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‘The King of Italy has declared war on Me 355 10 ‘The King of Italy has declared war on Me’ Unauthenticated Download Date | 6/16/17 7:41 AM 10. The flagship of the Imperial and Royal Navy Fleet, Viribus unitis, near Pula at the beginning of 1915. Four ships of the ‘Tegetthoff’ class, Austria-Hungary’s most modern battleships, with twelve 30.5 cm cannon and a crew of around 1,000 men, took part in only a few operations during the naval war in the Adriatic. They had to be protected, constituted a permanent threat to the Allies and were, therefore, themselves endangered. Two of them were sunk before the end of the war. One of these was the Viribus unitis. Unauthenticated Download Date | 6/16/17 7:41 AM H istorical events, nations and names are almost inevitably linked to certain associations. Slogans dominate here and sometimes prejudice rears its ugly head. The First World War reached in this respect a type of negative climax. On Christmas postcards, in New Year greetings and on all occasions imaginable, the people resorted all too gladly to the crass, the crude and the histrionic. All negative characteristics were attributed to the enemy, from ‘demonic-malicious, via barbaric-primitive to cowardly, weak and ludicrous’,826 and what was in 1915 the ‘dungeon of nations’ for one was ‘betrayal in Italian’ for another. If one looks over the Austrian primary sources on Italy’s entry into the war in 1915, it is above all one word that catches one’s eye : ‘perfidy’. In the case of Conrad, it appears in almost every letter, but even the officials of the Foreign Ministry and the ministers themselves used the word as a matter of course. It ultimately found its way into the proclamation of Emperor Franz Joseph from 23 May 1915, which began with a sentence that had been written long before Italy’s entry into the war by the envoy Baron Franz von Matscheko827 (others claim it was Baron Alexander von Musulin) : ‘The King of Italy has declared war on Me.’ What was ‘perfidious Albion’ for the Germans was ‘perfidious Italy’ for the Austrians. In this way, judgement was passed for a long time to come, and it took several decades for the beginning of the war between Austria-Hungary and Italy to be viewed in a more differentiated way. But Italy was by no means a one-off. Emotions played a role for all war-making parties. For the ‘terribles simplificateurs’ in Austria-Hungary, Serbia was the dangerous troublemaker, who did not even shrink back from devious murder ; for this, it had to be punished. Russia was the glutton in the east who not only fuelled Pan-Slavism but had also for a long time threatened a major war. Italy, however, was the country that had repeatedly embroiled Austria in wars, in 1848/49, just as in 1859 and 1866, in order to satisfy its territorial desires, and was always lying in wait for the next opportunity, in spite of all the peace treaties. This viewpoint is certainly too simplified, but it was indeed the case in 1914/15 that Italy saw the war as a unique opportunity and that it raised its desires for the realignment of borders and the consistent application of national statehood in general to the status of a political maxim. Political action dominated the rivalry between Italy and Austria-Hungary for long periods. For years, irredentist actions on the part of some Italian circles were pushed into the foreground, just as, in reverse, Italy did not tire of stressing the discrimination of Italians living in Austria, denouncing the supposed ‘Slavic infiltration’ of Trieste Unauthenticated Download Date | 6/16/17 7:41 AM 358 ‘The King of Italy has declared war on Me (Triest) and Dalmatia, and using the word ‘Croat’ as a swearword.828 It was well-known that Archduke Franz Ferdinand was hostile to Italy. Conrad von Hötzendorf ’s aversion to the Apennine state could be heard on numerous occasions and read in position papers. This did not change the fact that Conrad valued his Italian counterpart, General Pollio, and cultivated a relationship with him that was not only correct but in fact affectionate. Nevertheless, Conrad did not trust the government and the opinion-makers in the Kingdom of Italy an inch and saw himself confirmed in his principal rejection by numerous small incidents and above all a case of espionage. All in all, the two sides found plenty of reasons to find fault with each other. It only became more emotional now and then, as in August 1913, when the Governor of Trieste, Prince Konrad Hohenlohe-Schillingfürst, broke with a long-time practice and dismissed all so-called imperial Italians from the city’s civil service. This affected only 40 of the 30,000 Italians residing in Trieste, but Italian politics and media were in uproar.829 For months on end, relations were very strained, which was all the more odd because the military heads of the two monarchies agreed at the same time on joint action in the event of war and swore absolute allegiance. Political alienation was confronted with military agreement. On 28 June 1914, General Pollio died quite suddenly. The man who had seen more in the relationship to the Imperial and Royal Army than ‘allied enemies’ was dead. What might have happened, had he lived longer ? Were the reflections of his successor, Count Luigi Cadorna, to be taken seriously ? As late as 1918 he had said : ‘Oh well, if we had marched to war at Germany’s side in August 1914, then it would have been very advantageous for us. We would have taken Nice, likewise Corsica and Tunisia. […] We would have marched – and how ! I would have made sure of that myself.’830 Alexander Demandt’s book Ungeschehene Geschichte : Ein Traktat über die Frage : Was wäre geschehen, wenn … ? (Undone History : A Treatise on the Question, What would have happened if … ?) could be expanded with a noteworthy chapter. But let us restrict ourselves to the actual course of events.831 Italy had of course suspected, or rather : Italy had known that Austria-Hungary would call Serbia to account for the assassination in Sarajevo and as a precaution had already lodged the point that it wanted compensation for any changes in the Balkans in favour of the Habsburg Monarchy. On 23 July 1914, Italy was informed that Austria-Hungary had sent a limited démarche to Serbia ; 24 hours later the text of the démarche was handed over in Rome. This instance of being informed after the fact makes it clear that the Habsburg Monarchy had no interest, as was the case throughout the July Crisis, in involving Italy in the decision-making of the Danube Monarchy or that of the German Empire. The explanation given by the Ballhausplatz (Austro-Hungarian Imperial Chancellery) to the effect that the Imperial and Royal ambassador at the Quirinal Palace, Katejan von Mérey, had been taken ill at the most inopportune moment, which was why the mishap with the late handover had happened,832 was Unauthenticated Download Date | 6/16/17 7:41 AM ‘The King of Italy has declared war on Me 359 easily seen for what it was. Mérey had even suggested informing the Italians of the démarche a day before its transmission, but had been met with a rebuff at the Ballhausplatz. Formally, Rome was correct to regard the approach as a transgression, since the Triple Alliance treaty stipulated the obligation of consultation in just such a case. Rome spoke of a provocation, but then made it clear that Austria-Hungary could certainly demand compensation from Serbia. The alliance need not be activated, however, since that would have required at least that information be passed on in time and that consultations take place. This might appear to be quibbling, but Austria-Hungary had made it extremely easy for the Italians. No sooner had the démarche been rejected and the war was ‘in sight’ than Italy stepped up with the demand that it would require enduring recompense for an even temporary occupation of Serbian territory. Here Rome invoked Article VII of the Triple Alliance treaty. Count Berchtold rejected the Italian request. Berlin, however, was of the opinion that now was not the time to talk about how to interpret the Triple Alliance treaty – Austria-Hungary should accommodate Italy. This was not the only reason why the relationship between the Danube Monarchy, the German Empire and Italy developed into a difficult triangular affair. The German Empire, which was least affected by Italian policy and to whom the fulfilment of Italy’s wishes and demands seemed possible, since they did not concern the substance of Germany, made it clear from the outset that the Habsburg Monarchy would do well to fulfil Italy’s desires to the greatest possible extent.833 Germany said more or less openly that it would welcome it if Austria-Hungary could bring itself to cede Trentino to Italy in order to induce the Triple Alliance partner in this way to enter the war or at least to maintain very friendly neutrality. Emperor Franz Joseph then declared that he would rather abdicate than give up Trentino. With that, the positions were fixed for the time being. In expressing its wishes and demands, Rome chose not only the direct route of talking to Vienna but also preferred to take the detour via Berlin. The fact that the German imperial government adopted the Italian view as its own was already criticised during the session of the Joint Council of Ministers on 31 July 1914. Berchtold mentioned that during the previous week, he had received démarches almost every day from the German government, ‘in order to bring about that the Imperial and Royal government assume the viewpoint of the other two allied powers in the question of compensation’, namely the viewpoint of the German Empire and of Italy.834 The War Minister, Baron Krobatin, also reported that attempts had been made to ‘soften [him] up’, and in fact by none other than Kaiser Wilhelm personally. Count Stürgkh, however, argued that Italy had no right to make any demands for compensation, ‘if it does not fulfil its alliance obligations once the Great War breaks out’.835 The Joint Council of Ministers in Vienna was in agreement regarding the rejection of the Italian demands for