit. Actual physical
boundaries separating co-residential groups
may be minimal, as when members of a family
occupy contiguous hammocks in a large village house.
The degree to which co-residence, as a form
of group Propinquity, forms a significant aspect of social groups varies greatly. Instances
range from those in which co-residence is almost completely epiphenomenal to the social
grouping to those in which the group is based
primarily on propinquity. Co-residence is
epiphenomenal to another principle of social
grouping to the extent that groups simply
take up space in the process of their members’
living together. There are many instances,
however, in which co-residence is not merely
epiphenomenal to other principles, but is, in
part, the basis for the existence of that group.
Such is the case in many societies in which
the principles of kinship and propinquity are
combined to form what are frequently designated as household groups-groups composed of persons, usually but not necessarily
family members, who occupy a specific dwelling. The Burmese ain-daung is an example,
referring to a dwelling and to the group that
resides there, usually composed of family
members but also frequently including more
remote kinsmen and servants. I n addition to
acting as a principle of social grouping, propinquity can be a causal factor in the formation of groups, as when the mere proximity
of aggregates of people who reside near each
other results in the formation of formalized
relationships and groups, a kind of situation
well documented by Michel (1954). Under
some circumstances kinship features can be
epiphenomenal to co-residence. All the women
and children occupying a women’s house
among the Mundurucd are, in fact, related
through uterine links, since residence is matrilocal. This matrilineality is epiphenomenal
to the fact of co-residence and matrilocality,
since descent is formally traced patrilineally
among the MundurucG (Murphy 1960).
Domestic Functions
As a folk concept, our term “domestic”
refers to those activities associated with the
household or the home. Furthermore, it connotes female activities more than male ac-
il Refinement of the Concept of Household
499
tivities. Where the term has been used by this reason, they are most frequently carried
BENDER]
social scientists, it is generally used with no
modification from its vague folk meaning,
Bohannan has used the idea of domestic
rights in an analysis of the marriage contract.
Following the distinction between families,
which are kinship groups, and households,
which are local or spatial groups, Bohannan
has distinguished kinship rights from domestic
rights in the marriage contract. He has stated
that
the rights in a wife, which a man acquires at
marriage and which form the basis of the household, can be called “domestic rights.” Such rights
include his right to live with her and to form with
her a basic unit defined by the division of labor
between the sexes.. . .The precise and detailed
content of those rights varies from one culture to
the next. What does not vary is that wherever
the family does form a basis for household formation. . there are domestic duties and there is a
division of labor between the sexes [1963:78].
.
This analysis makes sense when it is assumed that households represent a single
social phenomenon. However, when i t is
realized that co-residence and domestic functions do not necessarily coincide, then a further complication arises, for if the domestic
rights that are exchanged between husband
and wife at marriage are those associated with
co-residential groups, then i t follows that the
same rights and duties are not domestic rights
when husband and wife reside separately as
members of different co-residential groups.
Because the rights are not necessarily any different under the two circumstances, it does
not seem reasonable to make such a distinction. Among the Ashanti, for example, there
is no indication that the right of a husband to
expect that his wife will prepare his meals
and the right of a wife to expect that her husband will help provide for her and her children
differ a t all in those cases in which husband
and wife reside separately and those less frequent cases in which they reside together.
The basic feature of “domestic” activities
is not that they are necessarily associated
either with families or with co-residential
groups, but that they are concerned with the
day-to-day necessities of living, including the
provision and preparation of food and the care
of children. They differ from various other economic and social functions in that they are
well suited to be carried out by small groups
in a wide range of societal circumstances. For
out, at least in part, by co-residential families.
They can be, and often also are, carried out
by co-residential units that are not families,
and in a few instances they are carried out,
in part, by families that are not co-residential
units. Within the same society, domestic
functions are frequently carried out by more
than one kind of small group, and in highly
specialized industrial societies they can be to
a great extent efficiently taken over by specialpurpose groups. And human ingenuity is such
that nearly all domestic functions can be carried out by special-purpose groups; witness
the Israeli kibbutz as described by Spiro.
