Download 10 `The King of Italy has declared war on Me`

‘The King of Italy has declared war on Me
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10 ‘The King of Italy has
declared war on Me’
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10. The flagship of the Imperial and Royal Navy Fleet, Viribus unitis, near Pula at the beginning of
1915. Four ships of the ‘Tegetthoff’ class, Austria-Hungary’s most modern battleships, with
twelve 30.5 cm cannon and a crew of around 1,000 men, took part in only a few operations
during the naval war in the Adriatic. They had to be protected, constituted a permanent threat to
the Allies and were, therefore, themselves endangered. Two of them were sunk before the end of
the war. One of these was the Viribus unitis.
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H
istorical events, nations and names are almost inevitably linked to certain associations. Slogans dominate here and sometimes prejudice rears its ugly head.
The First World War reached in this respect a type of negative climax. On Christmas
postcards, in New Year greetings and on all occasions imaginable, the people resorted
all too gladly to the crass, the crude and the histrionic. All negative characteristics were
attributed to the enemy, from ‘demonic-malicious, via barbaric-primitive to cowardly,
weak and ludicrous’,826 and what was in 1915 the ‘dungeon of nations’ for one was ‘betrayal in Italian’ for another. If one looks over the Austrian primary sources on Italy’s
entry into the war in 1915, it is above all one word that catches one’s eye : ‘perfidy’. In
the case of Conrad, it appears in almost every letter, but even the officials of the Foreign
Ministry and the ministers themselves used the word as a matter of course. It ultimately
found its way into the proclamation of Emperor Franz Joseph from 23 May 1915,
which began with a sentence that had been written long before Italy’s entry into the
war by the envoy Baron Franz von Matscheko827 (others claim it was Baron Alexander
von Musulin) : ‘The King of Italy has declared war on Me.’
What was ‘perfidious Albion’ for the Germans was ‘perfidious Italy’ for the Austrians.
In this way, judgement was passed for a long time to come, and it took several decades
for the beginning of the war between Austria-Hungary and Italy to be viewed in a
more differentiated way. But Italy was by no means a one-off.
Emotions played a role for all war-making parties. For the ‘terribles simplificateurs’
in Austria-Hungary, Serbia was the dangerous troublemaker, who did not even shrink
back from devious murder ; for this, it had to be punished. Russia was the glutton in
the east who not only fuelled Pan-Slavism but had also for a long time threatened a
major war. Italy, however, was the country that had repeatedly embroiled Austria in
wars, in 1848/49, just as in 1859 and 1866, in order to satisfy its territorial desires, and
was always lying in wait for the next opportunity, in spite of all the peace treaties. This
viewpoint is certainly too simplified, but it was indeed the case in 1914/15 that Italy
saw the war as a unique opportunity and that it raised its desires for the realignment
of borders and the consistent application of national statehood in general to the status
of a political maxim.
Political action dominated the rivalry between Italy and Austria-Hungary for long
periods. For years, irredentist actions on the part of some Italian circles were pushed
into the foreground, just as, in reverse, Italy did not tire of stressing the discrimination
of Italians living in Austria, denouncing the supposed ‘Slavic infiltration’ of Trieste
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(Triest) and Dalmatia, and using the word ‘Croat’ as a swearword.828 It was well-known
that Archduke Franz Ferdinand was hostile to Italy. Conrad von Hötzendorf ’s aversion
to the Apennine state could be heard on numerous occasions and read in position papers. This did not change the fact that Conrad valued his Italian counterpart, General
Pollio, and cultivated a relationship with him that was not only correct but in fact affectionate. Nevertheless, Conrad did not trust the government and the opinion-makers
in the Kingdom of Italy an inch and saw himself confirmed in his principal rejection
by numerous small incidents and above all a case of espionage. All in all, the two sides
found plenty of reasons to find fault with each other. It only became more emotional
now and then, as in August 1913, when the Governor of Trieste, Prince Konrad Hohenlohe-Schillingfürst, broke with a long-time practice and dismissed all so-called imperial Italians from the city’s civil service. This affected only 40 of the 30,000 Italians
residing in Trieste, but Italian politics and media were in uproar.829 For months on end,
relations were very strained, which was all the more odd because the military heads of
the two monarchies agreed at the same time on joint action in the event of war and
swore absolute allegiance. Political alienation was confronted with military agreement.
On 28 June 1914, General Pollio died quite suddenly. The man who had seen more
in the relationship to the Imperial and Royal Army than ‘allied enemies’ was dead.
What might have happened, had he lived longer ? Were the reflections of his successor,
Count Luigi Cadorna, to be taken seriously ? As late as 1918 he had said : ‘Oh well, if
we had marched to war at Germany’s side in August 1914, then it would have been
very advantageous for us. We would have taken Nice, likewise Corsica and Tunisia.
[…] We would have marched – and how ! I would have made sure of that myself.’830
Alexander Demandt’s book Ungeschehene Geschichte : Ein Traktat über die Frage : Was
wäre geschehen, wenn … ? (Undone History : A Treatise on the Question, What would
have happened if … ?) could be expanded with a noteworthy chapter. But let us restrict
ourselves to the actual course of events.831
Italy had of course suspected, or rather : Italy had known that Austria-Hungary
would call Serbia to account for the assassination in Sarajevo and as a precaution had
already lodged the point that it wanted compensation for any changes in the Balkans
in favour of the Habsburg Monarchy. On 23 July 1914, Italy was informed that Austria-Hungary had sent a limited démarche to Serbia ; 24 hours later the text of the
démarche was handed over in Rome. This instance of being informed after the fact
makes it clear that the Habsburg Monarchy had no interest, as was the case throughout
the July Crisis, in involving Italy in the decision-making of the Danube Monarchy or
that of the German Empire. The explanation given by the Ballhausplatz (Austro-Hungarian Imperial Chancellery) to the effect that the Imperial and Royal ambassador at
the Quirinal Palace, Katejan von Mérey, had been taken ill at the most inopportune
moment, which was why the mishap with the late handover had happened,832 was
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easily seen for what it was. Mérey had even suggested informing the Italians of the
démarche a day before its transmission, but had been met with a rebuff at the Ballhausplatz. Formally, Rome was correct to regard the approach as a transgression, since
the Triple Alliance treaty stipulated the obligation of consultation in just such a case.
Rome spoke of a provocation, but then made it clear that Austria-Hungary could certainly demand compensation from Serbia. The alliance need not be activated, however,
since that would have required at least that information be passed on in time and that
consultations take place. This might appear to be quibbling, but Austria-Hungary had
made it extremely easy for the Italians. No sooner had the démarche been rejected and
the war was ‘in sight’ than Italy stepped up with the demand that it would require enduring recompense for an even temporary occupation of Serbian territory. Here Rome
invoked Article VII of the Triple Alliance treaty. Count Berchtold rejected the Italian
request. Berlin, however, was of the opinion that now was not the time to talk about
how to interpret the Triple Alliance treaty – Austria-Hungary should accommodate
Italy. This was not the only reason why the relationship between the Danube Monarchy,
the German Empire and Italy developed into a difficult triangular affair.
The German Empire, which was least affected by Italian policy and to whom the
fulfilment of Italy’s wishes and demands seemed possible, since they did not concern
the substance of Germany, made it clear from the outset that the Habsburg Monarchy
would do well to fulfil Italy’s desires to the greatest possible extent.833 Germany said
more or less openly that it would welcome it if Austria-Hungary could bring itself to
cede Trentino to Italy in order to induce the Triple Alliance partner in this way to enter
the war or at least to maintain very friendly neutrality. Emperor Franz Joseph then
declared that he would rather abdicate than give up Trentino.
