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CHAPTER 26 WAR AND REVOLUTION, 1914–1920 SELLING THE GREAT WAR MOBILIZING THE HOME FRONT THE VISUAL RECORD forts. The poster is a good representation of the centrality of women’s work to the waging of a new kind of war in the twentieth century. The battlefront had to be backed up by a home front—the term used for the first time in the Great War—of working men, women, and even children. The poster communicates the dignity and worth that lay in the concerted partnership of soldiers and civilians to defeat the enemy. Early war posters stressed justice and national glory. Later, as weariness with the war spread, the need for personal sacrifice became the dominant theme. The poster on this page shows a sad female figure rising from a sea of suffering and ■ “Take Up the Sword of Justice” by Sir Bernard Partridge, England, 1915. 772 Civilization in the West, Seventh Edition, by Mark Kishlansky, Patrick Geary, and Patricia O’Brien. Published by Longman. Copyright © 2008 by Pearson Education, Inc. ISBN 0-558-43641-2 Advertising is a powerful influence in modern life. Some believe that it makes people buy goods they do not need. Others insist that advertising is an efficient way of conveying information, on the basis of which people make choices. The leaders of Western nations discovered the power of advertising during the years of World War I, from 1914 to 1918. Advertising did not create the conflict that came to be known as the Great War. Nor did it produce the enthusiasm that excited millions of Europeans when war was declared in 1914. But when death counts mounted, prices skyrocketed, food supplies dwindled, and the frenzy and fervor for the war flagged, governments came to rely more heavily on the art of persuasion. Survival and victory required the support and coordination of the whole society. For the first time in history, war had to advertise. By the early decades of the twentieth century, businessmen had learned that it was not enough to develop efficient technologies and to mass-produce everything from hair oil to corsets—they had to sell their goods to the public. People would not buy goods they did not know about and whose merits they did not understand. Modern advertising pioneered sales techniques that convinced people to buy. Now political leaders came to realize that the advertising techniques of the marketplace could be useful. Governments took up the “science” of selling— not products but the idea of war. It was not enough to have a well-trained and well-equipped army to ensure victory. Citizens had to be persuaded to join, to fight, to work, to save, and to believe in the national war effort. Warring nations learned how to organize enthusiasm and how to mobilize the masses in support of what proved to be a long and bloody conflict. The poster on the facing shows a dramatic appeal to German women to support war work. A stern soldier whose visage and bearing communicate strength and singleness of purpose is backed up by an equally determined young woman. She is in the act of handing him a grenade as she stands with him, her arm on his shoulder, facing the unseen enemy. Grenades hang from his belt and from his left hand, giving the sense that he is able to enter battle properly armed, thanks to the dedicated woman’s ef- ISBN 0-558-43641-2 ■ World War I poster by George Kirchbach, Germany, 1914–1918. death. The woman, both goddesslike and vulnerable, symbolizes Great Britain. She is making a strong visual plea for action, seeking soldiers for her cause. The appeal for volunteers for the armed forces was unique to Great Britain, where conscription was not established until 1916. Yet the image is typical of every nation’s reliance on a noble female symbol to emphasize the justice of its cause. The dark suffering and death in the waters lapping at her robes are reflected in her eyes. She evinces a fierce determination as she exhorts, “Take up the sword of justice.” In February 1915, Germany declared the waters around the British Isles to be a war zone. All British shipping was subject to attack, as were neutral merchant vessels, which were attacked without warning. In May 1915, the Lusitania was sunk, taking with it more than 1000 lives, including those of 128 Americans. The poster frames an illuminated horizon where a ship that is probably the Lusitania is sinking. The poster is a clear call to arms against the perfidy of an enemy who has killed innocent civilians. The female figure’s determined jaw, clenched fist, and outstretched arms communicate the nobility of the cause and the certainty of success. Civilians had to be mobilized for two reasons. First, it became evident early in the fighting that the costs of the war in terms of human lives were high. Soldiers at the front had to be constantly replaced by civilian reserves. Second, the costs of the war in terms of food, equipment, and productive materi- als were so high that civilian populations had to be willing to endure great hardships and to sacrifice their own well-being to produce supplies for soldiers at the front. Advertising was used by nations at war to coordinate civilian and military contributions to a common cause. Selling the Great War required selectively communicating information and inspiring belief and a commitment to total victory, no matter how high the cost. LOOKING AHEAD The European governments proudly “selling” war to their citizens in 1914 expected quick victories and a war of short duration. Instead, as this chapter will show, what they experienced was a prolonged global war, costly in human life and material destruction, stretching out over four devastating years. In adjusting to the unexpected, military technology and timetables called the tune in a defensive war fought from the trenches with sophisticated weapons capable of maiming and killing in new ways. In the case of Russia, the war signaled political and social collapse and a revolution of unprecedented scale. The intervention of the United States and German defeat preceded a peace that reshaped Europe as a whole in fundamental ways. 773 Civilization in the West, Seventh Edition, by Mark Kishlansky, Patrick Geary, and Patricia O’Brien. Published by Longman. Copyright © 2008 by Pearson Education, Inc. 774 Chapter 26 War and Revolution, 1914–1920 European goods and European culture all over the globe. Proud of the progress and prosperity of urban industrial society, Europeans had harnessed nature to transform their environment. They extended their influence beyond their continent, sure that their achievements marked the pinnacle of civilization. Westerners took stability and harmony for granted as preconditions for progress. Yet they also recognized the utility of war. In recent times, local confrontations between European states in Africa had been successfully contained in bids for increased territory. While warfare was accepted as an instrument of policy, no one expected or wanted a general war. Statesmen decided there were rules to the game of war that could be employed in the interests of statecraft. Science and technology also served the goals of limited war. Modern weapons, statesmen and generals were sure, would prevent a long war. Superiority in armed force became a priority for European states seeking to protect the peace. The beginning of the modern arms race resulted in “armed peace” as a defense against war. Leaders nevertheless expected and planned for a war, short and limited, in which the fittest and most advanced nation would win. Planners believed that their rivals could not triumph. War was acceptable because it would be quick and decisive. Previous confrontations among European states had been limited in duration and destruction, as in the case of Prussia and France in 1870, or confined to peripheries, as squabbles among the Great Powers in Africa CHAPTER OUTLINE ■ THE WAR EUROPE EXPECTED Separating Friends from Foes Military Timetables Assassination at Sarajevo ■ ■ ■ A NEW KIND OF WARFARE Technology and the Trenches The German Offensive War on the Eastern Front War on the Western Front War on the Periphery ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ADJUSTING TO THE UNEXPECTED: TOTAL WAR Mobilizing the Home Front Silencing Dissent ■ ■ THE RUSSIAN REVOLUTION AND ALLIED VICTORY Revolution in Russia The United States Enters the Great War ■ ■ SETTLING THE PEACE Wilson’s Fourteen Points ■ Treaties and Territories THE WAR EUROPE EXPECTED In 1914, Europe stood confidently at the center of the world. Covering only seven percent of the earth’s surface, it dominated the world’s trade and was actively exporting both ■ European Alliances on the Eve of World War I. Alliance systems divided Europe into two great blocs with few countries remaining neutral. Allied powers NORWAY SWEDEN 0 Central powers 0 Moscow Neutral countries 500 Miles 500 Kilometers a North Sea DENMARK ic alt Se RUSSIAN EMPIRE B GREAT BRITAIN Berlin NETH. GERMAN EMPIRE London BELGIUM Ca s LUX. ATLANTIC OCEAN FRANCE SWITZ. ROMANIA ALBANIA SPAIN rra SP. MOROCCO ALGERIA nea EMPIRE Sicily n S ea Dodecanese Is. (It.) Cyprus (Br.) TUNISIA NEJD EGYPT Civilization in the West, Seventh Edition, by Mark Kishlansky, Patrick Geary, and Patricia O’Brien. Published by Longman. Copyright © 2008 by Pearson Education, Inc. ISBN 0-558-43641-2 ite PERSIA OTTOMAN GREECE Sardinia ed S Black Sea SERBIA BULGARIA MONTENEGRO Corsica M an AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN EMPIRE ITALY PORTUGAL pi ea Paris The War Europe Expected indicated. The alliance system was expected to defend the peace by defining the conditions of war. As international tensions mounted, the hot summer days of 1914 were a time of hope and glory. The hope was that war, when it came, would be “over by Christmas.” The glory was the promise of ultimate victory in the “crusade for civilization” that each nation’s leaders held out to their people. Declarations of war were greeted with songs, flowers, wild enthusiasm, and dancing in the streets. Crowds welcomed the battles to come with the delirium of cheering a favorite team in a sports match. Some embraced war as a test of greatness, a purification of a society that had become lazy and complacent. When war did come in 1914, it was a choice, not an accident. Yet it was a choice that Europeans did not understand, one whose limits they could not control. Their unquestioned pride in reason and progress, which ironically had led them to the war, did not survive the four years of barbaric slaughter that followed. RUSSIA GERMANY Polish Czech Ruthenian Slovak AUSTRIA-HUNGARY Italian Romanian Slovene Cro atia n Se rbi ROMANIA an Cr oa A tia d SERBIA n ri at ic Indo-European Teutonic ea ITALY S ISBN 0-558-43641-2 Magyar German Separating Friends from Foes At the end of the nineteenth century, the world appeared to be coming together in a vast international network linked by commerce and finance. A system of alliances based on shared interests also connected states to one another. After 1905, the intricate defensive alliances between and among the European states maintained the balance of power between two blocs of nations and helped prevent one bloc from dominating the other. Yet by creating blocs, alliances identified foes as well as friends. On the eve of the war, France, Great Britain, and Russia stood together in the Triple Entente. Since 1882, Germany, Austria-Hungary, and Italy had joined forces in the Triple Alliance. Other states allied with one or the other of the blocs in pacts of mutual interest and protection. Throughout the world, whether in North Africa, the Balkans, or Asia, the power of some states was intended to balance the power of others. Yet the balance of power did not exist simply to preserve the peace. It existed to preserve a system of independent national societies—nation-states—in a precarious equilibrium. Gains in one area by one bloc had to be offset by compromises in another to maintain the balance. Nations recognized limited conflict as a legitimate means of preserving equilibrium. The alliance system of blocs reflected the growing impact of public opinion on international relations. Statesmen had the ability to manipulate the newspaper images of allies as good and rivals as evil. But controlling public opinion served to lock policy makers into permanent partnerships and “blank checks” of support for their allies. Western leaders understood that swings in public opinion in periods of crisis could hobble their efforts in the national interest. Permanent military alliances with clearly identified “friends,” therefore, took the place of more fluid arrangements. Although alliances that guaranteed military support did not cause war, they did permit weak nations to act irresponsibly, with the certainty that they would be defended by their 775 BULGARIA MONTENEGRO Ural-Altaic Finno-Ugrian Romantic Slavic 0 0 ■ 200 Miles 200 Kilometers Linguistic Groups in Austria-Hungary. The significant linguistic and cultural diversity of Habsburg lands made Austria-Hungary difficult to govern. Although Germany counted on Austria-Hungary as a key ally in promoting a balance of power, its internal challenges made it a weak partner. more powerful partners. France and Germany were publicly committed to their weaker allies Russia and Austria-Hungary, respectively, in supporting imperialist ambitions in the Balkans from which they themselves derived little direct benefit. Because of treaty commitments, no country expected to face war alone. The interlocking system of defensive alliances was structured to match strength against strength—France against Germany, for example—thereby making a prolonged war more likely than would be the case if a weak nation confronted a strong enemy. Military Timetables As Europe soon discovered, military timetables restricted the choices of leaders at times of conflict. The crisis of the summer of 1914 revealed the extent to which politicians and statesmen had come to rely on military expertise and strategic considerations in making decisions. Germany’s military preparations are a good example of how war strategy exacerbated crises and prevented peaceful solutions. The Schlieffen Plan. Alfred von Schlieffen (1833–1913), the Prussian general and chief of the German General Staff Civilization in the West, Seventh Edition, by Mark Kishlansky, Patrick Geary, and Patricia O’Brien. Published by Longman. Copyright © 2008 by Pearson Education, Inc. 776 Chapter 26 War and Revolution, 1914–1920 (1891–1905) who developed the war plan, understood little about politics but spent his life studying the strategic challenges of warfare. His war plan was designed to make Germany the greatest power on the Continent. The Schlieffen Plan, which he set before his fellow officers in 1905, was a bold and daring one: in the likely event of war with Russia, Germany would launch a devastating offensive against France. Schlieffen reasoned that France was a strong military presence that would come to the aid of its ally, Russia. Russia, lacking a modern transportation system, would not be able to mobilize as rapidly as France. Russia also had the inestimable advantage of the ability to retreat into its vast interior. If Germany were pulled into a war with Russia, its western frontier would be vulnerable to France, Russia’s powerful ally. The Schlieffen Plan recognized that France must first be defeated in the west before Germany could turn its forces to the task of defeating Russia. The Schlieffen Plan thus committed Germany to a war with France, regardless of particular circumstances. Furthermore, the plan, with its strategy of invading the neutral countries of Belgium, Holland, and Luxembourg in order to defeat France in six weeks, ignored the rights of the neutral countries. Russia’s Mobilization Plan and the French Plan XVII. Germany was not alone in being driven by military timetables when conflicts arose. Russian military strategists planned full mobilization if war broke out with AustriaHungary, which was menacing the interests of Russia’s ally Serbia. Russia foresaw the likelihood that Germany would come to the aid of Austria-Hungary. Russia knew, too, that because of its primitive railway network it would be unable to mobilize troops rapidly. In order to compensate for that IMAGE DISCOVERY A Cartoon Conveys the Politics of a Deadly Tug of War Civilization