DEFINING THE FAMILY
STRUCTURALLY
I have said that families, co-residential
groups, and domestic functions represent
three distinct social phenomena. Implicit here
is that the family is a strictly kinship phenomenon and, as such, is best deiined strictly
in terms of kinship relationships. This is because families, as a variety of kinship grouping, vary independently of co-residential
groups and of domestic functions. To include
the criteria of co-residence and domestic functions in the definition of the family results in
the absurdity of having to deny the existence
of families when their members do not reside
together or when they do not form domestic
units.
This in no way implies any sort of primacy
of social structure over social functions, nor
does it deny the importance of co-residence.
I n fact, viewed from one point of view, social
functions can be considered to be more basic
than specific forms: it is frequently said that
social groups exist to carry out certain functions that are requisites for biological or for
societal survival, Likewise, co-residence can
be equally as important as kinship as a basis
for forming .social groups, and in some instances kinship may be epiphenomena1 to COresidence. I n fact, it is widely recognized that
unilineal descent systems may in some instances have resulted from a particular form
of residence. It does not follow from this,
however, that kinship is a residential phenomenon or vice versa.
That families as structural units need not
be co-residential units has been clearly demonstrated and requires no further discussion.
The relationship between the family as struc-
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American Anthropologist
tural type and as social function does require
further consideration, however. The general
statement has been made that domestic functions should be distinguished from families
on logical grounds, and that in fact the two
vary independently of each other. It has not
been demonstrated that there are no specific
domestic functions that are invariably associated with families. Likewise, i t is possible that
there are social functions other than domestic
that are invariably associated with families.
Although logically it seems most consistent
to define kinship phenomena-in
this instance the family-strictly
in terms of kinship relationships, empirically i t would not
be incorrect to include certain social functions
in the definition of the family so long as these
functions were invariably associated with
families. This problem does not arise with nonfamilial kinship groups or with nonkinship
groups, because i t is recognized that whereas
such groups may carry out a variety of functions, no specific function is invariably associated with a given type of structural unit.
It is the family that is said to be universally
associated with specific social functions. Moreover, i t is not families in all their varied forms
that are said to universally carry out specific
social functions, but one particular form of the
family-the nuclear family. I n addition, the
frequent assumption that this association is a
necessary one makes it possible t o explain the
assumed universality of the nuclear family in
terms of social functions that are requisites
for societal survival.
Rather than deal with all of the many functions that at various times have been said to be
family functions, the focus here will be on
those functions identified by Murdock (1949)
as universally associated with the nuclear
family. Of those who have attempted to identify family functions, Murdock is the most
frequently cited, undoubtedly because his
conclusions are based upon a systematic sampling of societies throughout the world. The
four functions identified by him as universally
associated with the nuclear family are: sexual,
economic, reproductive, and educational.
There is no doubt that the functions of the
regulation of sexual activity and of reproduction do take place within the family. Nevertheless, to relate these functions universally
to the nuclear family is a somewhat dubious
procedure. It represents a case 01 misplaced
emphasis-misplaced in two ways: by focusing
[69, 1067
on the nuclear family as such and by overlooking the exact nature of the relationship
between kinship and man as a biological
creature.
It is certainly true, as Murdock has pointed
out, that a n exchange of sexual rights always
accompanies the marriage relationship. This
exchange of rights is associated specifically
with the marriage relationship, however, not
with the nuclear family. These rights exist in
marriages that have not resultcd in children
and they exist in family types other than nuclear, as in polyandrous families when a woman receives sexual rights in several brothers
and they in turn in her. The referent is not the
nuclear family, but marriage. Sexual relationships are prohibited between parents and
children and usually between siblings. Again,
the referent is not the nuclear family as such,
b u t the incest taboo, which, though i t includes
the nuclear family, includes other kinsmen as
well. Control of sexual activity occurs in the
nuclear family because the latter contains a
marriage relationship and because some of its
members are included under a n incest taboo,
but not because the sexual function is associated with the nuclear family as such.
As to the relationship between the reproductive function and the nuclear family, two
points may be made: this function is not universally associated with the nuclear family
exclusively, and nuclear families can exist
without this function. Both social and biological aspects of reproduction must be considered. If one considers the biological aspect,
then, in societies in which premarital or extramarital relationships are allowed for females,
it is not the nuclear family as such that is
necessarily the reproductive unit, though it
may be the child-rearing unit. T h e same is
true in the case of polyandrous families, in
which biological paternity is impossible to determine. If, on the other hand, i t is the social
aspect t h a t is considered, then it would be possible to say that i t does not matter who the
genitor is as long as a social father is identified.
