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Historically Speaking
Abraham Lincoln, Commander in Chief, at 200
ebruary 12th marks the 200th birth- By Brig. Gen. John S. Brown most of his generals, he recognized that
this effort required total war. Southern
day of Abraham Lincoln. Our revered
U.S. Army retired
leaders, with considerable justification,
16th President assumed office amid catastrophic civil strife, preserved the Union and died a martyr believed further participation in the Union imperiled a soto this cause. In four years, Lincoln—more so than any sin- cial and economic order they cherished. Their decision to
gle historical figure—defined Americans’ conception of secede was irreversible. Lincoln wisely let them strike the
first obvious blow—at Fort Sumter, S.C., in April 1861—betheir Commander in Chief.
Today we expect our presidents to establish the political fore mobilizing the outraged nation that remained. Meanand moral legitimacy of force when we choose to use it, to while, he had been urgently negotiating within the bordercommunicate a grand strategic vision and to assert them- line slave states of Delaware, Maryland, Missouri and
selves in significant military decisions without displacing Kentucky to keep them in the Union.
When war broke out, Lincoln suspended habeas corpus
the professionals who must work out the details and carry
them out. Military inexperience provides reason to seek and summarily swept 18,000 secessionists within those
wise counsel but does not diminish the Commander in states into captivity, tipping a political balance that kept
Chief’s responsibility to fulfill these functions. Lincoln’s them in the Union. This extraordinary act was later repudisole military experience, in the Black Hawk War of 1832, ated in the court case ex parte Merryman, after the intended
was fleeting and superficial, yet he rose to the tasks re- effect had already been achieved. In a speech before Conquired in far more dangerous circumstances 30 years later.
gress, Lincoln justified his actions, asking, “Are all the
Lincoln called upon his countrymen to fight to preserve laws, but one, to go unexecuted, and the government itself
the Union. All else was subordinate to this single and sin- go to pieces?” Congress subsequently empowered the susgularly defined purpose. Earlier and more thoroughly than pension of habeas corpus, as ex parte Merryman required.
National Archives
Library of Congress
Library of Congress
F
Above left, Currier and Ives immortalized the bombardment of
Fort Sumter in Charleston Harbor that began the Civil War. Left,
President Abraham Lincoln nominated Ulysses S. Grant lieutenant general in the Army of the United States. Above, Lincoln
meets with Allan Pinkerton (left), head of Union Intelligence
Services, and Maj. Gen. John A. McClernand after the Battle of
Antietam in October 1862.
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Library of Congress
A copy of Lincoln’s Emancipation Proclamation combines
his portrait at the top with a border of historical vignettes.
S
lavery was important to Lincoln personally, but subordinate as a war aim. His Emancipation Proclamation of
September 1862 freed slaves in states in rebellion, not in
those that remained loyal. In effect this was economic warfare, encouraging slaves to flee and to cooperate with invading Union armies, undermining the Confederate economy. Lincoln did not shrink from more drastic forms of
economic warfare. The devastation inflicted during Sherman’s March to the Sea through Georgia in 1864 was in accord with Lincoln’s authorization to his generals to target
Confederate infrastructure. As costs and battlefield losses
mounted, Lincoln affirmed the national purpose and
steeled his countrymen for losses yet to come. His iconic
1863 “Gettysburg Address” provides a classic example of
establishing political and moral legitimacy. The stakes were
no less than ensuring that “government of the people, by
the people, for the people, shall not perish from the earth.”
In addition to defining the reason to fight, Lincoln developed and communicated a grand strategic vision. Too many
of his generals sought to strike a decisive blow in a grand
BRIG. GEN. JOHN S. BROWN, USA Ret., was chief of military history at the U.S. Army Center of Military History from
December 1998 to October 2005. He commanded the 2nd Battalion, 66th Armor, in Iraq and Kuwait during the Gulf War
and returned to Kuwait as commander of the 2nd Brigade, 1st
Cavalry Division, in 1995. He has a doctorate in history from
Indiana University.