compensation, though it ultimately commissioned Berch- Unauthenticated Download Date | 6/16/17 7:41 AM 360 ‘The King of Italy has declared war on Me told to present Italy with the prospect of territorial compensation in the event of a lasting occupation of Serbian territory, though only if Italy were actually to fulfil its alliance obligations. Italy rejected this. However, it provided an image of complete disorientation, for almost at the same time King Vittorio Emanuele III agreed on 31 July to the plan submitted by his new Chief of the General Staff, Cadorna, to send Italian troops across the Alps to France, whereas the Italian government under Prime Minister Antonio Salandra resolved to declare Italy’s neutrality.836 The Prime Minister and the government thus cast their lot in with those who enjoyed a clear majority in the three-way division of opinion in Italy : a small share argued the case for an allegiance to the ally, a larger part advocated an entry into the war on the side of the Entente, and the neutralists received the most affirmation. Thus, Italy declared its neutrality. Late appeals by Emperor Franz Joseph and Kaiser Wilhelm II were to no avail. Again, a detour could be made to the counterfactual history : assuming that Italy had edited out the last chapter of the prehistory, resolved to join the war as part of the Triple Alliance, and strengthened the German western front with an army comprising three army corps and two cavalry divisions, would the allied armies of the Central Powers really have been able to crush France in six to eight weeks ? Would the combined fleets of Italy and Austria-Hungary have been able to defeat the French and the British in the Mediterranean and establish naval supremacy there ? Was the war lost for the Central Powers at the end of July 1914 before it had really even begun ? The trains that the Imperial and Royal Ministry of Railways had kept available as a precaution in order to transport Italian troops via Austria to the German western front837 were at any rate no longer needed. The Central Powers and above all Austria-Hungary were deeply disappointed, but had to make the best of a bad job. Cessions of territory continued to be ruled out. The words so vividly formulated by the Hungarian Prime Minister Count Tisza applied here : ‘A state that hands over territories from its own body, in order to deter a neighbour that is inclined towards treachery from committing complete betrayal, degrades itself in the eyes of the whole world.’838 Tisza of course knew what he was talking about, since it was not only a question of taking the Italian problem into consideration, but also a matter that concerned Hungary directly, namely how to act in the case of Romania, which had declared its neutrality as expected. The Germans also began to apply pressure in this case and mentioned the possibility of cessions. Rădăuţi (Radautz) and Suceava (Suczawa) should be sacrificed, in order to induce Romania to enter the war. For Hungary, but above all for Emperor Franz Joseph, this was unthinkable.839 Yet there was a kind of relenting on principle, since Italy was granted compensations even without its participation in the war. It was believed that a way out had been found : what if Italy were to be offered territories elsewhere ? However, the proposal did not have the desired effect. On 3 August the Italian Foreign Minister Marchese Anton- Unauthenticated Download Date | 6/16/17 7:41 AM ‘The King of Italy has declared war on Me 361 ino di San Giuliano rejected the proposal to add Nice, Corsica, Tunisia and Albania to the Apennine state. With the exception of Albania, these were, evidently, French possessions, which would have been available only after the complete defeat of France. However, the French territories were precisely what Italy expected for its participation in the war at Germany’s side. The Italian-German relationship was one thing ; the Italian-Austrian another. And Rome had changed its mind and demanded compensation only from Austria-Hungary. Yet the hoped-for offer from Austria, namely the cession of Austrian Trentino, did not come. On 8 August, the Joint Council of Ministers in Vienna dealt once more with Italy’s demands for compensation. It was noticeable here that the attitude of the two halves of the Empire, to the extent that this attitude was mentioned in the contributions of the two prime ministers, was completely identical in the question of ceding Trentino and that the Hungarian Prime Minister opposed the Italian wishes at least as vehemently as Count Stürgkh. Conrad von Hötzendorf, however, had noted unmistakeably during this session of the Joint Council of Ministers and before he left for the field that Austria-Hungary had nothing to mobilise in order to face Italy in the event of an Italian attack. He was even clearer when he said : ‘From a military point of view’, it was so imperative to keep Italy neutral ‘that he would say, as a soldier, that no price was too high’.840 Then Count Stürgkh said that in the event that the Italians were really serious and threatened with the choice of territorial cessions or war, he would have no moral scruples whatsoever in betraying the Italians. The following scene could be set : the German Empire should go and, purportedly behind Austria’s back, make the desired territorial assurances to Italy. By means of a second contract between Austria-Hungary and Germany, however, the first would become obsolete. Tisza and the Hungarian ‘Minister at the Royal Court’ in Vienna, Count Stephan Burián, came out in opposition to this. Italy, they said, would not allow itself to be so easily betrayed. Consequently, fears of an Italian attack not only became so strong that the fortification of Vienna, Budapest and the Danube crossings was undertaken as a result. Furthermore, border observations and safeguarding measures were taken in the most unobtrusive way possible. The language used towards Italy remained engaging, however. The newspapers were also obliged to adhere to this and were not allowed to pull out all the stops. ‘Now the order has been issued that our newspapers are not allowed to insult Italy, but are permitted to adopt the insults of the German newspapers’, noted the Chief of the Bosnian-Herzegovinian Civil Administration, Ludwig Thálloczy, on 5 August 1914 in his diary.841 On the Austrian side, it was pointed out that the Dual Monarchy did not strive for any territorial changes in the Balkans, i.e. did not want to reduce the size of Serbia ; therefore, there did not have to be any corresponding compensation agreements. Should there, for not yet foreseeable reasons, be changes in the Balkans, however, the Unauthenticated Download Date | 6/16/17 7:41 AM 362 ‘The King of Italy has declared war on Me wishes of Italy would of course be considered. This was the almost unvarying tone of Austro-Hungarian statements on the subject.842 But they were only at the start of a lesson in Machiavellian foreign policy. Austria-Hungary did not limit itself, however, to obliging expressions. There were also other things that indicated more clearly that the attitude of Italy and Austria-Hungary included military factors. As mentioned earlier, at the commencement of mobilisation in the case of a Balkan war scenario, Conrad von Hötzendorf had also set about mobilising the III Corps in Graz, not least because he was not certain about Italy’s stance. Even after Italy’s declaration of neutrality and after Austria-Hungary was entirely committed both in the Balkans and against Russia, the Italian border was not allowed out of sight. Both states heightened their safeguarding measures, which were not yet very extensive, however. A mobilisation of the Italian Army, as the Chief of the Italian General Staff Cadorna had demanded, was rejected by the Italian government. The politicians and diplomats still had the last word, even if there was complete confusion for a time and the neutralists and interventionists were at loggerheads with each other. On 19 August 1914, at the next session of the Joint Council of Ministers in Vienna, which was in fact chaired by the Emperor, the resolution was passed to continue the dialogue with Italy and to put off the breach for as long as possible, though in the meantime to take the necessary measures on the border with Italy. For its part, Italy also began military preparations, which the Italian ambassador in Vienna, Duke Giuseppe von Avarna, an advocate of the Triple Alliance who was ultimately degraded to the status of letter carrier for the politicians, had to justify by making it known that these measures served to reassure the Italian public and maintain order. This argument, as superficial as it perhaps sounds, had a genuine background, since in Italy an anti-Austrian mood was emerging, which could not be ignored by the government. Austria did everything to counteract this. Prominent Austrian socialists travelled to Italy and attempted to convince Italian social democrats to take a more moderate and pro-Triple Alliance line. Money flowed to the south in order to induce newspapers such as Mattino, Popolo Romano, Il Giorno and others to use a writing style that was beholden at least to the ideal of Italian neutrality.843 The Imperial and Royal War Ministry made ten million kronen available to the Foreign Ministry for this purpose. On the Austrian side, but also in Italian circles, stress was laid on the Catholic power of Austria. Other groups were stronger and more influential. The Corriere della Sera, whose importance and circulation far exceeded those of the aforementioned newspapers, questioned Italy’s neutrality in a series of articles as early as August 1914 and achieved a much more far-reaching effect with this than more radical newspapers from the cut of an Il Popolo d’Italia, which was edited by a certain Benito Mussolini.844 More effective was that which Mussolini wrote in the socialist Avanti, where he made the case for Italy’s Unauthenticated Download Date | 6/16/17 7:41 AM ‘The King of Italy has declared war on Me 363 participation in the war, in order to end the war as soon as possible. The majority of