Download Affirmative Action: Psychological Contributions to Policy

Analyses of Social Issues and Public Policy, 2001, pp. 71–87
Affirmative Action: Psychological Contributions
to Policy
Faye J. Crosby
University of California, Santa Cruz
Susan Clayton
College of Wooster
Affirmative action is a controversial policy. Lauded by many, the attempt at social
engineering has also been condemned by some as unnecessary and by others as
counterproductive to the goal of social equality. As such, affirmative action is ideally situated to benefit from psychological research pertaining to the need for and
the effectiveness of the policy. This article discusses both the potential benefits to
American society of affirmative action and the potential costs of such a policy.
Concluding that affirmative action is useful, we end with a look at ways to make
affirmative action programs as effective as possible.
For nearly a decade, affirmative action has been the object of intense national
debate. Legal attacks on affirmative action have mounted in recent years. With
some notable exceptions—including Judge Patrick J. Duggan’s decision in
December 2000 in favor of race-sensitive undergraduate admissions policies at the
University of Michigan and the 2001 decision by the regents of the University of
California to rescind their earlier ban on affirmative action—affirmative action
programs in both employment and education have been eroded by legal challenge.
Affirmative action also has not fared well in public referenda. In both California
and Washington, citizens endorsed proposals that have been characterized by the
media as anti–affirmative action.
Psychologists have a great deal to contribute to the debates on affirmative
action. From our vantage point as students of people’s behaviors, thoughts, and
*Correspondence concerning this article should be addressed to Faye Crosby, Psychology
Department, University of California, Santa Cruz, CA 15064 [e-mail: [email protected]]. We
would like to acknowledge the help of Valerie Jenni as well as Aarti Iyer.
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feelings, we are well equipped to see where the laws of the land conflict with
or capitalize on the laws of human nature. Social psychologists, aware of how situational factors shape behavior, have been especially active in pointing out how
affirmative action and other, similar policies can influence social arrangements,
bringing out the worst or the best in us.
Our article looks at affirmative action from a social psychological point of
view. At the heart of the article are two intertwined questions. First, given what we
know about prejudice and discrimination and about intergroup relations, what are
the advantages and disadvantages to Americans of the policy of affirmative action?
Second, how can we make affirmative action programs as effective as possible?
Defining Affirmative Action
Before plunging into the heart of the matter, it is necessary to define our terms.
Affirmative action has meant many different things to many people (Clayton &
Crosby, 1992; Tierney, 1997; Tomasson, Crosby, & Herzberger, 1996). An array
of different governmental programs has at one time or another been labeled affirmative action (Stephanopoulos & Edley, 1995). The media have not been helpful
in educating Americans about the philosophy of affirmative action as a policy
(Crosby, 2000a, 2000b). Nor have they informed people about how affirmative
action programs actually operate (Crosby & Cordova, 1996). People’s reactions
to affirmative action depend greatly on what they understand or imagine affirmative action policy to be (Bell, Harrison, & McLaughlin, 2000; Golden, Hinkle, &
Crosby, 2001; Kravitz et al., 2000). Several investigators have been able to demonstrate framing effects (Fine, 1992; Kravitz & Platania, 1993; Summers, 1995;
Taylor-Carter, Doverspike, & Alexander, 1995). For psychologists as well as for
laypeople, one’s (pre)conceptions of affirmative action influence how one
approaches the topic (Iyer & Crosby, 2000).
The American Psychological Association (1996) has provided the following
definition of affirmative action: “Affirmative action occurs whenever an organization expends energy to make sure there is no discrimination in employment or education and, instead, equal opportunity exists” (p. 5). Affirmative action and equal
opportunity differ from each other in terms of the philosophies that underlie them
(Crosby, 1994).
The policy of equal opportunity makes the assumption that the ways in which
organizations treat and evaluate people are not normally discriminatory and that
bias will result only through the intentional actions of prejudiced individuals. If a
person is discriminated against by virtue of group membership, he or she will be
able to identify the person or people responsible for the discrimination and seek
legal remedy, because discrimination is against the law.