in the West, Seventh Edition, by Mark Kishlansky, Patrick Geary, and Patricia O’Brien. Published by Longman. Copyright © 2008 by Pearson Education, Inc. ISBN 0-558-43641-2 By 1914 political cartoons with mass distribution in the daily press sought to convey complex political realities with humorous images. Here, Italy assumes the part of the referee in a deadly tug of war that culminated in World War I. Why is Italy, rather than another country, the umpire? Note the players on each side and their dress. Are any of the major participants in the war missing from the “game”? What might the cartoon imply as to the balance of power in this conflict? The War Europe Expected MAP DISCOVERY NETH. Calais Brussels Rh ine Liège R. Arras GERMANY BELGIUM Amiens Mainz LUXEMBOURG Reims 777 German drive through Belgium called for in the Schlieffen Plan. Military leaders throughout Europe argued that if their plans were to succeed, speed was essential. Delays to consider peaceful solutions would cripple military responses. Diplomacy bowed to military strategy. When orders to mobilize went out, armies would be set on the march. Like a row of dominoes falling with the initial push, the two alliance systems would be at war. Assassination at Sarajevo ne ar M A teenager with a handgun started the First World War. On 28 June Metz 1914, in Sarajevo, the sleepy capiParis Chartres tal of the Austro-Hungarian LORRAINE province of Bosnia, Gavrilo Troyes Seine R. Princip (1895–1918), a 19-yearColmar old Bosnian Serb, repeatedly ALSACE pulled the trigger of his Browning FRANCE Freiburg revolver, killing the designated Belfort heir of the Habsburg throne, Allied Central Archduke Franz Ferdinand, and Powers Powers Dijon his wife, Sophie. Princip belonged Neutral German troop French troop SWITZERLAND nations movement movement to the Young Bosnian Society, a group of students, workers, some peasants, Croats, Muslims, and inThe Schlieffen Plan and France’s Plan XVII tellectuals who wanted to The Schlieffen Plan was a German plan of attack devised in the event of a free Slavic populations war against Russia. Why was the plan based on the principle that the road from Habsburg control. to St. Petersburg (to the east) ran through Paris (to the west)? What counPrincip was part of a growtries on this map were neutral countries? Why was Germany willing to vioing movement of South Borijove Jevtic late their neutrality in order to move troops across their territory? The Slavs struggling for naon the French meanwhile were devising their own war plan, called Plan XVII. Where tional liberation who be- Assassination of did they plan to concentrate their offensive? Why was it not successful? Archduke Franz lieved they were being held Ferdinand in colonial servitude by Austria-Hungary. weakness, Russian leaders planned to mobilize before war was Struggle over control of the Balkans had been a longdeclared. German military leaders had no choice in the event standing issue that had involved all the major European powof full Russian mobilization but to mobilize their own troops ers for decades. As Austria-Hungary’s ally since 1879, immediately and to urge the declaration of war. There was no Germany was willing to support Vienna’s showdown in the chance of containing the conflict once a general mobilization Balkans as a way of stopping Russian advances in the area. on both sides was underway. Mobilization would mean war. The alliance with Germany gave Austria-Hungary a sense of Like the Schlieffen Plan, the French Plan XVII called for the security and confidence to pursue its Balkan aims. Germany concentration of troops in a single area, with the intention of had its own plans for domination of the Continent and feared decisively defeating the enemy. The French command, not well that a weakened Austria-Hungary would undermine its own informed about German strengths and strategies, designated position in central Europe. Independent Balkan states to the Alsace and Lorraine for the immediate offensive against south and east were also a threat to Germany’s plans. German Germany in the event of war. Plan XVII left Paris exposed to the leaders hoped that an Austro-Serbian war would remain ISBN 0-558-43641-2 R. Civilization in the West, Seventh Edition, by Mark Kishlansky, Patrick Geary, and Patricia O’Brien. Published by Longman. Copyright © 2008 by Pearson Education, Inc. 778 Chapter 26 War and Revolution, 1914–1920 ■ neutrality in its march to France, Great Britain honored its treaty obligations and declared war on Germany. Great Britain entered the war because it judged that a powerful Germany could use ports on the English Channel to invade the British Isles. Italy alone of the major powers remained for the moment outside the conflict. Although allied with Germany and Austria-Hungary, its own aspirations in the Balkans kept it from fighting for the Austrian cause in 1914. Self-interest, fear, and ambition motivated the Great Powers in different ways in the pursuit of war. The international diplomatic system that had worked so well to prevent war in the preceding decades now enmeshed European states in interlocking alliances and created a chain reaction. The Austro-Serbian war of July 1914 became a Europe-wide war within a month. A NEW KIND OF WARFARE Early in the war, the best-laid plans of political and military leaders collapsed. In the first place, Europe experienced a war that was not quickly and decisively won, but spread throughout Europe and became global. Switzerland, Spain, the Netherlands, and all of Scandinavia remained neutral, but every other European nation was pulled into the war. In August 1914, Japan cast its lot with the Allies, as the Entente came to be known, and in November the Ottoman Empire joined the Central Powers of Germany and Austria-Hungary. In the following year, Italy joined the war—not on the side of its long-term treaty partners, Germany and Austria-Hungary, but on the side of the Allies, with the expectation of benefiting Civilization in the West, Seventh Edition, by Mark Kishlansky, Patrick Geary, and Patricia O’Brien. Published by Longman. Copyright © 2008 by Pearson Education, Inc. ISBN 0-558-43641-2 localized and would strengthen their ally, Austria-Hungary. While Austria-Hungary had Germany’s support, Serbia was backed by a sympathetic Russia that favored nationalist movements in the Balkans. Russia, in turn, had been encouraged by France, its ally by military pact since 1894, to take a firm stand in its struggle with Austria-Hungary for dominance among Balkan nationalities. The interim of five weeks between the assassination of Archduke Ferdinand and the outbreak of the war was a period of intense diplomatic activity. The assassination gave AustriaHungary the excuse it needed to bring a troublesome Serbia into line. Austria-Hungary held Serbia responsible for the shootings. Leaders in Vienna had no evidence at the time to justify their allegations of a Serbian conspiracy, but they saw in the event the perfect pretext for military action. On 23 July 1914, Austria-Hungary issued an ultimatum to the small Balkan nation and secretly decided to declare war regardless of Serbia’s response. The demands were so severe that, if met, they would have stripped Serbia of its independence. Austria’s aim was to destroy Serbia. In spite of a conciliatory, though not capitulatory, reply from Serbia to the ultimatum, AustriaHungary declared war on the Balkan nation on 28 July 1914. Russia mobilized two days after the Austro-Hungarian declaration of war against Serbia. Germany mobilized in response to the Russian action and declared war on Russia on 1 August, and on France on 3 August. France had begun mobilizing on 30 July, when its ally, Russia, entered the war. Britain’s dependence on its alliance with France as a means of protecting British sea routes in the Mediterranean meant that Great Britain could not remain neutral once France declared war. On 4 August, after Germany had violated Belgian Austrian Archduke Franz Ferdinand and his wife, Sophie, leave the Senate House in Sarajevo on 28 June 1914. Five minutes later, Serbian terrorist Gavrilo Princip assassinated the couple. A New Kind of Warfare in the Balkans from Austrian defeat. Bulgaria joined Germany and Austria-Hungary in 1915, seeking territory at Serbia’s expense. By the time the United States entered the war in 1917, the war had become a world war. The second surprise for the European powers was that they did not get a war of movement, nor did they get one of short duration. Within weeks, that pattern had given way to what promised to be a long and costly war of attrition. The war started as German strategists had planned, with German victory in battle after battle. The end seemed near. But in the space of less than a month, the war changed in ways that no one had predicted. Technology was the key to understanding the change and explaining the surprises. Technology and the Trenches In the history of nineteenth-century European warfare, armies had relied on mobile cavalry and infantry units, whose greatest asset was speed. Rapid advance had been decisive in the Prussian victory over the French in 1870, which had resulted in the formation of the German Empire. Digging In. Soldiers of the twentieth century were also trained for a war of movement, high maneuverability, and max- imum territorial conquest. But after the first six weeks of battle, soldiers were ordered to do something unimaginable to strategists of European warfare: they were ordered to dig ditches and fight from fixed positions. Soldiers on both sides shoveled out trenches four feet deep, piled up sandbags, mounted their machine guns, and began to fight an unplanned defensive war. The front lines of Europe’s armies in the west wallowed in the 400 miles of trenches that ran from the English Channel to the Swiss frontier. The British and French on one side and the Germans on the other fought each other with machine guns and mortars, backed up by heavy artillery to the rear. Strategists on both sides be- Wilfred Owen, “Dulce et lieved they could break through enemy lines. As a re- Decorum Est” sult, the monotony of trench warfare was punctuated periodically by infantry offensives in which immense concentrations of artillery caused great bloodshed. Ten million men were killed in the bizarre and deadly combination of old and new warfare. The glamour of battle that had attracted many young men disappeared quickly in the daily reality of living in mud with rats and constantly facing death. New Weapons. The invention of new weaponry and heavy equipment had transformed war into an enterprise of increasing complexity. Military and naval staffs expanded to meet the A typical World War I trench. Millions of soldiers lived amid mud, disease, and vermin, awaiting death from enemy shells. After the French army mutiny in 1916, the troops wrung the concession from their commanders that they would not have to charge German machine guns while armed only with rifles. ISBN 0-558-43641-2 ■ 779 Civilization in the West, Seventh Edition, by Mark Kishlansky, Patrick Geary, and Patricia O’Brien. Published by Longman. Copyright © 2008 by Pearson Education, Inc. 780 Chapter 26 War and Revolution, 1914–1920 ALL QUIET ON THE WESTERN FRONT Eyewitness accounts described the horrors of the new trench warfare. But no one captured the war better than the German novelist Erich Maria Remarque (1898–1970), who drew on his own wartime experiences in All Quiet on the Western Front. Published in 1928 and subsequently translated into 25 languages, this powerful portrayal of the transformation of a schoolboy into a soldier indicts the inhumanity of war and pleads for peace. Stressing the camaraderie of fighting men and sympathy for the plight of the enemy soldier, Remarque also underscored the alienation of a whole generation—the lost generation of young men who could not go home again after the war. Focus Questions In the final paragraph, the narrator tells us his age. Would you have guessed his age from the opening three paragraphs? How does the narrator’s description of his generation transcend enemy lines? Attack, counter-attack, charge, repulse—these are words, but what things they signify! We have lost a good many men, mostly recruits. Reinforcements have again been sent up to our sector. They are one of the new regiments, composed almost entirely of young fellows just called up. They have had hardly any training, and are sent into the field with only a theoretical knowledge. They do know what a hand-grenade is, it is true, but they have very little idea of cover, and what is most important of all, have no eye for it. A fold in the ground has to be quite eighteen inches high before they can see it. Although we need reinforcement, the recruits give us almost more trouble than they are worth. They are helpless in this grim fighting area; they fall like flies. Modern trench-warfare demands knowledge and experience; a man must have a feeling for the contours of the ground, an ear for the sound and character of the shells, must be able to decide beforehand where they will drop, how they will burst, and how to shelter from them. The young recruits of course know none of these things. They get killed simply because they hardly can tell shrapnel from high-explosive, they are mown down because they are From Erich Maria Remarque, All Quiet on the Western Front. enal destructive power would work against an enemy armed with machine guns instead of spears. Military strategists drew all the wrong conclusions. They continued to plan an offensive strategy when the weaponry developed for massive destruction had pushed them into fighting a defensive war from the trenches. Both sides resorted to concentration of artillery, increased use of poison gas, and unrestricted submarine warfare in desperate attempts to break the deadlock caused by meeting armed force with force. The necessity of total victory drove the Central Powers and the Allies to grisly new inventions. Chlorine gas was first used Civilization in the West, Seventh Edition, by Mark Kishlansky, Patrick Geary, and Patricia O’Brien. Published by Longman. Copyright © 2008 by Pearson Education, Inc. ISBN 0-558-43641-2 new needs of warfare, but old ways persisted. Outmoded cavalry units survived despite more efficient mechanization. In their bright blue coats and red trousers, French and Belgian infantrymen made easy targets. The railroad made the mobilization, organization, and deployment of mass armies possible. Specialists were needed to control the new war machines that heavy industry had created. The shovel and the machine gun had transformed war. The Maxim machine gun had been used by the British in Africa. Strategists regarded the carnage that resulted as a stunning achievement but failed to ask how a weapon of such phenom- listening anxiously to the roar of the big coal-boxes falling in the rear, and miss the light, piping whistle of the low spreading daisy-cutters. They flock together like sheep instead of scattering, and even the wounded are shot down like hares by the airmen. Their pale turnip faces, their pitiful clenched hands, the fine courage of these poor devils, the desperate charges and attacks made by the poor brave wretches, who are so terrified that they dare not cry out loudly, but with battered chests, with torn bellies, arms and legs only whimper softly for their mothers and cease as soon as one looks at them. Their sharp, downy, dead faces have the awful expressionlessness of dead children. . . . I am young, I am twenty years old; yet I know nothing of life but despair, death, fear, and fatuous superficiality cast over an abyss of sorrow. I see how peoples are set against one another, and in silence, unknowingly, foolishly, obediently, innocently slay one another. I see that the keenest brains of the world invent weapons and words to make it yet more refined and enduring. And all men of my age, here and over there, throughout the whole world see these things; all my generation is experiencing these things with me. What would our fathers do if we suddenly stood up and came before them and proffered our account? What do they expect of us if a time ever comes when the war is over? Through the years our business has been killing;—it was our first calling in life. Our knowledge of life is limited to death. What will happen afterwards? And