his party was appalled and resolved upon a manifesto in which the will to neutrality was emphasised. Mussolini submitted his resignation as the editor of Avanti.845 Italy’s attitude of course interested not only the countries of the Dual Alliance but at least as much the Entente states. Here matters also developed their own dynamic. From discussions held by the Italian ambassador in St. Petersburg, Marchese Andrea Carlotti, who had played a role in the July Crisis as an informant for the Russians, it became clear that in the event of a victory for the Entente, Russia was contemplating the cession of Trentino as well as other territories. The outcome of these negotiations was admittedly similar to that in Austria-Hungary a few weeks earlier, when Italy had been offered Nice and Corsica. Largely independently of this, France and Great Britain developed their own proposals, which also involved Trentino, as well as Vlorë in Albania. The British Foreign Secretary Sir Edward Grey went a step further and wanted to see Trieste added. Thus, the catchphrase ‘Trento e Trieste’ was born. The Russian Foreign Minister Sazonov apparently did not want to be left out and offered Italy the acquisition of Dalmatia, adding that this was dependent on the agreement of Great Britain and France. Germany’s early military success in Belgium and France, likewise that of Austria-Hungary in the Balkans and in Russia, did not initially allow the discussions between Italy and the Entente powers to really get going, since at this point in time everyone was unclear about the course of the war. However, events moved along at an extraordinary pace. First of all, however, a clarification process within the Italian government was necessary, and this commenced in mid-August : after Foreign Minister San Giuliano had addressed the possibility of Italy entering the war on the side of the Entente in a letter to the Italian Prime Minister Salandra from 9 August, the ground was tested. San Giuliano did not conceal from the Prime Minister his personal assessment of the consequences of such a step when he wrote : ‘We should make no pretence of the fact, however, that such a war […] would be regarded across Europe as an act of dishonesty […] even by those who might become our new allies.’846 Italy nonetheless began to sound out London, and indeed consciously here first of all, because both the discretion of the French and that of the Russians was doubted. However, Italy demanded the continuation of British coal deliveries even to commence discussions. San Giuliano requested in addition an immediate attack by British naval forces on the Austro-Hungarian Fleet formations in the Adriatic Sea. When this attack did not take place, San Giuliano interpreted this as a very good reason to maintain Italian neutrality.847 He was absolutely aware that the security of Italy depended to a significant extent on the situation in the Mediterranean. As long as the Austro-Hungarian Navy dominated the Adriatic, caution was advised. Unauthenticated Download Date | 6/16/17 7:41 AM 364 ‘The King of Italy has declared war on Me On 16 October 1914, San Giuliano died. He had steered a course of neutrality for Italy, and wanted in this way first and foremost to keep Italy out of the war. His successor saw things differently. At the beginning of November, Baron Sidney Sonnino took over the Foreign Ministry. His semi-English parentage was immediately commented on. In the interim, however, Prime Minister Salandra himself had led the Foreign Ministry for two weeks. And on 18 October 1914 he used two words that would become formative for Italy : ‘sacro egoismo’.848 Almost unnoticeably, the emphases had changed. ‘Sacro egoismo’ During negotiations with the Entente and with the Central Powers Italy, remained a very patient adversary and attentively followed the war-related events in the meantime. It also exploited the situation for a time to improve its own position. When raids by Epirotes took place against southern Albania from Greece, raids that Italy believed threatened its own interests in the region around Albania, an Italian detachment – with a sweeping interpretation of the Treaty of London regarding Albania – occupied the port of Vlorë and the offshore island, and in this way brought the Strait of Otranto under its control. The distance from Vlorë to Otranto is only approximately 60 kilometres, and whoever controls the road from Otranto occupies a strategically important position. Austria accepted the occupation of Vlorë ; the German Empire even expressly welcomed it. In the meantime, as we know, the position of the Central Powers had not necessarily developed to their benefit. The German advance had stalled in France, the western front had to be pulled back and positional warfare began. The first offensives against Serbia had failed and in the east parts of Galicia had fallen into Russian hands. The Russian advance appeared to be unstoppable. In this situation, Great Britain, France and Russia made it clear that they were not of a mind in the event of a victory to make territorial concessions to Italy at the expense of the victors, unless Italy was prepared to step forward and declare war on the Central Powers. For its part, Italy pointed out that it had already set its conditions for entering the war and that one of these demands was a naval operation against the Imperial and Royal Navy. Italy feared having to bear the burden of the war against Austria-Hungary entirely alone, and this seemed too much of a risk. Here Italy almost unexpectedly received an ally, namely Romania. The Romanian Prime Minister Ion Brătianu began talks with the Italian envoy in Bucharest and had the Romanian standpoint forwarded to Rome : both states, Italy and Romania, should jointly pursue an annihilation of Austria-Hungary.849 As early as 23 September 1914, Romania and Italy signed a treaty that obligated both states to consult each other reciprocally and not to abandon their neutrality without giving the other one Unauthenticated Download Date | 6/16/17 7:41 AM ‘Sacro egoismo’ 365 advance notice of eight days. They furthermore secured the maintenance of their respective interests and committed themselves expressly to keeping the treaty absolutely secret. Romania had also received a generous offer from the Entente powers. In the event of Romanian participation in the war on the side of the Entente powers, the latter promised the Balkan state not only Transylvania and Bukovina but also the Hungarian territory inhabited by Romanians between Transylvania and the Tisza River. This was very much more than the cession of the territories of Rădăuţi and Suceava held out by Germany, which in any case absolutely no-one – above all in Hungary – wanted to hear of. After agreement had been reached with Romania, Italy resumed negotiations in London. By this time, however, the season of year now also played a role in Italian deliberations. Prime Minister Salandra did not conceal during a presentation to the Italian king that the state of the Italian army did not yet allow for an immediate entry into the war. It was especially unprepared for fighting in highlands in wintertime, for which reason Italy would only be able to begin waging war – as long as there were no unexpected events – in the spring.850 In the interim, however, Italy met with some reservation on the part of the Entente powers. They had clearly recognised Italy’s tactical manoeuvring. The London press expressed itself with unconcealed criticism to the effect that Italy could not enter the war due to a formal error, just because Austria-Hungary had not kept it up to date regarding the steps taken against Serbia. If the Italian stance is compared with that of Great Britain, which entered the war only after the flagrant violation of Belgian neutrality, then the two cases were very different. Just one English journalist consistently supported Italy and steadfastly championed the Italian standpoint, namely Henry Wickham-Steed, the man who had also appointed himself the advocate of the Czechs.851 However, he combined this with the call for Italy to take the step that it had evidently not yet thought of taking, namely to play the part of liberator of the Slavs in the Balkans. The population of Trieste and the surrounding region was predominantly Slav, according to Wickham-Steed, and Italy only had a chance of forcing through its wishes regarding the cession of Trieste and the Croatian and Dalmatian coastline if it presented itself as a pro-Slav power. Progress was made in the talks being held at different locations at precisely the moment Austro-Hungarian troops were advancing far into Serbia during their third offensive in November 1914. Italy regarded this as the right moment to hold talks with Austria-Hungary over compensation. Count Berchtold responded in his well-known way and said that Austria-Hungary did not have any territorial demands against Serbia ; furthermore, the ups and downs of war, which at times brought advances and at other times retreats, could not be cited as a sufficient argument for applying Article VII of the Triple Alliance treaty. This time, however, Italy played the German card and attempted again to influence Vienna by means of the detour via Berlin in order Unauthenticated Download Date | 6/16/17 7:41 AM 366 ‘The King of Italy has declared war on Me to achieve territorial concessions. Italy began in the process to dream of great power status, which no longer took Austria-Hungary into consideration : the German Empire would be the hegemonic power on the Continent, but Italy would dominate the Balkan-Adriatic region.852 It was as though Italy were anticipating the Rome-Berlin ‘Axis’ of the Mussolini-Hitler era. Italian hopes received an additional boost when the German ambassador in Rome, Baron Flotow, was replaced by the former Imperial Chancellor Prince Bernhard von Bülow, who was married to an Italian woman. Bülow started by stating that Trentino could be discussed, but Trieste was ‘Austria’s lung’ and must therefore be excluded from the talks.853 Pressure increased on Austria to cede Trentino and make additional