With that, the positions were fixed for the time being. In expressing its wishes and
demands, Rome chose not only the direct route of talking to Vienna but also preferred
to take the detour via Berlin. The fact that the German imperial government adopted
the Italian view as its own was already criticised during the session of the Joint Council of Ministers on 31 July 1914. Berchtold mentioned that during the previous week,
he had received démarches almost every day from the German government, ‘in order
to bring about that the Imperial and Royal government assume the viewpoint of the
other two allied powers in the question of compensation’, namely the viewpoint of the
German Empire and of Italy.834 The War Minister, Baron Krobatin, also reported that
attempts had been made to ‘soften [him] up’, and in fact by none other than Kaiser
Wilhelm personally. Count Stürgkh, however, argued that Italy had no right to make
any demands for compensation, ‘if it does not fulfil its alliance obligations once the
Great War breaks out’.835
The Joint Council of Ministers in Vienna was in agreement regarding the rejection
of the Italian demands for compensation, though it ultimately commissioned Berch-
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told to present Italy with the prospect of territorial compensation in the event of a
lasting occupation of Serbian territory, though only if Italy were actually to fulfil its
alliance obligations. Italy rejected this. However, it provided an image of complete
disorientation, for almost at the same time King Vittorio Emanuele III agreed on 31
July to the plan submitted by his new Chief of the General Staff, Cadorna, to send
Italian troops across the Alps to France, whereas the Italian government under Prime
Minister Antonio Salandra resolved to declare Italy’s neutrality.836 The Prime Minister
and the government thus cast their lot in with those who enjoyed a clear majority in the
three-way division of opinion in Italy : a small share argued the case for an allegiance
to the ally, a larger part advocated an entry into the war on the side of the Entente, and
the neutralists received the most affirmation. Thus, Italy declared its neutrality. Late
appeals by Emperor Franz Joseph and Kaiser Wilhelm II were to no avail.
Again, a detour could be made to the counterfactual history : assuming that Italy
had edited out the last chapter of the prehistory, resolved to join the war as part of the
Triple Alliance, and strengthened the German western front with an army comprising
three army corps and two cavalry divisions, would the allied armies of the Central Powers really have been able to crush France in six to eight weeks ? Would the combined
fleets of Italy and Austria-Hungary have been able to defeat the French and the British
in the Mediterranean and establish naval supremacy there ? Was the war lost for the
Central Powers at the end of July 1914 before it had really even begun ?
The trains that the Imperial and Royal Ministry of Railways had kept available as
a precaution in order to transport Italian troops via Austria to the German western
front837 were at any rate no longer needed. The Central Powers and above all Austria-Hungary were deeply disappointed, but had to make the best of a bad job. Cessions
of territory continued to be ruled out. The words so vividly formulated by the Hungarian Prime Minister Count Tisza applied here : ‘A state that hands over territories
from its own body, in order to deter a neighbour that is inclined towards treachery from
committing complete betrayal, degrades itself in the eyes of the whole world.’838 Tisza
of course knew what he was talking about, since it was not only a question of taking the
Italian problem into consideration, but also a matter that concerned Hungary directly,
namely how to act in the case of Romania, which had declared its neutrality as expected.
The Germans also began to apply pressure in this case and mentioned the possibility
of cessions. Rădăuţi (Radautz) and Suceava (Suczawa) should be sacrificed, in order to
induce Romania to enter the war. For Hungary, but above all for Emperor Franz Joseph,
this was unthinkable.839
Yet there was a kind of relenting on principle, since Italy was granted compensations
even without its participation in the war. It was believed that a way out had been found :
what if Italy were to be offered territories elsewhere ? However, the proposal did not
have the desired effect. On 3 August the Italian Foreign Minister Marchese Anton-
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ino di San Giuliano rejected the proposal to add Nice, Corsica, Tunisia and Albania
to the Apennine state. With the exception of Albania, these were, evidently, French
possessions, which would have been available only after the complete defeat of France.
However, the French territories were precisely what Italy expected for its participation
in the war at Germany’s side. The Italian-German relationship was one thing ; the Italian-Austrian another. And Rome had changed its mind and demanded compensation
only from Austria-Hungary. Yet the hoped-for offer from Austria, namely the cession
of Austrian Trentino, did not come. On 8 August, the Joint Council of Ministers in
Vienna dealt once more with Italy’s demands for compensation. It was noticeable here
that the attitude of the two halves of the Empire, to the extent that this attitude was
mentioned in the contributions of the two prime ministers, was completely identical
in the question of ceding Trentino and that the Hungarian Prime Minister opposed
the Italian wishes at least as vehemently as Count Stürgkh. Conrad von Hötzendorf,
however, had noted unmistakeably during this session of the Joint Council of Ministers
and before he left for the field that Austria-Hungary had nothing to mobilise in order
to face Italy in the event of an Italian attack. He was even clearer when he said : ‘From
a military point of view’, it was so imperative to keep Italy neutral ‘that he would say, as
a soldier, that no price was too high’.840
Then Count Stürgkh said that in the event that the Italians were really serious and
threatened with the choice of territorial cessions or war, he would have no moral scruples whatsoever in betraying the Italians. The following scene could be set : the German
Empire should go and, purportedly behind Austria’s back, make the desired territorial
assurances to Italy. By means of a second contract between Austria-Hungary and Germany, however, the first would become obsolete. Tisza and the Hungarian ‘Minister
at the Royal Court’ in Vienna, Count Stephan Burián, came out in opposition to this.
Italy, they said, would not allow itself to be so easily betrayed.
Consequently, fears of an Italian attack not only became so strong that the fortification of Vienna, Budapest and the Danube crossings was undertaken as a result.
Furthermore, border observations and safeguarding measures were taken in the most
unobtrusive way possible. The language used towards Italy remained engaging, however.
The newspapers were also obliged to adhere to this and were not allowed to pull out
all the stops. ‘Now the order has been issued that our newspapers are not allowed to
insult Italy, but are permitted to adopt the insults of the German newspapers’, noted
the Chief of the Bosnian-Herzegovinian Civil Administration, Ludwig Thálloczy, on
5 August 1914 in his diary.841
On the Austrian side, it was pointed out that the Dual Monarchy did not strive
for any territorial changes in the Balkans, i.e. did not want to reduce the size of Serbia ; therefore, there did not have to be any corresponding compensation agreements.
Should there, for not yet foreseeable reasons, be changes in the Balkans, however, the
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wishes of Italy would of course be considered. This was the almost unvarying tone of
Austro-Hungarian statements on the subject.842 But they were only at the start of a
lesson in Machiavellian foreign policy.
Austria-Hungary did not limit itself, however, to obliging expressions. There were
also other things that indicated more clearly that the attitude of Italy and Austria-Hungary included military factors. As mentioned earlier, at the commencement
of mobilisation in the case of a Balkan war scenario, Conrad von Hötzendorf had also
set about mobilising the III Corps in Graz, not least because he was not certain about
Italy’s stance. Even after Italy’s declaration of neutrality and after Austria-Hungary was
entirely committed both in the Balkans and against Russia, the Italian border was not
allowed out of sight.
Both states heightened their safeguarding measures, which were not yet very extensive, however. A mobilisation of the Italian Army, as the Chief of the Italian General
Staff Cadorna had demanded, was rejected by the Italian government. The politicians
and diplomats still had the last word, even if there was complete confusion for a time
and the neutralists and interventionists were at loggerheads with each other. On 19
August 1914, at the next session of the Joint Council of Ministers in Vienna, which was
in fact chaired by the Emperor, the resolution was passed to continue the dialogue with
Italy and to put off the breach for as long as possible, though in the meantime to take
the necessary measures on the border with Italy. For its part, Italy also began military
preparations, which the Italian ambassador in Vienna, Duke Giuseppe von Avarna,
an advocate of the Triple Alliance who was ultimately degraded to the status of letter
carrier for the politicians, had to justify by making it known that these measures served
to reassure the Italian public and maintain order.
This argument, as superficial as it perhaps sounds, had a genuine background, since in
Italy an anti-Austrian mood was emerging, which could not be ignored by the government. Austria did everything to counteract this. Prominent Austrian socialists travelled
to Italy and attempted to convince Italian social democrats to take a more moderate
and pro-Triple Alliance line. Money flowed to the south in order to induce newspapers
such as Mattino, Popolo Romano, Il Giorno and others to use a writing style that was beholden at least to the ideal of Italian neutrality.843 The Imperial and Royal War Ministry
made ten million kronen available to the Foreign Ministry for this purpose. On the
Austrian side, but also in Italian circles, stress was laid on the Catholic power of Austria.
Other groups were stronger and more influential. The Corriere della Sera, whose importance and circulation far exceeded those of the aforementioned newspapers, questioned
Italy’s neutrality in a series of articles as early as August 1914 and achieved a much
more far-reaching effect with this than more radical newspapers from the cut of an Il
Popolo d’Italia, which was edited by a certain Benito Mussolini.844 More effective was
that which Mussolini wrote in the socialist Avanti, where he made the case for Italy’s
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participation in the war, in order to end the war as soon as possible. The majority of his
party was appalled and resolved upon a manifesto in which the will to neutrality was
emphasised. Mussolini submitted his resignation as the editor of Avanti.845
Italy’s attitude of course interested not only the countries of the Dual Alliance but
at least as much the Entente states. Here matters also developed their own dynamic.