Affirmative action, on the other hand, makes the assumption that the history of
prejudice, discrimination, and group-based inequities in our country has resulted in
standard organizational structures and practices that are biased toward the people
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who used to hold the most powerful jobs: White men. These practices may exert a
discriminatory impact without discriminatory intent on the part of current employers and administrators. Under this assumption, victims of discrimination may not
be able to identify a particular person as the source of the problem; even if they can,
the same structural forces that diminish the victims’ opportunities from the start
also give them unequal access to legal remedies.
The law that most clearly and significantly prescribed affirmative action was
Executive Order 11246, issued by Lyndon Johnson in 1965, which requires the
federal government and each organization that has a contract with the federal government to have an affirmative action plan: a proactive attempt to ensure that people in protected gender or ethnic categories are treated fairly during employment,
by making a comparison between (a) the availability of such people in relevant
labor pools and (b) their actual utilization by the organization. It is worth noting
that the Office of Federal Contract Compliance Programs helps organizations to
calculate availability statistics based on Census data. Labor pools vary according
to the job description, with some (such as those for clerical help) calculated on the
basis of the local population and others (such as those for university faculty) drawing from a more regional or even national pool. If a problem is identified, with a
particular company or organization employing a smaller proportion of qualified
White women or qualified people of color than is suggested by their availability in
the labor pool, then corrective action must be taken. The corrective action plan usually includes organizational goals, timelines, and specification of legal and appropriate methods for meeting the goals within the timelines. Such methods cannot
include firing male employees or setting aside certain positions to be filled only by
people of color, but they can include targeted recruitment, or hiring a qualified person from a beneficiary group even if that person’s qualifications appear less strong
than those of a majority-group member candidate for the same job. No punitive
action is taken against an organization that fails to meet its goals as long as it makes
a good faith effort to do so.
What about education? California provides an example of how affirmative
action has worked in higher education. According to California’s Master Plan for
Education, the top 12.5% of high school students are admitted to the University of
California, with grades and scores on standardized tests determining rankings.
Some time ago, administrators noticed that Latinos comprised a much smaller percentage of matriculates at the university than would be expected on the basis of
grades and test scores. Having noticed the discrepancy, the administrators were
also able to locate the sources of the trouble: A set of high school courses, called
eligibility requirements, constituted one stumbling block. Apparently guidance
counselors were less likely to steer Latinos than Whites into the courses. Uneven
access to advanced placement courses constituted another stumbling block. Currently, the University of California has exempted the highest tier of students from
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the eligibility requirements and is also working to make advanced placement
courses available online.
What Are the Benefits of Affirmative Action?
Affirmative action policy has two direct positive outcomes. First, affirmative
action increases the ethnic and gender diversity in schools and at work. Second, it
increases true justice in American society. In both regards affirmative action is
more effective than passive policies of equal opportunity.
Diversity
Many proponents argue in favor of affirmative action on the grounds of diversity. Diversity was the plank on which the legal team for the University of Michigan defended the school’s admission system in two suits, one concerning the
university’s undergraduate school and the other concerning its law school. Citing
social science research, the university was able to show that diversity in education
benefits all members of society, not just people of color.
Using previously collected data from a large number of campuses around the
country and analyzing new data from a study conducted at the University of Michigan, Patricia Gurin (Gratz et al. v. Bolinger et al., 2001) found that diversity has
immediate benefits for White students. Contact within the classroom and on the
campus with ethnic-minority students has been found to affect a number of aspects
of learning among White students. Most significantly affected are listening ability,
critical thinking, writing skills, and foreign language skills (Gratz et al. v. Bolinger
et al., 2001).
Some of the benefits of affirmative action are long-term. With records from
more than 80,000 students who had matriculated at 28 elite colleges and universities in 1951, 1976, and 1989, researchers at the Andrew W. Mellon Foundation
looked at what occurred to ethnic-minority students who were “special admits” and
contrasted their fate with that of other students. The special admits graduated from
college and attended and graduated from professional and graduate schools at the
same rate as White students and held professional jobs at the same rate; but they
differed in one salient regard. Decades after graduation, those who were special
admits are even more likely than their White counterparts to be active civic leaders
(Bowen & Bok, 1998).