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Napoleonic battle. Unfortunately for them, Confederate generals such as Robert E. Lee and Thomas J. (Stonewall) Jackson proved considerably more capable in grand Napoleonic
maneuver. Lincoln recognized early on that the Confederacy
was a major power of continental scope, that it was unlikely
to succumb in a single battle, and that the full manpower
and industrial might of the Union would have to be brought
to bear to defeat it. Even prior to the embarrassing July 1861
debacle at Bull Run, Va., when many Northerners banked on
the quick success of 75,000 militiamen called up for three
months, Lincoln sought congressional authorization for
400,000 three-year volunteers. Congress approved 500,000,
and in the days after Bull Run authorized 500,000 more. Lincoln’s determination that the government should “avoid receiving troops faster than it can provide for them” was as
prescient as his appreciation of the manpower required.
Economic and industrial mobilizations were key features of his war plans and his personal efforts. He established a major arsenal at Rock Island, Ill., to bring logistical
wherewithal to the western theater comparable to that provided by Springfield, Mass., in the East. The nation’s first
income tax and elevated tariffs dramatically increased government revenues. The Legal Tender Act of 1862 introduced paper currency and greater liquidity. National
Banking Acts reinforced federal control of the financial system. Railway Acts subsidized a transportation network
upon which the economy depended. The Treasury Department assumed direct control of the cotton trade in the occupied South, profiting from lands lost to the Confederacy.
Having mobilized such massive resources, Lincoln was
determined to attack the Confederacy on a broad front
along multiple axes. His thinking transcended the tactical
battlefield, anticipating what we now call the operational
level of war. It took some time to find military leadership
capable of this grander vision. Interestingly enough, when
he elevated Ulysses S. Grant to be general in chief, he retained George G. Meade in command of the Army of the
Potomac, a narrower task to which this more traditional
professional was well suited. Lincoln proved capable of
sacking and shuffling generals until he assembled a command team capable of the grand strategy he envisioned.
Lincoln was hands-on in military deliberations, keeping
in touch with developments via layers of advisers and the
innovation of the telegraph. He characteristically deferred
to his generals in matters of detail, but nagged some into
compliance and removed others when circumstances or
the spirit moved him. His recurrent interest in military affairs moved George B. McClellan to lament the “browsing
President,” but the talented amateur occasionally picked
up on insights professionals had slighted. A case in point
was Lincoln’s imposition of a corps level of command
upon the Army of the Potomac over McClellan’s objections
that the division was a better capstone. In imposing the
corps, Lincoln reinforced the nascent operational level of
war he envisioned.
In 1863, General Order Number 100—promulgated over
the objection of many professionals after exhaustive legal
National Archives
President Lincoln meets with his generals after the Battle of Antietam.
deliberations—foresaw the holistic nature of modern war.
It provided guidance for military government, occupation
responsibilities, partisan warfare, civil unrest and a host of
other contingencies that traditional military thinking regarded as messy and peripheral. Lincoln also recognized
the contributions black soldiers could make to the Union
cause and overrode the prejudices of the era to support
raising and deploying the United States Colored Troops.
Ultimately these numbered more than 186,000 men, an invaluable augmentation to the Union Army.
Lincoln’s instincts were not flawless in all things military.
For political reasons—patronage—he continued to support
state habits of raising new regiments rather than providing
replacements to existing ones. The result was a recurrent
bloodying of green regiments while seasoned regiments
withered. Provisions for conscription, substitution and
commutation also proved more politically feasible than fair,
popular or effective. On balance, however, Lincoln’s involvement in military deliberations was a decided plus for
the war effort. He galvanized innovative thinking, implemented valuable initiatives, constructed a war machine of
unprecedented potential and provided presidential leadership to winning teams of military and political leaders.
W
e are generations removed from Abraham Lincoln’s
struggle to reunite his country “with malice towards
none, with charity for all, with firmness in the right, as God
gives us to see the right.” His model as Commander in Chief
remains remarkably current, however. The range and scope
of American power has multiplied many times over, but our
military expectations of the President remain much the same.
He must lead us into wars that are just, envision a feasible
path to success and involve himself enough in military deliberations to ensure that they are of the highest caliber.
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Recommended Reading:
Library of Congress
Donald, David Herbert, Why the North Won the Civil
War (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press,
1960)
McPherson, James M., Battle Cry of Freedom: The Civil
War Era (New York: Oxford University Press, 1988)
Abraham Lincoln sat for a formal portrait on
November 8, 1863, about two weeks before
delivering his Gettysburg Address in Pennsylvania.
Perret, Geoffrey, Lincoln’s War: The Untold Story of
America’s Greatest President as Commander in Chief
(New York: Random House, 2004)
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