From discussions held by the Italian ambassador in St. Petersburg, Marchese Andrea
Carlotti, who had played a role in the July Crisis as an informant for the Russians, it
became clear that in the event of a victory for the Entente, Russia was contemplating
the cession of Trentino as well as other territories. The outcome of these negotiations
was admittedly similar to that in Austria-Hungary a few weeks earlier, when Italy had
been offered Nice and Corsica.
Largely independently of this, France and Great Britain developed their own proposals, which also involved Trentino, as well as Vlorë in Albania. The British Foreign
Secretary Sir Edward Grey went a step further and wanted to see Trieste added. Thus,
the catchphrase ‘Trento e Trieste’ was born. The Russian Foreign Minister Sazonov
apparently did not want to be left out and offered Italy the acquisition of Dalmatia,
adding that this was dependent on the agreement of Great Britain and France. Germany’s early military success in Belgium and France, likewise that of Austria-Hungary
in the Balkans and in Russia, did not initially allow the discussions between Italy and
the Entente powers to really get going, since at this point in time everyone was unclear
about the course of the war.
However, events moved along at an extraordinary pace. First of all, however, a clarification process within the Italian government was necessary, and this commenced in
mid-August : after Foreign Minister San Giuliano had addressed the possibility of Italy
entering the war on the side of the Entente in a letter to the Italian Prime Minister
Salandra from 9 August, the ground was tested. San Giuliano did not conceal from the
Prime Minister his personal assessment of the consequences of such a step when he
wrote : ‘We should make no pretence of the fact, however, that such a war […] would be
regarded across Europe as an act of dishonesty […] even by those who might become
our new allies.’846 Italy nonetheless began to sound out London, and indeed consciously
here first of all, because both the discretion of the French and that of the Russians was
doubted.
However, Italy demanded the continuation of British coal deliveries even to commence discussions. San Giuliano requested in addition an immediate attack by British
naval forces on the Austro-Hungarian Fleet formations in the Adriatic Sea. When this
attack did not take place, San Giuliano interpreted this as a very good reason to maintain Italian neutrality.847 He was absolutely aware that the security of Italy depended to
a significant extent on the situation in the Mediterranean. As long as the Austro-Hungarian Navy dominated the Adriatic, caution was advised.
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On 16 October 1914, San Giuliano died. He had steered a course of neutrality for Italy,
and wanted in this way first and foremost to keep Italy out of the war. His successor saw
things differently. At the beginning of November, Baron Sidney Sonnino took over the
Foreign Ministry. His semi-English parentage was immediately commented on. In the
interim, however, Prime Minister Salandra himself had led the Foreign Ministry for
two weeks. And on 18 October 1914 he used two words that would become formative
for Italy : ‘sacro egoismo’.848 Almost unnoticeably, the emphases had changed.
‘Sacro egoismo’
During negotiations with the Entente and with the Central Powers Italy, remained a
very patient adversary and attentively followed the war-related events in the meantime.
It also exploited the situation for a time to improve its own position. When raids by
Epirotes took place against southern Albania from Greece, raids that Italy believed
threatened its own interests in the region around Albania, an Italian detachment – with
a sweeping interpretation of the Treaty of London regarding Albania – occupied the
port of Vlorë and the offshore island, and in this way brought the Strait of Otranto
under its control. The distance from Vlorë to Otranto is only approximately 60 kilometres, and whoever controls the road from Otranto occupies a strategically important
position. Austria accepted the occupation of Vlorë ; the German Empire even expressly
welcomed it.
In the meantime, as we know, the position of the Central Powers had not necessarily
developed to their benefit. The German advance had stalled in France, the western
front had to be pulled back and positional warfare began. The first offensives against
Serbia had failed and in the east parts of Galicia had fallen into Russian hands. The
Russian advance appeared to be unstoppable. In this situation, Great Britain, France
and Russia made it clear that they were not of a mind in the event of a victory to make
territorial concessions to Italy at the expense of the victors, unless Italy was prepared to
step forward and declare war on the Central Powers. For its part, Italy pointed out that
it had already set its conditions for entering the war and that one of these demands was
a naval operation against the Imperial and Royal Navy. Italy feared having to bear the
burden of the war against Austria-Hungary entirely alone, and this seemed too much
of a risk. Here Italy almost unexpectedly received an ally, namely Romania.
The Romanian Prime Minister Ion Brătianu began talks with the Italian envoy in
Bucharest and had the Romanian standpoint forwarded to Rome : both states, Italy and
Romania, should jointly pursue an annihilation of Austria-Hungary.849 As early as 23
September 1914, Romania and Italy signed a treaty that obligated both states to consult
each other reciprocally and not to abandon their neutrality without giving the other one
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advance notice of eight days. They furthermore secured the maintenance of their respective interests and committed themselves expressly to keeping the treaty absolutely secret.
Romania had also received a generous offer from the Entente powers. In the event of
Romanian participation in the war on the side of the Entente powers, the latter promised
the Balkan state not only Transylvania and Bukovina but also the Hungarian territory
inhabited by Romanians between Transylvania and the Tisza River. This was very much
more than the cession of the territories of Rădăuţi and Suceava held out by Germany,
which in any case absolutely no-one – above all in Hungary – wanted to hear of.
After agreement had been reached with Romania, Italy resumed negotiations in
London. By this time, however, the season of year now also played a role in Italian
deliberations. Prime Minister Salandra did not conceal during a presentation to the
Italian king that the state of the Italian army did not yet allow for an immediate entry
into the war. It was especially unprepared for fighting in highlands in wintertime, for
which reason Italy would only be able to begin waging war – as long as there were no
unexpected events – in the spring.850
In the interim, however, Italy met with some reservation on the part of the Entente
powers. They had clearly recognised Italy’s tactical manoeuvring. The London press
expressed itself with unconcealed criticism to the effect that Italy could not enter the
war due to a formal error, just because Austria-Hungary had not kept it up to date
regarding the steps taken against Serbia. If the Italian stance is compared with that
of Great Britain, which entered the war only after the flagrant violation of Belgian
neutrality, then the two cases were very different. Just one English journalist consistently supported Italy and steadfastly championed the Italian standpoint, namely
Henry Wickham-Steed, the man who had also appointed himself the advocate of the
Czechs.851 However, he combined this with the call for Italy to take the step that it had
evidently not yet thought of taking, namely to play the part of liberator of the Slavs in
the Balkans. The population of Trieste and the surrounding region was predominantly
Slav, according to Wickham-Steed, and Italy only had a chance of forcing through its
wishes regarding the cession of Trieste and the Croatian and Dalmatian coastline if it
presented itself as a pro-Slav power.
Progress was made in the talks being held at different locations at precisely the
moment Austro-Hungarian troops were advancing far into Serbia during their third
offensive in November 1914. Italy regarded this as the right moment to hold talks with
Austria-Hungary over compensation. Count Berchtold responded in his well-known
way and said that Austria-Hungary did not have any territorial demands against Serbia ; furthermore, the ups and downs of war, which at times brought advances and at
other times retreats, could not be cited as a sufficient argument for applying Article
VII of the Triple Alliance treaty. This time, however, Italy played the German card
and attempted again to influence Vienna by means of the detour via Berlin in order
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to achieve territorial concessions. Italy began in the process to dream of great power
status, which no longer took Austria-Hungary into consideration : the German Empire
would be the hegemonic power on the Continent, but Italy would dominate the Balkan-Adriatic region.852 It was as though Italy were anticipating the Rome-Berlin ‘Axis’
of the Mussolini-Hitler era.