what shall come out of us? A New Kind of Warfare ■ The British invented the tank, which made its combat debut in 1916. The new weapon terrified the German troops when it was first used on the western front. The British had developed it in heavy secrecy under the pretext of constructing water tanks; hence the name. in warfare by the Germans in 1915. Mustard gas, which was named for its distinctive smell and which caused severe blistering, was introduced two years later. The Germans were the first to use flame throwers, especially effective against mechanized vehicles with vulnerable fuel tanks. Barbed wire, invented in the American Midwest to contain farm animals, became an essential aspect of trench warfare, as it marked off the no-man’s-land between combatants and prevented surprise attacks. Late in the war, the need to break the deadlock of trench warfare ushered in the airplane and the tank. Neither was decisive in altering the course of the war, although the airplane was useful for reconnaissance and for limited bombing and the tank promised the means of breaking through defensive lines. New weapons sometimes produced their antidotes. For example, the invention of deadly gas was followed soon after by gas masks. Each side was capable of matching the other’s ability to devise new armaments. Deadlocks caused by technological parity forced both sides to resort to desperate concentrations of men and weaponry that resulted not in decisive battles but in ever-escalating casualty rates. By improving their efficiency at killing, the European powers were not finding a way to end the war. The German Offensive ISBN 0-558-43641-2 781 German forces seized the offensive in the west and invaded neutral Belgium at the beginning of August 1914. The Belgians resisted stubbornly but unsuccessfully. Belgian forts were systematically captured, and the capital of Brussels fell under the German advance on 20 August. After the fall of Belgium, German military might swept into northern France with the intention of defeating the French in six weeks. Germany on Two Fronts. In the years preceding the war, the German General Staff, unwilling to concentrate all of its troops in the west, had modified the Schlieffen Plan by committing divisions to its eastern frontier. The absence of the full German fighting force in the west did not appreciably slow the German advance through Belgium. Yet the Germans had underestimated both the cost of holding back the French in Alsace-Lorraine and the difficulty of maneuvering German forces and transporting supplies in an offensive war. Eventually, unexpected Russian advances in the east also siphoned off troops from the west. German forces in the west were so weakened by the offensive that they were unable to swing west of Paris, as planned, and instead chose to enter the French capital from the northeast by crossing the Marne River. The shift exposed the German First Army on its western flank and opened up a gap on its eastern flank. First Battle of the Marne. Despite an initial pattern of retreat and a lack of coordination of forces, Allied French and British troops were ready to take advantage of the vulnerabilities in the German advance. In a series of battles between 6 and 10 September 1914 that came to be known as the First Battle of the Marne, the Allies counterattacked and advanced into the gap. The German army was forced to drop back. In the following months, each army tried to outflank the other in what has been called “the race to the sea.” By late fall, it was clear that the battles from the Marne north to the border town of Ypres in northwest Belgium near the English Channel Civilization in the West, Seventh Edition, by Mark Kishlansky, Patrick Geary, and Patricia O’Brien. Published by Longman. Copyright © 2008 by Pearson Education, Inc. 782 Chapter 26 War and Revolution, 1914–1920 “DULCE ET DECORUM EST” Some of the best and most moving poetry of modern times was produced in the trenches of World War I. Wilfred Owen (1893–1918), a company commander for the British Army, died in battle one week before the war ended. His poems stand as a strong testimonial to the horrors of battle and the camaraderie of the trenches. Focus Questions In this poem, Owen uses his schoolboy Latin to quote the patriotic sentiment that “It is sweet and fitting to die for one’s country.” What leads him to conclude that this noble thought is “the old Lie”? Notice how he contrasts images of “old beggars under sacks” who are “coughing like hags” to youthful images, a reference to boys, “innocent tongues,” and “children ardent for some desperate glory.” What effect does his use of words like “ecstasy” and “dreams” have in conveying the horrors of war? This is a poem full of sounds; consider how those sounds are orchestrated to emphasize the poem’s theme. Bent double, like old beggars under sacks, Knock-kneed, coughing like hags, we cursed through sludge, Till on the haunting flares we turned our backs And towards our distant rest began to trudge. Men marched asleep. Many had lost their boots But limped on, blood-shod. All went lame; all blind; Drunk with fatigue; deaf even to the hoots Of tired, outstripped Five-Nines that dropped behind. If in some smothering dreams you too could pace Behind the wagon that we flung him in, And watch the white eyes writhing in his face, His hanging face, like a devil’s sick of sin; If you could hear, at every jolt, the blood Come gargling from the froth-corrupted lungs, Obscene as cancer, bitter as the cud Of vile, incurable sores on innocent tongues,— My friend, you would not tell with such high zest To children ardent for some desperate glory, The old Lie: Dulce et decorum est Pro patria mori. From Wilfred Owen, Poems, 1920. war on two fronts, had become a grim reality. The Central Powers were under a state of siege, cut off from the world by the great battlefront in the west and by the Allied blockade at sea. The rules of the game had changed, and the European powers settled in for a long war. War on the Eastern Front War on Germany’s eastern front was a mobile war, fought over vast distances. The Russian army was the largest in the world. Yet it was crippled from the outbreak of the war by inadequate supplies and poor leadership. At the end of August 1914, the smaller German army, supported by divisions drawn from the west, delivered a devastating defeat to the Russians in the one great battle on the eastern front. At Tannenberg, the entire Russian Second Army was destroyed, and about 100,000 Russian soldiers were taken prisoner. The German general Paul von Hindenburg (1847–1934), a veteran of the Franco-Prussian war of 1870, had been recalled from retirement to direct the campaign against the Russians because of his intimate knowledge of the area. Assisted by Quartermaster General Erich Ludendorff (1865–1937), Civilization in the West, Seventh Edition, by Mark Kishlansky, Patrick Geary, and Patricia O’Brien. Published by Longman. Copyright © 2008 by Pearson Education, Inc. ISBN 0-558-43641-2 had ended an open war of movement on the western front. Soldiers now dug in along a line of battle that changed little in the long three and a half years until March 1918. The Allies gained a strategic victory in the First Battle of the Marne by resisting the German advance in the fighting that quickly became known as the “miracle of the Marne.” The legend was further enhanced by true stories of French troops being rushed from Paris to the front in taxicabs. Yet the real significance of the Marne lay in the severe miscalculations of military leaders and statesmen on both sides who had expected a different kind of war. They did not understand the new technology that made a short war unlikely. Nor did they understand the demands that the new kind of warfare would make on civilian populations. Those Parisian taxi drivers foreshadowed how European civilians would be called upon again and again to support the war in the next four years. The Schlieffen Plan was dead. But it was no more a failure than any of the other military timetables of the Great Powers. “I don’t know what is to be done—this isn’t war.” So spoke Lord Horatio Kitchener (1850–1916), one of the most decorated British generals of his time. He was not alone in his bafflement over the stalemate of trench warfare at the end of 1914. By that time, Germany’s greatest fear, a simultaneous Gas! Gas! Quick, boys!—An ecstasy of fumbling, Fitting the clumsy helmets just in time; But someone still was yelling out and stumbling And flound’ring like a man in fire or lime. . . Dim, through the misty panes and thick green light, As under a green sea, I saw him drowning. In all my dreams, before my helpless sight, He plunges at me, guttering, choking, drowning. 783 A New Kind of Warfare Hindenburg followed the stunning victory of Tannenberg two weeks later with another devastating blow to Russian forces at the Masurian Lakes. The Russians were holding up their end of the bargain in the Allied war effort, but at great cost. They kept the Germans busy and forced them to divert troops to the eastern front, weakening the German effort to knock France out of the war. In the south, the tsar’s troops defeated the Austro-Hungarian army at Lemberg in Galicia in September. The Russian victory gave Serbia a temporary reprieve. But by mid-1915, Germany had thrown the Russians back and was keeping AustriaHungary propped up in the war. By fall, Russia had lost most of Galicia, the Polish lands of the Russian Empire, Lithuania, and parts of Latvia and Byelorussia to the advancing enemy. MAP DISCOVERY NORWAY SWEDEN Moscow R U S S I A North Sea DEN. Jutland 31 May – 1 June 1916 GREAT BRITAIN IRELAND a ltic Se Ba Masurian Lakes 6–15 Aug. 1914 Tannenberg 27–30 Aug. 1914 Berlin London NETH. Lusitania sunk 7 May 1915 GERMANY BELG. Area of EASTERN FRONT Lemberg 1 Sept.–1 Oct. 1914 inset map LUX. Paris Treaty of Brest-Litovsk March 1918 Caspian Sea Vienna WESTERN FRONT ATLANTIC OCEAN AUSTRIA-HUNGARY Caporetto 24 Oct. 1914 SWITZ. FRANCE IT PERSIA Y MONTENEGRO OTTOMAN Rome WESTERN FRONT Passchendaele 19 m e R July 1916 . 914 19 ay M Se e Ma rne R. . in LUX. Verdun Feb.–Dec. 1916 17 Marne 6–9 Sept. 1914 14 Aug . March 1918 FRANCE Aug. 1 BELGIUM m R. Stabilized front 1914–1917 Allied Powers Central Powers Neutral nations Central Powers offensives EMPIRE Gallipoli 25 April 1915– 9 Jan. 1916 GERM Brussels GREECE ANY Ypres . 191 7 Paris ALBANIA NETH. Dec So SERBIA BULGARIA AL SPAIN PORT. Black Sea ROMANIA Sarajevo Allied offensives Major battles Baghdad 11 March 1917 Cyprus (Br.) Mediterranean Jerusalem Sea PALESTINE Farthest advances of Central Powers Stabilized front MES OP OT AM IA NEJD British naval blockade German submarine war zone ISBN 0-558-43641-2 World War I The Central Powers were in the unenviable position of fighting wars on two major fronts. The inset shows the stabilized western front of trench warfare in northern France and Belgium. Why did warfare focus in the west on this area, and why did it bog down for such a long period along this front? How did warfare along the eastern front differ, and why did the eastern front cover a much greater expanse? Note the major battles in western and eastern Europe and the Ottoman Empire. Why was none of these battles decisive in ending the war? Were the British naval blockade and the German submarine war zone effective? Finally, note the reduced Russian territory as a result of the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk. Why was Russia willing to agree to such a loss of land to Germany before the war ended? Civilization in the West, Seventh Edition, by Mark Kishlansky, Patrick Geary, and Patricia O’Brien. Published by Longman. Copyright © 2008 by Pearson Education, Inc. 784 Chapter 26 War and Revolution, 1914–1920 The losses amounted to 15 percent of its territory and 20 percent of its population. The Russian army staggered, with more than one million soldiers taken as prisoners of war and at least as many killed or wounded. The Russian army, as one of its own officers described it, was being bled to death. Russian soldiers were poorly led into battle, or not led at all because of the shortage of officers. Munitions shortages meant that soldiers often went into battle without rifles, armed only with the hope of scavenging arms from their fallen comrades. Despite the difficulties, the Russians, under the direction of General Aleksei Brusilov (1853–1926), commander of the Russian armies in the southern part of the eastern front, remarkably managed to throw back the Austro-Hungarian forces in 1916 and almost eliminated Austria as a military power. Russia’s near-destruction of the Austrian army tremendously benefited Russia’s allies. In order to protect its partner, Germany was forced to withdraw 8 divisions from Italy—alleviating the Allied situation in the Tyrol—and 12 divisions from the western front, providing relief for the French at Verdun and the British at the Somme. In addition, Russia sent troops to the aid of a new member of the Allied camp, Romania, an act that probably further weakened Brusilov’s efforts. In response to Brusilov’s challenge, the Germans established control over the Austrian army, assigning military command of the coalition to General Ludendorff. But that was the last great campaign on the eastern front and Russia’s last show of strength in the Great War. War on the Western Front Along hundreds of miles of trenches, the French and British tried repeatedly to expel the Germans from Belgium. Long periods of inactivity were punctuated by orgies of heavy bloodletting. The German phrase “All quiet on the western front,” used in military communiqués to describe those periods of silence between massive shellings and infantry attacks, reported only the uneasy calm before the next violent storm. The Somme. Still, new offensives were devised. The British went ahead with their planned offensive on the Somme in July 1916. For an advance of seven miles, 400,000 British and 200,000 French soldiers were killed or wounded. The American writer F. Scott Fitzgerald (1896–1940), who had served as an army officer in World War I, wrote of the battle of the Somme in his novel Tender Is the Night (1934). One of his characters describes a visit to the Somme Valley after the war: “See that little stream. We could walk to it in two minutes. It took the British a whole month to walk to it—a whole empire walking very slowly, dying in front and pushing forward behind. And another empire walked very slowly backward a few inches a day, leaving the dead like a million bloody rugs.” German losses brought the total casualties of the offensive to one million men. Despite his experience at Verdun, the French general Robert Nivelle planned his own offensive in the Champagne region in spring 1917, sure that he could succeed where others had failed in “breaking the crust.” The Nivelle offensive resulted in 40,000 deaths, and Nivelle was dismissed. The French army was falling apart, with mutiny and insubordination everywhere. The British believed they could succeed where the French had failed. Under General Douglas Haig (1861–1928), the commander in chief of British expeditionary forces on the Civilization in the West, Seventh Edition, by Mark Kishlansky, Patrick Geary, and Patricia O’Brien. Published by Longman. Copyright © 2008 by Pearson Education, Inc. ISBN 0-558-43641-2 Verdun. Military leaders on both sides cherished the dream of a decisive offensive, the breakthrough that would win the war. In 1916, the Allies planned a joint strike at the Somme, a river in northern France flowing west into the English Channel, but the Germans struck first at Verdun, a small fortress city in northeast France. By concentrating great numbers of troops, the Germans outnumbered the French five to two. As General Erich von Falkenhayn (1861–1922), chief of the General Staff of the German army from 1914 to 1916, explained it, the German purpose in attacking Verdun was “to bleed the French white by virtue of our superiority in guns.” On the first day of battle, one million shells were fired. The battlefield was a living hell as soldiers stumbled across corpse after corpse. Against the German onslaught, French troops were instructed to hold out, though they lacked adequate artillery and reinforcements. General Joseph Joffre (1852–1931), commander in chief of the French