Fairness
Social scientists know that ethnic and gender disparities in occupation,
income, and other social indicators have not been entirely erased in the United
States (Fiske, 1998). Women still earn less than exactly comparable men (Reskin,
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1998). People of color still lag behind Whites in terms of earnings, assets, and
financial opportunities (Brief, Dietz, Pugh, & Vaslow, 2000; Williams, 1991).
Social psychology has delineated a number of processes by which discrimination occurs. Systematic research has demonstrated that discrimination is due only
partly to deliberate prejudice. Some unfairness derives from unconscious stereotypes (Devine, 1989; Devine, Monteith, Zuwerink, & Elliot, 1991; Fiske, 1998).
Dovidio and his colleagues (e.g., Dovidio & Gaertner, 1996; Gaertner et al., 1999)
have demonstrated the persistence of discriminatory attitudes among supposedly
unprejudiced White students. Most of the White participants in their studies hold
values such as fairness and equality that are antithetical to the concept of racism
(Dovidio & Gaertner, 1996) and refuse to admit that they see Blacks as inferior to
Whites. However, they consistently rate White targets more favorably than Blacks.
If job supervisors and managers are similar to the subjects in Dovidio’s experiments, they will have no hostility toward Blacks but will perceive White applicants
as better qualified than Blacks for jobs, raises, and promotions. Such subtle
pro-White bias is harder to identify, and thus to prosecute, than overt racial bigotry,
but ultimately, it is no less deadly.
Even if the perpetrators of discrimination are not aware of the import of their
actions, surely the victims are. Why not leave it to the victims to protest the injustices that affect them? Why not rely on traditional reactive systems of justice? Why
insist on the more proactive policy of affirmative action?
The answer is that people often do not acknowledge the extent to which they
are personally affected by systematic injustices. Social psychologists have long
known that people tend to perceive themselves as happier or better off than the
average person (Dalbert, 1997; Klar & Giladi, 1999). Self-deception, at least about
one’s present circumstances, seems to be a mainstay of well-being (Robinson &
Ryff, 1999; S. E. Taylor & Brown, 1988). A large body of research demonstrates
that even recognizing that one’s own group is discriminated against does not
always translate into a sensitivity to one’s own disadvantage. The phenomenon has
been variously labeled “the denial of personal discrimination,” “the denial of
personal disadvantage,” and the “personal/group discrimination discrepancy”
(PGDD). When people awaken to the fact that they personally are discriminated
against, a great deal of anger erupts (Crosby & Ropp, 2001). But prior to the epiphany, people may not recognize that they have been ill treated and thus may not
come forward on their own to demand justice for the wrongs they have suffered
(Sincharoen & Crosby, in press).
Explanations for the disconnection between the personal and the group can be
sorted into two categories centering on motivational and cognitive factors. The
motivation to deny personal discrimination is based primarily on a self-protective
impulse. To acknowledge discrimination is to acknowledge vulnerability, lack
of control, and at least some measure of devaluation of oneself by others. Research has shown that people who recognize personal discrimination experience
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decreased levels of personal self-esteem (Branscombe, 1998; Branscombe,
Schmitt, & Harvey, 1999). In addition, there can be negative social consequences
to making the claim of discrimination (Kaiser & Miller, 2001).
Research on the cognitive component of the PGDD, which is more substantial
than research on the motivational component, focuses on the difficulty of obtaining
and processing the information that will allow an individual to conclude that discrimination has occurred. A series of studies has shown that it is difficult to perceive discrimination when information is presented on a case-by-case basis rather
than in aggregate form (Crosby, Burris, Censor, & MacKethan, 1986; Crosby,
Clayton, Alksnis, & Hemker, 1986; Rutte, Diekmann, Polzer, Crosby, & Messick,
1994; Twiss, Tabb, & Crosby, 1989). The phenomenon exists when the discrimination is consistent with our gender stereotypes (e.g., places women in the disadvantaged position); when it is inconsistent with them (e.g., places men in the
disadvantaged position); and when sex stereotypes are avoided by using neutral
circumstances (e.g., comparing Plant A and Plant B). It is also independent of
ideology: Strong feminists are no more likely than sexists to perceive sex discrimination when they encounter materials in which the discrimination has been built in
disaggregated form (Crosby, 1984).