Italian hopes received an additional boost when the German ambassador in Rome,
Baron Flotow, was replaced by the former Imperial Chancellor Prince Bernhard von
Bülow, who was married to an Italian woman. Bülow started by stating that Trentino
could be discussed, but Trieste was ‘Austria’s lung’ and must therefore be excluded from
the talks.853
Pressure increased on Austria to cede Trentino and make additional territorial concessions. Count Hoyos, still known from his Berlin mission in July 1914, compared
the German approach with recommending that Germany end the war with France
by ceding Lorraine (Lothringen), which would be just as impertinent.854 The thing
that appeared so vivid and plausible about this comparison was in fact not quite fitting,
since Lorraine had only belonged to the German Empire since 1871, whereas Trentino
and Trieste were territories that had been a part of the Habsburg Monarchy for 500
or 600 years. Such comparisons on the one hand were always used, whilst on the other
hand they were never very expedient and history can provide arguments and counterarguments for everything imaginable. Ethnographers pointed to the demographic
structures, others argued that these structures had only emerged as a result of policies
that were arbitrary and repressive towards one national group, and scholarship was once
again used and abused. In the case of the Habsburg Monarchy, one could argue just as
well with the idea of empire as one could in the case of Italy with the nation state. This
all restricted the room for manoeuvre in negotiations. Austria-Hungary found itself
ever more on the political defensive.
In the meantime, Italy expanded the notion of compensation. In the view of the new
Foreign Minister Sidney Sonnino, it was no longer just a question of balancing out any
territorial changes in favour of Austria ; he also demanded compensation for political,
economic and ideational benefits.855 This brought imponderables into play. Italy could
claim, however, to also receive support for its demands from opposition circles in the
Habsburg Monarchy. Thus, the leader of the democratic opposition in Hungary, Count
Mihály Károlyi, gave the green light to a cession of Trentino. Trieste also appeared
to be a logical and grantable demand to Count Károlyi. He was not prepared to talk
about Rijeka (Fiume) in Croatia, however, which belonged to the Hungarian half of
the Empire, and ultimately the fulfilment of Italian demands should only serve to get
the Apennine state on to the side of the Central Powers, in order that Romania did not,
if anything, feel encouraged to enter the war on the side of the Entente and to threaten
Hungary in Transylvania.856
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The official Austria, however, referred Italy to Albania in all of its claims. There, it was
argued, Italy could offset its interests. This was too little for Italy, however. It repeatedly
demanded the cession of Trentino, and this touched upon basic questions of the Dual
Monarchy’s existence. It had after all gone to war to retain and defend its territorial
holdings, and any cession of territories, whether it were Trentino, Transylvania or East
Galicia, must appear to be exactly contrary to these aims. The Departmental Councillor
in the Foreign Ministry in Vienna, Baron Franz von Matscheko, expressed this stance
as follows on 21 December 1914 : ‘By ceding Trentino to Italy, we would ourselves
call into question the basic principle on which the existence of Austria-Hungary is
based. The Monarchy’s right to exist lies in the fact that the peace of Europe would be
subjected to incessant convulsions, if in that territory where the great European races,
Germanic peoples, Romance, northern and southern Slavs, adjoin one another in reciprocal permeation, a strong great power did not exist, which – having emerged and
been put together over the course of the centuries – encompasses parts of all adjoining
peoples and with them the isolated block of the Magyars. For the benefit of this European necessity, all neighbouring states must forego the complete realisation of their
national ideals, just as the individual tribes in the Monarchy are necessarily subjected
to constraints at a national level.’857 This was perhaps an acceptable interpretation of
the imperial idea and cast the famous words of František Palacký from April 1848 into
an updated postulation. However, it evidently completely bypassed nationalist realities.
Matscheko continued that the cession of Trentino would tempt the Monarchy’s
other neighbours to make territorial claims. For the state existence of Italy, however,
Trentino was just as dispensable as Ticino, Nice, Savoy or Tunis. Italy had to decide
whether it wanted to subordinate its sentimental aspirations to Trentino to the existence of Austria-Hungary.
Ultimately, however, it was pointless to discuss territorial concessions with Italy,
since Emperor Franz Joseph had categorically ruled out any cession, no matter who
may come. Franz Joseph was not prepared to make any concessions. He was indeed very
tempted to change his mind, but he remained a realist to the extent that he responded
to the next proposal to offer Italy Gibraltar by saying that he had also already heard the
idea but that the island was not his to offer.858
The Evidenzbüro (military intelligence service) of the Imperial and Royal General
Staff came to the conclusion at the end of 1914 that Italy would present its demands
in January in the form of an ultimatum, and request South Tyrol, Istria and Rijeka, including the Austrian Littoral, Dalmatia as far as Split (Spalato), as well as the cession
of the fleet against financial compensation.859
The question of the cession of Trentino ultimately led to the resignation of Foreign
Minister Count Berchtold. It is not entirely clear whether he resigned because he ultimately regarded territorial losses as unavoidable or because he was particularly uncom-
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promising.860 For his part, he regarded the resignation as very undramatic and stated :
‘[…] I saw that this situation required a man whose nerves can cope with it. In order
to sit tight through such a situation, sangfroid, or in fact a sort of light-heartedness,
is needed, so that the right moment is not missed, and I do not have that.’861 Weeks
later he intimated that he had resigned because the Emperor had prevented him from
taking part in talks on the cession of South Tyrol. Berchtold, Stürgkh, Tisza and the
Hungarian Minister at the Royal Court, Count István Burián von Rajecz, met at Buchlov Castle. Once again, Berchtold had made his castle available for discrete talks. It
concerned the matter of who would succeed him. Tisza was asked whether he wanted
to assume the portfolio, but he rejected it categorically.862
On 13 January 1915, Berchtold was removed. His successor was Count Burián, who
should have become Foreign Minister in 1912, but had to stand back in favour of
Berchtold due to the obligation to reflect the national structure in ministerial appointments. He had nonetheless exerted influence and was regarded as an extension of Tisza.
Burián also found himself under immediate pressure from Germany, but he certainly
did not want to yield to it. By now, however, the views of the politicians and the military
diverged quite considerably. A man such as Alexander Hoyos, who was undoubtedly
able to reflect the attitude of the Foreign Ministry as well as that of court circles very
accurately, made it clear that the court camarilla talked with enormous frivolity about
the possibility of an Italian entry into the war : ‘Let them try !’863 The attitude of the
military added up to the exact opposite of this viewpoint. They thought that having
another opponent would lead to a military catastrophe. Conrad had already said this as
early as August 1914. He repeated it several times. The Foreign Ministry, on the other
hand, advanced a completely different argument. Thus, on 27 January – that is, after his
departure – Berchtold justified the refusal to cede Trentino to Italy by saying that such
a sacrifice would only be seen as a sign of weakness and would have ‘had a depressing
effect on the army and the entire population’.864 He made no mention of the Emperor
not giving him any room for manoeuvre in negotiations.
Gradually, with all eyes glued to something that appeared unavoidable, the ‘Italian
crisis’ set in motion an increasingly hectic merry-go-round of proposals, counter-proposals and suggested solutions. Conrad conveyed to Burián an idea of Falkenhayn to
the effect that Italy should be invited to join the Triple Alliance negotiations. This step
was evidently to be taken in order to demonstrate the allegiance of Italy for all to see.865
Conrad did not reveal whether he believed that such an approach could yield success,
but he prepared everything himself in order to demonstrate the strength of the Imperial and Royal armies by means of a successful battle to relieve Przemyśl. He evidently
did not believe in such manoeuvres. The conference did not take place.
The proposal to send the heir to the throne Archduke Karl to Rome was also not
uninteresting. The idea emerged at the beginning of January 1915 and had evidently
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been concocted in the Military Chancellery of the Emperor. The Adjutant General of
the Emperor, Count Paar, should be sent ahead in order to make the matter palatable
to the Emperor, though it was not entirely clear how the matter should be approached
and the idea was dropped for the time being.866
At the end of January the idea was aired for the first time in the German Empire
of indemnifying Austria-Hungary for the cession of Trentino to Italy with the coal
mining district around Sosnowice in Russian Poland.867 It was questionable whether
Austria would even regard such as offer as sufficiently attractive. On 3 February, the
first session of the Joint Council of Ministers led by Burián addressed the matter of
Italy. Afterwards, the minister resumed talks with the Italian ambassador, the Duke of
Avarna, and stunned the latter with a list of counter-demands, also with reference to
Article VII of the Triple Alliance treaty. Burián said that Austria had the right to claim
compensation for the temporary occupation of the Dodecanese and Vlorë by Italy. This
was a turnaround that Rome had certainly not expected. Italy then broke off talks with
Vienna and began for the first time to make threats.868 Although this abortion was not
the end of talks, it had nonetheless become clear than a turning point had been reached.