On this basis, however, the Trobriand nuclear
family is not a reproduction unit, because biological paternity is not recognized and children
do not have fathers, only mothers’ husbands.
And, of course, nuclear families exist that d o
not engage in the reproductive function when
children are adopted.
Rather than associate sexual and reproductive functions with the nuclear family as such,
BENDER]
A Refinement of the Concept of Household
i t is more meaningful to look at the relationship between man’s biological nature and
kinship. Kinship is a social phenomenon that
has a referent in biology. The term “biological
family” places emphasis on the fact that nuclear families can be considered as resulting
from a sexually cohabitating pair having offspring. It is generally recognized, however,
that the nuclear family is more accurately conceived of as a social unit than a biological
unit. The relationship between biology and
kinship is an indirect one. Biological factors
as they relate to kinship may be emphasized,
de-emphasized, ignored, or in some cases
denied. Biological phenomena are always
given social meanings. Sexual reproduction
itself may be viewed in a variety of ways: i t
may be considered inseparable from sexual relationships: partially separable, or, as among
the native Australians and the Trobriand Islanders, completely separable as a biological
phenomenon.
I t is because man is a sexually reproducing
animal, and because the family in one form or
another is universal or nearly so, that families
are usually, though not always, involved in
sexual reproduction. Sexual reproduction is a
prerequisite for both biological and societal
survival and usually takes place in the context of the family. But reproduction and the
family are different orders of phenomena, the
first being biological, the second social, so
that reproduction can, and frequently does,
occur separately from the family. It is for this
reason that sexual rights may be exchanged
independently of any rights over potential
children, as in concubinage; that parentchild relationships can be created through
adoption rather than reproduction; that biological fatherhood can be ignored or denied;
and that the entire sexual reproductive process can, under some circumstances, take
place outside the family.
Another function said by Murdock to be
universally associated with the nuclear family
is the economic function. Unlike the sexual
and reproductive functions, the significance of
associating economic functions with the nuclear family, with families in general, or even
\\it11 kinship groups is doubtful, for nearly
every social group has some economic aspects
to its activities. Moreover, Murdock’s case
rests on the economic cooperation that is
said to exist between husband and wife (based
on the division of labor by sex), between par-
50 1
ents and children (based on the division of
labor by age), and between siblings.
But to say that the nuclear family always
carries out economic functions because a
division of labor by age and sex occurs within
that group is to misplace the functions. The
division of labor by age and sex exists in the
society as a whole and thus also in any social
groups that contain persons of both sexes and
of differentages, including all types of families.
This is not strictly a nuclear-family phenomenon. It may be that in some instances
particular economic aspects of the division of
labor can be only carried out by parents in
relationship to their children, not by unmarried
persons or by married persons without children. It is also true that in some societies, as
in our own, any economic roles played by
parents in relationship to their children can
also be played completely outside of the
family situation. It is not only in the Israeli
kibbutz that economic cooperation takes place
primarily outside the realm of the nuclear
family and that the division of labor by sex
takes place in the society as a whole: the
same is to a great extent true in the case of
the Mundurud, already mentioned.
The fourth universal nuclear family function identified by Murdock-considered by
some as the most basic-is socialization. There
are two issues involved here, one raised by
Murdock and one raised by Parsons and
Bales (1955). Murdock’s contention was that
the nuclear family is everywhere the primary
socializing agent. Parsons and Bales, in contrast, feel that there are certain aspects of the
socialization process related to personality
formation that can only be carried out by a
small, nuclear-family-like group, which thus
accounts for the universality of the nuclear
family.
It is very questionable whether the nuclear
family as such is always the primary socializing
agent. During infancy, children are frequently
in almost continuous contact with their
mothers, fathers playing a t best a relatively
minor direct role, particularly in societies in
which there is a sharp social and physical
separation between the sexes. Young boys, it
is true, frequently learn male tasks from their
fathers, and girls from their mothers, though in
societies in which boys reside with their
mothers away from their fathers, the father’s
role may still be relatively minor. Where
children are free to live in households other
502
A merican Anthropologist
than that of their parents, where children are
in continuous contact with a wide range of
kinsmen, where children live with their peers,
and where nurses and servants are important,
it is not unreasonable to suppose that the
nuclear family may actually be of secondary
importance as a socialization agent.