territorial concessions. Count Hoyos, still known from his Berlin mission in July 1914, compared the German approach with recommending that Germany end the war with France by ceding Lorraine (Lothringen), which would be just as impertinent.854 The thing that appeared so vivid and plausible about this comparison was in fact not quite fitting, since Lorraine had only belonged to the German Empire since 1871, whereas Trentino and Trieste were territories that had been a part of the Habsburg Monarchy for 500 or 600 years. Such comparisons on the one hand were always used, whilst on the other hand they were never very expedient and history can provide arguments and counterarguments for everything imaginable. Ethnographers pointed to the demographic structures, others argued that these structures had only emerged as a result of policies that were arbitrary and repressive towards one national group, and scholarship was once again used and abused. In the case of the Habsburg Monarchy, one could argue just as well with the idea of empire as one could in the case of Italy with the nation state. This all restricted the room for manoeuvre in negotiations. Austria-Hungary found itself ever more on the political defensive. In the meantime, Italy expanded the notion of compensation. In the view of the new Foreign Minister Sidney Sonnino, it was no longer just a question of balancing out any territorial changes in favour of Austria ; he also demanded compensation for political, economic and ideational benefits.855 This brought imponderables into play. Italy could claim, however, to also receive support for its demands from opposition circles in the Habsburg Monarchy. Thus, the leader of the democratic opposition in Hungary, Count Mihály Károlyi, gave the green light to a cession of Trentino. Trieste also appeared to be a logical and grantable demand to Count Károlyi. He was not prepared to talk about Rijeka (Fiume) in Croatia, however, which belonged to the Hungarian half of the Empire, and ultimately the fulfilment of Italian demands should only serve to get the Apennine state on to the side of the Central Powers, in order that Romania did not, if anything, feel encouraged to enter the war on the side of the Entente and to threaten Hungary in Transylvania.856 Unauthenticated Download Date | 6/16/17 7:41 AM ‘Sacro egoismo’ 367 The official Austria, however, referred Italy to Albania in all of its claims. There, it was argued, Italy could offset its interests. This was too little for Italy, however. It repeatedly demanded the cession of Trentino, and this touched upon basic questions of the Dual Monarchy’s existence. It had after all gone to war to retain and defend its territorial holdings, and any cession of territories, whether it were Trentino, Transylvania or East Galicia, must appear to be exactly contrary to these aims. The Departmental Councillor in the Foreign Ministry in Vienna, Baron Franz von Matscheko, expressed this stance as follows on 21 December 1914 : ‘By ceding Trentino to Italy, we would ourselves call into question the basic principle on which the existence of Austria-Hungary is based. The Monarchy’s right to exist lies in the fact that the peace of Europe would be subjected to incessant convulsions, if in that territory where the great European races, Germanic peoples, Romance, northern and southern Slavs, adjoin one another in reciprocal permeation, a strong great power did not exist, which – having emerged and been put together over the course of the centuries – encompasses parts of all adjoining peoples and with them the isolated block of the Magyars. For the benefit of this European necessity, all neighbouring states must forego the complete realisation of their national ideals, just as the individual tribes in the Monarchy are necessarily subjected to constraints at a national level.’857 This was perhaps an acceptable interpretation of the imperial idea and cast the famous words of František Palacký from April 1848 into an updated postulation. However, it evidently completely bypassed nationalist realities. Matscheko continued that the cession of Trentino would tempt the Monarchy’s other neighbours to make territorial claims. For the state existence of Italy, however, Trentino was just as dispensable as Ticino, Nice, Savoy or Tunis. Italy had to decide whether it wanted to subordinate its sentimental aspirations to Trentino to the existence of Austria-Hungary. Ultimately, however, it was pointless to discuss territorial concessions with Italy, since Emperor Franz Joseph had categorically ruled out any cession, no matter who may come. Franz Joseph was not prepared to make any concessions. He was indeed very tempted to change his mind, but he remained a realist to the extent that he responded to the next proposal to offer Italy Gibraltar by saying that he had also already heard the idea but that the island was not his to offer.858 The Evidenzbüro (military intelligence service) of the Imperial and Royal General Staff came to the conclusion at the end of 1914 that Italy would present its demands in January in the form of an ultimatum, and request South Tyrol, Istria and Rijeka, including the Austrian Littoral, Dalmatia as far as Split (Spalato), as well as the cession of the fleet against financial compensation.859 The question of the cession of Trentino ultimately led to the resignation of Foreign Minister Count Berchtold. It is not entirely clear whether he resigned because he ultimately regarded territorial losses as unavoidable or because he was particularly uncom- Unauthenticated Download Date | 6/16/17 7:41 AM 368 ‘The King of Italy has declared war on Me promising.860 For his part, he regarded the resignation as very undramatic and stated : ‘[…] I saw that this situation required a man whose nerves can cope with it. In order to sit tight through such a situation, sangfroid, or in fact a sort of light-heartedness, is needed, so that the right moment is not missed, and I do not have that.’861 Weeks later he intimated that he had resigned because the Emperor had prevented him from taking part in talks on the cession of South Tyrol. Berchtold, Stürgkh, Tisza and the Hungarian Minister at the Royal Court, Count István Burián von Rajecz, met at Buchlov Castle. Once again, Berchtold had made his castle available for discrete talks. It concerned the matter of who would succeed him. Tisza was asked whether he wanted to assume the portfolio, but he rejected it categorically.862 On 13 January 1915, Berchtold was removed. His successor was Count Burián, who should have become Foreign Minister in 1912, but had to stand back in favour of Berchtold due to the obligation to reflect the national structure in ministerial appointments. He had nonetheless exerted influence and was regarded as an extension of Tisza. Burián also found himself under immediate pressure from Germany, but he certainly did not want to yield to it. By now, however, the views of the politicians and the military diverged quite considerably. A man such as Alexander Hoyos, who was undoubtedly able to reflect the attitude of the Foreign Ministry as well as that of court circles very accurately, made it clear that the court camarilla talked with enormous frivolity about the possibility of an Italian entry into the war : ‘Let them try !’863 The attitude of the military added up to the exact opposite of this viewpoint. They thought that having another opponent would lead to a military catastrophe. Conrad had already said this as early as August 1914. He repeated it several times. The Foreign Ministry, on the other hand, advanced a completely different argument. Thus, on 27 January – that is, after his departure – Berchtold justified the refusal to cede Trentino to Italy by saying that such a sacrifice would only be seen as a sign of weakness and would have ‘had a depressing effect on the army and the entire population’.864 He made no mention of the Emperor not giving him any room for manoeuvre in negotiations. Gradually, with all eyes glued to something that appeared unavoidable, the ‘Italian crisis’ set in motion an increasingly hectic merry-go-round of proposals, counter-proposals and suggested solutions. Conrad conveyed to Burián an idea of Falkenhayn to the effect that Italy should be invited to join the Triple Alliance negotiations. This step was evidently to be taken in order to demonstrate the allegiance of Italy for all to see.865 Conrad did not reveal whether he believed that such an approach could yield success, but he prepared everything himself in order to demonstrate the strength of the Imperial and Royal armies by means of a successful battle to relieve Przemyśl. He evidently did not believe in such manoeuvres. The conference did not take place. The proposal to send the heir to the throne Archduke Karl to Rome was also not uninteresting. The idea emerged at the beginning of January 1915 and had evidently Unauthenticated Download Date | 6/16/17 7:41 AM ‘Sacro egoismo’ 369 been concocted in the Military Chancellery of the Emperor. The Adjutant General of the Emperor, Count Paar, should be sent ahead in order to make the matter palatable to the Emperor, though it was not entirely clear how the matter should be approached and the idea was dropped for the time being.866 At the end of January the idea was aired for the first time in the German Empire of indemnifying Austria-Hungary for the cession of Trentino to Italy with the coal mining district around Sosnowice in Russian Poland.867 It was questionable whether Austria would even regard such as offer as sufficiently attractive. On 3 February, the first session of the Joint Council of Ministers led by Burián addressed the matter of Italy. Afterwards, the minister resumed talks with the Italian ambassador, the Duke of Avarna, and stunned the latter with a list of counter-demands, also with reference to Article VII of the Triple Alliance treaty. Burián said that Austria had the right to claim compensation for the temporary occupation of the Dodecanese and Vlorë by Italy. This was a turnaround that Rome had certainly not expected. Italy then broke off talks with Vienna and began