The Austrian ambassador in Rome, now Baron Karl von Macchio, was able to learn that
Italy’s military preparations would not be completed until April 1915.869 At that point,
however, an entry into the war should be expected.
The German Empire now increased the pressure on Austria-Hungary. Prince Bülow,
the German ambassador in Rome, who, without any inhibitions at all, advocated concessions, expressed his opinion in a private letter to the editor-in-chief of the Hamburger Fremdenblatt, von Eckhard, to the effect that more influence had to be exerted
on Vienna, since ‘it would be outrageous if Austria, after it pulled us into this war, by
virtue of its incompetence at the beginning of this war and in the last two or three years,
would rob us of the involvement of Italy and Romania [and] send another two million
enemies after us’.870 The Chief of the Military Chancellery of the Emperor, Baron
Moritz von Lyncker, expressed himself with perhaps even more clarity : ‘The Austrians
do not want to, they are so haughty and blinkered, particularly the old emperor and
the so-called high nobility. How they imagine the war with Italy is anyone’s guess ; one
might think they would rather go under “with honour” and take us with them into
the abyss. That’s a nice prospect !’871 Falkenhayn regarded the Danube Monarchy as
a ‘cadaver’, and the leader of the German National Liberals characterised the alliance
partner, to whom Germany had sworn blind loyalty, as a ‘corpse galvanised for heroic
feats of strength’.872 This was also one way of looking at it. The fact was that ever more
perplexity and helplessness began to spread.
From January onwards it could repeatedly be heard that Italy would declare war in
April. One person recommended concessions and added in the same breath that it was
doubtful whether Italy would allow concessions to prevent it from entering the war.
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Another person advised on a powerful presence and intimidation, but at the beginning
of the year there was nothing that could intimidate Italy. The negotiators in Rome appeared increasingly self-confident and the Duke of Avarna informed Minister Burián
that the Imperial and Royal troops would only be allowed to take on Serbia again when
Italy received binding assurances regarding the cession of old Austrian territory.873 A
further offensive against Serbia was in any case not even being considered at the present time, but the Italians evidently wanted to plan ahead. It was questionable, however,
what would happen if the Italian wishes were satisfied. Would not Romania’s desire for
Transylvania by rights also have to be fulfilled ? The proposals and deliberations contained everything including a separate peace with Russia at the expense of the cession
of Galicia or at least part of the crown lands ; instead, there would be war over South
Tyrol.874 At the same time, however, it was said that there would not be any cession of
Galicia, since Galicia was the most important sales area for Austrian industry.875 One
side scourged the politics of Italy, which was aimed at making profits, and the ‘sacro
egoismo’, whilst the other located the roots of the problem somewhere in the past,
such as Prince Franz Liechtenstein, for example, who took the view that Austria had
pursued an incorrect domestic policy during the previous 30 years and had always patronised Italy like some sort of ‘indecent lady’.876
The Treaty of London
Following the months from January to May 1915 in the diary of Josef Redlich, one
gets the impression of considerable confusion. Phrases such as ‘highly alarming’, ‘not
very pleasant’, ‘quite desperate’ and, of course, ‘perfidious’ can be found in continuous
succession. Austria’s ‘ruling caste’, according to Redlich, comprised ‘weaklings and amateurs’,877 whilst the Foreign Ministry was ‘full of useless people or plotters’. Everyone
felt compelled to make comments about and pass judgement on the Emperor, the court,
the ministers and pretty much all decision-makers, and one gets the impression from
Redlich that – aside from himself – everyone was an idiot. That is, until Italy’s entry
into the war appeared unalterable, so that he was now confronted with only fatalism.
Yet it was a completely different situation to the July Crisis : at that time, Austria-Hungary had yearned for the outbreak of war above all because it was believed that there
might not be one. Now, since the ‘coup de grace’ appeared to threaten, the war should
be made as difficult as possible for the aggressor.
The deputy of the German Catholic Centre Party Mathias Erzberger had made use of
his contacts to the Vatican and succeeded in persuading the Holy See to intervene and
advise Vienna to accept Italian demands. The papal deputy secretary Eugenio Pacelli,
later Pope Pius XII, as well as the Jesuit Superior Count Wlodimir Ledóchowski and
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the Archbishop of Vienna Cardinal Piffl, had taken action on behalf of the Vatican.
Even the services of the companion of the old Emperor, Katharina Schratt, were apparently engaged. In short, nothing and no-one was left out in attempts to avoid a war
between the Habsburg Monarchy and Italy.
During all of this, Italy marked up its price. It made no pretence of the fact that it
had a mind to obtain as much as possible for its non-participation in the war.878 At the
beginning of March 1915, Italy resumed talks with the Entente in London. Rome’s
demands were summarised in several points : the Entente should commit itself to not
make any special peace with the Central Powers. A military convention should guarantee that Austria-Hungary could not concentrate its entire force against Italy. A fleet
convention should ensure that the British and the French Fleets would fight with the
Italians until the destruction of the Austro-Hungarian Fleet in the Mediterranean.
Furthermore, the cession of Trentino to Italy and the cisalpine part of South Tyrol, as
well as Trieste, the municipalities of Gorizia (Görz) and Gradisca d’Isonzo and the
whole of Istria as far as Quarnero, including Volosca in the Kvarner Gulf, were demanded. Finally, Foreign Minister Sonnino also demanded Dalmatia from its northern
border as far as Narenta. In eleven further points, the remaining Italian wishes for
entering the war were summarised and contained therein were its share of a war indemnity and a British guarantee of the independence of Yemen, a neutralisation of the holy
Islamic sites and the non-admittance of the Pope to peace negotiations.
All this should be negotiated to the end in the strictest secrecy ; this was another of
Sonnino’s conditions. In view of developments on the western front and the looming
failure in the war with Turkey, where the landing operations in the Dardanelles threatened to turn into a debacle on the Gallipoli peninsula, Great Britain and France were
ready to pay almost any price for the intervention of Italy. In practice, this meant above
all that Great Britain shelved its concerns. This was not the case with Russia, which
expected the collapse of the Danube Monarchy following the Battles of the Carpathian
Passes in March 1915 and furthermore brought Serbian interests into play. The Italian desire for Dalmatia naturally affected Serbia and its southern Slav ambitions. The
Russian Foreign Minister Sazonov therefore attempted to force the Italians towards
Albania and to raise Serbia’s hopes of obtaining parts of Transylvania. But this tempted
neither the Italians nor the Serbs, who would have had to argue with the Romanians over hegemony in Transylvania. Consequently, the Russian Foreign Minister was
inclined to no longer pursue Italy’s entry into the war.879 The Entente powers, Great
Britain and France, did not believe that they could forego Italian participation in the
war and therefore sought another possibility to accommodate the desires of all actual
and potential allies.
Now everything happened quickly. For the Entente powers, it was not a question
of the original core issues, namely the cession of Trentino and Trieste, but exclusively
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of Dalmatia. The British Foreign Secretary Grey suggested that Italy should at least
forego Spalato. On 27 March, Sonnino declared himself ready to do so. Difficulties also
emerged with the distribution of the islands off the coast of Dalmatia, which had to
be negotiated with Serbia, but these were ultimately not very eminent problems, since
Serbia was naturally extremely interested in an additional opponent for Austria-Hungary. On 14 April, agreement was reached over the wording of the article concerning
the Dalmatian islands, but new difficulties emerged due to Montenegro’s rights on the
Adriatic. Finally, only one point was open, namely the date of the Italian entry into the
war. The Entente powers requested 15 April. The Italian government could not accept
this date, however, because military preparations could not be completed by then. Now
it was really only a question of a date, however, and nothing more.