If there are certain aspects of the socialization process that can only be camed out by
the nuclear family, then the percentage of
socialization carried out by the nuclear family
may not be relevant. Parsons and Bales have
formulated a psychoanalytically based, socialpsychological theory of socialization, which
holds that adequate personality development
requires a small group in which both adult
male and female roles are performed. The
ideal and the most obvious social group that
is structurally adequate to carry out this function is the nuclear family. It does not automatically follow, if the theory is correct, that
the nuclear family is the only kinship group
that can carry out this function, a point made
by Fallers and Levy (1959). Nor does it
automatically follow that such a group need be
kinship based. I n fact, there is the distinct
possibility that a society could exist with somewhat less than ideal socializing agencies. There
are, of course, specific instances in our own and
other societies in which socialization takes
place in groups that are structurally inadequate by the criteria of Parsons and Bales. It
might be argued that a society can exist with
a few inadequately socialized individuals,
though the majority must be adequately
socialized. On the other hand, it is equally
arguable that all individuals in a given society
could be socialized by a structurally inadequate groupthough, if the theory is correct, i t would follow that all members of that
society would achieve somewhat less than
ideal personality development,
Because there is strong evidence to indicate
that the nuclear family is not always quantitatively the most important socializing agent,
and because there is not conclusive evidence
to indicate that any aspect of the socialization process requires the nuclear family as the
socializing agent, to incorporate the socialization process in the definition of the nuclear
family is of questionable value. It would be
even less useful to incorporate i t in the definition of families in general, for extended families
are frequently economically important a t the
same time that they play almost no role in
[69, 1967
socialization. By incorporating the socialization function as a part of the definition of the
family, one runs the danger of discovering
social groups that are structurally nuclear
families but are not primary socializing
agents.
As Goldschmidt has pointed out (1960),
there is no reason to assume that specific
functional requisites for societal survival must
necessarily be carried out by particular institutions such as marriage or the nuclear
family. The search for functions that are
universally associated either with families in
general or with nuclear families in particular
is certainly a legitimate task. Since families,
however, have been defined and classified primarily in terms of their structure, the inclusion of specific functions as a part of the
definition can only lead to confusion, unless i t
is reasonably certain that the relationship between form and function is an invariable one.
For if they do not necessarily go together,
then one is left with the alternative of excluding from the category of “family” all cases in
which the function is not associated with the
form. Spiro (1954) ran into this problem with
his study of an Israeli kibbutz: a t first, hr
considered the position that the nuclear family
did not exist because it did not carry out the
nuclear-family functions identified by Murdock, and that the whole kibbutz could he
viewed as an extended family.
There is a much broader problem involved
here, which has to do with the classification of
society in general and the related problem of
the relationship between social structure and
social functions. Society has been broken up
and categorized in a variety of ways, frequently in the same book by the same author.
One means of classifying all social groups and
social institutions is in terms of so-called
principles of social structure or principles of
social grouping. Thus Lowie (1948) has identified the following principles of social grouping, on which supposedly all social groupings
are based: sex, age, kinship, co-residence
and consciousness of kind. Firth, in his turn,
has identified sex, age, locality, and kinship
as some of the most fundamental principles oi
social structure (1958:82).
On a functional level, society is categorized
for analytical purposes in a complementary
manner. Thus there are political systems, religious systems, economic systems, and the like.
The concept of institution is sometimes on
BENDER]
A Refinement of the Cowept of Household
this level of analysis, though a t other times i t
is also on the structural level. I n the former
case, associated with each function there are
social groups, but nothing is implied regarding
their structure. A wide variety of social groups
can carry out a single function, and, conversely
a single type of social group can carry out a
variety of social functions. When used on a
structural level, however, the concept of institution implies a given social form, such as
the institutions of marriage and the family.