Motivation and cognition also function in concert. Postmes, Branscombe,
Spears, and Young (1999) demonstrated that individuals think about themselves in
a different way than they think about groups. Decisions or judgments of personal
disadvantage, on the one hand, and decisions or judgments of group disadvantage
appear to be based on “different comparison standard[s], and it appears that each
comparison standard activates a particular level of identity (personal or social),
each with different motives” (Postmes et al., 1999, p. 336). Research by Moghaddam, Stolkin, and Hutcheson (1997) suggests that the PGDD may be a more specific form of a general tendency for individuals to perceive themselves to be less
affected by particular phenomena than are groups to which they belong.
In Sum
Because it is difficult for individuals to perceive and to acknowledge that they
have been victimized by discrimination, a legal system that relies exclusively on
the aggrieved to press their case is likely to be ineffective. Add to the psychological
resistance the disparity between the economic and informational resources of the
individual and those of institutions. For the most part, the status quo is likely to
continue until the injustices become so intolerable that a dramatic event occurs
(Martin, 1986; Olson & Hafer, in press). At this point, people become so disturbed
that they will endorse draconian measures (Crosby & Ropp, 2001; Foster & Matheson, 1995, 1999).
Affirmative action attempts to avert potential problems before they occur
rather than to allow problems to occur and then correct them. Such a proactive policy is likely to contribute to social stability. By articulating fairness as a goal and
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endorsing the value that people of color and White women are competent members
of our society, affirmative action can contribute to a sense of procedural as well as
distributive justice.
What Are the Costs of Affirmative Action?
Several prominent commentators think that affirmative action is not a good
policy and see it as detrimental to American society or to parts of American society. It is our view that research does not substantiate the fears of those who oppose
affirmative action. We do, however, acknowledge that the policy of affirmative
action has come at a cost, although not in the ways its detractors imagine.
Alleged Disadvantage: Deflecting White Energy
Shelby Steele’s (1990) attack on affirmative action in his beautifully written
book The Content of Our Character is as famous as are the well-reasoned defenses
of affirmative action written by his brother Claude (1997, 1999). One major problem with affirmative action, writes Shelby Steele, is that it panders to White guilt.
By reducing White guilt, affirmative action presumably saps the will of White people to make fundamental change in American society.
At least one set of studies has documented that White guilt does figure in the
reactions that White students and nonstudent adults have to affirmative action that
can be characterized as retribution (Swim & Miller, 1999). More specifically,
acknowledgment of social inequities leads to support for retributive affirmative
action only when the research participant also experiences guilt over the privileges
of White people. Thus, Swim’s findings could be seen as supporting Shelby
Steele’s worries.
But other evidence counters the worry that affirmative action is nothing but a
sop to the guilty conscience of Whites. A follow-up to the original study showing
the connections between White guilt and support for affirmative action replicated
the findings—but only when affirmative action was framed as retribution against
Whites. When affirmative action was framed more neutrally, the association did
not hold (Iyer & Crosby, 2000).
Alleged Disadvantage: Driving a Wedge
Wilson (1984, 1987) has voiced serious doubts about the effectiveness of
affirmative action by noting that the policy may have unintentionally driven a
wedge between African Americans who can achieve a living wage and those who
cannot. Noting that affirmative action policies benefit only those who are or who
can be in the paid labor force, Wilson raised the possibility that affirmative action
has lead to a bifurcation of fortunes. Many Blacks, and especially many Black
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women, are unable to join the paid labor force because of poor preparation or family burdens. Could it be that affirmative action has lead relatively advantaged
Blacks to amass some savings, to move out of the cities, and to leave behind the
truly disadvantaged?