Whilst all this was being brought under lock and key, Italy continued to negotiate
with Vienna and left Austria-Hungary and Germany in the belief that an amicable
solution was possible that conformed to the Triple Alliance. On 16 March, Prime Minister Salandra wrote to Foreign Minister Sonnino that Vienna should ‘be allowed to
believe that we regard a friendly solution as possible, and all the more so, the less we
believe in it. This stance, however much power of disguise it might cost you, seems to
me to be currently essential in the interests of our country.’880
In the meantime, Vienna was in the process of completely revising its attitude to Italy. It was said in advance that the session of the Joint Council of Ministers on 8 March,
which would be a Privy Council due to the presence of the Emperor, and at which the
heir to the throne would also be present, would be the scene of ‘meaningful discussions’
on the further fate of the Monarchy. Burián, Tisza, Stürgkh and Ernest von Koerber,
Biliński’s successor as Joint Finance Minister, as well as War Minister Krobatin were
convinced of the necessity of cessions. Conrad, who had been fetched to Vienna from
Cieszyn, in order to attend the session, began by reminiscing and stressed that he had
been in favour of a pre-emptive war against Italy for good reasons. This remark had to
come, because Conrad saw in the dilemma, in which the Dual Monarchy found itself as
a result of the Italian attempt to blackmail it, nothing other than confirmation of what
he had predicted since his appointment as Chief of the General Staff. Therefore, he
frequently expressed himself with barely surpassable contempt about Aehrenthal, who –
as Conrad claimed – had prevented a timely defeat of Italy. The cession of Trentino
would be a severe loss from a strategic point of view. But it would have to be accepted.
Emperor Franz Joseph – and this was decisive – had been made increasingly prepared to grant concessions. He called the Italians ‘bootlegging lowlifes’ and ‘bandits’,
but on 27 February, the Lord Chamberlain Prince Montenuovo delightedly ascertained that the Emperor was no longer strictly hostile. In fact, he let it be known on 8
March that he was prepared to grant concessions in the case of Trentino, but not in the
case of Trieste and the Isonzo.
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Now, it was of course a matter of determining Italy’s willingness to negotiate on the
basis of the new proposals from Vienna. Shortly before the session of the Joint Council
of Ministers, however, a telegram for Emperor Franz Joseph had arrived in Vienna
from Kaiser Wilhelm, which contained the so-called ‘Silesian offer’, namely the return of some of the Silesian territories conquered by King Friedrich II of Prussia to
Austria, if Austria-Hungary gave in to Italy. The German Kaiser had assured Franz
Joseph in this telegram, which had been revised by Bethmann-Hollweg and von Jagow, that he had a mind to share good and bad with the Austrian Monarch. Another
enticement was attached to the ‘Silesian offer’, namely Germany’s agreement to lend
gold to Austria-Hungary. This was so important because the loans taken so far from
Germany now no longer even sufficed for the interest due and the repayment rates. Vienna believed furthermore that it had the right to demand generosity from the German
Empire in the financial area, since it had held out the prospect of a loan running into
the billions in the event that Italy maintained its neutrality.881 Thus, Conrad’s remarks
against Italy remained irrelevant, and Tisza and Burián even believed that with the
cession of Triente it would be possible to bind Italy once more to the Triple Alliance.882
Austria-Hungary was only unprepared to negotiate over cessions in the Isonzo region,
since the word of the Emperor held sway here. The turnaround in opinion was so complete that any speculation over a subsequent revision of the process was strictly rejected.
The Dual Monarchy, it was said, would certainly not wage a subsequent war of revenge
against Italy.
Burián immediately had the change of attitude on the part of the Vienna cabinet
announced in Rome via Berlin, though he demanded that in the cession of Trentino
the linguistic frontier would have to be taken as the outer limit of Italian demands. On
10 March, Italy declared itself ready to negotiate on the basis of the proposals from
Vienna. Absolute secrecy was also demanded for this, but also the immediate coming
into force of a treaty of cession, whilst Burián and the Austrian government had only
planned on a cession after the conclusion of a peace treaty. This demand thus had a snag,
since it was not only a question of making clear to the population of a region that had
belonged to Austria for hundreds of years that it would have to immediately change
its nationality.
Now the maps would have to be studied. Burián had one prepared, on which the linguistic frontier was marked, and the Foreign Minister wanted to conduct negotiations
according to that. The minister and the envoy responsible for Italy, Pogatscher, hoped
to eliminate existing differences with Italy once and for all after the cession of the ethnically Italian territory. Thus, an offer should be made that was as generous as possible.
The Chief of the Imperial Military Chancellery, General Bolfras, had drawn up another
map, which did not go quite as far as that of the Foreign Minister. On all maps, however, only new Tyrolean borders had been marked. The handling of the Friuli region
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was thus to be deferred. A study had been presented by one Professor Brückner that
provided information on the ethnic situation. The Italy specialist in the Army High
Command, Lieutenant Colonel Schneller, was brought to Vienna in order to allow military considerations to also flow into a new demarcation.883 Conrad even instructed that
care be taken to talk only of Trentino and not South Tyrol. He furthermore expressed
a widespread view, especially in the military, when he said that it should be possible ‘to
divest the enemy of the ceded land as soon as possible’.884
How deeply Conrad was stung by the concession and how much the Austrian protagonists were dominated by an element of impotence became evident from a lengthy
letter to Foreign Minister Burián from 2 April, in which Conrad regarded a special
peace with Russia to be more feasible than the prevention of an Italian entry into the
war. He wanted, however, that an armistice be concluded with Russia only with the aim
of giving the Imperial and Royal armies a free hand for the war against Italy.885 Here
revenge was in play again and the perfidy should be punished. It was as though Vienna
knew that Italy was receiving simultaneous assurances from the Allies not to conclude
a separate peace.
Conrad said it was out of the question to wage war simultaneously with Russia,
Serbia and Italy. A peaceful settlement thus had to be reached immediately with one of
the opponents. Russia could be accommodated in the question of the Turkish Straits
and even the cession of East Galicia would be a far smaller sacrifice to make than the
cession of Tyrol and the Austrian Littoral to Italy. Such arguments, however, were
already illusory. And the dilemma could not be any more complete : at the beginning
of April, Russia was still at the peak of its military successes and did not intend to
conclude a separate peace. Then came Gorlice–Tarnów. Russia had defeat in sight, but
knew that Italy’s entry into the war was imminent and thus did nothing to conclude a
peace. On the Austrian side, moreover, no attempt was made to actually enter into talks
with the Russians. All these considerations only existed on paper, likewise the demand
made shortly thereafter by Conrad that an agreement be reached with Serbia, which he
imagined would not be easy, but at least possible : ‘I have’, he wrote to Bolfras, ‘identified the solution of the southern Slav question as the most important problem of the
Monarchy and emphasised that the merging of the southern Slavs is an inevitable fact
that, if it does not take place within the Monarchy, will resolve itself outwardly to the
detriment of the latter. Back then, it was neglected to achieve the peaceful annexation
of Serbia ; in 1909 we [then] failed to bring this about by force, as I urgently advised.
Perhaps the opportunity poses itself now to achieve our objective by peaceful means,
since Serbia does not look to Italy with great trust. […] I think that we must make it
clear to Serbia that it can only achieve its dreams of unity and access to the Adriatic Sea
in close association with the Monarchy, in other words via its annexation by the latter
as a federal state, just like Bavaria in the German Empire […].’886
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Those at the German Grand Headquarters did not appear to think much of this.
Conrad was requested urgently to travel to Berlin in order to persuade him otherwise.
The Prussian War Minister General von Wild noted regarding the deliberations on
a separate peace : ‘I see in this a first, shameful admittance of weakness and the great
dangers of our federal brother breaking off. I have therefore emphatically brought this
danger to the attention of Falkenhayn […]. We must not allow ourselves to be taken
into tow by the “Oyster Hungarians” […]. There are no extra tours. This will have to
be made clear to Conrad tomorrow, and in general we have to open his eyes and shine
a light in his fantastical political darkroom.’887 In this way, and in accordance with
the well-known maxim ‘suaviter in modo, fortiter in re’, Conrad would be brought
‘into line’.
In Vienna, a map was shown to the Italian ambassador, the Duke of Avarna, that
had been agreed on between the politicians and the military and in which the Austrian
proposals on territorial cessions were marked. The Duke remained poker-faced, since
he was merely the messenger.