army, was unwilling to divert reinforcements to Verdun. The German troops advanced easily through the first lines of defense. But the French held their position for ten long, horrifying months of continuous mass slaughter from February to December 1916. General Henri Philippe Pétain (1856–1951), a local commander who had been planning an early retirement before the war, bolstered morale by constantly rotating his troops to the point that most of the French army—259 of 330 infantry battalions—saw action at Verdun. Nearly starving and poorly armed, the French stood alone in the bloodiest offensive of the war. Attack strategy backfired on the Germans as their own death tolls mounted. Pétain and his flamboyant general Robert Georges Nivelle (1856–1924) were both hailed as heroes for fulfilling the instruction to their troops: “They shall not pass.” Falkenhayn fared less well and was dismissed from his post. Yet no real winners emerged from the scorched earth of Verdun, where observers could see the nearest thing to a desert created in Europe. Verdun was a disaster. The French suffered more than half a million total casualties. German casualties were almost as high. A few square miles of territory had changed hands back and forth. In the end, no military advantage was gained, and almost 700,000 lives had been lost. Legends of the brilliant leadership of Pétain and Nivelle, who both went on to greater positions of authority, and the failed command of Falkenhayn, who retired in disgrace, obscured the real lesson of the battle: an offensive war under those conditions was impossible. A New Kind of Warfare ■ British machine gunners wearing gas masks at the battle of the Somme in 1916. Continent, the British launched an attack in Flanders throughout the summer and fall of 1917. Known as the Passchendaele offensive for the village and ridge in whose “porridge of mud” much of the fighting took place, the campaign resulted in the slaughter of almost 400,000 British soldiers for insignificant territorial gain. The Allies and the Germans finally recognized that “going over the top” in offensives was not working and could not work. The war must be won by other means. War on the Periphery ISBN 0-558-43641-2 785 Recognizing the stalemate in the west, the Allies attempted to open up other fronts where the Central Powers might be vulnerable. In the spring of 1915, the Allies were successful in convincing Italy to enter the war on their side by promising that it would receive, at the time of the peace, the South Tyrol, the southern part of Dalmatia, and key Dalmatian islands, which would ensure Italy’s dominance over the Adriatic Sea. By thus capitalizing on Italian antagonism toward AustriaHungary over control of that territory, the Allies gained 875,000 Italian soldiers for their cause. Although the Italian troops were in no way decisive in the fighting that followed, Great Britain, France, and Russia saw the need to build up Allied support in southern Europe in order to reinforce Serbian attempts to keep Austrian troops beyond its borders. The Allies also hoped that by pulling Germans into the southern front, some relief might be provided for British and French soldiers on the western front. Germany, in turn, was well aware of the need to expand its alliances beyond Austria-Hungary if it was to compete successfully against superior Allied forces. Trapped as they were to the east and west, the Central Powers established control over a broad corridor stretching from the North Sea through central Europe and down through the Ottoman Empire to the Suez Canal that was so vital to British interests. In the Balkans, where the war had begun, the Serbs were consistently bested by the Austrians. By late 1915, the Serbs had been knocked out of the war in spite of Allied attempts to assist them. Serbia paid a heavy price in the Great War: it lost one-sixth of its population through war, famine, and disease. The promise of booty persuaded Bulgaria to join Germany and Austria-Hungary. Over the next year and a half, the Allies responded by convincing Romania and then Greece to join them. War in the Ottoman Empire. The theater of war continued to expand. Although the Ottoman Empire had joined the Civilization in the West, Seventh Edition, by Mark Kishlansky, Patrick Geary, and Patricia O’Brien. Published by Longman. Copyright © 2008 by Pearson Education, Inc. 786 ■ Chapter 26 War and Revolution, 1914–1920 Paul Nash, We Are Making a New World (1918), depicts the destructiveness of war. Nash was one of many artists who used their work to communicate their moral outrage against the war. failed, the British foolishly decided to land troops on the Gallipoli Peninsula, which extended from the southern coast of European Turkey. There British soldiers were trapped on the rocky terrain, unable to advance against the Turks and unable to fall back. Gallipoli was the first large-scale attempt at amphibious warfare. The Australian and New Zealand forces (ANZACs) showed great bravery in some of the most brutal fighting of the war. Britain sought to protect its interests in the Suez Canal. Turkish troops menaced the canal effectively enough to terrify the British into maintaining an elaborate system of defense in the area and concentrating large troop reinforcements in Egypt. War with the Ottoman Empire also extended battle into the oil fields of Mesopotamia and Persia. The attempt at a new front was initially a fiasco for the British and Russian forces that threatened Baghdad. The Civilization in the West, Seventh Edition, by Mark Kishlansky, Patrick Geary, and Patricia O’Brien. Published by Longman. Copyright © 2008 by Pearson Education, Inc. ISBN 0-558-43641-2 war in late 1914 on the side of the Central Powers, its own internal difficulties attenuated its fighting ability. As a multinational empire consisting of Turks, Arabs, Armenians, Greeks, Kurds, and other ethnic minorities, it was plagued by Turkish misrule and Arab nationalism. Hence the Ottoman Empire was the weakest link in the chain of German alliances. Yet it held a crucial position. The Turks could block shipping of vital supplies to Russia through the Mediterranean and Black Seas. Coming to the aid of Turkish Officer Describes their Russian ally, a combined British and French fleet Armenian attacked Turkish forces at the straits of the Dardanelles Massacres in April 1915. In the face of political and military opposition, First Lord of the Admiralty Winston Churchill (1874–1965) supported the idea of opening a new front by sea. Poorly planned and mismanaged, the expedition was a disaster. When the naval effort in the German-mined strait Adjusting to the Unexpected: Total War Allies proceeded not only without plans, but also without maps. They literally did not know where they were going. Eventually, British forces recovered and took Baghdad in 1917, while Australian and New Zealand troops captured Jerusalem. The tentacles of war spread out, following the path of Western economic and imperial interests throughout the world. War at Sea. Most surprising of all was the indecisive nature of the war at sea. The great battleships of the British and German navies avoided confrontation on the high seas. The only major naval battle of the Great War, the Battle of Jutland in the North Sea, took place in early 1916. Each side inflicted damage on the other but, through careful maneuvering, avoided a decisive outcome to the battle. Probably the enormous cost of replacing battleships deterred both the British and the Germans from risking their fleets in engagements on the high seas. With the demands for munitions and equipment on the two great land fronts of the war, neither side could afford to lose a traditional war at sea. Instead, the British used their seapower as a policing force to blockade German trade and strangle the German economy. The German navy, much weaker than the British, relied on a new weapon, the submarine, which threatened to become decisive in the war at sea. Submarines were initially used in the first months of the war for reconnaissance. Their potential for inflicting heavy losses on commercial shipping became apparent in 1915. Undergoing technological improvements throughout the war, U-boats (Unterseebooten), as German submarines were called, torpedoed six million tons of Allied shipping in 1917. With cruising ranges as far as 3600 miles, German submarines attacked Allied and neutral shipping as far away as off the shore of the United States and the Arctic supply line to Russia. German insistence on unrestricted use outraged neutral powers, which considered the Germans in violation of international law. The Germans rejected the requirements of warning an enemy ship and boarding it for investigation as too dangerous for submarines, which were no match for battleships above water. The Allies invented depth charges and mines capable of blowing German submarines out of the water. Those weapons, combined with the use of the convoy system in the Atlantic Ocean and the Mediterranean Sea, produced a successful blockade and an antisubmarine campaign that put an end to the German advantage. ADJUSTING TO THE UNEXPECTED: TOTAL WAR The war that Europe experienced differed from all previous experiences and expectations of armed conflict. Technological advances, equally matched on both sides, introduced a war of attrition, defensive and prolonged. Nineteenth-century wars that lasted six to eight weeks, were confined to one locale, and were determined by a handful of battles marked by low casualties had nothing in common with the long, dirty, Crew on the deck of a German World War I submarine at sea. ISBN 0-558-43641-2 ■ 787 Civilization in the West, Seventh Edition, by Mark Kishlansky, Patrick Geary, and Patricia O’Brien. Published by Longman. Copyright © 2008 by Pearson Education, Inc. 788 Chapter 26 War and Revolution, 1914–1920 lice-infested reality of trench warfare. Warring European nations faced enemies to the west, to the east, and on the periphery, with no end to the slaughter in sight. The period from 1914 to 1918 marked the first time in history that the productive activities of entire populations were directed toward a single goal: military victory. The Great War became a war of peoples, not just of armies. Wars throughout history have involved noncombatants caught in the crossfire or standing in the wrong place at the wrong time. But the unexpected war of attrition required civilian populations to adjust to a situation in which what went on at the battlefront transformed life on the home front. For this reason, the Great War became known as history’s first total war. Adjusting to the unexpected war of 1914, governments intervened to centralize and control every aspect of economic life. Technology and industrial capacity made possible a war of unimaginable destruction. The scale of production and distribution of war-related materials required for victory was unprecedented. To persuade civilians to suffer at home for the sake of the war, leaders pictured the enemy as evil villains who had to be defeated at any cost. The sacrifice required for a total war made total victory necessary. And total victory required an economy totally geared to fighting the war. Mobilizing the Home Front While soldiers were fighting on the eastern and western fronts, businessmen and politicians at home were creating bureaucracies to control wages and prices, distribute supplies, establish production quotas, and mobilize human and material resources. Just as governments had conscripted the active male population for military service, the Allies and the Central Powers now mobilized civilians of all ages and both sexes to work for the war. WAR AT HOME The total character of World War I meant that it changed life for noncombatants as much as it did for those at the front. Women had to fend for themselves, organizing relief societies, working the fields, and manufacturing weapons and war goods. They often took jobs men had held before. In London, taxi driving had been a male monopoly before the war. Articles from 16 March 1917 in the Manchester Guardian show what could happen when both women and men shared jobs. Conflicts could break out when men felt threatened by women’s new positions. Focus Questions Why does this newspaper coverage consider that a strike by taxi-men “could be no more than a vain and selfish protest” against competition from women drivers? Is the question here women’s competence or something else? “Down Cabs” Again The London taxi-drivers are again threatening trouble—this time because the Home Office refuses to give way on the question of licensing women drivers. Sir George Cave told a deputation of the Licensed Vehicle Workers the other day that there is no intention at present of licensing women as tram and ’bus drivers, but that competent women will certainly be licensed for taxi-driving. The men are holding indignation meetings on Sunday, and threaten to bring all the cab, ’bus, and tram drivers of London out on strike—about 20,000 workers, inclusive of garage men. Civilization in the West, Seventh Edition, by Mark Kishlansky, Patrick Geary, and Patricia O’Brien. Published by Longman. Copyright © 2008 by Pearson Education, Inc. ISBN 0-558-43641-2 Women Taxi-Cab Drivers The taxi-cab drivers of London threaten to try to bring about a strike, which will include motor-’bus drivers and conductors, if the London County Council does not abandon its intention to license women to drive taxi-cabs. To be successful a strike must in the ultimate event be in defense of a principle that commands a measure of public assent. The only principle for which the men stand in this strike is that even where women are fitted to do men’s work they should be debarred from it. It is a principle never tenable in justice, and utterly discredited in the popular mind by the war. If the employment of women as motor-drivers meant a decrease in the general level of skill in the trade, a worsening of conditions, or a lowering of wages a real principle would be involved. Stress of war might make the setting aside of it temporarily necessary, but the point would be at least arguable. In this matter such considera- tions do not arise. Hundreds of women have taken the place of men as motor-drivers for the army and the Red Cross at home and abroad, thousands more are employed in driving commercial motors. They have proved, if proof were needed, that this work is well within their compass. The woman who can take a man’s place fully in the harder sort of tasks involved in work on the railways or in agriculture is an exception, and the employment of women for such work is a war-time necessity that may not to any great extent survive when peace comes. But the woman motordriver has come to stay, and a strike of taxi-men could be no more than a vain and selfish protest against her arrival. Adjusting to the Unexpected: Total War ISBN 0-558-43641-2 Women’s Roles. Women played an essential role in the mobilization of the home front. They had never been isolated from the experiences and hardships of war, but they now found new ways to support the war effort. In cities, women went to work in munitions factories and war-related industries that had previously employed only men. Women filled service jobs, from fire fighting to trolley-car conducting— jobs that were essential to the smooth running of industrial society and that had been left vacant by men. On farms, women literally took up the plow after both men and horses had been requisitioned for the war effort. By 1918, 650,000 French women were working in war-related industries and in clerical positions in the army, and they had counterparts throughout Europe. In Germany, two out of every five munitions workers were women. Women became more prominent in the work force as a whole, as the case of Great Britain makes clear: there the number of women workers jumped from 250,000 at the beginning of the war to five million by the war’s end. Women also served in the auxiliary units of the armed services, in the clerical and medical corps, in order to free men for fighting at the front. In eastern European nations, women entered combat as soldiers. Although most women were displaced from their wartime jobs with the return of men after the armistice, they were as important to the war effort as the men fighting at the front. Government