for the first time to make threats.868 Although this abortion was not the end of talks, it had nonetheless become clear than a turning point had been reached. The Austrian ambassador in Rome, now Baron Karl von Macchio, was able to learn that Italy’s military preparations would not be completed until April 1915.869 At that point, however, an entry into the war should be expected. The German Empire now increased the pressure on Austria-Hungary. Prince Bülow, the German ambassador in Rome, who, without any inhibitions at all, advocated concessions, expressed his opinion in a private letter to the editor-in-chief of the Hamburger Fremdenblatt, von Eckhard, to the effect that more influence had to be exerted on Vienna, since ‘it would be outrageous if Austria, after it pulled us into this war, by virtue of its incompetence at the beginning of this war and in the last two or three years, would rob us of the involvement of Italy and Romania [and] send another two million enemies after us’.870 The Chief of the Military Chancellery of the Emperor, Baron Moritz von Lyncker, expressed himself with perhaps even more clarity : ‘The Austrians do not want to, they are so haughty and blinkered, particularly the old emperor and the so-called high nobility. How they imagine the war with Italy is anyone’s guess ; one might think they would rather go under “with honour” and take us with them into the abyss. That’s a nice prospect !’871 Falkenhayn regarded the Danube Monarchy as a ‘cadaver’, and the leader of the German National Liberals characterised the alliance partner, to whom Germany had sworn blind loyalty, as a ‘corpse galvanised for heroic feats of strength’.872 This was also one way of looking at it. The fact was that ever more perplexity and helplessness began to spread. From January onwards it could repeatedly be heard that Italy would declare war in April. One person recommended concessions and added in the same breath that it was doubtful whether Italy would allow concessions to prevent it from entering the war. Unauthenticated Download Date | 6/16/17 7:41 AM 370 ‘The King of Italy has declared war on Me Another person advised on a powerful presence and intimidation, but at the beginning of the year there was nothing that could intimidate Italy. The negotiators in Rome appeared increasingly self-confident and the Duke of Avarna informed Minister Burián that the Imperial and Royal troops would only be allowed to take on Serbia again when Italy received binding assurances regarding the cession of old Austrian territory.873 A further offensive against Serbia was in any case not even being considered at the present time, but the Italians evidently wanted to plan ahead. It was questionable, however, what would happen if the Italian wishes were satisfied. Would not Romania’s desire for Transylvania by rights also have to be fulfilled ? The proposals and deliberations contained everything including a separate peace with Russia at the expense of the cession of Galicia or at least part of the crown lands ; instead, there would be war over South Tyrol.874 At the same time, however, it was said that there would not be any cession of Galicia, since Galicia was the most important sales area for Austrian industry.875 One side scourged the politics of Italy, which was aimed at making profits, and the ‘sacro egoismo’, whilst the other located the roots of the problem somewhere in the past, such as Prince Franz Liechtenstein, for example, who took the view that Austria had pursued an incorrect domestic policy during the previous 30 years and had always patronised Italy like some sort of ‘indecent lady’.876 The Treaty of London Following the months from January to May 1915 in the diary of Josef Redlich, one gets the impression of considerable confusion. Phrases such as ‘highly alarming’, ‘not very pleasant’, ‘quite desperate’ and, of course, ‘perfidious’ can be found in continuous succession. Austria’s ‘ruling caste’, according to Redlich, comprised ‘weaklings and amateurs’,877 whilst the Foreign Ministry was ‘full of useless people or plotters’. Everyone felt compelled to make comments about and pass judgement on the Emperor, the court, the ministers and pretty much all decision-makers, and one gets the impression from Redlich that – aside from himself – everyone was an idiot. That is, until Italy’s entry into the war appeared unalterable, so that he was now confronted with only fatalism. Yet it was a completely different situation to the July Crisis : at that time, Austria-Hungary had yearned for the outbreak of war above all because it was believed that there might not be one. Now, since the ‘coup de grace’ appeared to threaten, the war should be made as difficult as possible for the aggressor. The deputy of the German Catholic Centre Party Mathias Erzberger had made use of his contacts to the Vatican and succeeded in persuading the Holy See to intervene and advise Vienna to accept Italian demands. The papal deputy secretary Eugenio Pacelli, later Pope Pius XII, as well as the Jesuit Superior Count Wlodimir Ledóchowski and Unauthenticated Download Date | 6/16/17 7:41 AM The Treaty of London 371 the Archbishop of Vienna Cardinal Piffl, had taken action on behalf of the Vatican. Even the services of the companion of the old Emperor, Katharina Schratt, were apparently engaged. In short, nothing and no-one was left out in attempts to avoid a war between the Habsburg Monarchy and Italy. During all of this, Italy marked up its price. It made no pretence of the fact that it had a mind to obtain as much as possible for its non-participation in the war.878 At the beginning of March 1915, Italy resumed talks with the Entente in London. Rome’s demands were summarised in several points : the Entente should commit itself to not make any special peace with the Central Powers. A military convention should guarantee that Austria-Hungary could not concentrate its entire force against Italy. A fleet convention should ensure that the British and the French Fleets would fight with the Italians until the destruction of the Austro-Hungarian Fleet in the Mediterranean. Furthermore, the cession of Trentino to Italy and the cisalpine part of South Tyrol, as well as Trieste, the municipalities of Gorizia (Görz) and Gradisca d’Isonzo and the whole of Istria as far as Quarnero, including Volosca in the Kvarner Gulf, were demanded. Finally, Foreign Minister Sonnino also demanded Dalmatia from its northern border as far as Narenta. In eleven further points, the remaining Italian wishes for entering the war were summarised and contained therein were its share of a war indemnity and a British guarantee of the independence of Yemen, a neutralisation of the holy Islamic sites and the non-admittance of the Pope to peace negotiations. All this should be negotiated to the end in the strictest secrecy ; this was another of Sonnino’s conditions. In view of developments on the western front and the looming failure in the war with Turkey, where the landing operations in the Dardanelles threatened to turn into a debacle on the Gallipoli peninsula, Great Britain and France were ready to pay almost any price for the intervention of Italy. In practice, this meant above all that Great Britain shelved its concerns. This was not the case with Russia, which expected the collapse of the Danube Monarchy following the Battles of the Carpathian Passes in March 1915 and furthermore brought Serbian interests into play. The Italian desire for Dalmatia naturally affected Serbia and its southern Slav ambitions. The Russian Foreign Minister Sazonov therefore attempted to force the Italians towards Albania and to raise Serbia’s hopes of obtaining parts of Transylvania. But this tempted neither the Italians nor the Serbs, who would have had to argue with the Romanians over hegemony in Transylvania. Consequently, the Russian Foreign Minister was inclined to no longer pursue Italy’s entry into the war.879 The Entente powers, Great Britain and France, did not believe that they could forego Italian participation in the war and therefore sought another possibility to accommodate the desires of all actual and potential allies. Now everything happened quickly. For the Entente powers, it was not a question of the original core issues, namely the cession of Trentino and Trieste, but exclusively Unauthenticated Download Date | 6/16/17 7:41 AM 372 ‘The King of Italy has declared war on Me of Dalmatia. The British Foreign Secretary Grey suggested that Italy should at least forego Spalato. On 27 March, Sonnino declared himself ready to do so. Difficulties also emerged with the distribution of the islands off the coast of Dalmatia, which had to be negotiated with Serbia, but these were ultimately not very eminent problems, since Serbia was naturally extremely interested in an additional opponent for Austria-Hungary. On 14 April, agreement was reached over the wording of the article concerning the Dalmatian islands, but new difficulties emerged due to Montenegro’s rights on the Adriatic. Finally, only one point was open, namely the date of the Italian entry into the war. The Entente powers requested 15 April. The Italian government could not accept this date, however, because military preparations could not be completed by then. Now it was really only a question of a date, however, and nothing more. Whilst all this was being brought under lock and key, Italy continued to negotiate with Vienna and left Austria-Hungary and Germany in the belief that an amicable solution was possible that conformed to the Triple Alliance. On 16 March, Prime Minister Salandra wrote to Foreign Minister Sonnino that Vienna should ‘be allowed to believe that we regard a friendly solution as possible, and all the more so, the less we believe in it. This stance, however much power of disguise it might cost you, seems to me to be currently essential in the interests of our country.’880 In the meantime, Vienna was in the process of completely revising its attitude to Italy. It was said in advance that the session of the Joint Council of Ministers on 8 March, which would be a Privy Council due to the presence of the