Since the session of the Privy Council, Archduke Karl Franz Josef had been in Vienna almost continuously and was ultimately also included in the deliberations of the
Military Chancellery to send him on a special mission to Rome. He was immediately
willing to do this. He went ‘enthusiastically’, it was said.888 The Emperor still knew
nothing of this. Finally, on 16 March, General Bolfras mentioned this idea. The Emperor did not comment on it, but did not reject the proposal out of hand. On 4 April
it was the Lord Chamberlain Prince Montenuovo who urged the Emperor to agree to
the trip. Franz Joseph wanted to talk to Minister Burián about it. But the latter was
strictly against the idea.889
Then, on 5 April, Vienna knew that Italy would demand very much more than the
former was willing to concede. The Brenner border, the Austrian Friuli and the territory around Trieste were demanded. Even a visit by the heir to the throne would have
changed nothing. The plan to send Archduke Karl was dropped. Instead, the Italy specialist of the Army High Command returned immediately to Cieszyn, since he would
probably be most urgently needed there in the coming weeks.890
The Final Offer
The final round of negotiations was already characterised by the news of extensive Italian troop transports becoming known and rumours about English offers to Italy simultaneously filtering through. The only compromise that Sonnino was prepared to make
in negotiations with Austria was that Italy would agree to make the Trieste region a demilitarised zone and a free port. Finally, Italy once more submitted concrete demands
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that were even somewhat less than those on which agreement had almost been reached
in London parallel to this.
Burián, however, could not and would not concede anywhere near as much as demanded in the fulfilment of Italian wishes. He was bound by the decision of the Emperor and what was repeatedly invoked as public opinion. Heavy protests were reported
in Tyrol against any sort of concession to Italy. Burián described the immediate cession
of territories as unfeasible. The Chief of the Imperial Military Chancellery, Bolfras,
submitted the proposal that the territories granted to Italy should be militarily evacuated and in this way Austria-Hungary’s peaceableness particularly underlined. Only if
Italian troops were to advance further should military resistance be offered. Bolfras was
contradicted immediately and vehemently.891 But the Emperor, who received Conrad
on 21 April, also made the case for not continuing to haggle over the cession of territories, but instead to allow the Italians to march in, if necessary.892 Conrad recognised
what these thoughts amounted to : if a territory was conceded more or less willingly in
negotiations, then this was different to being compelled to give it up by force of arms.
If Austria were to win back what had been conquered, the situation would be a completely different one to that which would arise from a straightforward relinquishment.
The resolution not to concede anything voluntarily, necessitated almost automatically
that resistance be offered.
Now negotiations were taken up again with the Chief of the German General Staff.
Falkenhayn was doubtless more moderate in his views and his manner of expression
than the Prussian War Minister Wild von Hohenborn, who wrote to his wife on 14
April : ‘In itself, it could be irrelevant for us whether or not Italy hacks off once piece
more from the tail of the dying camel that is Austria, but the military situation intensifies dangerously as a result of the intervention of Italy.’893 Falkenhayn met Conrad on
24 April in Cieszyn.894 He informed him that he had told the Italian military attaché in
Berlin that the German Empire would immediately lend its support to Austria-Hungary with 20 divisions in the event of war with Italy. Whether the Italian had believed
this, however, was very questionable ; the reality, in any case, looked different. Germany
did not have anything with which it could come to the aid of its ally. Moreover, Germany did not want to come to its aid. How long, asked Falkenhayn, would it take the
Italians to reach Vienna ? Conrad answered : five weeks. Including the deployment time,
there remained not even seven weeks from the expected declaration of war to the fall
of Vienna. This was a horrible scenario. Falkenhayn did not know what to advise, and
merely said that they would have to wait for the outcome of the offensive in Galicia,
and only then they would see. There was furthermore hope of a new, effective ‘smoking
substance’, which was currently being tested and should be deployed in the west. He
of course meant chlorine gas. Perhaps this ‘miracle weapon’ would also help against the
Italians.
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As yet, Italy had not declared war ; it continued to try its luck. Since more had been conceded to Italy by the Entente powers in the parallel negotiations, however, than Austria
could offer in even the best case, it was no wonder that it was not Austria-Hungary
who was the highest bidder but the Entente. Italy also had every reason to be distrustful towards the Austrian offers, since it always had to be taken into account that the
Dual Monarchy would retake what it had ceded at the first good opportunity.
The German Empire also thought this way and Falkenhayn sent Conrad on 29 April
a telegram with the request to forward it to Count Burián ; the telegram stated : ‘In my
view, the simple facts must be decisive for our actions, namely that the intervention of
Italy and co., as far as it is humanly possible to say, will decide the war unfavourably for
us, also that without this intervention we can be very confident of victory, and that the
victor will decide on what Europe will look like and will thus be in a position to make
good any sacrifice made for victory, and, finally, that whoever is ultimately defeated not
only loses the sacrifices he has made but also his entire empire.’ Conrad forwarded the
telegram to Vienna without any comment.895
In the meantime, there were fights and running street battles in Italy between the
advocates and the opponents of an intervention. 60 Catholic bishops signed a manifesto against Italian participation in the war. In Popolo d’Italia, Mussolini wrote : ‘War
or republic’,896 and the opponent of intervention and former prime minister, Giovanni
Giolitti, was publicly insulted. But neither the one nor the other was of any consequence for the secret diplomacy.
On 25 April, the final text of the treaty was completed. The next day, the ‘Treaty
of London’ was signed. However, it did not become known to the wider public until
almost two years later, on 28 February 1917, when it was published by Izvestia, the
new Communist daily newspaper in Russia. The Treaty of London of 1915 constituted
the basis for Italian entry into the war. Italy committed itself to intervene actively in
the war as soon as possible in the near future, and not later than one month after the
signing of the treaty.897
Vienna did not know, of course, that there was actually nothing left to negotiate.
One could have been distrustful on 1 May, however, when Foreign Minister Sonnino
refused on this day to receive the former Imperial and Royal Foreign Minister, Count
Agenor Gołuchowski, who had been sent to Rome on a special mission.898 The Ballhausplatz did not even want to believe it when on the same day the Imperial and Royal
delegation in Athens reported that according to their information Italy had concluded
a treaty with the Entente on 26 April.899 The maxim retained its validity according to
which one should ‘first of all play the flute and not yet blow the horn’.900 Day after day,
Conrad’s telegrams from Cieszyn arrived in Vienna, however, in which he urged that
war with Italy be avoided at all costs. If necessary, all Italian demands should be fulfilled.901 One can thus accuse Conrad and the senior Austro-Hungarian generals of all
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‘The King of Italy has declared war on Me
sorts of things, including demands for a pre-emptive war as well as a sloppy approach
to their ally. Yet one thing is equally certain : since the beginning of the war, any means
and any concession seemed justified to them, especially Conrad, in order to at least
maintain Italian neutrality.
On 3 May, Sonnino sent a note to the Italian ambassador in Vienna, the Duke of
Avarna, which terminated the Triple Alliance. The note was given to Burián the following day. An identical note was handed over in Berlin three days later. Now it was
clear to everyone that the ‘War Scenario I’ would occur before long. Things became
emotional. Thought was still given to whether to send the heir to the Austrian throne
to Rome. Archduke Karl was called to the Emperor on a daily basis. And the Emperor,
who had unleashed the war more or less free of emotion, said : ‘This is how we will now
perish’. And he ‘wept’, as the Deputy Chief of the Military Chancellery noted.902
The German Empire was shocked and rebuked Austria-Hungary gravely for acting
too late and making too few concessions. Conrad took the same line and even complained to the Chief of the Military Chancellery that Burián had overestimated the
military means of the Dual Monarchy. The war would simply have to be avoided. At
this moment, Conrad was once more abandoned by his sense of reality, and he only reacted emotionally. Even if it was kept in mind that he was anxious that Romania would
follow Italy in entering the war and the offensive near Tarnów, which had just begun so
successfully, would perhaps have to be abandoned prematurely, it was too late for concessions and dramatic gestures of humility towards Italy. An interesting proposal was
made by the former Austrian prime minister, Baron Max Wladimir Beck, who advised
Burián to set up a German naval base in the Adriatic in order to discourage Italy at the
last moment from waging war.903 Burián also called for immediate military agreements
with the German Empire in the event of an Italian attack. In view of the news about
Italy’s military preparations and the offers of the Entente, Vienna was now prepared for
an imminent breach with Italy. Late in the day, a sense of reality made its presence felt.
This was not the case in Berlin, however, since the Permanent Secretary in the German
Foreign Ministry, von Jagow, demanded that negotiations with Italy be dragged out
for at least another four weeks ; only then would German troops be available to fight
against Italy.904
Conrad and Falkenhayn met each other at increasingly short intervals and, at the
end, almost daily. It was a question of assessing the Italian danger and of calculating relative strengths. Could, as Falkenhayn claimed, enough divisions be liberated from the
Russian front in order for at least a defence to be possible in the south-west ? Should
the Tyrolean front be placed under German command ?905 This would only be in order
to remain on the defensive there, however. Instead, Falkenhayn wanted all disposable
forces to be used against Serbia, in order to bring about Romanian and Bulgarian entry
into the war on the side of the Central Powers and to establish a link to Turkey. Conrad
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was not so sure ; in fact, he described such thoughts, which also incorporated Greece, as
plain ‘childish’906 and wanted every available man to be sent to the future Italian front.