Controls. In the first months of the war, the private sector had been left to its own devices, with nearly disastrous results. Shortages, especially of shells, and bottlenecks in production threatened military efforts. Governments were forced to establish controls and to set up state monopolies in order to guarantee the supplies necessary to wage war. In Germany, industrialists Walther Rathenau (1867–1922) and Alfred Hugenberg (1865–1951) worked with the government. By the spring of 1915, they had eliminated the German problem of munitions scarcity. France was in trouble six weeks after the outbreak of the war: it had used up half of its accumulated munitions supplies in the First Battle of the Marne. German occupation of France’s northern industrial basin further crippled munitions production. Through government intervention, France improvised and relocated its war industries. The British government became involved in production, too, by establishing in 1915 the first Ministry of Munitions under the direction of David Lloyd George (1863–1945). Distinct from the Ministry of War, the Ministry of Munitions was to coordinate military needs with the armaments industry. In a war that leaders soon realized would be a long one, food supplies assumed paramount importance. Germany, dependent on food imports to feed its people and isolated from the world market by the Allied blockade, introduced rationing five months after the outbreak of the war. Other continental nations followed suit. Government agents set quotas for agricultural producers. Armies were fed and supplied at the expense of domestic populations. Great Britain, which enjoyed a more reliable food supply by virtue of its sea power, did not impose food rationing until 1917. ■ 789 Women played a key role in the munitions industry during the war. In this ca. 1914 photograph of a British munitions factory, workers handle artillery shells. Three factors put food supplies at risk. First, the need for large numbers of soldiers at the front pulled farmers and peasants off the land. The resultant drop in the agricultural work force meant that land was taken out of production and what remained was less efficiently cultivated, so that productivity declined. A second factor was fear of requisitioning and the general uncertainties of war that caused agricultural producers to hoard supplies. What little was available was traded on black markets. Finally, because all European countries depended to some extent on imports of food and fertilizers, enemies successfully targeted trade routes for attack. Silencing Dissent The strains of total war were becoming apparent. Two years of sacrificing, scrimping, and, in some areas, starving began to take their toll among soldiers and civilians on both sides. With the lack of decisive victories, war weariness was spreading. Work stoppages and strikes, which had virtually ceased with the outbreak of war in 1914, began to climb rapidly in 1916. Between 1915 and 1916 in France, the number of strikes by dissatisfied workers increased by 400 percent. Underpaid and tired workers went on strike, staged demonstrations, and protested exploitation. Labor militancy also intensified in the British Isles and Germany. Women, breadwinners for their families, were often in the forefront of the protests throughout Europe. Social peace between unions and governments was no longer held together by patriotic enthusiasm for war. Politicians, too, began to rethink their suspension of opposition to government policies as the war dragged on. Civilization in the West, Seventh Edition, by Mark Kishlansky, Patrick Geary, and Patricia O’Brien. Published by Longman. Copyright © 2008 by Pearson Education, Inc. 790 Chapter 26 War and Revolution, 1914–1920 Dissidents among European socialist parties regained their prewar commitment to peace. Most socialists had enthusiastically supported the declarations of war in 1914. By 1916, the united front that political opponents had presented against the enemy was crumbling under growing demands for peace. In a total war, unrest at home guaranteed defeat. Governments knew that all opposition to war policies had to be eliminated. In a dramatic extension of the police powers of the state, whether among the Allies or the Central Powers, criticism of the government became treason. Censorship was enforced and propaganda became more virulent. Those who spoke for peace were no better than the enemy. The governments of every warring nation resorted to harsh measures. Parliamentary bodies were stripped of power, civil liberties were suspended, democratic procedures were ignored. The civilian governments of Premier Georges Clemenceau (1841–1929) in France and Prime Minister Lloyd George in Great Britain resorted to rule by emergency police power to repress criticism. Under Generals von Hindenburg and Ludendorff in Germany, military rule became the order of the day. Nowhere was “government as usual” possible in total war. Every warring nation sought to promote dissension from within the societies of its enemies. Germany provided some aid for the Easter Rebellion in Ireland in 1916 in the hope that the Irish demand for independence that predated the war would deflect British attention and undermine fighting strength and morale. Germany also supported separatist movements among minority nationalities in the Russian Empire and was responsible for returning the avowed revolutionary V. I. Lenin under escort to Russia in April 1917. The British engaged in similar tactics. The British foreign secretary Arthur Balfour (1848–1930) worked with Zionist leaders in 1917 in drawing up the Balfour Declaration, which promised to “look with favor” on the creation of a Jewish homeland in Palestine. The British thereby encouraged Zionist hopes among central European Jews, with the intent of creating difficulties for German and Austrian rulers. Similarly, the British encouraged Arabs to rebel against Turks with the same promise of Palestine. Undermining the loyalties of colonized peoples and minorities would be at minimum a nuisance to the enemy. Beyond that, it could erode war efforts from within. THE RUSSIAN REVOLUTION AND ALLIED VICTORY Revolution in Russia In order to understand Russia’s withdrawal from the war, it is important to understand that Russia’s ruler, Tsar Nicholas II (1894–1917), presided over an empire in the process of modernization with widening social divisions in 1914. Nicholas believed that a short, successful war would strengthen his monarchy against the domestic forces of change. Little did Nicholas know, when he committed Russia to the path of war instead of revolution, that he had guaranteed a future of war and revolution. He was delivering his nation up to humiliating defeat in global war and a devastating civil war. His own days were numbered, with his fate to be determined at the hands of a Marxist dictatorship. The Last Tsar. In 1914, Russia was considered backward by the standards of Western industrial society. Russia still recalled a recent feudal past. The serfs had been freed in the 1860s, but the nature of the emancipation exacerbated tensions in the countryside and peasant hunger for land. Russia’s limited, rapid industrialization in the 1880s and 1890s was an attempt to catch up with Great Britain, France, and Germany as a world industrial power. But the speed of such change brought with it severe dislocation and worker protests, especially in the industrial city of Moscow and the capital, St. Petersburg. Unrest among factory workers revived on the eve of the Great War, a period of rapid economic growth and renewed trade union activity. Between January and July 1914, Russia experienced 3500 strikes. The tsar certainly weighed the workers’ actions in his decision to view war as a possible diversion from domestic problems. Russia was least prepared for war of the belligerents. Undoubtedly it had more soldiers than other countries, but it lacked arms and equipment. Problems of provisioning such a huge fighting force placed great strains on the domestic economy and on the work force. Under government coercion to Civilization in the West, Seventh Edition, by Mark Kishlansky, Patrick Geary, and Patricia O’Brien. Published by Longman. Copyright © 2008 by Pearson Education, Inc. ISBN 0-558-43641-2 For the Allies, 1917 began with a series of crises. Under the hammering of one costly offensive after another, French morale had collapsed and military discipline was deteriorating. A combined German-Austrian force had eliminated the Allied states of Serbia and Romania. The Italians experienced a military debacle at Caporetto and were effectively out of the war. The peril at sea had increased with the opening of unrestricted U-boat warfare against Allied and neutral ships. Two events proved decisive in 1917 in determining the course of the war: the collapse of the Russian army and the entry of the United States into the war. Russia, in the throes of domestic revolution, ceased to be an effective opponent, and Germany was able to concentrate more of its resources in the west, fight a one-front war, and utilize the foodstuffs and raw materials of its newly acquired Russian territories to buoy its home front. The war had gone from a stalemate to a state of crisis for both sides. Every belligerent state was experiencing war weariness that undermined civilian and military morale. Both Austria-Hungary and the Ottoman Empire teetered on the verge of collapse, with internal difficulties increasing as the war dragged on. Germany suffered from labor and supply shortages and economic hardship resulting from the blockade and an economy totally dedicated to waging war. It was at this point of crisis and defeatism that the entry of the United States into the war on the side of the Allies proved decisive. The Russian Revolution and Allied Victory GREAT BRITAIN North 791 ARCTIC OCEAN NORWAY SWEDEN Sea a Se Reval ti c Kronstadt B al Riga Narva Petrograd GERMANY Sea of Okhotsk Nikolaeysko Vologda Minsk AUSTRIAHUNGARY Moscow Gomel Perm Orel Kiev SE RB I A ROMANIA Voronezh Odessa R Kazan Poltava BULG. U Saratov Yalta Blac kS ea Rostov Stavropol Omsk Tiflis 0 ■ Chita Vladivostok CHINA PERSIA KOREA (Japan) Areas of peasant unrest, 1905 Areas of peasant resistance, 1917 Military mutinies, 1905 Centers of Bolshevik political activity, 1917 AFGHAN. Revolution and Civil War in Russia, 1914–1920. Revolutionary and civil unrest was greatest in those areas of Russia with the greatest concentrations of peasants. Kulaks, the more prosperous peasants, were severely repressed for resisting the requisitioning of food after 1918. meet the needs of war, industrial output doubled between 1914 and 1917, while agricultural production plummeted. The tsar, who unwisely insisted on commanding his own troops, left the government in the hands of his wife, the Tsarina Alexandra, a German princess by birth, and her eccentric peasant adviser, Rasputin. Scandal, sexual innuendo, and charges of treason surrounded the royal court. The incompetence of a series of unpopular ministers further eroded confidence in the regime. (See “A Closer Look: The Women Who Started the Russian Revolution,” pp. 794–795.) In the end, the war sharpened long-standing divisions within Russian society. Led by exhausted and starving working women, poorly paid and underfed workers toppled the regime in the bitter winter of March 1917. The event was the beginning of a violent process of revolution and civil war. The tsar abdicated, and all public symbols of the tsardom were destroyed. The banner bearing the Romanov two-headed eagle was torn down, and in its place the red flag of revolution flew over the Winter Palace. ISBN 0-558-43641-2 Novosibirsk MONGOLIA 1000 Miles 1000 Kilometers A Aral Sea Tashkent 0 I ea Yerevan S TANNU TUVA Treaty of Brest-Litovsk, 1918 ia n S Casp OTTOMAN EMPIRE S Chelyabinsk Samara Dual Power. With the tsar’s abdication, two centers of authority replaced autocracy. One was the Provisional Government, appointed by the Duma and made up of progressive liberals led by Prince Georgi Lvov (1861–1925), prime minister of the new government, who also served as minister of the interior. Aleksandr Kerenski (1881–1970), the only socialist in the Provisional Government, served as minister of justice. The members of the new government hoped to establish constitutional and democratic rule. The other center of authority was the soviets—committees or councils elected by workers and soldiers and supported by radical lawyers, journalists, and intellectuals in favor of socialist selfrule. The Petrograd Soviet was the most prominent among the councils. The duality of power was matched by duality in policies and objectives, which guaranteed a short-lived and unstable regime. Peasants, who made up 80 percent of the Russian population, accepted the revolution and demanded land and peace. Without waiting for government directives, peasants began seizing the land. Peasants tried to alleviate some of their suffering by hoarding what little they had. The food crisis of winter persisted throughout the spring and summer as breadlines lengthened and prices rose. Workers in cities gained better working conditions and higher wages. But wage increases were invariably followed by higher prices that robbed workers of their gains. Real wages declined. In addition to the problems of land and bread, the war itself presented the new government with other insurmountable difficulties. Hundreds of thousands of Russian soldiers at the front deserted the war, having heard news from home of Civilization in the West, Seventh Edition, by Mark Kishlansky, Patrick Geary, and Patricia O’Brien. Published by Longman. Copyright © 2008 by Pearson Education, Inc. 792 Chapter 26 War and Revolution, 1914–1920 peasant land grabs and rumors of a new offensive planned for July. The Provisional Government, concerned with Russia’s territorial integrity and its position in the international system, continued to honor the tsar’s commitments to the Allies by participating in the war. By spring 1917, six to eight million Russian soldiers had been killed, wounded, or captured. The Russian army was incapable of fighting. The Provisional Government tried everything to convince its people to carry on with the war. In the summer of 1917, the Women’s Battalion of Death, composed exclusively of female recruits, was enlisted into the army. Its real purpose, officials admitted, was to “shame the men” into fighting. The allfemale unit, like its male counterparts, experienced high losses: 80 percent of the force suffered casualties. The Provisional Government was caught in an impossible situation: it could not withdraw from the war, but neither could it fight. Continued involvement in the lost cause of the war blocked any consideration of social reforms. While the Provisional Government was trying to deal with the calamities, many members of the intelligentsia—Russia’s educated class, who had been exiled by the tsar for their political beliefs—now rushed back from western Europe to take part in the great revolutionary experiment. Theorists of all stripes put their cases before the people. Those who were in favor of gradual reform debated the relative merits of various government policies with those who favored violent revolution. The months between February 1917 and July 1917 were a period of great intellectual ferment. The Marxists, or Social Democrats, had the greatest impact on the direction of the revolution. The Social Democrats believed that there were objective laws of historical development that could be discovered. Russia’s future could be understood only in terms of the present situation in western Europe. Like Marxists in the West, the Russian Social Democrats split over how best to achieve a socialist state. The more moderate Mensheviks (the term means “minority”) wanted to work through parliamentary institutions and were willing to cooperate with the Provisional Government. A smaller faction—despite its name—calling themselves Bolsheviks (meaning “majority”) dedicated themselves to preparation for revolutionary upheaval. After April 1917, the Bolsheviks refused to work with the Provisional Government and organized themselves to take control of the Petrograd Soviet. Lenin and the Opposition to War. The leader of the Bolsheviks was Vladimir Ilyich Ulyanov (1870–1924), best known by his