Emperor, and at which the heir to the throne would also be present, would be the scene of ‘meaningful discussions’ on the further fate of the Monarchy. Burián, Tisza, Stürgkh and Ernest von Koerber, Biliński’s successor as Joint Finance Minister, as well as War Minister Krobatin were convinced of the necessity of cessions. Conrad, who had been fetched to Vienna from Cieszyn, in order to attend the session, began by reminiscing and stressed that he had been in favour of a pre-emptive war against Italy for good reasons. This remark had to come, because Conrad saw in the dilemma, in which the Dual Monarchy found itself as a result of the Italian attempt to blackmail it, nothing other than confirmation of what he had predicted since his appointment as Chief of the General Staff. Therefore, he frequently expressed himself with barely surpassable contempt about Aehrenthal, who – as Conrad claimed – had prevented a timely defeat of Italy. The cession of Trentino would be a severe loss from a strategic point of view. But it would have to be accepted. Emperor Franz Joseph – and this was decisive – had been made increasingly prepared to grant concessions. He called the Italians ‘bootlegging lowlifes’ and ‘bandits’, but on 27 February, the Lord Chamberlain Prince Montenuovo delightedly ascertained that the Emperor was no longer strictly hostile. In fact, he let it be known on 8 March that he was prepared to grant concessions in the case of Trentino, but not in the case of Trieste and the Isonzo. Unauthenticated Download Date | 6/16/17 7:41 AM The Treaty of London 373 Now, it was of course a matter of determining Italy’s willingness to negotiate on the basis of the new proposals from Vienna. Shortly before the session of the Joint Council of Ministers, however, a telegram for Emperor Franz Joseph had arrived in Vienna from Kaiser Wilhelm, which contained the so-called ‘Silesian offer’, namely the return of some of the Silesian territories conquered by King Friedrich II of Prussia to Austria, if Austria-Hungary gave in to Italy. The German Kaiser had assured Franz Joseph in this telegram, which had been revised by Bethmann-Hollweg and von Jagow, that he had a mind to share good and bad with the Austrian Monarch. Another enticement was attached to the ‘Silesian offer’, namely Germany’s agreement to lend gold to Austria-Hungary. This was so important because the loans taken so far from Germany now no longer even sufficed for the interest due and the repayment rates. Vienna believed furthermore that it had the right to demand generosity from the German Empire in the financial area, since it had held out the prospect of a loan running into the billions in the event that Italy maintained its neutrality.881 Thus, Conrad’s remarks against Italy remained irrelevant, and Tisza and Burián even believed that with the cession of Triente it would be possible to bind Italy once more to the Triple Alliance.882 Austria-Hungary was only unprepared to negotiate over cessions in the Isonzo region, since the word of the Emperor held sway here. The turnaround in opinion was so complete that any speculation over a subsequent revision of the process was strictly rejected. The Dual Monarchy, it was said, would certainly not wage a subsequent war of revenge against Italy. Burián immediately had the change of attitude on the part of the Vienna cabinet announced in Rome via Berlin, though he demanded that in the cession of Trentino the linguistic frontier would have to be taken as the outer limit of Italian demands. On 10 March, Italy declared itself ready to negotiate on the basis of the proposals from Vienna. Absolute secrecy was also demanded for this, but also the immediate coming into force of a treaty of cession, whilst Burián and the Austrian government had only planned on a cession after the conclusion of a peace treaty. This demand thus had a snag, since it was not only a question of making clear to the population of a region that had belonged to Austria for hundreds of years that it would have to immediately change its nationality. Now the maps would have to be studied. Burián had one prepared, on which the linguistic frontier was marked, and the Foreign Minister wanted to conduct negotiations according to that. The minister and the envoy responsible for Italy, Pogatscher, hoped to eliminate existing differences with Italy once and for all after the cession of the ethnically Italian territory. Thus, an offer should be made that was as generous as possible. The Chief of the Imperial Military Chancellery, General Bolfras, had drawn up another map, which did not go quite as far as that of the Foreign Minister. On all maps, however, only new Tyrolean borders had been marked. The handling of the Friuli region Unauthenticated Download Date | 6/16/17 7:41 AM 374 ‘The King of Italy has declared war on Me was thus to be deferred. A study had been presented by one Professor Brückner that provided information on the ethnic situation. The Italy specialist in the Army High Command, Lieutenant Colonel Schneller, was brought to Vienna in order to allow military considerations to also flow into a new demarcation.883 Conrad even instructed that care be taken to talk only of Trentino and not South Tyrol. He furthermore expressed a widespread view, especially in the military, when he said that it should be possible ‘to divest the enemy of the ceded land as soon as possible’.884 How deeply Conrad was stung by the concession and how much the Austrian protagonists were dominated by an element of impotence became evident from a lengthy letter to Foreign Minister Burián from 2 April, in which Conrad regarded a special peace with Russia to be more feasible than the prevention of an Italian entry into the war. He wanted, however, that an armistice be concluded with Russia only with the aim of giving the Imperial and Royal armies a free hand for the war against Italy.885 Here revenge was in play again and the perfidy should be punished. It was as though Vienna knew that Italy was receiving simultaneous assurances from the Allies not to conclude a separate peace. Conrad said it was out of the question to wage war simultaneously with Russia, Serbia and Italy. A peaceful settlement thus had to be reached immediately with one of the opponents. Russia could be accommodated in the question of the Turkish Straits and even the cession of East Galicia would be a far smaller sacrifice to make than the cession of Tyrol and the Austrian Littoral to Italy. Such arguments, however, were already illusory. And the dilemma could not be any more complete : at the beginning of April, Russia was still at the peak of its military successes and did not intend to conclude a separate peace. Then came Gorlice–Tarnów. Russia had defeat in sight, but knew that Italy’s entry into the war was imminent and thus did nothing to conclude a peace. On the Austrian side, moreover, no attempt was made to actually enter into talks with the Russians. All these considerations only existed on paper, likewise the demand made shortly thereafter by Conrad that an agreement be reached with Serbia, which he imagined would not be easy, but at least possible : ‘I have’, he wrote to Bolfras, ‘identified the solution of the southern Slav question as the most important problem of the Monarchy and emphasised that the merging of the southern Slavs is an inevitable fact that, if it does not take place within the Monarchy, will resolve itself outwardly to the detriment of the latter. Back then, it was neglected to achieve the peaceful annexation of Serbia ; in 1909 we [then] failed to bring this about by force, as I urgently advised. Perhaps the opportunity poses itself now to achieve our objective by peaceful means, since Serbia does not look to Italy with great trust. […] I think that we must make it clear to Serbia that it can only achieve its dreams of unity and access to the Adriatic Sea in close association with the Monarchy, in other words via its annexation by the latter as a federal state, just like Bavaria in the German Empire […].’886 Unauthenticated Download Date | 6/16/17 7:41 AM The Final Offer 375 Those at the German Grand Headquarters did not appear to think much of this. Conrad was requested urgently to travel to Berlin in order to persuade him otherwise. The Prussian War Minister General von Wild noted regarding the deliberations on a separate peace : ‘I see in this a first, shameful admittance of weakness and the great dangers of our federal brother breaking off. I have therefore emphatically brought this danger to the attention of Falkenhayn […]. We must not allow ourselves to be taken into tow by the “Oyster Hungarians” […]. There are no extra tours. This will have to be made clear to Conrad tomorrow, and in general we have to open his eyes and shine a light in his fantastical political darkroom.’887 In this way, and in accordance with the well-known maxim ‘suaviter in modo, fortiter in re’, Conrad would be brought ‘into line’. In Vienna, a map was shown to the Italian ambassador, the Duke of Avarna, that had been agreed on between the politicians and the military and in which the Austrian proposals on territorial cessions were marked. The Duke remained poker-faced, since he was merely the messenger. Since the session of the Privy Council, Archduke Karl Franz Josef had been in Vienna almost continuously and was ultimately also included in the deliberations of the Military Chancellery to send him on a special mission to Rome. He was immediately willing to do this. He went ‘enthusiastically’, it was said.888 The Emperor still knew nothing of this. Finally, on 16 March, General Bolfras mentioned this idea. The Emperor did not comment on it, but did not reject the proposal out of hand. On 4 April it was the Lord Chamberlain Prince Montenuovo who urged the Emperor to agree to the trip. Franz Joseph wanted to talk to Minister Burián about it. But the latter was strictly against the idea.889 Then, on 5 April, Vienna knew that Italy would demand very much more than the former was willing to concede. The Brenner border, the Austrian Friuli and the territory around Trieste were demanded. Even