This seemed much more important to him than a potential campaign against Serbia,
all the more so because the determination to act collectively seemed after all to make
an impression on Italy at the last moment. All of a sudden, there was indeed a small
chance.
On 8 May, a discussion took place in Cieszyn at the request of Germany,907 in which
the German Kaiser, Imperial Chancellor Bethmann Hollweg, Falkenhayn, Burián,
Tisza, Stürgkh, Conrad and others took part.908 The main topic was naturally Italy.
Emperor Franz Joseph and Kaiser Wilhelm had written to King Vittorio Emanuele
and appealed to his honour and in the name of morality. It was pointed out during the
discussion that in the press of the Central Powers the question of Italy had so far not
been addressed very thoroughly and, above all, not with hostility. The military situation
was also discussed, as well as final offers and interventions. The possibility was also debated of not only triggering a crisis in the Italian government but also of toppling the
government and, with the help of Giovanni Giolitti, helping the neutralist wing of Italian politics to achieve a breakthrough. The decision to go to war had not, after all, been
unanimous in Italy. The south of the country and the rural regions were against the
war ; the north and the cities were in favour of it. Piedmont and Lombardy broke ranks
to the extent that they were also predominantly against the war. Brescia had evidently
not forgotten the oppressive measures of 1849 on the part of the Austrian General of
Artillery Julius von Haynau and voted in favour of the war. The bulk of Veneto, on the
other hand, was in favour of retaining neutrality. Italy was facing the acid test. The royal
house was cursed and the king subjected to death threats. A resident of Milan wrote
to the King that dying for Triente was ‘not worthwhile’.909 Giolitti’s faction indeed did
not yet want to climb down, and had it in their power to bring about a dramatic reversal.
Giolitti dressed it in harsh words as follows : ‘To violate the treaty now and move from
neutrality on to the attack is a betrayal like no other in history.’910
In order to avoid a confrontation with Giolitti, Prime Minister Salandra postponed
the meeting of the Chamber of Deputies until 20 May. On this day, according to the
Chief of the Italian General Staff, the army would be ready for war. Salandra came under pressure, however, from another side. The Ballhausplatz had placed all its hopes on
influencing Pope Benedict XV via the Austro-Hungarian ambassador. It indeed proved
possible to bring about an intervention on the part of the Holy See in favour of the
neutralists in Italy. The greater number of deputies in the Chamber and in the Senate
appeared to support Giolitti. Salandra expected to be defeated in a vote. Austria-Hungary made last-minute concessions and abandoned the path of secret negotiations. The
whole world should know how far the Habsburg Monarchy had gone with its concessions : the whole of Tyrol, as long as it was Italian, as well as Gradisca ; complete mu-
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nicipal autonomy in the mixed Italian territories that remained in Austria ; an Italian
university and free port in Trieste, which was to ultimately become a free city ; Vlorë
in Albania ; Austria-Hungary’s lack of interest in Albania ; the safeguarding of the national interests of the Italian subjects of Austria-Hungary ; a sympathetic examination
of the wishes of Italy regarding Gorizia and the Dalmatian islands ; guarantees from
the German Empire for the loyal adherence to a treaty to be signed between Italy and
Austria-Hungary. The Imperial and Royal ambassador in Rome, Baron Macchio, and
the German ambassador, Prince Bülow, finally went even further in their offers than
they had been instructed to do in their official versions and in the paperwork.
Sonnino convened a session of the Council of Ministers on 12 May. The situation
on this day was not favourable for those who made the case for Italian entry into the
war. The Russians were beaten at Gorlice, the naval and landing operation of the Entente powers in the Dardanelles had pretty much failed and nothing could be hoped
for in the Balkans. Voices grew louder demanding that the war be called off at the last
moment. The Italian press published the Austro-Hungarian offer, which appeared to
the Italians, who were not aware of the details of the Treaty of London, to be extremely
generous. The cabinet resigned. The interventionists had suffered a setback ; the neutralists, however, were not prepared for a government takeover. Giolitti had no chance of
forming a cabinet. On 16 May, the King therefore refused the resignation of Salandra’s
government. In this way, King Vittorio Emanuele tipped the scales : Giolitti did not
want to oppose the King, so he avoided the confrontation and left Rome. The neutralist
course had failed.
The session of parliament took place, as planned, on 20 May. The most important
point was the transfer of extraordinary powers to the royal government in the event of
war. The Senate voted almost unanimously in favour and the vote in the Chamber, with
407 :74, was also very clear. This can be regarded as a textbook example of how, from a
relatively insignificant group of interventionists and advocates of war, a nation could
be pulled into war by the playing of the national card. It was less the course of the war
than the end of the war that proved the interventionists and nationalists to have been
right. The Italian poet Gabriele d’Annunzio spoke of ‘le radiose giornate di maggio’
(the radiant month of May). No-one could know that the decision to go to war would
result in around a million dead and crippled.
Austria-Hungary did not respond to events in Italy with a declaration of war, as
Rome had perhaps expected. Instead, Burián reacted to the cancellation of the Triple
Alliance treaty by rejecting the reasons given as irrelevant and above all by noting that
in 1912 the Triple Alliance had been extended until 1920 at the request of Italy. Therefore, a termination could only be declared when this date had expired. In a Green Book,
the Italians published several documents from the negotiations with Austria-Hungary
on questions of compensation and cession, though not the documents of the parallel
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negotiations with the Entente. On 20 May the general mobilisation was announced
in Italy for 23 May. This did not mean, however, that the mobilisation had only been
commenced on this date. It had already been underway for weeks and months. In fact,
as early as the day of the mobilisation order itself, the Italians were already partially
operational.
In Rome, on the afternoon of Pentecost Sunday, 23 May, Baron Macchio was handed
the Italian declaration of war on Austria-Hungary, as was Minister Burián in Vienna
by the Duke of Avarna. With disarming honesty, it stated : ‘Determined to ensure
the protection of Italian rights and interests by any means at its disposal, the Italian
government cannot evade its duty to take those measures for the purpose of fulfilling
national aspirations against any current or future threat imposed on it by events. His
Majesty the King declares that he regards himself from tomorrow onwards in a state of
war with Austria-Hungary.’
The majority of Italians believed the predictions that it would be a short war, which
would end in an Italian victory.911 They believed the simplified portrayal, according to
which a democratic state was waging war against an undemocratic, atavistic construct
like Austria-Hungary. Germany was more or less blanked out. It was also irrelevant for
this war, which had been thought up by an intellectual minority, that the south of Italy
and large parts of the peasantry literally had to be forced to go to war. Only in retrospect did it seem that everything had to happen in this way and that – as was stated on
a poster embedded into the table on which the armistice with Austria-Hungary was
signed on 3 November 1918 – ‘with the victory of Italian arms, the end of the World
War’ was brought about.912
Italy declared war on Turkey on 20 August 1915 and on Bulgaria on 19 October
1915. The Italian declaration of war on the German Empire, however, did not take
place until the following year, on 28 August 1916.
Austria-Hungary responded to the Italian step with an imperial manifesto, which
had been prepared by the envoy Matscheko and was once more a textbook example of
the use of language as a political instrument ; it was a type of literary supplement to the
‘Great War’ : ‘The King of Italy has declared war on Me. A breach of fidelity unknown
in history has been committed by the Kingdom of Italy against both its allies […].
We have not threatened Italy, disparaged its reputation, infringed upon its honour or
its interests […]. We have done more : when Italy cast its greedy glances across Our
borders, We were determined to make painful sacrifices for the sake of maintaining the
alliance and peace […]. But Italy’s covetousness […] could not be satisfied. And thus
fate must take its course […]. The new treacherous enemy in the south is not a new
opponent […] Novara, Mortara, Custoza and Lissa […]. I greet My tried and tested
troops, I trust in you and your commanders ! I trust in My peoples, to whose unparalleled self-sacrifice My fatherly thanks are due […] Franz Joseph m.p.’
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