In contrast to the position taken in this
paper-that the family is best defined structurally since there are no conclusively established, invariable connections between specific
family forms and particular family functionsFallers and Levy (1959) conclude on the same
basis that the family is best defined functionally. They reason that the family as a concept
is ill adapted for comparative analysis because of the incorrect assumption that specific
structural units are invariably associated with
specific social functions. Such an assumption
is no longer made by anthropologists in the
study of other social phenomena, they note:
for example, in the study of political systems,
to associate specific kinds of social groups with
political functions is to overlook the facts
that a wide range of social groups can carry
out the same political function and that socalled political groups can carry out nonpolitical functions. Of all of the functions that have
been attributed to the nuclear family, they
believe socialization to be the most important.
They agree with Parsons and Bales that small
groups in which both adult male and female
roles are played are structural requisites for
adequate socialization, but they do not agree
that this group need be the nuclear familyany small, kinship-structured group would be
adequate. On this basis they conclude that the
most useful definition of the family for general
comparative purposes would be “any small,
kinship-structured unit which carries out
aspects of the relevant functions” (1959:Sl).
There are major weaknesses in Fallers’ and
Levy’s argument. They correctly indicate that
if it is the adult male and female roles in a
small-group situation that are of primary importance in the socialization process, it does
not follow that the nuclear family is the only
structurally adequate socializing agent; but
they do not follow the argument to its logical
conclusion: that the socialization agent need
not be a kinship-based group.
503
There is a much more important problem
with defining families functionally, however.
The term “family” is now legitimately used by
almost all anthropologists and sociologists to
refer to a variety of kinship groups that contain both affinal and consanguineal relationships; as such, i t has proven to be an indispensable tool. But if Fallers’ and Levy’s
definition were to be used, then nuclear families, polygynous families, polyandrous families, and extended families would be ‘Yamilies” in some instances and not in others.
Under these circumstances, some other designation would have to be formulated for these
social forms. If there are certain aspects of the
socialization process that are invariably
associated with some sort of small, kinshipstructured unit, which may be of a variety of
forms, certainly such a unit should be identified with a label, but not with a label that has
proven of great utility in another context.
The issue as to the relative utility of focusing on social structures or social functions for
purposes of comparative analysis is an important one, particularly when the desire is t o
discover structures or functions that are
universal because they are requisites for
societal survival. As Fallers and Levy have
pointed out, it has proven more useful for
comparative purposes to define political systems and other such institutions functionally
rather than structurally. Goldschmidt too has
made a strong case for what he terms “comparative functionalism,” the comparative
study of functional requisites for societal
survival and of how they are institutionally
carried out. He maintains that there are no
invariable connections between forms and
functions: while there are certain necessary
functions that are usually associated with
“marriage,” for example, these functions can
be taken care of in part or entirely outside this
institution.
The point to be stressed, I believe, is one
that has long been accepted in social science:
social structure and social function are complementary concepts. But the fact that specific
forms of the family may not have universal
functions, or that specific forms of the family
may not be universal, does not negate the
utility of defining families structurally. On the
contrary, because people in all societies recognize kinship relationships and use these relationships as a basis for forming social groups,
and because these relationships can be organ-
A merican Anthropologist
504
ized in only a certain number of logically possible ways, it is extremely useful to classify
kinship groups in terms of structural types.
Not all types need be found in all societies, nor
need they be equally functionally important
when they are found.
SUMMARY
Families (as specific types of kinship structures), co-residence, and domestic functions
are three distinct kinds of social phenomena.
Hitherto, co-residence and domestic functions
have been mistakenly considered as inherent
attributes of families. The first major analytical breakthrough came when families were
distinguished from households, the former having as their referent kinship, the latter having
as their referent presumably propinquity or
locality. I n fact, this distinction left the job
only half done, since the concept of the household, as formulated, included two distinct
kinds of social phenomena: co-residential
groups and domestic functions. While all three
very frequently correspond, they also can and
do vary independently.
NOTES
This paper is a revised and expanded version of one read at
the annual meetings of the Central States Anthropological Society in St. Louis, April 28, 1966.
2 No numerical data are available in this regard. The census
definition of households differs from that used here, consisting
of all persons occupying a housing unit. According to the 1953
census, 28.6 percent of household units actually contained
families (Click 1957).
I
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