a visit by the heir to the throne would have changed nothing. The plan to send Archduke Karl was dropped. Instead, the Italy specialist of the Army High Command returned immediately to Cieszyn, since he would probably be most urgently needed there in the coming weeks.890 The Final Offer The final round of negotiations was already characterised by the news of extensive Italian troop transports becoming known and rumours about English offers to Italy simultaneously filtering through. The only compromise that Sonnino was prepared to make in negotiations with Austria was that Italy would agree to make the Trieste region a demilitarised zone and a free port. Finally, Italy once more submitted concrete demands Unauthenticated Download Date | 6/16/17 7:41 AM 376 ‘The King of Italy has declared war on Me that were even somewhat less than those on which agreement had almost been reached in London parallel to this. Burián, however, could not and would not concede anywhere near as much as demanded in the fulfilment of Italian wishes. He was bound by the decision of the Emperor and what was repeatedly invoked as public opinion. Heavy protests were reported in Tyrol against any sort of concession to Italy. Burián described the immediate cession of territories as unfeasible. The Chief of the Imperial Military Chancellery, Bolfras, submitted the proposal that the territories granted to Italy should be militarily evacuated and in this way Austria-Hungary’s peaceableness particularly underlined. Only if Italian troops were to advance further should military resistance be offered. Bolfras was contradicted immediately and vehemently.891 But the Emperor, who received Conrad on 21 April, also made the case for not continuing to haggle over the cession of territories, but instead to allow the Italians to march in, if necessary.892 Conrad recognised what these thoughts amounted to : if a territory was conceded more or less willingly in negotiations, then this was different to being compelled to give it up by force of arms. If Austria were to win back what had been conquered, the situation would be a completely different one to that which would arise from a straightforward relinquishment. The resolution not to concede anything voluntarily, necessitated almost automatically that resistance be offered. Now negotiations were taken up again with the Chief of the German General Staff. Falkenhayn was doubtless more moderate in his views and his manner of expression than the Prussian War Minister Wild von Hohenborn, who wrote to his wife on 14 April : ‘In itself, it could be irrelevant for us whether or not Italy hacks off once piece more from the tail of the dying camel that is Austria, but the military situation intensifies dangerously as a result of the intervention of Italy.’893 Falkenhayn met Conrad on 24 April in Cieszyn.894 He informed him that he had told the Italian military attaché in Berlin that the German Empire would immediately lend its support to Austria-Hungary with 20 divisions in the event of war with Italy. Whether the Italian had believed this, however, was very questionable ; the reality, in any case, looked different. Germany did not have anything with which it could come to the aid of its ally. Moreover, Germany did not want to come to its aid. How long, asked Falkenhayn, would it take the Italians to reach Vienna ? Conrad answered : five weeks. Including the deployment time, there remained not even seven weeks from the expected declaration of war to the fall of Vienna. This was a horrible scenario. Falkenhayn did not know what to advise, and merely said that they would have to wait for the outcome of the offensive in Galicia, and only then they would see. There was furthermore hope of a new, effective ‘smoking substance’, which was currently being tested and should be deployed in the west. He of course meant chlorine gas. Perhaps this ‘miracle weapon’ would also help against the Italians. Unauthenticated Download Date | 6/16/17 7:41 AM The Final Offer 377 As yet, Italy had not declared war ; it continued to try its luck. Since more had been conceded to Italy by the Entente powers in the parallel negotiations, however, than Austria could offer in even the best case, it was no wonder that it was not Austria-Hungary who was the highest bidder but the Entente. Italy also had every reason to be distrustful towards the Austrian offers, since it always had to be taken into account that the Dual Monarchy would retake what it had ceded at the first good opportunity. The German Empire also thought this way and Falkenhayn sent Conrad on 29 April a telegram with the request to forward it to Count Burián ; the telegram stated : ‘In my view, the simple facts must be decisive for our actions, namely that the intervention of Italy and co., as far as it is humanly possible to say, will decide the war unfavourably for us, also that without this intervention we can be very confident of victory, and that the victor will decide on what Europe will look like and will thus be in a position to make good any sacrifice made for victory, and, finally, that whoever is ultimately defeated not only loses the sacrifices he has made but also his entire empire.’ Conrad forwarded the telegram to Vienna without any comment.895 In the meantime, there were fights and running street battles in Italy between the advocates and the opponents of an intervention. 60 Catholic bishops signed a manifesto against Italian participation in the war. In Popolo d’Italia, Mussolini wrote : ‘War or republic’,896 and the opponent of intervention and former prime minister, Giovanni Giolitti, was publicly insulted. But neither the one nor the other was of any consequence for the secret diplomacy. On 25 April, the final text of the treaty was completed. The next day, the ‘Treaty of London’ was signed. However, it did not become known to the wider public until almost two years later, on 28 February 1917, when it was published by Izvestia, the new Communist daily newspaper in Russia. The Treaty of London of 1915 constituted the basis for Italian entry into the war. Italy committed itself to intervene actively in the war as soon as possible in the near future, and not later than one month after the signing of the treaty.897 Vienna did not know, of course, that there was actually nothing left to negotiate. One could have been distrustful on 1 May, however, when Foreign Minister Sonnino refused on this day to receive the former Imperial and Royal Foreign Minister, Count Agenor Gołuchowski, who had been sent to Rome on a special mission.898 The Ballhausplatz did not even want to believe it when on the same day the Imperial and Royal delegation in Athens reported that according to their information Italy had concluded a treaty with the Entente on 26 April.899 The maxim retained its validity according to which one should ‘first of all play the flute and not yet blow the horn’.900 Day after day, Conrad’s telegrams from Cieszyn arrived in Vienna, however, in which he urged that war with Italy be avoided at all costs. If necessary, all Italian demands should be fulfilled.901 One can thus accuse Conrad and the senior Austro-Hungarian generals of all Unauthenticated Download Date | 6/16/17 7:41 AM 378 ‘The King of Italy has declared war on Me sorts of things, including demands for a pre-emptive war as well as a sloppy approach to their ally. Yet one thing is equally certain : since the beginning of the war, any means and any concession seemed justified to them, especially Conrad, in order to at least maintain Italian neutrality. On 3 May, Sonnino sent a note to the Italian ambassador in Vienna, the Duke of Avarna, which terminated the Triple Alliance. The note was given to Burián the following day. An identical note was handed over in Berlin three days later. Now it was clear to everyone that the ‘War Scenario I’ would occur before long. Things became emotional. Thought was still given to whether to send the heir to the Austrian throne to Rome. Archduke Karl was called to the Emperor on a daily basis. And the Emperor, who had unleashed the war more or less free of emotion, said : ‘This is how we will now perish’. And he ‘wept’, as the Deputy Chief of the Military Chancellery noted.902 The German Empire was shocked and rebuked Austria-Hungary gravely for acting too late and making too few concessions. Conrad took the same line and even complained to the Chief of the Military Chancellery that Burián had overestimated the military means of the Dual Monarchy. The war would simply have to be avoided. At this moment, Conrad was once more abandoned by his sense of reality, and he only reacted emotionally. Even if it was kept in mind that he was anxious that Romania would follow Italy in entering the war and the offensive near Tarnów, which had just begun so successfully, would perhaps have to be abandoned prematurely, it was too late for concessions and dramatic gestures of humility towards Italy. An interesting proposal was made by the former Austrian prime minister, Baron Max Wladimir Beck, who advised Burián to set up a German naval base in the Adriatic in order to discourage Italy at the last moment from waging war.903 Burián also called for immediate military agreements with the German Empire in the event of an Italian attack. In view of the news about Italy’s military preparations and the offers of the Entente, Vienna was now prepared for an imminent breach with Italy. Late in the day, a sense of reality made its presence felt. This was not the case in Berlin, however, since the Permanent Secretary in the German Foreign Ministry, von Jagow, demanded that negotiations with Italy be dragged out for at least another four weeks ; only then would German troops be available to fight against Italy.904 Conrad and Falkenhayn met each other at increasingly short intervals and, at the end, almost daily. It was a question of assessing the Italian danger and of calculating relative strengths. Could, as Falkenhayn claimed, enough divisions be liberated from the Russian front in order for at least a defence to be possible in the south-west ? Should the Tyrolean front be placed under