revolutionary name, Lenin. Forty-seven years old at the time of the revolution, Lenin had spent most of his life in exile or in prison. More a pragmatist than a theoretician, he argued for a disciplined party of professional revolutionaries, a vanguard that would lead the peasants and workers in a socialist revolution against capitalism. In contrast to the Mensheviks, he argued that the time was ripe for a successful revolution and that it could be achieved through the soviets. In his April Theses, Lenin promised the Russian people peace, land, and bread. The war must be ended immediately, he argued, because it represented an imperialist struggle that was benefiting capitalists. Russia’s duty was to withdraw and wait for a world revolution. His years in exile in the West and news of mutinies and worker protests convinced him that revolution was imminent. His revolutionary policies on land were little more than endorsements of the seizures already taking place all over Russia. Even his promises of bread had little substance. But on the whole, the April Theses constituted a clear critique of the policies of the Provisional Government. Dissatisfaction with the Provisional Government increased as the war dragged hopelessly on and bread lines lengthened. ■ As late as August 1917, the Provisional Government of Aleksandr Kerenski was determined to carry on the war, but the war-weary troops began to quit. In this scene from Galicia, demoralized Russian soldiers throw down their arms and flee after hearing that German cavalry has broken through the lines. ISBN 0-558-43641-2 Civilization in the West, Seventh Edition, by Mark Kishlansky, Patrick Geary, and Patricia O’Brien. Published by Longman. Copyright © 2008 by Pearson Education, Inc. The Russian Revolution and Allied Victory In the midst of the calamities, a massive popular demonstration erupted in July 1917 against the Provisional Government and in favor of the soviets, which excluded the upper classes from voting. The Provisional Government responded with repressive force reminiscent of the tsardom. The July Days were proof of the growing influence of the Bolsheviks among the Russian people. Although the Bolshevik leadership had withdrawn support for the demonstrations at the last moment, Bolshevik rank-and-file party members strongly endorsed the protest. Indisputably, Bolshevik influence was growing in the soviets despite repression and the persecution of its leaders. Lenin himself was forced to flee to Finland. As a result of the July Days, Kerenski, who had been heading the Ministry of Justice, was named prime minister and continued the Provisional Government’s moderate policies. In order to protect the government from a coup on the right, Kerenski permitted the arming of the Red Guards, the workers’ militia units of the Petrograd Soviet. The traditional chasm between the upper and lower classes was widening as the policies of the Provisional Government conflicted with the demands of the soviets. ISBN 0-558-43641-2 The October Revolution. The second revolution came in November (October according to the Russian calendar). It was not a spontaneous street demonstration by thousands of working women that triggered the second revolution, but rather the seizure of the Russian capital by the Red Guards of the Petrograd Soviet. The revolution was carefully planned and orchestrated by Lenin and his vanguard of Bolsheviks, who now possessed majorities in the soviets in Moscow and Petrograd and in other industrial centers. Returning surreptitiously from Finland, Lenin moved through the streets of Petrograd disguised in a curly wig and head bandages, watching the Red Guards seize centers of communication and public buildings. The military action was directed by Lev Bronstein, better known by his revolutionary name, Leon Trotsky (1879–1940). The Bolshevik chairman of the Petrograd Soviet, Trotsky used the Red Guards to seize political control and arrest the members of the Provisional Government. Kerenski escaped and fled the city. The takeover was achieved with almost no bloodshed and was immediately endorsed by the All-Russian Congress of Soviets, which consisted of representatives of local soviets from throughout the nation who were in session amid the takeover of the capital. A Bolshevik regime under Lenin now ruled Russia. Tsar Nicholas II and the royal family were executed by the Bolshevik revolutionaries in July 1918. The Treaty of Brest-Litovsk. Lenin immediately set to work to end the Great War for Russia. After months of negotiation, Russia signed a separate peace with the Germans in March 1918 in the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk. By every measure, the treaty was a bitter humiliation for the new Soviet regime. The territorial losses sustained were phenomenal. In a vast amputation, Russia was reduced to the size of its Muscovite 793 CHRONOLOGY The Russian Revolution January–July 1914 Protests and strikes 30 July 1914 Russia enters World War I March 1917 First Russian Revolution; Abdication of Tsar Nicholas II; Creation of Provisional Government April 1917 Bolsheviks take control of Petrograd July 1917 Massive demonstration against Provisional Government; Lenin is forced to flee Russia November 1917 Bolsheviks and Red Guards seize political control in what comes to be known as the October Revolution March 1918 July 1918 Russia withdraws from World War I and signs Treaty of Brest-Litovsk Tsar Nicholas II and family are executed period: it recognized the independence of the Ukraine, Georgia, and Finland; it relinquished its Polish territories, the Baltic States, and part of Byelorussia to Germany and AustriaHungary; it handed over other territories on the Black Sea to Turkey. Lenin believed that he had no choice: he needed to buy time in order to consolidate the revolution at home, and he hoped for a socialist revolution in Germany that would soften the results of the treaty. The Treaty of Brest-Litovsk was judged a betrayal, not only outside Russia among the Allied powers, but also inside Russia among some army officers who had sacrificed much for the tsar’s war. To those military men, the Bolsheviks were no more than German agents who held the country in their sway. To deal with the anarchy caused by the fratricidal struggle, Lenin had to strengthen the government’s dictatorial elements at the expense of its democratic ones. The new Soviet state used state police to suppress all opposition. The dictatorship of the proletariat yielded to the dictatorship of the repressive forces. In the course of the civil war, Lenin was no more successful than Kerenski and the Provisional Government had been in solving the problems of food supplies. Human costs of the civil war were high, with more than 800,000 soldiers dead on both sides and two million civilian deaths from dysentery and diseases caused by poor nutrition. Industrial production ceased, and people fled towns to return to the countryside. Civilization in the West, Seventh Edition, by Mark Kishlansky, Patrick Geary, and Patricia O’Brien. Published by Longman. Copyright © 2008 by Pearson Education, Inc. THE WOMEN WHO STARTED THE RUSSIAN REVOLUTION A CLOSER LOOK since the war had begun, prices had increased 400 percent and transport lines for food and coal had broken down. Bread was the main staple of meager diets. Supplies of flour and grain were not reaching towns and cities. People were starving and freezing to death. Young children were now working 111/2 hour days in the factories. The situation was dire, and working women knew that something must be done if their families were to survive. The working women of Petrograd correctly understood that the intolerable state of affairs had come about because the government was unable to control distribution and to ration limited supplies. Carrying a double burden of supporting those at home unable to work and of producing in the factory the armaments essential for the war effort, women workers began demanding that labor organizations take action to alleviate the situation. In the winter of 1916–1917, labor leaders advised exhausted and starving workers to be cautious and patient: workers must wait to strike until the time was ripe. Women workers did not agree. On 8 March 1917 (23 February by the Russian calendar), more than 7000 women went on strike in acknowledgment of International Women’s Day, an event initiated in the United States in 1909 to recognize the rights of working women. The striking women were angry, frustrated, hungry, and tired of watching their families starve while their husbands, brothers, and sons were away at the battlefront. One week earlier, the city had been placed on severe rationing because Petrograd was down to its last few days’ supply of flour. Although the principal concern of the striking women was bread, their protest was more than just a food riot. Women left their posts in the textile mills to demand an end to the war and an end to the reign of Tsar Nicholas II. They were responding not to revolutionary propaganda but to the politics of hunger. Singing songs of protest, they marched through the streets to take their cause to the better-paid and more radical male metalworkers. Women appealed to working men to join the strike. By the end of the day, 100,000 workers had left their jobs to join demonstrations against the government. The women did not stop there. They took justice into their own hands and looted bakeries and grocery shops in search of food. In the street demonstrations of the next several days, women and men marched by the thousands, attracting growing support from workers throughout the city and the suburbs. Forty demonstrators were killed when government troops fired into a crowd. Still the women were not deterred. Bolshevik leader Leon Trotsky recalled women’s bravery in going up to detachments of soldiers: “More boldly than men, they take hold of the rifles and beseech, almost command: ‘Put down your bayonets—join us!”’ Stories abound of how poor working women persuaded officers and soldiers of the Cossacks—the tsar’s privileged fighting force—to lay down 794 Civilization in the West, Seventh Edition, by Mark Kishlansky, Patrick Geary, and Patricia O’Brien. Published by Longman. Copyright © 2008 by Pearson Education, Inc. ISBN 0-558-43641-2 Women in Russia, like their counterparts throughout Europe in 1914, took over new jobs in the workplace as men marched off to war. Four of every ten Russian workers were women, up from three of ten on the eve of the war. The situation was more dramatic in Petrograd, Russia’s capital and principal industrial center, where by 1917 women constituted 55 percent of the labor force. Russian working women faced greater hardships than their sisters in the West. Most women workers in Petrograd held unskilled, poorly paid jobs in the textile industries and worked grueling 12- and 13-hour days. They left work only to stand for hours in long bread lines and then returned home to care for their elderly relatives and often sick children. Infant mortality was alarmingly high, with as many as half of all children dying before the age of three. Factory owners reported that nothing could be done. “The worker mother drudges and knows only need, only worry and grief,” one commentator observed. “Her life passes in gloom, without light.” Russia was suffering badly in the war, with more than two million soldiers killed by the beginning of 1917. News of disasters at the front reached mothers, wives, and sisters at home in spite of the government’s efforts to hide the defeats. In the less than three years ISBN 0-558-43641-2 ■ Women workers on strike march through Petrograd, Russia, in 1917. their arms. It was rumored that soldiers abandoned the tsar because they would not fire on the crowds of women. A participant in one confrontation reported that women workers stood without flinching as a detachment of Cossacks bore down upon them. Someone in the crowd shouted out that the women were the wives and sisters of soldiers at the front. The Cossacks lowered their rifles and turned their horses around. Troops like those, tired of the war, mutinied all over Petrograd. Within four days of the first action taken by women textile operatives, the government had lost the support of Petrograd workers, women and men, and its soldiers, who had joined the demonstrators. The tsar was forced to abdicate. From that point on, the Romanov monarchy and the Russian war effort were doomed. In those first days of protest, the women of Petrograd took action into their own hands, pouring into the streets to call for bread, peace, and the end of tsardom. They rejected autocracy and war in defense of their communities and their families. The Russian Revolution had begun. 795 Civilization in the West, Seventh Edition, by Mark Kishlansky, Patrick Geary, and Patricia O’Brien. Published by Longman. Copyright © 2008 by Pearson Education, Inc. 796 Chapter 26 War and Revolution, 1914–1920 The United States Enters the Great War The Allies longed for the entry of the United States into the war. Although the United States was a neutral country, from the beginning of the war it had been an important supplier to the Allies. U.S. trade with the Allies had jumped from $825 million in 1914 to $3.2 billion in 1916. American bankers also made loans and extended credit to the Allies to the amount of $2.2 billion. The United States had made a sizable investment in the Allied war effort, and its economy was prospering. Beginning with the sinking of the Lusitania in 1915, German policy on the high seas had incensed the American public. Increased U-boat activity in 1916 led U.S. President Woodrow Wilson (1856–1924) to issue a severe warning to the Germans to cease submarine warfare. The Germans, however, were driven to desperate measures. The great advantage of submarines was in sneak attacks—a procedure against international rules, which required warning. Germany initiated a new phase of unrestricted submarine warfare on 1 February 1917, when the German ambassador informed the U.S. government that U-boats would sink on sight all ships, including passenger ships—even those neutral and unarmed. German Defeat. Known as the Ludendorff offensive, after the general who devised it, the final German push began in March 1918, almost a year after U.S. entry into the war. CHRONOLOGY Fighting the Great War 1905 Development of the Schlieffen Plan 28 June 1914 Assassination of Archduke Franz Ferdinand and his wife, Sophie 28 July 1914 Austria-Hungary declares war on Serbia 30 July– 4 August 1914 August 1914 6–10 September 1914 1915 April 1915–January 1916 May 1915 February–December 1916 Russia, France, Britain, and Germany declare war in accordance with system of alliances Germany invades Belgium First Battle of the Marne Germany introduces chlorine gas Gallipoli Campaign Sinking of the Lusitania Battle at Verdun 1917 First use of mustard gas 2 April 1917 United States enters war March 1918 Russia withdraws; Ludendorff offensive 11 November 1918 Armistice Civilization in the West, Seventh Edition, by Mark Kishlansky, Patrick Geary, and Patricia O’Brien. Published by Longman. Copyright © 2008 by Pearson Education, Inc. ISBN 0-558-43641-2 The United States Declares War. German machinations in Mexico were also revealed on 25 February 1917, with the interception of a telegram from Arthur Zimmermann (1864–1940), the German foreign minister. The telegram, known as the “Zimmerman Note,” communicated Germany’s willingness to support Mexico’s recovery of “lost territory” in New Mexico, Arizona, and Texas in return for Mexican support of Germany in the event of U.S. entry into the war. U.S. citizens were outraged. On 2 April 1917, Wilson, who had won the presidential election of 1916 on the promise of peace, asked the U.S. Congress for a declaration of war against Germany. The entry of the United States was the turning point in the war, tipping the scales dramatically in favor of the Allies. The United States contributed its naval power to the large Allied convoys formed to protect shipping against German attacks. In a total war, control and shipment of resources had become crucial issues, and it was in those areas that the U.S. entry gave the Allies indisputable superiority. The United States was also able to send “over there” tens of thousands of conscripts fighting with the American Expeditionary