Plausible though it is, the notion that affirmative action drives a wedge in the
Black community has not been borne out by empirical investigations. Crosby,
Allen, and Opotow (1992) examined archival data on the distribution of wealth
among Black citizens between the years 1947 and 1989. Using 1965 as the year
when affirmative action became the law (through the signing of Executive Order
11246), the investigators did find Black wealth being concentrated in fewer and
fewer hands. But they also found the same pattern among Whites, meaning that
business cycles or similar forces were operating on both Whites and Blacks.
Also pertinent is the finding, cited above, that special admits to a university are
significantly more likely than other students to give back to their communities after
graduation (Bowen & Bok, 1998). Rather than moving away from needy communities of origin, many Black students seek ways to share the blessings that have
been bestowed on them. Thus, trickle down has been shown to provide a more apt
metaphor than driving a wedge.
Alleged Disadvantage: Undermining Self-Esteem
Several researchers have maintained that affirmative action programs undermine their intended beneficiaries by encouraging the attribution of successes to
affirmative action rather than individual qualifications (Heilman, 1994; Heilman,
McCullough, & Gilbert, 1996; Nacoste, 1987, 1989). Researchers like Heilman
and Nacoste echo the familiar refrain of prominent conservatives of color like
Stephan Carter (1991), Ward Connerly (1995), Dinesh D’Souza (1991), Richard
Rodriquez (1981), and Shelby Steele (1990). However, much of the experimental
research has been based on an unrealistic and simplified model in which affirmative action means paying little or no attention to merit (Kravitz, 1995; Nacoste,
1987). Real-world studies have found that most potential beneficiaries—people of
color and women—do not feel undermined and, in fact, endorse affirmative action
(Ayers, 1992; Bergmann, 1996; Schmermund, Sellers, Mueller, & Crosby, in
press; M. C. Taylor, 1994; Truax, Wood, Wright, Cordova, & Crosby, 1998).
Other studies (Branscombe, 1998) demonstrate that it is White males who are the
ones who feel uncomfortable and undermined when attention is drawn to demographic groupings.
Partial Disadvantage: Complicating Issues About How to Assess Merit
A principal complaint about affirmative action is that it rewards the underqualified (target group members with lower SAT scores, poorer interview ratings,
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etc.) with limited job or educational slots and thus penalizes those who are more
highly qualified (majority-group members with degrees from more prestigious
schools, higher GPAs, etc.). The claim about violating meritocracy assumes that
we have an objective way to measure merit.
One of the mixed blessings of affirmative action policy is how it has complicated the issues of testing and of standards (Crosby & Blanchard, 1989). Psychometricians and other educators have long been concerned about the possible biases
in standardized tests (e.g., Cicchetti, 1994), but the policy implications made
salient by debates over affirmative action have prompted creative new research
(Brown, 1994; Ford, Kraiger, & Schechtman, 1986; Gutman, 1993; Hunter &
Schmidt, 1976; Schmidt, 1988, 1991; Tett, Jackson, & Rothstein, 1991). Affirmative action has forced us to investigate and become aware of the cultural biases
inherent in some tests (Nelson, 2000; Reynolds, 2000; Suzuki & Kugler, 1995).
We are forced, moreover, to recognize that it is difficult to overcome such biases,
because all tests incorporate values. How we construct a test determines what
differences will be found among groups. Our preconceptions about what group differences exist in reality, furthermore, determine how we construct the test. The
desire to maximize sensitivity to the abilities of members of underrepresented
groups, driven partly by affirmative action and partly by the changing demographics of the labor force, invites thoughtfulness about how to define and assess talent
(Helms, 1985).
Even if we have carefully defined and operationalized a measure of ability,
group differences on this measure may not imply group differences in merit. It is
possible that the groups differ not on the trait, but simply on their testing behavior.
Research by Brenda Allen and Wade Boykin, for example, has shown that inner
city African American children perform better than other children on tests that are
administered under conditions that White middle-class educators might consider
noisy (Allen, 1996; Allen & Boykin, 1991, 1992; Boykin, 1994; Boykin & Allen,
1988). Thus we need to reevaluate not only whether the content of the tests we use
is biased against certain groups, but also whether the testing conditions are biased.