German command ?905 This would only be in order to remain on the defensive there, however. Instead, Falkenhayn wanted all disposable forces to be used against Serbia, in order to bring about Romanian and Bulgarian entry into the war on the side of the Central Powers and to establish a link to Turkey. Conrad Unauthenticated Download Date | 6/16/17 7:41 AM The Final Offer 379 was not so sure ; in fact, he described such thoughts, which also incorporated Greece, as plain ‘childish’906 and wanted every available man to be sent to the future Italian front. This seemed much more important to him than a potential campaign against Serbia, all the more so because the determination to act collectively seemed after all to make an impression on Italy at the last moment. All of a sudden, there was indeed a small chance. On 8 May, a discussion took place in Cieszyn at the request of Germany,907 in which the German Kaiser, Imperial Chancellor Bethmann Hollweg, Falkenhayn, Burián, Tisza, Stürgkh, Conrad and others took part.908 The main topic was naturally Italy. Emperor Franz Joseph and Kaiser Wilhelm had written to King Vittorio Emanuele and appealed to his honour and in the name of morality. It was pointed out during the discussion that in the press of the Central Powers the question of Italy had so far not been addressed very thoroughly and, above all, not with hostility. The military situation was also discussed, as well as final offers and interventions. The possibility was also debated of not only triggering a crisis in the Italian government but also of toppling the government and, with the help of Giovanni Giolitti, helping the neutralist wing of Italian politics to achieve a breakthrough. The decision to go to war had not, after all, been unanimous in Italy. The south of the country and the rural regions were against the war ; the north and the cities were in favour of it. Piedmont and Lombardy broke ranks to the extent that they were also predominantly against the war. Brescia had evidently not forgotten the oppressive measures of 1849 on the part of the Austrian General of Artillery Julius von Haynau and voted in favour of the war. The bulk of Veneto, on the other hand, was in favour of retaining neutrality. Italy was facing the acid test. The royal house was cursed and the king subjected to death threats. A resident of Milan wrote to the King that dying for Triente was ‘not worthwhile’.909 Giolitti’s faction indeed did not yet want to climb down, and had it in their power to bring about a dramatic reversal. Giolitti dressed it in harsh words as follows : ‘To violate the treaty now and move from neutrality on to the attack is a betrayal like no other in history.’910 In order to avoid a confrontation with Giolitti, Prime Minister Salandra postponed the meeting of the Chamber of Deputies until 20 May. On this day, according to the Chief of the Italian General Staff, the army would be ready for war. Salandra came under pressure, however, from another side. The Ballhausplatz had placed all its hopes on influencing Pope Benedict XV via the Austro-Hungarian ambassador. It indeed proved possible to bring about an intervention on the part of the Holy See in favour of the neutralists in Italy. The greater number of deputies in the Chamber and in the Senate appeared to support Giolitti. Salandra expected to be defeated in a vote. Austria-Hungary made last-minute concessions and abandoned the path of secret negotiations. The whole world should know how far the Habsburg Monarchy had gone with its concessions : the whole of Tyrol, as long as it was Italian, as well as Gradisca ; complete mu- Unauthenticated Download Date | 6/16/17 7:41 AM 380 ‘The King of Italy has declared war on Me nicipal autonomy in the mixed Italian territories that remained in Austria ; an Italian university and free port in Trieste, which was to ultimately become a free city ; Vlorë in Albania ; Austria-Hungary’s lack of interest in Albania ; the safeguarding of the national interests of the Italian subjects of Austria-Hungary ; a sympathetic examination of the wishes of Italy regarding Gorizia and the Dalmatian islands ; guarantees from the German Empire for the loyal adherence to a treaty to be signed between Italy and Austria-Hungary. The Imperial and Royal ambassador in Rome, Baron Macchio, and the German ambassador, Prince Bülow, finally went even further in their offers than they had been instructed to do in their official versions and in the paperwork. Sonnino convened a session of the Council of Ministers on 12 May. The situation on this day was not favourable for those who made the case for Italian entry into the war. The Russians were beaten at Gorlice, the naval and landing operation of the Entente powers in the Dardanelles had pretty much failed and nothing could be hoped for in the Balkans. Voices grew louder demanding that the war be called off at the last moment. The Italian press published the Austro-Hungarian offer, which appeared to the Italians, who were not aware of the details of the Treaty of London, to be extremely generous. The cabinet resigned. The interventionists had suffered a setback ; the neutralists, however, were not prepared for a government takeover. Giolitti had no chance of forming a cabinet. On 16 May, the King therefore refused the resignation of Salandra’s government. In this way, King Vittorio Emanuele tipped the scales : Giolitti did not want to oppose the King, so he avoided the confrontation and left Rome. The neutralist course had failed. The session of parliament took place, as planned, on 20 May. The most important point was the transfer of extraordinary powers to the royal government in the event of war. The Senate voted almost unanimously in favour and the vote in the Chamber, with 407 :74, was also very clear. This can be regarded as a textbook example of how, from a relatively insignificant group of interventionists and advocates of war, a nation could be pulled into war by the playing of the national card. It was less the course of the war than the end of the war that proved the interventionists and nationalists to have been right. The Italian poet Gabriele d’Annunzio spoke of ‘le radiose giornate di maggio’ (the radiant month of May). No-one could know that the decision to go to war would result in around a million dead and crippled. Austria-Hungary did not respond to events in Italy with a declaration of war, as Rome had perhaps expected. Instead, Burián reacted to the cancellation of the Triple Alliance treaty by rejecting the reasons given as irrelevant and above all by noting that in 1912 the Triple Alliance had been extended until 1920 at the request of Italy. Therefore, a termination could only be declared when this date had expired. In a Green Book, the Italians published several documents from the negotiations with Austria-Hungary on questions of compensation and cession, though not the documents of the parallel Unauthenticated Download Date | 6/16/17 7:41 AM The Final Offer 381 negotiations with the Entente. On 20 May the general mobilisation was announced in Italy for 23 May. This did not mean, however, that the mobilisation had only been commenced on this date. It had already been underway for weeks and months. In fact, as early as the day of the mobilisation order itself, the Italians were already partially operational. In Rome, on the afternoon of Pentecost Sunday, 23 May, Baron Macchio was handed the Italian declaration of war on Austria-Hungary, as was Minister Burián in Vienna by the Duke of Avarna. With disarming honesty, it stated : ‘Determined to ensure the protection of Italian rights and interests by any means at its disposal, the Italian government cannot evade its duty to take those measures for the purpose of fulfilling national aspirations against any current or future threat imposed on it by events. His Majesty the King declares that he regards himself from tomorrow onwards in a state of war with Austria-Hungary.’ The majority of Italians believed the predictions that it would be a short war, which would end in an Italian victory.911 They believed the simplified portrayal, according to which a democratic state was waging war against an undemocratic, atavistic construct like Austria-Hungary. Germany was more or less blanked out. It was also irrelevant for this war, which had been thought up by an intellectual minority, that the south of Italy and large parts of the peasantry literally had to be forced to go to war. Only in retrospect did it seem that everything had to happen in this way and that – as was stated on a poster embedded into the table on which the armistice with Austria-Hungary was signed on 3 November 1918 – ‘with the victory of Italian arms, the end of the World War’ was brought about.912 Italy declared war on Turkey on 20 August 1915 and on Bulgaria on 19 October 1915. The Italian declaration of war on the German Empire, however, did not take place until the following year, on 28 August 1916. Austria-Hungary responded to the Italian step with an imperial manifesto, which had been prepared by the envoy Matscheko and was once more a textbook example of the use of language as a political instrument ; it was a type of literary supplement to the ‘Great War’ : ‘The King of Italy has declared war on Me. A breach of fidelity unknown in history has been committed by the Kingdom of Italy against both its allies […]. We have not threatened Italy, disparaged its reputation, infringed upon its honour or its interests […]. We have done more : when Italy cast its greedy glances across Our borders, We were determined to make painful sacrifices for the sake of maintaining the alliance and peace […]. But Italy’s covetousness […] could not be satisfied. And thus fate must take its course […]. The new treacherous enemy in the south is not a new opponent […] Novara, Mortara, Custoza and Lissa […]. I greet My tried and tested troops, I trust in you and your commanders ! I trust in My peoples, to whose unparalleled self-sacrifice My fatherly thanks are due […] Franz Joseph m.p.’ Unauthenticated Download Date | 6/16/17 7:41 AM Unauthenticated Download Date | 6/16/17 7:41 AM