Forces under the leadership of General John “Black Jack” Pershing (1860–1948). They reinforced British and French troops and gave a vital boost to morale. However, for such a rich nation, the help that the United States was able to give at first was very little. The U.S. government was new to the business of coordinating a war effort, but it displayed great ingenuity in creating a wartime bureaucracy that increased a small military establishment of 210,000 soldiers to 9.5 million young men registered before the beginning of summer 1917. By July 1918, the Americans were sending a phenomenal 300,000 soldiers a month to Europe. By the end of the war, 2 million Americans had traveled to Europe to fight in the war. The U.S. entry is significant not just because it provided reinforcements, fresh troops, and fresh supplies to the beleaguered Allies. From a broader perspective, it marked a shift in the nature of international politics: Europe was no longer able to handle its own affairs and settle its own differences without outside help. U.S. troops, though numerous, were not well trained, and they relied on France and Great Britain for their arms and equipment. But the Germans correctly understood that they could not hold out indefinitely against the superior Allied force. Austria-Hungary was effectively out of the war. Germany had no replacements for its fallen soldiers, but it was able to transfer troops from Russia, Romania, and Macedonia to the west. It realized that its only chance of victory lay in swift action. The German high command decided on a bold measure: one great, final offensive that would knock the combined forces of Great Britain, France, and the United States out of the war once and for all by striking at a weak point and smashing through enemy lines. The great surprise was that it almost worked. Settling the Peace ISBN 0-558-43641-2 ■ 797 British soldiers, blinded by gas in Germany’s final offensive in the spring of 1918, lead each other toward a medical aid station. Secretly amassing tired troops from the eastern front pulled back after the Russian withdrawal, the Germans counted on the element of surprise to enable them to break through a weak sector in the west. On the first day of spring, Ludendorff struck. The larger German force gained initial success against weakened British and French forces. Yet in spite of breaches in its defense, the Allied line held. Allied Supreme Commander General Ferdinand Foch (1851–1929) coordinated the war effort that withstood German offensives throughout the spring and early summer of 1918. The final drive began in mid-July. More than one million German soldiers had already been killed, wounded, or captured in the months between March and July. German prisoners of war gave the French details of Ludendorff ’s plan. The Germans, now exposed and vulnerable, were placed on the defensive. On the other side, tanks, plentiful munitions, and U.S. reinforcements fueled an Allied offensive that advanced steadily throughout the summer of 1918. The German army retreated, destroying property and equipment as it went. With weak political leadership and indecision in Berlin, the Germans held on until early November, when their efforts collapsed. On 11 November 1918, an armistice signed by representatives of the German and Allied forces took effect. Thus came to an end a war of slightly more than four years in duration that had consumed the soldiers, material, and productive resources of the European nations on both sides. Nothing matched the destructiveness of the Great War. Of the 70 million who were mobilized, about one in eight were killed. Battlefields of scorched earth and mud-filled ditches, silent at last, scarred once-fertile countrysides as grim memorials to history’s first total war. Home fronts, too, served as battlefields, with those who demanded peace silenced as traitors. The war to end all wars was over; the task of settling the peace now loomed. SETTLING THE PEACE In the aftermath of war, the task of the victors was to define the terms of a settlement that would guarantee peace and stabilize Europe. Russia was the ghost at the conference table, excluded from the negotiations because of its withdrawal from the Allied Civilization in the West, Seventh Edition, by Mark Kishlansky, Patrick Geary, and Patricia O’Brien. Published by Longman. Copyright © 2008 by Pearson Education, Inc. 798 Chapter 26 War and Revolution, 1914–1920 ■ camp in 1917 and its separate peace with Germany in March 1918. The Bolsheviks were dealing with problems of their own following the revolution, including a great civil war that lasted through 1920. Much of what happened in the peace settlements reflected the unspoken concern with the challenge of revolution that the new Soviet Russia represented. A variety of goals marked the peace talks: the idealistic desire to create a better world, the patriotic pursuit of self-defense, a commitment to the self-determination of nations, and the desire to fix blame for the outbreak of the war. In the end, the peace treaties satisfied none of those goals. Meanwhile, Russia’s new leaders carefully watched events in the West, looking for opportunities that might permit them to extend their revolution to central Europe. From January to June 1919, an assembly of nations convened in Paris to draw up the new European peace. Although the primary task of settling the peace fell to the Council of Four—Premier Georges Clemenceau of France, Prime Minister David Lloyd George of Great Britain, Prime Minister Vittorio Emanuele Orlando of Italy, and President Woodrow Wilson of the United States—small states, newly formed states, and non-European states, Japan in particular, joined in the task of forging the peace. The states of Germany, AustriaHungary, and Soviet Russia were excluded from the negotiating tables where the future of Europe was to be determined. President Wilson, who captured international attention with his liberal views on the peace, was the central figure of the conference. He was firmly committed to the task of shaping a better world: before the end of the war he had proclaimed the Fourteen Points as a guideline to the future peace and as an appeal to the people of Europe to support his policies. Believing that secret diplomacy and the alliance system were responsible for the events leading up to the declaration of war in 1914, he put forward as a basic principle “open covenants of peace, openly arrived at.” Other points included the reduction of armaments, freedom of commerce and trade, self-determination of peoples, and a general association of nations to guarantee the peace that became the League of Nations. The Fourteen Points were, above all, an idealistic statement of the principles for a good and lasting peace. Point 14, which stipulated “mutual guarantees of independence and territorial integrity” through the establishment of the League of Nations, was endorsed by the peace conference. The League, which the United States refused to join despite Wilson’s advocacy, was intended to arbitrate all future disputes among states and to keep the peace. Georges Clemenceau of France represented a different approach to the challenge of the peace, one motivated primarily by a concern for his nation’s security. France had suffered the greatest losses of the war in both human lives and property destroyed. In order to prevent a resurgent Germany, Clemenceau supported a variety of measures to cripple it as a military force on the Continent. Germany was disarmed. The territory west of the Rhine River was demilitarized, with occupation by Allied troops to last for a period of 15 years. With Russia unavailable as a partner to contain Germany, France supported the creation of a series of states in eastern Europe carved out of former Russian, Austrian, and German territory. Civilization in the West, Seventh Edition, by Mark Kishlansky, Patrick Geary, and Patricia O’Brien. Published by Longman. Copyright © 2008 by Pearson Education, Inc. ISBN 0-558-43641-2 Wilson’s Fourteen Points The representatives of the victorious Allies at Versailles: (left to right) David Lloyd George of Great Britain, Vittorio Orlando of Italy, Georges Clemenceau of France, and Woodrow Wilson of the United States. Settling the Peace Wilson supported the new states out of a concern for the selfdetermination of peoples. Clemenceau’s main concern was self-defense. Much time and energy were devoted to redrawing the map of Europe. New states were created out of the lands of three failed empires. To allow self-determination, Finland, Latvia, Estonia, Lithuania, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Austria, Hungary, and Yugoslavia were all granted status as nation-states. However, the rights of ethnic and cultural minorities were violated in some cases because of the impossibility of redrawing the map of Europe strictly according to the principle of self-determination. In spite of good intentions, every new nation had its own national minority, a situation that held the promise of future trouble. ISBN 0-558-43641-2 Treaties and Territories 799 FINLAND NORWAY SWEDEN ESTONIA North Sea LATVIA DENMARK Gdansk (Free City) GREAT BRITAIN LITHUANIA EAST PRUSSIA (GER.) NETH. POLAND GERMANY BELG. CZ LUX. SAAR FRANCE RUSSIA SWITZ. EC HO AUSTRIA SL O V A KIA HUNGARY ROMANIA ITALY YUGOSLAVIA BULGARIA Corsica (Fr.) ALBANIA Sardinia (It.) GREECE TURKEY Mediterranean Sea The peace conference produced Sicily separate treaties with each of the defeated nations: Austria, Dodecanese Is. (It.) New and reconstituted Hungary, Turkey, Bulgaria, and Crete nations Germany. The Austria settlement 500 Miles 0 acknowledged the fundamental Demilitarized and Allied disintegration of the Austrian occupation zones 500 Kilometers 0 Empire, recognizing an independent Czechoslovakian republic and preparing the way for a fus- ■ Europe After World War I. The need for security on the continent led France to support a buffer zone of ing of Croatia, Dalmatia, Bosnia new nations between Russia and Germany, carved out of the former Austrian Empire. German terriand Herzegovina with the tory along the French border was demilitarized out of the same concern for protection. Kingdom of Serbia, into the nation of Yugoslavia. Hungary and the Jewish people (see p. 790). This declaration, however, was Poland also emerged as independent nations thanks to terriconsidered as a violation of promises made to the Arabs durtorial losses by Germany and Austria-Hungary. Bulgaria lost ing the war that they would be given control of Palestine in reterritory on the Aegean Sea to Greece, and Yugoslavia asturn for supporting the Allied war effort. Although Arab sumed control of Bulgarian holdings in Macedonia. Romania rulers were given control of British mandates, and Prince gained Hungarian and Bulgarian territory. Faisal assumed the title of king of Iraq, Arab resentment fesIn the Middle East, a separate treaty acknowledged Great tered as increased numbers of European Jews moved into Britain’s mandate in Palestine, Mesopotamia, and Palestine and Arab hopes for the creation of an Arab kingdom Transjordan; and France’s mandate in Syria. Hejaz emerged as were dashed. an independent state. Many aspects of the post-war settleAmid these other treaty negotiations, the treaty signed ment affecting Turkey and the Middle East were renegotiated with Germany on 28 June 1919, known as the Treaty of in the early 1920s, but British and French gains were preVersailles, dealt exclusively with defeated Germany. served, and Hejaz remained as an independent state. The principle of punitive reparations was included in the In November 1917 the British issued the Balfour German settlement. Germany learned it had to make a down Declaration, to affirm their support for a national home for Civilization in the West, Seventh Edition, by Mark Kishlansky, Patrick Geary, and Patricia O’Brien. Published by Longman. Copyright © 2008 by Pearson Education, Inc. 800 Chapter 26 War and Revolution, 1914–1920 THE TREATY OF VERSAILLES Of the various treaties negotiating the peace at the end of World War I, the Treaty of Versailles, signed in 1919, was the most important. This treaty dealt with Germany as a defeated nation and was signed in the great Versailles palace outside of Paris in the same location where in 1871 Germany as victor signed a treaty with its defeated enemy, France, at the close of the short Franco-Prussian War (see pp. 694). In the 1919 treaty, the Allies, represented by President Woodrow Wilson of the United States, Prime Minister David Lloyd George of Great Britain, Prime Minister Georges Clemenceau of France, and Prime Minister Vittorio Orlando of Italy, imposed sole blame for the war on Germany and its expansionist aims. According to the treaty, the war was Germany’s fault, and Germany must pay reparations for all the destruction of Allied property by its military. Germany lost territories and suffered a greatly reduced military capability. Especially burdensome was article 231 of the treaty, which came to be known as the War Guilt Clause, which spelled out Germany’s responsibility and the basis for the need to make restitution. Focus Questions In article 42, for whose benefit were the left and right banks of the Rhine demilitarized? How many different forms of reparation can you identify in the articles cited here? For whose benefit was the German navy scaled back? Examine carefully article 231—the War Guilt Clause. What is your judgment of its validity in light of what you know about the causes of the war? Part IV. German Rights and Interests Outside Germany Article 119. Germany renounces in favor of the Principal Allied and Associated Powers all her rights and titles over her overseas possessions. (This renunciation includes Germany’s concessions in China.) . . . Part V. Military, Naval, and Air Claims Article 159. The German military forces shall be demobilized and reduced as prescribed hereinafter. Article 160. (1) By a date which must not be later than March 31, 1920, the German Army must not comprise more than seven divisions of infantry and three divisions of cavalry. After that date the total number of effectives in the Army of the States constituting Germany must not exceed one hundred thousand men, including officers and establishments of depots. The Army shall be devoted exclusively to the maintenance of order within the territory and to the control of the frontiers. The total effective strength of officers, including the personnel of staffs, whatever their composition, must not exceed four thousand. . . . (3) The German General Staff and all similar organizations shall be dissolved and may not be reconstituted in any form. . . . Article 180. All fortified works, fortresses, and field works situated in German territory to the west of a line drawn fifty kilometers to the east of the Rhine shall be disarmed and dismantled. . . . 1 The recovery of Alsace and Lorraine had been a major goal of the French ever since the two provinces had been lost after the FrancoPrussian War (1870–1871). 