Real but Partial Disadvantage: Disruption of Complacency
The last problem caused by affirmative action is one that also carries potential
advantages for society as a whole. The problem is that the mere existence of the
policy disrupts our unquestioning acceptance of the operation of individual meritocracy in the United States. In this regard affirmative action differs dramatically
from the more neutral-sounding policy of equal opportunity (Crosby, 1994).
Recognition that vigilance is mandated not by personal inadequacies but
rather by the imbalances of the existing system can be more unsettling to those who
have enjoyed privilege within the status quo. It is comforting to presume that our
individual accomplishments are due mostly to our own merit rather than to
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accidents of birth and privilege. Anything that threatens the presumption may be
most menacing to people who are White and to people who are male. As one of us
noted recently:
Throughout my life I have been sheltered and protected by vast amounts of good fortune.
Challenges have—of course—abounded, but the resources to meet the challenges have
always been at hand. Privilege bred in me the overestimation of my own capabilities that is
the hallmark of the nondepressed person.
In my more mature days it has occurred to me to question whether “[others] have passed
through life with the same optimism and confidence that became mine.” At whatever “level”
one’s family is in the American social hierarchy, it is surely easier to feel in possession of
this country when your skin is White than when it is more darkly colored. (Crosby, 1997,
p. 183)
Not only does affirmative action remind us that none of us may take sole credit
for our accomplishments; it also reminds us that no individual deserves full blame
or full praise for his or her situation. Affirmative action, in other words, poses a
threat to the American ideal of individual merit. Ozawa, Crosby, and Crosby
(1996) demonstrated differences in the degree to which Japanese and American
students were individualistic or collectivist in their outlook. Ozawa et al. (1996)
presented the students with information about a company in which underqualified
men were hired instead of well-qualified women. The American students expressed more outrage than the Japanese students did about the discrimination. Yet
when presented with a variety of solutions, the American students expressed less
support than did the Japanese students for collectivist remedies that represented
affirmative action. A recent study by Kemmelmeier (2000) corroborated the
conclusions of Ozawa et al. (1996). Kemmelmeier (2000) showed that priming
individualistic attitudes increased hostility toward affirmative action.
Designing Effective Affirmative Action Programs
A good affirmative action program is one that achieves the objective of equality without jeopardizing other valued goals like social harmony, intergroup peace,
individual happiness, efficiency, profitability, and so on. Organizational and social
psychologists, along with counseling and clinical psychologists, have assembled
valuable observations concerning the effective functioning of affirmative action.
At the outset, it is important to recognize that affirmative action carries many
different meanings for most people and that disagreements may be more semantic
than substantive. One careful study of a randomly selected portion of citizens in a
large Midwestern town, for example, has documented that people’s definitions of
affirmative action statistically predict their evaluations of the policy, even after
controlling for gender, ethnicity, household income, education, political orientation, feminist ideology, and satisfaction with one’s standard of living (Golden,
Hinkle, & Crosby, 2001). People who think that affirmative action means quotas
dislike the policy, whereas those who think that affirmative action means a monitoring system endorse the policy.
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A simple piece of practical advice flows from the first empirical observation:
To minimize unproductive opposition to affirmative action, it behooves advocates
and administrators to educate people about what affirmative action is in principle
and in practice. Given the charged political rhetoric surrounding affirmative
action, a great deal of misinformation has permeated public life (Crosby, 2000a,
2000b; Opotow, 1996; Plous, 1996). Meanwhile, even responsible journalists do
little to let the public know what affirmative action is or how affirmative action
plans in fact operate (Crosby & Cordova, 1996).