2 The establishment of an independent Poland separated the German province of East Prussia from the rest of the nation. Civilization in the West, Seventh Edition, by Mark Kishlansky, Patrick Geary, and Patricia O’Brien. Published by Longman. Copyright © 2008 by Pearson Education, Inc. ISBN 0-558-43641-2 Part III. Political Clauses for Europe Article 42. Germany is forbidden to maintain or construct any fortifications either on the left bank of the Rhine or on the right bank to the west of a line drawn 50 kilometers to the east of the Rhine. . . . Article 45. As compensation for the destruction of the coal-mines in the north of France and as part payment towards the total reparation due from Germany for the damage resulting from the war, Germany cedes to France in full and absolute possession, with exclusive rights of exploitation, unencumbered and free from all debts and charges of any kind, the coal-mines situated in the Saar Basin. . . . The High Contracting Parties, recognizing the moral obligation to redress the wrong done by Germany in 1871 both to the rights of France and to the wishes of the population of Alsace and Lorraine, which were separated from their country in spite of the solemn protest of their representatives at the Assembly of Bordeaux.1 Agree upon the following Articles: Article 51. The territories which were ceded to Germany in accordance with the Preliminaries of Peace signed at Versailles on February 26, 1871, and the Treaty of Frankfurt of May 10, 1871, are restored to French sovereignty as from the date of the Armistice of November 11, 1918. The provisions of the Treaties establishing the delimitation of the frontiers before 1871 shall be restored. . . . Article 87. Germany, in conformity with the action already taken by the Allied and Associated Powers, recognizes the complete independence of Poland. . . . Article 89. Poland undertakes to accord freedom of transit to persons, goods, vessels, carriages, wagons, and mails in transit between East Prussia and the rest of Germany over Polish territory, including territorial waters, and to treat them at least as favorably as the persons, goods, vessels, carriages, wagons, and mails respectively of Polish or of any other more favored nationality, origin, importation, starting-point, or ownership as regards facilities, restrictions and all other matters.2 . . . Conclusion Article 181. After the expiration of a period of two months from the coming into force of the present Treaty the German naval forces in commission must not exceed: 6 battleships of the Deutschland or Lothringen type, 6 light cruisers, 12 destroyers, 12 torpedo boats, or an equal number of ships constructed to replace them as provided in Article 190. No submarines are to be included. All other warships, except where there is provision to the contrary in the present Treaty, must be placed in reserve or devoted to commercial purposes. . . . Article 198. The armed forces of Germany must not include any military or naval air forces. . . . ISBN 0-558-43641-2 Part VIII. Reparation Article 231. The Allied and Associated Governments affirm and Germany accepts the responsibility of Germany and her allies for causing all the loss and damage to which the Allied and Associated Governments and their nationals have been subjected as a consequence of the war imposed upon them by the aggression of Germany and her allies. Article 232. The Allied and Associated Governments recognize that the resources of Germany are not adequate, after taking into account permanent diminutions of such payment of $5 billion against a future bill of $32 billion; had to hand over a significant proportion of their merchant ships, including all vessels of more than 1600 tons; had to lose all German colonies; and had to deliver coal to neighboring countries. In addition, Germany lost the territory gained from Russia in 1918; returned Alsace and Lorraine to France; ceded territory to Belgium and eventually to Lithuania; and gave up parts of Prussia with large Polish populations. Furthermore, Germany lost control of the Saar, a coal-producing region, to France for fifteen years; and the German Baltic port of Danzig was declared an international “free city.” By stripping Germany of key resources, territory, and population, its ability to pay reparations was also weakened. These harsh clauses dictated by the determination of German war guilt, more than any other aspect of the peace settlement, came to haunt the Allies in the succeeding decades. In the end, no nation obtained what it wanted from the peace settlement. The defeated nations believed that they had been badly abused. The victorious nations were aware of the compromises they had reluctantly accepted. Cooperation among nations was essential if the treaty was to work successfully. It had taken the combined resources, not only of France and the British Empire but also of Russia with its vast population and the United States with its great industrial and financial might, to defeat the power of Germany and the militarily ineffective Austro-Hungarian Empire. A new and stable balance of power 801 resources which will result from other provisions of the present Treaty, to make complete reparation for all such loss and damage. The Allied and Associated Governments, however, require, and Germany undertakes, that she will make compensation for all damage done to the civilian population of the Allied and Associated Powers and to their property during the period of the belligerency of each as an Allied or Associated Power against Germany by such aggression by land, by sea and from the air, and in general all damages as defined in Annex I hereto. . . . Article 233. The amount of the above damage for which compensation is to be made by Germany shall be determined by an Inter-Allied Commission, to be called the Reparation Commission and constituted in the form and with the powers set forth hereunder and in Annexes II to VII inclusive hereto. This Commission shall consider the claims and give to the German Government a just opportunity to be heard. The findings of the Commission as to the amount of damage defined as above shall be concluded and notified to the German Government on or before May 1, 1921, as representing the extent of that Government’s obligations.3 3 The total demand on Germany was placed at $32 billion. depended on the participation of Russia, the United States, and the British Empire. But Russia was excluded from and hostile to the peace settlement, the United States was uncommitted to it, and the British Empire declined to guarantee it. All three Great Powers backed off from their European responsibilities at the end of the war. By 1920, all aspects of the treaty, but especially the reparations clause, had been questioned and criticized by the very governments that had written and accepted them. The search for a lasting peace had just begun. CONCLUSION By every measure, the Great War was disastrously expensive. Some European nations suffered more than others, but all endured significant losses of life, property, and productive capacity. The cost in human lives was enormous. In western Europe, 8.5 million were dead; total casualties amounted to 37.5 million. France lost 20 percent of its men between the ages of 20 and 44, Germany lost 15 percent, and Great Britain 10 percent. The war also resulted in huge losses in productive capacity. National economies buckled under the weight of foreign debts, and governments resorted to a variety of methods to bail themselves out, including taxes, loans, and currency inflation. The people of Europe continued to pay for the war long after the fighting had ended. Civilization in the West, Seventh Edition, by Mark Kishlansky, Patrick Geary, and Patricia O’Brien. Published by Longman. Copyright © 2008 by Pearson Education, Inc. 802 Chapter 26 War and Revolution, 1914–1920 4. How was peace achieved, and what were the terms of that peace? 5. In what ways did the Great War contribute to revolution in Russia? KEY TERMS Allies, p. 778 April Theses, p. 792 Balfour Declaration, p. 792 Bolsheviks, p. 792 Central Powers, p. 778 Fourteen Points, p. 798 Ludendorff offensive, p. 796 Schlieffen Plan, p. 776 soviets, p. 791 total war, p. 788 Treaty of Brest-Litovsk, p. 793 Treaty of Versailles, p. 799 War Guilt Clause, p. 800 Zimmerman Note, p. 796 DISCOVERING WESTERN CIVILIZATION ONLINE You can obtain more information about war and revolution between 1914 and 1920 at the Websites listed below. See also the Companion Website that accompanies this text, www.ablongman.com/kishlansky, which contains an online study guide and additional resources. The War Europe Expected ■ A German cartoon by Lindloff depicts German reaction to the terms of the Treaty of Versailles and to the Allies’ brand of justice. Greed, revenge, and other devils gloat over the settlement. Photos and Posters of the Great War www.geocities.com/SoHo/Gallery/8054 These are sites of posters, photos, and art of World War I. A New Kind of Warfare The big winner in the war was the United States, now a creditor nation owed billions of dollars in loans from the Allies and operating in new markets established during the war. The shift was not a temporary move but a structural change. The United States now took its place as a great power in the international system. The world that had existed before 1914 was gone, and what was to replace it was still very much in flux. To the east, Russia was engaged in the vast experiment of building a new society. In the west, the absence of war was not peace. QUESTIONS FOR REVIEW Adjusting to the Unexpected: Total War World War I: Trenches on the Web www.worldwar1.com/ This site on World War I is sponsored by the History Channel. The Great War (1914–1918) www.pitt.edu/~pugachev/greatwar/ww1.html A comprehensive site containing primary text, summaries, and photos of the major events in World War I. The War Poems & Manuscripts of Wilfred Owen www.hcu.ox.ac.uk/jtap/warpoems.htm This site contains 57 of Wilfred Owens’s war poems. Civilization in the West, Seventh Edition, by Mark Kishlansky, Patrick Geary, and Patricia O’Brien. Published by Longman. Copyright © 2008 by Pearson Education, Inc. ISBN 0-558-43641-2 1. Why did so many in Europe look forward to war by the summer of 1914, and what had they done to bring it about? 2. How and why did the Great War differ so much from the expectations of both the generals and the majority of Europeans? 3. What is total war, and what made World War I the first such war in history? Military History: World War I (1914–1918) wps.cfc.dnd.ca/links/milhist/wwi.html Sponsored by Canadian Forces College, this site provides an extensive set of links about World War I with emphasis on military history. Suggestions for Further Reading The Russian Revolution and Allied Victory Russian Revolution Resources www.historyguide.org/europe/rusrev_links.html This site provides electronic texts in English of Lenin and Trotsky and several other links to sites on the Russian Revolution. Settling the Peace The Versailles Treaty history.acusd.edu/gen/text/versaillestreaty/vercontents.html This site is devoted to the Versailles Treaty, including the text of all articles of the treaty. SUGGESTIONS FOR FURTHER READING The War Europe Expected Keith Robbins, The First World War (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1984). The author explores the major cultural, political, military, and social developments between 1914 and 1918, including the course of the land war and modes of warfare. Jeffrey Verhey, The Spirit of 1914: Militarism, Myth, and Mobilization in Germany (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000). The author captures the fervor and patriotism that surrounded the August experiences and the declaration of war and chronicles the survival of the memory of the “spirit of 1914” in the postwar period. A New Kind of Warfare Roger Chickering, Imperial Germany and the Great War, 1914–1918 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998). The author offers a synthetic treatment of the history of the war and its impact on German society. Frans Coetzee and Marilyn Shevin-Coetzee, eds., Authority, Identity and the Social History of the Great War (Providence: Berghahn Books, 1995). Recognizing that 1914 marks the beginning of the twentieth century, contributors examine the variety of national responses involved in waging total war and stress the interrelatedness of the home fronts and the battlefronts in affecting individual lives and identities. ISBN 0-558-43641-2 Mark Cornwall, The Undermining of Austria-Hungary: The Battle for Hearts and Minds (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 2000). This study presents extensive research on how propaganda was used by and against Austria-Hungary as a weapon of war. Paul Fussell, The Great War and Modern Memory (New York: Oxford University Press, 2000). This twenty-fifth anniversary edition is a cultural history of World War I that treats the patterns and tendencies in war literature within the framework of a literary tradition. 803 James Joll and Gordon Martel, The Origins of the First World War (New York: Longman, 2007). This up-to-date edition of a classic work deals with the complexity of the causes of the war and the ongoing historiographical debate. John Keegan, The First World War (New York: Vintage, 2000). Keegan offers the definitive military history of the war based on diaries, letters, and reports, and in so doing illuminates the origins and progress of the war and the experience of the combatants. Hew Strachan, ed., The Oxford Illustrated History of the First World War (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998). This extensively illustrated volume contains 23 chapters on key themes in the history of the Great War covering military issues, the home front, and the role of propaganda. Adjusting to the Unexpected: Total War Roger Chickering and Stig Förster, eds., Great War, Total War: Combat and Mobilization on the Western Front, 1914–1918 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000). In a collection of specialist essays, the authors consider the nineteenthcentury origins of total industrialized warfare in search of a consensus on what constitutes total war. Belinda J. Davis, Home Fires Burning: Food, Politics, and Everyday Life in World War I Berlin (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2000). This thorough study examines the actions of women, especially poorer women, in Berlin during the war and the impact they had on politics and policy. Patrick Fridenson, ed., The French Home Front, 1914–1918 (Providence: Berg Publishers, 1992). The collection of articles demonstrates that unity on the home front concealed deep divisions, which led to open resistance and a redefined political universe at the end of the war. Susan R. Grayzel, Women and the First World War (New York: Longman, 2002). A cultural history of women’s roles in World War I on the European home fronts and in Asia, Africa, Australia, and New Zealand. Aviel Roshwald and Richard Stites, eds., European Culture in the Great War: The Arts, Entertainment, and Propaganda, 1914–1918 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999). This volume encompasses Europe to include western and eastern Europe and the South Slavic lands and examines the relationship between culture and politics during the war. Jay Winter, Geoffrey Parker, and Mary Habeck, eds., The Great War and the Twentieth Century (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2000). This volume of essays by leading scholars contributes to a comparative history of total war in the twentieth century. The Russian Revolution and Allied Victory Jane Burbank, Intelligentsia and Revolution: Russian Views of Bolshevism, 1917–1922 (New York: Oxford University Press, Civilization in the West, Seventh Edition, by Mark Kishlansky, Patrick Geary, and Patricia O’Brien. Published by Longman. Copyright © 2008 by Pearson Education, Inc. 804 Chapter 26 War and Revolution, 1914–1920 1982). The author examines Russian intellectuals from the beginnings of revolution to the consolidation of Bolshevik power. Sheila Fitzpatrick, The Russian Revolution, 1917–1932 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1982). An analysis of the October Revolution of 1917 from the perspective of Stalinist society. The February and October revolutions of 1917, the civil war, and the economic policies of the 1920s are treated as various aspects of a single revolutionary movement. Jane McDermid and Anna Hillyar, Midwives of the Revolution: Female Bolsheviks and Women Workers in 1917 (Athens, OH: Ohio University Press, 1999). This work provides a good overview of the importance of women’s actions in the Russian Revolution. Settling the Peace Manfred E. Boemeke, Gerald D. Feldman, Elisabeth Glaser, eds., The Treaty of Versailles: A Reassessment After 75 Years (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998). The volume is a synthetic reappraisal of the peace treaty, divergent peace aims, and postwar context in which it was developed. David Stevenson, The First World War and International Politics (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1988). A study of the global ramifications of World War I, this work traces the development of war aims on both sides, the reasons peace negotiations failed, and why compromise proved elusive. For a list of additional titles related to this chapter’s topics, please see http://www.ablongman.com/kishlansky. ISBN 0-558-43641-2 Civilization in the West, Seventh Edition, by Mark Kishlansky, Patrick Geary, and Patricia O’Brien. Published by Longman. Copyright © 2008 by Pearson Education, Inc.