Of course, to educate people fully about the workings of affirmative action
may require more than a simple presentation of facts and figures. A substantial literature shows that prejudice statistically predicts resistance to affirmative action
(Crosby, Ferdman, & Wingate, 2001; Kravitz et al., 1997; Tierney, 1997). To be
sure, many nonprejudiced citizens oppose affirmative action because the policy
appears to them to fly in the face of distributive and procedural justice (Kuklinski et
al., 1997), but it is equally clear that many men oppose affirmative action for
women because of conscious or unconscious sexism (Tougas, Brown, Beaton, &
Joly, 1995; Tougas, Crosby, Joly, & Pelchat, 1995) and that many Whites oppose
affirmative action for people of color because of conscious or unconscious racism
(Bobo & Kleugel, 1993). When resistance is due to prejudice, facts and figures
may do little to melt away the opposition to affirmative action.
Sometimes the prejudice is more subtle than blatant. Illuminating is a study by
Clayton (1996), who investigated attitudes toward different identity groupings
(race, sex, religion) used for different purposes on a college campus (as the basis
for a social group, a political group, or consideration in admission). Clayton found
that it was more acceptable to White students to use some groups for certain purposes than for others—for example, using racial groupings was acceptable, but not
for admissions—and that the acceptability of a certain practice, such as affirmative
action, varied according to the group that was identified as the direct beneficiary.
Drawing on a close reading of the psychological literature and on their own
experiences as experts and consultants, Pratkanis and Turner (1994a) advise
administrators to tackle nagging issues of preferential treatment directly. According to their research, administrators inhibit the perception of preferential treatment
if they first establish rigorous and unambiguous standards for selection (in admission or hiring), then provide clear information about how newcomers meet or
exceed the standard. Administrators should also focus attention on the structural
barriers that remain to be dismantled (Pratkanis & Turner, 1994a, p. 58).
It is also crucial for those in the position of traditional privilege to see how they
stand to benefit in the long or short term from affirmative action. Groups are easier
to integrate if people’s fates are interdependent and are not in competition (Pettigrew, 2000; Pettigrew & Meertens, 1995).
Also helpful are techniques that facilitate the individuated treatment of the
newcomers as full human beings, rather than two-dimensional representations
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of demographic groups. Activities that enhance empathy are, as Pratkanis and
Turner (1994a) point out, vital to the success of affirmative action. It is encouraging to note that several studies have shown that employees—even White male
employees—express neutral to positive attitudes toward the affirmative action
programs at their own workplace and do not interpret support for these programs as
indicating a loss of career development opportunities for themselves personally or
organizational injustice in general (Konrad & Linnehan, 1995; Parker, Baltes, &
Christiansen, 1997).
Final Reflection
Given people’s inability to detect systematic unfairnesses from unsystematic
data, affirmative action is a policy that adds to social justice and stability in America. Yet the policy remains controversial. There are several reasons for the controversy, but it seems to us that the primary reason is that affirmative action brings
forcefully to the surface challenges about collective and individual needs and merits that might otherwise lie buried under the ideology of individualism and of
meritocracy.
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Web Resources
<http://www.feminist.org/other/ccri/cahome.html> (pro–affirmative action site with an emphasis on
women’s stake in affirmative action)
<http://www.aadap.org/> (anti–affirmative action site that nonetheless carries many stories that show
the value of affirmative action)
FAYE J. CROSBY is a social psychologist and professor of psychology at the University of California, Santa Cruz. She is a past president and ardent supporter of
SPSSI. Her research focuses on justice issues. She has published extensively on
affirmative action, often in collaboration with Susan Clayton. Crosby’s most
recent book on affirmative action, coedited with Cheryl Van De Veer and published in 2000 by the University of Michigan Press, is entitled Sex, Race, and
Merit: Debating Affirmative Action in Education and Employment.
Crosby and Clayton
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SUSAN CLAYTON is an associate professor of psychology at the College of
Wooster. Her research focuses on social issues and how people conceptualize
social justice. She has recently focused on environmental topics, publishing in
journals such as the Journal of Social Issues and Environment and Behavior. With
Faye Crosby, she wrote a 1992 book on affirmative action, Justice, Gender, and
Affirmative Action (University of Michigan Press), which received an Outstanding
Book Award from the Gustavus Myers Center for the Study of Human Rights.